[ G.R. No.

22008, November 03, 1924 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIO POMAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
JOHNSON, J.:
The only question presented by this appeal is whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful
exercise of the police power of the state.
It appears from the record that on the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila presented a complaint in the Court of
First Instance, accusing the defendant of a violation of section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The
complaint alleged:
"That on or about the 27th day of August, 1923, and sometime prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, being the
manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation
duly authorized to transact business in said city, and having, during the year 1923, in his employ and service as cigarmaker in said factory, a woman
by the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by reason of her pregnancy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she
was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took place on the 12th
day of August, 1923, despite and over the demands made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do so."
To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled,
whereupon the defendant answered and admitted at the trial all of the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the provisions of
said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based, were illegal, unconstitutional and void.
Upon a consideration of the facts charged in the complaint and admitted by the defendant, the Honorable C. A. Imperial, judge, found the defendant
guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of
said Act, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error: That the court erred in overruling the demurrer; in
convicting him of the crime charged in the information; and in not declaring section 13 of Act No. 3071 unconstitutional.
Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is as follows:
"Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman
employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the
employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two
months counted from the day of her discharge."
Section 15 of the same Act is as follows:
"Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two
hundred and fifty, or by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. "In the case of firms
or corporations, the presidents, directors or managers thereof or, in their default, the persons acting in their stead, shall be criminally responsible for
each violation of the provisions of this Act."
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose
of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain
extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The question presented for decision by the appeal is whether
said Act hats been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.
In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in fact, within said power, it becomes necessary, first, to
determine what that power is, its limits and scope. Literally hundreds of decisions have been promulgated in which definitions of the police power
have been attempted. An examination of all of said decisions will show that the definitions are generally limited to particular cases and examples,
which are as varied as they are numerous.
By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing civilization, the term "police power" has never been, and we do not believe can be,
clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. One hundred years ago, for example, it is doubtful whether the most eminent jurist, or court, or
legislature would have for a moment thought that, by any possibility, a law providing for the destruction of a building in which alcoholic liquors were
sold, was within a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.) The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with a desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for
the interests o f the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power of the state many questions for regulation which formerly were not
so considered. In a republican form of government public sentiment wields a tremendous influence upon what the state may or may not do, for the
protection of the health and public morals of the people. Yet, neither public sentiment, nor a desire to ameliorate the public morals of the people of
the state will justify the promulgation of a law which contravenes the express provisions of the fundamental law of the peoplethe constitution of the
state. A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law and the particular facts to which it is to be applied. The many
definitions which have been given by the highest courts may be examined, however, for the purpose of giving us a compass or guide to assist us in

Page 1 of 228

arriving at a correct conclusion in the particular case before us. Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest expounders of the common law, defines
the police power as "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious,
and inoffensive in their respective station." (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 162.)
Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, gives us the following definition: "Police is in general a system of precaution, either for
the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct branches: (1) Police for the prevention of offences; (2)
police for the prevention of calamities; (3) police for the prevention of endemic diseases; (4) police of charity; (5) police of interior communications;
(6) police of public amusements; (7) police for recent intelligence ; (8) police for registration."
Mr. Justice Cooley, perhaps the greatest expounder of the American Constitution, says: "The police power is the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. *
* *" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 830.)
In the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Alger (7 Cushing, 53), we find a very comprehensive definition of the police power of the state.
In that case it appears that the colony of Massachusetts in 1647 adopted an Act to preserve the harbor of Boston and to prevent encroachments
therein. The defendant unlawfully erected, built, and established in said harbor, and extended beyond said lines and into and over the tide water of
the Commonwealth a certain superstructure, obstruction and encumbrance. Said Act provided a penalty for its violation of a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $5,000 for every offense, and for the destruction of said buildings, or structures, or obstructions as a public nuisance. Alger
was arrested and placed on trial for violation of said Act. His defense was that the Act of 1647 was illegal and void, because it permitted the
destruction of private property without compensation. Mr. Justice Shaw, speaking for the court in that case, said: "We think it is a settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that
bordering on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the government and held subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to
the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment, as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.*' Mr. Justice Shaw further adds: "*
* * The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
This court has, in the case of Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser (24 Phil., 250), in discussing the police power of the state, had occasion to say: "*
* * It is a well settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and civilized society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The
state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner
as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression."
Many other definitions have been given not only by the Supreme Court of the United States but by the Supreme Court of every state of the Union.
The foregoing definitions, however, cover the general field of all of the definitions, found in jurisprudence. From all of the definitions we conclude that
it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of the police power than to exactly mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its
exercise by the legislative department of the government.
The most recent definition which has been called to our attention is that found in the case of Adkins vs. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia
(261 U. S., 525). In that case the controversy arose in this way: A children's hospital employed a number of women at various rates of wages, which
were entirely satisfactory to both the hospital and the employees. A hotel company employed a woman as elevator operator at $35 per month and
two meals a day under healthy and satisfactory conditions, and she did not risk to lose her position as she could not earn so much anywhere else.
Her wages were less than the minimum fixed by a board created under a law for the purpose of fixing a minimum wage for women and children, with
a penalty providing a punishment for a failure or refusal to pay the minimum wage fixed. The wage paid by the hotel company of $35 per month and
two meals a day was less than the minimum wage fixed by said board. By reason of the order of said board, the hotel company, was about to
discharge her, as it was unwilling to pay her more and could not give her employment at that salary without risking the penalty of a fine and
imprisonment under the law. She brought action to enjoin the hotel company from discharging her upon the ground that the enforcement of the
"Minimum Wage Act" would deprive her of her employment and wages without due process of law, and that she could not get as good a position
anywhere else. The constitutionality of the Act was squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that said Act was void on the ground that the right to contract about one's own affairs was a part of the
liberty of the individual under the constitution, and that while there was no such thing as absolute freedom of contract, and it was necessarily subject
to a great variety of restraints, yet none of the exceptional circumstances, which at times justify a limitation upon one's right to contract for his own
services, applied in the particular case.
In the course of the decision in that case (Adkins vs. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U. S., 525), Mr. Justice Sutherland, after a
statement of the fact and making reference to the particular law, said:

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"The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract
included within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of
the individual protected by tlhis clause is settled by the decisions of this court, and is no longer open to question. Within this liberty are contracts of
employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can
as the result of private bargaining. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578, 591; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S.,
412, 421.)
*

"The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not
less than a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden,
generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss. Within the limits of the minimum
sum, he is precluded, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, from adjusting compensation to the differing merits of his employees. It compels him
to pay at least the sum fixed in any event* because tine employee needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the employee. It (the
law) therefore undertakes to solve but one-half of the problem. The other half is the establishment of a corresponding standard of efficiency; and this
forms no part of the policy of the legislation, although in practice the former half without the latter must lead to ultimate failure, in accordance with the
inexorable law that no one can continue indefinitely to take out more than he puts in without ultimately exhausting the supply. The law * * * takes no
account of periods of distress and business depression, of crippling losses, Which may leave the employer himself without adequate means of
livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer
for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily
shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.
"The feature of this statute which, perhaps more than my other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary
payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee engages to do.
The declared basis, as already pointed out, is not the value of the service rendered, but the extraneous circumstance that the employee needs to get
a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence, health and morals. * * * The necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these
arise outside of the employment, are the same when there is no employment, and as great in one occupation as in another. * * * In principle, there
can be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker, or grocer to buy food, he
is morally entitled to obtain the worth of his money, but he is not entitled to more. If what he gets is worth what he pays, he is not justified in
demanding more simply because he needs more; and the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and honestly in that transaction, is not concerned in any
peculiar sense with the question of his customer's necessities. Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission power to determine the quantity of
food necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed
maximum, it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy of any argument in support of the validity of such a statute would be
quickly exposed. The argument in support of that now being considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it may not be so plain. * * *"
It has been said that the particular statute before us is required in the interest of social justice for whose end freedom of contract may lawfully be
subjected to restraint.
The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the common good,
and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, but may be made to move, within limits
not well defined, with changing needs and circumstances.
The late Mr. Justice Harlan, in the case of Adair vs. United States (208 U. S., 161, 174), said that the right of a person to sell his labor upon such
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from the person offering to sell. In all such particulars the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract, which no government can legally justify in a free land, under a
constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Mr. Justice Pitney, in the case of Coppage vs. Kansas (236 U. S., 1, 14), speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "* * * Included in
the right of personal liberty and the right of private propertypartaking of the nature of eachis the right to make contracts for the acquisition of
property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of
property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial, impairment of liberty in the long established constitutional
sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of persons have no other honest way
to begin to acquire property, save by working for money."
The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate contracts. In the case of Gillespie vs. People (188 111., 176, 183-185) it
was held that a statute making it unlawful to discharge an employee because of his connection with any lawful labor organization, and providing a
penalty therefor, is void, since the right to terminate a contract, subject to liability to respond in a civil action for an unwarranted termination, is within
the protection of the state and Federal constitutions which guarantee that no person shall be deprived" of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. The court said in part: "* * * One citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can anyone be compelled to be
employed against his will. The Act of 1893, now under consideration, deprives the employer of the right to terminate his contract with his employee.
The right to terminate such a contract is guaranteed by the organic law of the state. The legislature is forbidden to deprive the employer or employee
of the exercise of that right. The legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of an innocent act criminal when the public health, safety,
comfort or welfare is not interfered with. The statute in question says that, if a man exercises his constitutional right to terminate a contract with his
employee, he shall, without a hearing, be punished as for the commission of a crime.
*

"Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and, consequently, the right to contract to labor or for labor, and to terminate such
contracts, and to refuse to make such contracts. The legislature cannot prevent persons, who are sui juris, from laboring, or from making such

Page 3 of 228

contracts as they may see fit to make relative to their own lawful labor; nor has it any power by penal laws to prevent any person, with or without
cause, from refusing to employ another or to terminate a contract with him, subject only to the liability to respond in a civil action for an unwarranted
refusal to do that which has been agreed upon. Hence, we are of the opinion that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal
constitutions, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
The statute in question is exactly analogous to the "Minimum Wage Act" referred to above. In section 13 it will be seen that no person, firm, or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop, or place of labor of any description, can make a contract with a woman, without incurring the
obligation, whatever the contract of employment might be, unless he also promise to pay to such woman employed as a laborer, who may become
pregnant, her wages for thirty days before and thirty days after confinement. In other words, said section creates a term or condition in every contract
made by every person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant, and a failure to
include in said contract the terms fixed by the law, makes the employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and imprisonment. Clearly, therefore,
the law has deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine
Islands, of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a term in every
such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. The constitution of the Philippine
Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.
It is believed and confidently asserted that no case can be found, in civilized society and well-organized governments, where individuals have been
deprived of their property, under the police power of the state, without compensation, except in cases where the property in question was used for
the purpose of violating some law legally adopted, or constitutes a nuisance. Among such cases may be mentioned: Apparatus used in
counterfeiting the money of the state; firearms illegally possessed; opium possessed in violation of law; apparatus used for gambling in violation of
law; buildings and property used for the purpose of violating laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors; and all cases in which
the property itself has become a nuisance and dangerous and detrimental to the public health, morals and general welfare of the state. In all of such
cases, and in many more which might be cited, the destruction of the property is permitted in the exercise of the police power of the state. But it must
first be established that such property was used as the instrument for the violation of a valid existing law. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623;
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. [U. S.], 36; Butchers Union, etc., Co. vs. Crescent City, etc., Co., 11 U. S., 746; John Stuart Mill"On Liberty," 28,
29.)
Without further attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of the police power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the
restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals, must come within this category. But the state, when
providing by legislation for the protection of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere with the
execution of the powers and rights guaranteed to the people under their lawthe constitution. (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623.)
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police
power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people's law
the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must
first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the
piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop
or place of labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services
were rendered. It has been decided in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the right to contract about one's affairs
is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. (Allgeyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578, 591;
New York Life Ins. Co. vs. Dodge, 246 U. S., 357, 373, 374; Coppage vs. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1, 10, 14; Adair vs. United States, 208 U. S., 161;
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S., 45, 49; Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S., 412, 421.)
The rule in this jurisdiction is, that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the
Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the
Act of Congress of the United States of August 29, 1916. (Vol. 12, Public Laws, p. 238.)
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the defendant is hereby discharged from the
custody of the law, with costs de ofido. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Page 4 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-2043, February 28, 1950 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO CARILLO Y ALMADIN ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
ALEJANRO CARLLO Y ALMADIN AND TORIBIO RAQUENIO Y PITAS, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On June 4, 1947, between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., Emma Foronda-Abaya and her friend Marcelino Lontok, Jr., while F walking side by side on
Pampanga street, Manila, on their way home from the Far Eastern University, were held up by two men, each at the point of a pistol, and were
robbed of their personal belongings consisting of the following:
One Bulova wrist watch valued at
P 50.00
One smoked glass with gold rim valued at
25.00
One Parker fountain pen valued at
25.00
Cash amounting to
.40
---------Total
P 100.40
belonging to Marcelino Lontok, Jr., and
One gold bracelet valued at
One Elgin wrist watch valued at
One umbrella valued at
Cash in loose change
Total

P 35.00
80.00
15.00
1.00
---------P 131.00

belonging to Emma Foronda-Abaya.

After robbing Emma, one of the two robbers took her to a secluded place, a vacant lot south of the street, and then and there hugged her, kissed her
on the mouth, laid her down face upward on a log, and after pulling down her drawers placed himself on top of her with intent to satisfy his lust. In the
meantime the other robber was holding Marcelino Lontok, Jr., at the point of a pistol at a distance of about eight meters from the place where Emma
was being ravished. Emma cried for help, saying, "Junior, pity me!" But Marcelino Lontok, Jr., was threatened by his captor with bodily harm if he
should move to help her. The satyr did not succeed in raping his victim because she valiantly resisted and in the course of the struggle both of them
fell on the mire beside the log. At that precise moment the other robber left Marcelino and approached his companion, telling him to stop and inviting
him to leave the place. Marcelino escaped to seek help. At a distance of about 15 meters he heard two shots. When later in the same evening he
returned to the place with a police patrol, they found Emma dead, her chest and abdomen pierced by two bullets. Two empty shells were found at
the scene of the crime.
The Detective Bureau of the Manila Police Department mobilized its forces to discover the authors of the crime. They got the first tangible clue on the
morning of June 10 when Detective Leano and Marcelino Lontok, Jr., recovered the latter's Bulova wrist watch from a peddler who was offering it for
sale in front of the Ideal Theater on Rizal Avenue. The peddler, a colored American named Samuel Rhones, said that he had received the watch
from one Jacinto Cornel, alias Wy Teng Seng, to sell. Jacinto Cornel told the detective that he had received the watch from one Salvador Custodio.
The latter in turn said that he had bought it from a man called Big Boy, who turned out to be Brigido Carlos. Brigido Carlos said that the watch had
been given to him in payment of a debt by a man whom he knew by the name of Visaya and who had a stall at the foot of Quezon Bridge. Visaya1s
real name turned out to be Saturnino Macawile. The latter at first denied having had anything to do with the watch, but after further investigation he
admitted having delivered it to Brigido Carlos, alias Big Boy. At first he said he had bought the watch from a small boy about three years old; but after
further questioning he said he had bought it from a fellow with tattoos on both arms, on the chest, and on the legs. Finally he revealed the identity of
the mysterious seller as one known by the name of Romy. In view of his possession of the stolen watch, and because of his evasive answers as to
its origin, Saturnino Macawile was suspected as one of the robbers. Indeed Marcelino Lontok, Jr., thought so at first. An information was therefore
filed against Saturnino Macawile and John Doe on June 14, 1947, for the crime in question.
Subsequently, however, the detectives succeeded in establishing the identity of Romy as that of an ex-convict whose real name was Alejandro
Carillo, alias Romy alias Iwahig. They went to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, where they found his prison records and his photograph. His
records show that he was convicted of robbery in an inhabited house in criminal case No. 63494 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sentenced
to 4 months and 1 day of imprisonment as minimum and 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day as maximum, and commenced to serve his sentence on June
27, 1941. On January 4, 1942, he was released on conditional pardon. In August, 1942, he was again convicted of robbery in an inhabited house in
criminal case No. 511 and sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment as minimum and 2 years, 11 months, and 10 days as maximum, plus subsidiary
imprisonment. He was also made to serve the unserved portion of his first sentence, he having violated the condition of his pardon. He was released
from prison upon the expiration of his sentence on August 30, 1946. (Exhibit G.)
After thus ascertaining the identity of Romy, the detectives' next task was to find and arrest him. They discovered that he left Manila on a boat bound
for Tacloban, Leyte, on June 8, 1947. Three detectives were dispatched to Tacloban, where they found and arrested Alejandro Carillo in the public
market on June 23, 1947. He was at first brought to the police station of Tacloban, where he admitted verbally that he was the one who shot Emma
Foronda-Abaya.
On the afternoon of June 24, 1947, Alejandro Garillo was interrogated by Detective D. Lapina in the presence of Detective L. O. Garcia in the office
of the Manila Detective Bureau, the questions propounded to him in Tagalog and his answers having been reduced to writing by Stenographer D. B.
Ferrer. He gave his name and personal circumstances as follows: Alejandro Carillo y Almadin, 23 years old, single, a native of Tacloban, Leyte,
painter, and a resident of Magallanes Avenue, Tacloban, Leyte. He declared that he resided first at 1472 Calavite, La Loma, Rizal, up to 1943 and
then at 13 Esperanza, Quiapo, Manila; that he left Manila for Tacloban on June 4, 1947, because he happened to commit a crime. Answering further

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questions, he revealed that on the evening of June 4, 1947, about 8:30, he shot a woman on Aurora Avenue. V/e quote from his answers the
following:
"On June 4, 1947, I was at 1472 Calavite at 5 p. m. Frank and I drank gin. At 8 p. m. we went out and walked on Aurora Avenue. While we were
walking we met two persons, a woman and a man. We held than up and took them to a dark place. I took the watch of the man. After that I took hold
of the woman and took off her drawers. The woman screamed. I pulled her to a muddy place. The woman pushed me. I also pushed her and then
fired two shots at her. Afterwards Frank and I left and we separated. I slept at the Blue Dahlia Hotel. Four days after the woman had been killed, I
went to Leyte to the house of my sister on Magallanes Avenue."
He said he had known Frank since May 2, 1947; that Frank did not tell him his full name but that Frank told him that he lived on San Juan street,
Pasay, Rizal, and that he was a private detective; that on the night in question he was carrying a 45-caliber pistol and Frank, a Japanese Luger. He
gave further details of the commission of the crime as follows:
"I took the watch of the man and Frank took the watch of the woman; I told Frank to watch the man. I approached the woman, and when I saw that
she was pretty I intended to have carnal knowledge of her; so I took her to a yard and laid her on a log under banana trees. I kissed her on the
mouth, pulled down her drawers, grasped her breasts and laid her on the log. She screamed and struggled, so we fell into the mud. When I got up,
my feet sank into the mud; I got sore and took my pistol and shot her twice."
He further revealed that when the woman screamed, she called "Junior" in a loud voice; that he sold the man's watch for P11 to Nonoy Macawile,
whom he identified then and there as the accused Saturnino Macawile, and who according to him was his housemate at 13 Esperanza, Quiapo; that
he sold the watch to Macawile near the Quezon Bridge in Quiapo the day after the crime; that Macawile had been his housemate for about two
years; that Macawile knew him by the name of Romy only; that Macawile did not know that the watch had been stolen from the man he and Frank
held up; that he learned from the newspapers that the victims of the robbery he committed on June 4 were Emma and Lontok. He was shown the
Bulova watch Exhibit D, and he identified it as the same watch he had taken from Lontok. He ratified that when he was arrested on June 23 in
Tacloban he admitted before the local chief of police that he was the one who had shot Snma Foronda-Abaya. He also revealed that when he was
seven years old he was confined in the Welfareville Training School for theft, and that in 1939 and 1941 he was sentenced and incarcerated in
Muntinlupa for robbery. After his declaration was put in writing, he signed it and then ratified it under oath before Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor.
(Exhibit H.)
The detectives ascertained the identity of Frank mentioned by Alejandro Carillo to be Toribio Raquenio, who was apprehended on the night of June
25, 1947, and who on the evening of June 25, 1947, was subjected to interrogatories by Detective Tomas A. Calazan of the Manila Detective Bureau
in the presence of Detective J. Senen. He gave his name and personal circumstances as Toribio Raquenio y Pitas, alias Torin alias Frank, 37 years
of age, single, jobless, native of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, and residing at 55 Main street, Sampaloc, Manila. The following is an excerpt from his answers
to the interrogatories:
"I am a graduate of the public grammar school (seventh grade graduate) at Stockton, California, in the year 1932. At the age of eighteen I went there
to work and engaged in cutting asparagus and lettuce in Salinas and Stockton, California, earning $7 a day. In July, 1946, desirous of seeing my
parents and relatives, I returned to the Philippines on the s.s. Marine Lanes, paying P400 for my fare. After staying a few months in my home
province, I came to Manila and stayed in the house of my uncle Jesus Acosta at 73 Nacar, San Andres, Manila. I left the house of my uncle on the
1st day of June, 1947, and went to reside at 55 Main street, Sampaloc, Manila, up to the time of my present arrest. I have been jobless since I
arrived in Manila. In May I happened to meet one James Lavalle at the Cosmos Restaurant on the corner of Azcarraga and Rizal Avenue and he
invited me to live with him in his house at 55 Main street, Sampaloc, after learning that I was looking for a house to live in. A week later I became
acquainted with one Romy while I was at the Star Restaurant on Azcarraga street. Since then I have met him several times: once at the Central
Hotel, corner of Azcarraga and Rizal Avenue, and later in the house of Simeon Madayag at 1472 Calavite, La Loma; then at the Cosmos Restaurant
and again in the house of Simeon Madayag; then in the Aroma Cafe near the corner of Rizal Avenue and Azcarraga. The last meeting was on the
afternoon of June 4, 1947. Romy invited me to drink beer and gin at the Star Restaurant after I had met him at the Aroma Cafe. About 6 p.m. of that
day, June 4, 1947, we proceeded to the house of Simeon Madayag on Calavite street, and there Romy ordered again for Alcoholic drinks, and we
drank in the house in the presence of an old woman. After drinking, Romy invited me to a walk after showing me his 45-caliber pistol stuck at his
belly. Knowing him to be armed, I looked for the 3S-caliber Japanese Luger which Madayag used to hide underneath the piles of their clothes inside
their unlocked dresser. Fortunately I found the said firearm, so I took it without the knowledge of its owner, Simeon Madayag. I became acquainted
with Simeon Madayag thru my uncle. I learned that Simeon Madayag was the chief of police of Munoz, Nueva Ecija, from his sister-in-law Viring.
Romy and I boarded a bus in La Loma, heading for Santa Cruz, Manila, and upon reaching the crossroads near the Chinese Hospital, we alighted
and walked northward on Aurora Avenue. While walking Romy told me that we were going to hold up any passers-by and not long afterwards he was
in pursuit of two persons, one a girl and the other a man. He held them at the point of his pistol upon reaching a street corner. I then walked towards
them and held the man at the point of my gun and took his wrist watch which I put inside the left breast pocket of my polo shirt. I continued holding
the man while my companion Romy held up the girl at the point of his pistol. They passed alongside us heading southward until they (Romy and the
girl) reached the log lying on one side of the street. I did not notice what they were doing as I kept holding my man, the companion of the girl. We
were at a distance of about five meters from them. I then heard the girl screaming, so I told Romy, "That is enough; pity her." I noticed then that my
man was moving away. I did not stop my man from going away taut instead approached Romy, whose victim was calling for "Junior," her companion.
I told Romy to stop and leave the place. While I was about ten meters away from them (from Romy and the girl) I again heard the suppressed cry of
the girl and simultaneously I heard two successive shots fired from the direction of Romy and the girl. I continued my pace in haste southward while I
noticed that Romy was following me. Upon reaching the street corner which I found this morning to be that of Oroquieta and Bulacan, we separated
from each other, Romy heading towards Rizal Avenue while I went to La Loma and returned the .38 caliber Japanese Luger to Simeon Madayag.
Madayag was surprised to know that I took his firearm and he asked me for an explanation. I told him that I was drunk, not even telling him about the
crime Romy and I committed on that particular night. Afterwards I left for my home in Sampaloc. The wrist watch which I forcibly took from the man
was given by me to Romy on that same night of our robbery, while we were about to separate at the corner of Bulacan and Oroquieta streets. I do
not remember whether I have taken some other articles from our victims, as I was drunk at that time. I did not tell anybody about the crime I
committed with Romy on that night of June 4 because I was afraid of the relatives of the victims and of the police. I met Romy again yesterday
morning, June 28, when I was made to confront him in that office of the other building (pointing to the office of Captain Tenorio in the Bilibid
Compound). There he is (pointing to Alejandro Carillo y Almadin, alias Romy alias Romeo Reynaldo alias Amado Vergel). Although the place was
dark at that time, I was able to recognize the man whom I held up at the point of my gun on account of his proximity to me. There is the man

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(pointing to Marcelino Lontok, Jr.). I could hardly recognize the girl because she was led away by Romy, but the memory of her features is still fresh
in my mind, specially when she was in a reclining position on the log while Romy was stooping over her. (Exhibit E.)
On the afternoon of June 29, 1947, Alejandro Carillo was further interrogated by Detective J. P. Senen in the presence of Detective T. Calazan, and
he then and there pointed to and identified Toribio Raquenio as the same man whom he knew as Frank, "who was my companion when we held up
a couple at the corner of Pampanga and Oroquieta on June 4, 1947." The following is an excerpt from his answers to the questions propounded by
Detective Senen:
"The gun I used in the holdup was left by me in the possession of Simeon Madayag of 1472 Calavite, La Loma, Quezon City. I left it with him on
June 7, 1947, before I left Manila for Leyte. That gun is mine. I bought it from a friend of mine who is already dead. It is a .45 caliber Colt pistol. I left
it with Madayag because he is the only one I trust to take care of it. Aside from that, I had to leave it with him because I was afraid I would be
searched on the boat when I went home to Leyte. I have known Madayag since April, 1947, the same day I became acquainted with Frank. The only
article I took from my victims was the watch of the girl (Emma), but I think I dropped it when she resisted when I tried to rape her. The watch of
Lontok came to my possession because Frank gave it to me. I do not know where the other articles taken from our victims are now. As far as I know,
the gun used by Frank during the holdup was his, but I do not know where he got it. I do not know where Madayag is now. As to my educational
attainment, I finished the sixth grade. (Exhibit F.)
After Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio had confessed as above narrated, and as part of the investigation, they were taken by the detectives on
June 29, 1947, together with Marcelino Lontok, Jr., to the scene of the crime, which was ascertained to be the corner of Pampanga and Oroquieta
streets. Then and there they re-enacted the crime with a policewoman impersonating Emma. Photographs of the re-enactment were taken and
introduced in evidence during the trial. (Exhibits B-8, B-9, and B-10.)
After apprehending and investigating Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio the fiscal, on July 1, 1947, amended the information in this case by
dropping John Doe and charging Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and with attempted rape
and Saturnino Macawile as accessory after the fact.
Simeon Madayag, of 1472 Calavite, La Loma, Quezon City, mentioned by Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio in their confessions, turned out to
be a secret agent of the Department of the Interior, when he went to that Department on July 1, 1947, to surrender, according to him, the .45 caliber
pistol which he said had been left with his wife by Alejandro Carillo, he was informed that the Manila Detective Bureau wanted him for investigation.
He was immediately taken thereto and asked whether the pistol in question was really in his possession. He answered in the affirmative and then
and there surrendered it to Detectives Calazan and Senen.
Said pistol (Exhibit I) and the two empty shells found at the scene of the crime (Exhibits J and J-1) were delivered to the National Bureau of
Investigation for test and examination by Ballistics Expert Edgar Bond of that bureau to determine whether the said pistol was the same gun from
which the two shells had been fired. Mr. Edgar Bond fired three shots from the pistol Exhibit I in order to obtain therefrom the test shells Exhibits K,
K-1, and K-2. He then examined the two sets of shells under a comparison microscope and found from the congruent lines thereof that the two shells
Exhibits J and J-1 had been fired from the pistol Exhibit I. The congruences of the two sots of shells are graphically shown in Exhibits L, L-1, and L-2,
entitled "Ballistics Microphographic Chart," prepared by Ballistics Expert Edgar Bond and explained by him during the trial. He also made a written
report (Exhibit M) on the result of his ballistics examination, wherein he established the conclusion that the two shells Exhibits J and J-1 were fired
from the pistol Exhibit I.
Marcelino Lontok, Jr., one of the offended parties, testified during the trial to the facts set forth in the first two paragraphs of this decision. He also
identified the two appellants Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio as the robbers, saying that it was a moonlit night and that he was able to see
their features. He admitted on cross-examination that at first he pointed to the original defendant Saturnino Macawile (in lieu of Alejandro Carillo), but
explained: "As you will see from these two accused, there is semblance between the two, specially when Carillon hair was still long and not
cropped." He further testified that of the articles taken from him on the night in question he had been able to recover the watch (Exhibit D) in the
manner and under the circumstances narrated in the third paragraph of this decision. He said that he was sure that it was the same watch that had
been stolen from him because "just below the secondary dial, on the face of the watch, there is a small crack on the glass," and "in the spring
balance on the back there are some scratches."
Simeon Madayag, of 1472 Calavite, La Loma, Quezon City, testified during the trial in substance as follows:
"I know Alejandro Carillo because he used to go to my house once in a while in May and June, 1947. He wanted to court my sister-in-law. I know
also Toribio Raquenio because he used to go to my house sometimes with Romy (Alejandro Carillo) and one named Nestor; they used to go there
about three times a week. The Japanese pistol Exhibit N was the service pistol issued to me by the Department of the Interior in my capacity as
secret agent of said Department, and that pistol was defective. I gave it to my wife and secured another permit for a .45 caliber pistol. On June
4,1947, that pistol was placed by my wife in her vanity case and put under a drawer of the aparador in my house on Calavite. I did not at any time
lend that pistol to Toribio Raquenio. After June 23 or 24 (1947) I delivered that pistol (Exhibit N) to a repair shop. Members of the Detective Bureau
went personally to the repair shop to get it, but because they could not get it without my presence I went to get it myself and I gave it to them. That
was after I had delivered to the Detective Bureau on July 1 the .45 caliber automatic pistol Exhibit I. Exhibit I was given to my wife Antonieta Salazar
by one Romy, according to her, but I was not present when it was given to her.
Antonieta Salazar, 34) married to Simeon Madayag, and residing at 1472 Calavite, Quezon City, testified in substance as follows:
"I know the pistol Exhibit I because that was left in my possession by Romy (pointing to Alejandro Carillo) on June 7, 1947. He told me, 'Mining, I am
going to leave this (Exhibit I) to you first because I have to go someivhere." He did not tell me where he was going at that time. I came to know
Alejandro Carillo in May, 1947, when he went to the Funeraria Nacional. According to him he knew my brother-in-law who died. Since then he used
to come to our house for a visit. Sometimes he would come alone and at other times he would come with companions. I also know Toribio Raquenio
(pointing to the defendant by that name) because he used to be with Romy when he came to the house. I know the Japanese pistol Exhibit N
"because this is the revolver that my husband used when he was new in the Department of the Interior." On June 4, 1947, it was in my vanity case

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which I placed in the drawer under my aparador. Although I received the pistol Exhibit I from Alejandro Carillo on June 7, 1947, I did not report the
matter to my husband until June 29 or 30 because he was not at home. I was waiting for the owner to get it. The pistol Exhibit N was taken by the
police from the repair shop.
We have heretofore narrated in chronological order the facts and developments of the case as established by the prosecution through the testimony
of Detectives Jesus P. Senen, Wenceslao R. Leano, Jose Dimagiba, Leon O. Garcia, and Tomas Calazan, Police Photographer Remigio Abolencia,
Ballistics Expert Edgar Bond, and witnesses Marcelino Lontok, Jr., Simeon C. Madayag, and Antonieta Salazar, and through the written statements
Exhibits H and F of Alejandro Carillo and Exhibit E of Toribio Raquenio. We shall now relate the evidence for the defense.
Aside from his own testimony, Alejandro Carillo presented only one witness, Narciso Villegas. The latter testified that he was 23 years of age, single,
a prisoner at Muntinlupa, convicted of robbery; that while he was detained in the isolation cell in Bilibid Prison, he saw the accused Alejandro Carillo
there two months before October 1, 1947 (that is to say, about August 1, 1947); that he (witness) was the one keeping the key to the cells of the
prisoners; that it was his duty to search a prisoner for the isolation cell to see whether he had some contraband with him; that when he tried to
search the person of Alejandro Carillo, the latter told him that the sides of his body were painful and requested his permission to take off his clothes
himself; that witness allowed, him to do so "and when he took off his clothes I saw something in his body in that the left side of his body and under
his chest, left side, was bluish in color. I asked him why his body was black, and he told me, 'I was maltreated by the secret service men.' I allowed
him to get inside the isolation cell, telling his companion prisoners to allow him to lie down because he was not feeling well. That is all I can say." On
cross-examination he testified that the conversation he had with Carillo was witnessed by the guard who had brought Carillo; that the guard did not
attempt to stop him from talking with Carillo "because I was the one in charge of the key and it was necessary that I should search his pockets."
Testifying in his own behalf, Alejandro Carillo declared that on the afternoon of June 4, 1947, he was in Quiapo, Manila, working as a laborer or
cargador in the market; that he worked until 9 o'clock in the evening, when he went home and did not go out any more; that he did not know his
coaccused Toribio Raquenio until the day the latter was arrested "because the policemen were insisting that I was his companion"; that he did not
know anything as to the accusation against him of having robbed and killed Emma Foronda-Abaya on June 4, 1947; that he was not on Aurora
Avenue and Pampanga Street, Manila, on June 4, 1947; that he was arrested by the police in June in Tacloban, Leyte; that after his arrest he was
ordered by those who arrested him to admit "that case which occurred"; that he did not jet sign any document then; that he signed Exhibit F in
Manila; that "they ordered me to sign that document Exhibit F without my knowing its contents, they only told me to sign it"; that he did not give the
police the information contained in Exhibit F; that he did not sign Exhibit F voluntarily but was forced to do so; that from Tacloban he had fear of them
because they were pointing their revolvers at him.
"Q. They only pointed at you their revolvers?A. Yes, they pointed a revolver at my stomach and they beat me in the body.
"Q. "Who beat you in the body?A. Those who arrested me."
He admitted his signature to Exhibit H but claimed that he signed it without knowing its contents and that before signing it they did not read its
contents to him. He further testified that he did not know the watch Exhibit D; that he knew the revolver Exhibit I because on June 6 a friend of his
named Nestor delivered it to him; that at first he did not want to receive it because it had no license, but that he was afraid of Nestor because he
always beat him and for that reason he told Nestor, "Well, I am going to receive this Exhibit I on condition that I shall not use it; I shall keep it"; that
when he went to Leyte on June B he did not have the revolver in his possession because he left it with a friend of his who lived in La Loma. He
denied having sold the watch Exhibit D to Macawile. He claimed that his acts depicted in the photographs of the re-enactment of the crime, Exhibits
B-5, B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, and B-12, were not voluntary but that he acceded to the wishes of the police because he was afraid of them because they
carried long revolvers.
On cross-examination he admitted that the house on Esperanza street where he lived on June 4, 1947, was the same house where Saturnine
Macawile lived; that he had lived with Saturnino Macawile less than two years; that it was true that during the Japanese occupation he used to go
with Macawile but that he did not live with him in the same house then; that before going to Leyte he entrusted the revolver Exhibit I to a friend of his
whom he knew as Aling Tuning; that he delivered said revolver to Aling Tuning although Nestor did not know her "because if I kept that revolver in
my possession I possibly would be in bad plight because that revolver had no license."
"Q. If that is true, why did you accept this revolver from Nestor?A. Because he was in a hurry and he only left this on the table and then left.
"Q. Is that all the explanation you can give?A. Yes, sir."
He reiterated that on June 4 he went home at 9 o'clock; that he knew it was 9 o'clock because he had many friends in that house and he asked them
what time it was.
"Q. Why did you go home very late that night?A. I went home quite late that night because I entertained myself in the pool.
"Q. What is that pool you are referring to?A. It is a kind of game. I know how to play it.
"Q. Do you play pool every night?A. I do not play but only used to see.
"Q. Are you very sure that on June 4, 1947, about 9 o'clock in the evening, you were playing pool?A. I was not playing, I was only watching those
playing pool."
He admitted that after he was brought to the police station the police asked him many questions, but claimed that he was confused because they
asked him many things; that he answered them indifferently because he had bad presentiments about his mother and he was confused and did not
know what he was saying; that those who asked him questions did not write anything down.

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"Q. Did anyone of those who have testified here beat you?A. None of those who testified here beat me, because I know by face those who
maltreated me."
The accused Toribio Raquenio was the only one who testified in his own behalf. He gave his personal circumstances as 37 years of age, single,
residing at 55 Main street, Sampaloc, Manila. He declared in substance as follows: He was out of work on June 4, 1947, and was looking for a job
then. He did not remember having gone out on June 4, 1947. He did not know the accused Alejandro Carillo, alias Romy. He did not know anything
about the accusation against him of having, in company with Alejandro Carillo, held up and robbed Emma Foronda-Abaya and Marcelino Lontok, Jr.
He did not remember where he was on June 4, 1947. He was arrested on June 26. The signature on Exhibit E is his. He did not know the contents of
Exhibit E; it was not read to him by the police. He signed it because he was maltreated and in proof of that he had a scar on the lower lip. He was
maltreated by a detective whom he knew by face but who was not then in court. He was maltreated before he signed Exhibit E; he was kicked, and
when he fell on the floor they continued kicking him and he spat blood. He admitted that he knew Simeon Madayag. He did not know whether
Simeon Madayag possessed the .38 caliber Japanese Luger. He denied that he ever went with Alejandro Carillo to the house of Simeon Madayag.
He did not know whether the contents of Exhibit E are true or not.
On cross-examination he admitted having stayed in America 19 years. He indicated Detective Wenceslao Leano as the one and only one who had
maltreated him. He said that after his arrest the police asked him many questions, but that he never answered any of the questions, and that is the
reason why "they maltreated me"; that the only question he answered was that about his civil status. He admitted that he is from Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur. He also admitted that he has an uncle named Jesus Acosta who lives at 73 Nacar, San Andres. Upon being interrogated by the court, he
reiterated that he knew Simeon Madayag and knew where he lived but did not know the number. He admitted having been to the house of Simeon
Madayag but that he went there alone for a visit, looking for work.
The accused Saturnino Macawile, testifying in his own behalf, declared that he bought the Bulova watch Exhibit D from Romy (indicating the
accused Alejandro Carillo) for P3 on June 5 at 6:30 a.m. at his (witness') store in Quiapo; that he sold it for P10 to one Bidoy; that he did not know
that it was a stolen watch.
"Q. Did the detectives employ force or maltreat you before you told them from whom you bought this watch Exhibit D?"A. No, sir."
He said that he knew Alejandro Carillo only by the name Romy; that Romy used to go to his house because he courted someone there, the daughter
of his comadre.
Upon the evidence above set forth, Judge Felipe Natividad found the accused Alejandro Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of robbery with homicide, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Emma Foronda-Abaya in the sum of P2,000, and to return the stolen articles or their value aggregating P231.40;
and the accused Toribio Raquenio guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of against robbery with violence against and intimidation
of person, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with his coaccused Alejandro Carillo,
the offended parties in the sums of P131 and P100.40, respectively. The accused Saturnino Macawile was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
In their joint appeal, Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio, thru their counsel de oficio, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish their
guilt and ask for their acquittal. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends the imposition of the death penalty on the appellant Alejandro
Carillo and the increase of the maximum penalty meted out to appellant Toribio Raquenio.
Having heretofore set forth in detail the evidence adduced during the trial, our task in resolving the appeal is reduced to analyzing the chain of direct
and circumstantial evidence against the appellants to determine whether there is any missing or defective link which might warrant reversal.
The direct evidence consists of (1) the testimony of the eyewitness Marcelino Lontok, Jr., and (2) the confessions of the accused. The circumstantial
evidence consists of (1) the sale by Alejandro Carillo to Saturnino Macawile on the morning of June 5, 1947, of the Bulova watch Exhibit D, of which
Marcelino Lontok, Jr., had been robbed the previous evening; (2) the admission by Carillo and Macawile during the trial that they had known each
other and had lived in the same house for a long time, thus precluding any possible mistake by Macawile as to the identity of Carillo as the seller of
said watch; (3) the .45 caliber pistol Exhibit I, which was conclusively established to be the gun from which the two empty shells Exhibits J and J-1
found at the scene of the crime had been fired; (4) the testimony of the spouses Simeon Madayag and Antonieta Salazar that said pistol was left by
Alejandro Carillo with Antonieta Salazar on June 7, 1947, which fact was not denied but indirectly admitted by Alejandro Carillo during the trial; (5)
the testimony of the same spouses that the two appellants knew each other and used to frequent the house of said spouses at 1472 Calavite, La
Loma, Quezon City; (6) the .38 caliber Japanese Luger pistol Exhibit N, which according to the confession of Toribio Raquenio he took from the
house of said spouses and used in committing the crime in question and which said spouses identified during the trial; and (7) the flight of Alejandro
Carillo to Tacloban, Leyte, shortly after the commission of the crime. We find no defective link in this strong chain of circumstantial evidence, which
dovetails with the chain of direct evidence.
Appellant Carillo hammers on the weakness of the testimony of Marcelino Lontok, Jr., as to his identity, it appearing that said witness at first pointed
to Ma cavils in lieu of Carillo. Considering that Lontok and his companion were held up at night, although with moonlight, and that the robbers were
unknown to him, his testimony alone as to their identity would not be sufficient to convict the appellants, for his identification of them under the
circumstances could not be absolutely relied upon, as indeed he at first mistook Macawile for Carillo in view of some resemblance between the two.
It was, however, undoubtedly a mistake in good faith, not indicative of a will to 'prevaricate and not sufficient to divest his testimony of probatory
value as to the identity of the appellants, if we consider it, as we must, together with the rest of the evidence in this case. The trial judge, who saw
both Carillo and Macawile and who took Lontok's testimony into consideration, must have been satisfied with Lontok's explanation of his mistake due
to the resemblance between the said two accused as pointed out by Lontok during the trial.
The other link of direct evidence is the written confessions of the two appellants before the members of the Detective Bureau. Inasmuch as these
confessions were respectively repudiated by the appellants during the trial, we have to examine with caution and care the circumstances under
which they were given and the inherent veracity of their contents in relation to appellants' testimony during the trial, to determine whether they had

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been illegally extorted from them as they claimed. We are not unaware that some officers of the law resort to the illegal and reprehensible tactics of
extorting confessions thru violence and intimidation, and we have had occasion to express our condemnation of such tactics. Thus, in the case of
People vs. Ricardo Tipay, G.R. No. 49014 (March 31, 1944), we said:
"In this noonday of the twentieth century, when criminology and the investigation of crimes have developed into a science in all civilized countries
abreast with the progress and the ever-increasing enlightenment of the human race, to force or induce a suspect to incriminate himself thru violence,
torture, or trickery is a shameful disgracea reversion into the barbarism and the inquisitorial practices of the Dark Ages; and the minions of the law
who would still resort to such crude and cruel methods are universally regarded as anachronistic blockheads, who should be immediately lopped off
as a cancerous excrescence of the body politic."
The first written confession of appellant Alejandro Carillo is Exhibit II, which was taken by questions and answers in Tagalog by Detective D. Lapia
in the presence of Detective L. O. Garcia and written down by Stenographer D. B. Ferrer between 3:20 and 6:30 p.m. on June 24, 1947, the day
after Carillo was arrested in Tacloban, Leyte. Detective Garcia, as a witness for the prosecution, swore during the trial that Carillo answered the
questions propounded to him by Detective Diosdado Lapina and voluntarily signed and swore to Exhibit H before Fiscal Villamor after the latter had
read and explained its contents to the affiant, it is apparent from Exhibit H that it contains information which was known only to the affiant and which
could not have been known before by the investigator: the personal circumstances of the affiant; the places where he had resided before; that at the
age of 7 he was confined in Welfareville for theft; that he knew Frank (his coappellant); that he and Frank were in the house at 1472 Calavite, La
Loma, Quezon City, about 5 o'clock on June 4, 1947, and that from that house they went together to commit the crime in question; that he was then
armed with a 45-caliber pistol and Frank, with a Japanese Luger. At that time he told an untruth when he told the investigator that the .45 caliber
automatic pistol he used belonged to Frank and that after the crime he returned it to the latter before they separated. As a matter of fact, it was the
revelation made by appellant Carillo in Exhibit H that led the detectives to arrest his coappellant Toribio Raquenio, alias Frank. And after the latter
was arrested, Carillo was subjected to further interrogatories by Detective Senen in the presence of Detective Calazan, as shown by Exhibit F, in
which Carillo identified Raquenio as the same person to whom he had referred as Frank. It was then that for the first time Carillo revealed the truth
that the gun he had used had been left by him in the house of Simeon Madayag at 1472 Calavite and that that gun was his (Carillo's). Again it was
thru that information that the detectives recovered the .45 caliber pistol Exhibit I from Madayag.
It will be recalled that before Carillo was arrested in Tacloban, Leyte, on June 23, the detectives entertained the theory that the holdup men were
Saturnino Macawile and an unknown individual designated in the original information as John Doe. The detectives did not then know the facts
revealed by Carillo for the first time in his confessions Exhibits H and F. We therefore cannot give credence to the insinuation made by Carillo for the
first time during the trial of the case that the contents of Exhibits H and F were mere inventions of the detectives. The veracity of tire facts set forth in
said exhibits, with the exception of the statement made by Carillo in Exhibit H that the 45-caliber pistol belonged to Frank and was returned by him to
the latter after the commission of the crime, cannot be doubted. The very falsity of said statement as to the ownership of the pistol, which Carillo
subsequently rectified in Exhibit F, is in itself a clear proof that the contents of Exhibits H and F were not a fabrication of the detectives.
No one can doubt the veracity of a statement that turns out to be in conformity with the reality. If a person tells the police that he killed an individual
with a revolver after robbing him or his watch and that he buried his victim at a certain place and hid the revolver in another place and delivered the
watch to another person, and if the police finds the corpse in the place indicated by the killer and identifies it as that of the victim, and finds the
revolver in the other place mentioned by the confessed killer and also recovers the watch from the person to whom the killer said he had delivered it,
it would be impossible not to believe the statement of the killer even if he should subsequently deny it. What could not be believed is such denial.
Equally unbelievable is the testimony of Carillo during the trial when at first he said that he signed Exhibits F and H without knowing their contents
because the detectives ordered him to do so; then later he gave a stronger reason by saying that he was afraid of the police because they were
pointing their revolvers at him; and still later, after being prompted by his counsel, he gave a still stronger reason by saying that they beat him in the
body. But on cross-examination, when asked whether any of the detectives who had testified before him had beaten him, he answered that none of
them had. He could not point to any particular person as his alleged torturer. He did not even care to corroborate the testimony of his only witness,
Narciso Villegas, for the latter's testimony was not in any way referred to by him when he (Carillo) took the witness stand.
The testimony of Narciso Villegas is inherently incredible. In the first place, he was a convict of a crime involving moral turpituderobbery. In the
second place, if as he said he was in the isolation cell, we must assume that he was under disciplinary punishment and could not therefore have
been entrusted with the duty of the a trusty such as keeping the keys. Carillo, who was not yet then a convict but a mere detention prisoner, could
not have been placed in the isolation cell. And, lastly, the alleged physical examination or inspection made by Convict Villegas, during which he
claimed to have found a bluish spot on the chest of Carillo, took place, according to him, about August 1, 1947, that is to say, more than one month
after Carillo had signed Exhibits H and F. In any event, even assuming that there was such a bluish spot on Carillo's body, Carillo did not explain or
refer to it when he testified.
In this connection it is significant to note that although the detectives at first suspected Saturnino Macawile as the one who had robbed, ravished,
and killed Emma Foronda-Abaya, they did not use any force upon or maltreat him to extort a confession from him, according to his own testimony.
We must, therefore, conclude that Carillo's confessions Exhibits H and F were made by him voluntarily and without the employment of force or
intimidation on him.
The alibi set up by Carillo as a defense hardly merits any consideration at all. At first he claimed, that he worked in the Quiapo market as a cargador
until 9 o'clock in the evening on June 4, 1947. Later, on cross-examination he said that he stayed out late on that day because he was in a poolroora
watching the game.
Neither can we believe his testimony that the pistol Exhibit I was delivered to him on June 6 by a friend of his named Nestor. At first he said that he
accepted the gun from Nestor although it had no license because he was afraid of Nestor, as the latter always beat him. But on cross-examination
he changed that testimony by saying that he accepted the gun from Nestor because the latter was in a hurry "and he only left this on the table and
then left."

Page 10 of 228

The conclusion is inescapable from the foregoing analysis of the evidence that it leaves no room for any hypothesis consistent with appellant
Alejandro Carillo's innocence. We do not entertain the slightest doubt that he is guilty of the capital offense of robbery with homicide and attempted
rape, with which he was charged and duly tried. We shall consider the appropriate penalty later.
With regard to appellant Toribio Raquenio, he did not even care to set up an alibi. He said he did not remember where he was on June 4, 1947. We
find that his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by his confession Exhibit E; by the testimony of Marcelino Lontok, Jr., who identified him
as the robber who held him up at the point of a gun and robbed him; and by the testimony of the spouses Simeon Madayag and Antonieta Salazar.
His confession Exhibit E contains information regarding himself that could not have been known to the police. His claim, therefore, that it was a mere
invention or fabrication of the police cannot be believed.
Neither can we accept his pretension that he signed said confession because he had been maltreated. At first he said that the detective who had
maltreated him was not in court. Later he indicated Detective Wenceslao Leano, who was in court, as the one who had maltreated him. In rebuttal
Detective Leano denied that imputation, saying that he was not the one who took the statement of Raquenio and did not take part in his
investigation. Exhibit E shows that it was taken by Detective Tomas A. Calazan in the presence of Detective Senen. And Detective Jesus P. Senen
testified that Raquenio answered the questions propounded to him by Detective Calaaan and signed the statement voluntarily after having read it.
We likewise, therefore, do not entertain any doubt as to the guilt of this appellant.
Appellant Toribio Raquenio did not participate in the attempted rape and killing of Emma Foronda-Abaya but tried to induce his companion Alejandro
Carillo to desist therefrom. The trial court was right in finding him guilty only of robbery with violence against and intimidation of person, which is
penalized in paragraph 5 of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prisi6n correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its medium period.
However, the trial court erred in not considering the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, which facilitated the commission of the offense and
rendered detection difficult (People vs. Corpus, 43 Off.Gaz., 2249).
Therefore, with the only modification that the maximum of the indeterminate penalty imposed should be, as it is hereby, increased to ten years of
prision mayor, the sentence as to the appellant Toribio Raquenio is affirmed, with costs.
The appellant Alejandro Carillo is guilty of robbery with homicide as well as of attempted rape. Robbery with homicide is penalized in paragraph 1 of
article 294 with reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court erred in not considering the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism, said appellant
having been convicted twice of robbery; (2) nocturnity, which facilitated the commission of the offense and rendered detection difficult; and (3) abuse
of superior strength, considering his sex and the weapon he used in the act which overcame the victim and rendered her unable to defend herself
from his savage aggression (United States vs. Gonsuelo, 13 Phil. 612). The attempted rape committed by this appellant on the same occasion may
be penalized separately, but we think there is no need to do so, and we consider it only as a further aggravation of the offense. There is no mitigating
circumstance.
Alejandro Carillo has proved himself to be a dangerous enemy of society. The latter must protect itself from such enemy by taking his life in
retribution for his offense and as an example and warning to others. In these days of rampant criminality it should have a salutary effect upon the
criminally minded to know that the courts do not shirk teas their disagreeable duty to impose the death f& penalty in cases where the law so requires.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we modify the sentence of the trial court as to the appellant Alejandro Carillo y Almadin
by imposing, as we hereby impose upon him, the penalty of death, affirming the sentence in all other respects. This sentence shall be executed in
accordance with the provisions of articles 81 and 82 of the Revised Penal Code on a date to be fixed by the trial court within thirty days after the
return of the record of the case to said court. It is so ordered.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

Page 11 of 228

[ G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999 ]

PANFILO M. LACSON, PETITIONER VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being
challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against
them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was approved
by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder[2] before the
Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was dropped
from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7]
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused are government
officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused
has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249[13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5,
1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution [14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,

Page 12 of 228

ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.

On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering
the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop
and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has
competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and
by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis
supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to
all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were
under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than
defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and
an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They
further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer
avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions
of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof
additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged
the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within
the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486[21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the
Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No.
1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

Page 13 of 228

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned
in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;

Page 14 of 228

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where
all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent[28] or
higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme
Court except in certain cases,[29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A.
1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2)
the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law [33] because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the

Page 15 of 228

co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the
law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1)
it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2)
it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those
similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any
court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two
Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had
expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the
committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not
constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary
by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever
it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto
law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)
which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or

which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed,
which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. [44]

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f)
that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
(g)
deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;[47] or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment
of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times [50] considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included

Page 16 of 228

in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not
partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law
did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. [55] On the removal of the
intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording
in the title of the law that it defines the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title [57] is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is
severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of the
law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law
as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as
to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires
that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63]
This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall
have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,
in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. [65] This intimate relation between the offense
charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal
charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and
intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO

Page 17 of 228

F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of their
public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused
his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein
as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office,
there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),
we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an
essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a
factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960]), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen
and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is
under his command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose
of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot
and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official

Page 18 of 228

functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and GonzagaReyes, JJ., concur.

Page 19 of 228

[ G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol
convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the
second crime.[1]
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later referred to the Court en banc in view of the problematical issue of
whether to sustain the trial court's judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,[2] People vs. Tiozon,[3] People vs.
Caling,[4] People vs. Jumamoy,[5] People vs. Deunida,[6] People vs. Tiongco,[7] People vs. Fernandez,[8] and People vs. Somooc,[9] or to modify the
judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros,[10] which this Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
The informations read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the
opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident
of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm,
hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought
for or taken advantage of by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime.[11]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry and have in his possession, custody
and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm from competent
authorities which firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the crime of Murder with
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 1866. [12]
Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint hearings were had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were
SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Greg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis.
The defense presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the appellant himself.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight occurred
between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former's sister. Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim.
Cases 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held in the same place. This benefit dance was attended bv Rosita Iroy, Ariel
Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing area, Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then
sitting at the plaza (the area where they positioned themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four meters from the dancing hall), decided
to just watch the activities in the dance hall directly from the plaza.
After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the dance area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while
facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita lroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly, appellant
fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant
shot her brother; while appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime,
Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of
the preceding paragraphs).
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting Chief of Police Felipe Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula
Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the police blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the appellant.
But they were unable to locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father Teogenes Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and

Page 20 of 228

then, appellant was pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in the police blotter
as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-6).[13]
The slug was embedded at the midbrain.[14] Diosdado Iroy died of
Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. left
occipital area, transacting cerebellum up to midbrain.[15]
The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly
licensed firearm holder as verified from a consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the province[16] and was not authorized to carry a firearm
outside his residence.[17]
The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because he was positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It
summarized his testimony in this wise:
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that in the afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their house At 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit passengers. They transported
passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the evening. They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan.
Before the arrival of Trans Asia Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two passengers for Graham Avenue near
La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk with
Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his aunties scheduled to arrive aboard MV Cebu City. They were not able to pick up passengers which, as
a consequence, they went home. They had on their way home passengers for the Agora Public Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at
Bil-isan, Panglao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis, Bohol
at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.[18]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged and sentenced him accordingly. It appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering that the appellant shot
the victim at the back of the head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive portion of the decision dated 30 September 1993 reads as
follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law
and to pay the cost.
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
punished under Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1866 as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence from Seventeen (17) years
Four (4) months and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the
cost.
The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain at the back portion of the head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in favor
of the government.
It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from the term of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has not executed a waiver. [19]
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the decision an award of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal
Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order directing the appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of their son and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses.[20] The order was to form an integral part of the decision.
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.[21]
The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that the trial court erred
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY
AND FELIPE NIGPARANON.
II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED ARANZADO, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO
IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO.
III
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SP04 FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN
FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[22]
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the killer of Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer was
not identified, he attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SP04 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a motive "to
put him in a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado, the victim, boxed him on the night of 25 December
1992 because he allegedly "bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the person who shot Diosdado considering their
respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and ran towards
the crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the appellant considers it as suppression of evidence when the prosecution did not present as
witnesses Diosdado's companions who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot.
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said witness is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for
arbitrary detention had already been filed against him by the appellant. The appellant further claims of alleged omissions and unexplained entries in
the police blotter.

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Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, according to him, gained strength because of the lack of evidence on
the identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having been informed that he, among
many others, was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of Diosdado Iroy -- specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim
is to be believed that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy.
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged decision.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit.
The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly persuade. The appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost
to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human experience that it would be the
appellant who would have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convincing evidence was shown that Rosita had any
reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she
was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother only after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows
beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:
Q
You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place and you went out, about what time did you get out?
A
11:00 o'clock.
Q
And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the incident happened?
A
Yes, I was standing.
Q
And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and getting near going to my brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I
A
saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother Diosdado Iroy.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Q
And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting at the plaza to the dancing place?
A
More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A
Yes, your honor.
Q
And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or illuminated?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What kind of light illuminated the place?
A
I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.
Q
Was it an electric light?
A
It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q
Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?
A
It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from the house.
Q
You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place was enclosed at that time and there was a gate, an opening?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What material was used to enclose the dancing place?
A
Bamboo.
Q
And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of the dancing place to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A
Five (5) meters.
Q
You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house, now whose house was that?
A
The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family name.
Q
Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?
A
Yes sir.
Q
And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house of Fe and Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A
About six (6) meters distance.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
Q
What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing place?
A
The white bulb.[25]
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . . observing the attitude and deportment of witnesses while listening
to them speak (People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince
the trial court that they were telling the truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or
the forthright tone of a ready reply;[26] or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone,
the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[27]
The appellant has miserably failed to convince us that we must depart from this rule.

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Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the non-presentation as prosecution witnesses any of the
companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he was shot. In the first place, the said companions could not have seen from their back
the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most, only corroborate that of Rosita
Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the said companions were not available to the appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section 3
(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness
is merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the accused.[28]
The alleged improper motive on the part of SP04 Nigparanon simply because he is a neighbor of the Iroy; remains purely speculative, as no
evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship affected SP04 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.[29] As to the alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter, the same
were sufficiently clarified by SP04 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was positively identified by a credible witness. It is a fundamental
judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. [30] Besides, for that defense to prosper it is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[31] As testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf,
where the appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about thirty minutes to
traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle.[32] It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This argument
is plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating circumstance.[33]
Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.[34]
The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the appellant had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm
then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under
the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:
SEC. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition -- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an,[35] and reiterated in People vs. Tiozon,[36] People vs. Caling,[37] People vs. Jumamoy,[38]
People vs. Deunida,[39] People vs. Tiongco,[40] People vs. Fernandez,[41] and People vs. Somooc,[42] that one who kills another with the use of an
unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal
possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty
of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an
accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these
are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy will not apply. We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that
when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited
double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of
an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in
principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide or murder; however, the killing of a person
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.
In Tiozon, we stated:
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The
rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, x x x." In fine
then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to
the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
In People vs. Doriguez, [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle to a prosecution
of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
In People vs. Bacolod [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations of physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded
guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:

Page 23 of 228

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the
other.
Since the informations were for separate offense[s] -- the first against a person and the second against public peace and order -- one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 can also be separately charged with and convicted of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed
Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty
thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others,
"unlawfully possess any firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit and/or license
therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use of (such)
an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated
simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is Aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide
or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is
the latter absorbed in the former. There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which may be either
simple or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD 1866. The other is homicide or
murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the crime under
P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is
obviously distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and
punished for the two separate offenses of violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Thus:
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of firearms or
ammunition with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second paragraph thereof, the penalty is
increased to death if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide or murder
qualifies the offense because both are circumstances which increase the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is
absorbed in the offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would result whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person with the use of an
unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) the violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to bar the other; stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished by a special law while the second - Murder or Homicide - is punished by the Revised
Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that the
imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion
perpetua. (emphasis supplied)
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an information for murder and pursuing only the information for
"Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court categorically declared:
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined in
the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and, therefore,
does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs. People, involving the violation of P.D.
No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-an,
People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that document, although both the Information and the decision of the trial
court used the term "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been supposed to connote a "complex crime" as
used in the Revised Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no complex
crime of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a firearm
without a license or authority for such possession. This offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed firearm is shown
to have been used in the commission of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The killing of a human being,
whether characterized as homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is separately punished
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995 in People vs. Barros,[43] we set aside that portion of the appealed
decision convicting the appellant of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form. We therein made the following statement:
[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but
only that of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.
The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred to therein read as follows:
This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime should properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm through the use of which a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so situated should be liable only for
the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession of the firearm punished by death under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree
No. 1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from the holding which would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in addition to that

Page 24 of 228

for the illegal possession of the firearm used to commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the simple possession
punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of Section 1. Where, complementarily, the
unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will convert the erstwhile simple illegal possession into the
graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the homicide or murder constitutes the essential element for integrating into
existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical and unjustifiable to use
the very same offenses of homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said capital offense, and then treat the former all over again
as independent offenses to be separately punished further, with penalties immediately following the death penalty to boot.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint, virtually of the nature of the so-called, special complex crimes,"
which should more appropriately be called composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and Article 335. They are neither of the same legal
basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less
grave felonies nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of
two or more offenses.
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the conceptual definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the
Code imposes a single definite penalty therefor, it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as separate offense, but with only the
single penalty prescribed by law. Thus, even where a single act results in two less grave felonies of serious physical injuries and serious slander by
deed, the offense will not be punished as a delito compuesto under Article 48 but as less serious physical injuries with ignominy under the second
paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is integrated into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer separately
punished.
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as the discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when an
offense becomes a component of another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus aggravated by the integration of the other, the
former is not to be further separately punished as the majority would want to do with the homicide involved in the case at bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a question of classification for purposes of the other provisions of the
Code. The theory in Tac-an that the principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and the killing shall merely be included in
the particulars or, better still, as an element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here is actually source from
the very provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the various laws and presidential decrees to
harmonize their provision" which "must be updated and revised in order to more effectively deter violators" of said laws.
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlying the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be
charged is still carnapping, although the penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The
same situation, with escalating punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein the principal crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the matter of
destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts punished under said
article of the Code.
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal possession of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or,
conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the possible application of the provision
on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty for aggravated illegal possession of a firearm is the
single indivisible penalty of death, in which case the provision on recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not established but
either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism may have some significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof, the accused
was convicted of a crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another crime under the same title of the Code.
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to be imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession
are charged in separate informations, from what has been said the appropriate course of action would be to consolidate the cases and render a joint
decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such possession and the unlawful taking of life shall have
been proved, or for only the proven offense which may be either simple illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural rule and
substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for each offense was drawn up and these informations were individually assigned to
different courts or branches of the same court.
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the homicide or murder could be susceptible of abuse since it
entails undue concentration of prosecutorial powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was committed with a firearm will necessarily
be known to the police or prosecutorial agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and obtention of evidence to show that the
firearm is unlicensed.
Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging therein that the same was committed by means of an unlicensed
firearm, the case would not fall under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein, but without alleging the lack of a
license therefor as where that fact has not yet been verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if proved in that case, would not affect the
accused either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.
Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but the
same is inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated with the information for illegal possession, then any conviction that may result from the former
would only be for simple illegal possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent prosecution for homicide or murder prospers, the
objective of Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only be for the unlawful
killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may be proved.
In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that the real offense committed by the accused, and for which sole

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offense he should be punished, is the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the writer's position that the possible problems
projected herein may be minimized or obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one information or that the trial thereof, if separately
charged, be invariably consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly, this is the course necessarily indicated since only a single composite crime is
actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and dispose thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the penalty
for the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or
homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm in instances where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy
deliberation thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida,
Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court
away from a dangerous course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers through Judicial
legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not enunciate an "unfortunate doctrine" or a "speciously
camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense."
If Tac-an did in fact enunciate such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a convincing
number of years, so must the same verdict be made in our decision in People vs. De Gracia,[44] which was promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter
case, we held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between that
situation and the case where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements:
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a
rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him
was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose
active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives
and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of
appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Article
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal
Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably
be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession
of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained that said
provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if
considered highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. It follows that, subject to the presence of requisite elements in each
case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case
cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code with
variant elements.
We cannot justify what we did in De Gracia with a claim that the virtue of fidelity to a controlling doctrine, i.e., of Tac-an, had compelled us to do so.
Indeed, if Tac-an enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" which is "an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions
of common sense," then De Gracia should have blazed the trail of a new enlightenment and forthwith set aside the "unfortunate doctrine" without any
delay to camouflage a judicial faux pas or a doctrinal quirk. De Gracia provided an excellent vehicle for an honorable departure from Tac-an because
no attack on the latter was necessary as the former merely involved other crimes to which the doctrine in Tac-an might only be applied by analogy.
De Gracia did not even intimate the need to reexamine Tac-an; on the contrary, it adapted the latter to another category of illegal possession of
firearm qualified by rebellion precisely because the same legal principle and legislative purpose were involved, and not because De Gracia wanted to
perpetuate an "unfortunate doctrine" or to embellish "the expanding framework of our criminal law from barnacled ideas which have not grown apace
with conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because it has become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has
always been the obstacle to the virtues of change," as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly believes
that Tac-an laid down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on doctrinal concepts of penal laws and assails even
the ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not be laid at the doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did in
Tac-an was to apply the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an interpretation or the application of the niceties of legal
hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty is merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and
that in the course of such application or construction it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation modify, revise,
amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.[45]
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code[46] as crimes against persons. They are mala in se because malice or
dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor.[47] On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special penal
law,[48] P.D. No. 1866. It is a malum prohibitum[49] which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law powers,
so condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the
upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and

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explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence,
there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed
is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be clearly understood that this animus
possidendi is without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. [50]
A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibilum and their distinctions is an exercise in futility.
We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally provides for such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single
integrated offense which is punished as such. The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single offense into two but, worse, it resorted
to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a
component crime which is also an element of the former.
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal possession with murder punished with a single penalty have been divided
into two separate offenses of illegal possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a compounded infringement of legislative
powers for this Court to now, as it has done, treat that single offense as specifically described by the law and impose reclusion perpetua therefor
(since the death penalty for that offense is still proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of murder in order to be able
to impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential
murder (or homicide) is an integrated element or integral component since without the accompanying death, the crime would merely be simple illegal
possession of a firearm under the first paragraph of Section 1.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal possession and
resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single and integrated offense" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as
a result or on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its unequivocal and explicit language, which we quote to
be clearly understood:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE
of an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is penalized therein. There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the commission of
homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1, and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender, but a secondary event or
circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of the commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the second, the killing,
which requires a mens rea, is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm.
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also apply the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing
Stiffer Penalties Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated offense or a
special complex offense because the death therein occurs as a result or on the occasion of the commission of the offenses therein penalized or was
not the primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties. -- Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be
punished by:
a. Piracy. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage.-- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
SEC. 8. Penal provisions. -- Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be
punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on
the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:
SECTION. 3. Penalties.-- Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as
follows:
a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are used: Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in physical injury to person, the penalty shall
be imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death;
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are used: Provided, that if the use of such substances results (1) in
physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death; x x x (emphasis supplied)
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a
person. Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such
a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to
aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are
palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is
obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in

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killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua -- to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in using
an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with death if either crime is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have been the intention of
the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the
penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information
charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death .... The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying circumstance. This would not be without precedent. By
analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section provides that
when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
definition of the crime and the application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm
so illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity that would
defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is
used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion, create two offenses by dividing a single offense into two. Neither
did it resort to the "unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by
using a component crime which is also an element of the former." The majority has always maintained that the killing of a person with the use of an
illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form.
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it
define and punish a single integrated offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE
OCCASION OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth noting is the rule in statutory
construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation,[51] leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law. [52]
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated crime or composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain of
integration of the essential elements of one crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light of the clear language and indubitable purpose
and intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology, the determination of what should be criminalized, the
definition of crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate, the legislature may
even create from a single act or transaction various offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations set forth by the Constitution. This
Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single integrated crime or composite crimes.
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts is the rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that the majority view offends the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under the "sameevidence" test enunciated in People vs. Diaz.[53] He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder in the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with
murder would be different from the evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone. In the second charge, the illegal possession
is not in issue, except peripherally and inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying circumstance in the second charge, hence the
evidence therefor is immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the crime is only
simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because murder is the very subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other
requirements under Section 7, Rule 117 are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily present and can be validly raised to bar
the second prosecution for murder?
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases of the other composite crimes for which a single penalty is
imposed, such as the complex, compound and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a person convicted of estafa
through falsification under Article 48 can be validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or falsification; or how the accused
convicted of robbery with homicide under Article 294 can be legally charged again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or homicide;
or how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can be duly haled before the court again to face charges of either
the same rape or homicide. Why, then, do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since the very same offense was an
indispensable component for the other composite offense of illegal possession of firearm with murder? Why would the objection of non bis in idim as
a bar to a second jeopardy lie in the preceding examples and not apply to the cases now before us?
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in this case. For another, the so-called "sameevidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which
is covered by Section 21, Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act. This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero,[54]
from where People vs. Relova[55] quotes the following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains
that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (italics in the original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for

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the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he
is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The
second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the
other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in
the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown
to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.[56] The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved.[57]
It may be noted that to determine the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."[58]
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was brought to the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July
1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:
[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . .
This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August 1916. [59] Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones
Law provision was recast with the addition of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof provided as
follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21, Article III of the present Constitution.
This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form
are different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the
former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the subject provision would violate
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be
modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal
Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in
the first case, as amended by the Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty imposed in the second case is changed to
Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Melo, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, JJ., joined J.
Regalado in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
Regalado, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hermosisima, J., see concurring opinion.
Hermosisima, J., see concurring opinion.

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G.R. No. L-7557, U.S. v. Serapio

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
December 7, 1912
G.R. No. L-7557
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE S. SERAPIO, defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant. W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This defendant was charged with the crime of libel, alleged to have been committed as follows:
I. On or about the month of December, 1907, in the municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Bulacan, P.I., the said accused, Jose S. Serapio, did
willfully and criminally, with the intention of attacking, reviling, and exposing to public hatred and scorn the good name, virtue, and reputation of
Bonifacio Morales, write, publish, and send by mail, addressed to the Executive Secretary, an anonymous communication, the pertinent portion
whereof is as follows:
"11. Bonifacio Morales is the murdered of 12 peaceful and honest men, who are: Mariano Ramirez, municipal president of Bocaue; teacher of the
primary school of Marilao, Emigdio Perez, Candido del Rosario, Juan de Vera, Manuel Valderrama, a boy 13 years old of the barrio of Alangalang,
one Budio, musician, Mariano Mendoza, all of Santa Maria, an old man of the barrio of Sapang-palay of San Jose and two brothers, sons of
Francisco Pascual of Norzagaray. He has committed various assaults and robberies, which are: The robbery of Capatin Ciano Caluloua of
Meycauayan, the robbery of Simeona of Angat, whereby a girl 12 or 13 years old was killed, the robbery of P420 from Juana Reyes of Bocaue, all in
the year 1899."
II. On the same date or time, to wit, December, 1907, in the municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Bulacan, P.I., the said accused, Jose S.
Serapio, did willfully and criminally, with the intention of attacking, reviling, and exposing to public hatred and scorn the good name, virtue, and
reputation of Bonifacio Morales, write, publish, and send by mail, addressed to the Executive Secretary, an anonymous communication, the pertinent
portion whereof is as follows:
"12. Bonifacio Morales is known in the Secret Service Department of Manila as a criminal, whose crimes the detective Manuel Arbona discovered in
the year 1903."
III. At the same time, to wit, December, 1907, in the same place and province, the said accused, Jose S. Serapio, did willfully and criminally, with the
intention of attacking, reviling, and exposing to public hatred and scorn the good name, virtue, and reputation of Bonifacio Morales, write, publish,
and send by mail, addressed to the Executive Secretary, an anonymous communication, the pertinent portion whereof is as follows:
"15. Bonifacio Morales is an inveterate gambler and to get money he uses diabolical methods, as in the case of the General Santa Ana in 1903, who
surrendered voluntarily in order to get within the pale of the law, but Morales tried to demonstrate to the Government that he was caught by him in
order to secure the reward offerred by the Government.
"All the foregoing is little, if the provincial government would get interested in discovering many crimes committed in the province by Morales and his
people."
IV. All the facts above specified were written, published, and addressed to the Executive Secretary of the Islands by the said accused maliciously,
willfully, and at the time the slandered Bonifacio Morales was discharging the duties of the office of justice of the peace of the municipality of Santa
Maria, Province of Bulacan, P.I., and all the acts above specified were committed in violation of the law.
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned. Upon arraignment the defendant, by his attorneys, presented the following demurrer:
I. The facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a crime.
II. It appears from the allegation in the complaint that if there were a crime it has prescribed.
The fiscal of the Province of Bulacan and the attorney for the defendant, each presented written and oral arguments against and in support of said
demurrer. The attorney for the defendant (p. 82 of Expediente) seems to have waived his contention that the facts stated in the complaint were
insufficient a cause of action.

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After hearing the arguments of the respective parties, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, in a very interesting opinion, decided that the first
ground of said demurrer was not well founded, but sustained the second, and ordered the prosecuting attorney of the province to present a new
complaint.
With reference to the second ground of the demurrer, Judge Barretto in his decision said:
"With reference to the second ground for exception, counsel for the defense maintains that the crime has prescribed under the provisions of the laws
in force in the Islands and supports such conclusion by asserting that in the absence of a definite provision in Act No. 277 of the Philippine
Commission, which fixes the time during which the penal action arising from the crime of libel may be exercised, the time which article 131 of the
Penal Code fixes for the prescription of the crimes of calumny and insults is strictly applicable.
Against this contention of the defense, the Attorney-General and the private prosecutor maintain that the prescription of a general nature contained
in said article 131 is not applicable, for two reasons:
First, because the crime of libel is entirely distinct and independent from calumny and insults; and
Second, because that provision of the code in the matter of prescription of crimes is not applicable to the crimes created and punished by special
laws promulgated by the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature.
After carefully considering the case, the court finds that while the crime of libel differs from that of calumny, defined and penalized in article 452, it is
not so with respect to the crimes of insults provided for and penalized in articles 456 et seq. of the Penal Code. Under said articles and the first
paragraph of article 277, the court does not understand to exist the same essential difference between the crime of insults in writing and that of libel.
In both the object of the perpetrator of the crime is to attack the honesty, virtue, or reputation of a person, exposing him to public hatred, scorn or
ridicule, characteristic elements that are likes is found in the crime of insults in writing, defined and penalized in article 456 of the Penal Code, in
connection with 458 thereof. It is certain that Act No. 277 has not in any way fixed the prescription for the penal action in the crimes of libel. There is
no provision in said Act that fixes the time within which the action arising from a libelous imputation may prescribe, but it is not less certain that by
applying the rule that a criminal act is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such prescription, the crime of libel and others could be
prosecuted at anytime, which would naturally make the provisions of the Act absurd, for a case might arise where a penal action might be exercised
even after the person concerned in the crime or responsible therefor had died.
In support of his contention, the Attorney-General cites the precedent established by the court in the cases of U. S. vs. Lao Lock Hing (14 Phil. Rep.,
86) and U. S. vs. Calaguas (14 Phil. Rep., 739). What the Supreme court has established in these cases is that the rules of the Penal Code cannot
be applied in the penalty to be imposed in the crimes punished by a special Act, but only the characteristics and special American principles of
discretion in the punishment. In said cases the Supreme Court has laid down no principle applicable to the case at bar, that is, to prescription of the
crime.
The court believes that the provisions of the Penal Code with reference to the extinction of penal responsibility are applicable to the case, like those
of a general character included in Book I of the Penal Code, which refer to the essential requisites common to all crimes. No special law fixes these
or defines crime, but starting from the definition previously laid down by the common penal legislation it defines and establishes the requisites
peculiar to the special crime it is sought to correct; but still, the court thinks that no one can deny that before classifying an act as a special crime it
becomes necessary to see whether or not the essential requisites common to every crime are present. If such principles are of undoubted
application, even without express provision of the special law, the court thinks that those of the general legislation fixing the period within which the
penal responsibility is extinguished are likewise, for both are essential to make the law consistent and reasonable. Under these considerations, the
court holds that the ground for exception indicated should be sustained, and he therefore sustains the second ground of demurrer or exception, and
understanding that said objection can be corrected, orders the presentation of a new complaint.
From that decision an appeal was taken to this court by Mr. Imperial, acting for the Government, who made the following assignments of error:
The trial court incurred a legal error in sustaining the second ground of demurrer, and in declaring that the crime alleged in the complaint has
prescribed in accordance with the third paragraph of article 131 of the Penal Code of the Philippines.
Under this assignment of error the only question presented by the appellant is, whether the prescription fixed by article 131 of the Penal Code for the
offense of calumny and insults (arts. 452-457) is applicable to the crime of libel as defined and punished under Act (No. 277) of the Philippine
Commission.
Calumy, as defined by the Penal Code, is: "The false imputation of a crime upon which a prosecution might be instituted by the Government on its
own motion." (art. 452.) This false imputation of crime may be expressed publicly in writing (art. 453) or orally (art. 454). The punishment provided,
when the calumny is expressed publicly in writing, "is prision correccional minimum and medium degrees" (imprisonment from six months and one
day to four years and two months) ("and a fine of not more than 12,500 pesetas" (P2,500) (art. 453). If the calumny is expressed orally simply, the
punishment is "arresto mayor in its minimum degree (imprisonment from one month and one day to two months) and a fine of not less than 625 and
not more than 6,250 pesetas" (P125 to P1,250) (art. 454).
It will be noted by reading said articles 453 and 454, that the punishment for calumny depends not only upon whether it was expressed publicly, in
writing or orally, but also whether the crime imputed was "a grave felony," or "a less grave felony." When a felony is grave or less grave is defined by
the Penal Code. (Art. 6.).
In the case of the crime of "insults"," it may be either a statement or an act. In case it is a statement, it may also be either in writing or orally. The
penalty fixed for insults also depends on whether the offense is "grave," "less grave," or "trifling." The punishment for the offense of "insults," "grave"
or "less grave" is banishment, in its minimum and maximum degrees (for a period of two years four months and one day, to six years) "and a fine of

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not less than 325 and not more than 6,250 pesetas" (P65 to P1,250). (Art. 458.) If the insults is "trifling" the punishment is "arresto mayor in its
minimum degree" (imprisonment for a period of one month and one day to two months) "and a fine of not less than 325 and not more than 3,250
pesetas" (P65 to P650).
The crime of libel is defined by the law (Act No. 277) of the Philippine Commission as "a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing,
or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."
Under this law (Act No. 277) it will be noted that the crime of libel can never be committed by oral expressions; it must always be expressed either in
writing, printing or by signs or pictures or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions. The punishment provided under said Act (No. 277) is always within
the sound discretion of the court. The court, in fixing the penalty, is not limited by any of the rules of the Penal Code in relation to the grades of
punishment therein prescribed.
It is contended by the appellee, that inasmuch as the Act(No. 277) of the Philippine Commission covers a part of the offenses of calumny and insults,
that it is not a special law, as that phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code, and that the provisions of article 131 (of the Penal Code) relating to
calumny and insults apply to the crime of libel as defined by said Act (No. 277). This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that
phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning applied to
the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? Both under the common law and the civil law, one of the general classifications of laws is
that of (a) general and (b) special. The first, or general law, is defined as a law which applies to all of the people of the state or to all of a particular
class of persons in the state, with equal force and obligation. A special law, as the phrase is generally used, is a law which applies to particular
individuals in the state or to a particular section or portion of the state only. The phrase "general law" is sometimes substituted by the phrase "public
law" in the contradiction to special or private law. Mr. Black, in his very valuable law dictionary, defines a general law, as contra distinguished from
one that is special or local, as a law that embraces a class of subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such
class.(Van Riper, et al. vs. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 1.) It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code
(article 7) is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A
careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification
of that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it
(the crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code. We are confirmed in this opinion by an examination of the Spanish jurisprudence upon the
same subject. Viada (1 Viada, 84), in his valuable commentaries on the provisions of the Penal Code, in discussing article 7, practically limits himself
to an examination of "leyes especiales" to which the provisions of the Penal Code are not applicable. In answering the question: "Cuales son las
leyes especiales que penan delitos," he simply enumerates such laws as follows, to wit:
1. Ordennaza Militar;
2. Ley de Organizacion y Attribuciones de los Tribunales de Guerra:
3. Codigo Penal del Ejercito;
4. Ley de Enjuiciamiento Militar;
5. Delitos de Contrabando y Defraudacion;
6. Delitos Electorales;
7. Ordenanzas de Montes;
8. Ley Municipal;
9. Ley Reclutamiento y reemplazo del Ejercito;
10. Ley sobre policia;
11. Ley sobre conservacion de los Ferrocarriles;
12. Ley de Caza;
13. Ley sobre Usurpacion;
14. Ley sobre la Falsificacion de Patentes de Invencion;
15. Ley sobre Proteccion a los Menores;
and others which might be mentioned.
An examination of these laws denominated "leyes especiales," as that phrase is used in the Penal Code, shows that, in fact, most of them are
general laws in the sense that they apply to all the persons in the state or to all of a particular class. The rule which we now adopt, to wit: That, when
a crime is made punishable by a law other than by the provisions of the Penal Code, the provisions of said code do not apply, as has been
heretofore announced by this court. (U.S. vs. Lao Lock Hing, 14 Phil. Rep., 86; U. S. vs. Calaguas, 14 Phil. Rep., 739). In the case of U. S. vs. Lao

Page 32 of 228

Lock Hing, supra, the defendant was charged with a violation of the Opium Law. (Sec. 31, Act No. 1761.) In deciding the case, the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Torres, said:
The crime under consideration consists of the violation of a special law as referred to in article 7 of the Penal Code, and consequently the provisions
of said code and the classification of the crimes comprised therein are not applicable in the present case. The crime must be punished under the
provisions of the Act (No. 1761) which the sovereign power, by virtue of its authority's a fit to enact for the good of the country and its inhabitants.
Wherefore, inasmuch as it is an act which the lawmaker has declared to be invested with the attributes of a crime, the overruling of the demurrer and
the prosecution of the case are in accordance with the law.
In the case of U. S. vs. Calaguas, supra, the defendant was charged with having, by means of a wrench, removed several screws and fish plates
from the line of the railroad, in the municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of Nueva Ecija. It was alleged that he thereby damaged the line and that a
derailment of the train would have occurred, had it not been discovered in time. The court decided that the "Ley de Ferrocarriles" was a ley especial,
under said article 7, and that the general provisions of the Penal Code did not apply. This court, speaking through its chief justice, Mr. Arellano, said:
Crimes which are punished by special laws are not subject to the provisions of this article (article 7 of the Penal Code). The act of wrenching off
screws and fishplates from the rails of a railroad line is punished by a special law, that which governs the policing and preservation of railroads,
amended by the law of November 23, 1877, made applicable to the Philippine by royal decree of August 6, 1875. In reality this provision relates to
the law of November 14, 1855, one almost identical to that of 1877, article 16 of which reads: "He who shall voluntarily destroy or damage a railway
line . . . shall be punished with the penalty of prision correctional."
In the more recent case of U. S. vs. Fuster (10 Off. Gaz., 1048) in a very brief opinion, when the question was squarely presented whether the
provisions of the Penal Code relating to the prescription or limitation of an action for calumny and insults were applicable, this court refused to apply
the rule of prescription or limitation of the Penal Code to the crime of libel as defined by the law of the United States Commission. (Act No. 277.).
This court has refused in many cases to apply some of the general provisions of the Penal Code to the laws of the United States Commission, or to
special decrees of the Kingdom of Spain applicable to the Philippine Islands, thereby holding, in effect, that such laws, when they provided a penalty
for their violation, were "leyes especiales," as that phrase is used in the Penal Code.
See U. S. vs. Hutchinson (5 Phil. Rep., 343, November 21, 1905), where the court refused to apply the provisions as to subsidiary imprisonment for
the nonpayment of a fine under Acts Nos. 610 and 652 of the United States Commission;.
U. S. vs. Glefonea (5 Phil. Rep., 570, January 24, 1906), where the court refused to apply the rule with reference to subsidiary imprisonment to
article 8 of Act No. 619 of the United States Commission;
U. S. vs. Lineses (5 Phil. Rep., 631, February 17, 1906), where the court refused to apply the provisions as to subsidiary imprisonment of the Penal
Code, to Act No. 292 of the United States Commission;
U. S. vs. Carvajal, et al. (4 Off. Gaz., 705, April 16,1906), where the court refused again to apply the rules as to subsidiary imprisonment of the Penal
Code to section 8 of Act No. 292 of the United States Commission; in this case, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Torres, said:
The provisions of the Penal Code which authorize the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the nonpayment of a fine imposed are not applicable
to those guilty of crimes punished under said Act (No. 292) and other Acts of the Commission, the Penal Code being based upon an entirely different
system of legislation.
U. S. vs. Ang Kan Ko (6 Phil Rep., 376, August 22, 1906),where the court again refused to allow the application of the rules of the Penal code to the
laws of the United States Commission (Acts Nos. 355, 653 and 864);
U. S. vs. Cortes, et al. (7 Phil. Rep., 149, December 7, 1906). In this case the court again refused to allow the provisions of the Penal Code to be
applied to the laws of the United States Commission, or to the Law of Brigandage (Act No. 518 );
U. S. vs. Lopez Basa (8 Phil. Rep., 89, March 19, 1907). In this case the court refused to apply article 3 of the Penal Code relating to attempts to
commit crimes, to the crimes defined and punished by the laws of the United States Commission (Act No. 82 );
U. S. vs. Macasaet (11 Phil. Rep., 447, October 15, 1908). In this case the court refused to apply the rules relating to subsidiary imprisonment of the
Penal Code to sections 66 and 68 of Act No. 1189 of the United States Commission;
U. S. vs. Servillas (12 Phil. Rep., 12, November 11, 1908), where the court again refused to allow the provisions of the Penal Code to be applied to
Act No. 1461 of the United States Commission;
Ocampo vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681, 683, December 24, 1909), where the court said it had, in numerous cases, decided that the provisions of
the Penal Code were not applicable to crimes created by the laws of the United States Commission;
Cruz vs. The Director of Prisons (17 Phil. Rep., 269, November 3, 1910), where this court again said, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, "prior to
the enactment of Act No. 1732, the Courts of First Instance had no authority to impose subsidiary imprisonment for a failure to pay fines in cases of
conviction for violation of Acts of the United States Commission;
U. S. Kennedy (18 Phil. Rep., 122, December 29, 1910), where the court again refused to apply the provisions of the Penal Code to the Acts of the
United States Commission.

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This court has uniformly, through a long line of decisions, as above indicated, refused to apply some of the provisions of the Penal Code to leyes
especiales, as that phrase is used in article 7; or in other words, the court has refused to apply some provisions of the Penal Code to any general law
of the Philippine Commission, which, within itself, defined the punishment of a crime.
The Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, in his decision in the court below, very correctly says, among other things:
But it is no less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal act is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such description." In our opinion
this is the correct rule. (Dover vs. Maestaer, 5 Esp., 92 English Common Law Reports; Hyde vs. Partridge, 3 salk, 223, 228 (E. C.L.); Reg. vs. Hull, 2
Fast and F., 16 (E. C. L.).) The doctrine of prescription or the limitation of time within which an action may be brought, is of purely statutory origin.
Both under the common and the civil law a right of action never died by mere lapse of time. (Mackeldrey's Roman Law, sec. 213; Gaius, 4 sec. 128.)
The court, in the absence of express law, has no authority to fix a period of prescription or limitation. (Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S., 496; Reist vs.
Heibrennan, 11 Serg and R. (Pa.), 131; Battle vs. Shiversm, 39 Ga., 405; Buchannan vs. Rowland, 5 N.J. Law,. 721; Gray vs. Hartford Ins. Co., 6
Fed. Cases, No. 3375; 1 Blatchford (U. S.), 280; Williams vs. Jones, 13 East, 439; The People vs. Gilbert, 18 Johnson (N. Y.), 227; Bell vs. Morrison,
1 Peters (U. S.), 351.).
Under the common law the word "prescription" is generally used with reference to the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time. It is said, for
example, under the common law, that one may acquire a right to real property or to an easement by prescription.
The word "limitation," as applied to actions under the common law, has reference to the time within which an action must be brought after the right of
action had accrued. Under the Civil Code the word "prescription" is used to cover both of these ideas. (See Civil Code, arts. 1930-1975;4 Escriche's
Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 643-649.).
Under the Penal Code the word "prescription" is used with reference to the time within which the action must be brought. (See Penal Code, art. 130,
paragraphs 6 and 7.).
By prescription or limitation of actions, the right of action is not extinguished, neither under the common nor under the civil law. Both the Civil and
Penal Codes provide when the action is extinguished and when it is prescribed simply. These statutes (of prescription or limitation)did not destroy
the right. They simply provided in effect, that, after the lapse of the time prescribed by law, the defendant might object, if he desired, to being sued. If
the defendant failed, in some proper way, to object, or, in other words, interpose the statutory defense, the action could be maintained. The statute
provided a special defenses imply. If the defense of prescription or limitation is not expressly raised, it is waived and is not available. It cannot be
raised by demurrer. It must be expressly pleaded. (Aldeguer et al. vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500; Domingo vs. Osorio, 7 Phil. Rep., 405; Maxilom vs.
Tabotabo, 9 Phil. Rep., 390; Harty vs. Luna, 13 Phil. Rep., 31; Sunico vs. Ramirez, 14 Phil. Rep., 500.)
Our conclusions, then, following the rule heretofore adopted by this court, are:
First. That by reason of article 7 of the Penal Code, some of the general provisions of said code do not apply to the penal laws of the United States
Commission, unless, by express provision of law, they are made applicable.
Second. That there is no general or special provision of law making any of the provisions of the Penal Code applicable to the Libel of Law of the
United States Commission (Act No. 277), except the provision as to subsidiary imprisonment when a fine is imposed. (Act No. 1732.).
Third. That the period of prescription fixed by article 131 of the Penal Code for calumny and insults, does not apply to the crime of libel as defined
and punished under Act No. 277 of the United States Commission.
Fourth. That unless a period of prescription or limitation is fixed by law for a particular offense or crime, the action for such offense or a crime is not
barred by lapse of time.
Fifth. That the law defining and punishing the crime of libel (Act No. 277) has not fixed a period of prescription or limitation within which an action for
such crime shall be instituted.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court, sustaining the second ground of demurrer, is hereby reversed, and it is hereby
ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court from which it came, with direction that the defendant Jose S. Serapio be ordered to appear
and plead to the complaint presented in this cause.
It is so ordered, without any finding as to costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ.

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[ G.R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1995 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO BARROS Y BALTAZAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
This is an old case, going back to May 14, 1984 which, it may be recalled, was the day set by law for the election of representatives of the former
legislature, the Batasang Pambansa. It would seem, however, that the elections were not the primary concern of Romeo Barros, the number one
councilman of Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, and designated election watcher, it was, apparently, the extermination of his enemy, Tubao Vice-Mayor
Gregorio "Gene" Mapalo Jr.
As early as 9 o'clock in the morning of that day, Barros went to Mapalo's house, and very shortly thereafter gunshots rang out. This brought
Reynaldo Gonzales, a neighbor of Mapalos, to the gate at the rear of his home. He saw Romeo Barros walking down the road behind the Mapalo
residence, a gun tucked at his waist. Evidently Reynaldo had foreknowledge of Barros' sinister intent against Mapalo, for the first question he asked
was: "Did you get him?" The quick reply was, "He was able to fly. I will kill Gene." Reynaldo says that he then attempted to dissuade Barros from
carrying out his malevolent design by suggesting that he attend to his job as election watcher. Barros ignored him and walked away.[1]
Reynaldo Gonzales saw Barros again later that morning, at about 11:30 o'clock. Reynaldo was then seated at his father's store, located adjacent to
their house. Nearby, another person, Mariden Milanes, was tending her own store fronting the main road of the Poblacion. Both Reynaldo and
Mariden noticed Barros sauntering up the road coming from the North. They saw that after passing the Gonzales store, and while in front of the
Gonzaleses' residence, Barros pointed a small gun held in his fist towards the south of the road and fired three successive shots in the direction of
the house of Vice-Mayor Gregorio Mapalo, Jr. They both also heard Barros shouting invectives in the local dialect against Vice-Mayor Mapalo, and
challenging him to come out of the house to confront him (Barros), after which Barros reloaded his gun.
The gunshots turned the attention of Isabelo Gonzales (Reynaldo's father) to the place where Barros was. He saw his son, Reynaldo, talking to
Barros, attempting to deter the latter from carrying out his nefarious objective. Isabelo heard his son say to Barros, "That's enough," and "Never
mind that." Barros however continued to hurl imprecations against Vice-Mayor Mapalo and to demand that he come out. Then, as Isabelo, Reynaldo
Gonzales, and Mariden Milanes watched, Barros again raised his gun and fired three more shots towards the house of Vice-Mayor Mapalo.
When the first three shots were fired at the Mapalo bungalow a few minutes earlier, Mrs. Lydia Mapalo, the wife of Vice-Mayor Mapalo, immediately
dashed out of her room to the sala. There she saw her son, Jojo, and her daughter; they said they were probably the target of the gunshots for the
jalousies of the window at the northern wall of their house had been shattered. She peered through that window and saw Romeo Barros re-loading
his gun, shouting curses, raising the gun, aiming it at their house, and firing three more shots.
As the sound of the gunshots was dying out, Lydia became aware of her son Jojo falling face down on the floor, blood oozing from his nose. She
began shouting for help, and became quite hysterical. Her screams and the sounds of commotion in the Mapalo residence following the second
group of shots were heard by the Gonzaleses, father and son, and Mariden. They heard people shouting: Jojo was gone, Jojo was dead.
Police Chief Ricardo Fronda rushed to the Mapalo bungalow. He had heard the first three gun shots, while in his office around thirty (30) or forty (40)
meters away, and correctly surmised that they had come from the vicinity of the Mapalos' house. The first thing Fronda saw was Jojo Mapalo lying
prone on the floor of the sala, blood flowing profusely from his head. Fronda instructed Lydia to bring her son to the hospital. Immediately, Lydia's
relatives took Jojo to the Doa Gregoria Memorial Hospital.
Vice-Mayor Mapalo soon arrived at his house, and he and his wife immediately proceeded to the hospital. There they were advised to rush their son
to the Baguio General Hospital. It was too late. Jojo Mapalo was already dead. His death was officially pronounced by the doctors at 2:15 p.m. that
same day, due to "intracranial hemorrhage, massive, secondary to gunshot wound with brain tissue maceration." [2]
Meanwhile, Chief Fronda examined the Mapalos' house and found: (a) a superficial bullet hole on the concrete south wall; (b) two (2) or three (3)
broken slats or blades of the glass jalousies of the window of the north wall; (c) a slug about a meter from the superficial bullet hole, inside the house
and below the broken jalousies; and (d) a bullet hole in the canvas roof of the garage outside the house. [3]
Fronda then proceeded to the residence of Romeo Barros, being informed that the latter had just been seen there. He requested permission to
search the house, and Romeo and his brother, Rolando, nodded their heads in assent. The search was conducted in the presence of barangay
officials, and yielded a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver with serial number J219345, one round of live ammunition, and three "empty/spent"
shells. The gun was found atop a rooster coop or cage at the back of the house, inconspicuously covered with a cardboard box.
Separate criminal actions for murder (with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation alleged to be present in the
commission of the crime) and illegal possession of firearm were thereafter commenced against Romeo Barros y Baltazar in the Regional Trial Court
of Agoo, La Union,[4] docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. A-1381 and A-1389, respectively. The cases were jointly heard, having arisen from a single
incident involving the same accused.
The State's evidence, which substantially tended to establish the facts and circumstances just related, consisted chiefly of the testimony of Mariden

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Milades, Isabelo Gonzales, Reynaldo Gonzales, Lydia Mapalo, Police Chief Fronda. The following expert witnesses were also presented:
(1) Dr. Juan A. Redor, Jr. who testified on his findings at the post-mortem examination conducted by him, to wit: the presence of a gun shot wound
on the occipital area of Jojo Mapalo's brain measuring one (1) cm. through and through, and a slug, recovered from beneath the skin on the right
occipital region.[5]
(2) Ireneo S. Ordiano, Jr., a senior Ballistician of the National Bureau of Investigation, who deposed on the conclusions derived by him from his
ballistic tests on the firearm recovered from Barros, its single round of live ammunition, three (3) slugs and three (3) empty shells, to wit: that the
items possessed similar markings and that the bullets and shells were fired from the gun tested.[6]
(3) Julita de Villa, a forensic chemist of the NBI, who testified that she conducted a paraffin test on the person of Barros and found both his hands
positive for gun powder nitrates.[7]
(4) Capt. Joffrey E. Palalay, Chief of Records, Legal and Research Branch, Firearms and Explosive Unit of Camp Crame, who had issued a formal
certification to the effect that Romeo Barros was not the licensee of any kind and caliber of firearm, per verification from the records of his unit, said
records containing a master list of all firearm licensees throughout the country. [8]
Proof of the damages suffered by the family as a result of Barros' slaying of Jojo Mapalo was also given by the mother, Lydia Mapalo.
In his defense, Romeo Barros posited a different version of the tragic event. On the witness stand, he asserted that on the date and time in question
he was drinking with Reynaldo Gonzales and some other friends in front of the town plaza near the grocery of Gonzales in the course of which a
heated discussion ensued about the number of votes their respective political candidates would garner by the end of the day. Suddenly, Reynaldo
drew a gun and pointed it upwards. Knowing that it was illegal to carry a firearm publicly on election day, Barros grappled with Gonzales for
possession of the gun. While they were thus engaged, the gun came to be pointed to the south of the road at which juncture it accidentally went off
three times. Barros eventually succeeded in taking control of the weapon, left the place and went home. He placed the gun on the rooster pen,
intending to surrender it to the police authorities; but the intended surrender was overtaken by events; before he could go to the police, the latater
came and confiscated the firearm.
Reynaldo Gonzales was recalled to the stand, as rebuttal witness. He belied Barros' version of the incident. He denied that the pistol was his. He
reiterated his earlier testimony that it was Barros who was in possession of the gun, that he saw Barros walk up the road, stop in front of his
(Gonzales') house, raise his arm and discharge the firearm at the Mapalos' house.
On November 20, 1990, the Trial Court rendered a decision finding Barros guilty of the charges against him.[9] The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused Romeo Barros y Baltazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of murder contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition contrary to Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended.
"For the crime of Murder, the accused ** is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemtify the heirs of the deceased
Joseph Mapalo for actual damages in the total amount of P35,000.00; moral damages for P150,000.00; exemplary damages of P20,000.00;
Attorney's fees of P20,000.00 and to pay the cost.
"For the crime of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the penalty should be that of paragraph 2 thereof considering that Murder
was committed with the use of unlicensed firearm. Under paragraph 2 of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 the penalty imposable is death. However, since
the death penalty has been abolished under the New Constitution, the penalty hereto lower in degree to that of the death penalty which is reclusion
perpetua, should be imposed. The accused is therefore hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the crime of Violation of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and to pay the cost.
"The firearm and ammunition seized from the accused are forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED."
The accused has appealed to this Court, insisting that his version of the occurrences is the truth and it was error for the trial court to convict him of
the crimes charged. He reiterates his defense that there was no intention on his part to fire the gun in the direction of the Mapalos' residence; it
accidentally discharged while he was grappling with Reynaldo Gonzales for its possession. He asserts that the gun is not his, that he took it away
from Reynaldo because he knew it was illegal for Reynaldo or for him to be in the possession of any firearm on election day, and that he really
meant to surrender the same to the police.
The appeal must fail.
The Court rejects this tale supported by naught but appellant's bare word. Against the testimony of the three witnesses who positively pointed to him
as the person who intentionally fired his gun in the direction of the Mapalo residence namely, Mariden Milades, Isabelo Gonzales, Reynaldo
Gonzales appellant's uncorroborated story that the gun had accidentally been discharged as he was wrestling with Reynaldo for its possession,
cannot prevail. Not only are the declarations in Court of said three (3) witnesses untainted by any material self-contradiction or other serious flaw,

Page 36 of 228

and entirely consistent with one another, but the Court also perceives no reason whatever for any one of them to testify falsely against appellant
Barros.
There is yet another reason why appellant's version of the shooting is difficult to accept, and that is, that it was made public only when he testified in
Court in his deffense. He claims, to be sure, that he had told his story the CLAO lawyers now representing him. He does not however explain why
he did not disclose it to his first lawyer, Atty. Arthur Galace, or to any of the police officers when he was taken into custody or at any other time
afterwards. If his story of the accidental discharge of the firearm were true, the Court sees no rational explanation for Barros' reticence in revealing it
to the authorities or his lawyer. Indeed, its immediate divulgence would have been the natural, expected reaction of an innocent individual wrongly
suspected of a killing. All things considered, his story appears to be a last-minute attempt to exculpate himself by ventilation of a contrived and
seemingly plausible explanation for the death of Jojo Mapalo.
The Court however cannot see its way clear to upholding the Trial Court's conclusion that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premediation.
It is elementary that alevosia, to be appreciated, must be proved as clearly as the alements of the crime or crimes it is alleged to qualify. It must be
proved that the accused had consciously and deliberately employed a form of attack to ensure the consummation of his objective without risk to
himself from any defense the person assaulted could have made. [10] Under the established circumstances, it could not be said that Barros had
deliberately adopted a manner of attack which would ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any measures which his intended
victim might take. Barros was in the middle of the road, in broad daylight, when he discharged two (2) volleys of three (3) shots each in the direction
of the Mapalos' residence. The first three shots -- none of which hit any person already placed Jojo Mapalo, his sister and his mother on their
guard; in fact, Jojo had remarked to his mother at the time that they were probably the targets of the pistol shots. They could have taken steps to
protect and defend themselves; actually, they saw Barros re-loading his gun and aiming it at their house again before discharging it at them a second
time. Unfortunately, Jojo Mapalo was apparently a little late in taking cover, and was hit in the head by one of the bullets.
Neither may this Court appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant. As with alevosia, evident premeditation
must be established with as much certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself. It is necessary to prove (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[11] While the existence of the first and third
requisites appear to have been adequately proven, there is some ambivalence in the proof about the second, there being no substantially
appreciable interval of time between the first and second groups of shots directed at the Mapalos' house, such that the discharge of those two
volleys within a minute or two of each other might be considered as only one continuing event. In any event, even if the existence of all the elements
of evident premeditation is conceded, it still cannot be appreciated against appellant for the reason that the actual victim was different from the
intended one. It "is settled that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in a case where, although the accused had planned the perpetration of
the killing, the victim was different from the person whom the accused had originally intended to kill (See Aquino, the Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1,
1976 ed., p. 341, citing cases)."[12]
Now, appellant was also convicted by the Trial Court of illegal possession of firearm, in its aggravated form.[13] The evidence does convincingly prove
that appellant is not a licensee of any firearm or ammunition and that Jojo Mapalo was slain with the unlicensed firearm in question. However,
appellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses, but only of that of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in
light of the legal principles and propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to which the Members of the
Division, the ponente included, subscribe.
The indemnity for death awarded by the Trial Court should be increased from P35,000.00 to P50,000.00, conformably with prevailing doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the Trial Court's judgment in Criminal Case No. A1381, convicting said appellant of the offense of murder, is SET ASIDE. The
judgment of the same Trial Court in Criminal Case No. A-1389 sentencing appellant Barros to reclusion perpetua for the crime of illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form, and decreeing the forfeiture in favor of the government of the firearm and ammunition seized from the accused, is
AFFIRMED, and in addition, the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of damages awarded by the Trial Court except
that of the death indemnity, which is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992 ]

ORIEL MAGNO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of
the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he did not have complete equipment that could make his
venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the
necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached
Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service
equipment of which Mancor was a distributor. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former
(Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LS Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
(Ibid., p. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of
the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to
petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest.
(Ibid., p. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
"1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT - Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations.
"This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12
of this Article." (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments
and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were
delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to
Corazon Teng. When the check matured, petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking
with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and
cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily
by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858,
dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861
dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43)
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that
petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and
promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account
closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the
four (4) cases, as follows:
"x x x finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected
in subject checks." (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks
subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the
"warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the

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equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of
the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It
would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in
which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did
not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor)
when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty
deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS
Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS
Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his
knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested
Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez,
to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and
doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor,
would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection
from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a
willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibita" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is
tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00
subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the
refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease
agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official
or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No. 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It
did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble
purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "getrich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society
against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential
wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be falling prey to such a vicious
transaction. (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, p. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation x x x of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disapprobation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. x x x
That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation: the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment." (Ibid., p. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904. Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86
Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society,
should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner
should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer",
whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court below,
even when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
"Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the
leasing agreement -- by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee -- and that as
the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may be assumed that the amount was
already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the
evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a
conviction under the first paragraph of Section 2 of BP Blg. 22 -- with respect to the element of said offense that the check should have been made

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and issued on account or for value -- it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and
issued in payment of an obligation.
"Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishments, after the issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the
checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Big. 22, there is no
satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct
evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her." (Rollo, p.
30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty
of the crime charged. But how can he produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is
an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may
have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks
that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following
pronouncement:
"And the trial court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are
mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of
criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good
faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to
apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of BP Blg. 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms
"warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by
petitioner:
a) Warranty - A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will
remain so; x x x." (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
"Fitness for Particular Purpose: - Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose." (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: - Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
"To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe-keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
"The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules
and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates,
whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice, or at a fixed future time." (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason x x x" is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did
not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction,
Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the
parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, J., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), in the result.
Regalado, J., pro hac vice.
Nocon, J., on leave.

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G.R. No. L-51368 November 6, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAGLALA MACATANDA, defendant-appellant.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle
rustling, Saglala Macatanda was sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, this court finds the accused Saglala Macatanda guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Cattle Rustling penalized under PD No. 533 and as described in the information filed against him. Crediting in his
favor the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and extreme poverty without any attendant aggravating circumstances, and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum .
The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The amount of One Hundred Fifty (P150.00) Pesos is hereby ordered paid to Atty. Reynaldo Echavez for his services as counsel
de oficio in this case in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, the amount to be taken from the funds appropriated
by the Government for the purpose.
With costs against the accused. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 1- 2)
From the judgment of conviction, Saglala Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this Court, raising purely legal
questions, to wit: whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction, and (2) being a member of a cultural minority, being a Moslem,
should be appreciated in his favor, which the court a quo refused to consider in the imposition of the penalty, and also disputing the correctness of
the trial court's computation of the proper penalty.
Before going into a discussion of the legal questions, the facts may be recited, quoting from the People's Brief, the following:
In the evening of December 25, 1976, complainant left his two carabaos near his house in Salug, Sapad, Lanao del Norte. the
following morning, however, he noticed they were missing. He immediately reported the loss to Welfredo Bucol, who was the
team leader of the constabulary home defense unit. Complainant joined the posse composed of the members of the unit, and the
barangay captain to search for the missing Carabaos. When they reached Pawak, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, they saw
Macabaas, Mangigya, Makaonggos, and appellant in possession of the two carabaos. These four, surprised at being discovered
engaged the posse in a gun battle, as a result of which, appellant was wounded. Appellant's companions fled, leaving him and
the carabaos behind. (Rec. pp. 3- 7).
Appellant was taken into custody and was charged with cattle rustling. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
(People's Brief, pp. 2-3).
Citing the case of U.S. vs. Maqui, 1 appellant contends that his lack of instruction and education and his being a Moslem belonging to a cultural
minority should mitigate his liability, and the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced accordingly. He also cites the fact that the
prosecution did not object to his being credited with the aforesaid mitigating circumstances.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the Maqui case may not be invoked as a precedent. In the first place, in that case, the Supreme Court
found indication in the record which tends to show that Maqui was an uncivilized Igorot. In the present case, owing to appellant's plea of guilty, the
records discloses no evidence presented to prove the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction, which needs to be proven, as all circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be proved directly and positively. 2
Likewise, nowhere in the Maqui case was it disclosed that his being a member of a cultural minority, being an Igorot, sufficed to mitigate his liability
on that circumstance alone. What the Court considered mitigating was his being an uncivilized Igorot which amounted to more than just lack of
instruction. Again, there is no proof on record that appellant herein may be similarly described. In any case, mere membership in a cultural minority is
not expressly mentioned by the Revised Penal Code among the mitigating circumstances 3 nor would it come under paragraph 10, Art. 3 of said
Code, which speaks of ''any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. "
Appellant, however, prays for a lenient approach in consideration of his being an ignorant and semi-uncivilized offender, belonging to a cultural
minority, the two separate circumstances to be joined together to constitute the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction to mitigate his liability, 4
relying on the Maqui case from which he quotes the following:
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142, (now Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code) the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration the lack of instruction and
education of the offender where it appears that under all the circumstances attending, he should not be held to the strict degree
of responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5)

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Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery 5 leave
us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized
state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant
therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle. Incidentally, the Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to
mitigate liability for theft, for even long before it, in U.S. vs. Pascual, 6 a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of
theft or robbery. The Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in reaching its present
state since recent years, when it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semiuncivilized.
But more than what has just been observed. a legal impediment stands in the way to giving the lenient treatment appellant invokes in his appeal. It is
that the records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the appellant, no evidence having been taken
relative thereto because he entered a plea of guilty. 7 And the stricter treatment provided by P.D. 533 for the crime charged with a more severe
penalty imposed thereon, hardly justifies the courts to apply said law with leniency.
Appellant, finally, contends that in the computation of the penalty the rules prescribed under Article 64, paragraph 5 should be applied. To this
argument, the Solicitor General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to penalties prescribed by special
laws. He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of 1974" as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, 8 the
penalty should not be governed by the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, his recommendation as to the proper penalty to be imposed and pursuant
to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides:
... if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.) (Appellee's Brief, p. 7)
is a minimum of not less than 10 years and 1 day and the maximum, not more than 17 years and 4 months, the penalty imposed under P.D. 533.
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the
nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not
for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal
Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to be
discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles
appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary
medium.
Appellant's computation would be to lower the aforesaid penalty to prision correccional maximum, to prision mayor, medium period, in view of the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances as appreciated by the court a quo, with no aggravating circumstance attendant. For the purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should be one degree lower still, or arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision
correccional in its medium period, or from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and not
less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range, as to its maximum period, but is beyond the range, as to its minimum period, which should
be not more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to 4 years of prision
correccional and maintaining the maximum at 8 years of prision mayor as imposed by the lower court. With the modification as indicated, the
appealed decision is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur in the result.

Page 42 of 228

[ G.R. No. 111343, August 22, 1996 ]

ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND LOURDES DU, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information
which reads:
"I N F O R M A T I O N
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential Decree 1612), committed as follows:
That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, with intent to gain for himself, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously purchased and received dismantled farrowing crates made of
GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00, knowing the same to be the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of fencing, in violation of the AntiFencing Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Lourdes Du.
Contrary to law.
Davao City, Philippines, January 19, 1987.
(SGD.) ANTONINA B. ESCOVILLA
4th Asst. City Fiscal"[1]
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business name "Dunlao Enterprise."
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor,
Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioners premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify information
received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I.
pipes inside a cabinet in petitioners shop and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law.
On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Trial ensued and on May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED and the evidence being sufficient, this Court finds ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years, Eight (8) Months, One (1) Day as minimum to
Seven (7) Years and Four (4) Months as maximum of Prision Mayor with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED."[2]
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 1993, the appellate court promulgated its decision[3] affirming the
judgment of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner states that the appellate court erred:
"(A) IN NOT FINDING THAT AT LEAST TWO (2) ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED, NAMELY, THE ALLEGED PURCHASE BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE GI-PIPES AND HIS ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BEING STOLEN ITEMS, WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE;
(B) IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, A DULY LICENSED SCRAP METAL BUSINESSMAN FOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS, HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN POSSESSING AS TEMPORARY CUSTODIAN OF SAID GIPIPES BY BRINGING THEM INSIDE HIS BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT, WHOSE INSIDE PREMISES WERE OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW, BEFORE
DARK SET IN ON THE DAY THEY WERE BROUGHT TO HIM BY WELL-DRESSED JEEP-RIDING MEN WHO MERELY OFFERED SAID ITEMS
TO HIM FOR SALE BUT WHO FAILED TO RETURN TO HIS ESTABLISHMENT UNTIL POLICE OPERATIVES WENT TO HIS BUSINESS
PREMISES A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER."[4]
In brief, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was motivated by
gain or that he purchased the said articles. Further, he questions the alleged value of the stolen properties stating that they are worth a lot less than
what the trial court declared them to be.
Under Presidential Decree 1612,[5] "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

Page 43 of 228

There is no question that the farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of petitioner. The positive identification
by Fortunato Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these items were previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of fencing under
the law:
"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. -- Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing."
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioners contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita."[6] This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done.
The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? [7] When
an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:
"On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the Peoples evidence and he, therefore,
draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that
intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external
demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly
spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal,
the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pickup (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not
required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58)
because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes,
supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52)."
Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing.[10]
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer,
by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and
left them there.
There was a jeep loaded with G.I. pipes where he approached me with the G.I. pipes but I refused to buy and instead requested me
"A.
that they will unload those G.I. pipes in front of my establishment.
Q.
Now, did you have a talk with that person whom you said arrived aboard the jeep which was carrying G.I. pipes?
A.
We had a talk requesting me that they will just unload the G.I. pipe but we have never talked that I am going to buy those G.I. pipes.
Q.
Can you recall what did the man tell you as he asked you to allow him to unload those G.I. pipes?
A.
He told me that he would just leave them temporarily and he will come back but it took a long time, he failed to come back.
Q.
What time, more less, of the day was that when the unloading of the G.I. pipes was made, was it in the morning or afternoon?
A.
I can remember it was in the afternoon but I am not certain as to the time.
Q.
Can you estimate the time in the afternoon?
A.
May be around 2 or 3 oclock but I am not certain, it was in the afternoon.
You said that man who unloaded the G.I. pipes did not return anymore and so, what did you do with the G.I. pipes that were unloaded
Q.
in front of your establishment?
That was already late in the afternoon, around 5:30 up to 6:00 oclock, we are about to close, so what I did I have it brought inside my
A.
compound for safekeeping."[11]
In the Lim[12] case, we held that:
"x x x the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 x x x must be upheld in the light of petitioners shallow demurrer
premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence."
The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed[13] on petitioners shelves inside his compound.If petitioner were merely keeping the
farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that he is
doing so with the intention of selling them.
Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not even bother to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who deposited the articles
with him. We quote with approval the trial courts observation that:
The narration of how the items were simply dumped at the compound of the accused; the fragile and vague statement that the unidentified party
unloading the items would bring more items at some indefinite date; x x x that accused caused the pipes to be brought inside the compound of his
own volition without any such arrangement with the strangers; that the latter did not return thereafter; that some of the items delivered by the
strangers were distributed in and around the compound and in cabinets inside the building already cut in short pieces; that accused cannot produce
any proof of ownership by the persons who simply unloaded the items then left without coming back - these are matters which common sense and
sound business practices would normally clarify in the face of the express provisions of the Anti-fencing Law.x x x And when the accused took it
upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound items unloaded by total strangers without any agreement as to how the items would be sold
or disposed of nor how soon agreement would be compensated, a rather dubious aura of illegitimacy envelopes and taints the entire transaction."
Lastly, petitioner questions the value of the stolen articles as found by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. He contends that the
pipes were worth only P200.00, not the P20,000.00 alleged in the Information.

Page 44 of 228

Prosecution witness Carlito Catog testified on the value of the stolen pipes stating that, as he worked as purchaser for Lourdes Farms, he was
knowledgeable about their true worth. He also explained the basis of the estimate of the said articles:[14]
Now, those G.I. pipes which you said you saw in the premises of Mr. Dumlao and which you earlier mentioned as having been
Q.
identified by you as coming from Lourdes Farms, can you tell the Honorable Court, more or less, how much did you buy those pipes?
A.
I arrive at the amount of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) as my estimate.
Q.
Fifty Nine?
A.
Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00).
Q.
And can you tell the Honorable Court what is your basis of making this estimate?
The G.I. pipes were made into piggery crates, we use the 3 / 4 inch by 20 feet G.I. pipes in fabricating. We use 6 lengths of those pipes
at the cost of P80.00 per crate. So, we arrive at the amount of P480.00 of the materials, the G.I. pipes used in fabricating crates, plus
A.
the cost of fabrication which we paid to the one making at P700.00 per crate, so we arrive at P1,180.00 per crate and the number of
crates per estimate, which we recovered from the premises of Mr. Dumlao is about more or less 50 crates. So, we arrive at Fifty Nine
Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00).
The trial court, however, based its decision on the amount of P20,000.00 as alleged in the information, instead of the appraisal of P59,000.00 made
by Mr. Catog. The Court believes that P20,000.00 is a more realistic estimate of the value of the stolen pipes. Petitioners claim that the pipes were
worth only P200.00 is not credible considering that it took a truck to haul off the entire load from petitioners premises, as testified to by Fortunato
Mariquit.[15]
Q.
How did you bring the G.I. pipes from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station?
A.
We loaded them in a dump truck owned by Federico Jaca.
Q.
Now, what was the quantity of the pipes that you were able to bring from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station?
A.
Almost a truckload.
Q.
What did you say, it was a dump truck?
A.
Almost a load of a dump truck.
Q.
After reaching the police station, what happened?
A.
We unloaded it in the police station and we went home.
In line with our ruling in the Lim case,[16] petitioner should pay Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by its owner Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of
P20,000.00 minus the value of the pipes and farrowing crates recovered and in the custody of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Mrs.
Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 45 of 228

[ G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994 ]

ROBERTO CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not petitioner is liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing a check
knowing he does not have credit with drawee bank and thereafter claiming that the said check was not intended for circulation and negotiation, the
same having been issued only to serve as mere evidence or memorandum of indebtedness.
The relevant antecedents are as follows, viz:
Complaining witness Andrea Mayor is a businesswoman engaged, among others, in granting interest-bearing loans and in rediscounting checks.[1]
Sometime in 1987, she was introduced to herein petitioner, Roberto Cruz who at that time was engaged in the business of selling ready-to-wear
clothes at the Pasay Commercial Center.[2] From then on, petitioner has been borrowing money from Mayor.[3] On March 15, 1989, petitioner
borrowed from Andrea Mayor one hundred seventy six thousand pesos (P176,000.00). [4] On April 6, 1989, Mayor delivered the said amount to
petitioner himself in the latter's stall at the Pasay Commercial Center. Cruz, in turn, issued Premiere Bank Check No. 057848 postdated April 20,
1989 for same amount.[5] When the check matured, complaining witness presented it to the drawee bank for payment but the same was dishonored
and returned for reason "account closed." When notified of the dishonor, petitioner promised to pay his obligation in cash. No payment was made,
hence, an information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed against the petitioner. [6]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.[7]
At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the existence of the check.[8]
During trial, the prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, Andrea Mayor, herein complainant, and Marcelo Ladao, a representative of Premiere
Development Bank.
Andrea Mayor testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the business, among others, of rediscounting checks and lending money at an
interest of 3% to 5% monthly; that she came to know the accused Roberto Cruz through the latter's sisters sometime in 1987; that the accused is
engaged in the RTW business at the Pasay Commercial Center; that she rediscounted some of the checks of the accused in previous transactions
as shown by Exhibits "C," "C-1" to "C-3," in the amounts of P20,000.00, P5,000.00, P9,000.00, and P5,000.00, respectively, which were personal
checks issued by the accused for the sums he borrowed and which checks bounced when presented for payment but were paid in cash by the
accused when the latter was notified of the dishonor.[9]
Complaining witness Andrea Mayor further testified that on March 15, 1989, accused told her that he needed P176,000.00 and asked to be lent the
said amount; that complainant gave the accused the said amount at the latter's store at the Pasay City Commercial Center; that accused, in turn,
issued a check[10] for the same amount; that the check was signed in her presence and she was told that accused might be able to pay before the
due date on April 20, 1989; that the check was dishonored upon presentment by the drawee bank; that accused was notified of the dishonor and he
promised to raise the amount on May 15, 1989; that accused failed to make good his commitment, hence, she consulted a lawyer and caused the
preparation of a complaint.[11]
Marcelo Ladao, a representative of Premiere Development Bank, testified that accused opened Current Account No. 0101-00250-5 on May 15, 1987
and, accordingly, affixed three (3) signatures on the signature card provided by the bank for account applicants; that the said account was closed on
October 2, 1989 and that accused was duly advised of the said closure by the Branch Manager of the Pasay City Branch. Ladao, likewise, identified
the stamp marked on the face of the check in question, which stamp indicated that the account of the depositor is already closed.[12] On crossexamination, the same witness explained that the subject account was closed at the discretion of the branch manager and that closure is normally a
result of a series of checks issued without sufficient funds.[13]
The accused testified in his defense and proffered the defense of denial. He denied (a) having issued the subject check; (b) the signature "R. Cruz"
appearing thereon as his; and (c) knowing complainant Andrea Mayor and existence of previous transactions with her.[14] He declared that he saw
the check in question for the first time only on January 16, 1991 when it was showed to him by the fiscal and that he never met Andrea Mayor
before.[15] He admitted, however, opening Current Account No. 0101-00250-37 with Premiere Development Bank.[16]
The trial court rejected accused's defense and rendered judgment as follows, to wit:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the information, and
conformably with the penal provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P176,000.00, Philippine Currency. With costs."[17]
Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.
On January 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the trial court's decision. [18]
Now petitioner comes to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the respondent court's decision. Petitioner cites
the following for allowance of his petition, viz:

Page 46 of 228

A. Respondent Court Committed Reversible Error and Grave Abuse Of Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess Of Jurisdiction in Affirming The
Finding of The Trial Court On The Basis Of Surmises, Conjectures and Unfounded Conclusions.
xxx
B. Respondent Court Gravely Erred In Holding The Petitioner Liable Under BP No. 22, Despite Knowledge of the Complaining Witness That The
Account Had Long been Closed.
xxx
C. Respondent Court Gravely Erred In Holding That The Complete Turnabout of the Petitioner, As Claimed By The Solicitor General, Rendered
Petitioner's Appeal Devoid of Merit.
x x x[19]
Petitioner, in this case, cannot seem to make up his mind. First, he denies having issued the questioned check, then, he claims that when he issued
the same, it was more in the nature of a memorandum of indebtedness and, as such, does not fall within the purview of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
However, the issuance of the check subject of the present case is no longer at issue since the petitioner himself, on appeal to the respondent court,
admitted having issued the check after he received the amount of P176,000.00 from the complaining witness. Therefore, the only issue in the case at
bench is whether or not petitioner can be convicted for violation of B.P. 22.
We answer in the affirmative.
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment has the same effect of an ordinary check, [20] hence, falls
within the ambit of B.P. 22 which merely provides that "any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does, not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds on credit x x x shall be punished by imprisonment x x x" [21]
When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an
obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check [22] not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the term and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[23] This point has been
made clear by this Court, thus:
'It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not
made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the
enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the
operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was
enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the
issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming 'useless scraps of paper' and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that
while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere
guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the
abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular
Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
"Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the
checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee.' (pp. 4-5, Dec. IAC)
[pp. 37-38, Rollo]."[24]
The importance of arresting the proliferation of worthless checks need not be underscored. The mischief created by unfunded checks in circulation is
injurious not only to the payee or holder, but to the public as well. This harmful practice "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." [25]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee, herein complaining witness, was aware of the fact that his account with Premiere Development Bank was
closed. He claims that the payee's knowledge verily supports his contention that he did not intend to put the said check in circulation much less
ensure its payment upon presentment.
Knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of
an offense penalized by B.P. 22. As already aforestated, the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check,[26] hence, malice and intent in
the issuance thereof are inconsequential. Moreover, the fact that the check issued is restricted is likewise of no moment. Cross checks or restricted
checks are negotiable instruments within the coverage of B.P. 22.
Petitioner, on appeal, changed his theory from complete denial that he issued the questioned check to an admission of its issuance without intent to
circulate or negotiate it. Such a change of theory however, cannot be allowed. When a party adopts a certain theory, and the case is tried and
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. [27]
Finally, the issue raised primarily involves a question of fact. Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. Therefore, barring any showing that the findings complained of are totally

Page 47 of 228

devoid of support in the record, such findings must stand.[28] After a careful consideration of the records, we sustain the conclusion of the respondent
court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the questioned decision of the respondent court is hereby AFFIRMED
en toto. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Page 48 of 228

A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,
vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI. City Court of Quezon City,
recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q- 7171), Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Quezon City), a crime
involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Receipt No.
4736418.
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI as
shown by his handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my present deputy clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon request of the undersigned primarily
to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores, which I strongly disapproved of, and to avail my Court of the services of
a full-fledged lawyer with unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten notes, he persisted in
taking this unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated March 11, 1976. 1
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was required to file his answer to the letter of Judge
Remigio E. Zari and this case was transferred to the First Division. 2
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude;
that the then Commissioner Abelardo Subido, who was also convicted of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had approved his appointment
as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to unduly influence the complainant in the
discharge of the latter's duties and responsibilities; that while respondent's language in his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the same could not
be considered contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the sentiments of an aggrieved employee who
deserves a better treatment from his superior after more than six years and nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in the City
Court of Quezon City; that if ever respondent requested favors from his superior, these were all done in the spirit of friendship which the complainant
professed to him before he left Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City on March 9, 1976; that from October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on
March 8, 1976, the respondent was practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored the complainant on the fine
interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge Zari who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered from the following instances: On January
8, 1976, after the trial in Criminal Case No VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the
respondent to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise, told the respondent to join him
for lunch at Alfredo's Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after conducting the ocular inspection, the respondent proceeded to Alfredo's Steakhouse
where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel of Chua and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the respondent not to prepare
anymore his report on the ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records of said cases
anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the respondent was instructed to convict
both the accused because the complainant was a relative of a certain Judge Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689
versus Gerundio Villanueva y Elazo, Dominador Garcia y Orteza and Balbino Domingo y Ramos, for the crime of theft, he was instructed by Judge
Zari to convict the accused Dominador Garcia y Orteza because according to said judge, the complainant is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of the respondent within ten (10) days from
notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the respondent that he had not allowed the respondent to interfere in the preparation of orders
and decisions; that while the complainant is aware of his limitations, he is certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of the Philippine
Bar to "tutor" and give him finer interpretation of the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua and
VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before this court; that he did not call the respondent to his chamber and instruct him to conduct an
ocular inspection on the illegal constructions; that he did not invite the respondent for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the trial, he went to
Alfredo's Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that while in the said place, the complainant was surprised to see the
respondent in the company of the accused; that he counseled the respondent to be more circumspect as these people had cases before his sala;
that it is true that from then on up to the relief of the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the aforesaid case could not be found by the
respondent because the complainant had the records brought inside his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the respondent to
manipulate the records; that he did not instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 and in Criminal Cases Nos.
VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the complainant is a relative of a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he requested
Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all orders, decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint responsibility. 5
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the respondent applied for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of
Quezon City, he submitted, among others, an affidavit dated June 10, 1969 that contains the following statement "That I am a person of good moral
character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record;" that the respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212

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(1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data sheet, the respondent admits having
acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is
dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully
established in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation after City Judge
Minerva Genovea and City Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit themselves from investigating this
case. 6
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the investigation of this administrative case recommended that the respondent be separated from
the service on the following findings:
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude."
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of the grounds for disciplinary action is "conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude."
Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the respondent was that on April 28, 1967 respondent was
convicted of the crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00 which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.
Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. 7
Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral turpitude are adultery, concubinage, 8
rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 9 criminal conspiracy to smuggle
opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance
contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury,
seduction under promise of marriage, 10 estafa, 11 falsification of public document, 12 estafa thru falsification
of public document. 13
"Moral turpitude" has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
14 It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not
merely be mala prohibita but, the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 15 Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are
not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited. 16 Hence, the
crime of illegal possession of firearm or ammunition does not involve moral turpitude for under our laws, what
is punishable is the possession of a firearm or ammunition without a license or authority. 17
Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude. 18
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander, against a municipal officer is not a ground for
suspending him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. 19
When respondent submitted his application for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he
submitted among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969, which reads as follows:
That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police
record.
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question No. 10, which asked if applicant has previously
been convicted of a criminal offense, accused placed no. It was later discovered that accused was previously
convicted of theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of public document under Art. 171, par. 4, because
there is no legal obligation to reveal previous conviction. 20 However he maybe guilty of perjury under Art.
183. 21
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is "falsification of public documents."
The second charge is "persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending
before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the complainant and to his present Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo
Elcano."
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits "F", "F-1", "F-2", & "F-3"), he intervened for and in behalf of Gaw
Chin in Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the sala of the complainant because the accused was a compadre of his
friend, Salvador Estrada.

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On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was practically doing the work of the complainant and tutoring him in
the finer interpretation and application of the law, and he was preparing the decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he
was not trying to influence the complainant.
The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", & "F-3" speak for themselves. There is no need for the undersigned to quote the
same.
A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his wife the family of the judge before whom the client's
cause is to be heard, and to endeavor, in conversation thus to be had in advance of the hearing, to commit
the judge to an expression of opinion favorable to the client's case warrants his dismissal from the bar. 22
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 23
The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested by respondent in calling for and unjust use of strong and
contemptuous language in addressing the city judges when he wrote the letter, dated March 11, 1976."
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of heart and have developed cold feet. You have
badly shaken my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are truly a woman, very fickle and unpredictable, but
very impulsive.
I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the sympathies and, if possible, like the other five (5)
judges, involved them in the mess originally of your own making and design and align them with you against
me, hoping to impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be convinced that mine is a lost cause.
However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your conduct, you have dismally failed to live up to your
oaths, ...
Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of your wits when you all decided to lay the blame
on me and condemned without trial for the alleged inefficiency.
Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring under deep and nagging hallucinations,
induced and prompted by your serious concern to save the face of a colleague.
By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of Branches I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say the public
service in their respective branches is efficient, so that they could now come to the succor of a colleague and
are also competent to promote the efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is true, promotions of Judges in
the City Court would be fast, the Purge in the Judiciary would not have affected Quezon City and the
unprepared and the inexperienced would not have come to the Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in his letter was justified and very much called for it being the
indubitable manifestation of the indignation and disgust of the respondent, urged upon him by the complainant who engineered
the respondent's illegal transfer from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a valid and subsisting
appointment to the Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to quote the pertinent
provision of which:
'as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after due and circumspect deliberation by and among
the judges. '
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge under Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court which provides
as follows:
To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another branch (sala) or to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the interest
of the service requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in consultation with the Presiding
Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and in case of disagreement, the assignment of the Executive Judge
shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of the branch concerned who is the complainant in this case.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment
and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and
scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his
case to the commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless
otherwise ordered by the commission. 24

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An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency. Provided: That
such reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status or salary. 25
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee from one branch to the Office of the Clerk of Court in
accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court and in consonance with PD 807.
The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a "Civilized,
democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the
Court's decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices for being interested in the
decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for
favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners including the President constitute disrespectful
language to the Court. It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
The language is necessary for the defense of client is no justification. It ill behooves an attorney to justify his
disrespectful language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause
does not permanent an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "since lawyers are administrators of justice, oathbound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this their client's
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. 26
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had committed insubordination, a ground for disciplinary
action. 27
The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7
While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His
letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and
uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the
complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent,
taken together with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the
tendency of the respondent to malign people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided by the complainant is inimical to the
service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of
good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. " This averment is not true because the respondent had
been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This
prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F.
Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City,
with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government
instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 121592, July 05, 1996 ]

ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARCIAL VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of two resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in SPA No. 95-047, a case for disqualification filed against
petitioner before the COMELEC.[1]
The first assailed resolution dated May 6,1995 declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last
May 8,1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991)[2] which provides
as follows:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
"(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment
within two (2) years after serving sentence;
"(b) x x x x x x x x x."
In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that:
"Documentary evidence x x x established that herein respondent (petitioner in this case) was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court, x x x in
Criminal Case No. 14723 for violation of P.D. 1612, (otherwise known as the Anti-fencing Law) in a Decision dated June 1,1990. Respondent
appealed the said conviction with the Regional Trial Court x x x, which however, affirmed respondents conviction in a Decision dated November
14,1990. Respondents conviction became final on January 18,1991.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"x x x, there exists legal grounds to disqualify respondent as candidate for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna this coming elections. Although there is dearth
of jurisprudence involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 or P.D.1612 x x x, the nature of the offense under P.D. 1612 with which
respondent was convicted certainly involves moral turpitude x x x."[3]
The second assailed resolution, dated August 28, 1995, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. In said motion, petitioner claimed that Section
40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which
suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as
well.[4]
The two (2) issues to be resolved are:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)s applicability.
Particularly involved in the first issue is the first of two instances contemplated in Section 40 (a) when prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground
for disqualification - i, e., "when the conviction by final judgment is for an offense involving moral turpitude." And in this connection, the Court has
consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary of "moral turpitude" as:
"x x x an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."[5]
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine".[6] In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not[7], the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores,"[8] to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita,
but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."[9]
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC,[10] the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. [11]
The Court in this case shall nonetheless dispense with a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, inasmuch

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as petitioner after all does not assail his conviction. Petitioner has in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of fencing. At any rate, the
determination of whether or not fencing involves moral turpitude can likewise be achieved by analyzing the elements alone.
Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D.1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) as:
"a. x x x the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."[12]
From the foregoing definition may be gleaned the elements of the crime of fencing which are:
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
"2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of
the said crime;
"3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and [Underscoring supplied.]
"4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another."[13]
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the "fence" and the actual
perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process "private duties" they owe
their "fellowmen" or "society" in a manner "contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good
morals." The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
provisions of the Civil Code on "Human Relations" and "Solutio Indebiti," to wit:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
"Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same."
"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
"Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
"Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it
arises."
The same underlying reason holds even if the "fence" did not have actual knowledge, but merely "should have known" the origin of the property
received. In this regard, the Court held:
"When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high
probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person
of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists."[14] [Italics supplied.]
Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the
proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices
of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may
likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No.
1612 that "mere possession of any goods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing"- a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of x x x possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." [15] All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the
petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude.
Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. [16] Petitioners conviction of
fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a),
subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains
finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. [17] Clearly then,
petitioners theory has no merit.

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ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 6,1995 and
August 28,1995 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 55 of 228

[ G.R. NO. 152644, February 10, 2006 ]

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID AND PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5
November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against
petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel's end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of
or near the tunnel's end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of
Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), [5] Section 8[6] of
Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.[11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the
quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners' arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners' motion, the MTC
issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The
MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and
Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water
Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements
constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three
(3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining
Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be
dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the
Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for
[v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.

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The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not
the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13]
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners
manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942
as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners'
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated
Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an
ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.
Public respondent's appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent's motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent's appeal consolidated
with petitioners' petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal but denied petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the
Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94
affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses,
as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each
other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require
[sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act. [15]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the
Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in
People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942
are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should
only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being
violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to
be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under
Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x

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xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly
absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court's quashal of the Informations against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion to quash R.A.
7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A.

THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984),
THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE
BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF
MINE TAILINGS.

B.

THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS
EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE
WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]
The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1)

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and

(2)

Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

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Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 [20] of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23] Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all
the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of
mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "ack of necessary or
adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. [24] The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or
more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.[27] (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. [28] However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners'
claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94's comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942,
and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the
others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the
entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit
to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine
Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual
pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In
the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of
run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved
[sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however,
that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under
the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much
more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law
are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942,

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suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such
as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the
latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular,
petitioners cite the Court's statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power
under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencia's right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the
act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions
for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised
Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the
first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III
which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court
of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Page 60 of 228

[ G.R. No. 109279-80, January 18, 1999 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OCTAVIO MENDOZA Y LANDICHO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found her husband, Octavio Mendoza,
responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the spouses only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now
left to the care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with parricide and illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot
wounds which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct
custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first
securing the necessary license or permit therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced, following which, a judgment of conviction
was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE, defined
and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the funeral, wake, burial and incidental expenses that said Alipio Eusebio
spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza.
And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;
2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. P25,000.00 for and as attorneys fees.
Plus costs of the proceedings.
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child Charmaine Mendoza and he cannot inherit
from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the Commission of Parricide, defined and penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 as amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the
accessories of the law.
The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government together with
all the ammunitions.
With costs against the accused.
Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered committed to the Bureau of Corrections.
The accused, if he appeals the decision is not entitled to Bail.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)

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Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable documents, in grave violation of
accuseds constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredible coached and unreliable direct testimony of the minor daughter of accused and victim,
Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the
police investigators.
III
. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by his witness.
IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of Firearms despite the police investigators
undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a situation consistent with the decisively clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the crime of parricide was committed, the law and
doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294
(known as Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that Penal laws favorable to the
accused shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old daughter attended the birthday party of a relative of
accused-appellant held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza. While the party was going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried
Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer. When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-appellant,
hence, they decided to just leave, proceeding directly to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias (p.
4, Appellees Brief.).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 oclock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet there. After a while, mother and daughter
left for the house of Cecilias parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some perfume for Cecilias brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 oclock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of the subdivision where they live, they
saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilias god-daughter, and they hitched a ride home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the
garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were on but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accused-appellant
did not respond. A moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the masters
bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to douse him. She willingly
obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She change her clothes and readied herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her
parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three
gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw
accused-appellant hiding a gun under the bed in her parents room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores
Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not believe Charmaine and talked to accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had been shot and is already dead. Gabac,
on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he would be arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accusedappellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia into accused-appellants car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas,
Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital to investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any
statement or comment. Thereafter , the policemen invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella
Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias. While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked inside Gabacs waist. He
promptly told Gabac Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril. Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38 caliber revolver with Serial No. 41001
and with two empty shells and two live rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the gun was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at
the crime scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughters death, and that valuables were being taken out of his daughters house,
decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-appellants personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)

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From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated November 7, 1986 issued to accusedappellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which
authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There
was also a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and
Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which described the firearm as One
Colt Revolver SN 41001 (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night of November 11, 1988, he and his wife
Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found
out that his wife was still supporting her parents as well as her brothers and sisters.
Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death threats over the telephone because
Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and perfumes business. She also allegedly owed people some cash which was
coursed through her by workers from Saudi Arabia to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 oclock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his wife, Cecilia, and daughter,
Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they proceeded to the masters bedroom, after which, her daughter
kissed him goodnight. He and his wife were then left alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him some money and uttered Dad,
okey na. She also brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn,
November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).
Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their room. When he went out, he saw his
wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the backdoor of their house which banged. Consequently, he ran outside and
pursue the intruder who ran from the backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his concern over his
wifes condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a while, he called up his brother-in-law,
policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and the two of them then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant about the incident, but he refused to
comment. He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any
statement to the police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife
was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied possession of a .38 caliber revolver, he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45
caliber between the years 1968 and 1969 (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to have sired children by another
woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defenses theory that the victim was engaged in illegal activities which supposedly led to her
death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the opportunity and the propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all elements which were needed to arrive at
a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that no proof had been established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant
Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People,
262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]).
During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las
Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter Charmaine, and his now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia
was shot to death, no one was there except these three persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his innocence by
denying that he killed his wife, insinuating that another person is the killer. This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder perpetrated
the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought, a devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accusedappellant even refused to give any statement or comment to the police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia
was shot and killed by somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate
with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and
instead, he took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about the incident when the police conducted the investigation, which is
rather odd if he really were innocent. Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came out with the story about the
handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his
own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their testimony,
truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).

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As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family went to the birthday party of his relative,
he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party
without informing them where he would be. The victims father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia,
had been quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends that Alipio is not a
credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on account of his having children with
another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The Court finds improbable and
contrary to human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was
actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to believe that accused-appellant killed
his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did
not appear to be a naturally spontaneous narration, but rather evidently a coached one. According to to him, this theory was bolstered when she
cried and suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this, being in accord with human behavior and
nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her, at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she
loves and respects as shown by the act of embracing him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the trial court correctly disregarded the same. The first time
Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after her mothers death. Her recantation was made two years later
when she was already in the custody of accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she
saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act. Such contradictory
statements should not discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234
[1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court
should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for
the change discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony for the prosecution. The second
declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither are we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in
mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellants denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin test conducted on him yielded positive
results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal weapon, and even implied that the
gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun
which his wife carried wherever she went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that
the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun
which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed
that the same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accusedappellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the
said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to
privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in
point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private
citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham
Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant
is not a licensed firearm holder of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accused-appellant, the established
circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is
guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational
circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano,
264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all too
plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed,
fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now merely

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considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs. Molina,
G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. This
notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion
perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988,
when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Martinez, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 112092, March 01, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERT NUEZ Y LAGASCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated May 26, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified illegal possession of firearms, sentencing him to life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay the costs.
The facts are as follows:
On March 6, 1992, at around 2:00 to 3:00 P.M., in Palina Sur, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, four (4) persons, namely Teofilo Pacquing, Calixto Pacorza,[2]
Marlito Parias and Roy Tolentino were riding a tricycle driven by Jerry Almendrez.[3] When they passed by the gate of appellant's family compound,
appellant fired at them from a distance of about twenty (20) meters, hitting Pacquing on the right toe, Almendrez on the left breast, and Pacorza
resulting to his death. The records do not indicate the injuries sustained by Pacorza, but merely state that he died as a result of the shooting
incident.[4]
The victims were brought to the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital for treatment. Teofilo Pacquing [5] reported the incident to the police. SPO1 Ernesto
C. Gancea, a member of the Investigation and Intelligence Operations of the Philippine National Police (PNP) investigated the incident. Teofilo
Pacquing informed him that it was appellant who fired at them. Thereafter, SPO1 Gancea, accompanied by PO3 Asterio Dismaya, and SPO1 Henry
R. Kang proceeded to the scene of the incident. When they arrived at appellant's house, SPO1 Gancea talked to appellant who readily admitted
that he was the one who shot Pacorza. SPO1 Kang recovered a caliber .22, long rifle, "Squibman," model 116 MK with serial no. A-320554 with
telescope from appellant. When asked for the permit for the firearm, appellant could not produce any. Appellant was thereafter brought to the
Urdaneta Police Station for investigation. He refused to give any statement to the police. The incident was entered in the police blotter by desk officer
Romulo Dutong.[6]
For the shooting of Almendrez and Pacquing and the death of Pacorza, appellant was charged under four (4) separate Informations for (1) homicide,
(2) frustrated homicide, (3) frustrated homicide and (4) illegal possession of firearms docketed as Criminal Case No. U-6449. The cases were raffled
to the different branches. Only the Illegal Possession of Firearms case is before us.
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms reads:[7]
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1992, at barangay Palina Sur, municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control
and custody one (1) Caliber .22 Rifle 116MK, bearing Serial No. A320554, with trademark "Kassnar Squibman" and with magazine and nine (9) live
ammunitions, without first securing the necessary permit or license from lawful authorities, which said firearm was used by the accused in the
commission of the crime of homicide and double frustrated homicide against the persons of Calixto Pacursa (sic), Jerry Armendez (sic) and Teofilo
Pacquing.
CONTRARY to Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, June 16, 1992.
On September 10, 1992, upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.[8] Pre-trial conference was waived. Trial
then commenced.
The prosecution presented the four (4) members of the PNP, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, who were involved in the investigation, and one of the victims,
Teofilo Pacquing.
SPO1 Ernesto C. Gancea testified that he conducted the investigation and that appellant admitted to him that he shot the victim, Pacorza.[9] PO2
Asterio Dismaya, corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Gancea. [10] SPO1 Henry R. Kang, testified that he was the one who recovered the firearm
from appellant.[11] SPO1 Nestor G. Manongsong, responding to a subpoena duces tecum, testified that he could not bring the police blotter, but
presented the complaint/assignment sheet,[12] and the spot report[13] pertaining to the incident.[14] Teofilo Pacquing testified on the circumstances
surrounding the attack, and identified appellant as the assailant.[15]
On the other hand, the defense presented five (5) witnesses, namely: (1) appellant, (2) Salvador Paz, a carpenter working in the house of Alvaro
Nuez; (3) Eugene Nuez, a neighbor of the aunt of appellant who allegedly witnessed the shooting incident; (4) Cesar Nuez Celeste, a cousin of
appellant and the owner of the subject firearm and (5) SPO4 Benito Opguar, of the Provincial Headquarters, PNP Command, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
who testified that Cesar Celeste had a temporary license to possess the subject firearm, but at the time of the shooting incident, the temporary
license had already lapsed.[16]

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The defense claims that the shooting incident did not happen on the road, but inside the living room of the house of appellant's aunt, Magdalena
Celeste. Appellant claims that he shot at the victims in self-defense. He narrates his version of the incident as follows:[17]
That on March 6, 1992, the accused-appellant was busy sticking tobacco leaves when six (6) armed men namely: Calixto Pacursa, Gerry
Almendrez, Teofilo Tolentino, Teofilo Pacquing, Nick Gascon and Carlito Parnas, arrived in their compound and went inside their compound and
stoned the houses of his grandmother, Maxima Nuez, his uncle Mariano Nuez and his aunt Magdalena Celeste. When the six (6) men noticed
him, they shouted at him so the accused-appellant ran towards the north and since they ran after him, the accused-appellant hid behind the santol
tree, then the six men left the place boarding on the same tricycle and proceeded towards the west. In the afternoon between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock
of the same date, while he is unloading tobacco leaves, Gerry Almendrez and his companions came back and they shouted at him and he heard one
gunshot so he ran inside the compound where his grandfather's house were being constructed and that was then the time that Cesar Celeste and
Juanito Nuez went to town to report the said incident.
Calixto Pacursa armed with a .38 caliber met the accused-appellant so he ran towards the house of his aunt Magdalena Celeste and hide (sic) inside
the bathroom since Calixto Pacursa continued chasing him. When Calixto Pacursa was about to go the second floor, he saw the .22 caliber that was
placed on top of the bed of Cesar Celeste and he got the said firearm and when he went out he was still holding the .38 caliber and at the same time
holding the .22 caliber firearm. When the accused-appellant saw Calixto Pacurza tucked his .38 caliber firearm in his waist and loaded the .22 caliber
rifle that was the time accused-appellant went out from the bathroom and grappled with Calixto Pacurza and the accused-appellant was able to
retrieve the subject firearm from Calixto Pacurza. The accused-appellant move two steps backward but Calixto Pacurza drew his .38 caliber firearm
from his waist and that was the time that accused-appellant fired the .22 caliber rifle at Calixto Pacurza. The accused-appellant and Gerry Almendrez
had a misunderstanding because the former noticed that some parts of the motorcycle driven by the latter had been replaced.
The testimony of herein accused-appellant were corroborated by Salvador Paz, a laborer in the on-going construction of the house of Alvaro Nuez,
and Eugene Nuez, who at that time were inside the kitchen of Magdalena Celeste, the former was pouring hot water in a thermos while the latter
went inside the kitchen to light his cigarette.
Cesar Celeste declared that he is the owner of the subject firearm and he brought outside the said firearm when Teofilo Pacquing and his
companions arrived and stoned the houses in their compound. And before he and Juanito Nuez went to town to report to the police authorities, he
left the licensed firearm on top of his bed. He applied a license to possess the firearm through First Continental Co., Inc., and had paid the firearm
bond.
After presentation of prosecution evidence in the illegal possession case, appellant filed a motion for consolidation of the four cases. Upon the
opposition of the public prosecutor, the trial court denied the motion.[18] Subsequently, on May 26, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19]
convicting appellant, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the death of the victim and pursuant to P.D. 1866 in
relation to the 1987 Constitution the court sentences the said accused Robert Nuez to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and with costs.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Appellant now assigns the following errors:[21]
I.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS
POSSESSION AS TESTIFIED TO ON REBUTTAL BY PROSECUTION WITNESS PO3 HENRY KANG.

II.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING GREAT WEIGHT TO THE INCONSISTENT AND UNCORROBORATED
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CORROBORATED AND CREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.

III.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.

IV.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL AND IN ADMITTING THE FIREARM IN ISSUE WHICH WAS
SEARCHED AND SEIZED WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT.

In support of his first and second assignment of errors, appellant points out major inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
SPO1 Gancea testified that appellant was inside his house when the police arrived at the crime scene and the rifle was located "beside" appellant,
and it was SPO1 Kang who got the rifle from appellant. SPO3 Dismaya, however, testified that appellant was actually in the yard when they arrived
and that appellant was the one who got the rifle from the house and handed it to SPO2 Kang. SPO2 Kang testified during direct examination that it
was appellant who gave him the gun, but during rebuttal, he said that it was one of appellant's cousins who handed to him the gun.
In support of his third assignment of error, appellant claims that it was error for the trial court to shift the burden of proof to the defense when he
invoked self-defense.
In support of his fourth assignment of error, appellant contends that his alleged "extra-judicial confession" to SPO1 Gancea is inadmissible since he

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was not assisted by counsel at the time it was made. Further, the rifle was seized without a search warrant and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, points out that it is of no moment who among the responding policemen received the fatal
weapon. What is important is that he admitted possession of the firearm at the time the victim was shot. His conviction was based not on his alleged
"extrajudicial confession," but on his admissions in open court. The rifle was not seized from appellant, but was surrendered by him to the policemen.
Simply put, the issues pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of witnesses, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of the
crime charged.
It is well-settled that, generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of trial courts in passing upon the credibility of the witnesses
unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which the trial court has overlooked or the significance of
which it has misapprehended or misinterpreted.[22] After a careful examination of the records of the case, we are inclined to give credence to the
version of the prosecution. The alleged inconsistencies as to who recovered the firearm from appellant, in our view, do not pertain to a material
matter. What is important is that one of the police officers recovered the firearm from appellant, who does not deny his possession of said firearm.
Further, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, insofar as the policemen are concerned, has not been overturned.
Credence should be given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are police officers and presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[23]
Anent the second issue, we have held that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit
to possess the same.[24] The prosecution was able to prove both elements. First, prosecution witness Pacquing categorically stated that he saw
appellant fire at them with a long gun from a distance of 20 meters.[25] Appellant would make us believe that his possession of the firearm was
"transient" possession. He claims that he merely acquired it during the scuffle with the victim. Having given credence to the version presented by the
prosecution, this argument deserves scant consideration. Second, the defense presented SPO4 Opguar, who testified that a temporary license of
the rifle was issued in the name of Cesar Celeste, the owner thereof, but said license already lapsed. Clearly, appellant had no license to possess
the rifle.
Appellant was convicted of "illegal possession of firearms resulting to the death of the victim." At the time of the commission of the crime, the existing
jurisprudence was People v. Quijada.[26] This Court held then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes - one for
the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or murder. In the meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8294,[27] which lowered the penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Thus in People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 (1998), this Court held that the use of an unlicensed weapon in the commission of homicide or murder
should now be considered simply as an aggravating circumstance and no longer a separate offense. The Molina ruling,[28] however, is not applicable
to the present case. In Molina, separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possessions were filed, but the cases were eventually
consolidated and jointly tried and decided. In the present case, there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately tried.[29]
Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither adopted nor presented before the trial court trying the illegal
possession case. For this reason, there is a dearth of evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated homicide.
Accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A. No. 8294, being
favorable to the accused, should be applied retroactively.[30] Under R.A. No. 8294, the penalty for simple illegal possession of a low-powered firearm
is prision correccional in its maximum period, which is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than
P15,000.00. It will not be amiss to point out that R.A. No. 8294 contains the proviso: "Provided, That no other crime was committed." However, as
explained earlier, the facts obtaining in this case do not indubitably prove the frustrated murder cases or the murder case in relation to the illegal
possession case. Hence, we find it proper to convict appellant only of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellant should be sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five
(5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00.[31]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. U-6449, is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum
as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. Nos. 131856-57, July 09, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. WILLIAM MONTINOLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The core issue in this case is whether the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery may be
treated as a separate offense or as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant William Muyco Montinola (hereafter WILLIAM) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City with robbery with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 47168 and illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 47269. The accusatory portions of the two informations
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 47168:
That on or about the 18th day of November 1996, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named
accused, armed with unlicensed Cal. 380 Pistol "Llama" with Serial No. 170257 did then and there deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence
against or intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion, and
by reason and on occasion thereof, the said accused shot to death the said Jose Eduardo Reteracion; that cash amount of P48,200.00 was
recovered from the herein accused.
Contrary to Law.[1]
Criminal Case No. 47169 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of November 1996, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused,
with deliberate intent and without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) Pistol Llama, caliber .380 with Serial No. 170257 with two (2) cal. .380 live ammunition without having obtained the proper license or
permit to carry, to hold and possess the same, which firearm was used by the said accused William Muyco Montinola in shooting to death the victim
Jose Eduardo Reteracion.
Contrary to Law.[2]
Upon his arraignment on 6 January 1997,[3] WILLIAM entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. Joint trial of the two cases was conducted.
However, on 19 February 1997, after the prosecution had presented three witnesses, WILLIAM moved to withdraw his previous plea of "not guilty";
and when rearraigned, he pleaded "guilty" to both charges. Nevertheless, trial on the merits continued.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows:
At noon of November 18, 1996, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Hibinioda bound for Libertad Plaza, Iloilo City. Among the
passengers was Jose Eduardo Reteracion. All of a sudden, appellant drew his gun, an unlicensed firearm, .380 caliber pistol Llama with Serial No.
170257 and directed Reteracion to hand over his money or else he would be killed (p. 19, TSN, January 13, 1997). Appellant aimed the firearm at
the neck of Reteracion and fired successive shots at the latter. As a result Reteracion slumped dead (pp. 22-23, TSN, January 13, 1997).
Police Officer Garcia, who heard the shot, approached the jeep and met appellant carrying a gun. He chased appellant who ran away with his jacket
bloodstained as he threw bundles of money. Garcia and the bystanders picked up the money strewn on the way by appellant. Police Officer Hollero
finally caught up with appellant, who was brought to the police station with his gun (pp. 5-10, TSN, January 13, 1997).
The gun used by appellant while robbing and killing Reteracion was determined by Senior Police Officer Ely Superio of the PNP Firearms Unit as not
licensed. Appellant had no permit to possess and/or carry the same (p. 4, TSN, February 18, 1997). The paraffin test made on the hands of appellant
yielded positive for gun powder nitrate indicating that he had recently fired a gun (p. 7, TSN, February 19, 1997). The gun confiscated from appellant
[was] the same gun used to shoot and kill the victim as shown by the comparison of the slugs from the tested bullets with the slugs recovered from
the body of the victim (pp. 7-8 TSN, February 26, 1997).
The wife of the victim spent for the burial and wake of her husband an amount of P191,835.00 and failed to recover P39,500.00 which was a part of
the money taken from her husband. She became depressed, sleepless and not in the mood to eat because of utter sadness resulting from the death
of her husband (pp. 6-14, TSN, January 14, 1997).[4]
On 24 April 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment[5] finding WILLIAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against him. It
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for the robbery with homicide and to the penalty of death for illegal possession of firearm. It also ordered him to
pay the family of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P191,835 for the burial and wake expenses; and P39,000 for the
unrecovered part of the money taken from the victim and to pay the victim's wife P100,000 as moral damages.

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On 19 May 1997, WILLIAM filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal[6] stating that he was appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. In an
order dated 15 May 1997, the trial court directed the transmission of the records to this Court.
In his appellant's Brief, WILLIAM imputes this lone error to the trial court:
IT WOULD BE AN ERROR TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM BECAUSE OF THE
ENACTMENT OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294 WHICH AMENDED PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866.
WILLIAM contends that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the crime of murder or homicide should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
and not as a separate offense pursuant to R.A. No. 8294,[7] specifically Section 1 thereof, amending for that purpose P.D. No. 1866.[8] The new law,
R.A. No. 8294, may be retroactively applied, since it is favorable to him in that it effectively "reduced the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of
illegal possession." For this reason, he prays that the Court reconsider the challenged decision of the trial court and order the dismissal of the case
for illegal possession of firearm.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the invocation by WILLIAM of the benefits of the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294, is misplaced. The use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of murder or homicide only, which are classified as crimes against persons, and not to robbery with homicide, which is
classified as a crime against property under Title X of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, to apply to the present case the provisions of R.A. No.
8279 and treat the use of an unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance would contravene Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 22, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the "ex post facto application of law." Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of robbery with homicide is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Should the Court appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance, the higher penalty of death shall be meted on the accused. Essentially, therefore, WILLIAM shall be made to suffer a
greater and harsher punishment than that which the law imposed when the act was committed. Upon the other hand, there is no legal obstacle on
the conviction of WILLIAM of the separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm because such is supported by our ruling
in People v. Cerveto.[9]
The OSG then sought for the affirmance of the trial court's ruling adjudging the accused guilty of two separate crimes of robbery with homicide and
illegal possession of firearm. It recommends, however, that in the charge of illegal possession of firearm the accused be given the benefit of the
lighter penalty provided in R.A. No. 8294, i.e., a penalty ranging from four years (4) and two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum,
of prision correccional. Furthermore, the accused should be ordered to return the amount of P19,300 representing the "difference between the
amount taken away and the amount recovered as alleged in the information."
A few words on procedure and jurisdiction.
WILLIAM's notice of appeal has not escaped our attention. He therein stated that he was appealing the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals.
It must be noted that it is the Supreme Court, and not the Court of Appeals, that has appellate jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[10] As to judgments in which death penalty is imposed, such as the judgment in Criminal Case No. 47169, no
notice of appeal is necessary, as the same is subject to automatic review[11] pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659. But as to judgments imposing reclusion perpetua, such as that in Criminal Case No. 47168, the appeal to this Court shall be by filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court.[12]
WILLIAM's notice of appeal from the judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 47168-69, albeit erroneous since it was directed to the Court of Appeals, may
nevertheless be given due course. For even without that or even if he did not appeal from said judgment, we would nevertheless review the same
conformably with our ruling in People vs. Alitagtag,[13] as affirmed in People vs. Contreras.[14] We ruled therein that where cases have been
consolidated and jointly tried, and only one decision is rendered sentencing the accused to death in one and to reclusion perpetua in the others, he
would be deemed to have appealed from the judgment in the latter cases.
Now on the merits of the case.
We find that the prosecution has duly established by evidence independent from WILLIAM's plea of guilty and confession of guilt that he killed the
victim after having succeeded in divesting the latter of his money. The gun he used in shooting the victim, which was thereafter seized from him and
offered in evidence, was unlicensed. And per the testimony of SPO3 Ely Superio of the PNP Firearms and Explosive Unit, WILLIAM had no license
or permit to possess or carry the same.
The lone issue thus obtaining in this case is whether in light of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866 he could be prosecuted
for, and convicted of, the separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearms.
On 18 November 1996, when the crime was committed, the pertinent law, P.D. No. 1866, provided in Section 1 thereof as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearms or ammunition.

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If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
In People v. Alolod,[15] the accused therein grabbed from a passenger of a jeepney a bag containing money. When the latter resisted and grappled
for the possession of the bag, accused shot him twice with a .38 caliber paltik revolver. In our decision of 7 January 1997, we affirmed the trial court's
judgment convicting the accused-appellant therein of two separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm and sentencing
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. As to the charge of illegal possession of firearm, we held:
Sec. 1 of P.D. [No.] 1866 provides that "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed." Since the incident took place on 13 December 1991 when the death penalty was proscribed and before it was reimposed under R.A. [No.]
7659, which took effect [on] 31 December 1993, the sentence is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The present case has similar set of facts; the only difference is that the crimes were committed on 18 November 1996 when R.A. No. 7659 restoring
the death penalty was already in effect. Thus, in line with the ruling in Alolod and applying P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 7659, WILLIAM could be held
guilty of two separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the first crime and
to death for the second.
Fortunately for WILLIAM, on 6 July 1997 while his case was still pending, R.A. No. 8294 amending P.D. No. 1866 took effect. The third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
In recent cases,[16] we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed.
Hence, insofar as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it
shall be given retroactive effect.[17]
We cannot apply to the instant case People v. Cervito,[18] which is relied upon by the OSG. Unlike in the instant case, that case did not call for the
application of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, since the unlicensed firearm which was recovered from the scene of the crime was not the one used in the homicide committed on the
occasion of the robbery. The prosecution evidence itself disclosed that such gun had not been fired, as it had no spent shells. The accused-appellant
therein, Freneto Cervito, was, however, seen pointing that gun at the passengers while the robbery was going on. He was thus convicted of two
crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal possession of firearm. We affirmed his conviction for both crimes. Although the crimes were committed
on 10 July 1995 before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8294, we applied the said law with respect to the penalty for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm for being more favorable to the accused in that it provided a lighter penalty.
The next question that needs to be addressed is whether the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide.
It is undisputed that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm
is a special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. But, may the aggravating circumstances attending the killing be
appreciated in fixing the appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide? The rulings on this matter are conflicting.
In People v. Galang[19] and People v. Semaada,[20] treachery and cruelty, which attended the killing, were considered as aggravating circumstances
in determining the penalty for robbery with homicide. In People v. Nismal,[21] the circumstance of disregard of respect due the victim on account of his
rank aggravated the crime of robbery with homicide.
Likewise, in People v. Capillas,[22] People v. Ang,[23] and People v. Punzalan,[24] we held that when the killing is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, the qualifying circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating circumstances; thus, in all
these three cases the circumstance of abuse of superior strength[25] served to aggravate the crime. In the third case, evident premeditation was also
considered as aggravating. However, in these three cases, as well as in People v. Ponciano,[26] we said that disregard of age, sex or rank is not
aggravating in robbery with homicide, which is primarily a crime against property, as the homicide is regarded as merely incidental to the robbery.
It is worthy to note, however, that in the more recent case of People v. Salvatiera,[27] reiterated in People v. Cando[28] and People v. Macabales,[29] we
held that when treachery obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance, since robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. Having
formed part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the crime, such treachery would help determine the penalty to be
imposed.
Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in Article 296 [30] of the
Revised Penal Code has been held to be applicable only to cases of robbery in band under Article 295 of the same Code. It was not appreciated in
fixing the penalty for robbery with homicide under Article 294 even if committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (the element of band
was considered merely as an ordinary aggravating circumstance).[31]

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At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the
determination of the penalty for robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating circumstance of "use of an
unlicensed firearm" mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted
when the crime was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being unfavorable to him.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we would
apply retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, the imposable penalty would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez,[32] reiterated in People v. Macoy,[33] insofar as the new
law would aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death, it would not be given retroactive
application, lest it would acquire the character of an ex post facto law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating circumstance. There
being no modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty[34] of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant WILLIAM.
Parenthetically, the trial court was correct in not crediting in favor of WILLIAM the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, since the change of his
plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" was made only after the presentation of some evidence for the prosecution. [35] To be entitled to such mitigating
circumstance, the accused must have voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.[36]
The following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open
court, that is, before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.[37] The third requisite is wanting in the present case.
We shall modify the awards of damages. The award of P191,835 for burial and wake expenses should be reduced to P117,672.26, since only the
latter amount was evidenced by receipts. Likewise, considering the allegation in the information and the testimony [38] of the victim's wife that the
amount of P48,200 was recovered from WILLIAM, the award of P39,000 representing the unrecovered part of the money taken from the victim must
also be reduced to P19,300 (the difference between the sum of money taken from the victim [P67,500] and that recovered from accused-appellant
[P48,200]). We should also reduce the award of moral damages from P100,000 to P50,000 in accordance with current jurisprudence. [39]
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47168 and 47269 is AFFIRMED with
MODICATIONS as follows:
1.

In Criminal Case No. 47169, accused-appellant WILLIAM MONTINOLA is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
therefore spared the penalty of death;

2.

In Criminal Case No. 47168, where the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed,
(a)

The award of P191,835 for burial and wake expenses is REDUCED to P117,672.26;

(b)

The award of P39,000 representing the unrecovered part of the money taken from the victim is REDUCED to P19,300; and

(c)

The award for moral damages is REDUCED from P100,000 to P50,000.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official business abroad.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.

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[ G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM Y MIHAJIL ALIAS WARPAN, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if
the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence,
where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were
about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be
considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25,
1997. The first Information[3] was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo, [4] this City, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than
to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and
control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2)
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition;
one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and
one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade
launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the
aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt
to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS,
in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the
Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in
the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional
Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the
accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary
desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the
bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan
Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused
PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the
assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;

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4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and
SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and
some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the
Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by
SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant.
SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards
(TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife
at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three
(3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4).
When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second
floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle
towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent
Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the
house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos,
Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team
then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen
surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children
to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While
they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from
the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to
arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because
there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The
rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live
ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another
with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN,
March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying
themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera
then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table
was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1)
homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an
M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was
instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and
had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought
P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the
curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed
on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 815).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were
instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are
already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore.
Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants
house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties

Page 74 of 228

seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio
reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23,
1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the
paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had
fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that
the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver
(homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial
number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight
of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the
examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exh. L).
The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any
application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court. [15] Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to
go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul
Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan
Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he
was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his
house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his
neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He
said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7,
id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons.
Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School.
According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at
us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does
not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun
like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh.
B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two
(2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh.
J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the
policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4,
1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence
(tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons
were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already
because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y
Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell
anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in
selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City
jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he
smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP
Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were
killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of
his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided
the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the
house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long
firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open
a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time
Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search
was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that
was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano
arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of
money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front
of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to

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Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a
policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead
leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at
the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with
her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is
the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The
policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman
shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May
5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching
her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went
down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was
about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely,
Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by
two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the
afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called
him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he
went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the
Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed
on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during
the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three
persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).[16]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day.
However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense, [17] in violation of Section 3, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x
contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one
offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.[19] (emphasis in the
original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void
search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the
laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on
his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the
raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the
raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the
policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the
policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested
after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant. [23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live
ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines. [25] The trial court observed
that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of
a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been
given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police officers had been planted was
disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the
previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were
accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frameup, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that
Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and
sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form
or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including
evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan

Page 76 of 228

Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or
smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the
extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four
occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the
extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the
weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the
crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit
and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21,
Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum
foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as
evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void
as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be
held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing
fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the
policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be
returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to
him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.[30]
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:

The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to
serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house
of the appellant [was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the
firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular
inspection would have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime. [32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in
particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of
appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a
relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. [36] Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that
discretion.[37]
Second Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is
generally accorded respect, even finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim,
we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired
upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q:
A:

And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
Yes.

Page 77 of 228

Q:
A:

And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q:
A:

How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired upon?
More or less, five (5) meters.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q:

Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that
question.

Q:
A:

Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?

SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

Q:
A:

And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?

Yes.

Q:
A:

Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
Yes.

Q:
A:

What did you see inside the house?

I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We
went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q:
A:

Now, what did you do with these two old women?

I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was concentrating on the second
floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of
the house.

Q:
A:

Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?

Yes.

Q:
A:

What happened when you were already on the second floor?

While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately went inside the
bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the
neighbors house.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q:
A:

What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q:
A:

Were you able to go down?

Yes.

Q:
A:

What happened when you were there?

We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator of the unit especially
SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos, [43] as follows:
Q:
What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A:
I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the second floor because
there [are] a lot of children here.
Q:

Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?

Page 78 of 228

A:

At the sala set.

Q:
A:

This sala set where is this located?

Located [on] the second floor of the house.

Q:
A:

Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

Yes.

Q:
A:

Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
Yes.

Q:
A:

Why can you identify that?

The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.

Q:
A:

Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.

FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].
Q:
A:

After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?

When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to the investigator.

Q:
A:

Where did you turn it over?

At the crime scene.

Q:
A:

Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?

Yes.

Q:
A:

Why?
I put x x x markings.
xxx

xxx

xxx

COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A:

Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.

Q:
A:

The M16 magazines [were] empty?

Empty.

Q:
A:

How about the M14?

Found with [ammunition].
xxx

Q:
A:

So, where are the three M16 magazines?

In the corner.

Q:
A:

What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?

I turned [them] over to the investigator.

Q:
A:

Can you identify them?

Yes, because of my initials[.]

Q:
A:

Where are your initials?

On the magazines.

xxx

xxx

Q:
RJL?
A:
RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as
well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro
explained in open court:
Q:
Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A:
The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder nitrates.
Q:
A:

What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?

It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.

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Q:
A:

Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be] positive on his hands for
gun powder nitrates.

Q:
A:

But, most likely, he fired a gun?

Yes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q:
A:

What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and traces of brown residue on
the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.

Q:
A:

And, that indicates Madam Witness...?

It indicates that the gun was fired.

Q:
A:

Recently?
Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x.

COURT:
Q:
A:

There is also black residue?

Yes.

Q:
A:

What does it indicate?

It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.

Q:
A:

And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
This one.

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q:
A:

The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
Yes.

Q:
And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A:
Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that
appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession
thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification[47] stating that he had not filed any application for license to
possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence. [48] Further, it should be pointed out that his
possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private
individual.[49]
Third Issue:
Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items
seized from his house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent
any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty,
such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to
substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.[53] He testified thus:
Q
Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A
I could not remember.
Q

I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;] tell us whose
signature is this appearing above the typewritten name

FISCAL NUVAL:
Q

. . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

(Showing)

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Yes, Sir. This is mine.

Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was resting and sleeping when I
heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by
armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this
paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from]
which you said you heard gunshots?
Our house.

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A

Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home
in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this
correct?
They were not there.
Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which
is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
I was in the house near my house.
So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo.
Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]
Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal
possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension
house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding
police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions
story.
Direct Assault with Multiple
Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the
accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex
crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted
homicide carries the penalty of prision correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the
most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period. [58]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the new law. It contends that under
the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294.
Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used
in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

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If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted
coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company,
corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any
person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed
firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct
assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second
paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but
PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in
the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of
firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court
found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted
homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was
committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July
6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no
other crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of
firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for
consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and
homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by
the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so,
as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty
heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused
may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, [66] like alarm and scandal[67] or
slight physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct
assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision
correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. NO. 166401 (FORMERLY G.R. NOS. 158660-67), October 30, 2006 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO BON, APPELLANT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six
counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a consequence though, we
are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to
acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution,[1] we now find it necessary to determine
whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court
of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346
which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for attempted
qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or
reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations[2] were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca,
Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA[3] and BBB,[4] the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA
in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G,
and 6907-G.[5] All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6)
years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth
certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother.[6] She
recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and vagina, removed her
clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to
anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house,
yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.[7]
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of her grandmother.[8] The following
year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an outdoor clearing [9] after having
been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his
penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.[10]
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,[11] the brutish acts appellant had done to her.[12] Her mother thus filed a
complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to prove that she
was born on 3 September 1988.[13]
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared
with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite
the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat
that he would kill her.[14] BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring
under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.[15]
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.[16] On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her
grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the
door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced her
to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down."
Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had
molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmother's house again. [17]
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual
abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police station and her statement was taken.
Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June

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2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her family. [18]
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000.
Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was packing more than
enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon
learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was
raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it
was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested. [19]
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It
was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC,
and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.[20]
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District
Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child. These medical
certificates were presented in court.[21]
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical injury found on her body. However,
Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance and
there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr.
Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times. [22]
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora
and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the hymen would still
be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated that
there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. [23]
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of
his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15 January 2000
because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30
in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day.[24]
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted
that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case was filed
against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC
"lazy" within earshot of other family members.[25]
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.[26] The RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing
jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear, candid and
straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the
victims and appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for review.
However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo[27] the present case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on
appellant.[28] The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at least
two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and
credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was established
with certitude that the accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were proved by
the victims' candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their own uncle. The
sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to her and her
sister.[29]
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged
that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find evidence beyond
reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for
consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting
portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and
she answered in the negative.[30] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)

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months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.

Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief[31] before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of
BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15
January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated
that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at her grandmother's), the accused passed
through a window, entered their room and raped her again.[32] Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the
duration of her rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July
2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the
Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v. Perez[33] on the
appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted.[[34]] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief,
the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and
cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to
recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often than not, is
talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[[35]] "Moreover, the
inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a
witness answers questions."[[36]][37]
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the
Memorandum for the People[38] filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as
regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top - 3 minutes or half-minute.
But she remained consistent in her declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was moving while on
her top then she felt something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the
first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against
her. She was even confused about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the separate
charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own house.
These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission - accused's house or victim's house - is not an essential element of the crime of rape
and both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x [39]
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest
as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise
demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[40]
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000
cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sister's house in the middle of
the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[41] The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has
strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator.[42] In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant,
positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the
accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about the
allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to
even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating their harrowing
experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years before the criminal
charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done
so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family,
more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed. [43]
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to
public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Testimonies of child-victims
are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is

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necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[44] The weight of such
testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in
the absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their
relationship with appellant were aptly established in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages of
the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to
prove that they were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being
the brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly
threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in revealing the
commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.[45] Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at
the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not
yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with
death if she would report the incident.[46]
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[47] In Criminal
Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of
AAA. This was evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q

Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were eleven years old?

Yes, Mam. [sic]

What was that?

He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]

Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?

No, Mam. [sic]

Why?

It was painful, Mam. [sic]

How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?

Many times, Mam.[48] [sic]

xxxx

AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
Q

I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this
sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle?

June 11, Mam. [sic]

What year?

June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]

What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?

He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]

And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?

He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

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xxxx
Q

And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?

Painful, Mam. [sic]

And what did you do when you feel painful?

I cried, Mam. [sic]

When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?

He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]

And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?

No, Mam.[49] [sic]

xxxx

In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be
convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary
to convict for consummated rape since the slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the term
"slightest penetration" was clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the
labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina (the stroking and the grazing of
the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive
proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated. We,
therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved
painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the aforenumbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby
touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x x x [50]
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be
an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.[51]
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6)
counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both crimes should be
amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed,
impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had
occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua[52] and People v. Cabalquinto.[53]
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting
question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted rape. There is no doubt as to
the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes
the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.[54]

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What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1.

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x[55]

The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her
uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive,
of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the
following rules shall be observed:
1.

When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.[56]

xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty,
the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Death
Reclusion perpetua
Reclusion temporal
Prision mayor
Prision correctional
Arresto mayor
Destierro
Arresto menor
Public censure
Fine[57]
xxxx

Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum,
a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose of the prescription
of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who
have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence. [58] Thus, convicts sentenced to
suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without
minimum or maximum periods.[59]
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court
would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable
penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the
elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the
highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of
reclusion temporal.
IV.

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Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well.
Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two different frames of reference. This was especially made
clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as
an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery "if it is the public officer who
asks or demands such gift or present;"[60] kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;"[61]
destructive arson wherein "death results;"[62] and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several crimes, including murder,[63] qualified piracy,[64] and
treason.[65] The imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the appreciation of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was
unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by
"reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not relate to the case of
appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the enactment of
Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive
penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.[66] In contrast,
the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of
death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal."[67] In People v. Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for
the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the
Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT[69]] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's]
mother. The last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.[70]
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties.
Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties - the penalty
next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, in passing
sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has
consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated
crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed
under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetua to death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had no
occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It
was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were
penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and accessories or

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persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death
pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No.
9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven
(R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,[71] among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such
amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a
general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar
as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We
can entertain two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the
present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the
convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in
determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its
literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we
were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the
application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a
means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep.
Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative construction, there is a natural
tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,[72] a
decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have been
accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would have been no
room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to
shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep.
Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to
the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to
matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal for having
directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y
was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could
no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next
lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains
unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated
scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.

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It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to
equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has the
theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices,
a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change
would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or
in the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some
crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for simple kidnapping, with
no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No.
9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an
accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and
established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would
receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational
explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if
consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the
same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion
perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated
felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of
commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death,"[73] such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term
for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty.[74] If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion
temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one
degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established thought
in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential
theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least,
highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate
legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies,
clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not
having barred the application of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative
amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks
"death" at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal laws. Returning
to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one
degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence
as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals
and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.The harmonization that would result if
Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws.
Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than
that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be consistent
with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible systema uniform

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system of jurisprudence.[75] "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction
would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasilegislative acts."[76] There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as
having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and
consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused.[77] If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were
remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.[78] The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual.[79] It is this philosophy of caution
before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the
repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than death, dependent as these are
on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such
intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have
remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the
legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately,
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects
with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would
most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,[80] decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition
of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no expression of "such a
requirement... in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication."[81] In so concluding,
the Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty."[82]
It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muoz as precedent deter the Court
from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and thus penalized in the
penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion
temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that
the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition
of the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the
Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the reexamination of Muoz.[83]
It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different from
those in this case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while herein, we are
ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the
Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now being
whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from
concluding that with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress has unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muoz and its progenies, have interpreted that provision as
prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of
the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it would have been polemical to
foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that
Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as Congress very well did just
four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to
enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition
of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that
of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other
penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding modifications of other penalties arose
as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the Constitution.

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For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for
in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to Article 71 and the Constitution, for
what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no
provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to
Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the
imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means
employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a
means of retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain
degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity when
infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard
characterized as "nothing but blather in search of meaning."[84] In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, the demand for a
clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty.
Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of Article 71 involves
the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346
unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the application of the
death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other
penalties in our penal laws. Muoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated
by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty once
thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be
asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our
political history as a nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it
under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution
and its reimposition through law as being "in a state of hibernation." [85] No longer. It reawakened then it died; because the sovereign people,
through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a
penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal justification when it
was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on convicts on the
basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No.
9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as
"heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other than
the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes. [86] The categorization of certain
crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in
adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount
of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously
catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the definition or
classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is
the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does
not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other
than death through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the determination

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of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence,
the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as
opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the
present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that
both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the
crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties
prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion
perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of
crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend
the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[[87]] x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of
Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its
enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua
by reason of this Act."[88]
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving
their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does not make
operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are
remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and
non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners
who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.
XI.
We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the
corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts
of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to
Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period.
Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v. Miranda.[89]
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence[90] in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences
appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated rape
committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further
ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as
maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in
the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, ChicoNazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., in the result.

Page 94 of 228

[ G.R. Nos. 63408 & 64026, August 07, 1985 ]

GAUDIOSO C. LLAMOSO, HILARIO A. GUIGUE, PROTACIO U. JUMAMOY, JR., NICANOR ANINIPO AND ALFREDO CAGAIS, PETITIONERS,
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about a false entry in the payroll for March 16 to 31, 1981 of 12 laborers who worked in the improvement of Sta. Rosa Street,
municipality of E. Villanueva, Siquijor. The anomaly involves the sum of P130 as the wages for two weeks of one laborer at P13 a day. The entries
for the 11 laborers were not falsified.
Gaudioso C. Llamoso was the assistant highway engineer and officer-in-charge of the district engineer's office. Hilario A. Guigue, 56, a senior civil
engineer, was assigned to Project CRI-80-0704 which undertook the repair of drainage canals and sidewalks at Sta. Rosa Street, E.
Villanueva. Protacio U. Jumamoy, Jr., 33, was also a civil engineer who had been in the service since 1974.
Llamoso, now 57, was assigned as district engineer on February 10, 1981. Alfredo Cagais, 25, worked as caretaker of the district engineer's cottage
and acted as utility man and messenger. On March 10, 1981 Cagais complained that he had not been paid his wages at thirteen pesos a day or
P130 for the quincena of February 16 to 27; 1981, a period of ten working days.
He was on the verge of crying because he was the sole breadwinner of his family. His mother was sickly. Llamoso called Guigue and Jumamoy to
explain why Cagais had not been paid his wages. They said that Cagais was listed in the payroll of the Pisong Bridge project. Apparently, he could
not be included in the payroll for personnel of the district engineer's office. Llamoso asked Guigue and Jumamoy to find a "legitimate way" by which
Cagais could be paid his wages as caretaker (11 tsn November 17, 1982).
Jumamoy intended to consult the auditor as to how Cagais could be paid his wages. He was not able to see the auditor. Instead, he talked with
Gertrudes Quilat, an auditing aide who suggested that a person, acting as a "stand-in" or substitute for Cagais, might be included in the payroll but
Jumamoy should consult a lawyer about that arrangement (14).
Jumamoy discussed the matter with Mayor Alfredo Orquillas, Sr. of the municipality of E. Villanueva who used to be a municipal judge. Orquillas
advised that a "stand-in" was permissible provided it was done in good faith and without the slightest intention of defrauding the government
(15). Jumamoy then asked Cagais who could act as his "stand-in" Cagais suggested Nicanor Aninipo, 18, who was allegedly jobless (17).
So, on March 12, 1981, Jumamoy instructed his clerk to include the name of Aninipo in the form or document known as "Authority to Hire Casual
Employees and Order to Work" for the project On Sta. Rosa Street, municipality of E. Villanueva for the quincena of March 16 to 31, 1981 (Exh. A
and A-2). Jumamoy initialed the inclusion of Aninipo's name in that form and gave it to his immediate superior, Guigue, for approval (19). Guigue
approved it.
Aninipo was also included in the "Time Book and Payroll" (Exh. A) for that quincena of March 16 to 31, 1981 which listed 12 laborers, 11 of whom
worked for 12 days. In the case of Aninipo, the twelfth in the list, it was indicated that he worked for 10 days only to correspond with the ten-day
period for the quincena of February 12 to 27, 1981 for which, as already noted, Cagais worked in the district engineer's cottage (21-22).
Aninipo was able to collect P130 under that payroll for the project on Sta. Rosa Street, E. Villanueva. He gave the amount to Cagais because, as
previously arranged, Aninipo was only a "stand-in" for Cagais (22-23).
The paymaster, the sole prosecution witness, testified that at nine o'clock in the morning of April 13, 1981 he paid Aninipo P130 for his supposed
work in the Sta. Rosa Street project. Two hours later, Aninipo wanted to collect P156 for his actual work in the BogoLicuan road, another project
(Exh. B). The paymaster refused to pay him again. That was how the false entry was discovered.
It should be clarified that before March 16, Aninipo was really jobless. His first job was in the Bogo-Licuan project. But he was not able to apprise
Cagais before March 16 that he started working in that project (62-63).
Jumamoy declared that the government was not defrauded because Aninipo gave the P130 to Cagais for his work of ten days in the district
engineer's cottage but Aninipo was not able to collect P156 for his actual work in the Bogo-Licuan Road project (31-2).
The Sandiganbayan convicted Llamoso, Guigue, Jumamoy, Cagais and Aninipo as conspirators in the crime of falsification of public documents by
allegedly having made it appear in the time book, payroll and authority to hire employees (Exh. A to A-2) that Aninipo worked in the Sta. Rosa Street
project when in fact he did not work therein.
It sentenced each of them to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of P2,000. They appealed.
We hold that the accused are not criminally liable because they had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion, they admitted that there
was a false entry. They acted in good faith (12-13 tsn Nov. 16, 1982). They may be disciplined administratively for the irregularity but their inclusion
of Aninipo in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law.
Apparently, the case was an isolated instance. It should not be equated with the systematic and rampant practice in some engineering districts of
fabricating payrolls with fictitious laborers working on fictitious projects resulting in the defraudation of the government of considerable sums of
money.
There is a ruling that the accused is not guilty of falsification in the absence of proof that he maliciously perverted the truth with the wrongful intent of

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injuring some third person (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 343).
The instant case is similar to U. S. vs. Arceo, 17 Phil. 592, where the accused was the foreman of carpenters hired by the City of Manila to
reconstruct the houses torn down for reasons of sanitation and removed to the San Lazaro Estate. The city had bound itself to reconstruct gratis
said houses. The wife of the accused had purchased from Severino Pelagio one of these houses, including the right to have the house, rebuilt at the
city's expense.
The accused foreman reported that a carpenter named Castro worked for the city when in truth he worked on the reconstruction of the house which
the accused had purchased. He was charged with falsification.
It was held that he was not criminally liable. He believed in good faith that the city was duty-bound to rebuild the house which his wife had
purchased from Pelagio and that there was nothing wrong in charging against the city the time spent by Castro in rebuilding that house, just as there
was nothing wrong in charging against the city the time spent by the other carpenters in rebuilding the other houses removed under the same
circumstances.
In the instant case, as in the Arceo case, it cannot be said that the accused perverted the truth in including Aninipo in the payroll in order to attain
any felonious objective. Their honest motive was to enable Cagais to receive his compensation which he needed very badly.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. The accused are acquitted with costs de oficio. A copy of this decision should be furnished
the Minister of Public Works and Highways for the purpose of taking administrative action against the accused should the facts warrant such action.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De La Fuente, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Makasiar, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, and Cuevas, JJ., reserve their votes.
Plana, J., no part.

Page 96 of 228

[ G. R. No. L-11489, December 23, 1957 ]

THE PEOPLE OP THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. UY JUI PIO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals as raising
only a question of law.
It appears that the appellant Uy Jui Pio was charged in the municipal court of Manila with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142 for
using publicly a name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he had been known since childhood. Convicted in that
court, he appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the case was submitted for decision solely upon the admissions made by him at the
hearing. Those admissions were to the effect that he had been known since childhood "by the name of Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy"; that he was
also known in school "as Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy"; that the records of the Bureau of Immigration from the year 1946 "would also bear (out) the
same name of Uy Jui Pio alias Juanito Uy"; that "since 1936 until the passage of Commonwealth Act 142", he had been using that name; and that
in his marriage contract he signed the name "Juanito Uy" to conform to the name already typewritten thereon by someone else.
On the basis of the above admissions, the trial court found defendant to have violated section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 by adopting the
name "Juanito Uy" "when he was already named in his own country as 'Uy Jui Pio'." The conviction cannot stand.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 reads:
"SECTION 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person snail use any name different from the one with "which he was christened
or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames."
In forbidding the use of a name different from that by which one has been known since childhood, this section, by necessary, implication, allows
the use of the latter. Defendant, therefore, had the right to use the name "Juanito Uy" because he has since childhood been known by that
name.
It is contended, however, that the name "Juanito Uy" is an alias and defendant is. not authorized to use it without judicial authorization in view of
section 2 of this Act which reads:
SEC. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefore in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name
and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority
was granted. Judicial authority for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register."
The contention is without merit. Section 2 necessarily refers to a name whose use is not already authorised by section 1 for, otherwise, the
two sections would conflict with each other in that one forbids what the other allows. A statute should be so construed as to prevent a conflict
between different parts of it (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 345-347). Moreover, as Commonwealth Act No. 142 is a penal statute,
it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused (Ibid., p. 451).
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs de officio.
Para's, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Page 97 of 228

[ G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989 ]

AMADO C. ARIAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 82512. DECEMBER 19, 1989]
CRESENCIO D. DATA, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino which follows this majority opinion. The dissent
substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice Grino-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being
discussed and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn from those events and the facts
insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in
the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General[1] who, in 80 pages of his consolidated manifestation and motion,
recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio
F. Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and construction of public works
and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may
have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its implementation. The careless
use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who
engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors
would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be
guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a
transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part
of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works
for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in
1973 were sold as "residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely
unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or preparation of spurious supporting
papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per
square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax
declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows
that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
"1. No undue injury was caused to the Government. -

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a.

The P80.00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair and reasonable.

It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale
where the purchase price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting
parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller and
the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to
negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After
taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable
price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was
indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution's principal witness
Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham property
as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is 'reasonable' (tsn, August 19, 1983, p. 20) and 'fair' (Ibid, p. 76); that the value of lands within the town of
Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00 (Ibid, P. 21); that the Agleham property is around 300 meters from Ortigas Avenue, adjacent to the existing
Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision x x x and near Eastland Garment Building (ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by factories,
commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham
property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (Ibid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in
Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid.,
pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23)." (At pp. 256-259,
Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree that pegged just compensation in
eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower.
Other factors must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low valuation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more
weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair valuation. The value must be
determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the
decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted the petitioners of causing undue injury,
damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings has been presented and
accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems - dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork,
multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence - is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction
before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten
number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield.
But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is
doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to
call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of
food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added
reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to
the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely
pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on
April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his
arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his
signature on the voucher, there is no evidence linking him to the transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him
personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.

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Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to personally investigate the smallest details of the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no
warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential" was done before Arias was assigned to
Pasig. Besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or
kangkong but this is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going
to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer foundations.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that the rules of the Commission on
Audit require auditors to keep these documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau
of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by
prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is the alleged gross overprice for the
land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q

In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the property?

A
In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title had
been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase price.
Q
Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the
papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A

Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.

Q
Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without paying the price. Did you not consider that rather
odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27, 1987).
A

No, Your Honor.

Why not?

A
Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments will be made unless the corresponding title in the
payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q

In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government?

A
Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As of
the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.
Q
My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the government; the sale was consummated; the
title was issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the seller?
A

No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the goverment comes later than the transfer.

That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?

Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27, 1987).

Q
And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you are also called upon by going over the papers...
(TSN, page 22, April 27, 1987).
....vouchers called upon to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?
A

Yes, Ma'am.

And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?

As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296.

They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27, 1987).

and continuing:
A
..... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is
beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987)." (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
"As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District
he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos
Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct
surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and
active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented
to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale
together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and
complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of

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sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with
its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public
Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the
approval of the deed of sale by the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner Data signed; petitioner
Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 3132)." (At pp. 267-268, Rollo)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
"It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners
and their co-accused. There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon
the purported pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on
record. Nowhere in the seventy-eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would link either
petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in
the Information. That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and
passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does not raise any presumption or inference that they were part of
the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury
caused to the Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00 per square
meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to
P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the estimated 19,328 square meters
to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price
from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in
the deed of sale because the approval of the survey plan/technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of the deed of sale. What is
important is that before any payment is made by the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and
another one issued to the Government incorporating therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as what
obtained in the instant case." (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D.
Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D.
Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., joins in the dissent of Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino.
Grio-Aquino, J., see dissenting opinion.

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[ G.R. No. 110097, December 22, 1997 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNULFO ASTORGA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actual detention or locking up is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be
held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew.
There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.
In an Information[2] dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article
267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne
Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, [3] pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision[4] reads as follows:[5]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article
267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed.[6]
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows:[7]
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of the
grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] about
the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or Boy Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or
Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed
his hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed;
others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the
compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there
being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused
answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparents house is at
Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were
on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did
not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. Having
met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama.
Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was
bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the
victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered
towards Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to
Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who
showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonnes home.
The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven by her aunt and
adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonnes father. He left and never talked with the family.

Page 102 of 228

Evidence for the Defense

The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellants Brief,[8] dated December 10, 1993:
The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao.
She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished drinking, she went with
Astorga to the latters house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the
complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left behind. She told them to
hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for them, but because it was already dark, she did not find them. She went back to the house of the
accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from
Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage
and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three
proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine. (Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will
buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for
a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which was about 20 meters away from the second store. They
went out of the school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the way towards their house.
(Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they
met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that they [sic] way was already
going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it
was Trayas child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was already crying as she already wanted to go home. The group of
persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women. They arrived at Yvonnes house. He talked to the auntie of the child
and told her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go away because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid,
pp. 18-19)
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion:[9]
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
Consider these facts.
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from 1:00
P.M. until 5:00 P.M.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne.
When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in
chasing them, until they had overtaken him.
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow
afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum.
Accused did not change course.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also used
psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by force prevented to go home to her parents.
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that
she went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the
direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonnes insistence and that of the person they met that he was on the wrong way considering that there are no
criss crossing roads except the highway, is preposterous.

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The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court:[10]
I
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of credence because they were inconsistent and improbable. He
cites the following:
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk.
(TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already went
[sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor
on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p.
35, March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN,
p. 10, March 11, 1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel
Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993)
meaning accused was running fast.[11]
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by
appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility,
for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things differently.[12] Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be
expected to be uniform to the last detail.
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly contradicted Yvonnes statement that the accused did not smell
of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,[13] and her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven
years old,[14] do not have the same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the accused
was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the testimonies of these witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses estimate of the distance covered by the men who chased appellant does not render their testimonies
incredible.[15] Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were unrehearsed.[16]
Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonnes testimony is in accord with that of
Arnel Fabila -- a member of the group who chased appellant -- that they were able to overtake appellant after chasing him half a kilometer.[17]
Appellants challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following
points:[18]
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they
were already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecutions witnesses, corroborated the fact that the two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw
them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along
the highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one
kilometer;
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be

Page 104 of 228

confused on which way they should take in going home.

e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall
which was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely
sought their help in guiding them home, and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the case at the Fiscals Office.
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained.[19] In
the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue
Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did.[20] There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should react upon seeing a young
girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.
Appellants claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As
noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and psychological means in restraining her. [21] Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to
clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night.
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact
is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be
accorded great respect on appeal.[22]
Second Issue: No Motive to Kidnap
Petitioner contends that [t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya. He submits that the
prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more credible and
believable.[23]
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed,
motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[24] In this case, the identity of
appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping -- the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The
solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo,[25]
he argues:
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument against this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her
liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a
person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty.[26]
We agree with appellants contention this time.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[27] the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority; or
(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms lockup (encerrar) rather than kidnap (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup
is included in the broader term of detention, which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any
other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking up.[28] Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted
in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised
Administrative Code.[29]

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A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the absence of locking up. Victim Yvonne Traya testified:[30]
Q. And after that what happened next?
A. When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we
will buy candy, sir.
Q. And after that?
A. And while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next?
A. He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my mouth.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. And after that what did he do next?

A. He brought me to the school.
Q. What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of the school?
A. Maco Central Elementary School.
Q. How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?
A. A little bit near.
Q. When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?
A. Inside the gate, sir.
Q. And once inside the gate what did he do to you?
A. We were going around the school?
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Do you know why you were going around the school?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why, what did he do?
A. We were going around and when he saw that there is no person in the gate we passed at that gate.
Q. And where did he go after passing that gate?
A. Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. What about you, did you talk to him?

A. I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home and I told him that this is not the way to our house, and we did not pass
this way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction).
Q. And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said that is not the way because our house is towards Binuangan...
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. Going to my place.
Q. Do you know the place where it was going? What is that place?
A. On the road going to Tagum.
Q. Now, what about your house, where is it going?
A. To Binuangan.
Q. And so when you ... what did he do next when you said that is not the place going to your house?
A. We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my shoulder and dragged me, sir.
Q. What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?
A. I was crying, sir.
Q. Did you say any word to him when you were crying?

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A. Yes, I told him that we are going home.

Q. And what did Boy Astorga say?
A. He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be lost on our way.
Q. And so, what did you do?
A. I continued crying, sir.
Q. And after that, what happened?
A. We continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.
Q. What did that man ask Boy Astorga?
A. The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to say that this way is going
to Tagum and not to Binuangan any more.
Q. What else did the man ask, if any?
A. I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down because he
urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any more because there is a ghost.
Q. When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated, where did you run?
A. Towards Binuangan, sir.
Q. Towards the direction of your house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Astorga?
A. He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not a red eyes of the
ghost but that is a light coming from the vehicle.
Q. Now, what happened next?
A. He placed a necklace on me, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A. He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging me.

Q. While you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?
A. Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that that place we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the opposite.
Q. So, what happened next?
A. He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped my mouth and after a
few steps he already carried me.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A. He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want to go home and he told me that we are heading towards home, but I
told him that the way we are going to is not the way to our house.
Q. By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, what happened next?
A. He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q. After that, what happened next?
A. He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that persons were already chasing him and after that he carried me and ran.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on
the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time,
Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward
the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabilas group
chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping.[31] Appellants
apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize, however, because
Fabilas group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne.

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There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three
elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her
will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.[32] When appellant forcibly
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from
going home, and we cannot find any.
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. [33] Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling
her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home, but appellant refused and
instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or lock up
Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with
accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victims
neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case:[34]
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by
indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime
of kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held the victims hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go over to her
neighbor, who by then already saw what was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that
there were a good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The
child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when
Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the
inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the
case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of
testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the
case at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were
sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. -- When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos.[35] The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not exceed one year. [36]
However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense.[37]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has more
than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. The director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this
Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Page 108 of 228

[ G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-BR. 88,
QUEZON CITY, AND HONORATO GALVEZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of
answering twice for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in
the cases for murder and frustrated murder (although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged
did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.
We narrate a brief factual backdrop.
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting
claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel
Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained
until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged
bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the
crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in
addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth
Information had to be filed.
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There
the cases were stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to
Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to
insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding
in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would
have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and
substituted with a verdict of guilt.
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite
acquittal by the trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled
constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as
in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned.[1] Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States,[2] and because similarly in this jurisdiction a
retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.
Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause"
in the Philippines[3] and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a century ago are still germane and useful today in view of
certain modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v. Wilson[4] and United States v. Scott.[5]
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of
review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other
is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge
from the service) may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The
Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering
especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the
issues advanced by petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and
experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive rulings.
For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more
circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same
offense.[6] This prohibition does not consist merely of one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of
exceptions.[7] It must have been this unique transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to
remark in Albernaz v. United States[8] that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to

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challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on
double jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a compendious review of its
historical growth and development be undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing landmark interpretive
applications of the doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu under which it evolved.
Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word,"[9] derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke, jest or game,[10] and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which
denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an uncertain game.[11] The genesis of the
concept itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek
law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man
to be tried twice on the same issue."[12] The Justinian Digest[13] providing that "(a) governor should not permit the same person to be again accused
of crime of which he has been acquitted,"[14] suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great
Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting mans "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was
continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing
from one misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis
or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the same
misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus
limits were needed on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal
can be found in the first law of the Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not
proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to death."[15]
The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the
promise by God to his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second time" [16] and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I
will afflict thee no more."[17] Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim insinuated itself into canon law as early as
847 A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for the same act."[18]
The most famous cause clbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend,
Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain customs initiated by his predecessors called
"avitae consuetudines," one of the known purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be delivered to lay tribunals
for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the kings punishment. This was met with stinging
criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy. The issue
between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral,
allegedly at the instance of his king.[19]
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized "as a maxim of common law" [20] based on the universal
principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one
now and another in the future, but among all nations, it is the same."[21] But even as early as the 15th century, the English courts already began to
use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials.[22] Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.),
Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.).[23] Lord Coke for instance described the protection afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related
common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon.[24] In Vauxs Case,[25] it was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall
not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense
is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the
common law of England that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a
consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent
jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. [26]
The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal procedure, became an integral part of
the legal system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the
statutes and common law of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same crime,
offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall causes shall be briefly
and destinctly entered on the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."[27] Ineluctably, this pronouncement became the springboard for the
proposal of the First Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition against
placing an individual twice in danger of a second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in English law and legislation derived
from colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently
ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an acquittal from perjury, declaring that: A writ of error, or appeal
in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for
one and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by repeated
attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is
acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him.[28] Verily, these concepts were founded upon that great fundamental rule of
common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common law, embodied
in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in criminal cases, a writ of error
has been denied to the State.[29]
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no
small amount of controversy in United States v. Gibert.[30] There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared that "the court had no power to grant a new
trial when the first trial had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was that the
prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had been acquitted or convicted.

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But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the most serious cases was already being exercised by many
American courts, the practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of provisions of law against double jeopardy. [31] For this reason, the
rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted.[32] As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen[33] declared that the constitutional provision did not
prohibit a new trial on defendants motion after a conviction. In Hopt v. Utah,[34] the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his
convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball[35] affirmed that the double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on
appeal, a conviction had been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a judgment against him could be tried
anew upon the same indictment or upon another indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of autrefois convict
was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States[36] where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by
holding that "since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order to secure a reversal, there was no bar to
convicting them of the higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the
Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt
of the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole
controversy and acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been."[37] It was ratiocinated that the result was justified not only on the theory that
the accused had waived their right not to be retried but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to x x x cover
the case of a judgment x x x which has been annulled at the request of the accused x x x x"
It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final,
ending a defendants jeopardy, and, even when not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of
the elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an acquittal may
appear to be erroneous.
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing
circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The following year an issue was raised in
United States v. Sanges[38] on whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case. In that case,
existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the
matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal,
or upon the determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a
judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of
the constitutional provision.[39] Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United States Government had no right of
appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy.
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to
appeal in criminal cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an
indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when President
Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March
1907 such legislative authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law[40] 40 Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40 permitting the United
States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictments is founded."[41] The law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of the
District Courts decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in favor of the defendant
based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it
made no difference whether the verdict be the result of the jurys decision or that of the judge. In other words, Government could appeal from a
decision dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal statute and
from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not be put in jeopardy.[42]
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by
the State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23
April 1900 the military government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others,
extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900
Instructions of President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft. The Instructions read in part: x x x the
Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are certain great principles of government
which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their islands for the
sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon
every division and branch of the Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no person shall be
put twice in jeopardy for the same offense x x x x"[43]
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government
Act of 1 July 1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth
Amendment and in McKinleys Instructions by providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not take long however
for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinleys Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.
In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court
of first instance, minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and
judgment was reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public office or place of trust.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of
his judgment of acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the
Philippines and the Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the prohibition
against double jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United
States. Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were

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regarded not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings constituted one
continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been rendered by the Audiencia.
Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real[44] as: After a man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no
one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas[45] which provided that: If a
man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x
x Under this system of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of last
resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused was not finally convicted or
acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in
Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Governments argument and held that the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused
Kepner twice in jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that,
whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional
jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that
Kepner soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly returned and
received, the court could take no other action than to order his discharge. x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes
one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective
indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same offense."[46]
This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills[47] where the Court further clarified that jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an
offense of which a person has already been acquitted x x x x It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v. United States[48] in which Mr. Justice Black, writing
for the Court, professed that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was
considered final, ending the accuseds jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the
same charge.
American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy since then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by
Kepner, but not without encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois[49] did
cause some amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in Illinois
and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to
those of the federal charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
declared that the Fifth Amendments double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so that an acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a
prosecution by a state based on the same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the federal authorities in the
Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state indictment
essentially a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting
opinion. Black rued that the Courts ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the already weakened constitutional guarantees
against double prosecution," citing the earlier case of United States v. Lanza,[50] where the Court allowed the federal conviction and punishment of a
man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in
its history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the same offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black
asserted, was unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut,[51] "double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary
to the spirit of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and immunities of
the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption x x x x One may infer, from the
fewness of the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after
conviction."
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case
of Fong Foo v. United States,[52] decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and
could not be reviewed x x x without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted
for the first time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme
Court.[53] However, due to the many modifications the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation became more laborious, effectively
transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial bete noire, for even the U.S.
Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act."[54] In one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that
the Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that has not improved with age."[55]
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of
Government to appeal whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the
constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same offense. [56]
In Wilson,[57] the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further
punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same offense.[58] And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty."[59] It can thus be inferred from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to the

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rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott[60] the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the
successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to
further prosecution on the same charge; and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court
that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a
reversal.[61] It would seem that the conditionality of when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal was attached thereto because
ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal is reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of
the case for another trial may be allowed if needed.
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but
also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of
dismissals do not involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a
matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of
evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in some
fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order
arresting judgment, i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that
rendered the judgment;[62] or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that does not relate to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, but which is set up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have been connected with the
case.[63] Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals
therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the
Philippines. To be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no
appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a defendants liability to
be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law
attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal however mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high
risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x
x x On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset his
first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the x x x Clause was intended to protect."
In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the
seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal
are possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a
review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the
evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.
Petitioners own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that
rehears the case and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it
adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and, for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before the
American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by
the Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence
that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is,
quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as
equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions.[64] Although Kepner
technically involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a
second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil of successive trials.[65]
No less than the case of Wilson,[66] petitioners main anchor for its propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the
present, rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy
in the same cause however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It declared
unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government
to appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy
attaches for that particular cause.
To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the
defendant due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been
entered by the jury. But it was not an acquittal that involved factual resolution. It was one anchored on an extraneous cause. Factual resolution is
defined in United States v. Sorenson[67] following the rulings in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as the finding that government failed to prove all the
elements of the offense. It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence, could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in
Wilson is that where a judge holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the
prosecution may appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law. [68] This is so since no second trial
will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jurys verdict.[69] And if the prosecution is upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial
court for disposition of the remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was presented because the appellate
court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply order the jurys guilty verdict reinstated, no new factfinding would be
necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in jeopardy. [70]
The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved
for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the
motion. Government appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double

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Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to
forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts."
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not
upon his own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or
innocent. Here, trial on the merits was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in court.
We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioners concept of "another trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual
interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the
cause before us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner,
upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the postverdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the
case at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay,
definitely forecloses the applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.
Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic
philosophy on double jeopardy vis--vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved
since Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not improved with age?"
The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran observed in People v. Tarok,[71] are not indigenous but are a matter
of constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, from there it found its way into this country, first, in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, then in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of
the common law, and adopted from the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same line of
development - no narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the
United States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner.
For Kepner may be said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The
cases of People v. Bringas,[72] People v. Hernandez,[73] People v. Montemayor,[74] City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,[75] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[76]
and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,[77] to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or
reluctance to keep up with the Joneses, in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution,
statutes and jurisprudence. As early as Julia v. Sotto[78] the Court warned that without this safeguard against double jeopardy secured in favor of the
accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often
as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
The discussions by the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an appeal from
acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was
strongly voted down. Thus MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The amendment is commendable, but we submit that the reason against far
outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity of suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second,
suits will be expensive if we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or more amor
propio. In the third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of
consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be one-sided. In the fifth place, as
demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural rather than constitutional. And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson
Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would
walk around under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.
PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority:
YES). Those against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is rejected x x x x
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. 361)
The case of People v. Bringas[79] was the first case to be decided under this Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court,
guided by Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way[80] against the right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging
the defendant in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether his discharge was
based upon the trial courts conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged.
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof, reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935
Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the
right of government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department
read as follows Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court
by a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.[81]

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This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the
parties in power, situation and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited resources, trained detectives, willing officers and
counsel learned in the law, stands arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted with their officers or
attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property rested
upon the result of the trial."[82]
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that we could be subjecting an accused individual to a very serious danger of
harassment from a prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag of possibility of appeal x x x could be much more
than letting a guilty person go."[83] Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated.[84]
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla
reopened the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The following exchanges ensued:
MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide resolution which allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided that in such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail.
This has been deleted by the Commission x x x x
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the
great objection was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I recall, the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day
before, that it did not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of
double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?
FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we considered the matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I
took was that it was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse
of discretion but it also required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.
MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make the exercise of that right by the state or offended party restrictive not
only through a petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that
are really covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction."
But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial
court, that is final, executory and not appealable.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended
party or the state will improve the administration of justice?
FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we voted on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the
Commissioner wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor.
Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.[85]
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions.
The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information x x x x
From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. [86] It bears repeating that where acquittal is
concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly
establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless
there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.[87] Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled
doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the
sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal,
such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment
is a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw. It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis:
If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law unto
himself; he invites anarchy. The contention of respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be
appealed or reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:[88]
x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at
all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It

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neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke 'justice for the
innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society which they have
wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily
spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They
render justice where justice is due.
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. [89] The Court in People v. Bocar[90]
rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." [91]
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" [92] Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent,
he may be found guilty."[93]
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of
the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance
criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction."[94] The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. [95] With this
right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.[96]
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. [97] This interest encompasses
his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for societys awareness of the
heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. [98] The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression;
the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding.[99] As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,[100] "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.[101]
Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic
to the American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts of acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the
underlying rationale of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system.
This is a rather strained if not facile approach to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective of factfinding is
concerned, factfinding forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a difference between a jury acquittal and a judge
acquittal, Philippine version. To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains that in the United States there is an emerging consensus to
differentiate the constitutional impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis--vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench. While this consensus may
have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of countless instances of conflict between jury
verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of
distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have no juries to
speak of, petitioners hypothesis is inappropriate.
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioners argument lies in its focus on the instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the
American jury versus the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals,"
rather than on the essential function of factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of
factfinding is concerned, there exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts. This much
petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one
considers that, universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge.
Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved our own doctrine that
acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy
having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the
evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally put to rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to
charge respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v.
Pablo,[102] it alleges that "respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence already presented for a proper assessment x x x
x It is in completely ignoring the evidence already presented x x x that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It adds that
"discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by
the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness."[103]
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioners certiorari as a mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a
strategy to camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioners assertions, evidence in the case at bar was
subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great writ of certiorari.
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior
tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not
proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by
statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the

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right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant
contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights are
being thus encroached upon.[104]
Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to
secure by certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth
the scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is
some indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate remedy
available,[105] and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it
cannot do by appeal.[106] Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on
the merits by the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an order as one
sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty. [107]
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without
good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's
appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge
considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis--vis the
accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the
appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence
was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writs limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it
becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the
exercise of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., agree with J. Panganibans separate opinion.
Melo, J., in the result.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

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[ G.R. No. 140615, February 19, 2001 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), PETITIONER,
VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND RODOLFO T. ARAMBULO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for annulment of the Resolutions[1] of the public respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 11, 1997 and February 3, 1998 on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and that the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines/Presidential Commission on Good Government was deprived of due process of law, in that the public respondent declared the private
respondent the owner of 1/7 of the shares of stock of Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. without first requiring him to present evidence showing his
ownership over them, and awarded him 144.12 Million Pesos from a mere motion for execution filed by said private respondent of a judgment on a
Compromise Agreement to which private respondent Arambulo is not a party. Petitioner alleges that the owner of the said shares is Imelda R.
Marcos who funded the paid-up subscriptions of all the seven (7) incorporators and directors/subscribers of Piedras with TRB (Traders Royal Bank)
check No. 582753 dated March 31, 1976, for five million pesos taken from TRB Investment Management Account (IMA) No. 75-20 of Imelda R.
Marcos.
The Sandiganbayan summarized the relevant antecedent facts as follows:[2]
"Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc. was organized in 1976, with the authorized capital stock of P20,000,000.00 divided into 2,000,000,000 shares at
P0.01 per share.
"George Alba, Nestor Mata, Dominador Pangilinan, Salvador Tan and Mariano del Mundo were the incorporators and, together with Francisco de
Leon and Arambulo, directors and subscribers. De Leon subscribed to 145,000,000 shares with the total par value of P1,450,000.00 and paid on his
subscription P725,000.00. Each of the others subscribed to 142,500,000 shares with the par value of P1,425,000.00 and paid on his subscription
P712,000.00. The total shares subscribed were 1,000,000,000 amounting to P10,000,000.00 of which P5,000,000.00 was paid-up.
"All the seven directors and subscribers were nominees of Roberto S. Benedicto.
"On a date or dates not appearing in the record, Piedras acquired 13,500,000,000 shares of Oriental Petroleum.
"On July 23, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered all the stockholdings, rights and interests of the seven directors
and subscribers: namely, Alba, Mata, Pangilinan, Tan, del Mundo, de Leon and Arambulo in Piedras.
"Eight days later, the PCGG filed this case [Civil Case No. 0034] against Benedicto, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos as principal
defendants and 32 other defendants. Among them are Hector T. Rivera, Julieta C. Benedicto, Lourdes V. Rivera, Miguel V. Gonzales, Pagasa San
Agustin, Rocio R Torres, Mariano Benedicto, Romulo Benedicto, Zacarias Amante, Francisco A. Benedicto, Jose Montalvo, Jesus Martinez, Nestor
Mata, Alberto Velez, Ricardo de Leon, Zapiro Tampinco, Dominador Pangilinan and Arambulo. Except Hector T. Rivera, all these defendants are
alleged to be dummies, nominees or agents acting as incorporators, directors or stockholders of corporations owned or controlled by the principal
defendants.
"The Amended Complaint dated April 12, 1987, is for 'reconveyance,' 'reversion' or 'restitution' of alleged ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the
defendants acting in unlawful concert with one another, with accounting and damages. Of the several causes of action sued upon, none involves
Piedras or its shares. In fact, the corporation or its stocks are not expressly mentioned as ill-gotten wealth of any of the defendants. The only cause
of action involving Arambulo concerns the establishment of the California Overseas Bank in California, U.S.A., in which he allegedly participated in
unlawful concert with the principal defendants.
"Neither is Piedras specifically included in Annex "A" of the Amended Complaint, which is a list of the claimed ill-gotten wealth amassed by
Benedicto and his co-defendants. But Annex "A" mentions the 'Frozen Bank Accounts and other assets of Rodolfo Arambulo' and contains the catchall clause: 'And all other assets of all the defendants sequestered and/or frozen by the Commission pursuant to Executive Order [s] Nos. 1 and 2.'
"The Record does not show that any of the defendants set up in their respective answers cross-claims against Arambulo claiming ownership of the
sequestered Piedras shares in his name.
"On November 3, 1990, the plaintiff, through the PCGG, and principal defendant Benedicto entered into a 'Compromise Agreement.' Upon their joint
motion and after hearing, the Court approved it on October 2, 1992, rendered judgment on it and enjoined the parties to comply with it. In the
decision in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (226 SCRA 314 [1993]), the Supreme Court dismissed the petition to set aside the approval and ordered
strict compliance with the Compromise Agreement.
"x x x x x x x x x
"As a requirement in the entry into the Compromise Agreement, Benedicto executed a Deed of Confirmation dated October 20, 1990, xxx
"After the approval of the Compromise Agreement, a general Information Sheet subscribed and sworn to on September 5, 1994 was filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The address of Piedras is stated to be '6/F Philcomsen Bldg., Ortigas Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila,' which
was and is now the given address of the PCGG.
"Arambulo is still one of the directors and has a subscription of P1,424,999.00 of which P712,499.00 is paid-up. This is the same subscription and
paid-up amount he had when Piedras was incorporated, minus P1.00. Instead of the other directors and subscribers nominated by Benedicto, the
new subscriber is the Republic of the Philippines with P8,574,999.05 worth of shares, of which P4,287,000.00 is paid-up. This is also the total
subscriptions and paid-up amounts, which the other nominees had at the time of incorporation, less P0.95 from the total subscriptions.

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"The other directors each holds a share in Piedras obviously placed in their respective names to qualify them as directors."
In a Motion for Execution dated March 13, 1996 of the judgment on Compromise Agreement, Arambulo alleged that: 1.) he is a stockholder and
director of Piedras owning 1/7 of the outstanding shares therein 2.) under the Compromise Agreement between the plaintiff and Benedicto, the latter
ceded to the Government properties listed in Annex "A" thereof and assigned whatever rights and interests he had in the corporate assets
enumerated in Annex "B;" 3.) the Piedras shares in the names of Francisco Benedicto, Mariano del Mundo, Salvador Tan and Dominador Pangilinan
are mentioned in Annex "A" and ceded to the government, but Arambulo's shares are not so listed nor ceded; 4.) on the other hand, the PCGG lifted
the writs of sequestration over properties set forth in Annex "C" and "all other sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and/or his
corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex "A" as ceded or to be ceded to the Government; and 5.) upon the approval of the Compromise
Agreement by this Court and affirmation of the approval by the Supreme Court, this case became moot and academic and this Court lost jurisdiction
over it, except to order the execution of the judgment or the Agreement. Arambulo prayed that the PCGG be ordered to release to him the dividends
appertaining to his shares in Piedras and to cease interfering with and/or obstructing the peaceful exercise of his rights over the said shares.
In its Opposition, the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter Republic) contended that Arambulo has no legal personality to ask for the execution of
the judgment, for he is not a party to the Compromise Agreement, and while the Agreement may have put an end to the litigation as between the
Republic and therein defendant Benedicto, it is not so as to Arambulo.
Arambulo replied asserting that although he is not a party to the Agreement, the same extends by its terms to him and other defendants who are
alleged to be Benedicto's officers, agents and/or nominees and who, by reason of their being such, were impleaded as defendants. Arambulo further
argued that in the Complaint, he and Benedicto were sued under a common cause of action which cannot be sustained without the presence of
Benedicto.
In his Fourth Urgent Motion for Resolution of the Motion for Execution, Arambulo attached a Deed of Confirmation dated October 20, 1990, and
quoting the provisions thereof, he pointed out to the following: That he is a stockholder of Piedras; that he acquired his shares therein legitimately;
that Benedicto, he and the other nominees do not hold assets in trust and for the benefit of the former President Marcos' family, and that except he
(Arambulo), the stockholders of Piedras assigned their Piedras shares to the Government as part of the assets ceded by Benedicto under the
Compromise Agreement.
The Republic filed an Opposition asserting that under Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement, Benedicto ceded to it 100% of the 13.5 billion
shares of Oriental Petroleum; that under the Deed of Confirmation, Benedicto confirmed that all stockholders of Piedras are his nominees, and that a
nominee is one who is being nominated and therefore Arambulo is not a stockholder but one who holds in trust the shares of Benedicto who is the
beneficial owner.
Arambulo countered with a Reply arguing that what Benedicto ceded to the Government was not 100% of the Oriental Petroleum shares owned by
Piedras but 100% thereof pertaining to Francisco Benedicto, Mariano del Mundo, Salvador Tan and Solita Pangilinan, widow of Dominador
Pangilinan; and that he (Arambulo) is a stockholder by the language of the Deed of Confirmation and the Piedras shares were legitimately acquired
by Benedicto and/or his nominees.
In compliance with the directive of the Sandiganbayan, Benedicto's counsel filed a comment. None was submitted for the 18 associates/nominees.
Benedicto pointed out that the intention of the parties was to transfer 100% of the sequestered 13.5 billion Oriental Petroleum shares to the
Government; that since these shares were Piedras property (not of the stockholders of Piedras), to effect the transfer it was not necessary that all
the seven stockholders who were nominees of Benedicto should act, but only the majority of the stockholders or, at least, 66 2/3% vote. Benedicto
submitted that if affirmative relief is granted as prayed for in the Motion for Execution, it should be subject to the qualification that the said relief
should not in any way serve as basis to impair or prejudice the cessions or provisions of the Compromise Agreement.
On July 11, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the herein assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that Rodolfo T. Arambulo is the subscriber-owner of 145,000,000 shares
issued by Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc. with the par value of P0.01 per share or a total of P1,425,000.00, P712,500 of which is fully paid-up,
free of any sequestration lien; and, accordingly, orders the Presidential Commission on Good Government, as sequestrator of the said shares and/or
as holder of the great majority of stock in Piedras acting through its Board of PCGG nominated Directors:
1.) To release in favor of Rodolfo T. Arambulo all the dividends corresponding to his Piedras shares and
2.) To cease from interfering with and/or obstructing the peaceful exercise of his rights of ownership over the Piedras shares, including the right to
vote and to be voted for.
SO ORDERED."[3]
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied on February 3, 1998, [4] reiterating the orders in its Resolution of
July 11, 1997.
On March 23, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Writ of Execution.[5]
On April 8, 1998, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 11, 1997 and February 3, 1998 docketed as G.R. No. 133096, but the same was
dismissed for having been filed one (1) day late.
On June 8, 1998, the OSG filed before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 133096 an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from implementing the Writ of Execution.
On July 2, 1998, the OSG received a copy of the Resolution dated June 1, 1998 of this Court dismissing the petition for certiorari for having been
filed beyond the sixty-day period from receipt of the questioned Resolution.

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On July 5, 1999, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating that the petition was filed on time because the last day for filing of the petition was
on April 7, 1998 and the petition was filed on said date.
On August 31, 1998, the OSG received a copy of the Resolution dated July 20, 1998 of this Court in G.R. No. 133096, where petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion praying that the petition for certiorari be admitted and the prayer for a temporary restraining order be granted, was noted.
On September 15, 1998, the OSG filed a Motion to Give Due Course to the Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order with the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 133096.
On November 22, 1999, the OSG filed a Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Give Due Course.
On even date, the petitioner, through the OSG filed the instant petition for annulment which was docketed as G.R. No. 140615. As heretofore stated,
the petition prays for the annulment of the Resolutions dated July 11, 1997 and February 3, 1998 of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and that the petitioner was deprived of due process of law.
On January 26, 2000, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. [6]
On February 22, 2000, this court issued a temporary restraining order, [7] effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering the respondents Sandiganbayan and Rodolfo T. Arambulo, or his representatives, to cease and desist from implementing the writ of
execution issued by the Sandiganbayan on 23 March 1998 in Civil Case No. 0034, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Roberto S. Benedicto, et
al.
In a Resolution[8] dated February 22, 2000, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require respondents to comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice.
On March 2, 2000, private respondent Arambulo filed an Urgent Motion (To Dismiss Petition and Recall Temporary Restraining Order),[9] praying
that: 1.) the temporary restraining order dated 22 February 2000 be recalled; 2.) the petition for annulment of resolutions with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction be dismissed outright on grounds of res judicata and forum-shopping; 3.) the members of the PCGG, particularly
Associate Commissioner Antonio A. Mereles, be cited for contempt of court for grave misrepresentation and forum-shopping; 4.) disciplinary and
administrative sanctions against the Office of the Solicitor General be initiated and imposed for violation of the lawyer's oath and for conspiracy with
the PCGG in violating the constitutional and statutory rights of private respondent; and 5.) reasonable damages and costs be awarded to private
respondent as compensation for the alleged violation of his rights.
On March 10, 2000, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion For Early Resolution.[10]
On March 30, 2000, the Court required petitioner to comment on private respondent's Urgent Motion (To Dismiss Petition and Recall TRO) within ten
(10) days from notice.[11]
On April 5, 2000, private respondent filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Comment)[12] praying that the Urgent Motion (To Dismiss Petition and Recall
Temporary Restraining Order) and the Urgent Motion For Early Resolution be adopted as private respondent's Comment; and that the prayers in the
adopted pleadings/motions be granted.
On May 25, 2000, petitioner filed its Comment On The Urgent Motion (To Dismiss Petition and Recall Temporary Restraining Order) Of Private
Respondent.[13] In its Comment, petitioner averred that a void judgment can never become final and executory; that action to declare it a nullity does
not prescribe; that the petition is not a mere rehash of a prior dismissed petition; that the State's right to recover ill-gotten wealth is not barred by
estoppel; that res adjudicata does not apply in the instant case; that petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping but private respondent; that neither
petitioner nor Comm. Merelos is guilty of misrepresentation; and that the TRO prevents injustice to the government and violates no constitutional or
statutory right of private respondent.
In a Resolution[14] dated June 7, 2000, the Court resolved to require the private respondent to Reply to the Solicitor General's Comment On The
Urgent Motion (To Dismiss Petition and Recall Temporary Restraining Order).
On June 27, 2000, private respondent filed his Reply. [15]
The proper issues in this case boil down to two: 1.) whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process of law when the public respondent
resolved the motion for execution in favor of private respondent Arambulo allegedly without requiring the parties to present their respective evidence
to prove their contrary claims/allegations; and, 2.) whether the dismissal of the petition docketed as G.R. No. 133096 bars the filing of the instant
case.
On the first issue, petitioner alleges that there was no evidence supporting respondent Sandiganbayan's conclusion that respondent Arambulo is the
"subscriber-owner" of 1/7 of the Piedras shares. Petitioner also alleges that this unmistakably disregards the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process which demand that "a finding or decision" must be supported by evidence presented at a hearing or contained in the records or
disclosed to the parties affected. Petitioner avers that such Sandiganbayan's conclusion or finding is without any explanation or reason therefor,
which is one of the essential requirements of due process of law.[16]
This Court finds petitioner's contentions untenable. The Sandiganbayan gave both the petitioner and the private respondent ample opportunity to
present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the 1/7 Piedras Shares. When petitioner (plaintiff in the case below) submitted its
Opposition (to Arambulo's motion for execution) dated April 11, 1996 and another Opposition (to Arambulo's additional argument in his motion for
resolution) dated February 26, 1997,[17] petitioner was thereby given the chance to air its side which is the essence of due process of law.
Contrary to petitioner's averments that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion or finding is without any explanation or reason therefor, the following

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ratiocinations in the public respondent's assailed Resolution promulgated on July 11, 1997, explain why affirmative relief should be granted to private
respondent Arambulo, thus:
"1. Section 26, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution, provides in part:
'For [sequestration or freeze] orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution [on February 7, 1987], the corresponding judicial action or
proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be
commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.
'The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein prescribed.'
"In this case, the PCGG sequestered the shares in the names of seven Piedras stockholders, one of whom was Arambulo on July 23, 1987, and the
plaintiff filed this case on July 31, 1987. The question is: Is this case the corresponding judicial action or proceeding contemplated in the above
quoted constitutional provision insofar as Piedras Petroleum Co., Inc. and/or its stocks issued in the name of Arambulo are concerned? The answer
is no.
"The complaints, original and amended, do not allege any cause of action for recovery of the Piedras shares in the name of Arambulo. In fact, no
mention whatsoever is made in the pleadings of Piedras and/or its shares as supposed ill-gotten wealth of any of the defendants. The only cause of
action involving Arambulo concerns the establishment of the California Overseas Bank in California, U.S.A., in which he averredly participated in
unlawful concert with the principal defendants.
"Neither is Piedras specifically named in Annex "A" of the Amended Complaint, which is a list of alleged ill-gotten wealth of Benedicto and his codefendants. Albeit the said Annex "A" mentions the 'Frozen Bank Accounts and the Assets of Rodolfo Arambulo' and contains the catch-all clause
'And all other assets of all the defendants sequestered and/or frozen by the Commission pursuant to Executive Order[s] Nos. 1 and 2,' these general
averments, without more, are insufficient to catapult this case to the category of a judicial action or proceeding referred to in the Constitution insofar
as Arambulo is concerned.
"Since this case is not that required in the fundamental law and none has been filed up to now, the sequestration order over the Piedras shares of
Arambulo was automatically lifted upon the lapse of the prescribed six-month period. Consequently, the plaintiff has no more legal right to retain the
dividends appertaining to his shares in Piedras.
"2. The Deed of Confirmation executed by Benedicto in favor of the plaintiff on October 20, 1990, provides in part:
'NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the First Party [Benedicto] hereby confirms that the assets, both real and
personal, [including the shares of stock of Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc.] (intercalated words taken from another where clause of the Deed of
Confirmation), covered by the proposed Compromise Agreement involving the settlement of the claims of the Second Party [the plaintiff] on the
sequestered assets of the First Party located in the Philippines, are exclusively owned and belonged to the First Party and/or his group controlled
corporations/businesses or nominees and the said assets were legitimately and lawfully acquired by the First Party and/or his nominees, as earlier
stated, and as such, the latter has/have the right to cede in favor of the Second Party part of the said assets, as consideration of the proposed
Compromise Agreement.'
"The just quoted stipulation identifies Arambulo as a nominee of Benedicto, but it does not necessarily imply that Benedicto, not Arambulo, is the
owner of the Piedras shares recorded in the latter's name. Under the Deed, the owner can be Benedicto, Arambulo and/or any of the other
nominees. This is clear from the above provision that... 'the sequestered assets... are exclusively owned [by] and belonged to' Benedicto 'and/or his
group controlled corporations, businesses or nominees and the said assets were legitimately and lawfully acquired by' Benedicto 'and/or his
nominees...'
"The facts narrated in the early part of this Resolution disclose that none of the defendants in this case set up a cross-claim in their respective
answers to the complaint, original or amended, asserting exclusive ownership of Piedras shares registered in the name of Arambulo.
"With particular reference to Benedicto, he did not assert any claim of exclusive ownership over the said shares as against Arambulo. Neither did he
deny such claim by Arambulo. He merely submits that any affirmative relief to Arambulo on the Motion for Execution should not in any way impair or
prejudice the cessions he made to the Government.
"Nor did any of the other nominees of Benedicto. They did not even bother to comment on the motion, despite the period given them to do so.
"It was only Arambulo who claimed and now claims exclusive ownership of and concomitant rights in the Piedras shares placed in his name.
"From all the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that Arambulo was merely invited or requested to be a shareholder in Piedras by Benedicto but he
(Arambulo) himself paid for his own subscriptions from his own resources. This is strengthened by the fact that although Arambulo is mentioned as a
nominee in the Deed of Confirmation, unlike the other nominees, he did not assign any Piedras shares to the Government.
"3. Under Par. I (a) of the Compromise Agreement and Annex "A" thereof, Benedicto ceded to the Government the 'shareholdings' in, among other
corporations:
`Piedras Mining (100% of 13.5 billion shares of Oriental Petroleum valued at 0.03/share, thru the ff. nominees:
1.) Francisco Benedicto,
2.) Mariano del Mundo,
3.) Salvador Tan,
4.) Solita Pangilinan(widow of Dominador Pangilinan)...[P]418,500,000.00M'
"Contrary to the assertions of both the plaintiff and Arambulo, what Benedicto ceded was his 'shareholdings' in Piedras through his four nominees
and not any of the 13.5 billion shares of Oriental Petroleum owned by Piedras.
"But why were the Oriental shares mentioned? Because they were used as basis for fixing the value of the Piedras shares ceded to the Government

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which became the great majority stockholder in Piedras. The same mode of determining the value of the shareholdings of Benedicto in Pontevedra
Agricultural Land and Inter-Continental Broadcasting Corporation mentioned in the same Par. 1 (a) and Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement
was adopted. Thus, the Pontevedra shares ceded by him to the Government were appraised at an amount equal to 40% of the estimated value of
three haciendas owned by Pontevedra. Similarly, the Inter-Continental shares were given a value equal to 100% of some corporate lands and
buildings used as TV and Radio stations.
"For the reason that the Piedras shareholdings to be ceded were in the names of Benedicto's six nominees -- namely: Francisco Benedicto, del
Mundo, Salvador and Pangilinan, plus George Alba and Nestor Mata, as added in the Deed of Confirmation -- the cession must have to be through
them. Accordingly, as mentioned in the said Deed, the six listed nominees assigned the Piedras shares under their respective names to the
Government, which assignment were for all intents and purposes deemed as if executed by Benedicto. All in all, they assigned or ceded 8,575,000
Piedras shares with the total par value of P857,500.00, of which P4,287,500.00 was fully paid. The remaining outstanding Piedras shares, 1,425,000
in number, amounting to 1,425,000.00, of which P712,500.00 was paid up continue to be Arambulo's.
"Accordingly, the General Information Sheet of Piedras prepared in September 1994 when the plaintiff was already the great majority stockholder
shows that it owns Piedras shares amounting to P8,574,999.05, of which P4,287,500.00 was fully paid. These are the same Piedras shares
assigned to the Government by Benedicto's six nominees, minus P0.95. The said General Information Sheet also discloses that Arambulo is still a
director and has Piedras shares with par value of P1,424,999.00, of which P712,499.00 is paid up. This is also the same Piedras shares he
subscribed when Piedras was incorporated, less P1.00. The deducted shares were placed in the names of the other directors to qualify them as
such.
"Benedicto tried to justify why only four of his nominees through whom the Piedras shares were ceded to the Government, and not all seven of them,
including Arambulo. According to Benedicto, the assignment of 13.5 billion Oriental shares was a corporate act of Piedras, which under the law could
be done by the majority or, at least, 662/3% vote. This would have been perhaps correct had the Oriental shares been the assets ceded and the
cession had been made by Piedras which owned the said shares. But as already stated, what was transferred was the shareholdings in Piedras, and
not the Oriental shares. It was Benedicto who effected the transfer through his nominees, except Arambulo, and not Piedras. And Piedras continued
to be the owner of the Oriental shares, and not the Government.
"4. In the Deed of Confirmation executed in October 1990, by Benedicto, only his six nominees assigned the Piedras shares recorded in their
respective names. They were Alba, Mata, Pangilinan, Tan, del Mundo and Francisco de Leon (Francisco Benedicto). Although Arambulo was also
mentioned in the Deed as Benedicto's nominees, he did not assign the Piedras shares registered in his name.
If under the Compromise Agreement the intention was to cede all outstanding Piedras shares, no valid reason appears why Arambulo did not also
assign his shares. The fact that he was allegedly in the United States at the time was not an insurmountable obstacle, just as the fact that Benedicto
was in Caracas, Venezuela when he executed the Deed of Confirmation and in Singapore when he signed the Compromise Agreement was not.
"The plaintiff did not take any legal action to compel Arambulo to transfer to it his Piedras share purportedly pursuant to the Compromise Agreement
entered into in November 1990 until after more than six years on (sic) February1997 when it prayed for the first time in its second Opposition to the
Motion for Execution that he be so directed. When the plaintiff filed its first Opposition in April 1996, it did not. It did not even allege therein that it was
entitled to the assignment of the shares. The belated prayer appears to be an after-thought.
"Neither Benedicto, nor any of his other nominees moved in this case or filed any action for an order directing Arambulo to cede his Piedras shares
to the Government. In fact, as already mentioned, they did not even deny the ownership claimed by him over the Piedras shares.
"5. As already stated, Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement is a list of assets ceded or to be ceded by Benedicto to the Government and
Arambulo's Piedras shares are not mentioned therein. Annex "B" of the same Agreement is another list of assets over which any rights or interests of
Benedicto shall be assigned to the Government. Similarly, Arambulo's Piedras shares are not included in Annex "B."
"The Annex "C" of the said Agreement is the third list of assets the sequestration over which shall be lifted by the plaintiff. Arambulo's Piedras shares
are not specified therein. But after enumerating various assets, it adds:
'All the sequestered properties or assets (real or personal) not otherwise ceded to the Republic of the Philippines.'
"Assuming that the writ of sequestration issued over the Piedras shares of Arambulo is still in effect despite the failure of the plaintiff to file the
corresponding judicial action or proceeding within the prescribed period, the same should be lifted in accordance with the above quoted general
stipulation under which the said shares of Arambulo fall."[18]
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in G.R. No. 133096 is not a bar to the instant
petition, for, in a similar case where the petition for relief from judgment was filed outside the reglementary period, this Court entertained it, treating it
as an action for annulment of judgment.
The Court is not persuaded. One important condition for the availment of annulment of judgments or final orders and resolution under Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against, or take other
appropriate remedies assailing the questioned judgment or final order or resolution through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those
other remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in this Rule, otherwise he would benefit from his
own inaction or negligence.[19] Since petitioner failed to avail of its remedy when it filed its petition one day late in G.R. No. 133096 questioning the
same Sandiganbayan Resolutions of July 11, 1997 and February 3, 1998, he cannot resort to the action for annulment.
Petitioner cites cases where the Supreme Court entertained the petition which was filed out of time and treated it as an action for annulment of
judgment. We cannot do the same in the case at bar. Upon examination of the pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds the instant petition to be
not prima facie meritorious. Petitioner's arguments for the annulment of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions revolve around the alleged
absence of factual and legal basis for declaring respondent Arambulo as the subscriber-owner of 145,000,000 Piedras shares of stock. But as
heretofore discussed, the assailed Resolutions fully explained the reasons why affirmative relief should be granted to private respondent Arambulo.
In the Preliminary Statement of the petition, petitioner alleges that it was "xxx Imelda R. Marcos who funded the paid-up subscriptions of all the
seven (7) incorporators xxx including that of Arambulo's P712,000.00 (as reflected in the Piedras' Articles of Incorporation), with TRB (Traders Royal

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Bank) check No. 582753 dated March 31, 1976, for P5 million, taken from TRB Investment Management Account (IMA) No. 75-20 of Imelda R.
Marcos, and deposited for Piedras under Current Account No. 30499."[20] Petitioner supports its allegation with Annex "E," appearing on pages 9091 of the case rollo, which is a copy of the TRB Check Voucher Authority To Pay Disbursement & Advance showing the withdrawal of funds from
IMA 75-20. This attachment merely showed that the money for the Piedras shares came from IMA 75-20. There is no showing, however, that IMA
No. 75-20 indeed belonged to Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.[21]
Petitioner having failed to present sufficient grounds for this Court to give due course to the instant petition, the same should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued on February 22, 2000 is hereby
recalled.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 113811, October 07, 1994 ]

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, BR. 11, DAVAO CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City,
was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder[1] and
attempted murder[2] were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which provides:
SEC. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. - Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. (Underscoring ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension,[3] relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that
his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,[4] and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.[5] In his
order dated December 14, 1993[6] respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be
suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.[7] Hence, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely
under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of
suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the
penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same
section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:
SEC. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.,
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to
ninety (90) days, thus:
SEC. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.- When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is
not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that
the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.
While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests
that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide
the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant,
to criminal[8] or civil liability.[9] If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he
is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.[10]

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Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel
of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members
of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil
Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995
provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A.
3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits.- Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed against him for
offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift
his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office.
Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this
information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this
while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable
to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of
their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally.
In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question.
For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an
injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of
the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner
Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive
suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension
applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of
Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of
guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing,
in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law.
To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.[11]
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the AntiGraft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due
process and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based is silent
with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length
of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is
undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R. A. 6995 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.
The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the
preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing
else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.[12]
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning
of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases? What is this all about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.

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REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. 'Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court
shall immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated.'
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . . ?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 - Preventive Suspension.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang
tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. x x x
xxx

xxx

SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa 'Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.' Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the early termination of the
case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba 'the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?' Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso
rito sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago ma-terminate,
sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate...
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maaari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year from the time ... aywan ko
kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on having it quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case
shall it go beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature...
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are
talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a
criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.
xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially
if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing
to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission ...

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SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect ...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission .[13]
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass
or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.[14] Thus, the equal
protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences;[15] is germane to the purpose of the law;[16] applies to all members of the same class;[17] and applies to current as well as
future conditions,[18] the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and
reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., on leave.

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[ G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 03, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts [1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the
query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
1.

Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or
interest not even the police power of the State.

2.

To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3.

To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to
him by the people.

4.

The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5.

A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6.

The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7.

The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8.

Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law.
There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the
common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accusedappellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

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Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the
intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody
of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is
enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
which states that
(2)

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves
as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury
to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the
House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call
he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from
its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the
Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a)

to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend
him from the House of Representatives;

b)

to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c)

to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d)

to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to
leave the prison premises, to wit:

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a)

to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going
to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b)

to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c)

to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity
to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be
accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason,
if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and
well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that
the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with
the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional
office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement
of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills
and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.
Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.
They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time,
he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." [6] This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A

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doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others
who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. [11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful
tribunal, and is personal to the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from
place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him
of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or
any exterior barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individuals status in society. [16] Prison officials have the difficult and
often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates
for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. [17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right
or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the main and separate opinion.

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[ G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 ]

RESTITUTO YNOT, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner
in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying
with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against interprovincial movement
of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of
carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.[1] The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained
the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule
on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.[2]
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,[*] [3] which upheld the trial court,[**] and he has now come before us in this
petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and
so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.[4]
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles[5] is not applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity
of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on
the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.[6] We have jurisdiction under the Constitution
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.[7] This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,

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and heavily,"[8] to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,[9] and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or
popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really a presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the
exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to
question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the
President "in his judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until
a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that
might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed
and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of
1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body.[10]
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is
not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every
situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket
that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave
the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decision of cases as they arise."[11] Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due
process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play." [12]
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that the Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life,
liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215
has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern
visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a
decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but
in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias
or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing[13] which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich
with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, [14] as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive
presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.[15] There are instances when the need for expeditious action will
justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be canceled without hearing, to
compel his return to the country he has fled.[16] Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses
to protect the public morals.[17] In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of
the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restrains and is restrained by due process. The police
power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.[18] By reason of its
function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power,
which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead - from the womb to beyond the tomb - in practically everything he does
or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some
relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable

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Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the
benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of
our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve
them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio,[19] where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was
claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police
measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid
exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by 'the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption,
so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by
a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon
issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty
that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order
No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes
us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed
a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
the centuriesfold guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement
for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. [20] In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the
right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were
not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,[21] Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have

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been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and
only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and
the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who
are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages
for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order
unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they
had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the
taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his
spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its
obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or
violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with
use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.

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[ G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998 ]

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC AND VERONICA DIMATULAC, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SESINANDO VILLON IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PAMPANGA, BRANCH 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT AND FORTUNATO MALLARI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum[1] and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment[2] in this special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio
Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED
BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF
THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS
ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe,
Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano
Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito
Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and answers, and finding
probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counteraffidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his
counter affidavit.[3]
On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution [4] in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to
believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions were as
follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago "Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified
only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.
At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter,
they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they
were able to reach the house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.
Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding, stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3
Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by the truck and
the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.
Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao went inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee.
[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say
sorry.
[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down from his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to
shout the following words: "What did you do to my father?!"
One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration
pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut as the one responsible.
That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving
Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.
On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was
asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he did.

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Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to Masantol.
The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic]
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and confederating with one another are
probably guilty thereof.
Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.
That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco
Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.
However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police authorities to furnish the court [a] descriptio personae
of the accused for the purpose of issuing the needed warrant of arrest.
The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file their counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.
As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived the filing of the same.
A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic] straightforward and more or less
credible and seems to be consistent with truth, human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against
him is rather weak [compared to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty, and the
courts previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pampanga for further action, together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of
Pampanga.[5] (underscoring supplied)
In a sworn statement,[6] petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of bodyguards, went to the
residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Pauls uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the
group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but
hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor
Yabuts companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor.
Peter Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay)[7] that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[8] Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on 3
November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the police station, three men approached him and asked for directions to the house of
Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them
directions, but one of the three returned to ask whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home.
The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call
at the police station reporting that someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.
Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record
whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter
YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding,"
submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.
In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996,[9] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the
exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of
such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:
The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to constitute treachery, two conditions must be
present, to wit, 1) the employment of the [sic] means of execution were give [sic] the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted xxx.
In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence, such that the attack upon the victim while descending
the stairs was so sudden and unexpected as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed
by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According to the said witness, the victim was already descending
when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the
assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so
sudden as to afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor Yabut in giving the command to
shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would
have been no necessity for him to give the order to the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the
moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously adopted. Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and
the crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.
Alfonso-Flores then ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:
1. An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one John Doe alias Danny as
conspirators in the crime of Homicide;
2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.
Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.

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The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions were propounded only to Peter
Paul Dimatulac.
On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to
the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ).[10] They alleged in their appeal that:
1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE
CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:
A. THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR
AFFORD IMPUNITY;
B. THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;
C. THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS
RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;
D. THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO
MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI
AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.
To refute Alfonso-Flores finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that the meeting of the accused and
the victim was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even
remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what
to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the
deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused
Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck." In view of
that enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accuseds resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further
narrated that when the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept
away at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (Thats enough, move quickly) without giving medical assistance to
the deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.
On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution [11] ordering the release of accused Evelino David, Justino
Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the
order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996."
On 28 February 1996, an Information[12] for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y.
Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny
Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to take
the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on his abdomen
with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon him a gunshot wound which cause[d] the death of the said victim.
All contrary to law.
The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on "2/27/96", i.e., a day before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of
P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest.[13]
On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a
Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All Accuseds[14] [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings,[15] copies of which were
furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the pendency of the appeal before the
Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the motion. Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. [16]
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili.[17]
On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition[18] to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to Defer Proceedings. The
YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and were bound by the condition
therein to "surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from the court should any one of them desire to travel;"
and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court
had to consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking this Courts
rulings in Crespo v. Mogul[19] and Balgos v. Sandiganbayan,[20] the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer the
filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the
Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in court.
In a Reply[21] to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the need for a hold-departure
order against the accused; argued that the accuseds right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice
was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery
and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery; and contended that the accuseds invocation of the right to a speedy trial was

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inconsistent with their filing of various dilatory motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder[22] to this Opposition.
On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all the accused who are out
on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal
was filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of
Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the accused on 12 April 1996.[23]
It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings since, on 12 April 1996, Judge
Roura issued an Order[24] giving the private prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a petition for certiorari questioning the order of
the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996." Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.
On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura[25] from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily
set the case for arraignment while the formers appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked in
open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for
prohibition[26] with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).
On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment[27] with the trial court wherein he opposed the motion to
inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in the record - which shows that the subject killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that
he "will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latters petition to inhibit Judge
Roura.
On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public
respondent Judge Sesinando Villon.[28]
On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).[29]
On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation[30] submitting, in connection with their Motion to Defer Proceedings and Motion
to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents
which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the following:
a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.
b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.
c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.
d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.
e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.
f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.
g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-360, containing the testimony of:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Peter Paul Dimatulac

Vladimir D. Yumul
SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan
PO3 Alfonso Canilao

h. Investigation Report- dated November 4, 1995.

i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.
j. Sketch
k. Unscaled Sketch
Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution[31] directing respondent therein to file his
comment to the petition within ten days from notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued
as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on the prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required
comment [was] submitted."
On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation[32] with the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of the aforementioned resolution of
the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in "Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals" as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of
Appeals."
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. [33] On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered
a plea of not guilty.[34]
Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment,[35] citing the resolution of 30
April 996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining order
"until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was
"clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and asserted that a
number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.
On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order[36] directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment within
fifteen days from notice.
In a letter[37] addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the
appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,

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Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the
amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona read as follows:
Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while
he was descending the stairs. The attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was
unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate.
Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by the respondents to ensure the
accomplishment of their criminal objective. The admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how the principal respondent, Mayor
Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime. According
to him, while they were on their way to the victims house, Mayor Yabut already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, alam no na
king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na". This explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the victims house armed with a handgun,
such positioning was precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered nobody else but
Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.
As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the
person [attacked] no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs.
Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence, there
being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).
Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient evidence against Mallari as part of the
conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to
persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun
which was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.
On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining circumstances, Yambao had no other option
but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actual danger to his life then, and having acted
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be freed from criminal liability. [38]
The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution,[39] citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the DOJ."[40]
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation[41] dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial courts attention to the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, a copy of
which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion[42] dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set
aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion [43] of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest of justice, [the]
Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said prayer, the Solicitor General argued:
2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would find their Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be
directed to upgrade the Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.
3 Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in holding the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeal with the
Secretary of Justice.
The YABUTs opposed[44] petitioners Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been arraigned and, therefore, would be
placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor -- not the private prosecutor -- had control of the prosecution of the case.
In his letter[45] dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set aside his order to amend the
information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused for homicide
and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:
Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned on May 20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the
charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are
concerned has been rendered moot and academic.
However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended Information.[46] The
Amended Information[47] merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused.
In his Order[48] of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223,
and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration[49] of the order, arguing that the Motion to
Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did not violate the accuseds right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the
proper offense to be charged was murder and did not reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor Generals stand[50] in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393 that holding accuseds arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended that in proceeding with
the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised no argument which had not yet been
resolved.[51]
On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, [52] which the trial court granted in view of
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the courts order denying petitioners motion to set aside private respondents arraignment. [53] As expected,
Mallari moved to reconsider the trial courts order and clamored for consistency in the trial courts rulings. [54]
In an order[55] dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners motion to set aside arraignment, citing
the YABUTs right to a speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the control of the public prosecutor, whereas
petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge
Villon deemed accused Mallaris motion for reconsideration moot and academic. [56]

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On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision [57] in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the petition therein for having become
moot and academic in view of Judge Rouras voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of
petitioners appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.
Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by the Supreme Court to preside
over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously presided over by Judge Villon. [58] Judge
Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already inhibited himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 961667(M).[59]
On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this Court to reverse the order of
respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action be taken
by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors
concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.
Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private respondents tricked the victim into coming out of
his house and then shot him while he was going down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an orchestrated effort on the part of [private
respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view of evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder,"
as shown by the following events or circumstances:
(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a
motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been arrested.
(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and went into hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged was
downgraded.
(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the Secretary
of Justice and request to defer any action on the case.
(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that there was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding
the pendency of petitioners appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.
(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Rouras order inhibiting himself and the order regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54, public
respondent Judge Villon set the case for arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the accused on the information for
homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.
(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutors Office did not object to the arraignment nor take any action to prevent further proceedings on the case
despite knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.
(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the amendment of the
information to charge the crime of murder.
Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[60] respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in proceeding with private
respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was
not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, he should have deferred the proceedings just the same as the very issue in said case was whether or
not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon
unjustly invoked private respondents right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February
1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface when the
charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of private respondents. Judge Villon should have been
more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.
Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice once the accused had
already been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon
their appeal.
In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private respondents' arraignment, it having
already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 May 1996, due to petitioners pending appeal with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996,
due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ had not yet resolved petitioners appeal and the DOJ did not
request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact that petitioners appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days
prior to private respondents arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to
Defer, opting instead for Judge Rouras recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals, it was but proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondents, to which the public and private prosecutors
did not object.
Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of discretionary powers, is not subject to
judicial review. Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the President. While as regards petitioners
plea that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide to murder, private respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as
the determination as to what offense was committed is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.
As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed only if the complaint is dismissed
by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners appeal was
improper.

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Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the private prosecutor's
authority to handle the case.
In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied because: (a) in accordance with
Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the
filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for
reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause shall not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated
petitioners by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since said Court did not
issue any restraining order, arraignment was properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not
been arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending resolution of their petitions before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.
Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that something had gone awry in the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the
State and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary liberty. However, for one
reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the
custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since
said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this
difference of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no
other option under the circumstances, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs and all other accused, except
Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching her magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes
allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against
them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be
charged with the lesser offense of homicide.
Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused "Danny," despite the fact that they were charged
with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and having
failed to voluntarily surrender.
Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecutions appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could not have been ignorant of the fact
that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing, and that the private prosecution had
convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private
prosecutions stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes.
Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It is interesting to note that while
the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996. This simply means that the
Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed
even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores
was extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the offended parties the same courtesy by at least
waiting for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly,
under the circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.
Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not even bother to motu proprio
inform the trial court that the private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could
muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by the evidence before it.
Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did not even have the decency to
agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of the DOJs power of control
and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio
Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of
[the] case" simply because the private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties
here had not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the right to
intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112
of the Rules of Court provides:
If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall
direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the
dismissal of the complaint or information.
It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended party or the accused.
More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretarys power of control over prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals,[61] we emphatically held:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,[62] exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.

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Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and
control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is
delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
"(1) Supervision and Control. -- Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; x x x x."
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
"Section 3. x x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such
other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service."
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is
entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division
or service."
"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:
"In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.
DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus:
SECTION 1. What May Be Appealed. -- Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing from the resolution holding
that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1.
To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated
what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the
offended parties are allowed only in cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court would
be meaningless.
We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section 4 of DOJ Department Order No. 223 is the
controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof, the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing of the information. As stated above,
Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:
SEC. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. - No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion.
Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
(underscoring supplied)
The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held in Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals[63] that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul,[64] reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[65] forecloses the power or authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The
Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor
once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of
Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have
foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court" which is quoted above.
Indubitably then, there was, on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide, depriving the State and
the offended parties of due process.
As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March 1996,[66] he deferred
resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to
defer proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary
of Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic, supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon
was called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that arraignment

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is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura
was fully aware of the pendency of petitioners appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have taken that
into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12 April 1996, and on that date, after denying petitioners motion to reconsider the
denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a petition
for certiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom
suggested that, at the very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that if the DOJ would not
decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.
Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to inhibit Judge Roura. These twin
moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 [67] and to transfer the case to the branch presided by
public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the record of the case on 30 April 1996. From that time on, however, the offended parties did not
receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch, Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May
1996. If Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone who has just taken over a new case, he
could not have helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within which to
file a petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filing of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals
directing respondents to comment on the petition and show cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted and
deferring resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment was filed, which indicated a prima facie
showing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6)
Judge Rouras subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996 supporting a charge of
murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly, the pending appeal with the DOJ.
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the
probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true
that he was not bound to await the DOJs resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any
disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion,[68] his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April 1996
and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed;
or, he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances,
Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo[69] that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution
agency, dictated that he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not have
merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed
information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a manner consistent with the principle of
accountability inherent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be
reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be punished[70] and judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs
is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e., not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to suffer.[71]
Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, [72] they are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As such, they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the
law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the public action with such zeal
and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from improper methods designed to secure a
wrongful conviction.[73] With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at the judges disposal with strict attention to punctilios,
thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the courts mind as to the accuseds
innocence or guilt.
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice."[74] He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the
same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in him. [75] Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his
exclusive jurisdiction and competence,[76] his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. [77] The judges
action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law.[78]
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended
parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is
not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. [79] Justice then must be rendered
even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross, grave and palpable, denying the
State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial
of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.
These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation before the onset of any
irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan:[80]
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are
courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice

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to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice.
We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to process each accused in and out of
prison, but a noble duty to preserve our democratic society under a rule of law.
Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder was committed and
directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been
arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latters inappropriate conduct or even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty
or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the
YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was
murder, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have courageously
exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further
injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter alia, even
asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case, and,
insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the
appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of
discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the
acquittal of the accused[81] or the dismissal of the case[82] is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those
cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings and of
12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon
of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 15 October 1996 denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No.
96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut
and their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice
of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by
forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable
dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. NOS. 138792-804, March 31, 2005 ]

DANTE GUEVARRA, AUGUSTUS F. CESAR AND ADRIANO SALVADOR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. FOURTH DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENAIDA P. PIA AND CRESENCIANO D. GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999 in Criminal Case Nos. 23082,
23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097, ordering the reinstatement of said criminal cases.
Cresenciano Gatchalian and Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint [2] for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 with the Office of the Ombudsman against the administrators of PUP, namely, petitioners Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, the
President, Dr. Dante Guevarra, the Vice-President for Administration and Finance, Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, Administrative Officer V, and Mr.
Adriano A. Salvador, the Acting Chief of the Accounting Office. The charges were made in connection with certain questionable transactions entered
into by the PUP. A special audit team of the Commission on Audit (COA) had, likewise, conducted a special audit of selected transactions, and its
findings were contained in SAO-SOG Report No. 93-19. The case was docketed as COA Case No. 92-290. Petitioner Olonan submitted a copy of
the said report, the Memorandum of the COA Review Panel, and her request for reconsideration of the findings of the special audit team in the said
report.
An Information was, thereafter, filed in the Sandiganbayan against all the accused, including petitioner Olonan. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about 1989 and for a period subsequent thereto, in Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, a public officer, being then the President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (P.U.P.), accused Dr. Dante
G. Guevarra, likewise a public officer, being then the Vice-President for Administration and Finance, of the P.U.P., accused Atty. Augustus F. Cesar,
also a public officer, being then an Administrative Officer V of the P.U.P., and accused Adriano A. Salvador, a public officer too, being then the
Acting Chief of the Accounting Division of the P.U.P., taking advantage of their positions and the offense being committed in relation to their office,
acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality with a single criminal intent, and all together, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, commit the following acts, to wit:
1.

After the construction of eight school buildings with a total cost of P20,912,229.31, allow the non-turnover of unused construction materials
and scrap construction materials to the P.U.P.;

2.

Make an overpayment of P1,107,056.45 as terminal leave benefits to Dr. Nemesio Prudente;

3.

Make a payment of P1.74 Million to 64 employees of the Bureau of Construction (B.O.C.), Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), which amount is over and above the prescribed fees for technical and supervision services, and also make honoraria payments
to 19 P.U.P. officials in the amount of P556,367.00 without legal basis;

4.

Incur an overpayment of P133,200.00 on a parcel of land in Lopez, Quezon Province, by failing to register on time a Deed of Donation
covering 1,332 square meters of the aforestated property, which was embodied in a Deed of Sale covering 15,919 square meters of land;

5.

Make payments in the total amount of P10,646,230.28 based on blind certifications in violation of Sec. 46 of P.D. 1177, the names of
creditors submitted to the DBM for purposes of cash allocation, being different from the names of the creditors in the Schedule of Accounts
payable;

6.

Make payment for the purchase of curtains for the C.M. Recto Auditorium, exceeding the required quantity of 159 yards worth P27,462.00;

7.

Make payments with a total amount of P167,627.13 with the necessary documents to validate payments thereto in the: repainting of the
elevated concrete tank; floor sanding and varnishing of the gymnasium; renovation of the four (4) tennis courts; and repair and painting of
the Pacia Board High School Building; and

8.

Make an overpayment of P1.99 Million when six change-work orders in the construction of the library building were imposed with the
indirect cost of 19% instead of only 16%;

thus, causing undue injury to the government in the aforestated amounts, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 22854 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. On motion of the Special Prosecutor,
the arraignment of the accused was reset to November 14, 1995.[4]
Graft Investigation Officer II Evelina S. Maglanoc-Reyes, recommended that the charges be dismissed.[5] However, the Ombudsman disapproved
this recommendation and adopted that of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero D. Jurado, Jr., dated July 28, 1995, to charge the accused with 17
counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. [6] The accused filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution.

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Meanwhile, Special Prosecution Officer I Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili reviewed the recommendation of Jurado, and submitted a Memorandum to the
Ombudsman recommending that 17 Informations be filed against all the accused, and that the Information in Criminal Case No. 22854 be
withdrawn. Hence, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 22854 [7] dated January 8, 1996. Appended thereto were the
17 Informations adverted to by the Special Prosecutor.
On January 12, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Case No. 22854. The bond posted by the accused was,
likewise, cancelled.[8] On February 28, 1996, Agcaoili submitted a Memorandum[9] to the Office of the Ombudsman recommending that the 17
Informations be maintained.
It appears, however, that the recommendation of Agcaoili was referred to retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen, a Special
Assistant in the Office of the Ombudsman, for review. On May 24, 1996, Justice Marigomen submitted a Report[10] recommending the dropping of
some of the charges against petitioner Olonan, and her retention as one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098. The
Ombudsman approved the recommendation.[11]
On June 4, 1996, the COA rendered a decision[12] in Case No. 92-290 granting the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Olonan in SAO-SOG
Report No. 93-19 and exonerating her of the charges therein. On August 15, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[13] requiring the
Prosecutor to inform the Court when the Ombudsman received the decision of the COA in Case No. 92-290 and whether the said decision will alter
the position of the prosecution.
On November 27, 1997, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion[14] praying, inter alia, that the arraignment of all the accused in
Criminal Case No. 23098 proceed as scheduled. They, likewise, manifested that, based on the recommendation of retired Justice Marigomen, dated
May 24, 1996, 13 cases filed against the accused, specifically Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091,
23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097 were recommended for dismissal; he had no objection to the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 23097 since it was merely a repetition of Criminal Case No. 23096; and with respect to the remaining four cases, it appears that one of them,
specifically Criminal Case No. 23095 (withholding of RATA of Buscaino), was recommended for dismissal; in regard to the three cases, Criminal
Case No. 23083 (blind certification); Criminal Case No. 23088 (floor sanding and varnishing of gymnasium) and Criminal Case No. 23098
(irregular payment of salary of COA Auditors), it appears that petitioner Olonans participation was undisputed. [15] The accused opposed the motion.
During the hearing of November 28, 1997, the graft court consequently, directed the Special Prosecutor to file the appropriate motion with reference
to the 13 criminal cases.[16] On January 8, 1998, the Prosecutor filed a Joint Reply to the pleadings of the accused, appending thereto the Report of
Justice Marigomen.[17] On January 26, 1998, the graft court issued an Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087,
and 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094 and 23096 to 23097; and, with reference to Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor was given a period of 30 days within which to further review the records of the said cases and to report to the graft
court, within the same period, its findings and recommendation, and the Ombudsmans action thereon, more specifically as to whether the said
cases should proceed to trial or should be dismissed. The said order was purportedly based on the recommendation of Justice Marigomen which
was cited by the Special Prosecutor in his Manifestation and Motion.
Consequently, the graft court held in abeyance the arraignment of petitioners Olonan, Cesar and Salvador in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and
23098 until further assignment. Likewise, the consideration of the Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite dated December 3, 1995 was held in
abeyance until the graft court had received the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor containing its findings and recommendations in
Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098, and the Ombudsmans final action thereon.[18]
When the Special Prosecutor received a copy of the Order of January 26, 1998, he filed, on February 20, 1998, a motion for the partial
reconsideration of the order contending that, in his report, Justice Marigomen merely recommended that only petitioner Olonan be dropped as one of
the accused persons in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097;
that the said cases should be maintained as against the three other accused; that the inclusion of accused Olonan in Criminal Case Nos. 23082,
23088 and 23098 remain undisturbed; and that Criminal Case Nos. 23095 should be dismissed.[19]
The Special Prosecutor reasoned out that, as gleaned from the Memorandum of retired Justice Marigomen, the recommendation of dropping of the
13 criminal cases applied only to petitioner Olonan. Hence, there was no legal and factual basis for the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases as against
petitioners Guevarra, Cesar and Salvador.[20]
The Special Prosecutor then prayed that the January 26, 1998 Order of the graft court, dismissing the above-mentioned cases against the
petitioners, be reconsidered, and the 13 cases filed against them be reinstated.[21]
The petitioners opposed the motion, contending that the January 26, 1998 Order of the graft court had become final and executory. Since no appeal
or a motion for reconsideration thereof was filed within the period therefor, the order of the graft court was based on no less than the Manifestation
and Motion of the Special Prosecutor.
On April 6, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor and modified its January 26, 1998
Order. The graft court set aside its Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093,
23094, 23096 and 23097 as against the petitioners and ordered the reinstatement of the said cases as against them.[22]

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The graft court declared that, while the motion of the Special Prosecutor was filed three days beyond the period therefor, nevertheless, it granted the
motion in the interest of substantial justice.[23]
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, assailing the April 6, 1999 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan where the following issues are raised:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REINSTATING THE THIRTEEN (13)
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THE PETITIONERS ON THE BASIS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE
PROSECUTION FILED BEYOND THE FIFTEEN-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THE BASIS SOLELY OF THE GROUNDS CITED BY THE PROSECUTION. [24]

The petitioners aver that under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan,
respondent People of the Philippines, as plaintiff, had only 15 days from notice of the graft courts final order within which to file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof. The petitioners also assert that under Section 2, Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the respondent People of
the Philippines, had only 15 days from receipt of notice of the final order or the resolution denying its motion for reconsideration thereof within which
to file a petition for review with this Court. The failure of the respondent People of the Philippines to file the said motion within the period therefor
rendered the order issued by the graft court final and executory. As such, no matter how erroneous the said orders may have been, it was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to set aside or nullify them. Citing the ruling of this Court in Icao v. Apalisok,[25] the petitioners posit that the rule
applies even to criminal cases. They further posit that penal laws should be observed strictly against the State. The petitioners point out that the
Special Prosecutor has not cited any justification for his failure to file the motion for partial reconsideration within the period therefore, given the fact
that he was present when the graft court issued its order in open court on January 26, 1998, dismissing the 13 cases.
The petitioners further assert that in resolving whether to dismiss the 13 cases or not, it behooved the respondent People of the Philippines and the
Sandiganbayan to consider not only the Report of Justice Marigomen, but also the decision of the COA in Case No. 92-290.
In its comment on the petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts that the general rule that the periods prescribed to do certain acts must
be followed is subject to exceptional circumstances. A delay may be excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity, and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction. The respondent emphasized that when the graft court gave a verbal order dismissing the 13 cases during the hearing of January
26, 1998, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto. The respondent argues that the graft court did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion in
issuing its April 6, 1999 Resolution, and insists that it acted in the interest of substantial justice when it rectified its January 26, 1998 Order upon
realizing that it erred in dismissing the 13 cases on the basis of the Report of Justice Marigomen since it did not contain any such recommendation of
dismissal.
In their reply, the petitioners insist that substantial justice alone without any justification of the respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period should not prevail over the clearly laid down policy on finality of judgment and rules on reglementary period.
The petition has no merit.
The petitioners are correct in claiming that an order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering the dismissal of criminal cases becomes final and
executory upon the lapse of 15 days from notice thereof to the parties, and, as such, is beyond the jurisdiction of the graft court to review, modify or
set aside, if no appeal therefrom is filed by the aggrieved party. However, if the Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null and void. A tribunal acts without
jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[26] A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for
any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.[27] Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is
involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.[28]
In the present case, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of its jurisdiction when
it issued the Order of January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases based on the Manifestation and Motion of the Special Prosecutor, which
was, in turn, based on the report of retired Court of Appeals Justice Marigomen. The records further show that the report of Justice Marigomen was
triggered by the Recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero Jurado, Jr., dated July 28, 1995, recommending that the 17 charges
against the accused be maintained which, in effect, denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Olonan. The report of Justice Marigomen did
not delve into and resolve the matter of the retention or dismissal of the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners precisely because the same was
not referred to him for study and recommendation. Hence, Justice Marigomen merely recommended that petitioner Olonan be dropped as accused
in the 13 criminal cases, and that her inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098 be maintained, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby recommended that movant Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan be dropped as one of the accused persons in Criminal Case Nos.
23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097. Her inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083,
23088 and 23098 shall remain undisturbed. The entire Criminal Case No. 23095 should be dismissed.[29]
The Sandiganbayan was well aware of Justice Marigomens report since the Special Prosecutor appended a copy thereof to his Joint Reply filed on
January 8, 1998, in compliance with the graft courts Order of December 10, 1997.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of the 13 cases as against the petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor on its erroneous

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perception that Justice Marigomen recommended in his report the dismissal of the 13 cases against the petitioners. By its Order, the graft court
deprived the respondent People of the Philippines of its right to due process. In fine, the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
committed grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners.[30] Hence, its Order dated January 26, 1998
dismissing the 13 criminal cases, as against the petitioners, was null and void;[31] it may thus be rectified, as did the graft court, per its Resolution
dated April 6, 1999 despite the lapse of fifteen days from notice of the Special Prosecutor of its January 26, 1998 Order. By rectifying its void Order,
it cannot be said that the graft court acted with grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Indeed, in so doing, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with law. It bears stressing that the State, like the accused, is also entitled to due process of
law. Not too long ago, the Court emphasized that:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended
parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is
not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered
even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[32]
The Special Prosecutor must share the blame with the Sandiganbayan because in his Manifestation and Motion, the Special Prosecutor averred
therein that Justice Marigomen recommended the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases against all the accused, without specifically stating therein that
the recommendation for dismissal pertained only to petitioner Olonan, and not to the other accused who are the petitioners herein. The Special
Prosecutor should have been more precise and forthright so as not to mislead the graft court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., no part. Close relation with some parties.

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[ G.R. No. 117472, February 07, 1997 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year
old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the
Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother
that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the said motion that can
disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion
raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint
acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accusedappellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of
death against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of
counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19 ( I ) of
the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial
proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7659.
I.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the
first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[1]
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be
disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court."
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge xxx, the
defense attempted to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;

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c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our
judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately
defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty
Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of
Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-appellant considering
that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal.[2]
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by
the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing
the charge against the accused because the latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women."[3] Thus, this is one occasion where an
affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape
charges against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted
by the judge."[5]
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive
identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard
as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over
the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. [6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross
incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply
exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his client's defense. As the rape
case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover,
he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive
discussion in support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the prosecution
evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The
alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against
the accused-appellant.
III

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Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient
practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a
wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the
institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human rights
recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm
of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce
these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment,
our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this
notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided
for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system
through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered
this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v. Puda[11] and People
v. Marcos,[12] In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.'" [13]
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However,
as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.[15]
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy,
parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity,
robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the
times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders of the
rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act,
and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional
Commission was convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped
themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed
shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the
death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done -whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. Father Bernas explained:

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"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition
should be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized
by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be
destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any
man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is
more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in
support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty".[16]
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first
pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the last decade".[17]
Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in
the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish
the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation,"[18] and his concern was amplified by the
interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de
Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo
Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital
punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital
punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is
whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever
under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the
retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked
within a few days or even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death
penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating circumstances." [19]
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los
Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments
pro and con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after
repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think
this is not worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the
discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the death
penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the legislature
to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending
on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent."[20]

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Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting
against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal
laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"[22] thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death
penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v.
Masangkay,[23] People v. Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as
the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the threegrade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended
discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not
Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old
one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the death
penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total inexistence of the death
penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
has not, by reducing it toreclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough".[27]
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the
initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a
matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the
policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of
death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would
mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No
would be a vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and

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thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in
favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a
vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty
would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the
scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No.
891 pursuant to the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever course it will
take will depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the
Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1)
Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a
compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous."[28]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to reincorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently created
to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the
committee would be the determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He
began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and other special
penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator
Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of
drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty
was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that
penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death
penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed -- all provisions on the death penalty would be
considered as having been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous
crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code
itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the
specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some
provisions were totally repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them had to be amended
because the Committee thought that amendments were proper."[29]
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law
which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides
that where the death penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for
some crimes that may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

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Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special
bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for
which the death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised
Penal Code, we will do the same -- merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the definition of the
crime as the same and merely adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses originally punished in the
Revised Penal Code."[30]
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its
provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and
every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same
is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each
and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such ratification. [31]Inasmuch as the reimpositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a
compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons
therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything in its
command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty". [32] The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even
the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the
recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling
reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and
refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in
incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason. [33]
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of
"heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His
interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described
in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense
is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to
have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government have
made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of
malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death
penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would
call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and
all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating
the compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were
made to show these compelling reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what
were considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court
would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the
measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation,
especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will
clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?

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Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will
more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a
separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these
are:
1.
2.
3.

Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

There are compelling reasons; and
These involve heinous crimes.

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly
the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous
included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we
state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will
be controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or
not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of
Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due process." [34]
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide
abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional
Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which
vote on them for consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no binding
effect on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol considering that
these agreements have reached only the committee level. [35]
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4)
negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House
had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous
crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the
House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21)
Members of the House of Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781,
955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to reimpose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of
such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment
by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987
Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative
and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today.
xxx

xxx

xxx

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I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in
which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses,
and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen
asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and
inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the
epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our
people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday,
at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines,
is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the
overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there
are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and exact vengeance
in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and
pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will
deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon
all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."[36]
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not
wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law
specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are
heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their
occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so reimpositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also
for other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without
additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section
2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality
in a just and civilized society.

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For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v.
Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government under which they live
or to their sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels
who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the
commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is
committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of
the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of
having to undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers
and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the
helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making
unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to
terrorism." [37]
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of
Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up
for consideration on third reading. [38] The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral
Conference Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and
one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old
daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death
sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence
of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with
the twin requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide
the context for the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous
crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the
death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the
attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the
death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that

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"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, [40] traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early
Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or
shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately
undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and
effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate
penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a
mere enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were
two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes
penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three
days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made; and
(d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane
for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime;
(f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or
regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more
persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of regulated drugs (id.);

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(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes
because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these
crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty
because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was
committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the
crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or
manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which
was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
[of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

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5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where
a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every
case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1),
16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are government
officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and
13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of
another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum
[of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the
victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. The right
of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality,
the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and

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social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger
socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged
masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in
turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the
mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less
abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on
automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with
the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death
penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating
circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by the
maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No.
7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as
to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the
commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in
the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that
may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not
foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for
the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever
existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of
executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that
ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a statement of
the reason in each and every heinous crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the
subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions,
implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as
a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we
cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such
reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing else but the death
penalty is left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of
our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in
the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality.
Such are, however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty,
moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves itself to be a truly
deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was suspended,
that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in
the first place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.

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Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the
death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a
higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It
is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by
said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous
crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed
in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed
on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal
sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the
landmark case of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not
restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of
judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor
and despised x x x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient
not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary
death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was
uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases,
prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that
were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v.
Georgia,[42] Jurek v. Texas,[43] and Profitt v. Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the
latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is
also established that imposing capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves
the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe
punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty
when imposed for other crimes. x x x

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That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different.
In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include
rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult
woman in their revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found
guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised
their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to our
knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North
Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among
the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a
child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x x x The upshot is
that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult
woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the
personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be
established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or
intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can
also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition
does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over
for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We
have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who,
as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the
aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy,
and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of
"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the
death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury
to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government,
they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we
have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."

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We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful,
sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with the fundamental
question of death provides a context for struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to
ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet
the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears
harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant
in order that tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that
maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false
delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival." [47]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED [48]
for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-2349

October 22, 1948

FRED M. HARDEN, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.
Claro M. Recto for the intervenor.

TUASON, J.:
The petitioner, Fred M. Harden, is being confined in prison for contempt of court by virtue of an order of the following tenor:
It appearing that the defendant Fred M. Harden has not up to this date complied with the orders of this court of October 7, 1947 and March
27, 1948;
As prayed for, the court orders the arrest of the defendant Fred M. Harden as well as his confinement at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he complies with the aforementioned orders.
The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants,
commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a
receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring
or alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other
properties and assets, real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said defendants or either
of them.
On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
& China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an
unknown person, P50,000.
On September 9, 1947, Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China. On October 7, 1947, Judge Pea granted the motion in an order worded as follows:
Wherefore, finding the motion of the plaintiff of September 9, 1947, to be well founded, for the purpose of preserving the status quo and in
order that the amounts above referred to may stand ready to answer for any legitimate claims of the Government in the form of taxes, the
aforementioned motion is hereby ordered to return, within a period of 15 days from the receipt of a copy hereof, the amount of
P1,000,608.66 to the Philippines and to redeposit the same with the accounts of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered
Bank of India, Australia and China, with the understanding that upon failure to comply with this order he will be declared in contempt of
court.
After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court and decided, and after various motions were filed and heard, Judge
Pea, on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was a modification of that of October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch
of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in
Hongkong, without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has
submitted to the court an itemized account of those expenses.
In the same order there was this decree:
With respect to the plaintiff's motion filed on March 16, 1948 praying that Fred M. Harden be ordered to deliver the certificate covering the
368,553 Balatoc Mining Company shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the receiver in this case for safekeeping after his
compliance with the order of January 17, 1948, the Court, after considering the different pleadings filed, denies defendant's motion for
extension of time to register the said certificate of stock, thereby maintaining its order of January 17, 1948. The said defendant is further
ordered, after the registration of the said certificate, to deposit the same with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China.
The last part of the order was the culmination of another series of motions with their corresponding hearings. The facts taken from the pleading were
in brief as follows:
In a motion dated May 28, 1947, the receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal partnership, among
them 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., alleged to be in the possession of defendant Harden, be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so
that he might have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62. On June 7, 1947, the court "authorized" Harden "to
register not later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying the court afterwards of such action.
On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order and prayed that he be ordered to show cause why
he should not be declared in contempt. On August 1, 1947, Harden filed a perfunctory compliance, and in order dated August 2, 1947, he was
required to "make a detailed report of the stock certificates which have been duly registered in accordance with Republic Act No. 62." In his

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"compliance" dated August 7, 1947, Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until December 31, 1947, within which to register the
Balatoc Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No. 62.
In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that, notwithstanding the expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's extended
time to comply with Republic Act No. 62, the records of the Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of January 7,
1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948, was issued giving Harden "an extension until March 31, 1948 within which to comply
with the Order dated June 7, 1947."
In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons therein stated, that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates
covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after
registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a motion stating that the registration of shares of stock under
Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within such
period as by law or regulations is or may be provided."
It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail.
Broadly speaking, the grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of jurisdiction
of the court to impose the sentence, or (3) excessive penalty. (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 1 L-1083, Jan. 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz., 1231.)
The fact that the property is in a foreign country is said to deprive the court of jurisdiction, the remedy in such case being, it is contended, ancillary
receivership. We can not agree with this view.
While a court can not give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391), yet it may act
directly upon the parties before it with respect to property beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the
court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition (Id. 118)
Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise immaterial.
In Sercomb vs. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
It is true that the property attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but the appellant, who caused it to be attached, is in
this state, and within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the power
to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes no difference that the property was in
a foreign jurisdiction.
The facts of that case as stated in the decision were as follows:
On April 14, 1887, in the case of Ada S. Havens et al. vs. Caleb Clapp et al. then pending in said superior court, the appellee was
appointed receiver of all the property and effects, real and personal, of the defendants therein, Caleb Clapp and Thomas Davies. Prior to
that date Clapp and Davies had forwarded, on consignment, to Elijah E. Newton, an auctioneer and commission merchant in Washington
city, in the District of Columbia, a lot of jewelry, watches and silverware, to be by him disposed of for their benefit. So far as appears to the
contrary, the goods so consigned were still in the possession of Newton at Washington when the order was entered on April 7, 1887, for
the commitment of appellant for contempt. Within a week or 10 days after his appointment as receiver, appellee gave notice of such
appointment to Newton, and demanded a return of the goods. On May 18, 1887, the Meriden Britannia Company, a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of Connecticut, being a creditor of Clapp and Davies, commenced an attachment suit against them for the
amount of its claim in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and attached the goods in the hands of Newton.
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U. S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
"punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the
Rules of Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way
is left open for him to avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the court, and in this manner put an end to his incarceration. In
these circumstances, the judgment can not be said to be excessive or unjust. (Davis vs. Murphy [1947] 188 P., 2nd, 229-231.) As stated in a more
recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147), "to order that one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in civil contempt is purely a remedial
measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contender to do an act within his or her power to perform. He must have the means by which he may purge
himself of the contempt." The latter decision cites Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is
expressed in this language:
In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the other
party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose
and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he many discharge
himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket."

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The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void the order
of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not require such finding to appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error in saying that section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil
Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has been copied, was of California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that
section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure. (Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.)
The exact similarity in substance though not in language between the two provisions is a confirmation of this statement.
At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it should be taken, in connection with the orders of
October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as
the grounds for the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn
clearly specify the acts with the petitioner was commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner
is in a position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.
Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence is a different matter; it is a matter of fact which can not be reviewed
by habeas corpus.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus does not lie to correct errors of fact or law. (Slade Perkins vs. Director
of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304; Toronto Felipe vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil., 121; Gutierrez Repide vs.
Peterson, 3 Phil., 276; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, L-1083, 1 44 Off. Gaz., 1231; McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U.S. 99. 41 Phil., 971; Tinsley vs.
Anderson, 43 Law. ed., 91.) When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order or decree is
not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. the writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of error; and this holds
true even if the judgment, orders or decree was erroneous, provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued
such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, supra.) So whether the act charged has
been committed or can still be performed is conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the
petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. (Ex-parte Fisher, 206 S.W. 2d. 1000.).
The petition is denied with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Page 169 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-25513, March 27, 1968 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSAURO DIONISIO Y CRUZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., Acting C.J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Criminal Case No. 65715, convicting appellant Rosauro Dionisio y Cruz of
violating Republic Act No. 3063, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one month.
The case and facts are stated in the appellant's brief (pages 1-2) and agreed to by the Solicitor General, in this wise:
"ROSAURO DIONISIO, appellant herein, was charged with having violated Republic Act No. 3063 before the Court of First Instance of Manila in an
information filed by the Assistant City Fiscal in this wise:
'That on or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, a person who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusements Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the
Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati, Rizal, and for that purpose has in possession the following,
to wit: cash money in the amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated Aug. 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of
Daily Double receipt.' (Original Record, p. 1).
On being arraigned, accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. (Id., p. 5).
However, when the case was finally called for trial, accused voluntarily waived his right to be assisted by counsel, withdrew his former plea of not
guilty and pleaded guilty to the information charging him with violation of Rep. Act No. 3063. The Court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and, accordingly, sentenced him "to suffer one month imprisonment.' (Id., p. 18).
Having filed an appeal bond duly approved by the Court a quo, his appeal from the decision of said Court was given due course. (Id., p. 19)."
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3063 amends section 2 of R. A. 954 to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. No person shall offer, take or arrange bets on any horse race, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or
gamble or any horse race outside the place, enclosure, or track where the race is held. This prohibition shall not apply to a race-track or racing club
licensed by the Games and Amusements Board to conduct horse race nor to the duly authorized agents of such race-track or racing club and its duly
authorized agents are hereby authorized on the days when races are being held in its premises to offer, take or arrange bets outside the place,
enclosure or track where the races are held, provided such bets are offered, taken or arranged only in Rizal Province and chartered cities. The sale
of such tickets shall be made only from offices or booths and shall be recorded in the race track before the start of the races."
Violation of the Act is sanctioned by "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not less
than one month or more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court." (R. A. 954, Sec. 1, as amended by R. A. 3063, sec. 2).
Sole issue posed by appellant is that the penalty as applied to his offense infringes the constitutional provision that "Excessive fines shall hot be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." (Art. III, Sec. 1, clause 19, of the Constitution of the Philippines).
To bolster his position, appellant argues that the provided penalty is harsh, the true measure of the gravity of any offense being its effects, if
unchecked, upon the well-being of the people and the body politic. The premise can be granted, without the conclusion being true or correct.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience (Weems vs. U. S., 217 U. S. 349) and fines or imprisonment
are definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C. J. S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been
held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppresive, "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community.' (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not
believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual,
barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the
Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the
oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration of the imprisonment
stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the
appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range."
What evils should be corrected as pernicious to the body politic, and how correction should be done, is a matter primarily addressed to the discretion
of the legislative department, not of the courts; and the view that unsupervised gambling is definitely detrimental to the national and its citizens
counts with respectable support. "The hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman, and habitual

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gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." (Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2110). "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws
against gambling must be enforced to the limit." (Peo. vs. Gorostiza, 77 Phil. 88).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SIMEON N. FERRER (IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF TARLAC, BRANCH I), FELICIANO CO ALIAS LEONCIO CO ALIAS "BOB," AND NILO S. TAYAG ALIAS ROMY REYES ALIAS
"TABA," RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act,[1] which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and
other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a
member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against
Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27,
recites:
"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other
illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of
an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of
the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
"That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity."
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial
Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR
GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN
DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as
follows:
"That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as officers
and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE alias
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by overt acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer
and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party
of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or
seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the government,
and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered
speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and to establish in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the
above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting
the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.

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"That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity;
and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed."
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a
bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex-post facto law shall be enacted."[2] A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without trial.[3] Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.[4] The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers[5] by confining legislatures to rule-making[6] and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function.[7] History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities,[8] and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on
it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.[9]
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was, condemned by the court aquo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist
Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the
security of the Philippines.' " By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy
by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be
determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other
organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. [10]
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959[11] which, in
U.S. vs. Brown,[12] was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party * * * shall serve:
"(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization * * *
*** ***
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party * * *
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."
This statute specifies the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more,
ipsofacto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
United States pointed out:
"Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of
attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In sec. 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain
acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold
union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified
characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union
office without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party.
"Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 Led 2 d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lends support to our conclusion. That case
involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a 'Communist-action organization,' under the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 etseq. (1958 ed). The definition of 'Communist-action organization' which
the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
" `[A]ny organization in the United States * * * which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world Communist movement * * *' 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)

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"A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon
which the deprivations set forth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953
that the Communist Party was a `Communist-action organization,' the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the
Party would always come within it:
"In this proceeding the Board has found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtue of the activities
in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at any time choose to abandon these activities, after it is
once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)"
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without
more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has
yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive
character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means
and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the
Party, suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all who participate in
the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party.[13] But the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to
have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts."[14] The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be
shown by "overt acts."[15] Thisconstitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative
finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared
not to be a bill of attainder.[16] Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its
operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan.[17]
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act,[18] requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of
union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the
overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. [19]
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.[20] It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, [21] or from exercising their
profession,[22] or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had
engaged in subversive activities,[23] or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor
union,[24] have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply
its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.[25]
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman,[26] the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership
of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did
not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated
against the Ku Klux Klan, while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United
States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
"The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a
difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of
one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare,
and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the
principal association in the included class: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members
disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;' and later said of the other class: 'These
organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and
secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others.' Another of the courts said: 'It
is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;' and later said of the other class Labor
unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny
and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies.' The third court,
after recognizing 'the potentialities of evil in secret societies,' and observing that 'the danger of certain organizations has been judicially
demonstrated,' meaning in that state, said: 'Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not
immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
"We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available, including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. If so it was

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advised putting aside controverted evidence that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed
from the Know Nothing and the A.P.A. orders of other periods; that its membership was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part
of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another
exacted of its members an oath to shield and preserve 'white supremacy;' and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to
be a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;' that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes." [27]
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist
Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. [28] In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red
China."[29] More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia,[30] we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After
meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was * * * doubly objectionable because of its ex-post facto
features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex-post facto law shall be passed.' * * *
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex-post facto law. But if it is not an ex-post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not
are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder."[31]
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works,[32] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
"* * * [N]o person shall hold or retain or eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught,
or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which
advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States of America or of the State of California."
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
"* * * Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply retrospectively for a five-year period to
its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public
service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or teach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or
become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service
by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
"* * * Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general
and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of
compensation to named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statute was held to
have imposed penalties without judicial trial."
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute
claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed with
respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950:
"Nor is the statute made an act of 'outlawry' or of attainder by the fact that the conduct which it regulates is described with such particularity that, in
probability, few organizations will come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public
welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons
who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present activities, there
can be no complaint of an attainder."[33]
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only
to acts committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that
such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability.[34] The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government is intended
not to provide the basis for a legislative finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify the proscription spelled out in section
4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are so fundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the

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hierarchy of constitutional values.[35] Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This is the
reason why before enacting the statute in question Congress conducted careful investigations and then stated its findings in the preamble, thus:
"* * *[T]he Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
"* * * [T]he continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security
of the Philippines;
"* * * [I]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security
of the country."
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to question if, instead of making these findings in enacting the statute, Congress omitted to do
so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial court failed to take proper account of the distinction between
legislativefact and adjudicativefact. Professor Paul Freund elucidates the crucial distinction, thus:
"* * *A law forbidding the sale of beverages containing more than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislative fact, i.e., whether this
standard has a reasonable relation to public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. A law forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages
(assuming it is not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making) would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether this or that
beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statute and the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we
mean by fact in each case is itself an ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and on criteria of judgment for weighing them.
"A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rational basis for believing that they exist, while adjudicative facts those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant - are to
be demonstrated and found according to the ordinary standards prevailing for judicial trials."[36]
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. New York,[37] and adopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia,[38] is that "if laws are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislativepurpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functusofficio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findings in the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlled by the foreign government controlling the world Communist movement and that they operate primarily to "advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"), the U. S. Supreme Court said:
"It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of these legislative findings and reject them. * * * They are the product of extensive investigation by
Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them
as unfounded or irrational imaginings. * * * And if we accept them, as we must, as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which
Communist organizations pose not only to existing government in the United States, but to the United States as a sovereign, independent Nation. * *
we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of this nature is extensive."[39]
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the "ultimate
value" of society. It surpasses and transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, * * * no
subordinate value can be protected."[40] As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States:[41]
"Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the
existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of
preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not within the
power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force and violence."
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in section 4 thereof), Congress reaffirmed its respect for the rule that
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."[42] The requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal
membership, has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership in a subversive organization. [43] For, as has been stated:
"Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is accepted or retained with knowledge
that the organization is engaged in an unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membership with such knowledge makes himself a party to
the unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged."[44]
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow" of the Government and overthrow may
be achieved by peaceful, means, misconceives the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a
legislative declaration; the definitions of and the penalties prescribed for the different acts proscribed are stated in section 4 which requires that
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first

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"whereas" clause makes clear that the overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means." The absence of this qualification in section 2 appears to be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberate omission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow" sufficiently connotes the use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphorical sense may one speak of
peaceful overthrow of governments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors. In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use of the word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardly consistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow," namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and place [sic] the Government under the control and domination of an alien power." What this Court once said in a
prosecution for sedition is apropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should
be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow' could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience
to use against the Constabulary], an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild interpretation
which the appellant would have us impute to the language."[45]
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means. Whatever
interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the
preservation of democratic institutions in this country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in many respects to the membership provision of the Anti-Subversion Act. The
former provides:
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow
or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of
persons, knowing the purpose thereof "Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. * * *[46]
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the Court said in Scales vs. United States:[47]
"It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that
a combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the
first Amendment. We can discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment."
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-preservation and the values of liberty are as
complex and intricate as in the situation described in the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the
legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met consistently with the safeguards of personal freedoms is not to be set aside merely
because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. [48] For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom to
hire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromise between the claims of the social order and individual freedom, and when the legislative
compromise in either case is brought to the judicial test the court stands one step removed from the conflict and its resolution through law."[49]
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional command that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill."[50]
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in the title of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
"And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivision under the control and domination of any alien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the
accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code."
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes not only membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines or similar associations, but as
well "any conspiracy by two persons to overthrow the national or any local government by illegal means, even if their intent is not to establish a
totalitarian regime, but a democratic regime, even if their purpose is not to place the nation under an alien communist power, but under an alien
democratic power like the United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communist power like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwan or
Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership
Therein, and for Other Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that' "This Act shall be known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the
main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject-matter is subversion in general which has for its fundamental purpose
the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies.
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act.[51] It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. [52] A narrow or technical construction is to be

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avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. We hold that the Anti-Subversion Act fully
satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the following basicguidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act. The Government, in addition to proving such circumstances as may affect liability, must establish the
following elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power;
(b) that the accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led Congress in 1957 to
declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the
control of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and by overt acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime of remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any other
subversive association; we leave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY , the questioned resolution of September 15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court aquo for trial
on the merits. Costs deoficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Fernando, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

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[ G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994 ]

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI,
M.M. AND HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of
extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of
the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory.[1] The act of extraditing amounts to a delivery by the
State of a person accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and
which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice.[2] As it is an act of surrender of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State
which demands his surrender[3], an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not
impose an obligation to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting States
demand, in accordance with the requested States own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from treaty. [4] Pursuant to these principles, States enter into
treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right
of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal
laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them to the State
where their offenses were committed,[5] jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished
only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime,[6] the two
countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both
States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.[7]
The Treaty adopts a non-list, double criminality approach which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries
and (which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed
prior to the treatys date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite... persons...wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in
the Requesting State for an extraditable offense.[8] A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the
requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant
charge against the person sought to be extradited.[9]
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a
period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty.[10] For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offence within the same category or
denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the
constituent elements of the offense.[11]
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the
provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial courts decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he
is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the
extradition proceedings instituted by the government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[12] are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note
No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said
Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter - one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958;
and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter - Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes
Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly
committed in the following manner:

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The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wrights and
co-offender, Herbert Lance Orrs, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a mortgage
on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely
representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wrights
and co?offender Mr. John Carson Crakers receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via
Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of business written, by submitting two hundred fifteen (15) life insurance proposals, and paying
premiums thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the
Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals none are in existence and
approximately 200 of which are alleged to have been false, in one or more of the following ways:
(i) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were
required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100) to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used
(at which a direct debit request for payment of premiums would apply). These policy-holders were also told no payments by
them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the Daily Personnel Agency, and again were told the policies were free for 2
years as long as an unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wrights and Mr. Crakers attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by
submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist with the end in view of paying the premiums
thereon to insure acceptance of the policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wrights and Mr. Crakers signing and swearing
before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the
validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on
September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the
respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten
days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that
the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to
date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no
case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on
February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990
for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the
Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce
the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the
documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses or which the
petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the
provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense - in relation to the extradition - was committed, provided
that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. [13]
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION
TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH
PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION
TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN EX POST FACTO LAW AND VIOLATES
SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.

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IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONERS DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE
PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN
HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision on September 14, 1993 and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on December 16,
1993.[14] Reiterating substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the
validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the
trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the Australian
government should show that he has a criminal case pending before a competent court in that country which can legally pass judgement or
acquittal or conviction upon him.
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order,
reveals that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioners extradition. Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the
crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses in the
Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court
correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on
swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.[15]
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation.
The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which
were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of
these documentary requirements were duly submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of compliance with the provisions of
the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the
Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself.[16] In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate
documents and annexes were signed by an officer in or of the Requesting State[17], sealed with...(a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a
Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting State,[18] and certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requesting State accredited to the Requested State.[19] The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular
Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioners contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting
State which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction[20] stretches the meaning of the phrase wanted for prosecution beyond that
intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the
person sought to be extradited.[21] Furthermore, the Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for
prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only
when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested
State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court
of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase wanted for prosecution to persons charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the
Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. [22]
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is
wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country
were allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their
respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth
day after the day on which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to
the Treatys date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less,
prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was
committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for
extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.

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Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the
Requesting State at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition
Treatys provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treatys retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post
facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal.[23] However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone,
The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs Bull[24] concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes.
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense
when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribe greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant.[25]
Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of
the accused.[26] This being so, there is absolutely no merit in petitioners contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treatys
retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treatys coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural
statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.[27]
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of
Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the
Senate in a Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took
effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., (Chairman), on official leave.

Page 182 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23, 1984 ]

REYNALDO R. BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on
Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the
Teachers' Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers' Camp
resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1976.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two
(32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G. R. Nos. L-54645-76.
However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said
section, as amended, reads "Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for and offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had
been filed against him."
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying pending
trial of their cases.
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public positions
or from any other public office that they may be holding x x x " (p. 26, Rollo).
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be
violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law" (p. 28, Rollo). The motion was denied by respondent court in a
resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
It is the submission of petitioner that respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because 1. Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal statute in
which case the provision of said Act must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and against the State;
2. A close perusal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, as well as the proceedings therein of the Batas Pambansa is absent of the legislative intent to have
said Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 applied retroactively;
3. In the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, its application would violate the Constitutional provision against
enactment of ex post facto law; and,
4. Petitioner cannot be suspended to the position of which he was duly elected by the people of Amadeo, Cavite, based on an act which has nothing
to do with his present position.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime
of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of
Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those
mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision,
therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before
its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because
he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud
upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

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ACCORDINGLY, instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Acting C.J., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Teehankee, J., on leave - abroad.

Page 184 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-6201, April 20, 1954 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE A. LIVARA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
After the corresponding trial in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, Felipe A. Livara, was found guilty of malversation of public funds and
sentenced to imprisonment from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor, with
perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P5,000, to indemnify the government in the sum of P9,597, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appealed on time. Because he assailed the constitutionality of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, the expediente was forwarded to this Court.
Appellant was from January, 1947 to July 22, 1948, provincial disbursing officer of the Philippine Constabulary in Romblon. As finance and
accountable officer, he took charge of paying the salaries and subsistence of the PC officers and enlisted men of that region. On July 22, 1948, he
came to Manila carrying some money, and, having secured a Treasury Warrant from the finance officer at Camp Crame for more than P8,000, he
cashed the same in the Finance Building at Taft Avenue. In November, 1948, an examination of his accounts was conducted by Major Emilio Baldia,
Chief of the Cash Examination and Inspection Branch of the Finance Service, who found him with a net shortage of P9,597 unaccounted for. Major
Baldia submitted a report of his findings to the Adjutant General of the PC. Days afterwards, a board of officers was created formally to investigate
the appellant. That board found him accountable for P9,597, and recommended his prosecution before the civil courts for malversation of public
funds. An information for the crime of malversation of public funds was consequently filed in the Court of First Instance of Romblon September, 10,
1949.
Major Emilio Baldia, testified in the Romblon court that sometime in November 6, 1948, he examined the accountability of Lieutenant Felipe A. Livara
and found he had incurred a net shortage of P9,597; and that in answer to his question, appellant admitted his financial liability but asserted he had
lost the money in Manila on his way to North Harbor to board a vessel for Romblon.
Capt. Teofilo V. Dayao, Zone Finance Officer, testified that in the month of August, 1948, he was dispatched to Romblon to pay the salaries and
subsistence of the officers and enlisted men of the PC stationed in said province; that he inquired into the whereabouts of Lt. Livara but was
informed that he had left for Manila in July 23, 1948, to submit for approval the disbursement he had made and get the return of the same from the
PC headquarters; that finding the safe of the accused locked, he sealed it In the presence of Capt. Diaz and Lt. Tanedo and brought it to Manila
where it was opened in the presence of eleven officers including the appellant; and that no cash was found in the safe.
Provincial Auditor Aproniano S. Celajes, last prosecution witness, declared that on July 16, 1948, he examined and verified the books of account and
money accountability of the appellant and found a balance of P14,984, represented by cash of P6,330.10, actually found on hand and vouchers in
the amount of P8,654.
The appellant Felipe A. Livara was the lone witness for the defense. He declared that on July 22, 1948, he came to Manila and submitted his
abstract to the Auditor of the PC; that a treasury warrant was issued to him in the amount of more than P8,000; that he proceeded to the Finance
Building at Taft Avenue and cashed the same; that while riding a public utility jeepney bound for the North Harbor to embark on the S. S. Elena for
Romblon, he lost his portfolio containing the said money plus about P1,000 more, and other public documents. He swore to having made efforts to
recover the portfolio but the jeepney was nowhere to be found.
There is no doubt about the shortage. It constitutes prima facie evidence that the accused made personal use of the money, unless he gives a
satisfactory explanation (Art. 217, Rev. Penal Code). His account of the loss of the portfolio was not believed by the board officers that investigated
him, and by the court below. It is really an incredible story. With about ten thousand pesos in it, the portfolio could not have been forgotten for one
moment by any passenger, especially a finance officer like the accused. The alleged loss was obviously a ruse to conceal his defalcations. As a
matter of fact, even before the Manila trip he was already in the red, as shown by the testimonies of Lt. Bernabe Cadiz, commanding officer of the
83rd PC company and Lt. Damaso C. Quiao, adjutant, supply and finance officer of Romblon.
If the portfolio had actually been lost as recounted by appellant, he would not be responsible for the money. Yet he admitted his liability, made efforts
to pay it, even used for that purpose a false check payable to Colonel Selga of the Constabulary.
Counsel for the appellant contends that the Court of First Instance of Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the alleged crime of
malversation of public funds occurred during the incumbency of the accused as an officer of the Philippine Constabulary. Such contention is without
merit. The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of
military law and the public law. The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other (Grafton vs. U. S., 11 Phil., 776;
Valdez vs. Lucero, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 112835), The accused-appellant having been first tried and convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance
of Romblon he cannot now claim that the criminal action should have been brought before a court-martial.
The constitutionality of the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is likewise assailed. It reads:
"The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses."
Defense counsel maintains the view that this provision is contrary to the constitutional directive that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.

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This contention deserves no merit, inasmuch as the validity of the said article has already been discussed and upheld in People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil.,
856, wherein this court through Mr. Justice Reyes declared: "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence."
Wherefore, as this appellant is guilty of malversation of public funds and as the penalty imposed on him accords with the law, we hereby affirm the
judgment with costs against him. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.

Page 186 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-6277, February 26, 1954 ]

JUAN D. CRISOLOGO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. PABLO VILLALOBOS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant
colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed in the People's Court. But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13, 1947,
indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by authority of the Army
Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid
to the enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the
USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of having certain civilians killed in time of war. Found innocent of the
first and third charges but guilty of the second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.
With the approval on June 17,1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People's Court, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was,
pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason were amplified.
Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and pleading
double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner had pleaded not guilty,
proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding
with the trial and dismiss the case.
The petition is opposed by the Solicitor General who, in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial judge, denies that petitioner is being subjected to double
jeopardy.
As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same offense in the civil
courts.
The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In the case of U. S. vs. Tubig, 3 Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States Army in the
Philippines was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia. Upon arraignment, he pleaded
double jeopardy in that he had already been previously convicted and sentenced by a court-martial for the same offense and had already served his
sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that as the province where the offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the
military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this court held that "one who has been tried and convicted by a court martial under
circumstances giving that tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been once in jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be
again prosecuted in another court of the same sovereignty." In a later case, Grafton vs. U. S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the United States Army in the
Philippines was tried by a general court martial for homicide under the Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was prosecuted in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general laws of the Philippines. Invoicing his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it
in bar of proceedings against him in the civil court, but the latter court overruled the plea and after trial found him guilty of homicide and sentenced
him to prison. The sentence was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the sentence was
reversed and defendant acquitted, that court holding that "defendant, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to have been
committed by him by a court martial of competent jurisdiction proceeding under the authority of the United States, cannot be subsequently tried for
the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in the Philippines."
There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military law and subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military
authority, a conviction or an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the military court, and vice versa. But the rule "is
strictly limited to the case of a single act which infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to constitute two distinct offenses, one
of which is within the cognizance of the military courts and the other a subject of civil jurisdiction" (15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not apply where both
courts derive their powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C. J. S., 449.) It therefore, has no application to the present case where the military court
that convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him again derive their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that
the charges of treason tried in the court martial were punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a matter of fact impliedly admitted by the
Solicitor General that the two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense charged.
It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court is different from that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the
offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the People's Court had previously acquired
jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged that the amended
information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note that
while. certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they
all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes
as there are overt acts, because all overt acts "he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense." (Guinto vs. Veluz, [1]
44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco, L-4570,[2] promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration of additional overt acts not
specifically mentioned in the indictment before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new
and distinct offense from that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held that a person, cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time
also guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple
reason that those overt acts are not separate offense distinct from that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof. Respondents cite the cases of
Melo vs. People,[3] 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, and People vs. Manolong,[4] 47 Off. Gaz., 5104, where this court held:

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"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be second jeopardy if indicted for
the new offense."
But respondents overlook that in the present case no new facts have supervened that would change the nature of the offense for which petitioner
was tried in the military court, the alleged additional overt acts specified in the amended information in the civil court having already taken place
when petitioner was indicted in the former court. Of more pertinent application is the following from 15 American Jurisprudence, 56-57:
"Subject to statutory provisions and the interpretation thereof for the purpose of arriving at the intent of the legislature enacting them, it may be said
that as a rule only one prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and that where an offense charged consists of a series of acts extending over
a period of time, a conviction or acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar a prosecution covering the whole period. In such case
the offense is single and indivisible; and whether the time alleged is longer or shorter, the commission of the acts which constitute it within any
portion of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for other acts committed within the same time. * * *."
As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of
the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed. (22 C. J. S., pp. 186-187.)
The record in the present case shows that the information for treason in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet
been arrested or brought into the custody of the courtthe warrant of arrest had not even been issuedwhen the indictment for the same offense
was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that
court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction
of the person of defendant.
It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and
that both courts derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military court to the petitioner should, in accordance with
the precedents above cited, be a bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the criminal case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered
dismissed. Without costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Page 188 of 228

G.R. No. L-28949

June 23, 1969

JIBIN ARULA, petitioner,

vs.
Brigadier General ROMEO C. ESPINO, Members of the General Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO B. GAVINO, President, CRISOGONO T.
MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO
MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and MABINI BERNABE, LAW Member, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familar for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Col. Manuel V. Reyes (AFP Judge Advocate General), Col.
Primitivo D. Chingcuangco (AFP Deputy Judge Advocate General), Lt. Col. Pedro Malit, Captain Ciriaco P. Cruz of the AFP, and Amelito Mutuc for
respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
I. Preliminary Statement
The present original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction seeks the annulment of Special Order 208 1
(issued on April 6, 1968 by the respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino as commanding general of the Philippine Army), which special order
convenes a general court-martial and appoints the members thereof, and to prohibit permanently the said court-martial, composed of the other
respondents, from taking cognizance of and proceeding with the trial of the case before it with respect to the shooting and wounding of the petitioner
Jibin Arula. The petition was filed with this Court on April 25, 1968, 2 and given due course the following day, April 26. We issued a temporary
restraining order on the same day, April 26, "effective immediately and until further orders from this Court," and set the "hearing on the injunction and
merits" for May 6.
On May 4 the respondent filed their answer (with opposition to the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction). On this day also, Capt. Alberto Soteco,
MSgt. Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara, thru counsel filed a motion to intervene; Attorneys Jesus G. Barrera, J. Antonio
Araneta and Crispin Baizas of the Citizens' Legal Assistance Committee of the Philippine Bar Association moved for leave to appear as amici curiae.
At the hearing of the case on May 6, in Baguio City, Atty. Gregorio M. Familar argued for the petitioner, Solicitor General Antonio Barredo argued for
the respondents. 3 The petitioner was given 5 days to submit a memorandum of additional facts and additional arguments. The respondents were
granted leave to submit an answer thereto, and allowed to present within 3 days the affidavit of Capt. Ruperto I. Amistoso. The motion to intervene
was likewise granted, and the intervenors were given 5 days to file the necessary pleadings.
On May 7 this Court gave leave to Attys. Barrera, Araneta and Baizas to appear as amici curiae, granting them 10 days from notice within which to
submit their memorandum. On the same day the Solicitor General submitted the affidavit of Capt. Amistoso, in compliance with this Court's May 6
resolution.1awphil.nt
On May 11 the petitioner filed an amended petition; on May 22 the intervenor filed an answer with counter petition for preliminary injunction; and on
May 27 the respondents submitted their answer to the amended petition. On June 18 the amici curiae filed their memorandum, making common
cause with the petitioner.
This case was reheard on August 26. The petitioner thereafter, on September 19, filed his memorandum of authorities and exhibits. The intervenors
filed their reply memorandum of authorities and exhibits on October 23. And on November 12 the Solicitor General filed the respondents' reply to the
petitioner's memorandum of authorities and exhibits.
II. Facts
Shorn of trivia and minutiae, the uncontroverted facts converge in sharp focus.
The petitioner Arula was on December 17, 1967 recruited by one Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at Simunul, Sulu,
to undergo training. On the following January 3, he, together with other recruits, was taken to Corregidor island. On March 18 a shooting incident
occurred at Corregidor, resulting in, among other things, the infliction of serious physical injuries upon the petitioner. Despite his wounds he
succeeded in fleeing Corregidor, and on March 23, he filed, a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt.
Alberto Soteco, Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, 4 and nine others. Acting on
the criminal complaint, the city fiscal on March 29 sent subpoenas to the persons above enumerated, advising them that the preliminary investigation
was set for April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the morning, and requiring them to appear at his office on the same date and time.
On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the Philippine Army, informing the latter that he was "not filing any charges" with
the military authorities against the army personnel responsible for his injuries, for the reason that he had "already filed the corresponding criminal
complaint" with the city fiscal of Cavite City. On the following day, April 3, the date set for the preliminary investigation, army lawyers headed by
Capt. Jose Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the respondents and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which, as a result of such
request, was reset for April 16.
Meanwhile, the respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of his command to conduct a pre-trial investigation of the Corregidor
incident to pinpoint responsibility therefor. As early as March 22, however, all of the army personnel, except two, supposedly involved in the hapless

Page 189 of 228

incident had already been placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits. (These last two were subsequently, on April 16, placed under
technical arrest.)
On April 6 Capt. Pontejos, as pre-trial investigator, submitted his written report, which contained the substance of the declarations of Andrew Gruber,
Colonel Wilfredo E. Encarnacion, Trainee Capt. Rosauro Novesteras, Lt. Tomas Rainilo of the Special Forces Training Unit (provisional), 2nd Class
Trainee Wilfredo Pahayhay, Trainee Dugasan Ahid and 2nd Lt. Antonio Santos. Appended thereto was an array of documents.
Recommended for trial by general court-martial are Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Major Abdul Latif Martelino, Capt. Cirilo Oropesa, Capt. Teodoro
R. Facelo, Capt. Ruperto E. Amistoso, Capt. Alberto G. Soteco, 1st Lt. Eduardo B. Batalla, 2nd Lt. Rolando Abadilla, MSgt. Benjamin C. Munar,
MSgt. Federico Ilangilang, MSgt. Cesar Calinawagan, TSgt. Timoteo C. Malubay, TSgt. Pedro Banigued, SSgt. Narciso T. Dabbay, Cpl. Rolando
Buenaventura, Cpl. Felix Lauzon, Cpl. Evaristo Ruiz, Cpl. Orlando Decena, Cpl. Francisco Grinn, Cpl. Agustin Dagdag, Cpl. Alfredo F. Forfieda and
Pfc. Wilfredo Latonero.
On April 14, Capt. Pontejos submitted a supplemental report, recommending trial by general court-martial of Capt. Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike,
trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey and trainee Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On the same day (April 6) that Capt. Pontejos submitted his pre-trial investigation report, the respondent General Espino issued Special Order 208,
appointing a General court-martial, composed of the other respondents, to try the case against the army personnel involved in the Corregidor
incident, intervenors herein being among them. Charges and specifications for violations of articles of war 94 and 97 5 were filed with the general
court-martial; additional charges and specifications were subsequently filed and renumbered.
At the hearing by the general court-martial on April 16, the petitioner Arula adduced testimony to prove specification 1, charge 1 (violation of the 94th
article of war) which directly and squarely pertains to the shooting and wounding of the said petitioner.
On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with the city fiscal of Cavite upon the ground that the civil courts had lost
jurisdiction over the case because a court-martial had been convened.
It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered an investigation of the reported killings of
commando trainees on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try whomsoever might be
responsible for the reported killings. (See the March 22 and 23, 1968 issues of the Manila Times, Philippines Herald and Manila Daily Bulletin.) So
that before the petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint (on March 23) with the city fiscal of Cavite, the President had already ordered an
investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of a court-martial relative thereto.
III. Issues
The petitioner poses as the dominant issue the jurisdiction of the general court-martial to take cognizance of charge 1, specification 1 for frustrated
murder involving the petitioner's injuries. More specifically he avers that; .
1. the offense was committed outside a military reservation because Corregidor where the offense was committed had been declared by
President Ramon Magsaysay as a "national shrine";
2. he, the petitioner, is a civilian, not subject to military law because he had never enlisted in the Army nor had he been formally inducted
therein; and
3. the Court of First Instance of Cavite has already taken cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of the general court-martial.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the general court-martial has jurisdiction over the offense committed against the petitioner, to the
exclusion of the Cavite CFI, because:
1. the petitioner, like all the persons accused before the general court-martial, is subject to military law:
2. the offense (shooting and wounding of the petitioner) was committed inside a military reservation by persons subject to military law; and
3. the general court-martial acquired jurisdiction over the case ahead of any civil court with concurrent jurisdiction.
At the threshold, the respondents traverse the petitioner's legal personality to bring and maintain the present action. 6
On their part, the intervenors refuted point by point the arguments advanced by the petitioner in his amended petition. Upon the other hand, the amici
curiae, as stated earlier, made common cause with the petitioner.
On the basis of the pleadings of all the parties, the following issues are joined: (1) Does the petitioner have legal personality to institute and maintain
the present action for certiorari and prohibition to stop the general court-martial from proceeding with the hearing of the case insofar as it concerns
the injuries inflicted upon him? (2) In the affirmative, does the general court-martial have jurisdiction over the case? This in turn depends on the
resolution of the sub-issues of (a) whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law; (b) if he is not, whether Corregidor is a military
reservation; and (c) whether the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint (involving the same offense) with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith
invested the Court of First Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to try the case to the exclusion of the general court-martial.
IV. Discussion

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Of basic and immediate involvement is article of war 94 of Commonwealth Act 408, as amended by Republic Act 242, which provides in full as
follows:
Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance
which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal
ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party
(and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) in a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial
may direct, Provided, That, in time of peace officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-martial
for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances committed under this article. In imposing the penalties for such
offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or such municipal ordinances
shall be taken into consideration.
The parties are agreed on the purview and meaning of this article. It places persons subject to military law 7 under the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the proper civil courts, when they commit any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance which
is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (a) inside a
reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (b) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended
parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law. Whenever persons subject to military law commit offenses punishable under
article of war 94 outside a military reservation and the offended party (or any one of the offended parties it there be more than one) is not a person
subject to military law, they fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts. This article of war removes officers and enlisted men of the Philippine
Constabulary entirely from the jurisdiction of courts-martial when they commit offenses under this article in time of peace, notwithstanding that the
said offenses are committed within military reservations; or outside such reservations and the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if
there be more than one is a person subject to military law.
Nor is it disputed that the crime of frustrated murder, the offense imputed to the military personnel accused before the general court-martial, is
embraced within the purview of article of war 94. That the said accused are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are not officers or
enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary, is likewise conceded.
The divergence of opinion is to whether Corregidor was, on March 18, 1968 (the date when the offense was allegedly committed), a military
reservation, and, if it was not, as to whether the petitioner was at that time a person subject to military law.
1. On May 31, 1948 President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 69 8 (hereinafter referred to as P-69) declaring "Corregidor, including the
adjacent islands and detached rocks surrounding the same," a military reservation and placing it under the direct supervision and control of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The petitioner's insistence that Corregidor is no longer a military reservation is anchored on Executive Order No. 58
9 (hereinafter referred to as EO 58) issued on August 16, 1954 by President Ramon Magsaysay, which declared "all battlefield areas in Corregidor
and Bataan province" as national shrines and "except such portions as may be temporarily needed for the storage of ammunition or deemed
absolutely essential for safeguarding the national security," opening them "to the public, accessible as tourist resorts and attractions, as scenes of
popular pilgrimages and as recreational centers," from which the petitioner argues that Corregidor is no longer a military reservation because it has
been converted into a national shrine and made accessible to the public.
For several cogent reasons, it is our view that this argument is devoid of merit.
In the first place, EO 58 does not expressly repeal P-69. From the terms contained within the four corners of the later presidential decree cannot be
inferred or implied a repeal of the former presidential act. It cannot, therefore, be safely said that implied repeal of P-69 was intended. Wellentrenched is the rule that implied repeals are not favored (Camacho vs. ClR, 80 Phil. 848; Visayan Electric Co. vs. David, 94 Phil. 969; North
Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. vs. David, 51 OG 1860, Manila Electric Co. vs. City of Manila, 98 Phil. 951; Manila Letter Carriers Association vs.
Auditor General, 57 OG 9027).
In the second place, there is nothing in the language of EO 58 from which it can be reasonably inferred that the declaration of certain areas in
Corregidor island as battlefield areas or as national shrines necessarily divests such areas or the entire island of Corregidor itself of their
character as a military reservation and national defense zone. Even if an area were actually declared as a "national shrine" or "battlefield area" or
"historic site" by the National Shrines Commission, its character as part of a national defense zone or military reservation would not thereby be
abated or impaired. A military reservation or national defense zone under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 321 10 can concurrently be used and
developed as a national shrine without excluding it from the operation of the said Act. This Act makes the entry of a private person into a national
defense zone subject to regulations prescribed by the President, thereby not precluding the possibility that civilians may be permitted to enter and
remain in a proclaimed national defense zone under appropriate regulations. Paragraph 1 of EO 58 declares that even portions of battlefield areas
declared as national shrines are not to be opened to the public as tourist resorts or recreational centers if they are deemed "absolutely essential for
safeguarding the national security."
In the third place, if the President had intended to repeal P-69, he would have done so in an unequivocal manner. If he had intended to remove
certain portions of Corregidor island from the ambit of P-69, he would have expressly withdrawn such portions, describing them by specific metes
and bounds. This is the uniform pattern of presidential orders modifying the extent of an area previously reserved for a certain public purpose. A
typical example is Proclamation No. 208 dated May 28, 1967 (63 OG No. 31, 6614) wherein President Ferdinand E. Marcos excluded from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12, 1957 (which had established the Fort Bonifacio military reservation) a certain portion of the land
embraced therein situated in Taguig, Rizal, and reserved the same for national shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines
Commission, subject to private rights, if any, and to future survey.
In the fourth place, admitting in gratia argumenti that the declaration of a certain area as a battlefield area under EO 58 would have the effect of
removing it from the Operation of P-69, the fact remains that the Corregidor airstrip, where the shooting and wounding of the petitioner allegedly took
place, has not been actually delimited and officially declared as a national shrine. In its overall context as well as in its specific phraseology, EO 58
affects and opens to the public only those areas of Corregidor island to be selected, declared, delimited and developed as historic sites by the

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National Shrines Commission. This official act of the National Shrines Commission is the operative act that can give to any portion of Corregidor
island the status of a "national shrine," or "battlefield area" or "historic site." There is no showing that the airstrip in Corregidor has been officially
declared by the National Shrines Commission a national shrine, battlefield area, or historic site.
The duty of the Commission to recondition the airstrip in Corregidor (paragraph 6, EO 58) does not, in fact and in law, make the said air-strip itself a
"battlefield area" or "historic site" within the contemplation of EO 58. Clearly, the airstrip and resthouses mentioned are only service facilities to
promote tourism.
To buttress his claim that Corregidor island, in its entirety, is a battlefield area, the petitioner invokes Executive Order No. 123 dated March 15, 1968,
which, amending EO 58, authorizes the National Shrines Commission, with the prior approval of the President, "to enter into any contract for the
conversion of areas within national shrines into tourist spots and to lease such areas to any citizen or citizens of the Philippines, or any corporation
60% of the capital stock of which belongs to Filipino citizens." In the absence, however, of the delimitation and marking of the historical sites or
battlefield areas and pending the conversion of portions thereof into tourist spots (disposable for lease to private parties), the status and identity of
the entire Corregidor island as a national defense zone remain unchanged.
With some vehemence, the petitioner presses the contention that "the entire island of Corregidor, including the airstrip, was a battlefield from the
time it was first bombed on December 29, 1941, until its surrender on May 6, 1942." To unmask the emptiness of this conclusion, we have only to
recall the requirement of EO 58 that the "Commission shall immediately proceed to determine the historic areas [battlefield areas in Corregidor Island
and Bataan province] to be preserved, developed and beautified for the purposes of this order, establish the boundaries thereof and mark them out
properly" (par. 4). Such requirement of delimitation would indeed be an absolute superfluity insofar as Corregidor is concerned if this island in its
entirety were in fact and in design a battlefield area within the purview of EO 58.
In sum and substance, we do not discern any incompatibility or repugnance between P-69 and EO 58 as would warrant the suggestion that the
former has given way to the latter, or that the latter, in legal effect, has obliterated the former.
2. We now proceed to assess the claim of the petitioner that the general court-martial is barred from asserting and exercising jurisdiction because
the Court of First Instance of Cavite a court of concurrent jurisdiction first acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Let us initially examine the relevant facts.
On March 23 the petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated homicide against those accused before the
general court-martial.
On March 29, the city fiscal of Cavite City sent subpoenas to the aforesaid accused, advising them that the preliminary investigation would be
conducted on April 3 at 9:00 a.m.
On April 2 the petitioner wrote to the Commanding Officer, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, informing the latter that he was not filing charges
with the military authorities against those responsible for his injuries, because he had already filed the corresponding criminal complaint with the city
fiscal of Cavite City.
On April 3 Army lawyers appeared before the city fiscal of Cavite City on behalf of those army personnel involved in the shooting and wounding of
the petitioner and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which was, accordingly, reset for April 16.
On April 19 the same Army lawyers moved to dismiss Arula's complaint upon the ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction because a courtmartial had already been convened. This motion was rejected by the city fiscal.
This was the status of the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the city fiscal of Cavite City when the present petition was instituted by him.
This status has remained static and at present obtains.
On the other hand, the pertinent proceedings had by and before the military authorities may be summarized as follows:
On March 21 the President of the Philippines (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered a full investigation of the Corregidor incident, and, on the following
day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try all officers and enlisted men responsible for any crime or crimes committed in connection
with the said incident.
On March 27 Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., were placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits.
On April 6 Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos, pre-trial investigator, submitted his pre-trial report recommending trial by general court-martial of Major
Eduardo Martelino, et al. Acting on this recommendation, General Espino, by Special Order 208, appointed a general court-martial to try the case
against the said Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., for violation of the 94th and 97th articles of war, and forthwith the corresponding charges and
specifications were filed.
On April 14 the pre-trial investigator, Capt. Pontejos, submitted a supplemental report recommending trial by general court-martial of Capt. Solferino
Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, and trainee Eugenie Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On April 16, the general court-martial "reconvened." 11 The first prosecution witness to testify on this day was the petitioner himself. The court-martial
then adjourned to meet again on April 19, 1968.

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This was the status of the case before the general court-martial when the present action was commenced.
Does our jurisprudence yield any rule of thumb by which we may conclusively resolve the issue generated by the above two sets of facts? It does.
Although for infractions of the general penal laws, military courts and civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the rule enunciated in Crisologo vs.
People of the Philippines 12 accords to the court first acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused by the filing of charges and having him in
custody the preferential right to proceed with the trial. Thus
As to the claim that the Military Court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when several courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule,
however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was
filed (22 C.J.S., pp. 186-187). The record in the present case shows that the information for treason in the People's Court was filed on
March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody of the Court the warrant of arrest had not been
issued when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in
the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that
the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied)
The salutary rule expounded in Crisologo was explicitly affirmed in Quirico Alimajen vs. Pascual Valera, et al., L-13722, February 29, 1960. Speaking
for the Court, Justice J.B.L., Reyes unequivocally restated the rule in the following words:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a
matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by the appellant, the moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction over the
same and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; from which time the right and power of the court to try the
accused attaches (see People vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz No. 7, 3425; Crisologo vs. People, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1021). (Emphasis supplied).
A thoroughgoing review of American jurisprudence has failed to yield a contrary doctrine. The doctrine restated and re-affirmed in countless
decisions of the Federal and States courts in the United States is the same: jurisdiction to try a particular criminal case is vested in a court only when
the appropriate charge is filed with it AND when jurisdiction of the person is acquired by it through the arrest of the party charged or by his voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction.
The record in the present case discloses that on April 6 and thereafter, charges and specifications were preferred against Major Eduardo Martelino
and several others including the accused Soteco, Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara for violations of the 94th article of war.
An order for their arrest and/or custody was issued (annex 13). Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara were subsequently, that is, on April 16,
placed under technical arrest (annex 14). On the other hand, no indictment has yet been filed with the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the complaint
lodged by the petitioner with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite City (see annexes B and C), the same being merely in the preliminary investigation
phase. The mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting fiscal cannot have parity with the filing of such complaint with the court. And even if there
could be such parity, the criterion laid down in Crisologo is not the mere filing of the complaint or information but the actual taking into custody of the
accused under the process of one court or the other.
Evidently, the general court-martial has acquired jurisdiction, which it acquired exclusively as against the CFI of Cavite, not only as to the element of
precedence in the filing of the charges, but also because it first acquired custody or jurisdiction of the persons of the accused. Court-martial
jurisdiction over the accused having properly attached, such military jurisdiction continues throughout all phases of the proceedings, including
appellate review and execution of the sentence. 13
In the deliberations of this Court on this case, it was suggested that the rule clearly delineated in Crisologo and explicitly affirmed in Alimajen should
be abandoned in the resolution of the present case, because once Arula filed his complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite, the military, as a matter of
"comity" and "public policy," should have yielded jurisdiction to the civil courts. This suggestion, to our mind, completely ignores, among other things
of fundamental import which we need not dwell on here, the overriding consideration that the military should be accorded, and is entitled to, priority in
disciplining its own members.
It was also suggested that this Court adopt a rule which would vest jurisdiction to try a criminal case in a civil court once a complaint has been filed
with the proper city or provincial fiscal. This suggestion is, in our view, unacceptable because it would be productive of absurd results which would
obtain even among civil courts themselves in situations of conflict of jurisdiction, that is, as between one civil court and another civil court having
concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense.
Juan de la Cruz kidnaps a woman in Manila and takes her by motor vehicle to Pangasinan, passing the provinces of Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Tarlac. In Pangasinan he slays her. Meanwhile, her relatives learn of the kidnapping, and forthwith file a complaint for kidnapping against Juan de la
Cruz with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan. Shortly after the killing which takes place two days after the filing of the complaint by her relatives with the
provincial fiscal of Bulacan, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan files an information for kidnapping with murder against Juan de la Cruz, who is
thereafter arrested by virtue of forcible process issued by the court of first instance of Pangasinan. It is true that under these circumstances the
courts of first instance of Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Pangasinan have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of kidnapping with
murder because this felony is a continuing one. But can it be logically argued, can the proposition be reasonably sustained, that because the
relatives of the victim had filed with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan a complaint for kidnapping, before the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan filed the
information for kidnapping with murder with the CFI of Pangasinan, the latter court could not validly acquire jurisdiction, and the CFI of Bulacan, by
the mere filing of a complaint by the victim's relatives with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, has thereby preempted jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
CFI of Pangasinan?
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following
requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within

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its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought into its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or
upon his voluntary submission to the court. In the case at bar, while the first two requisites are indispensably present with respect to the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, the third requisite has not even become viable, because no information has been filed with the court, nor have the accused
persons been brought under its jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, all these three requisites obtained, by the latest, as of April 16 in respect to the
general court-martial. The charges and specifications were before that day forwarded to the court-martial for trial; all the accused as of that day were
already under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits; the offense is one that is cognizable by the court-martial under the authority of article of
war 94; the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court-martial.
3. The petitioner insists nevertheless that the respondent General Espino acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion "in
hastily constituting and convening a general court-martial to try the case involving Arula, without the same being thoroughly investigated by the pretrial investigator, resulting in the filing of charges against persons without prima facie evidence in violation of the Constitution, existing laws, and Art.
71 14 of the Articles of War." The petitioner has not at all elaborated on this contention, although apparently on the basis of this bare accusation, his
counsel, in the oral argument had on May 6, expressed in no uncertain terms his apprehension that the trial by the court-martial will be in the
language of those who are not disinclined to be mundane one big, thorough "whitewash."
We are not impressed by this contention.
It is our view that the respondent Espino acted well within the periphery of his authority as commanding general of the Philippine Army in constituting
and convening the general court-martial in question. In issuing Special Order 208 for the purpose of constituting and convening the general courtmartial, the respondent Espino was guided by the report and recommendation of Capt. Pontejos, the pre-trial investigating officer. In his report of
April 6 (annex 6) Capt. Pontejos gave the abstract of the declarations made by several persons concerning the Corregidor incident. The said report
was accomplished pursuant to the provisions of article of war 71. And so was his supplemental report of April 14 (annex 7).
Moreover, it would appear that the persons who should be most concerned in questioning the absence of a pretrial investigation, or the unseemly
haste with which it was conducted, are those accused before the court-martial and this not one of the 23 accused has done.
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In
Humphrey vs. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure required by Article 70 15can property be construed as an indispensible prerequesiteto exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of the courtmartial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the
absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military
reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court-martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly
void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial
investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge
Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no
way affect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947
after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. (Emphasis supplied)..
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pre-trial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but
the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. 16 Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to
the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. 17
Likewise, the respondent Espino's authority, as commanding general of the Philippine Army, to refer military charges against members of his
command for trial by general court-martial cannot legally be assailed. Under article of war 8, 18 as implemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial (PA)
and Executive Order 493, series 1952, 19 the commanding officer of a major command or task force is empowered to appoint general courts-martial.
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must
be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. 20 "Even an abuse of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari." 21
The speedy referral by the appointing authority, herein respondent Espino, of the case to a general court-martial for trial is not jurisdictional error.
(See Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871). Speedy trial is a fundamental right accorded by the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1[17]), the Rules of Court
(Rule 115, Sec. 7[h]) and article of war 71 to an accused in all criminal prosecutions.
This right to a speedy trial is given greater emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. In Ex parte Milligan (4 Wall [71 US] 1), the
Supreme Court of the United States observed that the discipline necessary to the efficiency of the Army required swifter modes of trial than are
furnished by the common law courts.

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In the military, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by article of war 71 which requires that when a person subject to military law is
placed in arrest or confinement, immediate steps shall be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. This article
further requires that, if practicable, the general court-martial charges shall be forwarded to the appointing authority within eight days after the
accused is arrested or confined; if the same is not practicable, he shall report to the superior authority the reasons for delay.
The importance of the right to speedy trial is underscored by the fact that an officer who is guilty of negligence or omission resulting in unnecessary
delay may be held accountable therefor under article of war 71 (Reyes v. Crisologo, 75 Phil. 225).
The apprehension, heretofore adverted to, expressed by the counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on May 6 that the rights of the petitioner will
not be fully vindicated should be dismissed as purely speculative. Such thinking at this stage has no basis in law and in fact. Moreover, it is wellsettled that mere apprehension or fear entertained by an individual cannot serve as the basis of injunctive relief. 22 The presumption that official duty
will be regularly performed by officers sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law cannot be overthrown by the mere articulation of misgivings to
the contrary.
We thus ineluctably reach the following conclusions: (1) the airstrip on Corregidor island where the shooting and wounding of the petitioner Arula
allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of Proclamation No. 69, series of 1948, and is therefore to be properly considered a part
of the military reservation that is Corregidor island; (2) because the prime imputed to the accused, who are persons subject to military law, was
committed in a military reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance of Cavite to try the offense;
and (3) the general court-martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to have acquired
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the latter court.
With the view that we take of this case, resolving the issue of whether the petitioner Arula is a person subject to military law would be at best a
purposeless exercise in exegesis if not altogether an exercise in futility.
Although it would appear that in the above disquisition we have assumed the existence of legal standing on the part of the petitioner to bring and
maintain the present action we must hasten, without equivocation, to state that we have so assumed, but only ad hoc, that is, solely for the purposes
of the present case. We do not here resolve the general abstract issue of whether a complaining witness in any or every criminal prosecution has
legal standing to question the jurisdiction of the court trying the case. Happily, in upholding the jurisdiction of the general court-martial to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in the context of the environmental circumstances of the case at bar, we have not been pressed by
any compelling need to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, and the restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1968 is hereby lifted. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

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[ G. R. No. 44896, July 31, 1936 ]

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL V. MORAN, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection
having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case
filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United
States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of
the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law.
ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 DalL,
297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it
necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the
Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about
a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into
full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive
and judicial, of the Government of the Common- wealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes
its own existence to that great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by
the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that
"the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and
determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also con- ferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190,
sees. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the
same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original
jurisdiction" thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction
did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara,
supra; Bdrs vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction
in all criminal cases to which; a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No.
136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being
entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in
force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal
cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that
the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an
exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases,
are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to

Page 196 of 228

amend, alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. v8. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No.
12, pp. 620, 623.)
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of prohibition
must be denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Vlla-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

Page 197 of 228

[ G.R. No. 496, December 31, 1902 ]

THE UNITED STATES., COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT, VS. WILLIAM FOWLER ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
DECISION
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board
the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the
property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and
without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants
presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the
information that the crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon
the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty
exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission
admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessels flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Courts of First Instance of
the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil
Commission. He argued that the President of the United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil
Commission to establish a judicial system with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the States
of the Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to
have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government.
Against this order the prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No, 186
passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to
take cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil
admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable
to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56,
consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the
Courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport
Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

Page 198 of 228

[ G.R. No. L-44, September 13, 1945 ]

LILY RAQUIZA ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. LR. COL. L. J. BRADFORD ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
HlLADO, J.:
Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945, that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of
their liberty in the Coire'ctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante, pray that the officers
therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L. J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twidle of the CIC, U. S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to
appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why petitioners should not forthwith be set at liberty.
Respondent Lt. Col. Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated
September 5, 1945, to which are attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders marked Schedules A, A-l and A-2, the first and last emanating
from the Headquarters of the Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army Forces
in the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return
thereto dated on the same day, incorporating therein by reference Schedules A, A-l and A-2 of her co-respondents' return above mentioned.
It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur
on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S.
Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 (Schedule A), wherein she was charged as follows:
"Commitment Order.The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the security of the U. S. Forces for the reasons set forth above.
The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and directed to
detain him in custody until released by competent military authority."
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, it appears that by virtue of the aforesaid proclamation she, on February 25, 1945, was arrested by the same
306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 286 (Schedule A-2) wherein the Commitment
Order is in exactly the same terms as in Schedule A. The specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active
collaboration with the enemy."
With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, it appears that by virtue of the same proclamation she, on April 10, 1945, was arrested by the 493rd
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, and detained under Commitment of that date (Schedule Al), wherein she was charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." Her previous association with the enemy constitutes a present security
risk to the United States Armed Forces.
The said proclamation reads:
"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
"SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
"PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO
VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
"Whereas evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to. the enemy in violation
of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
"Whereas military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do
publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment
upon their respective cases.
"Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day of December, 1944.
"DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
"General of the Army

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"United States Army

"Commander-in-Chief"
Of course, the power of the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned. It
has not been questioned in this case. Where opinions are divided as to its interpretation and effects.
General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to,
when apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective
cases." He premised his proclamation upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the Philippines
voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines"; and (2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the
security of pur military forces or the success.of our military operations."
In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of liberation at the time of issuing that proclamation had to act upon the evidence
then before him. The exigencies of the mighty military operations that he had then but recently begun for the destruction or defeat of the powerful
enemy who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of any other procedure. And to deny him the exclusive power and competency to
determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military efficiency with which, in the interest of all the
citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their liberation had to be conducted. And once having
apprehended the persons to whom the proclamation referred, the same exigencies required that the said Commander in Chief be invested with the
exclusive power and authority to decide when he should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such
persons in restraint "for the duration of the war"? We are of opinion that it has not.
In the case of United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this Court said:
"From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the President proclaimed it at an end, July 4, 1902. It is
necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79 U. S., 700.)
"If it be alleged that, notwithstanding the insurrection, there were no actual hostilities in Nueva Bcija at the times above mentioned, the answer is that
the condition of hostility remained impressed on the whole island until it was removed by the proclamation of the President. * * *"
"War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It
is the province of the political department, and not of the judicial department, of government to determine when war is at an end. * * *" (67 C. J., 429,
sec. 195.)
And even if the war had terminated, we are of opinion that under the aforesaid proclamation the petitioners, who are held in restraint thereunder,
would continue legally under custody of the proper military authorities of General of the Army MacArthur's or his successors' command, for a
reasonable time after termination of the war.
If General of the Army MacArthur had, in express terms, declared in his aforesaid proclamation that after termination, of the war he will release the
persons therein named to the Philippine Government within a reasonable time, we think that, he could have done so within his legitimate powers as
Commander in Chief of the United States Army; and not only this, but that for obvious reasons he should be the best and, therefore, the only judge of
how long or how short that time should be under the circumstances. And in order to give his proclamation a reasonable construction, we are of
opinion that this should be implied from the context. Otherwise, we would be giving to this solemn document the irrational interpretation that said
Commander in Chief thereby announced a purpose which wquld be physically impossible for him to carry out; namely, to make delivery to the
Philippine Government immediately upon termination of the war of persons under restraint whose number he could not then foresee but which he
could reasonably expect to be more or less considerable, with their respective charges and pertinent evidence, papers, and the like. It was not a
matter of delivering a certain quantity or amount of personal property but human beings who, although under custody, had to be properly housed,
maintained and otherwise treated as becoming the "dignity of the human person," which is one of the cardinal principles of democracy for which the
United Nations have fought in this war.
The fact that, as this Court can take judicial notice of, delivery of certain persons under custody of the United States Army pursuant to the said
proclamation has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, which it clearly has not. Such delivery is
undoubtedly within the power of the proper military authorities to make even before the termination of the war. The existence of the military necessity
to which General of the Army MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well as its continuance, is a question exclusively for the military authorities to
determine, as regards each and every person under detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not here interfere, and it is to be
presumed that in the judgment of said military authorities that necessity no longer requires the detention by them of the persons whom they have
already delivered to the Philippine Government.
In the case of Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U. S., 509), the Supreme Court of the United States, among other things, said:
"It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or
sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood, said this court in the celebrated case of The
Exchange, 7 Cranch, 13,9, to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions:
"In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, the sovereign who
should attempt to exercise it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted
would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to
which it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining
the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during

Page 200 of 228

their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require.'
" (Italics ours.)
In the case of the United States Army of liberation, not only has the Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government agreed,
that it come and be stationed in the Philippines, but it is here for the very realization of the overruling and vehement desire and dream of the Filipino
people to be freed from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and to see this war brought to a victorious end. If a foreign army permitted to be stationed
in a friendly country, "by permission of its government or sovereign," is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more
reason should the Army of the United States which is not only permitted by the Commonwealth Government to be stationed here but has come to
the islands and stayed in them for the express purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, be exempt
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by said agreement of the two Governments. By analogy, an attempt
of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period expires, would be considered as a violation of this country's
faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold. By exercising it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for which the
stationing of the army in the islands was requested or agreed upon may be hampered or prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be
withdrawn from the control of the sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the agreement for the stationing of the United States Army
or a part of its forces in the Philippines implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, and permits
the allied general or commander in chief to retain that exclusive control and discipline which the government of his army may require.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139), gave the reasons underlying the doctrine of mutual waiver of
jurisdiction between nations in the following paragraphs:
"The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have
consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases tinder certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers.
*******
"This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange
of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that
complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation."
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the present petitioners, while under the custody of the United States military forces, may be considered as
prisoners of war. In volume II, Hyde International Law, page 345, section 676, we read:
"* * * It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the course of any operation in any locality * * * may also avail itself of the right to make
civilians prisoners of war."
The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contain an enumeration of civilians who may be made prisoners of war. This enumeration
includes:
"(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil of- ficials, diplomatic
agents, couriers, .guides, etc. * * * " (Italics ours.)
We think that the petitioners would prima facie come within this classification under the charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese," "Active
collaboration with the Japanese," and "Active collaboration with the enemy."
We are not unmindful of the fact that the detention of the petitioners may have subjected them to hardships, but this situation is one of those born of
all wars where hardships of all description are visited upon even the most innocent people. At any rate, we do not think that the petitioners are totally
without remedy. We think they may have recourse to the proper military authorities by making due representations to them.
These military authorities, we can safely presume, will not deny to the petitioners any remedy which may be available under the military laws and
under the prevailing circumstances. The United States army forces which have come to the Philippines for the express purpose of liberating the
Filipinos and to restore to them the blessings of liberty under a democratic government, just as fast as the military situation would permit, would not
bewe can justly assumethe very ones to take from them any of those liberties without legal reason or justification. But the present state of the
world is such that military exigencies or military necessity may, under certain circumstances, still require some limitation on the restoration or
enjoyment of those liberties. The present case is, in our opinion, one such situation.
Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time of peace, we do not decide. In conclusion, we hold that the petition
should be dismissed. No special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moron, C. J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Page 201 of 228

[ G.R. No. 125865, March 26, 2001 ]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1)
THE DFA'S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2)
THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3)
THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
4)
DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL.
5)
THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE
SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER'S CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)MANDALUYONG.
6)
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations[1] for grave oral defamation filed against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an
Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly
uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the
criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160,
annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.[2]
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review.
We ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity.
Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial
processes in the Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is
diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner
were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the
"Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian
Development Bank," to wit:
Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner's and intervenor's Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb
our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the
purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for
oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an
act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED
with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., Pls. See concurring opinion.

Page 202 of 228

[ G.R. No. 922, November 08, 1902 ]

TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
LADD, J.:
Both the private prosecutor and the defendant have appealed from the judgment of the court below, finding the defendant guilty of the offense of
injurias graves under articles 457 and 458 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment and
costs.
(1) No brief has been filed by the defendant, nor did he appear, either personally or by counsel, on the day fixed for the argument, and under the
rules of this court the motion that his appeal be dismissed for lack of prosecution might be granted, but we have nevertheless deemed it proper to
consider the whole case upon the merits. The evidence shows that the defendant was in September, 1901, the editor of "Miau," a periodical
published and circulated in Manila, and that an article containing the alleged injurious matter was published in the issue of that periodical of
September 15,1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly abusive language, and in terms not capable of being misunderstood; charges the
private prosecutor, who had been then recently appointed a member of the United States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at
the time of the murder of his mother and sister and with having subsequently entered into intimate political relations with the assassin. The article
contains other statements and imputations of a derogatory character, but we base our opinion upon that portion to which reference has been made.
Injurias graves are classified by article 457 of the Penal Code under four heads, as follows: "(1) The imputation of a crime of the class not subject to
prosecution de oficio. (2) That of a vice or moral shortcoming, the consequences of which might seriously injure the reputation, credit, or interests of
the person offended. (3) Injurias which by reason of their nature, occasion, or circumstances are commonly regarded as insulting. (4) Those which
may be reasonably classified as grave in view of the condition, dignity, and personal circumstances of the injured party and the offender." The
statements in question do not involve the imputation of a crime, and, possibly, not of a vice or moral shortcoming in the strict sense, but they are
obviously of a character calculated to bring the person attacked into public obloquy and contempt, and specially so in the present case in view of the
position of the private prosecutor as a high official of the Government, and they are therefore clearly comprehended under Nos. 3 and 4 of the article
cited. The defendant's offer to prove the truth of the statements was properly rejected. (Penal Code, art. 460.) The conviction must be sustained.
2.

The question raised by the appeal of the private prosecutor relates solely to the propriety of the punishment imposed by the court below.
Article 458 of the Penal Code provides that "injurias graves, put into writing and made public [which is the present case] shall be punished
with the penalty of destierro in its medium to its maximum degree, and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas." Act No. 277 of the United
States Philippine Commission "defining the law of libel," etc., and reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and
injurias affixes to the offense of publishing a libel as defined in the act the punishment of "a fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for
not exceeding one year, or both." Section 13 of the same act provides as follows: "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the
same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws
in so far as they are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of action or pending actions existing
laws shall remain in full force and effect." This act went into effect October 24, 1901, subsequent to the publication of the article in
question, and during the pendency of the prosecution. By article 22 of the Penal Code "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far
as they favor the person guilty of a crime or misdemeanor," etc. The court below in fixing the punishment proceeded upon tbe theory that
by the operation of this general rule the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code for the offense in question was necessarily modified and
could not be inflicted in its full extension. In so doing we think the court overlooked or improperly construed the proviso in the section of Act
No. 277, above cited, by virtue of which the previously existing law on the subject covered by the act is left intact in all its parts as respects
pending actions or existing causes of action. The language is general and embraces, we think, all actions, whether civil, criminal, or of a
mixed character. In this view of the case we have no occasion to consider the question argued by counsel for the private prosecutor as to
whether the provisions of Act No. 277 respecting the penalty are more favorable to the accused than those of the former law or otherwise.
The punishment must be determined exclusively by the provisions of the former law.

It is urged by counsel that the official position of the private prosecutor should be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Penal Code,
article 10, No. 20. We are inclined to think that in the view we have taken of the case this circumstance is qualificative rather than generic. (Penal
Code, art. 78.)
The result, then, is that the penalty prescribed by article 458, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code should be applied in its medium grade, and in view of
all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as four years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day's
banishment for every 12| pesetas not paid, and the costs of both instances. The judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance with this
opinion, and the record will be returned to that court for the execution of the sentence as thus modified. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, Smith, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 75217-18, September 21, 1987 ]

VICTOR QUE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of Our minute resolution[1] dated September 22, 1986 denying the main Petition for Review on Certiorari of
the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
convicting herein petitioner of the crime of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on two (2) counts.
In the main Petition filed on August 25, 1986, petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of the appellate court's decision dated January 14, 1986 and the
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the same, on the grounds that respondent appellate court not only decided a substantial
question of jurisdiction not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence but also sanctioned the departure by the lower court from the
accepted judicial procedures on the issue of jurisdiction.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner raises the following grounds:
1. That the denial of the petition by way of a minute resolution is for no stated reason except for "lack of merit."
2. That the respondent-appellate court erred in not considering material facts as well as the principal element of the crime charged showing that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to try the instant case.
3. The respondent-appellate court erred in failing to consider that one of the most important elements of the offense charged under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which is the place of the issuance of the check is clearly absent in the instant case.
Or simply stated, the issue is whether the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in
accordance with law and evidence.
The motion is without merit.
There is no question that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over the case as provided for in Secs. 10 and 15(a) Rule 110 of the
New Rules of Court. The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City as admitted by petitioner
himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his civil liability. Thus, the trial court held:
"In his answer (Exhibit "H") to the civil complaint for collection of sum of money, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-32445 of the Court of First Instance,
Branch IX, Quezon City (Exhibit "G"), the accused inferentially admitted that the purchases and issuance of the check in question were made at
Francis Hill Supply located at No. 194 Speaker Perez Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. (Exhibit "G-1" and Exhibit "H-1"). (p. 4, Dec.) (p. 62,
Rollo)
It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is
the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.
The argument on petitioner's second issue has likewise no leg to stand on. On this argument that he issued the checks in question merely to
guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager, We give our stamp of approval on the findings of
the appellate court, to wit:
"Neither may appellant's claim in his second assignment of error that the accused issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of
the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for his act of issuing the checks in question.

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"It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not
made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the
enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the
operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was
enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the
issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that
while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere
guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the
abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular
Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
"Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the
checks were dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee." (pp. 4-5, Dec. IAC)
(pp. 37-38, Rollo)
From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.
Finally, We now come to the third argument regarding the denial of the petition by a minute resolution. Although, petitioner in his Reply, thru his
counsel, Atty. Joanes G. Caacbay has never questioned the power of this Court to deny petition for review by the issuance of a mere minute
resolution as there is no violation whatsoever of the provisions of the Constitution and at the same time, same counsel disowns having knowledge or
a hand in the preparation of the motion for reconsideration which was prepared by a certain Atty. Victor T. Avena, We deemed it worthwhile to
mention here the case of In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, 574 where We held that:
"Six years ago in Novino, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
"In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions'
within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the instant petition for certiorari, is hereby DENIED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations
therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days
and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have
relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3
i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time
of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September
21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing
or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs.
Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s.
1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino,
August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after
Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular
No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the
explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128
Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued
after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will
no longer be considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court
opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP
22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By
Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court
required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively
argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment,
Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of
justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4
of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682
(June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in
payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30,

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1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No.
90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;
Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing
P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of
a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the
repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA
6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA,
Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely
to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the
holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had
expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent
by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang
(1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The
sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should
his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the
date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the
time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was
acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29,
1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and
Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we
emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a
statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared "that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared

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"quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential
decrees . . ." the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that
it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation,
which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a
municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any
official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount.
Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not
admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had
to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise
the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An
even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114,
Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 declaring invalid criminal proceedings
conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court,
in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases
and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of
final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person
or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be
declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer
doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of
martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity
of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was
promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of

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Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive
order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v.
People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala
prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico
are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government
officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law
under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed,
not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice,
whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority
that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is
crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by
the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal
prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

Page 209 of 228

[ G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE Y ABELLAR, MANUEL REGINALDO Y
SAPON, AND ERNIE LAPAN Y CABRAL ALIAS ERNING BULAG, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the
accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration
from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at
the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so
airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning Bulag, stand charged with the crime
of Robbery with Double Homicide under the following Information, dated October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of Cavite accuses Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan
y Cabral alias Erning Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and intimidation, rob, take and carry away a
necklace worth P600.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without the consent
of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said
robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack, scald and stab Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3 incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca
Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law."[1]
Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in a Decision of the court a quo, dated February 13, 1989, and his case is on appeal with
this Court. Manuel Reginaldo y Sapon is at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989. He had been in hiding for more than two years.
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by the court a quo of herein appellant Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch XVII, rendered judgment on September 21, 1990 finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Double Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita
Rosalinas the amount of P30,000 each and to pay unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value of the articles lost without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost."[2]
Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION WITNESS' DECLARATION CONCERNING THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE VICTIM'S
HOUSE AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EVADED ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE
HEINOUS CRIME IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[3]

Page 210 of 228

At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to have been proven:
On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening, Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark Din, arrived home from the Kingdom
Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no response, she pounded on the garage door while her husband went to the
back of their house and stoned the window of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody trying to remove the padlock of the garage door and saw
a man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw." After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one after the other, whom she
recognized as appellant Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to her and saw a man about to turn at the other street. He ran after him but could not catch up. He
thus proceeded back to their house. By this time, some of their neighbors, roused by the shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, among whom
were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The two (2) policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw the television set on. Din turned on the
lights and started to look for his son. He tried the bathroom but it was locked. He then went to their room, got the keys and opened the bathroom
where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas, hands tied with her mouth gagged, and bathed in her own blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay
Vee Parnala, in the dirty kitchen, his head and body immersed in a pail of water, dead.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Jay Vee and Rosalina. His findings disclosed that
Rosalina sustained six (6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised wounds
on different parts of the body.[4] In the case of Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7 while in the case of Jay Vee, almost all of
the wounds were fatal due to his age.[5] Jay Vee was only six years old at the time of his death.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he was not in Cavite City at the time the
crime was committed, but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works located in Paraaque, Metro Manila. This shop is owned by Rafael Diaz.
Appellant worked as an all around employee, alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse which indictees never seem to tire of.[6] At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate
once more the oft-repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. [7] In the case at bench, Violeta Parnala,
witness for the prosecution and mother of one of the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant Bracamonte, together with Manuel Reginaldo
and Ernie Lapan, come out of their garage door, obviously immediately after the incident in question. The situation was that the accused were still
inside the Parnala residence when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta in a
hurried manner and without paying their respects to the house owner as would have been the case if their presence in the Parnala house were
legitimate, constitute circumstantial evidence of their culpability. Violeta clearly saw the three (3) men because they were only about an arm's length
from where she was when they scampered out of the garage door. As they came out, they were practically facing her. Moreover, although the light
coming from the electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional illumination coming from the houses nearby sufficient to enable her to
identify the malefactors: Thus:
"Q:
Following your testimony, you were outside the small door knocking, then these three persons came out from the garage?
They were still in the garage when suddenly they opened the door of the garage. I thought he is our maid and I told him that I was
A:
knocking here for a long time already why did you wake up just now.
Q:
And the distance between you and the place where they came out was very short distance?
A:
Yes, Ma'am.
Q:
What is the distance?
A:
About an arm (sic) length.
Q:
And you said they walked very fast?
A:
Not so fast. When they were already outside they ran so fast.
Q:
Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic) in your door?
A:
There is an electric post that has a light.
Q:
And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door of your garage?
A:
It could be not so far (sic) because our house is at the corner.
Q:
Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic notes shows it is about 8 to 10 meters. What is the kind of light?
A:
Electric bulb.
Q:
Not the fluorescent?
A:
Bulb.
Q:
And it was about how high?
A:
The height of an electric post.
Q:
It could be about 20 feet?
A:
I am not sure.
And you will agree with me that that light was not sufficient enough to be able to clearly see the faces of the persons going out of the
Q:
garage?
A:
The house nearby have also light. The place was also lighted by the houses of the neighbor which has a light." [8]
Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in open court of appellant Bracamonte as one of the felons who emerged from their house,
considering that the latter used to drive her son to school. As further recounted by Violeta, viz:
In your direct testimony when you were asked this question. Q: Why do you know the accused? A: Because my son used to ride in his
Q:
jeepney on his way to school. How young was your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio when the incident happened?
A:
He was six years old?

Page 211 of 228

xxx xxx xxx

And during those times when this Teresita Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee Parnala Custodio were going to school, you do not mind
Q:
who the driver was of the jeepney they were taking?
A:
I also looked at him.
Q:
But your concern was merely to reach their destination, not to identify the driver of the jeepney?
Of course when my child leaves the house, I used to see who was the driver because I have much concern about my son in case
A:
something might happen.
xxx xxx xxx
What is in the driver taking your son to school (sic) or the distinguishing feature that made you say that you came to know the accused
Q:
because he used to ride in the jeepney of his?
A:
Of course the feature of his face and the built of his body.
Q:
Was there any distinguishing feature in his face or in his body, what is it?
A:
His face a little bit round.
Q:
If that accused is in the courtroom today, will you be able to identify him?
A:
Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to the accused.)
Q:
How many times more or less did your son Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in this jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte?
A:
I cannot remember already how many times but I could see them very often riding in the jeepney.
Q:
And this accused Bracamonte is not living in your neighborhood?
A:
He is also living in that place but a little bit far from our place."[9]
Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta could not have known him personally since her son and maid rode coincidentally on appellant's
jeepney only on occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the course of regular work. Their relationship was impersonal, not
conducive to close and regular relationship thereby ruling out intimate knowledge of each other. [10] The implication is that Violeta could not have
positively identified him as one of those who emerged from the garage door of the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each other.
This averment is of no consequence, because nowhere in the testimony of Violeta did she claim that she knows the appellant personally. What she
testified to was that she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's jeepney very often, [11] which is the reason why she became familiar with
appellant's physical appearance. There is nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a
positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely
get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the
prosecution than that the identification made by its witness be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly, credible. The witness' degree of
closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an
all around employee and where he allegedly spent the night on September 23, 1987, the time when the crime was committed. Diaz' testimony
contributed very little, if at all, to his defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the following:
"Q:
Please recall the specific date of September 23, 1987, have you gone to your shop?
As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that date because of too long to recall (sic) but what can say is that I know that he stayed in
A:
the shop. He sleep (sic) in the shop.
xxx xxx xxx
Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect your shop usually in the morning. Now, tell us Mr. Witness have you done that in
Q:
September 1987?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
In your doing such inspection, where was Florentino Bracamonte?
A:
He was in the shop.
Q:
For the whole month of September 1987?
A:
Yes, sir.[12]
However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more ambivalent:
"Q:
And you are definite that on September 23, 1987 as you mentioned earlier you did not know if the accused left your shop or not?
A:
In the afternoon.
Q:
On September 23, 1987?
A:
I am not sure.
COURT:
Q:
You are not sure he did not leave?
A:
Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]
The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate appellant's defense of alibi, failed to serve its purpose for it was hardly clear and convincing.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any error in refusing to give probative value to this piece of evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial court's
evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses must be accorded great respect. [14]
It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be
established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have
been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof.[15] In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and
convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims' house at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving

Page 212 of 228

declaration that he was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited testimony of his
alleged employer, Rafael Diaz.
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely accuse appellant, other than her sincere
desire to seek justice for the deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Violeta
should testify falsely against him.[16] Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to
testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. [17]
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did not escape nor evade arrest after the commission of the crime imputed against him. He
contends that he stayed in his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from 1986 to 1989, regularly performing his job, when he was
apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which held that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at large until his arrest on October 27, 1989 after more than two years of hiding to evade the
scales of justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime and to stay beyond the clutches of the law x x x, thus spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty
fleeth while the innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."'[18]
The evidence on record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain from reviewing findings of
fact by the lower court, considering that it has all the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on the stand
the probative value of their testimonies.[19]
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that appellant's claim of non-flight is true, there is no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per
se is proof, let alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in the case of alibi, such a defense is unavailing when placed astride the
undisputed fact that there is positive identification of the felon. [20]
Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him is purely circumstantial which is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He submits that there is
no solitary piece of evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue. [21] In this jurisdiction, direct evidence is
not only the basis upon which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be established through circumstantial evidence.[22] Under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence will support and justify a conviction if the following requisites concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [23]
In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to accused-appellant's guilt are as follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's house and so, his presence therein at a late hour in the evening indicate his and his companions'
evil designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of the victims' house immediately after the crime of robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than two (2) years. Bracamonte was arrested on October 27, 1989.
The above circumstances, highlighted by the testimony of Violeta Parnala which was straightforward and clear as to the identity of the appellant as
one of the malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of
innocence in appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi, weak defenses, to support his claim of innocence, which defenses were overthrown by the
prosecution.
The Court notes that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge
and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed.[24] In this complex crime, the
penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery.[25] The multiplicity
of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.[26]
Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery with homicide,[27] the capital punishment
could not be imposed in the case at bench. The crime here was committed way back in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only on
December 31, 1993.[28] To impose upon appellant the death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law that, if the new law imposes a heavier
penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied,[29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code sans the death penalty clause by virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Page 213 of 228

"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is for robbery with homicide, and the
indemnity for the heirs of the two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to P50,000[30] each.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Page 214 of 228

[ G.R. No. 41423, March 19, 1935 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CRISANTO TAMAYO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, of a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5,
series of 1932, of said municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted and a fine was imposed. From that
decision this appeal was brought.
While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question, which repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and
the act complained of, instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that municipality.
Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.
In the leading cases of the United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), and Wing vs. United States (218 U. S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established
that in the Philippines repeal of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability. But not a single
sentence in either decision indicates that there was any desire to hold that a person could be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer
criminal.
There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have
been repealed than has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases to
be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, ?96.)
The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. Nor was there any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown by
the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to
attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.
We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings1 against appellant must be dismissed. So ordered. Costs de oficio.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Case dismissed.

Page 215 of 228

[ G. R. No. 38046, September 24, 1932 ]

EUSTAQUIO LAGRIMAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
The petitioner, who is detained in Bilibid, prays that an order be issued directing that he be set at liberty, invoking article 149 of the Revised Penal
Code, which prescribes a lesser penalty for the crime penalized tjy article 251 of the old Penal Code under which he was sentenced by the Court of
First Instance of Samar to two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correctional and a fine of 375 pesetas.
The respondent opposes the petition maintaining that article 148 and not 149 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to the present case.
The record shows that the petitioner slapped and used offensive language to Mamerta Alcazar, a teacher in the public school of the town of Laoang,
Samar, while she was performing her official duties. The accused was found guilty of the crime of assault upon a public official as charged, and
sentenced according to article 251 of the old Penal Code, to the penalty aforementioned.
It may be noted that in the brief filed against the petitioner in G. R. No. 33529,[1] the Attorney-General contended that the crime committed was
penalized by article 250, No. % of the old Penal Code, with a penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision correctional to eight years of
prision mayor, and the court said that this contention was technically correct. But in view of the fact that the accused was actuated by passion and
obfuscation, the court affirmed the judgment appealed from.
According to the old Penal Code, article 249, the offense of assault is committed by: "1. * * *; 2. Any person who shall attack, employ force against,
or seriously resist or intimidate, any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by
reason of such performance."
The penalties for such assaults are given in articles 250 and 251 of the Code.
Similarly, the Revised Penal Code penalizes two kinds of assault, direct and indirect, in articles 148 and 149.
For a better understanding of the matter, we deem it wise to place the old and the new provision side by side:

Old Penal Code

Revised Penal Code

"ART. 250. The penalty for assaults falling within the next
"ART. 148. Direct assaults.-Any person or persons who, without a public
preceding article shall be prision correccional in its medium degree uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
to prision mayor in its minimum degree and a finr of not less than purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or
six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two shall attack, employ force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
hundred and fifty pesetas, when the offense is committed under authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
any of the following circumstances:
duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
"1. When the person committing the assault displays a weapon. exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender
lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be
"2. When the person committing the assault is a government
present the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a
employee.
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
"3. When the offenders lay hands upon any person in authority.
"4. When, in consequence of coercion, the person in authority has
acceded to the demands of the offenders.
"If no one of these circumstances be present, the penalty shall be
prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees and a
fine of not less than three hundred and seventy-five and not more
than three thousand seven hundred and fifty pesetas.
ART. 251. Offenders who shall made use of force of intimidation, "ART 149. Indirect assaults.-The penalty of prision correccional in its
as referred to in paragraph one of article two hundred and forty- minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall
nine, for the purposes therein mentioned, shall suffer the
be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force or intimidation
maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by the last paragraph upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on
of the next preceding article, if they shall have laid hands upon any occasion of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next
person or persons who shall have come to the aid of the
preceding article."
authorities or upon their agents, or upon any public officer."
A comparative reading of the provisions above quoted will show that articles 250 and 148 refer to assaults upon a person in authority or his agents,
and both articles are concerned with two cases. The circumstances determining the first case are the same, with the exception of No. 4, article 250,
which is not reproduced in article 148. These articles differ with respect to the penalties in the first and the second case. The first case contemplated

Page 216 of 228

in article 250 is penalized with prision correccional in the medium degree to prision mayor in the minimum degree in addition to the fine prescribed by
the law; whereas the first case of article 148 is only penalized with prision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and a fine. These two
articles
also differ in regard to the second case, for, while article 250 imposes the penalty of prision correctional in the minimum and medium degrees, and
a fine, article 148 only provides prision correctional in the minimum degree and a fine.
As for articles 251 and 149 it may be stated that they refer to those guilty of laying hands upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities, with
the difference that article 251 also penalizes those who lay hands upon agents of the authorities or upon public officials, and article 149 does not.
These two articles also differ with reference to the penalty, for while article 251 imposes the maximum of the penalty ranging from the minimum to
the medium degree of prision correctional, and a fine, article 149 only imposes prision correctional in the minimum and medium degrees, and a fine.
As stated above, counsel for the respondent contends that the law applicable to the case is article 148 and not 149 of the Revised Penal Code,
averring in his answer that the petitioner was charged with the crime of assault upon a person in authority, and sentenced to two years, eleven
months and eleven days, and a fine of 375 pesetas, which is the minimum of the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed in No. 2 of article 250 of
the old Penal Code.
It is noted, however, that the sentence of the trial court, affirmed by this court, expressly held that the crime charged is that penalized by article 251
of the Penal Code, to wit, laying hands upon persons coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents or upon public officials, an offense punished
with the penalty fixed by No. 2 of article 250, in the maximum degree, that is two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correctional and a
fine of 375 pesetas, equivalent to P75. And as heretofore stated, article 251 is concordant to article 149, with the difference that the latter contains no
penal sanction for the offense of laying hands upon agents of the authorities or upon public officials.
This conclusion relieves us of the necessity of discussing in this case whether a public-school teacher, like Alcazar whom the accused assaulted, is
or is not an agent of the authorities or a public official; and the remaining question is whether the petitioner, who was sentenced by virtue of a
provision of the former Penal Code, may be set at iibprty on the ground that the Revised Penal Code provides no penalty for the crime committed
under the former Code.
Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors,
committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their
commission." We understand that the intention of the Legislature in embodying this provision in the Revised Penal Code was to insure that the
elimination from this Code of certain crimes penalized by former acts before the enforcement of this Code should not have the effect of pardoning
guilty persons who were serving their sentences for the commission of such crimes. By virtue of this provision, we are clearly of the opinion that the
petitioner must serve out the penalty imposed upon him, unless he be pardoned by the Executive Power.
Petition denied, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

Page 217 of 228

[ G.R. No. 4504, December 15, 1908 ]

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EL CHINO CUNA (ALIAS SY CONCO), DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
CARSON, J.:
On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela, an information charging the defendant
Chinaman Cuna (alias By Conco), with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission, committed as follows:
"That the said Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), on or about the 30th day of June, 1907, in the municipality of Echague, in the Province of Isabela,
in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents, Philippine currency, a small quantity of opium, to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipino woman, who was neither
a doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with license, nor an inveterate user of opium duly registered; all contrary to the law."
Thereafter the defendant demurred to the information on the ground:
"1. That the information alleges that on the 30th day of June, 1907, in the town of Echague, Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, the
accused violated the provisions of section 5 of Act No. 1461.
"2, That the said Act No. 1461 was repealed by Act No. 1761, enacted on the 10th day of October, 1907, and in effect on the 17th day of October,
1907, during the pendency of this case.
"3. That the said Act. No. 1461 having been repealed during the pendency of this case, and the repealing law not containing any exception touching
pending cases, there is no law in force which penalizes the alleged offense. Wherefore, this court has no jurisdiction over the case."
The trial court in its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information held as follows:
"After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the record, the court finds that at the time when it is alleged this accused committed the
offense with which he is charged, Act No. 1461, known as the 'Opium Law' was in force, and continued to be in force until the 17th day of October,
1907, when it was superseded by a new Act, No. 1761, which, in section 33'thereof, repeals Act No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions of
the repealing clause cases pending at the time of its enactment, for the infraction of Act No. 1461, and without prescribing what disposition should be
made of such cases.- This being true, the court is of opinion that this case should be dismissed, there being at this time no law in force, in
accordance with which this accused, if he be tried and convicted, can be punished for the offense committed in June, 1907. (U. S. vs. Tynen, 11
Wai., 88; Mongeon vs. People, 55 N. Y., 613; State vs. Wilder, 47 Ga., 522). The court, therefore, sustains this demurrer, and dismisses the case,
declaring the costs de oficio"
From the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information, the Government appealed, and the only question submitted for
consideration is whether the provisions of section 33 of Act No. 1761, which in express terms repeal Act No. 1461, should be construed so as to
deprive the courts of jurisdiction, after the date when the repealing Act went into effect, to try, convict, and sentence persons guilty of violations of Act
No. 1461, committed prior to that date.
The cases cited by the trial court, as well as many others of like tenor and effect which are to be found in the reports, leave no room for doubt as to
the American and English common-law doctrine touching the effect of a repeal of a law prescribing penalties; most if not all of the state courts
holding that, in accord with this doctrine, the repeal of a law prescribing penalties has the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty, loss of
rights or responsibility incurred under such law as to all persons who have not been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of such law prior
to the enactment of the repealing law,the Supreme Court of the United States declaring that "under the general principles of the common law, the
repeal of a penal statute operates as a remission of all penalties for violations of it committed before its repeal, and a release from prosecution
therefor after said repeal, unless there be either a clause in the repealing statute, or a provision of some other statute, expressly authorizing such
prosecution." (U. S. vs. Reisinger, 128 U. S. Rep., 398, 401.)
But neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only
in so far as they are founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law; and, in our opinion, the
common-law rule of interpretation just cited is in conflict with existing law in these Islands, and directly opposed to the rule of interpretation laid down
by the supreme court of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish written law; and, in the language of a learned American judge, "the rule is
an arbitrary one, and never had anything to commend it, except in the United States an undue sympathy for wrongdoers, and in England an early
prejudice among common-law judges against 'statute-made law.' " (Opinion of Judge Deady, Eastman vs. Clackamas Co., 32 Fed. Rep., 24, 33.)
Article 1 of the Penal Code in force in these Islands defines crimes and misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by the law; arid
complementary to this provision, article 21 provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty which has not been prescribed
by law prior to its commission. In accordance with these provisions the question whether an act is punishable or not depends upon the question
whether or not at the time of its commission, there was a law in force which penalized it; this rule being modified, however, by article 22 of the same
code, which provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, and this
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the enactment of such laws, final judgment may have been pronounced and the convict may have entered
upon the execution of his sentence.
The courts of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish law have construed these provisions to mean that penal laws are to be given a
retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant charged with a crime or a misdemeanor, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing
a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the
new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is
favorable to the offender. In other words, that the enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing clauses,
does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the date when the
repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law.
Thus Pacheco, commenting upon the new Penal Code of 1848-1850, of which article 506 provided that all general penal laws were repealed by its
publication, says:

Page 218 of 228

"At this time when the Penal Code is being put into effect and given force, we have in fact two criminal laws in Spain, and close attention is
necessary to apply them properly. There may be prosecutions which it is necessary to dismiss, as, for example, those for sodomy; others which it
may be necessary to decide in conformity with the provisions of the new code, as, for example, those for carrying concealed weapons; and others
which must be judged in accordance with the old provisions, as, for example, many cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in one or other manner
being furnished us by the former article (article 19 of the Penal Code of Spain identical with article 21 of the Penal Code of the Philippines), and the
present article (article 20 of the Penal Code of Spain and article 22 of the Philippine Code). Has the code increased the penalty? Then it is not
applicable to crimes committed prior to its enactment. Has it extinguished or diminished them? Then it is clearly applicable to them." (1 Pacheco,
296.)
And a similar construction was placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code of 1870 by the supreme court of Spain. Article 626 of this code (which
is substantially identical with article 506 of the Penal Code of 1848 and article 611 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands) repealed all general
penal laws prior to its promulgation, but the court held that, where a crime was committed prior to the publication of the reformed code, the penalty
prescribed by the code of 1850 (the code prior to that of 1870) being more favorable to the accused, that must be applied. (Decision of the supreme
court of Spain, 17th of January, 1873.)
It is contended, however, that the general provisions of the Penal Code thus construed are not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the
Philippine Legislature defining and penalizing offenses, these provisions being limited in their application to the subject-matter embraced in the code
itself. In answer to this suggestion it is said that, while all the provisions of the Penal Code may not be applicable to special Acts defining and
penalizing offenses, article 22 pi that code prescribes a rule of general application, and in the absence of other provisions this rule is universally
applicable in all cases where new penal laws repeal former laws touching the same subject-matter.
For the purposes of this decision, however, it is not necessary to determine this question, because the penalty prescribed in both Acts under
consideration is the same, and, even if the rule prescribed in article 22 of the code were not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the Philippine
Legislature, article 3 of the preliminary title of the Spanish Civil Code, still in force in the Philippines, which treats of laws in general,, their effect, and
general rules for application, provides that laws in general shall not have a retroactive effect, if the contrary is not expressly provided; so that, if it be
granted that the express provision of article 22, prescribing that penal laws shall not have retroactive effect save only where favorable to the
offender, is not applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, then it must be held under this provision of the Civil
Code that such Acts can have no retroactive effect whatever; and the reasoning advanced in support of the Spanish doctrine as to the effect of
general repealing clauses in the code, which is based upon a comparative examination of the limited retroactive effect given its provisions in article
22, read together with articles 3 and 21 (which undoubtedly declare principles of universal application), applies to such Acts with equal if not greater
force and cogency, since, unless article 22 be held to apply to them, these Acts can have no retroactive force whatever.
We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of English and American common law relied upon by counsel for defendant is not and has not been the
accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the accepted doctrine, the courts in these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to
try, convict, and sentence offenders who have violated the provisions of Act No. 1461 prior to the date when Act No. 1761 went into effect,
notwithstanding the provision of the latter Act repealing Act No. 1461; and that the penalty prescribed by the repealing Act for the violation charged in
the information not being more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to be imposed is that prescribed by the old
law. But we expressly reserve our opinion as to which penalty would properly be imposed in a case wherein a later Act of the Commission or the
Philippine Legislature imposed a more favorable penalty than that prescribed in a repealed Act.
The reason originally advanced in support of the common law rule of interpretation, was that the former law, defining and penalizing certain acts
committed prior to the enactment of the new law, having been repealed, there is no law in force after the date of the repeal by virtue of which the
court can impose the penalties prescribed in the repealed law. This proposition will not bear close scrutiny. Either it assumes that the repeal of a.
law defining and penalizing an offense has the retroactive effect of remitting penalties already incurred under the repealed law, an assumption which
if carried to its logical conclusion would require the discharge of all offenders against the old law, whether actually convicted or not; or else it
assumes that, when the legislator repeals a law defining and penalizing an offense, there is an implied derogation of the jurisdiction of the courts to
try and convict persons who have already incurred penalties under the repealed law, but have not been tried and sentenced therefor. No satisfactory
reason can be assigned for reading such provisions into the repealing law. Where the repealing law itself penalizes the acts penalized in the
repealed law, it is absurd to say that the legislator, although continuing in force the penal provisions of the old law, intended to remit the penalties as
to certain persons guilty of the very acts which the new law itself penalizes, because of the mere accident that they had not been brought to trial and
sentenced before the enactment of the repealing law; and the courts by the laws creating them and defining their powers, are clothed with power to
try, convict and sentence all persons guilty of a violation of law which constitutes a crime or a misdemeanor, and unless this jurisdiction is expressly
taken away from them by the repealing law, or unless penalties incurred under the old law are expressly remitted, there is no ground for denying to
the courts jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence violations of the old law. All persons who violated the provisions of the old law prior to its repeal
thereby incurred the penalties therein prescribed, and thereafter the jurisdiction of the courts to try, convict, and sentence such offenders does not
depend upon the continuance in force of that law as to future offenders, but upon those provisions of law which clothe the courts with power to hear
and decide complaints charging the commission of violations of law, and upon the observance of those rules of procedural law' which prescribe the
steps to be taken in prosecuting criminal offenses. The mere repeal of a penal statute is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the statute was
invalid from the date of its enactment. On the contrary, it continues on the statute book as the law of the land touching the subject-matter of which it
treats; so that, unless the contrary expressly appears, a repealed penal statute loses none of its force and effect as a law defining and penalizing
certain acts committed prior to its repeal, and the courts may and should find in the repealed statute the rule whereby to determine whether penalties
have been incurred thereunder, and the nature and extent of such penalties as may have been incurred.
We the more readily accept the doctrine laid down by the Spanish authorities, because it leads to a conclusion which appears to be in consonance
with the dictates of good sense and sound judgment, while the rule of interpretation laid down by the English and American common law authorities
results in a construction of repealing statutes which it is difficult to believe the law maker has in mind when these statutes are enacted. A rule of
interpretation which results in a conclusion manifestly contrary to the intention of the legislator and which, as was well said by Judge Beady, is an
arbitrary rule, with nothing to commend it, should not be adopted in this jurisdiction where it is not supported by those binding precedents which
alone have kept it alive in England and the United States.
We are confirmed in our conclusions by a review of modern American legislation modifying and restricting the application of the common-law
doctrine; for it appears that the Congress of the United States, and many if not most of the States have adopted statutory provisions for the express
purpose of escaping the absurd and unreasonable consequences flowing from a strict application of the common law doctrine, and it appears that

Page 219 of 228

American courts of last resort have never hesitated to give full force and effect to these statutory modifications of the common-law doctrine. (U. S. vs.
Jacobus, 96 Fed. Rep., 260; Lang vs. U. S., 133 Fed. Rep., 201, 206; Daggy vs. Ball, 7 Ind. App., 64, 34 N. E., 246; Art. 13, Rev. Stat, U. S.)
The judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint interposed by the accused is reversed, and the record will be returned to that
court for further proceedings in accordance with law. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Willard; and Tracey, JJ.,concur.

Page 220 of 228

[ G. R. No. L-9621, January 30, 1957 ]

ANG BENG, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J.:
The petitioners, both Chinese nationals, were prosecuted in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the Import Control
Law (Republic Act No. 650) in Criminal Case No. 21317. They were also charged before the Deportation Board. Pending appeal of the criminal case
in the Court of Appeals, the Import Control Law expired, in view of which and with the conformity of the Solicitor General, petitioners' motion for
dismissal was granted and they were ordered discharged. The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the President of the Philippines its findings
Jn the Deportation Case and recommended petitioners' deportation. On January 18, 1954, the President issued the corresponding order of
deportation.' On March 1, 1955, the petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the
President's order of deportation be declared illegal and that they be released. From the dismissal of the petition the petitioners have appealed before
us.
The issue raised is whether the order deporting the petitioners should be, set aside, because the law defining the crime of which they were convicted
had already expired, the order of deportation being based on said conviction.
The felony with which the petitioners were charged was committed during the effectivity of the Import Control Law. The pertinent legal provisions are
therefore Articles 366 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
"Art. 36. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their Commission.
"Art. 22. Penal laws1 shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same."
We cannot subscribed to petitioners' contention that the expiration of the Import Control Law should be considered favorable to them in the sense
that it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law upholding such proposition. The benefit of retroactivity and liberal construction accrues
when penal laws are repealed. There i is no subsequent repealing law that petitioners could mention. The law violated by them expired in virtue of its
own force. The case of Tamayo, 6 Phil., 225, invoked by petitioners is irrelevant, as it involved absolute repeal.
What is more, the order of deportation emanated from a branch of the government which exercises jurisdiction independent from the judiciary. The
President, in the exercise of his executive prerogative and as an act of State, is vested with full power and discretion to issue orders of deportation.
"The power to expel or exclude aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political department of the government, and is
to be regulated by treaty or act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except as far
as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or statute, or required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene." (In re
Faterson, 1 Phil., 95; In e McGulluch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.)
To spearhead all other consideration, it is fundamental that an executive' order for exportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a
criminal case. This axiom of law was reiterated in the decision in the case of Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, (96 Phil., 934) which pertinently ruled
as follows:
"The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of
this office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code of to such future legislation as may be
promulgated on the subject. (In re McGulluck Dick, 38 Phil., 41)
"By no form or manner of reasoning can the inference be made that by section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code the Legislature intended
that an alien can be deported for illegal importation only upon conviction therefor in a competent Court, and thereby deprived the Deportation Board
of its power to investigate charges of unlawful importation of merchandise against a'n alien, especially, when as it appears from the record, no
criminal action for unlawful importation has been filed against him. The language of the provision and the chapter in which it is found do not justify
petitioner's contention. No derogation of a power vested in the Chief Executive or a limitation thereof can be presumed by the implication from the
mere ^addition of the Clause he may be subject to deportation at the end of Section 2702. This section punishes illegal importation and imposes, in
addition to the penalty prescribed, the liability to deportation if the person found guilty is an alien. Its sole import is that if a competent court has found
an alien guilty of a violation of section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code, the proceedings outlined in section 69 of the said Code are no
longer necessary for deportation. Beyond this it is unreasonable if not absurd, to presume that the legislature intended more. It could not have
intended that if there is no conviction for a crime of unlawful importation, or if no charges have been filed aaginst an alien therefor, the Deportation
Board may not proceed to investigate said charges against him and recommend deportation." (Italics supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., Endentia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Page 221 of 228

[ G.R. Nos. 159418-19, December 10, 2003 ]

NORMA DE JOYA, PETITIONER, VS. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON. RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BATANGAS CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH I, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her
detention was illegal.
The Antecedents
The petitioner was charged separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court In Cities in Batangas City. The
docket numbers and accusatory portion of each of the Informations reads:
Criminal Case No. 25484
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Solid Bank, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously draw, make and issue to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, Solid Bank Check No. 040297 postdated to October 28, 1994 in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for value, but when said check was
presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of the check, the same was dishonored by the
drawee bank on the ground `account closed,' which in effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor
and demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to
Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and
prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Flor Catapang de Tenorio in particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
...
Criminal Case No. 25773
That on or about October 17, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, wellknowing that she does not have fund in or credit with the Security Bank and Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and Trust Company Check No. 038111
postdated to October 24, 1994 in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P225,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply
on account or for value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of `account closed,' which in effect is even more than a dishonor for
insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the
drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Resurreccion T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear
violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Resurreccion T. Castillo in
particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, the petitioner jumped bail. No
evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases.
On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 25484. The petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite
due notice. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya guilty of the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences said
accused to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal Case No. 25773 was likewise promulgated in absentia. The decretal portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences
herein-accused Norma de Joya of imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR and to pay complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the amount of TWO HUNDRED

Page 222 of 228

TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P225,000.00) PESOS by way of damages.

SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions. In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on November 21, 2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of the
Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail
on December 3, 2002. On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City asking the court to
apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention. The
public prosecutor opposed the motion. In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the penalty
imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but
merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine.
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the
imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United States v. Pacrose.[7] The petitioner prays that the Court declare her detention illegal and order her
release from the Batangas City Jail.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition contending that:
1)

THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER HAD LONG ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO
LONGER BE MODIFIED.

2)

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 AS MODIFIED BY ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 DID NOT DELETE THE
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22 CASES.[8]

The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.[9]
The petition has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v.
Vinarao[10] that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon,[11] is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin.
Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to
those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused
whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence and such other circumstance which the trial court or the
appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule
of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

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The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where
the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition
of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1.

Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2.

The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3.

Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[12]

B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment as follows:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two
hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. [13]
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of
fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public
interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public order.[14]
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has
adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social
and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate
sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the
important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their
relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends.[15] The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative,
to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The court has to
consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private
complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime - was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his
wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the
reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others. [16] As Rousseau said, crimes can
be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on
whom they are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much punishment of
innocence.[18]
In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The
petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse,
the petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the
long arm of the law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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[ G.R. No. 135981, September 29, 2000 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. MARIVIC GENOSA, APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court may pass upon all relevant issues, including
those factual in nature and those that may not have been brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even novel theories such as the
"battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the
merits, not rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the
September 25, 1998 "Judgment"[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City[2] in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of
parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to death.
In an Information[3] dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged appellant-movant with parricide allegedly
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood
vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."
After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."
The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,[4] to bring "to the attention of the x x x Court certain facts and
circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death penalty."
Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the means she employed in killing her husband. On the
contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from her
admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy
report on the body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial
court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent
to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered
at his hands."
She thus prays for the following reliefs:[5]
"1.
The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-examination of the cause of death.
2.

The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists of the Court to determine her
state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.

3.

Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to form part of the records of the case for purposes of
the automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists."

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On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,[6] which substantially objected to the Motion on the ground that
appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due process, substantial or procedural."
The Issues
In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his
death, and (2) whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the
time of the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or
psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her state of mind at the time of the killing.
First Issue: No Need for a
Reexamination of Cause of Death
Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion
that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at
the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the
victim's death. There is no need to exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.
Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and again, we have said that this Court is not
a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during
the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's
State of Mind at the Time of the Killing
In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine
whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina
Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the "battered woman
syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the
responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.[7] Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will
escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when
it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness
and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal
aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it
is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness.[8] It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's
perception of the danger posed by the abuser.[9]
In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim had
afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger
and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.
The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr.
Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6) times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for
severe hypertension due to emotional stress.[10] Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses' quarrels every now and then. The
court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.
Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman syndrome" as a possible modifying circumstance that
could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court
that the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her very life. It could be that very thin line between
death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense,
for any criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the death penalty
must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from capital punishment.
In People v. Parazo,[11] after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental,
neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and
mute, yet unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally understand and interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court
granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused]
be consigned to the lethal injection chamber."
More recently in People v. Estrada,[12] we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded the case "to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper

Page 227 of 228

mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense
counsel had moved to suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because of his mental defect,
and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them "intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus
sentenced to death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:[13]
"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellant's
competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of
the latter's history of mental illness."
It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court practically denied him a fair trial prior to
conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could
not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our
penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired."[14]
In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her
spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and
emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her
for proper psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes
of automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine the defense witnesses and
to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the
defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross
examine and refute the same.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and,
thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any,
submitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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