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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

INTRODUCTION

I. Concept/definition of administrative law

The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual remedies for the violations of his rights.

II. Scope of administrative law

Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the administrative operations of the

government.

III. Classification of administrative law

A. That body of statutes setting up or creating

administrative agencies and endowing them with power and duties;

B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations

and orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions;

C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of

public agents which conflict with private rights;

D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of

administrative bodies made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.

IV. Origin and development of administrative law

V. Advantages of the administrative process

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I. Concept

A. Definition of administrative agency - An

administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any department, independent establishment,

commission, administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."

Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.

Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?

RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof? In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as “government body charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation” examples are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term “agency” includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority or bureau.

B. Test for determining administrative nature

1. Mandatory – statutory requirement intended for the

protection of the citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected;

2. Directory – if no substantial right depend on it and no

injury can result from ignoring it and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially, the same results attained.

C. Administrative function, defined -

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Facts: It’s a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial committee on justice created pursuant to presidential order. That his membership in committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as executive judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon

the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence "we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.

D.

administrative law

Public

office,

defined

in

relation

to

Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194

Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same. Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued .

Issues :

(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.

Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPERA and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises groups of positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions these functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. These offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve.

N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

E.

agencies -

Reasons

for

creation

of

administrative

Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987

Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.

Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.

Reyes vs Caneba

Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988

Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government- owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. x x x (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." (Italics supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.

E. Types of administrative agencies

1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO)

2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA, BoC, BI)

3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public; (Bureau of Posts, PNR, MWS)

4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest; (LTFRB, ERB, HLURB)

5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals; (MTRCB, GAB, DDB)

6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved. (NLRC, ECC, DAR, COA)

F. Relation between administrative

courts

agencies and

Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows them to interpret and apply rules and regulations.

Findings of these administrative agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts.

G. Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 292)

Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538

1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the

Phils. - refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers

to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any

agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

4. Definition of Administration -

US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper “manila freedom” charge with the crime of libel together with Eduard O’Brian.

The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, and each was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.

During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and an exception was also taken to this ruling.

Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands.

Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being.

1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has

been acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the territories which are a part-of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United States.

2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the

treaty of Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.

3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United

States did not extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within

either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of the territory.

4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury, and consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling the defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in overruling their application for a trial by jury

The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled “An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes,” in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly all of the provisions of the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there was excepted from it the provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.

The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants where convicted.

II. Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative

agencies

A. Creation of administrative agencies

Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196

Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 934359. The resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service board.

Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."

B. Abolition of administrative agencies

Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787

Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but was laid off due to the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties, but he was refused reinstatement.

Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position of toll collector.

Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.

De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294

Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the president his authority to fix compensation and allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed a defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith. Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives, organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.

Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC into what is now the PUP.

Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution not in its corporate life.

When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.

Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure and organization bring about the abolition of an

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

educational institution and the creation of a new one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.

“Stand transferred” simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.

But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.

C. Reorganization of administrative agencies

1. Reorganization, defined

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145

Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct

Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.

Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NILTDRA. The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

III. Power of control, supervision and investigation by the

President

A. Executive power, defined

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the marcose’s to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of presidential power and its limits.

Executive power

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander- in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It

has

been

advanced

that

whatever

power

inherent

in

the

government that is neither executive.

legislative nor judicial

has

to

be

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14- 23]. (more than the sum of the powers enumerated)

B. Power of control, defined – power of the president

to nullify, modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a

subordinate.

Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290

Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975 otherwise known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine National Police under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government in pursuant to the provision of the constitution that the state shall establish and maintain one police force which is national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner alleged that the said law limits only the power of the National Police Commission into an administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the PNP and NAPOLCOM were placed.

Issue

Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the Department Secretary of the DILG.

Ruling The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. This Presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise

it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and void.

Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.

Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over from him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The President’s power of control means that if a cabinet secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power not only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.

C. Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined –

alter ego doctrine;

Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office, headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court, in instances where the subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office being sufficient where the subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however, it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in excess of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not

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capable of appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within the expanded titles.

Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the accused because it used him as a prosecution witness in cases similar to this case and because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the defendant from any criminal complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.

As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code places him under the 'general supervision and control' of the Department of Justice together with other prosecuting officers and under Section 74 of the same Code, the Secretary of Justice as 'Department Secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility of all activities of the Government under his control and supervision. Consequently, the constitutional power of the President of control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices (sec. 10, Art. VII, Constitution of the Philippines) should be considered as embracing his office.

Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.

Ruling: The power of control

(and naturally of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service. Accordingly, the law confers upon the Secretary only 'general supervision and control' may not be construed as limiting or in any way diminishing the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control which is constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the President. Acts of the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that of the president.

implies the right of the President

D. Limitations on the power of control

Does not include:

1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;

2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials

or employees without due process of law; 3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, including the office of the President, on contested cases to have become final pursuant to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law;

E. Power of supervision

Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143

Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial, governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.

The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.

Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction

Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised

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Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and, offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of

the latter. The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs their duty and if they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973

Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court by the Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution abolishing the positions of three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the provincial treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if three special counsel and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the functions incident to their positions.

Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the Secretary of Finance.

Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the power to revise their budget, local governments should be given a large degree of freedom in determining for themselves the propriety and wisdom of the expenses that they make provided that the expenses contemplated are within their financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over local governments is limited by the phrase “as provided by law” and where there is no law in accordance with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be exercised in accord with general principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central government, not of provincial governments, which are distinct and separate. The power of general supervision granted to the President over local governments, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that hem or his alter ego the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration, nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting as a representative of he President by virtue of the latter’s power of general supervision over local governments.

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.

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Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent Secretary.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election? Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.

Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.

F. Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294

Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over him.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I. Doctrine of separation of powers

A. Distribution of powers of government:

1. Legislative power is the power to

propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.

2. Executive power is the power to execute

and implement the laws.

3. Judicial power is the power of the courts

of justice to settle actual controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned anywhere by such name in the 1987 Constitution, can be inferred from its provisions. The heart of the doctrine is that the basic powers of the government must be kept separate from each other, each power being under the principal control of a branch of government. The legislative power is granted to the Congress, the executive power to the President, and the judicial power to the Judiciary. The President as Chief Executive exercises control over agencies and offices which perform rule-making or adjudicatory functions. If the agency is created by Congress, consider the law that created it. If the law is silent as to the control which the President may exercise, the President can only supervise, i.e., to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed.

B. Purpose of doctrine

So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one department (one person or group of persons) that would lead to abuse.

C. Blending of powers – though each department has

their own duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that they can work with other departments and conduct checks and balances regarding the actions of each.

Basis for blending of powers:

1. No function is capable of exact definition.

Description is only a generalization concerning its principal but not all of its characteristics;

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2. The Constitution allocated to the several

departments specific powers which in their nature

did not ordinarily pertain to them.

3. Practical necessity of exercising powers

incidental to those that are express or are appropriate to it, even if such incidental powers should fall within the category of functions pertaining to another department.

II.

what has been delegated cannot be delegated.

Doctrine of non-delegation of powers

A. General rule

US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327

-

Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.

B. Exception to the general rule

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726

Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of Public Works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is invalid delegation of legislative power.

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

C. Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions

KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386

Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the memoranda no. 92-009 issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which, among others, to authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application there for with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency and other matters.

Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?

Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid. Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services.

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Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles."

of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Moreover, the rule also provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment made by the Director on the Rule vesting hearing officers authority to hear their cases was illegal and void because under the law, it is the Director who should personally hear the cases of petitioners.

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by neither “filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to art undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing

Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.

Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director suggests that the aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since that the parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the actual taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the decision.

and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who

III.

Powers of administrative agencies, in general

would benefit and profit from the industry.

A.

Sources of powers of an administrative agency

 

1.

Constitution – is the body of rules and

American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L- 26803 Oct. 14, 1975

principles by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined.

2.

Statutes – rules and regulations

Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who

promulgated by the legislature.

have pending interference and cancellation proceedings, questions

B.

Limitations to the powers of an administrative

the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official

agency

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Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1

Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators. Private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board for the legalization of their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD 101 in order “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators. Petitioners contend that the BOT does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law provided a period of six (6) months which limited the time period to legitimize such clandestine operations by certain taxicab operators.

Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab operators under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.

Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.

Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA

619

Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case against herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the reason that latter were encroaching a part of the river with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries. The secretary of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct hearings on the same and eventually ordered the same be removed. Petitioners went to the Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the secretary and obtain an injunction which were ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower court’s decision.

Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation and order the removal of the encroachment made on the river.

Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided x x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).

C. Nature of the powers of administrative agencies

Quasi legislative – consists of issuance of rules and regulations; general applicability; and prospective in application;

Quasi Judicial – refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies to a specific situation; and determination of rights, privileges,etc. (fact finding investigate)

Depends on the enabling statute

D. Express and implied powers

Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498

Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which provided for the procedure of removal and suspension of

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policemen. Petitioner herein contends that the Civil Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others, that charges against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by the city or municipal council.

Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in competitive service.

Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against policemen and the power of the City Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified service.

Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal, suspension or separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's "final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension" of classified service employees presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another official to originally or initially decide the removal, separation or suspension which the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.

Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation contained in Section 16(i), namely, the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, it does not obtain at all in those instances where the power of removal is by law conferred on another body alone, with no appeal therefrom, as in the case provided for in Section 14 of Republic Act 296.

LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292

Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the deleterious effect of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding area. It has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850 and its amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly bestowed upon LLDA by EO 927.

Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has only such power as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise an administrative agency has also such power as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.

Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750

Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA. The case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was compensated by virtue of a contract entered by the NPC and the former. The COA held several persons liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer which included herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services that was contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a memorandum prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers without following the necessary procedures required by the COA.

Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case?

Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for services rendered to the government. This is in line with the Commission on Audit’s constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411

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Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before the Supreme Court to seek relief.

Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.

Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).

Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the

amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.

RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237

Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645

Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption.

Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend government officials and employees pending investigation of administrative complaints.

Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively suspend officers as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.

E. Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty

Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593

Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof. AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate of the said school. The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition before the RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using

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the organization of the parents of their students. The said court presided by the respondent Judge issued the preliminary injunction sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate because DECS is only performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.

Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or discretionary function.

Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the appeal is discretionary.

1. Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an

officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment (remedy mandamus)

2. Discretionary power, defined - If the law

Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power with respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution. The Court further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own

imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed (remedy certiorari)

3.

Importance

of

knowing

distinction

to

determine the remedies available…

 

4.

Delegation of ministerial and discretionary

judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

power

Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154

 

Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of the DECS in securing the quality education that an educational institution should provide pursuant to the constitutional provision on education and the organic law authorizing said department to issue rules and regulations pertinent thereto.

Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280

Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent. Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.

Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is ministerial?

Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to the Office of General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986, petitioner was designated by then Minister Gonzales as General Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the president which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent was the new Secretary of Tourism and asked for the resignation of the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho designating him as General Manager for the reason that petitioner was not appointed by the President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of then Minister Gonzales was also the act of the president which presumes that the act of the department heads were the act of the president.

Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.

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Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the total amount collectible as informers’ reward.

Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes has after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the

Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or

F.

Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory

performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less

duties and powers

 

reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any stranger or

Article 5 Civil Code

Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the operations of the government.

discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its

 

1.

Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and

purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that prescribed

effect

and substantially the same result obtained.

Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715

Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.

2.

Permissive/directory statute, defined and

effect

Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA

804

G. Error in the exercise of powers

1. Doctrine of non-suability of the state

inapplicable – the state cannot be sued without its consent.

Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713

Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school (navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case against the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the non-

suability of the state.

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Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.

Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office by virtue of their official capacity.

2. Estoppel inapplicable

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348

Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does not apply.

3. Presumption of regularity

Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716

Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority and established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11 but reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority initiated a special coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner. The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to release the subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to the court.

Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decision had became moot.

Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice

underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.

Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.

IV. Investigatory Powers

A. Scope and extent of powers

De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to inspect, secure, require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise. They are conferred on practically all administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities to investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is one of the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the court.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance of concerned teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as “mass concerted actions” to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been bought to the latter’s attention. As a result of the said action, the DECS secretary dismissed from the service one of the private respondents and the other nine were suspended.

Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won the CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies do?

Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in

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controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions.

Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.

The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as regard claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.

The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate.

Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate? Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate depending on the law granting such power.

Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies are formed for the sole purpose of investigation only (fact finding, etc.)

Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502

Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National Government.

MWSS caused the publication or an “invitation for pre-qualification and bids.” The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants’ financial condition, technical qualification and experience to undertake the project. Private Respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers’ Association sent letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications.

Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE recommended F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed and opted for a rebidding bating the contract to be awarded to Joint Venture. But MWSS Board Committee on construction Management and Board Committee on Engineering that contract be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the lowest complying bidder.

PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there on.

Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside the recommendation of MWSS to award contract.

Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts the same by his office.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMA’s complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CTSE.

Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and public assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede however, that the constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon

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it veto or provisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.

While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract vested by law in a government agency, which involves the exercise of discretion, the Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the award and granting it to another bidder.

Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545

Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was charged before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official function as governor.

Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of any public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not required that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

B. Requirement of notice and hearing – when the

law is silent, notice and hearing may be dispensed with, which depends upon the stage of the proceedings. (substantial right – can be given notice and hearing)

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for alleged violation of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a panel of lawyers to review and study the request. Pending the review, MJ requested copies of all documents and papers relative to the request that the proceedings be suspended for the meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish him the documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal to the SC. Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the preliminary or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against him.

Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695

Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the executive secretary.

Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his position after investigation of a committee on several charges against him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon, as executive secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer. After eight days, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was not meritorious and a case of forum shopping. The SC dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor General for the public respondents it being that the

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pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for them to act on said petition.

Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed administrative orders. / Was the petitioner entitled to be informed of the findings of an investigative committee created to inquire into charges against him?

Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees.

Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439

Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did not appeal the judgement .

Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss.

Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision

based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.

C. Right to counsel in administrative investigations – a

counsel may or may not assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)

D. Importance of administrative investigations

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs.

bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner. Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,

1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.

E. Executive power to investigate, source

Section 64c Revised Administrative Code

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Power of the president –to order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted.

Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code

Residual Powers – unless congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713

Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the president.

Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner?

Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service under the law which is appointed by

the president. As a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause enumerated by law.

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs.

bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner. Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,

1966.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas

Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.

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Requirements in issuing a subpoena:

1. Within the authority of the agency

2. Information is reasonably relevant

3. Demand is not indefinite

V. Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers

Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304

Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS

inquired from the Civil Service Commission as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of

81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the National Board for

Teachers. After an investigation, Remolona’s name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be together.

A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSS found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition and therefore a review by the SC.

Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact that the offense committed was not done in the performance of his official duty.

Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.

Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.

A. Nature of power, definition – Administrative

agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature or

quasi-legislative, and in practical effect, with the power to make law. However, the essential legislative functions may not be delegated to administrative agencies and in this sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no legislative power and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.

People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450

Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water.

Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing.

Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of PD 704. Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by law.

1. Ordinance

President/Delegation to the President

power

of

the

- The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive orders, proclamations, etc.)

Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution

Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts

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within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code

Chapter 2 ORDINANCE POWER

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null and void.

Issue

: Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was

valid.

Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.

EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies functions.

Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259

Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippines assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly depriving them of their right of exporting cigars to the United States due to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Viscaya.

Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make rules and regulations which are not within the scope of Act 2613.

Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined and that all of these who produce tobacco of the same standard would have equal rights and opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the legislative act.

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The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and the handling of it under sanitary conditions.

2. Delegation to the Supreme Court

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by changing scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic stiles. Mariwasa oppose filed motion for reconsideration. Mariwasa filed petition for review with respondent CA. it is temporarily restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20 days lapsed without respondent court issuing preliminary injunction. Lepanto filed motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over BOI vested with SC.

Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.

Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of its cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be filed with SC, are brought to CA.

3. Delegation to LGUs

Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.

Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160

SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the

provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be.

If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall

affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.

(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive

concerned to the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of

a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.

(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon

approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.

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SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.

(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the Sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.

(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.

SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sanggunian Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance

or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay shall furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.

(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the

case may be, fails to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the

case may be, finds the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

B.

Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative

power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry." On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372. Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a

total transference of legislative authority to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533

Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of money and attorney’s fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.

The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.

Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221

Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in transporting passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and Zambales by means of TPU buses for 20 years. It filed with Public Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

additional new Brockway Trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its current certificates. As a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public Service Commission denied it. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the

Public Service Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No.

454 constitute a complete and total abdication of the Legislatures’

functions and thus unconstitutional and void. (2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority.

Held:

(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional.

Section 8 of Art. XIII of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be “for a longer period than fifty years” and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No.

146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public

Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That it shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period shall not be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the commission is the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of “public interests in a proper and suitable manner.” With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. (2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726

Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of

Public works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal drawn vehicle for a specific time.

The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.

Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

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Administrative Law Reviewer

C. Limitations on the rule-making power

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003

Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case

agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444

Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of Labor issued on May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only distressed employers but also "those who have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of said rules).

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void. The recognition of the power of administrative

officials to promulgate rules in the administration of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. It is of elementary knowledge that an act of Congress cannot be amended by a rule promulgated by an administrative

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of

agency.

"It

seems

too

clear

for

serious

argument

that

an

Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule- making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed

administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity."

is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by

D.

Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative

the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-

power

 

legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330

 

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry." On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372. Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and

guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.

1. Completeness test – the law must be

complete in all its items and conditions when it

it reaches

the delegate, the only thing they will have to do is

enforce Shipping vs. POEA)

leaves the legislature such that when

it

(Eastern

What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in nature. He cannot determine what the law shall be.

US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533

Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for sum of money and attorney’s fee claiming that herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA. The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional

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Administrative Law Reviewer

Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is dismissed.

People vs Vera 65 Phil 56

Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July

1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal

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Administrative Law Reviewer

and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

2. Sufficient standard test – to map out the

boundaries of the delegates’ authority by defining legislative policy and indicating circumstances under which it is pursued.

Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.

Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253

Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734, “authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, “Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanano.” Four provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi- Tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as amended by E.O 439 was issued by the Chief Executive providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the Petitioners contends that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly delegates the legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge the existing regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted. Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.

Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied, nor it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are pertinent to that subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be

gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject

as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found

in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.

Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952

Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers

Corporation. Its board of directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to the control of the government enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA 51 for approval, the resolution was disapproved on recommendation by auditor general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition

of NAFCO.

Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/

Issue:

unconstitutional being an undue delegation of legislative power to executive.

is

that

EO

93

is

invalid

as

based

on

the

law

that

Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative “lays down policy and a standard is established by the statute there is no undue

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Administrative Law Reviewer

delegation. RA 51 is authorizes the president to make reforms and changes in the government controlled corporation for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant to this authority, the president promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises council with power to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of member corporations. Petition is dismissed.

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable

Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659

Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by the President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner

was affected to the said order with the contention that the said order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a proper delegation of legislative power to the President of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.

Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power. The court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, the court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

3. Exceptions

sufficient legislative standards

to

the

requirement

of

1. power which is not directly or

exclusively a legislative one and has no

relation whatsoever to personal or property rights;

2. power to regulate a mere matter of

privilege

E. Issues on validity of legislation

1. Against the delegating statute itself ---

whether or not the requisites of valid delegation are present;

2. Against the exercise of the delegated

power --- whether or not the rule or regulation

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conforms with what the statute provides and whether the same is reasonable.

Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837

Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum.

Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.

Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

An ordinance to be valid:

Must not be in contravention of the constitution

Must not be oppressive

Must not be discriminatory

Must not regulate or prohibit trade

Must not be against a statute

F. Rule and rule-making, defined

Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.

Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161

Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per diems claimed under the National Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.

Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside by authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void.

Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.

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Supplementary legislation – A statute which leaves to the executive the power to fill in the technical details in view of the latter’s expertise is a recognized delegation of legislative power.

Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not

1. Classification of rules and regulations

a. Those

superior and directed exclusively to the subordinates --- rules and regulations of internal administration to be observed by subordinate officials for the prompt and

administrative

issued

by

an

efficient dispatch of government business and to facilitate the transactions of the general public with the government;

b. Those directed not only to the inferior

officers but also and primarily to private individuals, fixing the manner by which the

terms of a statute are to be complied with.

2. Types of rule-making powers

2.1. Rule-making by reason of particular

delegation of authority (supplementary or

detailed legislation)--- refers to the power to issue rules and regulations which have the force and effect of law;

2.2. Rule-making by the construction

and interpretation

administered (interpretative legislation)--- refers to the power to interpret and construe the statutes entrusted to them for implementation;

being

of

a

statute

2.3. The ascertainment of facts which

will form the basis for the enforcement of a

statute

determination).

or

(contingent

legislation

G. Supplementary/detailed legislation

1. Source – enabling law;

2. Requisites for validity:

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22

Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim. This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two mining claims.

Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim. The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.

Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631. Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking power.

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Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with

invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes

a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the

enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly

delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.

4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation

must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law

conform to the standards that the law prescribes

must be reasonable

must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions of law

UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376

Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the decision of the latter as regard the taxability of the former’s income from tuition fees. The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance with the rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of respondent to take cognizance of the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the reason that it deprives the CFI’s of their jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases involving recovery of taxes.

Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly come within the purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the CFI’s of their jurisdiction to act on internal evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by Congress alone has “the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.”

Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329

Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary regulation issued by the Department of Labor and Employment Secretary regarding the application and implementation of 13 th month pay law. The Department order included commission as part of the computation of determining the 13 th month pay of the employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be violators of the law for not including the commission on its employees in the computation of the 13 th month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary Drilon is acting in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The Secretary however contended that the said order was just a supplementary to the law which the same tried to erase the cloud thereof.

Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative regulation.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further ruled that the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3th-month pay. "While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has

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hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary. "The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays,

pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered i the computation of the 13th month pay. If they were not excluded

it is hard to find any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly

excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.

GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79

Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane, i.e., with the

concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation

of its quasi-judicial functions.

Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body

Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring

a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in

order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC.

The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.

Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481

Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of serious misconduct and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCC.

Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992 election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.

A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for disqualification and suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and assume office; petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.

Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?

Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992.

"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as

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the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'

Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777

Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.

Issue: WON the amendments are valid

Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.

Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667

3. Requirement of reasonableness

a. Bears a reasonable relation to the

purpose sought to be accomplished;

b. Supported by good reasons;

c. Free from constitutional infirmities

or charge of arbitrariness

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 “that no examine shall attend any review class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any handouts, review material or any tip from school

or any review center during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.

Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.

Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held invalid.

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment.

H. Interpretative legislation

1. Distinction between rule and interpretation

Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555

Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in the exercise of its rule making power delegated to it by the legislature, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely advisory.

2. Types

construction/interpretation

of

executive

a. Construction by an executive

officer directly called to implement the law. It may be express (embodied in a circular, directive or regulation) or implied (practice or mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situations; by usage or practice);

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b. Construction by the Secretary of

Justice as chief legal adviser of the

government. May be reversed by President in the exercise of the power to modify, alter or reverse;

c. Interpretation handed down in an

adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.

2.

constructions

Weight

accorded

to

administrative

Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617

Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the silence of the Tariff and Customs Code which extends the period of exportation of a specific containers in which the petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner questioned the said order alleging that the construction of a specific statute by an administrative body must not be observed.

Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative construction.

Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given controlling weight.

Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262

Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying with the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay

elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all forty- seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68.

On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with this requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not jurisdictional.

Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non- compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is hereby denied.

When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that finally determine what the law means.

Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425

United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982

Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to condone penalties. Petitioners contention that they had under the impression that international organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask for condonation, which was denied by commissioner.

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ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.

RULING: No error in the commissioner’s action. The provision on the SSC precisely enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said powers may it shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the act.

3. Construction of administrative rules and

regulations

Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072

Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect from the courts, as no one is better qualified to interpret the intent of the regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its interpretation that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable, should be followed.

I. Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts

Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234 People vs Vera 65 Phil 56 US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1 Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557

J. Penal rules and regulations

1. Requisites for validity of penal rules and

regulations

Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843

US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608

Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the

quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime.

Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.

Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said finding does not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the revised penal code.

People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125 People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450

2. Imposition of penalties by administrative

authorities

K. Rate-fixing power

Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218

Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the reservation to make further reduction later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is allegedly under the contemplation of E.O. 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate- fixing powers; and E.O. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC.

Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.

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Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of due process clause is void and should be nullified . Thus, temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from the procedural requirement of notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary rate- fixing becomes final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case.

In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the admin authority is that the rate reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. The fixing of rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines, in which case, notice and hearing are not required for their validity.

L. Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations

1. Publication requirement

Section 2, Civil Code

Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless otherwise provided.

Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

Chapter 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS

Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule

adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each

rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing

or

specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.

as above

provided

unless a different date is fixed

by law,

Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:

(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and

(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.

Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the

Philippines

Law

Center

may

omit

from

the

bulletin

or

the

codification

any

rule

if

its

publication

would

be

unduly

cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.

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(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.

Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid

unless

newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

a

shall

(2) In the fixing

the

proposed

rates

have

been

published

in

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive

Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates

Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa — and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records — no such publicity accompanies the law- making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only

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to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all- inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of its contents.

2. Notice and hearing requirement

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63

3. Application, general rule – that the

issuance of rules and regulations to implement the law does not require that there be prior notice and hearing conducted by the administrative agencies. However, if the statute making the delegation requires such hearing, then one must be conducted before such rules and regulations are issued. On the other hand, if the statute is silent on the matter, a public hearing, if practicable, may be conducted.

VI. Adjudicatory Powers

a.

Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body,

defined

Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to

decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

Quasi-judicial body – an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making power.

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule- making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi- legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the

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power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned

civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION” "Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to a real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari, it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in '

making their decision, whatever may be their public

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative dudes, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433

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Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on

administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the

"

legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

b. Distinguished from judicial power

Judicial Power – is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case of controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear

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and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

c. Distinguished from administrative function

Administrative Function – are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature as such are devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of existence.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

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Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country. PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution?

Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:

(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent office, office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board

of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future. Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

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Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.

The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the factfinding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.

It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of the waters flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the dam was afterwards interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is, is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.

The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.

Issue: WON

Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after the date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of this work, the Director of Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director of Public

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Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)

DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing as it does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in irrigation engineering, should invariably be made a part of the judicial record because (1) the determination of these officials would be most useful to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides whether the appeal was taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

d. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from

enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself- would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

e. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with

quasi-judicial power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it had jurisdiction over the matter.

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Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

f.

Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative

agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs of the deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue :

WON the

judgment.

CSC had powers to execute

its resolution or

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be

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stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission.

Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the

Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member.

Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." PTFI

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then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction

controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).

the courts cannot or will not determine a

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the

extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it clearly abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money. Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.

Issue

reservation fee.

:

WON

the

RTC

had

jurisdiction

over

the

recovery

of

Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected

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contract of sale. Said powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law,

and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

g. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the

corrective powers of public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards under;

3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of

permit or authorization;

1. Dispensing powers. The authority to

exempt from or relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative duty. The

licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard;

2. Summary powers. To designate

administrative power to apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action;

3. Equitable powers. An administrative

tribunal having power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has the right to and must consider and make proper application of the rules of equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390

Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she appeared at the date, time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and

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demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary was Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non- official and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the

presentation of some of private respondents’ witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded as a “fishing bill” to discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.

In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it must appear. By clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance therof is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents or things does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

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Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when

it opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons and/or

parties indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.

Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to

enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as

a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section

30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.

When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.

In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative code. The refusal to comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is neither contempt nor a penalized offense.

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding information’s against her and the same are now pending trial in court. The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to

impose the penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No.

875.

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Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well- informed persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.

This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity. Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No.

1773 was that the marriage of the accused or convict with the

offended party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No.

1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the

offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies

performing quasi-judicial acts Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and

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the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales. Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga

barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

II. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A.

procedure

Source

of

authority

to

promulgate

rules

of

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete

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and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of

procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

C. Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment of publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRC’s decision on the ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the

arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

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Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency (FIDELITY). The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the decision of the SEC which had (a)

ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.

The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of

a P50,000 fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely

different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the

latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but

a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.

Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188 Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876 Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257 First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259

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R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826 Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493

E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675 Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704

F. Pre-trial conference; default Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110

G. Hearing Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160 Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278 Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396 Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700

H. Evidence Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505

1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557

2. Clear and convincing evidence

Black’s Law Dictionary 5 th ed. P. 227

3. Preponderance of evidence

New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266

4. Substantial evidence

Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28 Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380

I. Decision Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

1. Form of decision

Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273 Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616

Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

2. Publication of decisions

Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

3. Finality, promulgation and notice of

decision Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354 Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25 Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349 Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548

4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445

Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515

5. Finality of decisions

Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987 Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7 Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607

Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666

6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812 Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497

Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963 Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429

J. Administrative appeal in contested cases

Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965 PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560 Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283 De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584 Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22 Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92 Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261 Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673

K. Execution Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775 GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799 Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235

III. Due process of law in administrative adjudication

A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined

DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one’s person or property. It is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail over form.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal

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By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial

The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law, which clause optimizes the principle of justice which hears before it condemns which upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.

Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356

Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and 97. He was arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him. From the proven facts and the admission likewise of the respondents, the court martial which tried his case was not properly convened. There was no special order published by the headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the General Court Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try however was already an existing court trying another case.