Department of Agriculture vs.

NLRC
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well
as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and thesecurity agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution themotor vehicles of the
DA.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing
less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an expressaffirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or
a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to
a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guardsclearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the
consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on
Audit.
G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978
PHIL. NATIONAL BANK vs. JAVIER PABALAN
FACTS:The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan
who issued a writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration, deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being
alleged that such funds are public in character.
ISSUE: WON the funds are public in character, thus immune from suit.
HELD:
NO.It is tobe admitted that under thepresent Constitution, what was formerlyimplicit as a fundamental doctrine inconstitutiona
l law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without
itsconsent." If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in thegovernment, then, certainly, such a
provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here.It is wellsettled that when thegovernment enters into commercial business,it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. By engagingin a particular business thru theinstrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of lawgoverning
private corporations.

G.R. No. L-55273-83

December 19, 1981
Gaudencio Rayo vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan
Facts:1.During the height of typhoon Kading, the National Power Corporations plant superintendent Chavez
openedsimultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam.
2.As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded (particularly Norzagaray). About ahundred of its
residents died and properties worth million of pesos were destroyed.
3.The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed several complaints for damages
against NPC and the plant superintendent.
4.NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function. Thus, it
cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.
5.The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but merely proprietary
functions and that based on the organic charter (charter -a legal document that provides for the creation of a corporate entity)
of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court.
Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
Held :The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court
under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled corporation, has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. In any court, NPC can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.

G.R. No. L-23139 December 17,1966

MOBIL PHILIPPINESEXPLORATION, INC. vs.CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE andBUREAU of CUSTOMS
FACTS:Four cases of rotary drill parts wereshipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville"consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc.
, Manila. It was discharged to the custodyof the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling
arrastreoperations therein. The Customs ArrastreService later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only.
Petitioner filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the
Bureauof Customs to recover the value of theundelivered case plus other damages. Therespondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that not being persons under the law, they cannot be sued.
ISSUE: WON the defendants can invoke state immunity.
HELD: YES.Now, the fact that a noncorporategovernment entity performs a functionproprietary in nature does not necessarilyresult in its being suable. If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as anincident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity.The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of
the Department of Finance with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties,
fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO,LA UNION vs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET.AL.
FACTS:At about 7am of December 16, 1965, acollision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
(owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez),
and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Unionanddriven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,several passengers of the jeepney includingLaureano Bania Sr. died as a
result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
ownerand driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendantsfiled a Third Party Complaint again
st thepetitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.Petitioner raised as one of its defensesthe non-suability of the
State.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernandois immune from suit.

HELD: YES.Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
byits employee, the test of liability of themunicipality depends on whether or not thedriver, acting in behalf of the municipality,
is performing governmental or proprietary functions.In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that "hewas on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
SanFernando's municipal streets." We alreadystressed in the case of Palafox,et .al .vs.Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102Phil 1186) that "the construction ormaintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable thoughit
may be imposed on the municipality noduty to pay monetary compensation.
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez
No. L-61744 June 25, 1984
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. De Imperio, et al. v. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al."
dated April 28, 1978, under presiding Judge Oscar C. Fernandez, rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal
Treasurer. The court ordered the defendant municipality to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php64,440.00 corresponding to the
rentals collected from the tenants from 1970 up to and including 1975 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970
until fully paid. In addition to this, the defendant municipality must pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php3,000.00 for attorney's fees
and to pay the cost of suit. Thereafter, the private respondents moved for issuance of the writ of execution for the satisfaction
of the said judgement, however, petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that
the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said Motion was then denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the writ of execution still stands in full force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the possession of the provincial and municipal
treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the
money judgement in Civil Case No. 604-B.
HELD:
Yes, all the funds of the municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel and of Bulacan, are public funds
which are exempt from execution as stated under Presidential Decree No. 477, "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration",
Section 2, paragraph (a): No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other
specific statutory authority. Furthermore, there must be an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan containing the
corresponding appropriation for the funds before any money of the municipality may be paid out.
Unlike the State which has the immunity of not being sued without its consent, A municipal corporation is an example of an
incorporated agency which has a charter of its own that grants them the competence to sue and be sued. However, municipal
government is generally not liable for torts committed during the discharge of its governmental functions. It can be held liable
only if it has been proven that they were acting in a proprietary function. Failing to do this, the claimant cannot recover.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must
pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in
PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the
PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC
dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed
this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45,
wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by

statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for
the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds
deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay
for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be
exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Villavicencio vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond
the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was
not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
Issue:Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.
Held:The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there
was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said
the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional
enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could
considered tantamount to slavery.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
Facts:Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. The city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office
for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
ISSUE:Whether or not the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue.
RULING:No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of women of ill-repute from Manila to be brought to Davao, deprived them of their freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they were imprisoned.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
FACTS: Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was
then charged before the Military Commission due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and
prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO
arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a
signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any
criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 68 is constitutional.
HELD: EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to
the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar
conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.
Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195
G.R. NO. L-49112, February 2, 1979
Facts :This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Transportation Office issued Administratie Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.

This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it
violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional.
These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In
fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of
the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such
letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and
highways.
LAO H. ICHONG vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ
L-7995 May 31, 1957
FACTS:R.A. No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed that nationalizes the retail trade business by
prohibiting against persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the
exception of U.S. citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are required to present registration to the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the
raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary Rufino G. Hechanova authorized an importation of tons foreign rice. Such act is being
questioned by petitioner Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, for
being violative of a particular statute which proscribes importation of rice and corn by government agencies.
Respondents aver that petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file herein petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a real party in interest.
HELD: Yes. x x x, [S] ince the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation,
and as a rice producer and landowner, petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality
and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts: Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino
parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of
the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils.
Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.
Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the
phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to
practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.

People v Lagman
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
FACTS: In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense
Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he
does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. www.uberdigests.info
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization
of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service,
does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the
State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
FACTS: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce
the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and
sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the
petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if
we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still,
the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of
the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

Estrella Ondoy vs Virgilio Ignacio

L-47178 May 16, 1980
Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Facts: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and
oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel,
and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was asking for compensation from the death of her son while in the
However, the statement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and
thereforedismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was also denied by the
Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice applicable in this case?
Ruling: Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely disregarded the
statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of
protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son was
shown to
the actual performance of
justice
a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer,

Meyer v. Nebraska
262 U.S. 390
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign
languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to
reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the
purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state.
Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental
liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as
harmful.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

268 U.S. 510
Facts: The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which
facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided
together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.
ISSUE: Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children?
HELD: Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
FACTS: A class suit brought by 44 children, as represented by their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of
"their generation as well as those generations yet unborn." Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary
Factoran of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The
children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the
highest law of humankind --the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case
was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the case?
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case on behalf
of future generations based on the concept of "inter-generational responsibility". Their right to a healthy environment carried
with it an obligation to preserve the environment for the succeeding generations. Section 16 of Article 2 which recognizes
above all; "The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." Also, the Supreme Court said that the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to
the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.