LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

SURVEY OF LATEST CASES IN

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
(JANUARY 1999 MAY 2003)
SM: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
LADAGA
350 SCRA 326 [2001]
FACTS:
Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of
Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in
a criminal case, without the previous authority
from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as
required by the Administrative Code. An
administrative complaint was filed against Atty.
Ladaga fro practicing law without permission from
the Department Head (CJ) as required by law.
Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he
merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative
and that he was on an approved leave of
absence during his appearances as such
counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the
court to which he is assigned knew his
appearance as such counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ladagaa
appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the
Administrative Code.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

the filing of a motion fro reconsideration before
the Court of Appeals and he could not be held
responsible for the dismissal of the complainants
appeal for failure of counsel to file the appellants
brief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer should be
disciplined.
HELD
Yes. The absence of a written contract
does not preclude a finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorneys
fees fro professional services rendered. A written
contract is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be
expressed or implied. To establish the relation, it
is sufficient that the advice the assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter
persistent to his profession. In this case,
complainant sought and received legal advice
from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he
agreed to sign the appellants brief to be filed and
that he received P600.00 from complainant
spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client
relationship existed between the two. He thus
violated that Code of Professional Responsibility
which provide:
RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

HELD
No. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of the statute should be customarily
and habitually holding ones self to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. It does not pertain to isolated court
appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for
his failure to obtain a prior permission from the
head of the Department (CJ) as required by law,
respondent was reprimanded.

CANON 1
SM: IMMORAL, DISHONEST CONDUCT
SOLEDED NUEZ vs. ATTY. ROMULO
RICAFORT
A.C. No. 5054 MAY 29, 2002
FACTS:

SM: EXISTENCE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP IS NOT DETERMINED BY
ABSENCE OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT.
SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO
D. RABANAL vs. ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE
A.C. No. 1372 JUNE 27, 2002
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed
by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio
Rabanal against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is
alleged that respondent, aa counsel for
complainant Cayetano, Rabanal, did not file the
appellants brief in the Court of Appeals despite
having been granted by the appellate court an
extension of time to file the same, as a result of
which the appeal filed by Cayetano was
dismisses and the decision of the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became
final and executory.
Respondent claims however that he was
not the counsel of complainant Cayetano prior to

Sometime in October 1982, petitioner

authorized respondent attorney to sell her two
parcels of land located in Legazpi city for P40,
000. She agreed to give respondent 10% of the
price as commission. Respondent succeeded in
selling the lots, but despite complainants
repeated demands, he did not turn over to her
the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant
to file against respondent and his wife an action
for a sum of money before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Respondent was declared in default and
judgement was rendered in favor of petitioner.
Respondent appealed said decision to the Court
of Appeals but the same was dismissed fro failure
to pay the docket fee within the required period.
A writ of execution was issued; it
appeared however that only the lawyer has paid
a partial amount. Four postdated checks were
subsequently issued to cover the balance. Said
checks however, upon presentment were
dishonored because the account against which
they were drawn was closed. Demands to make
good the checks were to no avail so petitioner
filed a case for violation of BP 22.

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

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The lawyer denied the allegations and
filed several motions for extension of time to file
comment. Complainant filed a motion to cite
lawyer for contempt for his alleged delaying
tactics unbecoming of a lawyer and a law dean.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lawyer is liable for
immoral and dishonest conduct.
HELD

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial

without such commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
SM: VIOLATION OF THE NOTARIAL LAW

Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave

misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilty, which provides that A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
and deceitful conduct.
Respondent had no intention to honor
the money judgment against him in as can be
gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated
checks; (2) closing of the account against which
said checks were drawn; and (3) continued
failure to make good the amounts of the checks.
SM:
DECEITFUL
CONDUCT;
ENTRUSTED BY CLIENTS.

FUNDS

PENTICOSTES vs. IBANEZ

304 SCRA 281
FACTS
The sister-in-law of Atty. Penticostes
was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments.
The respondent, Pros. Ibanez was given by the
sister-in-law of Penticostes P1, 804 as payment
of her SSS contribution arrears but said
respondent did not remit the amount to the
system. Complainant filed with the RTC a
complaint fro professional misconduct against
Ibanez due to the latters failure to remit to the
SSS her contribution and for respondents
misappropriation of the amount.

ALITAGTAG vs. ATTY. GARCIA

February 6, 2002
FACTS
This is a petition fro disbarment against
respondent Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia fro the
falsification of a deed of donation and notarizing
the same.
It appears that Atty. Garcia notarized the
Deed of Donation covering a parcel of land.
When said document was examined by the PNP
Laboratory upon complaint of Violeta Flores
Alitagtag, it certified that the questioned signature
in the Deed of Donation and the standard
signatures of the deceased donor, Caesar B.
Flores, WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND
THE SAME PERSON. Hence, the Deed of
Donation was declared falsified and thus, null
and void by the lower court.
As a result of such findings, the IBP
recommended the suspension of Atty. Garcia
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that Atty. Garcia be disbarred.
HELD

Yes. Non-remittance by the public

prosecutor for over one year of ends entrusted to
him constitutes conduct in gross violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. Lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them on behalf
of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.

Yes. Article 2103, Sec. 1(4) provides

that a notary public shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he is the same person
who executed it, and acknowledged that the
Deed of Donation is authentic. He assisted his
father0in-law, the donor, in executing the same.
By notarizing the document, he likewise
acknowledged that the signature therein is the
donors true signature.
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a
graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws
and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.
A notary who acknowledged a document
that was a forgery destroys the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. He does not
deserve to continue as member of the bar.

SM: VIOLATION OF THE NOTARIAL LAW

SM: VIOLATION OF THE NOTARIAL LAW

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents acts
amounted to violation of his oath as a lawyer.
HELD

NUNGA vs. VIRAY

306 SCRA 487

FLORES vs. CHUA

306 SCRA 465

FACTS

FACTS

Victor Nunga, president of the Masantol

Rural Bank filed a complaint fro disbarment
against Atty. Viray on the ground of gross and
serious misconduct fro notarizing documents
when he was not commissioned to do so at the
time the said documents were executed.

The complainant seeks the disbarment

of respondent Atty. Chua, a practicing lawyer and
a notary public, for various offenses amounting to
malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his
lawyers oath, the CPR as well as the provisions
of the laws of the Philippines, to wit: (a) Fraud
through falsification and forgery of public
document; (b) foisting falsehood and fabricated
public document to molest and harass parties;
and (c) libel, misrepresentation and unlawful
advertisement.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents act is a
valid ground for disbarment.
HELD
Yes. Where a member of the Philippine
Bar does the notarization of a document at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to

ISSUE

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

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Whether or not the charges against Atty.
Chua sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
against him.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

person who executed it and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what stated therein breached the foregoing rules.

HELD
Yes. When a notary public is a lawyer, a
graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws
and do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also
commands him not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of
legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty
and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.
SM: CANON 1; RULE 1.01 CPR
FIDEL AQUINO vs. ATTY. OSCAR MANESE
A.C. No. 4958; APRIL 3, 2003
FACTS
Complainant filed this complaint against
respondent, a Notary Public, for notarizing and
preparing a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
September 15, 1994, which could not have been
executed and sworn to by Lilia D. Cardona, one
of the therein three vendors signatories, she
having died on November 25, 1990, or four years
earlier.
It appears that complainant is the lawful
tiller of the land subject of the sale. Comparative
Examination conducted by the NBI shows that
the specimen signatures of Lilia Cardona and her
signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute
Sale were not written by one and the same
person.
In his comment, respondent asserted
that complainant has neither personality to
complain as he has neither a legal right nor claim
over the land nor legal personality to challenge
the sale; as a Notary Public, he is not expected to
know every person who goes to him for
notarization of documents.

CANON 11
SM: RESPECT TOWARDS THE COURT AND
JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
VILLAFLOR vs. SARITA
308 SCRA 129
FACTS
Complainant filed a case for disbarment
against respondents before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline. The Commissioner assigned to
investigate the case issued an order directing
respondent to file his answer or comment to the
complaint. The period of time allotted to answer
the complaint lapsed without respondent
submitting his comment. An order was issued
requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the
case but the respondent failed to appear. A notice
of hearing was sent to respondent but again he
failed to attend the proceeding. After giving the
respondent enough opportunity to face the
charges against him, which the latter did not
avail, the case was submitted for resolution.
ISSUE
Whether or not failure to obey notices
from the IBP investigators constitutes an
unethical act.
HELD
Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the
duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity,
according to the oath he has taken. It is his
foremost responsibility to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers. The highest form of respect to
the judicial authority is shown by the lawyers
obedience.
SM: MOTION FOR EXTENSION
GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.

ISSUE

IS

NOT

RAMOS vs. ATTY. DAJOYAG

February 28, 2002

Whether or not the contentions of the

respondent are tenable.
FACTS
HELD
No. Complainant has the legal
personality to file this complaint because as a
tenant, the transfer of the ownership of the land
disturbs his rights over the land. In any event,
proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of lawyers may, under Section 1 of Rule
139 B of the Rules of Court, motu proprio be
taken by the SC or the IBP upon the verified
complaint of any person.
Respondent cannot also successfully
plead that he is not expected to know every
person who goes to him fro notarization of their
documents because in the Acknowledgement of
the Deed, he affirmed that all the persons who
appeared before him (including Lilia Cardona)
are known to him to be the same individuals who
executed the instrument and acknowledged to
him that the same is their free act and voluntary
deed.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution and to obey the laws of the land and
promote and respect fro the law and legal
processes, and Rule 1. 01 thereof proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. His reckless act of
notarizing the DAS without ascertaining that the
vendors signatories thereto were very same

This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M.

Ramos against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag Jr. for
negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the
NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor
Arbiter of a complaint for legal dismissal.
It appears that Ramos was terminated
from work fro failure of his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag,
to file on time the petition for certiorari, when the
Supreme Court dismissed it with finality.
From the record, it can be gleaned that
Atty. Dajoyag moved for an extension to file,
which was granted but the Resolution granting
the 1st extension contained a warning that no
further extension would be given. Atty. Dajoyag,
on the other hand, explained that he was not
aware of this because when he filed his motion
fro last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet
received the copy of said resolution. He further
explained that he relied on good faith that his
Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be
granted without the warning as this was only a
first extension; and also that he requested for a
second and last extension of 20 days for which
he complied with the filing of the Petition for
Certiorari on the last day of the supposed
extended period.

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

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ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of
negligence.
HELD
Yes. Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer
shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation fro his failure to do so. Motions for
extension are not granted as a matter of right but
in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers
should never presume that their motions fro
extension or postponement will be granted or that
they will be granted the length of time they pray
for. Due diligence requires that they should
conduct a timely inquiry with the division clerks of
court of the action on their motions and, the lack
of notice thereof will not make them any less
accountable for their omission.

SM: GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

GALEN vs. PAGUIRIGAN
March 21, 2002
FACTS:
This is complaint for disbarment and
damages filed by spouses Lolita and Romy
Galen, spouses Enriqueta and Tomas Rasdas,
and spouses Esperanza and Ernesto Villa
against Atty. Antonio B. Paguirigan.
It appears that Attorney Paguirigan
failed to file the Appellees Brief for the
complainants due to his mistaken belief that the
trial courts decision would be affirmed. To make
matter worse, after being granted a 30-day
extension of the time to file a petition for review of
the decision of the court of Appeals, he again lost
through default the benefit of the extension
granted as he failed to file his petition for review
within the extended period granted. He faults the
Supreme Court in not acting on his motion until
close to the end of the 30-day period he was
asking for.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Paguirigan is
guilty of gross negligence in the performance of
his duty.
HELD:
Yes. While the failure to file the
appellees brief in a case is not a ground for an
adverse ruling against the appellee, unlike the
failure to file the appellants brief which may result
in the dismissal of an appeal, nonetheless, the
importance of filing an appellees brief cannot be
gainsaid. As has been pointed out repeatedly,
Upon appeal, the appellate court, not being in
position to hear firsthand the testimony of parties,
can only place great reliance on the briefs and
memoranda of the parties. The failure to submit
these pleadings could very well be fatal to the
cause of the client.
Worse, respondent failed to file his
petition for review within the extended period
granted and even faulting the SC for his failure. It
only succeeds in showing his ignorance of two
basis principles: first that a party cannot presume
that his motion will be granted, and, second, that
any extension granted is always counted from the
last day of the reglementary period for the last
period of extension previously sought and / or
granted. The last rule is important because
unless the extension from the last day of last ex
tension is granted, this period would become

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

inextensible. Respondent is thus guilty of
violation of rule 12.03 of the code of professional
responsibility which provides that A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining ex tensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same of offering an
explanation for he failure to do so.
CANON 15
SM. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

DE GUZMAN vs. DE DIOS

350 SCRA 320 (2001)

FACTS:
Diana de Guzman filed a disbarment
complaint against Attorney De Dios for
representing conflicting interests. Complainant
averred that she engaged the service of
respondent in 1995 as counsel in order to form a
hotel and restaurant corporation. With the
assistance of respondent, said corporation was
registered with the SEC. Respondent also
represented complainant in one case involving a
property of the corporation. Respondent however
averred that since the action involved a property
of the corporation, she represented complainant
to protect the interests of the corporation, she
being its legal counsel. Complainant also averred
that while respondent rose to become president
of the corporation, she lost or her investment
when her delinquent shares were sold by the
corporation in a public auction upon the advice of
respondent. The IBP dismissed the complaint on
the ground that there was no attorney client
relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an attorney
client relationship that may justify holding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests.
HELD:
Yes. It was complainant who retained respondent
to form a corporation. She appeared as counsel
in behalf of the complainant. There was also
evidence of collusion between the board of
directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of
directors now included respondent as the
president. It was also upon her advice that the
deliquint shares of complainant were sold at
public auction. The present situation shows a
clear case of conflict of interests of the
respondent.

SM: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

ERLINDA ABRAGA NET vs. ATTY. MAXIMO
RODRIGUE
A.C. No. 4346. April 3, 2002
FACTS:
Sometime in 1986, complainants hired
the services of the respondent to represent in a
case be fore the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City.
The case was won by the complainants.
Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly
surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with
other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer
client relationship.

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

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On August 1991, Complainants filed a
case of indirect contempt against Sheriff
Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise,
respondent represented the sheriff. Since the
counsel employed by the complainants was a
former student of respondent, said counsel,
egged by the suggestion of respondent withdrew
the case without the petitioners consent. That as
a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events
occurred to the prejudice of the complainants.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

CANON 16
SM: MISAPPROPRIATION OF THE CLIENTS
FUND
DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C.
MAGULTA
A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002
Facts:

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Rodriguez
should be disbarred.
HELD:
Yes. In the present case, respondent
clearly violated Rule 15.03 if Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Which
provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts.
SM: Conflict of Interests
LOLITA ARTEZUELA vs. ATTY. RICARTE B.
MADERAZO
A.C. No. 4354, April 22, 2002
Facts:
Artezuela filed brfore the Supreme Court
a verified compliant for disbarment against the
respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly
neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit
and failed to represent her interests with zeal and
enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was
scheduled for pre-trail conference, respondent
asked for its postponement although all the
parties
were
present.
Notwithstanding
complainants persistent and repeated follow-up,
respondent did not do anything to keep the case
moving. He withdrew as counsel without
obtaining complianants consent.
Complainant
also
claimed
that
respondent engaged in activities inimical to her
interests. While acting as her counsel,
respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint. The said document was
even printed in repondnets office. Complainant
further averred that it was respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the
trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with
her consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be
disbarred.
Held:
Yes. He is guilty of representing
conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilty.
To be guilty of representing conflicting
interest, a counsel-of-record of one party need
not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse
party. He does not have to publicly hold himself
as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting
interests
of
recordalthough
these
circumstances are the most obvious and
satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that
the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with
that of his oroginal client. To require that he also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would
punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
reward, with impunity, the highest form of
disloyalty.

Petitioner engaged the services of the

respondent to help him recover claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand
letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a
case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included
also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the
petitioner has not yet received any feedback as
to the status of his case. Petitioner made several
follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already
been filed even invited petitioner to come with
him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the
case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the
prosecutors office while the lawyer allegedly
went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with
the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that
day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer,
petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk
of court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner found out that no such case has been
filed.
Petitioner confronted attorney Magulta
where he continued to lie to with the excuse that
the delay was being caused by the court
personal, and only when shown the certification
did he admit that he has not at all filed the
complaint because he had spent the money for
the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease
petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse him
by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and
June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P2,000.00 and
P800.00, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer should be
disbarred.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP as follows: It is evident that the P25,000
deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill
complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing
fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created
and that was to file the Regwill complaint within
the time frame contemplated by his client. The
failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to
his misuse of the filing fees deposit by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the
money deposited by complainant for filing fees,
does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds.

SM: NEGLIGENCE OF AN ATTORNEY.

REONTOY vs. IBADLIT

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

6
A.C. CBD No. 190 February 4, 1999
302 SCRA 604
FACTS:
An adverse decision was rendered by the trial
court against the client of attorney Ibadlit. He did
not appeal the decision because of his opinion
that to appeal would be futile. An administrative
complaint was later filed by attorney ibadlits
client against him for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether a lawyer may refuse to file an appeal on
behalf of his client when in his opinion to make
an appeal would be futile.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

This is disbarment case filed by Alex
Ong against Attorney Elpidio D. Unto, for
malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.
It is evident from the records that he
tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various
charges against the latter. When the complainant
did not heed his warning, he made good his
threat and filed a string of criminal and
administrative cases against the complainant.
They, however, did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client,
The records show that the respondent
offered monetary rewards to anyone who could
provide him any information against the
complainant just so he would have leverage in
his actions against the latter.

HELD:
No. It was highly improper for him to
have adopted such opinion since a lawyer is
without authority to waive his clients right to
appeal and his failure to appeal within the
prescribed period constituted negligence and
malpractice. Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

SM: DUTY OF A DEFENCE COUNSIL WHEN

ACCUSED ENTERS A GUILTY PLEA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Untos acts
constitute malpractice.
HELD:
Yes. Canon 19 of the code of
professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal but within the
bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands
that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attained the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate, or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges
to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

PEOPLE vs. SEVILLENO

305 SCRA 519
SM: Right of attorneys to compensation based on
quantum meruit.
FACTS:
The accused was charge with the crime
of rape with homicide against a 9 year old minor.
He entered the plea of guilty for the crime
charged. When the prosecution rested its case,
Attorney Saldavia of the PAO appointed as
counsel de officio for the accused manifested that
since his client had already pleaded guilty ha
would no longer present any evidence. He only
invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel de officio of
the accused acted property as defense counsel.
HELD:
No. Canon of the coda of professional
Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and
diligence. He must not neglect a legal matters
entrusted to him, and his negligence in this
regard renders him administratively liable. In the
instant case, the defense lawyer did not protect,
much less uphold the fundamental nights of the
accused. Instead, they haphazardly preformed
their
function as counsel de officio to the
detriment and prejudice of the accused.
SM: LAWYERS MUST REPRESENT THEIR
CLIENT WITH ZEAL BUT WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF LAW.

EMILLIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. ATTORNEY
MICHAEL DIONEDA
ADM. CASE No. 5162; March 20, 2003.
FACTS:
In 1997, complainant ETCHA and
respondent entered into Retainers Agreement
wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the
case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr.
Tinsay and BPI family Savings Bank by way of
filing a complaint -in - intervention. ETCHA
alleged that after respondent received the
amount of Php 20,000, he did nothing for the
development of the case and to update the
complaint in intervention.
ETCHA then demanded the return of the
amount received by respondent since he did
nothing to protect the interest of the complainant.
Respondent promised to return the amount but
after deducting there from a reasonable fee for
the efforts exerted by him. He averred that the
agreement also included an earlier case with the
HLURB where he was able to obtain a favorable
judgment for the complainant.
It appears however that respondent, for
one reason or another, failed to attend any
hearing with the IBP Commission on Bar
discipline tasked to hear this administrative
complaint.

ONG vs. UNTO

February 6, 2002
ISSUE:
FACTS:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to

compensation
based
on
the
Retainers
Agreement? If not, is he entitled to compensation
based on quantum meruit?

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

7
HELD:
He is not entitled to compensation
neither based on the Retainers Agreement nor
on quantum meruit.
Generally, a valid written agreement
fixing attorneys fees in conclusive as between
the parties. And when both parties are deemed to
have impliedly repudiated the contract and places
themselves in the position as though there was
no express stipulation as to the attorneys fees,
the lawyers compensation shall be determined
on the basis of quantum meruit. Here, the
Supreme Court considered the demand of
ETCHA for the refund of the entire amount
received as attorneys fees and the counter
proposal of respondent to deduct reasonable
fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied
repudiation of the conduct by both parties.
However, to deserved compensation
based on quantum meruit the lawyer must prove
by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a
reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing his
clients case with the court taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees. It
is noteworthy to point out respondents failure to
attend any hearing of his disbarment case before
the IBP without presenting any reason.
Respondents lamentable attitude towards his
clients case is clearly evident from his apparent
disinterest in his own case for disbarment.
Therefore, for having missed the opportunities to
present evidence in hi favor without any
satisfactory explanation as to his nonappearance, he should be denied compensation
based on quantum meruit due to the lack of any
factual basis to determine the value of his work
as complainants counsel.

SM: DUTY OF A LAWYER WHO SUCCEEDS IN

A CASE.
DBP vs. CA
302 SCRA 362
FACTS:
The DBP tiled the office of the sheriff of Malolos
an application for extra judicial foreclosure of
real and personal properties involving several
real and or chattel mortgage executed by the
Continental Cement Corporation (CCC). The
CCC filed a complaint with the RTC to principally
seek to enjoin the DBP and sheriff of Malolos,
Bulacan from commencing the foreclosure
proceedings on CCC s mortgage. A hearing was
scheduled for the sole purpose of examining
three of CCCs witnesses but their counsels were
not present. Counsels justified their absence due
to the failure of the former counsel to turn over
the records of the case despite several demands.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

previous counsel. A new counsel who appears in
a case in midstream is presumed obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent process
and proceedings that have transferred prior to his
takeover.

SM: WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

ANGELITA C. ORCINO vs. ATTORNEY GASPAR
A.C. No. 3773 September 24,1997
FACTS:
Orcino engages the services of attorney
Gaspar to prosecute a criminal case she
intended to file against several suspects in the
slaying of her husband. Complainant paid
respondent his fees as stipulated. Forthwith,
respondent entered into his duties and performed
them religiously from the preliminary investigation
with the office of the prosecutor until the case
was thereafter filed with the RTC of Baloc, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
Respondent however failed to attend the
bail hearing scheduled in August, 1991. it was at
this nearing that the court, over complainants
objections, granted bail to all the accused. After
the hearing, complainant immediately went to
respondents residence and confronted him with
his absence. Respondent explained that he did
not received formal notice of the hearing.
Complainant became belligerent and started
accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his
absence. Respondent said that her suspicions
were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by
her relatives. Complainant, however, continued
accusing him belligerently. She asked for the
records of the case saying that she could refer
them to another lawyer. Stung by her words,
respondent gave her the records.
Subsequently, respondent filed before
the trial court a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
but it dead not bear the consent of complainant.
The court issued an order directing respondent to
secure coplainants co sent to the motion and
his appearance as private prosecutor shall
continue until he has secured this consent.
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to
respondents
withdrawal.
Meanwhile,
the
hearings in the criminal case continued.
Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor
did he contact complainant. Complainant was
thus compelled to engages the services of
another lawyer. Hence, this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer is excused
from his duty to represent his client if said client
refuses to give his consent to the lawyers motion
to withdraw his appearance.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Whether or not the absences of

counsels are justified under the circumstances.

No. A lawyer may retire at any time from

any action or special proceeding with the written
consent of his client filed in court and copy
thereof served upon the adverse party. Should
the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer
must file an application with the court. The court
on notice to the client and adverse party,shall be
determined whether he ought to be allowed to
retire. The application for withdrawal must be
baes on a good cause. In the instant case,
respondent, did not file an application with the
court for it to dtermine whether he should be
allowes to withdraw.

HELD:
No. The withdrawal of previous counsel
in the thick of the proceedings would be a
reasonable ground the seek postponement of the
hearing. However, such reason necessitates a
duty and obligation, on the part of the new
counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled
hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former
counsels failure to turn over the records of the
case shows the negligence of the new counsel to
actively recover the records of the case. More
demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have
taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest
of his client, rather than pass the blame on the

Corollary issue:

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

8
Granting that the Motion to withdraw
appearance filed by the respondent is sufficient
as a form, is it based upon a good cause?
No. Rule 22.01 of Canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer
may withdraw his services from his client only in
the following instances: (a) when a client insists
upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case;
(b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or
more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not
get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when
the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
makes him incapable of handling the case
effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to
pay the attorneys fees agrees upon; (f) when the
lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g)
other similar cases.
Respondents withdrawal was made on
the ground that there no longer exist[ed] the
confidence between them relating to the matter
of private prosecution. This circumstance is
neither one of the foregoing instances nor can it
be said that it is analogous thereof.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
SM: IGNORANCE OF A BASIC LAW IS GROSS
IGNORANCE OF LAW.
ATTY. DANIEL O. OSUMO vs. JUDGE
RODOLFO M. SERRANO
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1607. April 3, 2002
FACTS:
A
complaint
was
filed
against
respondent judge in connection with a criminal
case for Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder
pending in his sala. Complainant is the private
prosecutor in the above-mentioned criminal case.
He alleged that respondent judge, after dying the
accuseds demurrer to evidence without prior
leave of court, set the continuation of the hearing
for the reception of defense evidence, in
disregard of Rule 199, Section 15 of the Rules of
Court. Complainant contends that the demurrer
to evidence without prior leave of court amounted
to a waiver of the right to present evidence upon
denial thereof. Thus, the prosecution filed a
motion to submit the case for judgment, which
was however denied. Moreover, respondent
judge failed to resolve the prosecutions formal
offer of evidence.
Respondent judge filed his Comment,
arguing that while a demurrer to evidence without
prior leave of court amounted to a waiver of the
right to present evidence, the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2693 was charge with the heinous
crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder.
Hence, procedural rules should not prevail over
the right of the accused to be hard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is liable for
gross ignorance of law?
HELD:
Yes. Observation of the law which he is
bound to know and swore to uphold is required of
every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a
judges owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the is
so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
The filing of the demurrer to evidence
without leave of court and its subsequent denial
results in the submission of the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence in record.
Considering that the governing rule in demurrer
to evidence is a fundamental component of
criminal procedure, respondent judge had to

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

obligation to observe the same, regardless of the
gravity of the offense charge. It is not for him to
grant concession to the accused who failed to
obtained prior leave of court. The rule is clear
that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence
in this case, the accused, who failed to ask for
leave of court, shall waive the right to present
evidence in his behalf.

SM: IGNORANCE OF A BASIC LAW IS GROSS

IGNORANCE OF LAW.
FACTS:
Respondent judge granted bail to the
accused that appears to remain at large when the
motion to grant the same was filed by the
accuseds father.
Complainant avers that respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the motion for bail on recognizance because (1) it
was filed not by the accused but by his father,
Hadji Yusoph Tabao; (2) the prosecutor was not
furnished a copy of the motion and there was no
hearing conducted; (3) it lacked the sworn
statement of accused signed in the presence of
two witnesses; and (4) the motion and its
supporting affidavit were signed by the father of
the accused. Complainant also contends that the
accused is not poor but is a certified public
accountant and operates a transport business in
Metro Manila. Thus, it is urged that he should not
have been released on recognizance since he
could put up a cash bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge erred in
granting bail to the accused.
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar. Respondent
judge was fully cognizant that the court had not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused who was still at large and yet, he
entertained and granted his motion for bail. In
doing so, respondent judge violated a tenet in
criminal procedure which is too basic as to
constitute gross ignorance of the law. When the
law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action.
SM: GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW
ESPINO vs. SALUBRE
352 SCRA 669 [2001]
FACTS
An administrative compliant was filed
against Judge Salubre for gross ignorance of law
for issuing a warrant of arrest against Melvin
Espino despite having lost jurisdiction over the
case by forwarding the records of the preliminary
investigation he earlier conducted to the
Prosecutor and information was filed accordingliy
with the RTC. Judge Salubre averred that on the
basis of the Supplemental Sworn Statement
executed by the private complainant, he had the
duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation and since it was demanded by the
results of hid inquiry, he issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest.
ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Salubre is guilty
of gross ignorance of law.
HELD
Yes. As a judge, he is presumed to know
the law. And when the law is so elementary, not

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

9
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. It is a basic rule that once information is
filed in the RTC, it is that court which must issue
a warrant of arrest against the accused in a
criminal case pending before it. Generally
however, to constitute gross ignorance of the law,
the acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and
corruption. Although these circumstances were
not all attendant in the case at bar, the fact still
remains that respondent judge is ignorant of the
basic rule in issuing warrants of arrest. For lack
of bad faith, he was merely fined.
SM: GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW
MONTEROLA vs. JUDGE CAOIBES Jr.
March 18, 2002
FACTS
Respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,
promulgated a decision in favor of herein
complainants Spouses Adriano and Hilda
Monterola in a civil case. Due to said decision,
the spouse filed a Motion for Execution, since the
defendant Spouses Mario and Mavis Delagado
did not appeal the decision and the period of
appeal had already lapsed.
Judge Caoibes, however, refused to
grant the motion for issuance of the Writ of
Execution.
In his comment, respondent judge
denied the allegations in the compliant. He made
it cleat that he would issue the order for the
issuance of the Writ of Execution but there was a
necessity to determine first the exact amount due
the complainants. According to him, this delay
could not be considered as dereliction of duty
because it was basically due to the sudden
resignation of his personnel, which gave rise to
confusion that affected the disposition of pending
matters. Additionally, the Motion for Execution
filed by the complainants was a pro forma motion
for falling to comply with the requirements of Sec.
5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as it lacked notice of hearing, and proof of
service.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judges
refusal to issue a Writ of Execution was an act
unbecoming of a judge.
HELD
Yes. There is no dispute that the
decsion of the respondent had already become
final and executory. Execution of said decision
should have issued as a matter of right, in
accordance of Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
In failing to issue the Writ of Execution in
compliance with the clear mandate of the said
rule, respondent either deliberately disregarded
the rule or demonstrated ignorance thereof. His
justification for his admitted delay in the issuance
of the writ, namely, pro forma character of the
motion for execution, necessity to dtermine the
exact amount and confusion of court records due
to the resignation of his key staff are very flimsy.
In attempting to hide his ignorance by anchoring
his inaction on other provisions of the Rules of
Court, respondent are all th emore manifest a
lack of familiarity on the harmonious interplay of
the provisions of procedural law.
While judges should not be disciplined
for inefficiency on account merely of accasional
mistakes or errors of judgements, it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

fundamental and basic legal principles in order
to merit the confidence of the citizenry.
SM: GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW
GERRY JAUCIAN vs. JUDGE SALVACION B.
ESPINAS
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1641. MAY 9, 2002
FACTS
Complainant,
as
losing
mayoral
candidate for the municipality of Daraga, Albay, in
the May 11, 1998 local elections, filed a petition,
dated May 22, 1998, denominated as an election
protest and/or revision/recounting of voted, on
the ground that fraud and anomalies were
allegedly committed during the aforesaid local
elections, both in the course of voting and during
the counting and tabulation of the ballots, to his
prejudice. He prayed for th eissuance of an order
directing the revision or recounting of the ballots
in the contested 114 precintys as enumerated in
his petition, the nullification and setting aside of
the proclamation of Wilson Andes as mayor, and
hos won proclamation as mayor.
Respondent judge, despite being
apprised of the relevant law, consistently and
unjustly refused to order a recount of all the
contested boxes and ballots. Respondent judge
based her order on a repealed law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judge should be
made liable for the erroneous decision.
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, as models of competence,
integrity and independence, judges are expected
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. To be able to
render substantial justice and maintain public
confidence in the legal system, they are expected
to keep abreast of all laws, le gal principles and
prevailing jurisprudence and to re main
conversant with them. Everyone especially a
judge, is presumed to know the laws and apply
them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less. Ignorance of the
law excuses no one-least of all, a judge.
Thus,
judges
may
be
held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law when it is shown that- motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonest or corruption they ignored,
contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.

SM: JUDGES SHOULD AVOID ACTS OF

IMPROPRIETY
WHETHER
INSIDE
OR
OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM.
BALDERAMA vs. ALAGAR
January 18, 2002
FACTS:
Spouses Edmundo and Carmelita
Balderama filed a letter-complaint against
respondent Judge Adolfo Alagar of the RTC; San
Fernando City, and La Union with the office of the
Court administrator for partiality and bias and
impropriety.
It appears that the spouses are the
accused in a criminal case of estafa through
falsification of public documents pending before
judge Alagar for impropriety as he was seen
fraternizing with private complaints in the criminal
case, spouses Jamie and Bernerda Ader. They

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

10
thus filed a motion for inhibition against judge
Alagar which was denied.
Judge Alagar on the other hand
explained that it was his driver who drove the
judges car, who offered, on at least 2 occasions,
the spouses Ader a ride to the court wherein they
had a hearing before the sala of respondent
judge. Judge Alagar further explained that he was
not personally aware of what his driver did and
only found out later upon investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there reasonable ground
to believe that respondent Judge transgressed
the high standard of moral ethics mandated of
magistrates by allowing him to be seen at the
residence of the private complainants.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

HELD:
No. In an administrative case, the court
can only pass upon the administrative liability of
the respondent. It cannot be a substitute for other
judicial remedies available to the complainant,
such as a motion for reconsideration or a special
Civil Action for Certioran.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his official duties and in his
everyday life. Respondents intimate relationship
with a woman other than his wife shows his moral
indifference to the opinion of a good and
respectable member of the community.

HELD:
Yes. What has not been clearly proven,
however, was whether or not Judge Alagar had
knowledge of his drivers actuations, and also
whether or not he ever personally went to the
spouses Aders residence or fetched them for a
hearing anytime. Notwithstanding this lack of
direct proof of fraternizing with the party litigants
in a case pending before his sala, this court hold
that Judge Alagar should have nonetheless have
exercised a greater degree of diligence in the
supervision of his driver.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conducts mandates that a judge should avoid
that only actual acts of impropriety, but equally
also the appearance thereof in all his activities,
whether inside or outside the courtroom. A
judges official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of official duties, but also in his
everyday life should be beyond reproach.

SM: ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST A

JUDGE NOT AGROUND FOR INHIBITION IN
THE CASE.
CRUZ, JR. vs. JOVEN
350 SCRA 70 [2001]
FACTS:
Attorney Cruz filed and administrative complaint
against Judge Joven for gross negligence, abuse
of authority, dereliction of duty and failure to
render decision within 30 days as so prescribe by
the Rules of Summary Procedure in an ejectment
case then pending before him default on the part
of the dependant and proper motion from the
plaintiff. The failure to decide within the said
period was due to the orders of respondent
inhibiting himself from the case on the ground
that an administrative complaint against him flied
by the dependant was then pending. Judge
Joven justified his orders as to assure the
parties of the impartiality and cold neutrality of a
judge.
ISSUE:

SM: CANON 2 CJC

SINNOT vs. judge BARTE
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1453; December 14, 2001.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed
against Judge Ricaredo P.Barte, of RTC
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 29 for bias at
partiality for the acquittal of Nenito Gadonan, the
accused in a double murder case in the sala of
respondent.
Respondent does not deny the fact that
he has an illicit relationship with the daughter of a
accused, Richel Gadonan, a woman not his wife.
Noticeably, complainants did not take
any action to inhibit respondent from the case at
the time if the trial. It was only when the learned
about the special relationship of respondent
judge and a daughter of the accused after the
trial of the criminal cases that they speculated on
the partiality of respondent. Hence they filed this
administrative case asking that the criminal cases
before the RTC, Zamboanga del Sur should
again be tried the presiding judge, herein
respondent, was biased and partial in favor of the
accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judges illicit
relationship with the daughter of the accused
sufficient to reverse his judgment of acquittal in
an administrative case.

Whether or not Judge Jovens orders of

inhibit on his proper.
HELD:
No. Mere filing of an administrative case against
a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from
hearing the case. In the evolvement of the public
perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no
greater empirical data that influences it than the
prompt and proper disposition of cases before
the courts.
SM: PROMPT
BUSINESSES.

DISPOSITION

OF

COURT

GONZALES-DECANO vs. SIAPNO

353 SCRA 269
FACTS:
Judge Alicia Gonzales decano, Executive
Judge, RTC Urdanita, Pangasinan, reported to
the OCA the failure of judge Siapno to decide
numerous cases within the required periods
despite having been submitted for decision.
Respondent judge justified is failures evening
that his staff failed to transmit to him the
stenographic notes of the proceedings to which
he can rely on his decisions including the typed
text of his decision for his signature. He also
averred that his failure to render a decision in
some cases were due to his appointments by the
same Exec. Judge to numerous courts in
Pangasinan.

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

11
ISSUE:
Whether or not excuses of respondent judges
sufficient to escape administrative sanction?
HELD:
No. Rule 3.05 of the Code Conduct requires
judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. Judge are charge with the administrative
responsibility of organizing and supervising the
court personnel to secure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business. Also, additional
assignments imposed upon a judge do not make
him less liable for the delay in deciding cases.
SM: PROMPT
BUSINESS.

DISPOSITION

OF

COURT

MELISSA DOMONDON et. Al. vs. JUDGE

PERCIVAL MANDAP LOPEZ
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696. June 20,2002
FACTS:
This case against respondent judge
arose from a case filed by complainants who
were all students of AMA College. Said students
were members of the editorial board of the
schools official publication who were expelled
from the school for alleged libelous and
scandalous writings in a spoof paper they
published.
Complainants filed a case for damages
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against AMA
Computer College and Mauricia Herrera, Dean of
Student Affairs. Complainants pressed their
request for the immediate resolution of their
application for preliminary mandatory injunction
before the end of the enrollment period so that
they can enroll in the first trimester of SY- 19971998. they alleged that respondent judge failed to
resolve their application for mandatory injunction
on time to the prejudice of the complainants.
Respondent countered however that there was
no provision in law providing for a timeframe in
resolving such application. On June 14, 1997, on
the basis of the pleadings of the parties,
respondent judges dismissed the case itself after
finding that the expulsion of the complainants
from the school was for cause and was effected
only after an investigation during which the y
were duly heard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is liable for the
delay.
HELD:
Yes. Canon 3,.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Judges Lopez cannot invoke the
absence of any provision prescribing a period
within which to resolve an application for a writ of
injunction. He should have been guided by the
exigencies of the situation. He knew that
complainants were seeking the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction precisely because they
wanted to be readmitted by the college and for
them to be able to enroll in the first trimester of
school year 1997-1998.
It is also undisputed that no trial was
ever conducted by respondent judge before
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent judge could not do this since there
were issues of facts, which had to be resolved.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS

SM: PROMPT DISPOSITION OF COURT

BUSINESS;
ORGANIZATION
AND
SUOERVISION OF COURT PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
judge MARCELINO L. SAYO JR
A.M. Nos. RTJ-00-1587. May 7, 2002
FACTS:
Two letters of complainant addressed to
the Chief of Justice commenced this
administration case. In those letters, Judge
Marcelino L. Sayo jr. of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) OF Manila, Branch 45, was charge with
gross misconduct, incompetence, corrupt,
practices, immorality, undue delay in rendering a
decision, making untruthful statements in his
Certificates of Service, and habitual tardiness.
The first letter, dated November 19,
1999, was signed and sworn to by Bella
Balaguer-Fabro, court interpreter in respondents
sala who was forced by the judge to leave for
whirnsical and capricious reasons.
The second letter, dated November 23,
1999, was authored by Juanito Roxas, court legal
researcher, Eufracio B. Pilipina, sheriff IV; Merlita
M. Decena, court stenografer III; Lina Norma S.
Galicinao, court stenografer III;andf Christine
Salvador, clerk III who complained that the very
short period since the appointed of respondent
judge, five employees in the said branch were
either detailed or transferred to another branch of
office without any apparent reason.
On October 29,1999, the chief justice
received a similar letter from a concerned
employee of Branch 45 alleging gross
incompetence of judge Sayo, as demonstrated by
his failure to decide cases way beyond the
prescribed period and his habitual tardiness
(almost past 10:00 am.) in coming to court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is liable for his
acts.
HELD:
The Court of Judicial Conduct requires a
judge to dispose of the courts business promptly
by deciding cases and matters within the required
period of ninety (90) days from the date of their
submission for decision, as mandated by the
constitution.
Judges should act with dispatch in
resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate
and delay the satisfaction of a judgment. Their
inaction or procrastination to act one way or
another gives room for suspicion that they are
biased. As dispensers of justice, they should act
in such a manner as to avoid suspicion, so that
faith in the administration of justice may be
preserved. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents within the reglementary period of 90
days fixed by the Constitution and the law cannot
be excused or condoned.
Likewise, respondent cannot use the
alleged inefficiency and antagonistic attitude of
his staff towards him as a defense. The Code of
Judicial Conduct requires a judge to organize and
supervise the court personal to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well
as to observe high standards of public service
and fidelity at all times. The inability of
respondent to control and discipline his staff
demonstrate his witness in administrative

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

12
supervision, an undesirable trait frowned upon by
this Court.

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deceased
Rafael
Benemerito
and
the
complaining
witness,
considering
that
respondents wife is their niece. Their relationship
is within the apparent ambit of the aforecited
laws.

SM: Canon 3;Code of Judicial Conduct

ISSUE:
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
Judge TOMAS NOYNAY
A.M. No. RTJ- 02- 1704; March 18, 2003

Whether
or
not
the
rule
on
disqualification applies only to cases where the
judge is called upon to decide a case, and not to
preliminary investigations.

FACTS:
This administrative case stems from a
certification dated July 13, 2001 written by Judge
Salvador L.Infante, the successor of respondent.
He reported therein that at least 56 cases had
been left undecided by judge Noynay.
In his explanation, respondent gave
several reasons for his failure to decide the case
during his stint as presiding judge.
1. That he inherited more or less 20
cases when he assumed office.
2. That his branch is the lone RTC
within his jurisdiction;
3. Pressure due to heavy turn out of
load or cases;
4. Intermittent electrical brown- outs;
5. Health
and
/
or
physical
indisposition due to age and his
recent eye operations;
6. Occasional mental black-out.
The Office of the Court Administrator
Also found out that this is the second time
respondent is asked to explain his delay in
rendering decisions.

HELD:
No. To sit in a case means to hold
court; to do any act of the judicial nature. To be
formally organized and proceeding with the
transaction of business. The prohibition is thus
not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases
where he acts by resolving motions, issuing
orders
and
the
like
evidently,
the
disqualification
applies even to preliminary
investigation stage where the judge would have
to act on asset of facts presented to him and
determined whether or not there is probable
cause to charge an accused.
The appropriate step for respondent to
take would have been to immediately desist from
hearing the case, even at the preliminary
investigation stage. His failure to do so is a
glaring violation not only of the Rules of COURT
BUT ALSO rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that: In every instance
the judge shall indicate the legal reason for
inhibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the excuses presented
by respondent sufficient to excuse him from
administrative liability.

DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION.

NAVARRO vs. MANESES III
285 SCRA 586

HELD:
No. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates judges to dispose of
the courts business within the periods prescribed
by the law and the rules. Under the constitution,
lower court judges are directed to decide a case
with 90 days from his submission. Failure to
comply with this mandate constitute gross
inefficiency.
But in meritorious cases, the judge may
request the Supreme Court through the OCA for
extension of time to dispose cases before them.
Respondent should have known that if his health,
his caseload or other factors hindered him from
disposing of case with dispatch, all he needed to
do was to request and extension of time from the
Supreme Court. He did not.

SM: INHIBITION; DISQUALIFICATION

SALES vs. CALVAN
February 27, 2002
FACTS:
This is a complaint for gross violation of
the Code of Judicial conduct and the Rules of
Court, and for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, filed by Reynolan T. Sales,
then incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos
Norte, against judge Melvin U. Calvan.
The office of the court administrator
recommended that respondent be fined Php
10,000 for conducting a preliminary investigation
in a criminal case, though disqualified by the
Rules of court as he is closely related to the

FACTS:
Respondent lawyer was charge with disbarment
for dishonesty. The IBP found him guilty. The
dispositive portion of the IBP Resolution reads:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
3 years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty
Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner
within 15 days from receipt of this resolution.
Failure on his part comply will result in his
DISBARMENT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a penalty in the
alternative is proper.
HELD:
Disposition of this nature should be avoided. In
the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it
has long been the rule that the penalty imposed
in a judgment cannot be in the alternative; even
if the law provides for alternative penalties, nor
can such penalty be subject to a condition. There
is no reason why such legal principles in penal
law should not apply in administrative disciplinary
action, which, as in this case also involved
punitive sanctions.
Attorneys Oath:

I,
__________________,
of
_____(Place of Birth)___________do solemnly
swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will supports its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the

LEGAL ETHICS REVIEWER

13
legal orders of the duty constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will no t wittingly nor
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and I will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
So help me GOD
REMOVAL OF JUDGES.
SM: MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE; WILLFUL
NEGLECT; CORRUPTIO AND INCOMPETENCY.
ANG vs. Judge ASIS
January 15, 2002
FACTS:
Gina B. Ang charge judges Enrique C.
Asis of the RTC of Naval, Biliran, with Bribery,
Extortion and violation of the Anti-graft and
Practices Act relative to an Election case.
Complainant alleged that she filed with
respondents court an election protest against her
opponent, Caridad Atok, who was declared
mayor of Kawayan, Biliran in the May 1998
elections. While her protest was pending,
respondent allegedly intimated to complainants
lawyers that he would decide the case in
complainants favor in exchange for monetary
consideration; that without her knowledge,
complainants father delivered to respondent the
total amount of Php 140,000.00
Respondent rendered his decision in the
election protest declaring Caridad Atok is the
winner in the mayoralty race.
Respondent vehemently denied the
charges of complainant and instead, cited various
citations he received as a member of the
Judiciary of Biliran because of his integrity.
ISSUE
Whether or not judge Asis is liable for
extortion and bribery.
HELD
No. The ground fro the removal of a
judicial office should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charge on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetence, etc. the general rule in regard to
admissibility in evidence in criminal trails applies.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. To reiterate, bad faith is not presumed
and he who alleges the same has the onus of
proving it. Complainant has not, in fact, adduced
any proof that impropriety attended the issuance
of the subject decision. In view of the fact that
complainant relied mainly on second-hand
information to prove her charges, he compliant is
reduced into a bare indictment or mere
speculation.

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