JOSON V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 290 SCRA 279 (1998)

FACTS: A complaint was filed against petitioner Joson for barging violently into the session hall of
the Provincial Capitol in the company of several armed men.
1. The case was endorsed to the DILG.
2. For failure to file an answer after 3 extensions, Joson was declared in default. On the
recommendation of the DILG, respondent Executive Secretary placed Joson under
preventive suspension for 30 days.
3. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation and prayed that
a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the LGC
4. DILG denied the motion and declared that the submission of the position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceeding
5. Respondent adopted the findings of DILG and imposed on petitioner a penalty of
suspension from office for 6 months without pay
ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension is proper
Sec 60 LGC enumerates the grounds for which an elective official may be disciplined,
suspended or removed from office: (1) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (2) culpable
violation of the Constitution; (3) dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence,
or dereliction of duty; (4) commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or offense
punishable by at least prision mayor; (5) abuse of authority; (6) unauthorized absence for 15
consecutive working days; (7) application or acquisition of foreign citizenship.
An administrative complaint filed against an erring elective official must be verified and filed
with the proper government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official
must be filed with the Office of the President.
Preventive suspension may be imposed by the disciplining authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; (c) and given the gravity of offense,
there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
CAB: Petitioners failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him is construed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf. The requisite of joinder of issues is squarely
met with his waiver of right to submit his answer. The act petitioner in allegedly barging violently
into th session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes
grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of 2
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the DILG secretary is invalid on the ground of undue violation
HELD: No. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments pursuant to Sec
4, Art X 1987 Constitution. The power of supervision means the overseeing or the authority to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill
their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. The Presidents power of general supervision means no more than the
power of ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the
law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the disciplining authority,
the President has the power investigate complainants against local government officials. AO No
23 delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a special investigating committee as may
be constituted by the disciplining authority. This is not undue delegation. The President remains
the disciplining authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate not the power to
discipline.

FLORES V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, 452 SCRA 278 (2005)

FACTS: An administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against petitioner
Mayor Flores was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga. The complainants
were the municipal councilors of Minalin.
1. The complaint alleged that Flores executed a purchase request for the acquisition of a
communication equipment without any resolution or ordinance enacted by the
Sanggunian. Moreover, the communication equipment was overpriced by more than
100%
2. Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order recommending to the Governor
(Lapid) that petitioner by preventively suspended from office for a period of 60 days.
3. Without seeking a reconsideration of the order, petitioner sent a letter to Lapid
requesting him to veto the same. Also, without waiting for respondent Lapids action on
his letter, petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari
4. CA held that Flores failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before going to court
and that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not gravely abused its discretion
when it issued the order considering that the allegation of overpricing was supported by
documentary evidence
ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
HELD: Yes. Sec 61(b) LGC provides that a complaint against any elective official of a
municipality shall be filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President.
After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively suspending
him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the
latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a
condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC. Sec 1 Rule 65
ROC requires that petitioner must not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in
issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The SC have held that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Sec 1, Rule 65 is
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. The SC also added that
petitioner, before filing with the CA his petition for certiorari, should have waited for respondent
Governor Lapids action on the recommendation of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available remedies within the
administrative machinery against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, the
intervention of the courts can be resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such
remedies.
The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it
properly.
The strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will also prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

CONSTANTINO V. DESIERTO, 288 SCRA 654 (1998)

FACTS: A complaint was filed against petitioner Mayor Constantino for grave misconduct. It
appears that Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution authorizing Constantino to purchase
and acquire for the Municipality heavy equipment. But contrary to the resolution, Constantino
entered into a lease agreement over said heavy equipment.
1. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio handed down an order placing Constantino
under preventive suspension for 6 months without pay. The order, however, was not
enforced (enjoined by orders promulgated by RTC)
2. Constatino then filed a motion for inhibition against Gervacio alleging that the issuance
of the order of preventive suspension was without due process and in utter disregarded
of the provisions of Sec 23 RA 6770
3. Meanwhile an information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against petitioner was filed before the Sandiganbayan with approval of respondent
Desierto
4. On recommendation of the respondent Ombudsman, a resolution was handed down by
the Graft Investigation Officer finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and
ordered his removal from service
ISSUE: WON respondent erred in finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
HELD: Yes. It is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at the
conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the subject transaction. In truth, the
resolution and the questioned contracts confirms their integrity and congruity. It is difficult to see
how those written documents could establish prima facie case to warrant the preventive
suspension of Constantino.
ISSUE: WON there was due process
HELD: Yes. Sec 28 RA 6770 provides that the investigation of complaints may be assigned to the
regional or sectoral deputy concerned or to a special investigator who shall proceed in
accordance with the rules or special instructions or directives of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Pending investigation, the deputy or investigator may issue orders and provisional
remedies which are immediately executory subject to review by the Ombudsman. Within 3 days
after concluding the investigation, the deputy or investigator shall transmit, together with the
entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the Office of the Ombudsman. Within 5
days after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall render the appropriate order, directive
or decision.
CAB: The impugned order was actually reviewed by a superior officer, Director Valenzuela, the
recommended for approval by Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio and ultimately approved by
Ombudsman Desierto. The mayors motions therefore received due attention and consideration
although resolved adverse to him.

LAPID V. CA, 334 SCRA 738 (2000)

FACTS: Governor Manuel Lapid and 5 other government officials were charged with alleged
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding & collecting from various
quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per
truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance
authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection.
1. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which
meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay pursuant to Sec 25(2) RA 6770
2. The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision.
3. Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final,
petitioner argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG
for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct
and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately executory
pending appeal
HELD: Sec 27 RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and
unappealable. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a
similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the respondent is absolved
of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless
a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed
in Section 27of R.A. 6770.
The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable.
The legal maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the
things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken
together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties not
enumerated in the said section are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An
appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman
Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of
these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being
appealable would be rendered nugatory.
The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has
become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general
rule.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are
immediately executory.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is
immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.
Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise. Final order or
resolution unless the law directs otherwise. Petitioner was charged administratively before the
Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. It
is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law
alone which should govern his case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, AO No 07, mandate that decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary
are still appealable and hence, not final and executory.

BUNYE V. ESCAREAL, 226 SCRA 332 (1993)

FACTS: The above-named accused (Bunye et al), all public officers of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, were charged of enacting Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 in order to
allegedly take possession and take over its operation and management of the New Public
Market inAlabang, Muntinlupa starting August 19, 1988 despite the valid and subsisting lease
contract for a term of 25 years between the Municipality of Muntinlupa and the Kilusang Bayan
sa Paglilingkod and Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.(Kilusang
Magtitinda).
1. COA Chairman Domingo and MMC Governor Cruz also warned that appropriate legal
steps be taken by the MMC toward the rescission of the contractto protect the
interests of the Government, and to evaluate thoroughly and study further the case to
preclude possible damages of financial liabilities which the Court may adjudge against
that municipality as an offshoot of the case.
2. The forcible take-over allegedly caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative
members, and gave the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official
functions.
3. On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
suspending them pendent lite from public office pursuant to Sec.13 of RA 3019.
4. Petitioners Municipal
Mayor, Vice
Mayor and Councilors question
the
resolution
suspending them from office for 90 days pending their trial for violation of Sec.3(3) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension is unjustified or unnecessary and its implementation will
sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the
shattering of the peace and order thereat
HELD: No. Sec.13 of RA No. 3019 as amended, provides that the accused public officials
shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.
In Gonzaga vs Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, the SC ruled that such preventive
suspension is mandatory. Preventive suspension n is not a penalty. In fact, suspension
under Sec.13 of RA 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People
vs CA, 135 SCRA 372).
The Sandiganbayan clearly did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the preventive
suspension of the petitioners.
The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions
are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. The
prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under
conditions which would ensure non-intervention and non-interference for 90 straight days from
petitioners camp (p.13, Solicitor Generals comment).
The petitioners fear that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for 90 days
when they are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain 8 councillors who can
meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior

Local Government, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily
vacant positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor, and 6 councillors in accordance with the provisions of
the LGC, RA 7160

RODRIGUEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 424 SCRA 236 (2004)

FACTS: Acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on
in Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) and Provincial Environmental and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), PNP, among
others, confiscated ipil lumber. The cutting and sawing of the lumber were alleged to have been
done under the supervision of Samaniego (barangay captain) on orders of petitioner Rodriguez
(mayor)
1. Subsequently, a case had been filed against petitioners Rodriguez at al for violation of
Sec 1(b) PD 1829 (Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders)
2. Petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed forum shopping in filing the same
information before the Sandiganbayan and RTC
ISSUE: WON Rodriguez, who holds a position of Grade 27 under LGC, committed the offense in
relation to her office
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, for an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation
between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense,
the offense cannot exist without the office.
As an exception, the SC held in People v. Montejo that although public office is not an
element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal
motive to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not
held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed
in relation to his office.
Although public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any
person, whether a public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein
petitioner, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the
course of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely within
the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public office.
CAB: Public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged
to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not
have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked
to exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces, used
her influence, authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of
Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation of
P.D. 705.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the information. The averment in the information that petitioner
Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the

lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705
effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan.

AGUINALDO V. SANTOS, 212 SCRA 768 (1992)

FACTS: Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the
December 1989 coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to
Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed
from office for disloyalty to the Republic.
1. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against
Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the
planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that
he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
2. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the
outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding
petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas
was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
3. Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent
Secretary of Local Government.
4. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has
power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin
Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should
be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the RPC.
5. While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed
against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.
6. The COMELEC granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the
decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the
Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the
way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
ISSUE: WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administration case moot and academic
HELD: Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes,
petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local governmentofficials as alter
ego of the President
HELD: Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both
the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of
general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the
department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and
authority to enact a local governmentcode, which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The
power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60
and 61 of BP 337.
ISSUE: WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed
from office
HELD: No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum
of proof required is only substantial evidence

PABLICO V. VILLAPANDO, 385 SCRA 601 (2002)

FACTS: Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Vicente, Palawan filed an administrative complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, the mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for
entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate
in the May 1998 elections where Villapando was elected.
1. They allege that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6,
of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Villapando, on the other hand, argues that he did not hire Tiape, but appointed him and
invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice which states that the
appointment of a defeated candidate as a consultant does not constitute an
appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
3. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found Villapando guilty of the administrative
charge and dismissed him from service which was affirmed by the Office of the
President.
4. Meanwhile, Ramir Pablico, the vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of
office as Municipal Mayor. Villapando filed for a temporary restraining order with the RTC
of Palawan which was first granted, then denied.
5. Villapando now seeks to annul the Sangguniang Panlalawigans Decision as affirmed by
the Office of the President, and the RTCs denial of the TRO. He argues that under Sec. 60
of R.A. 7160, an elective local official may be removed by order of the proper court
based on the grounds enumerated under said section. Without such order of the court,
he cannot be dismissed.
ISSUE: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, may validly
impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials
HELD: No. The SC held that it is clear under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 that the penalty of dismissal from
service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law.
In Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., it was held that [t]he Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60. Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that (b) An
elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a)
of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order
of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective
local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules

and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such
as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that
they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute
is a nullity. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials
from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being
repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and
applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise
it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen
by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be
put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.

EVARDONE V. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (1991)

FACTS: Evardone was the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position in
the 1988 local elections
1. In 1990 Apelado et al filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the
Local Election Registrar
2. COMELEC, then, issued a resolution approving the recommendation of the Local
Election Registrar to hold a the signing of the petition for recall against Evardone
3. The Court subsequently issued a TRO ordering respondents to cease and desist from from
holding the signing of the petition for recall, pursuant to the COMELEC resolution
4. However, the TRO was received by the field agent of COMELEC a day after the
completion of the signing process sought to be stopped by the TRO. As such, COMELEC
nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO issued by SC.
ISSUE: WON the TRO issued by the SC rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for
recall
HELD: No. The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the
right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic
control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is
"burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices
are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform
and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices.
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent
mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the
judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's
ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The
constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process
held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.
Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took
place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and
Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of
Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by
this Court.

AFIADO V. COMELEC, 340 SCRA 600 (2000)

FACTS: This case involves a petition asking for the annulment of a resolution calling for the recall
of the vice-mayor. The barangay officials in a preparatory recall assembly passed this resolution.
The proclaimed mayor at that time was the son of the previous mayor who had already served
for 3 consecutive terms. The father ran for a 4th term but withdrew, and was substituted by the
son. The opponent filed a petition asking for the annulment of the substitution. When the SC
ruled that the substitution was invalid, the vice-mayor became the mayor. Hence this petition.
HELD: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-mayor.
However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she gave up the
office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor.