G.R. No.

L-353

August 31, 1946

PACIENCIA DE JESUS, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
IIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents.

Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

La O and San Jose for respondents.
.:

HILADO, J

Facts:
Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorari and mandamus whereby they
would have this Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January
29, 1946, entered in civil case No. 3174 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in the matter of the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus, which
order petitioners denominate "a writ of possession," and command the
respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and the respondents Justina S. Vda.
de Manglapus and Gregorio Leynes to return to said petitioners the possession
of the two parcels of land covered by original certificates of title Nos. 1292 and
1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of Batangas and mentioned in their
petition.
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the
respondents' answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the
late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid
special proceeding No. 3174
in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4
of their answer, after admitting the institution of said action for legal
redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946, the Court of First Instance of
Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and supplemental complaints
in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as
Appendix 1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that within the
period prescribed by law they had perfected an appeal from said order of
dismissal.

From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices
and annexes, the said for legal redemption is still pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs can claim Legal Redemption
Held:
Yes. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, thus commencing, civil case No. 3960
of said court, carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of
said petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of
the shares of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated estate,
particularly, the two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly
approved by the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by
the probate court the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the
purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1, confers upon
such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share
purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also
from any other person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the
probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most
logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate
proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power
and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the
necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and
expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There
can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the possession of
the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the
same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person
entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same
power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding
if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any other
person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who
are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate
proceeding.

The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de
Jesus was a proceeding in rem And by the publication of the notice prescribed
by the Rules and by the fact that petitioners herein were and are among the
testamentary heirs of the decedent, they were and are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate
court when the said court's order of January 29, 1946, was entered and
thereafter. If, even the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child
may be instituted and decided within the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, 348), it would be
absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the
delivery of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has already been
assigned to a certain person within the estate proceeding, the probate court
lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the same proceeding, but should
require the institution of an independent ordinary action.
We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal
redemption case, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with
costs to petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996

ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON
ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Facts:
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter
residential lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre,
located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan
City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise
a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the
late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with
Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latters death, with Canuto
Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son
Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos)
Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage,
namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time
after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely,
his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold
to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for
the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November
1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only
P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely to
save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurers Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the
Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the
property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused

to accept the amount for being much less than the lots current value of
P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong
Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against
petitioner an action for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction before
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court
handed down its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents right to
redeem the property had already lapsed.

Issue:
Whether or not Socorro Rosales can claim for the right of redemption being
not a co-heir
Held:
Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere
relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3] however,
Socorro s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship
in Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales,
part of whose estate is a share in his mothers inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria
died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among
them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When
David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included
his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to
his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.[4]

Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended
from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to
petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction
whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case
the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner
shall pay only a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the
Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners[5] required under Article 1623 of the
Civil Code
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when
private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31
March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987,
before the trial court.

G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.

Jose Gaton for petitioners.

Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article
1088 forpetitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already
elapsed and thatthe requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing
is deemed satisfiedbecause written notice would be superfluous, the
purpose of the law having beenfully served when petitioner Garcia went to the
Office of the Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood the
contents of the Deeds of Sale.
Issue:
Whether or not there is legal redemption and is there proper notice
HELD:
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale
assufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496
appliesonly to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a
casewhere the property involved is unregistered land.If the intention of the law
had been to include verbal notice or nay other meansof information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would havebeen no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the saidnotice be made in

writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or informationwas sufficient. In
the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623)
Written notice is indispensable actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled
to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to
the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method
of notifications remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption.

G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES
MAESTRADO-LAVIA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA,
JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents.
DE LEON,
JR., J.:

Facts:
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the
rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of
57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died
intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by the following
heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves,
Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated
intestate proceedings[3] in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was
appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the
estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition.
Thus, they filed an action for partition[4] before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo

Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision

approving the project of partition. However, the records of said case are
missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a
copy of said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No.
3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of
coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa;
and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14
hectares was distributed equally between petitioners (a) Josefa ChavesMaestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His
share was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvadors
father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver
Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance with
the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while
Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to
Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Issue:
Whether or not oral partition can be considered
Held:
Yes. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was
acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses
heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and
September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition
of the decedents estate, was not presented by either party thereto. The
existence of the oral partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of
contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual partition of the
estate conformed to the alleged oral partition despite a contrary court order.

Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly
delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of
twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of
partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make
sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims
that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition,
petitioners were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or
another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of
the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs
questioned petitioners possession of or ownership over said Lot No. 5872.
Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent with
such oral agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the
situation but no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the
adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the
petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a
superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed
by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the
heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral
partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.
In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral
partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of
the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27)
years.

G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Facts:
ne Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,
Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has
been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial
partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they,
however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his
other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta,
both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria;
Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by
his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and
Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father,
Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of
his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the
buyer.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went
through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of
amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid extrajudicial Partition
Held:
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on
the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance
of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is
shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid No
showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto
Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary
acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of
never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said
partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was
a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a
parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and
one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the
owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches
have equally set in.

G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY,
and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio,
Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the
spouses, the property should have been divided among their children, however, the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedures.

Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from
her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a
third party named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions
of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.

However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action
for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor
of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.

Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been
declared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase.
The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
between Mauricia and Laurencia.

Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made

Held: Yes.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.

Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The
legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses
was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by
Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the
segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he was in
effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the
estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially,
(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the
testator.
2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the
segregation of the property in favor of Nique However, evidence on the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the
order for segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of
the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions
its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the nonpublication thereof.
3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected
the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both
of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of
them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is
no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.

G.R. No. 49286

August 16, 1947

EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON, petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL., respondents..
PERFECTO, J.:

Facts:
Petitioners seek the annulment of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, issued on
July 26 and August 18, 1944.
In the first one, the lower court, acting on a petition for the execution of the decision in
special proceeding No. 3906, intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, dated October 25,1943,
declaring all the parties therein heirs of the deceased and dividing all the estate into three parts, one
to each of the three sets of heirs, ordered petitioners to deliver one-third of the estate to Josefa
Mayo Villapando, unless they should post a bond in the amount of P2,000 pending the decision of
the Supreme Court on the appeal interposed against the lower court's decision of the petition. The
order issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one to the effect that petitioners should deliver
two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose Morada,
unless they should file a bond in the amount of P2,000, pending the decision of the Supreme Court.
Ten days before the decision became final, on May 9, Josefa Mayo filed a motion for execution upon
the ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her share in the fruits of the estate
was left without guarantee. The petition was filed without notice to petitioners. On May 19,
petitioners filed their amended record on appeal as well as the appeal bond of P60. On May 24,
Josefa Mayo filed a petition, also without notice to petitioners, praying that the hearing on the
amended record on appeal be suspended until after her motion for execution be acted upon, and the
lower court issued an order on the same day, setting for hearing the motion for execution sometime
after June 15. On June 6, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of May 24, upon the
ground that the motion for execution should not have been acted upon as it was filed without notice
in violation of section 2 of Rule 39, besides having been filed during the efficacy of the resolution of
January 14, 1944, issued by the Supreme Court, suspending all proceedings in the intestate of
Gregorio Mayo Villapando, case No. 3906, and that the amended record on appeal is the only valid
pleading then pending and should be acted upon before anything else.
On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings on the motion for
execution, on the amended record on appeal and on the motion for reconsideration. On July 14,
petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for execution alleging, among other reasons, that the
lower court had no power or authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting the appeal
and that said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be executed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction
Held:
Yes. The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction when he
issued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders, purportedly to execute the decision
of October 25, 1943, provided for the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo and
later of two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers, unless petitioners should
file bond in the amount of P2,000. No law nor legal authority has been mentioned in respondent's
answer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The decision of October 25, 1943, provided
only for the declaration of heirs and of the shares each set of heirs was entitled to. Nothing was
provided in said decision as to the delivery of shares from one person to another. The orders of July
26, and August 18, provided for the execution of something supposed to be executed by the
decision of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not provided therein.

Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no project of partition
has as yet been filed and approved.