Serrano vs gallant maritime

Skippers united pacific vs nathaniel roza

Sameer overseas vs bajaro
Crewlink vs editha
People vs Charlie and ida
People vs joseph jamilosa
Santosa dahuman vs first cosmopolitan
People vs nenita hu
Nasi villar vs people
Backmen service vs simplicio cuaresma

7. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NOE

LEVANTINO, IDG HUMAN RESOURCES, INC., (FORMERLY IDG TRADING AND
GENERAL SERVICES, INC.), RESPONDENTS.

Facts:
A complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and illegal deductions was
filed by respondent Noe Levantino (Levantino) against the petitioner. He was hired and
deployed by Sameer for and in behalf of its foreign principal, Arabian Fal Co., on 20 July
1994,[2] Levantino's contract provided that his office employment was for twelve (12) months
and fixed his basic monthly salary at Two Hundred Seventy-Seven US Dollars (US$277.00).
However, upon his arrival at the job site on 21 July 1994, Levantino was made to sign another
contract of employment, this time with the basic monthly salary of Six Hundred Seventy-Nine
Saudi Rial (SR679.00), plus One Hundred Eighty Saudi Rial (SR180.00) as food allowance.
Levantino was terminated by the foreign employer and subsequently repatriated to the
Philippines. He filed complaint with the POEA. Sameer filed a third-party complaint against IDG
Human Resources, Inc. (IDG), alleging that IDG should be held liable for the claims of Levantino
since Sameer's accreditation for foreign principal, Arabian Fal Co., had already been transferred
to IDG pursuant to an affidavit of assumption of responsibility and quitclaims. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that Levantino was terminated for just or authorized cause, the employee having been
unable to rebut the allegations raised against him of poor habits, disobedience of superiors, and
low productivity. He concluded, however, that Levantino was not paid his basic salary in
accordance with his POEA approved contract of employment of Two Hundred Seventy-Seven
US Dollars (US$277.00), and illegal deductions were made by the foreign employer from the
basic monthly salary for the food allowance. Thus, the Labor Arbiter held that Levantino was
entitled to a wage differential of Five Hundred Seventy-Five US Dollars and Sixty Cents
(US$575.60), and attorney's fees of Fifty-Seven US Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents (US$57.56). The
Labor Arbiter likewise held that Sameer and IDG were jointly and severally liable to pay
Levantino. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and a memorandum of appeal on 27 October
1997, along with a motion for extension of time to file a surety-appeal bond, alleging that it was
still arranging for the issuance of such with the bonding company. It was only on 3 November
1997 that it filed the appeal bond. NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to perfect it within the
ten (10)-day reglementary period. CA affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC; hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was perfected
HELD:
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement
of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the
other requisite afore stated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly
authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final
disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorney's fees. The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall
submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine. The
Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of
the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to
perfect appeal. Had Sameer been inclined to diligently comply with the requisites of appeal, as
plainly stated in the Labor Code. There is nothing in the said period that suggests innate
difficulty in obtaining the said bond. In fact, Sameer, who submitted the bond only on 3
November 1998, probably incurred further delay in submitting the appeal bond due to the early
November holidays, though such fact is of no moment considering that these holidays came
only after the lapse of the reglementary period. Nor should have there been eminent difficulty in
obtaining the said bond, considering that the amount of the monetary judgment, Six Hundred
Thirty-Three U.S. Dollars and Sixteen Cents (US$633.16), is relatively miniscule. It is not even
expected that Sameer itself expends from its own funds the entire amount of the monetary
judgment for the appeal bond. . . . The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal
is evident from the afore quoted provision that the appeal may be perfected only upon the
posting of cash or surety bond. It is not an excuse that the over P2 million award is too much for
a small business enterprise, like the petitioner company, to shoulder. The law does not require
its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually
paid should the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for
the premium for such bond. Cost against the petitioner.

Crewlink vs Editha Teringtering

FACTS: Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in

behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death benefits,
benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages, and attorneys fees. Editha alleged that her
husband entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink, had medical
examinations and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001, Jacinto died due to drowning.
Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed that the fact Jacinto

died during the term of his contract and while still on board is enough for her to claim for
compensation. She asserted that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a result
of mental disorder. Crewlink, on the other hand, claimed that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice.
He was just saved the 1st time. Hence, it is a clear manifestation that it was Jacintos will to jump
off the 2nd time. The Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Labor
Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract
of employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his
deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to
him.Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter however the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC

Issue:
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A
DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO
THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER
AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality unless there is a showing of
grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
utter disregard of the evidence on record.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but was
deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his second
attempt that caused his death.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is
provided that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer
can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.
(Emphasis ours)
Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the
effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment
makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is
not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the
seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was
attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile,
respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was suffering from a mental
disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's
insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start.
Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not
necessarily equate to mental disorder.

People vs Comlia pdf

People vs Jamilosa
in 1996,Jamilosa representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and
deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants,
namely, Haide R. Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work
or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center without first
obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled
departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant who was supposed
to be with them in the flight failed to show up and his whereabouts is unknown.
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in large scale
The respondent avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyobd reasonable doubt and
its failure to present receipts.

Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and categorical narration of each
complainant as to how they were recruited by accused who had received some amounts from
them for the processing of their papers. Want of receipts is not fatal to the prosecutions
case, for as long as it has been shown, as in this case, that accused had engaged in
prohibited recruitment. That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment, is shown in the Certification issued by POEA.
Issue:
w/n the RTC erred in convictiong the accused of illegal recruitment in large scale sepite
the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt by not presenting
receipts and relying only in oral testimonies.
Held:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. x x x
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.14 Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.15
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove
three (3) essential elements,
(1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code
(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers;

(3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.16
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by
appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from
criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the
"services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee
employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of
Joseph Jamilosa for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8042 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby ordered to refund to each
of the complaining witnesses the peso equivalent of US$300.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Datuman vs first cosmoppolitan

Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc.
recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work as saleslady in Bahrain with a salary of 370
dollars for 1 year as approved by POEA. On the same year, the petitioner was deployed.
However, her employer took her passport was forced to work as a domestic helper with 100
dollars salary and compelled her to sign another contract. she continued working against her
will. Worse, she even worked without compensation. In May 1993, she was able to finally return
to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department.5
On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding respondent
liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to pay petitioner.
Issue:

On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:
Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. - Every applicant for license to operate
a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application
together with the following requirements:
(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and
liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract;
including but not limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and
repatriation. (emphasis supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint and
solidary liability with the employer.19 This Court has, time and again, ruled that private
employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.20 This joint and solidary
liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure
the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.21 This is in line
with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote,23 we held that the subsequently
executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which
reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is against our
existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement cannot supersede the terms of
the standard employment contract approved by the POEA.
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee our
overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fide employers.
Local agencies should never allow themselves to be instruments of exploitation or oppression of
their compatriots at the hands of foreign employers. Indeed, being the ones who profit most
from the exodus of Filipino workers to find greener pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to
ensure the welfare of the very people that keep their industry alive.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification with respect to the award of salary
differentials, which should be granted for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May
1993 to April 1994.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS HU
Nenita Hu is the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. a land-based recruitment agency duly licensed by the POEA to engage in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers abroad. Ethel Genoves, on the other hand, worked as a consultant and marketing officer of
Brighturn. Aside from her stint at Brighturn, she was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service, another recruitment agency. Brighturn
was authorized to recruit, process, and deploy land-based workers for the period of 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001.
Genoves and Hu were charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale following the complaint from 6 people that they promised the latter
employment/job placement abroad and collected fees from them. However, when the job placements never materialized, the complainants
demanded that the money they gave as placement fees be returned to them. Hu was not able to refund the same.
Four of these complainants were promised employment during the validity of Brighturns license. Garcia applied on April 2002, when
Brighturns license had already expired. She was referred to Best One, another recruitment agency, but her placement fee was paid with
Brighturn.
For her defense, Hu cited that the receipts that the complainants showed her were issued by Riverland. She denied knowing Genoves.
W/N Hu was engaged in recruitment in large scale.
Held:
NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons
whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is
necessary that there is a sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal recruitment was committed against three or more persons. The illegal
recruitment was committed against only one person: Garcia, because Hu referred Garcia to another agency without the license or authority to do
so. Illegal recruitment cannot successfully attach to the allegations of the others since they testified that they accomplished their pre-employment
requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to October of the same year, a period wherein Brighturns license to engage in recruitment
and placement was still in full force and effect.However, failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not
absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she collected from the complainants. Neither does her acquittal herein exempt her from
subsequent criminal prosecution for estafa provided that deceit, which is an essential element of estafa, be proven by the prosecution.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two
elements concur, with the addition of a third elementthe recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or
bureau, is included in recruitment.The absence of receipts in the case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is
not fatal to the prosecutions case. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible and testimonial evidence that the appellant had
engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well justified.
Obiter:
Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.

Villar vs People
In January 1993, Rosario Villar and Dolores Placa represented to Nila Panilag that they would be able to find her a job abroad and obtained from
the latter P6,500 as placement fee, but they did not have any license or authority to do so. An Information was filed against Villar and Placa with
the title designating their offense under RA 8042. In 2002, after the trial, the RTC held Villar liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under
the Labor Code.
Villar appealed to the CA, which found that Villar should have only been charged under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and not under RA 8042.
It then held that Villar was liable under Article 38 of the Labor Code, in relation to Article 13(b) and Article 39 of the same Code. It then
affirmed the trial courts decision.
Villar appealed, claiming that the CA failed to consider that RA 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and the decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.
Issue:
W/N RA 8042 was retroactively used as basis for filing a criminal action against Villar for illegal recruitment.
W/N Villar is guilty of illegal recruitment.
Under which law should Villar be held accountable?
W/N RA 8042 was applied retroactively in Villars case.

Held
NO. Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that erroneously designated the offense as covered by RA 8042, but alleged in its body
acts which are punishable under the Labor Code. As it was proven that she had committed the acts she was charged with, she was properly
convicted under the Labor Code, and not under RA 8042.
YES. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had performed the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the Information.
THE LABOR CODE. A criminal act is punishable under the laws in force at the time of its commission. Thus, Villar can only be charged and
found guilty under the Labor Code which was in force in 1993 when the acts attributed to her were committed.
NO. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court give RA 8042 a retroactive application because both courts passed upon Villars case only
under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court did not violate the prohibition against ex post
facto law nor involved a retroactive application of RA 8042 in any way.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law
alleged to have been violated, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of the information, in the manner stated, the then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.