PAUL LICHTENSTERN, MAR 2014

Critically discuss Kants views regarding the relations between

freedom, autonomy and moral obligation
Emmanuel Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is split into two clearly distinct
sections, the separation created towards the end of Chapter 2 by a marked change in subject. The
first part of the work concerns itself solely with moral obligation and duty, outlining formulations
of the categorical imperative, the instruction according to which all rational agents should live. The
second discusses the nature of those agents themselves: are they autonomous, do they have
freedom, if so of what kind, and so on. In what way is the first relevant to the second, and how can
the second be said to justify the first? If links are made, how accurate are they, and are they
necessary? Is the Groundwork even structured well at all?
The obvious place to start is the relationship between moral obligation and freedom, as this is the
crucial question, the answer to which determines the validity of the relationship between the two
parts, and, on one reading, the strength of the argument as a whole. However, I choose first to
outline a simpler comparison, that between freedom and autonomy. Indeed, in my view it is as
simple as can be, as I define them as practically synonymous. The crucial evidence comes at the
very opening of Chapter 3, and can be formulated in the following four step syllogism, the content
of which I will here try to justify:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

Autonomy = Freedom of the will

Freedom of the will = positive freedom
Positive freedom = negative freedom = freedom
Therefore, autonomy = freedom

Kant says what else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will
to be a law to itself. It seems, then, that point (i) is explicitly stated; the autonomous individual is a
law to herself, unlike the heteronomous individual whose actions are determined by external causal
factors, similarly the free will is the will with an ability to rationalise independently, make its own
decisions, be held morally responsible, and so on. The two are alike. Point (ii) is the most simple to
prove, it is merely a formality to show that the two terms are used interchangeably in the
consideration of what positive freedom is. Actions either have grounding in rationality (are a
product of the will) or have no such grounding at all (and are founded on merely causal
determined desires or inclination); the first kind is positive freedom, it also acts as a definition for
freedom of the will. It could be that we have the possibility for non-rational freedom, in which case
positive freedom would entail more than just freedom of the will. But that isnt the case.
The most commonly disputed point is (iii), that positive and negative freedom are alike. First,
perhaps a slight alteration is necessary. I am not claiming that they have identical definitions, we
can make a clear distinction between the meaning of positive and negative freedom. I am merely
claiming that one necessitates the other; any scenario that can correctly be described as negatively
free in the Kantian sense must also be positively free. Negative freedom is a state of freedom from
interference, in which there is some element that exists independently of foreign causes
determining it; positive freedom, as we have just discovered is the property of the will to be a law
to itself. Here is my contention: in order for negative freedom to exist, there must be something
that lies outside the causal process of nature. According to Kant, the only thing this can be is the

1|Page

PAUL LICHTENSTERN, MAR 2014

will, the product instead of rationality. Therefore negative freedom necessitates the existence of a
free will, which Kant shows later is equal to an autonomous will, itself making decisions for itself.
Kant seems himself to admit this relationship: *negative freedom+ leads to a positive conception
which is so much the more full and fruitful. The leads to implies inevitability, it could not really
lead to anything else. For if there was no autonomy, no positive freedom, then there would be no
element not subject to natural causality, no negative freedom. And taking freedom to encompass
both positive and negative, and thus be equal to the two, I can equate freedom and autonomy as
the same.
The links between moral obligation and freedom, and that between moral obligation and
autonomy, are therefore one and the same, and I shall discuss them as such now. On one reading,
the first part of Groundwork treats autonomy/freedom as an unspoken conditional. All Kants
arguments about good will, duty and imperatives could be prefaced with if we are free, then
Thus the second part is vital, intended to validate the conditional claim. We establish that morality
lies in rationality, but to be rational you have to be autonomous as opposed to heteronomous, you
have to be able to deliberate freely over choices, you cannot be determined by causal impulses,
you must have freedom. Thus, the first part of Groundwork necessitates the existence of free will,
and the second part makes the case for it.
However, if this view is correct, Kants arguments in the first part are dangerously unstable.
Groundwork is essentially a basis for a new theory of morality that Kant wants to advocate, and the
first part that we have discussed, in which he outlines this theory of imperatives, takes up the bulk
of the text. To make this entire body of work contingent on the fact that we are free, and then, in
analysing freedom, to come up short and conclude that we cannot know for certain, seems bizarre.
But what other options are there? Any other interpretation of the relationship between moral
obligation and freedom seems forced; for freedom not to be a necessity would both weaken the
moral arguments, and render the third chapter of the work utterly out of place. Perhaps we could
draw on Kants metaphysical distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. The will
exists in the noumenal world of thing-in-themselves about which we can never have any
knowledge, so freedom can be neither proved nor disproved. Instead, what is important, is that
agents live as though they have such freedom, because they will then be engaging in the rational
process that Kant thinks is the centre of morality. However, this view too seems problematic. For
Kant must maintain that it is our ability to rationalise well that ensures every rational agent will
arrive at the same formulations of the categorical imperatives, will deem the same actions morally
just or unjust. If we are not actually rationalising, however, or if our rationality is determined
causally independent of us, then there is no reason to suggest we will reach the right conclusion,
and certainly no reason to hold us morally responsible for the decisions we do reach. It therefore
seems that Kants moral theory must be based on a strong defence of freedom which the
Groundwork, unfortunately, fails to provide.
The relationship between obligation and freedom has a seemingly unpleasant implication that
warrants examination. If morality is based on rationality, and rationality on freedom, whenever an
agent acts without rationality they are also acting without freedom. Of course, if the agent is not
free she cannot be held morally responsible. This sets up the following view (that Kant seems
happy to accept, but most of us find intuitively problematic): no rational agent is ever responsible
when they commit an evil act. Put a different way if (a) an agent is only responsible for

2|Page

PAUL LICHTENSTERN, MAR 2014

autonomous/freely committed acts; (b) such acts are fully rational; (c) rational acts are by definition
good (because anyone will rationalise the same maxims). Why is this so challenging, and how can
Kant respond?
Take an example of a bad action: you have an impulsive desire to push a stranger in front of a
train, and you act on your desire, killing him. Our intuitions suggest that you (a) are responsible for
the action, and (b), the action is bad. However, according to the relationship we have just
discovered between obligation and freedom, neither intuition is correct. It was a desire led action,
thus determined by natural causes, and not a product of your rationality. Because of this, an action
can be neither bad (because only rational actions are moral) nor can you be responsible (for you
are only responsible for autonomous acts of will, not heteronomous, caused actions). The obvious
response is that surely, to some extent, the agent rationally decided to follow the instinctive desire,
and is therefore still responsible? However, it seems that similar scenarios could be stipulated in
which there is clearly no involvement of rationality, yet we still want to call the action bad. The
problem remains.
It seems to me the best Kantian explanations is still problematic. Kant might say, perhaps it is an
immoral act because the agent did use her rationality in committing the bad act, but incorrectly
deduced the maxim, and thus acted on a maxim that was invalid. This seems a poor response for
Kant to make. For an agent to incorrectly deduce the maxim that it is good to push innocent
people in front of trains whenever you desire to, is a pretty drastic failure at rationalising the
correct maxim (a clear case of contradiction in will, nobody would want to live in that world, as well
as treating the person as a means to satisfy your desire, nothing more). However, it is important for
Kant that he can argue that we are all good at rationality. His theory of the imperatives is a
practical suggestion for a system of morality we could use; if it turns out that only the most
intelligent elite of society can rationalise successfully, then his theory will fail to be useful to society
as a whole. This is another point on which Kants view is often challenged, and therefore not one
he would want to give up; the explanation of failure to rationalise is therefore inadequate.
Kants morality seems to be heavily dependent on his metaphysics. Indeed, the whole work is built
conditionally: we are moral if we are rational, we are rational if we are autonomous, and we are
autonomous if we have freedom. As such, there are many problems, such as the problem of evil
discussed above, that have unfortunate implications for the entirety of the text. For the
sympathetic Kantian, perhaps a challenge is to try to separate the morality from the more abstract
metaphysical claims. If one accepted a compatibilist account of free will, for example, maybe you
could accept the claims about moral obligation and rationality, without needing to prove actual
autonomy exists. (Although it is dubious as to whether, if our rationality is determined, we will all
arrive at the same conclusions). There are some appealing elements to Kantian philosophy, but as
presented in the Groundwork it seems they are a packaged in a heavily reliant structure which
commits a supporter to accept the entire bundle of ideas. And some of these are extremely
problematic.

1840 words

3|Page