3)

AlongwiththeCF,theSFisoneofthemaininstrumentsintheEUregionalpolicy.
Themainobjectiveofthispolicyistonarrowthedevelopmentdisparitiesamongregionsand
MemberStates.Or,inotherwords,toenhanceEconomicandSocialCohesionbetween
them.

4)

Fourprinciplesrulethispolicy:
theprincipleofadditionalitystatesthatEUresourcesmustgodirectlytotheregions
ratherthannationaltreasuries
theprincipleofpartnershipstatesthatthepolicyshouldbeimplementedbyaclose
cooperationbtwtheCommission,theNat.Govtsandregionalauthorities
theprincipleofpartnershipstatesthatfundingshouldbedeliverbymultiannual
developmentprogrammes
Andthetheprincipleofconcentrationstatesthatareconcentratedinaseriesof
priorityobjectives

5)

Objective1:promotedevelopmentandstructuraladjustmentinregionsthathaveapercapita
GDPbelow75%oftheEUaverage.

Objective2:combatstructuraladjustmentinregionswitheconomicsectorsfacingmajor
change,ruralareasinseriousdecline,anddeprivedurbanareas.

Objective3:modernizehumanresourcesinfrastructure,suchaseducationandtraining
systems(forregionsnotcoveredinobj.1y2)

6)

ThreefundsconstitutestheSF,theseare:1,2and3
TogetanideaofthemagnitudeoftheseFunds,forthe20072013period,theSD(278billion
)andtheCohesionFund(70billion)andbothofthemrepresentedthe35%ofthe
Communitybudget.
Itsthesecondlargestbudgetitem.


7)

Soastheauthorsdidonthepaper,Iwilltrytoexposethereasonswhysuchapowerful
financialinstrumentastheSFisnoteffectiveinachievingitsstatedaims.

8)
Thefirstissuetolookatistheformulation:

ThetermCohesionemergesinlegalandofficialdocumentsasahighlyambiguousconcept.
Atfirst,TheSingleEuropeanAct(1987)setthebasisfortheoverhauloftheStructuralFunds
in1988.
Then,theMaastrichtTreaty(1992)includeeconomicandsocialcohesionasoneofthe
Unionspriorities,alongsidetheSingleMarketandtheEMU.But,whileitsetouttheconcept
ofconvergenceofeconomicperformance,forthepurposesoftheEMU,ononehand,and
economicandsocialcohesion,ontheother,itleftopenthequestionoftheinterfacebetween
the2.
Thesecondbulletisreferredtotheambiguityofhow,withintheconceptofec.andsoc.
cohesion,theeconomicandsocialaspectsrelatetoeachother.
Andthethirdbulletisrelatedtothequestionofwhobenefits?
TheTreatyisalsounclearastotheterritoriallevelatwhichthegoalofpromotingcohesion
shouldbepursued.
Advancingonetheconclusion,theauthorssuggestthatthisisnotincidental,andthata
strongcasecanbemadethattheinstrumentstopursuecohesionbetweentheregionswere,
infact,createdasinterstatetransfermechanismsinelaboratedisguise.

9)

Thesecondissueisthecrationofthebudget:

CohesionpolicyismadethroughatriangularinteractionbetweentheCouncil,theCommision
andtheregionalauthorities.
ButdecisionsconcerningfinancialdistributionaretakenattheleveloftheEuropeanCouncil
Highleveldiplomacyproducesanoutcomewherebythebudgetaryallocationsperseare
oftenmoreimportantthandefiningthenatureoftheproblemtobeaddressed.
Whilemanypolicyareascanbedescribedasasetofinstitutionslookingforfunding,
cohesionpolicyisfundinglookingforasetofinstitutions
Whythisisthecase?Because,accordingtotheauthors,thisisalegacyofthe19868period
whenthecohesionpolicywaspresentedasaninterventionistcounterbalancetotheSingle
Market.TherewerefivememberstatesthatwerereluctanttoagreetheSingleMarketwithout
afinancialcommitmenttostrongercohesion.
Theseleadtothedecision,atBrusselsEuropeanCouncilof1988,ofdoublingtheSF
resources.

10)
Thethirdproblemtheauthorspointout,andprobablythemoreimportantone,ishowthe
Cohesionpolicyidentifiesthedisparitiesbetweentheregions.Theindicatorusedtothese
purposeistheGDPpercapita.
Asyoumayknow,GDPpercapitaisdefinedastheTotalvalueofallmarketandpublic
sectorgoodsandservicesthatthosewhoworkinaparticularareaproduce
Todelimittheseareas,orthesegeographicalunitsonanalysis,theNUTSlevelsareused
TheNUTScategoriescorrespondtoadministrativeratherthaneconomicentities,leadingto
policyanomalies.
ThenextfourbulletsarerelatedtoanincreaseinGDPpercapitathatmaynotleadtoa
cohesionenhancement:
Culturalpattern,whatclassifiesashiddenwork,asnonactivepopulation,voluntarywork
andsoon.
AnotherwayofGDPpercapitatoincreaseisbycriminalprofitschanneledintoregular
economy
Also,GDPpercapitacanshiftowed(OUD)tomigration.Forexample:outmigrationofalow
productivitylaborforce.
Finally,theproductivityofanareacanrisewithoutacorrespondingincreaseinthevolumeof
demandandoutput.Ifthishappenswithoutaninternalredistributivemechanism,theresult
willbeamorepolarizedsociety
Sothen,WhyGDPpercapita?1)fittedeasilyintothedominantparadigmofterritorial
integrationofthe1980sand2)avoidedopeningapoliticalPandorasboxonalternative
definitionsofdisparity
ThechoiceoftheGDPindicatorofferedtheadvantageofalowintellectualandpoliticalcost.

11)
Thefourthissueisrelatedtotheimplementationofthepolicy.
Onceintergovernmentalbargaininghasallocatedthebudgettothevariousmemberstates
andregion,whattheauthorsobserveisthatSFexhibitsthefeaturesofapatronagebasedor
clientelisticdistributivepolicyor,inotherwords,aporkbarrellogic:Appropriationof
governmentspendingforlocalizedprojectssecuredsolelyorprimarilytobringmoneytoa
representative'sdistrict.
Wecanidentify3consequencesoftheselogic:
First,afeedbackeffectofcohesionpolicythatisthecreationofitsownsupportnetworksthat
increasesthecostofanyreformand,itcontributestomaintainofthestatusquo
Second,byadisaggregationofthestakesallactorsinthepartnershipcanbecomewinners,
andadditionalactorscomingontothescenecanbeaccommodated
PrioritieswithintheSFprogrammesaresufficientlybroadandflexibletosatisfydiverse
appetitesduringtheimplementation.
Andthethirdandmostproblematicconsequenceisthatthislogicgivesanadvantageto
stronglyorganizedgroupswithintheregion.Lowincomegroups,whichtendtobeless
integratedsocially,willfacetheconsiderablebarrieroforganizingcollectiveactionbefore
beingabletogainaccesstopartnershipandbecomebeneficiaries.increasesdisparities


12)

Alsoattheimplementationstage,butinthiscasewithintheregions,theauthorsfound
disturbingevidencethispolicyincreasingthedisparities.
Forthedisadvantagegroups,cohesionpolicyshouldfollowatrickledowneffectof
economicgrowth.But,suchaneffectcannotbetakenforgrantedand,evenwhenitoccurs,it
canbeaccompaniedbywideningincomegaps.

ConsiderObjective1regionat70%ofEUaverageincome,composedoftwoequallysized
groupswitharespectiveincomeof50and90%.Asociallyuniform10%increasewouldbring
theaverageincometo77%.Group1willobtainanincomeof55%andGroup2anincomeof
99%,increasingtheabsolutegapbetweenthem.

Thiswasthecaseinmanyareas,wheretherelativeprosperouszoneswithintheregionand
strongergroupsonthelabormarketwheretheprimebeneficiaries,therebyincreasingthe
disparitieswithineacharea.

13)

SUPRA:cohesionpolicyoriginatesfromthelogicofintergovernmentalredistributive
bargainingwithintheframeworkofmarketliberalization.
NAT:Inasubsequentstage,centralgovernmentsplayakeyroleinallocatingtheirbudgetto
thevariouseligibleareas
SUBNAT:Oncethecohesionbudgetisinplaceforamultiannualperiod,however,amainly
distributivetypeofpolicydevelopsintheregions,favoringwellorganizedgroups.

14)
Butauthorsfoundsomeevidenceofanincreasedroleforsubnationalactors.
InananattemptoftheEUCommissiontomovethepolicyagendatowardsanenhanced
recognitionoflocaldeprivation.
Threedevelopmentsstandout:
1)
2)
3)
Thisincreaseofthelocaldimensionleadstotwotypesofchanges:
1)Astructuralchange:MeaningthatasCitiesarefacingnewopportunitiestheyarebecoming
increasinglyresponsibleforreproducingthesamedisparitiesatamicrolevel.
2)Aagencyrelatedchange:Theincreasingpoliticalimportanceoflocalofficeholderswould
leadquitenaturallytothembypassingnationaladministrationsandgaininfluencein
Europeanpolicymaking.

15)However,theauthorsinterpretthisreactionasaGarbagecanmodelofpolicymaking.
Thesemodelisbasedonthenotionthatorganizationstendtoproducemany"solutions"
whicharediscardedduetoalackofappropriateproblems.Howeverproblemsmayeventually
ariseforwhichasearchofthegarbagemightyieldfittingsolutions.

Therefore,actorswithintheCommissionhavetriedtousetheexistinglogicofterritorial
cohesionpolicytotackletheparallelproblemofdisparitiesinindividuallivingstandards,
ratherthanseekingtodesignanewsolutionforthelatter.

ThewaytheEUCommissionreacts,aswellasbeingaffectedbytheconstraintsofthe
Europeangovernancestructure,isdirectlyrelatedtotheambiguousnatureofthecohesion
policyitself.
Moreover,ininterpretingthehesitancyoftheCommissionsmovetowardstargetinglocal
deprivation,oneshouldalsoconsiderthelimitsonitscapacitytointerveneintheutilizationof
StructuralFundsbehindtheoutershellofthememberstates.

16)

1)itfacilitatesthepursuitofdistributiveobjectivesintheformofapolicythatshould
ultimatelybeconcernedwithredistributionandequality.
2)Althoughredistributiveconcernshavebecomemoreapparentoverrecentyears,the
Commissionmodifieditsproposalsforcohesionpolicyatthemarginonly,andregionalGDP
percapitaremainscentralinthepolicystructure.
3)Aconflictualpoliciesofusandthem,BmemberstatesagainstexpandedEUbudgetand
competences,CRedistributioninvolvesissuesthatarenotsalientinBrussels,DEUpolitics
onlyallowincrementalchange
4)AsthelogicofStructuralFundimplementationfavourscertainorganizedactors,andinthe
absenceofabenigntrickledowneffect,nowinwinsituationappearsintheregions.
Cohesionpolicywithinregionscanimplyazerosumgame,andaslongastheEUisunable
toaddressthiscohesiondecit,thedemocraticdecitwillpersistaswell,sincedisadvantaged
groupswillperceivenogainsintheUnionssolidaritymechanism.