God and Omnispatiality

God and Omnispatiality
Author(s): Ishtiyaque Haji

Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 99-108
Published by: Springer
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Philosophyof Religion 25: 99-108 (1989)

1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers.Printedin the Netherlands
God and omnispatiality
ISHTIYAQUE HAJI
Departmentof Philosophy, Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst,MA 01003
In a recent piece Paul Helm argues, amongst other things, that the view
that God is an individual in space is replete with difficulties.1 Either
on its own or in conjunction with some other supposedly non-controversial claims, this view entails, according to Helm, each of the following: (i) God is a scattered object; (ii) God cannot be wholly present
in two places at once; (iii) God has proper parts and is therefore not
simple as traditionally conceived and (iv) God cannot occupy all space
and so is finite. I believe Helm is mistaken in thinking that (i), (iii),
and (iv) are entailments of the view in question. He is not similarly
mistaken about (ii), but (ii), I think, is innocuous. At least that is
what I wish to argue in this paper. I proceed as follows. Beginning
with a thesis that Helm seems to accept, namely, that God is omnispatial, I first argue that if this thesis is true, then God cannot be a
finite object. But the problems Helm discusses in relation to God's
being an individual in space seem only to arise on the assumption that
God is such an object. It cannot then both be the case that God is
omnispatial and that God's spacefulness entails, with the one exception, what Helm claims it does.
(1)
1.0
Assume that God is omnipresent. If a being is omnipresent, then there
is no place where it is not. Better still, if any place is a place where an
entity can be at a given time, then an omnipresent being is at that
place at that time. If we further assume that God is not essentially
non-spatial, then, given the first assumption, God is everywhere in
100
space. Call the thesis that God is everywhere in space the "omnispatial"
thesis (OMS). OMS can be clarified further by first disambiguatingthe
"spatial" thesis (S), the thesis that God is in space. S is ambiguous
between
SI : God occupies space, or takes up space, and
S2: God has a location in space.
As Fred Feldman explains,
Even though [an unextended object] takes up no space, still it may
be located at a certain spot in space ... Consider a point such as the
midway point between New York and Los Angeles. Since that is just
a point, it takes up no space, yet it surely has a location. An even
more obvious case can be constructed. Draw a circle on a blackboard.
That circle has a center. The center is an unextended point, but it
has a location.2
Anything that occupies or takes up space has a location in space. But
a thing that has a location in space need not occupy space since it may
have no extension.
S's ambiguity infects OMS. We may distinguish between
OMS1: God is omnispatial = df. at each moment of his existence
God occupies all the places in the universe that can be occupied, and
OMS2: God is omnispatial = df. at each moment of his existence
God is located at every spot in space where he can be located.
Since Helm seems to construe the spatial thesis in the way described by
SI, I shall accordingly adopt OMS1 as our interpretation of the omnispatial thesis.3
1.1
What is the link, if any, between being omnispatial and being some kind
of physical entity? Consider the following argument:
101
1. If God is omnispatial, then at any given time there is no place

God fails to occupy.
2. If God is an extended object, then at any given time there is a
place God fails to occupy.
3. Therefore, it is not the case both that God is omnispatial and that
God is an extended object.4
The argument may be rejected at line (2). God may be a very large
body or object, so large that he occupies every place it is possible to
occupy. In fact, if God is omnispatial, then God is such an object. It
will be helpful to introduce some terminology:
(1) X is a superbody = df. X is an object such that it is not the case
that X fails to occupy any place that can be occupied at a given
time.
A superbody need not be God. But God, if omnispatial, could be a
superbody. Of course if the property of being superbodily or being
superbody-like is identical to that of being omnispatial, then God, if
omnispatial, must be a superbody. If definition (1) adequately captures
the notion of being an entity as large as the universe saturating all of
space, then it seems to me that the two properties are identical. I will
not, however, foreclose this issue and will simply endorse the more
cautious claim that if an entity is omnispatial, then it could be a superbody. Our next item of terminology is this:
(2) X is a finite body = df. at a given time X occupies some but not
all places in space that can be occupied at that time.
The problem with the argument just considered, then, is that if God is
a superbody, line (2) is false.
In light of this problem, the argument may be modified:
1. If God is omnispatial, then at any given time there is no place
2. If God is a finite object, then at any given time there is a place
3. Therefore, it is not the case both that God is omnispatial and God
is a finite object.
102
This argument, it seems to me, is sound.

We may now draw the following conclusions: If God is omnispatial,
then God cannot be a finite body.5 Being omnispatial, though, does not
preclude God from being a superbody.
(2)
2.1
Helm argues that spatial thesis SI has a number of troubling consequences, consequences that cast doubt on the thesis itself. The first of
these in the order they are presented is that if SI is true, then God is a
scattered object:
One thing [SI ] seems to mean is that God has some spatial perspective, as he has some temporal perspective if he is in time. That is to
say God will be positioned in space and know things from some
spatial perspective or other ... To say that God must have some
spatial perspective it does not follow that he has only one spatial
perspective at once. Yet we must not be misled by the analogy of a
person in a control room watching a series of television screens relaying pictures from differently positioned cameras. The cameras
each have a different spatial perspective, but the person in the control room has one perspective. To have more than one perspective
in the sense that interests us must be to have more than one position - in effect be a scattered object.6
Assume SI were true. Then I take it that it would not be the mere
fact that God would have some spatial perspective that would cause a
worry. Rather it would be God's having to be a scattered object that
would be the source of concern.7 What is the connection between
God's having some spatial perspective and his being a scattered object?
Unfortunately, Helm does not make this explicitly clear. Perhaps his
thought is this:
1. God is omnispatial.
2. If God is omnispatial, then God has multiple spatial perspectives.
3. If God has multiple spatial perspectives, then it is possible that at
a given time God is able to occupy more than one position in
space.
103
4. If it is possible that at a given time God is able to occupy more

than one position in space, God is a scattered object.
5. Therefore, if God is omnispatial, then God is a scattered object.
Alternatively, Helm's line of reasoning may be even simpler amounting
to this:
1. God is omnispatial.
2. If God is omnispatial, then at a given time God occupies more
than one position in space.
3. If at a given time God occupies more than one position in space,
then God is a scattered object.
4. Therefore, if God is omnispatial, then God is a scattered object.
Call these arguments the "complex argument" and the "simple argument" respectively.
Neither of these arguments is compelling. Suppose God is omnispatial. Then God could be a superbody. If God is a superbody, line
(2) of the simple argument is false. It is false on the assumption suggested by the last sentence of the passage just cited that in order for
an entity to occupy more than one position in space at a given time, it
must be able to occupy more than one place in space at that time. If
we accept this assumption, then it is not possible that a superbody
occupy more than one position in space at a given time, as it is not
possible for such a body to be in more than one place at a given time.
This is not possible since at every moment of its existence, a superbody
occupies whatever available place in space there is. Thus at each moment of its existence there is no place other than the place it is that a
superbody can occupy. If God is a superbody and if a superbody is
unable to occupy more than one position in space at a given time,
then, given line (3) of the complex argument, it is not possible for
God to have multiple spatial perspectives. If this is in turn not possible, then on the assumption that God is an omnispatial superbody,
line (2) of the complex argument also fails.
The kind of problem I have described would not arise were God an
omnispatial but finite object. For at any given time of its existence
there is a place in space other than the place at which it then is where
a finite object could be. This line of defense, however, is unavailable
to Helm since God's being omnispatial is incompatible with his being
a finite body.
104
Nor is it to any avail to appeal to scattered objects. For either a

scattered object is extended or it is not. If it is not, then it fails to
occupy any position in space, in which case both arguments collapse.
If it is, it is either an object that is finite and scattered or it is a scattered superbody. A scattered superbody seems to be an impossibility,
unless such an entity just is a superbody. In that case matters have not
been advanced. What about a finite and scattered object? If God is
omnispatial, he cannot be a finite object and so he cannot be a finite
object that is scattered.
I conclude that neither the complex nor the simple argument is defensible.
2.2
As a second consequence of spatial thesis SI Helm claims that if it is
true, then
... God cannot be wholly present at two or more separated places at
once. It seems to be a conceptual truth about any individual in space
that it cannot be wholly present in two places at once.8
I must confess I am not entirely clear why God's inability, if such is the
case, to be wholly present at two different places at once is meant to
be worrisome. Perhaps the idea is that such an inability would compromise God's omnipotence - it would imply that God's power is limited.
This, however, would not be convincing if it is true, as Helm seems to
believe, that it is not possible for any individual in space - superbody
or not - to be wholly present in two places at once. Such logical impossibility cannot be used in any cogent fashion as a basis for impugning God's power. Alternatively, it may be thought that God's inability
to be in two different places at once calls into question God's very
omnispatiality. But this, it seems, would be an error as well. For if
spatial thesis SI is true, then it seems that God must either be a finite
object or a superbody. If God were a superbody, then as explained in
the previous section he could not be present and so not be wholly
present at two separated places at once. In that case, God's inability
to be wholly present at two separated places at once would be compatible with his being omnispatial, since being a superbody is com-
105
patible with being omnispatial. Suppose, on the other hand, that God
were a finite object. It would then be true that he could not be wholly
present at two separated places at once. This truth though could not in
any way, whatever this way, cast doubt on God's omnispatiality. For if
God were a finite object, he could not be omnispatial.
In summary, I believe Helm is right in contending that spatial thesis
SI entails that God cannot be wholly present at two separated places
at once. Neither a finite body nor a superbody could be so present.
But I see no compelling reason why this entailment is disturbing.
2.3
The third supposed consequence of spatial thesis S 1 Helm discusses is
this: If SI is true and
... if God is capable of being at two places at once, then God is
spatially divisible. For if God can be at two places at once, though
not wholly at two places at once, then it would seem to follow that
he can only be in two or more places at once by having a part of him
in one place and a part of him in each of the other places where he
is. Hence it seems to follow that God has parts, proper parts that is,
and is not simple, as has traditionally been thought.9
If SI is true, then either God is a superbody or God is a finite body.
If either, God is incapable of being at two different places at once,
and so Helm's worry fails to arise.
A more charitable interpretation of Helm's concern is this: If SI is
true and if God is omnispatial, then God is spatially divisible. His being
spatially divisible would apparently follow from similar reasoning as
outlined in the passage above.
If God were a superbody, though, he could not possibly be in more
than two places at once. In this case even if God were omnispatial and
so SI were true it would not follow - at least not by Helm's reasoning
- that God would be spatially divisible. Suppose, alternatively, that
God were a finite body. Then it seems it would be true that if somehow - it does not matter how - God could be at two places at once,
though not wholly at two places at once, God would have proper
parts and so not be simple. But on this second alternative, God could
not possibly be omnispatial. It cannot therefore be the case both that
106
God is omnispatial and that he is a finite entity with proper parts.

2.4
Finally, Helm tells us that
... the main difficulty with supposing that God is an individual in
space, at least on the reasons considered earlier, can be expressed as
follows. Suppose God says
(24)
Elijah is here.
Suppose further the truth of the doctrine we might call the omnispatiality or spacefulness of God, the doctrine that at any time
God occupies (in some sense) all the spaces in the universe that there
are. It follows from
(25)
God is omnispatial
that
(26)
Of every space at a given time God can truly say both "I
am here" and "I am there."
That is, take any particular place, say the Old Kent Road. Then God
can say, with respect to the Old Kent Road, "I am here" and also,
since he is omnispatial, he can say with respect to the MarbleArch,
"I am there." But given the truth of (24), (26) contradicts it, for
by (26) God can also say, with respect to the place where Elijah is,
(27)
Elijah is there.
Given the truth of (24), (27) cannot be true since an individual who
is here cannot be there ... So God cannot occupy all space. If (24)
is true (25) must be false. 10
The response to this last objection of Helm's is fairly straightforward:
Either God is a superbody or he is not. Suppose he is not. Then there
are two possibilities. Either he is unextended or he is a finite body. If
the former, then he does not take up any space and Helm's objection
fails to arise. If the latter, then he could not be omnispatial. Once
again the objection would fail to arise.
107
Suppose, now, that God is a superbody. Then given what Helm seems
to believe, namely, that to have multiple spatial perspectives an entity
must be able to occupy different positions in space at a given time, a
superbody cannot have multiple spatial perspectives. In order, though,
for (26) to follow from (25), it must be the case that God has multiple spatial perspectives. So if God is a superbody, (25) fails to entail (26) and Helm's objection collapses.
God may be in space. He may also be in space in a grand manner
- he may be omnispatial. His omnispatiality need not perturb the
theist - at least not in the way suggested by Helm.
Bibliography
(1) Paul Helm, God and Spacelessness.In S.M.Cahnand D. Shatz (eds.), ContemporaryPhilosophyof Religion., 99-110. Oxford UniversityPress, 1982.
(2) PaulHelm,Time and Place for God. Sophia 24 (1985):53-55.
(3) MurrayMacBeath,God's Spacelessnessand Timelessness.Sophia 22 (1983):
23-31.
(4) Fred Feldman,A CartesianIntroductionto Philosophy. McGraw-Hill,1986.
(5) GraceM. Dyck, Omnipresenceand Incorporeality.ReligiousStudies 13
(1977):85-91.
Notes
1. See (1), especially Section 3, pp. 107-1 10. 1 am not here concernedwith why
it may be believed God is in space. This is discussedby Helm in the first two
sections of his paper. MurrayMacBeathcomments on some of what Helmhas
to say on this issue in (3). Helm'sresponseto MacBeathis to be found in (2).
2. See (4), p. 187.
3. On page 108 in (1), Helm tells us that
"... the doctrine we might call the omnispatialityor spacefulnessof God
[is] the doctrine that at any time God occupies (in some sense) all the
spacesin the universethat there are."
There are, of course, non-equivalenttheories of space. It is reasonableto expect
that different conceptions of space will lead to different construalsof the spatial
and the omnispatialtheses.
4. I assumethat no entity at a giventime can have incompatibleproperties.
5. A finite object or body need not be corporeal.Nor need a superbody.A superbody, for instance, could be somethinglike an electrical field. It would then
haveextension but not be corporeal.
108
6. See(l), pp. 107-108.

7. It may be that a necessarycondition for an entity to have a spatialperspective
is that it have some sense organs.If so,thenif God has some spatialperspective,
he must be corporeal.CouldGod be a corporealsuperbody?That is an interesting question I am not here preparedto discuss. For some thoughts on omnipresenceand incorporeality,see (5).
8. See(l),p. 108.
9. See(l),p. 108.
10. See (1), pp. 108-109.

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God and Omnispatiality

Author(s): Ishtiyaque Haji

Philosophyof Religion 25: 99-108 (1989)

God and omnispatiality

Departmentof Philosophy, Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst,MA 01003

1. If God is omnispatial, then at any given time there is no place

This argument, it seems to me, is sound.

4. If it is possible that at a given time God is able to occupy more

Nor is it to any avail to appeal to scattered objects. For either a

God is omnispatial and that he is a finite entity with proper parts.

6. See(l), pp. 107-108.

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