CHURCHILvRAFFERTY

G.R.No.L10572
December21,1915
Substantive due process whether an act of government has sufficient justification for
deprivingapersonoflife,liberty,orproperty.

FACTS:
Thisisanappealof ajudgement renderedperpetually restraining defendantandhisdeputies
fromcollectingandenforcingagainstplaintiffsandtheirpropertytheannualtaxprescribedinsection
100 ofActNo.2339, fromdestroyingor removinganysignonthepropertyof theplaintiffsforthe
solereason thatitmaybeoffensivetosight, andcancellingthebondgivenbytheplaintiffstosecure
the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted after the commencement of the action.TheAct
allowsthe Collector ofInternalRevenuetodecidewhetherasignorbillboarddisplayedto thepublic
is offensive to sight or is otherwise a nuisance and empowers him to order its removal. Plaintiffs
billboards are posted on private lands in Rizal. The Act also expressly forbids the use of an
injunctionto staythecollectionofany internalrevenuetax,andprovidesaremedyforanywrongin
connectionto suchtaxes. This remedywas intendedtobeexclusive, thereby precluding theremedy
by injunction which should notissueasofcourse, butisgrantedonly upon theoath ofaparty and
whenthereisnoadequateremedyatlaw.
These sections take away the preventive remedy of injunction, leaving ordinary remedial
actions available to taxpayers. The AttorneyGeneral contends that there is no provisions of the
paramount law which prohibit such a course, while the plaintiffs urge that the two sections are
unconstitutional because theyattempttodepriveaggrievedtaxpayersofallsubstantialremediesfor
theprotectionoftheirproperty,deprivingthemofitwithoutdueprocess.

ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not portions of section 100 of Act No. 2339, empowering the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances if objectionable to sight, is
unconstitutionalasitisadeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.

HELD:
1.
No.
Offensivenoisesand smellshavebeen fora longtimeconsideredsusceptibleofsuppression
inthickly populated districts.Ostensiblylocatedonprivate property,the realand solevalueofthe
billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of
billboardsandtheirrestrictionisnotso mucha regulation ofprivate property asitisaregulation of
theuseofthestreetsandotherpublicthoroughfares.
The inquiryislimitedtothequestionof whethertheenactmentassailedbythe plaintiffswas
a legitimate exercise of thepolice powerof the Government, forallpropertyisheld subjecttothat
power. TheCourtstatesthat theexerciseof policepowerbelongs totheLegislature, andthatpower
is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those principles which are the foundation of all
republican forms ofgovernment,andwhere theAct is reasonablywithintheproperconsiderationof
andcareforthepublichealth,safety,orcomfort,itshouldnotbedisturbedbythecourts.
Preparedby:YsabelAshleyR.Garcia