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(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
Sec. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions;
3. Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
In the instant case, the claim of attorney's fees by the private respondent in
the amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal cause of action
which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized installation of the
glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount is not
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
3. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT MANDATORY INJUNCTION, IT IS MERELY A
PROVISIONAL REMEDY. Note should be taken, however, that the trial
court had erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatory
injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the complaint.
A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional
because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency
of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is
dependent upon the result of the main action.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for certiorari & prohibition dismissed.
NOTE:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of first instance [now
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said
court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and
void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.
Issue # 1:
Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:
Held: No. Exprop suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP
129 as amended by RA 7691).
- The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't
has complied with the requisites for the taking or property.
- An exprop suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the
value of the land.
Issue # 2:
Whether the dismissal of the first complaint in the MTC amounts to res
judicata?
Held: NO
- Requisites for res judicata
1. Former judgment must be final.
2. Court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties.
3. Judgment is on the merits.
4. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in both actions.
- Since MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata.
Issue # 3:
Whether CA erred when it ignored the RTC's issuance of a writ of
possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint.
Held: NO
- Requisites of immediate entry:
1. filing of a complaint for exprop sufficient in form and substance
2. deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the property's fair market value
based on its current tax declaration.
- Masili complied with both requisites.
- The issue of necessity of the exprop is a matter that should be addressed
by the RTC. If petitioner objects to the necessity, her objection should be
included in her Answer to the complaint.
Issue # 4: Whether or not Masili is guilty of forum shopping?
Held: NO
- Test for determining forum shopping: whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another.
- The earlier case in the MTC had already been dismissed when the second
complaint was filed in the RTC.
- Even if the MTC case was still pending, it will make no difference, because
the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place.
Dispo:
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
5. VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007)
FACTS: Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered
into a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in
Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90 days from
down payment of 50% of the purchase price. A down payment was paid.
Another contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and
Villena also paid the downpayment. Villena faled to install the kitchen
cabinets and deliver the appliances.
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the
amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for
RTCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES, RTC has jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdiction of an
action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the
amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are
actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of
money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,
one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it
is actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a
cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.
An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that
Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the down
payments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the
appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. While
the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts.
Petition DENIED.
6. Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,et al
7.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and
damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents
as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with
damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de
Ungria et al.Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando
Castor, while the rest of the respondents are their legitimate children. The
documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1) the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly
executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and
(2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss
raising, among others that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for
failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending resolution
of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue
prosecuting this case as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to
complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case
is terminated
8. HILARIO vs. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 160384 . April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located
in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon
against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to
possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon
without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite
demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the
property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however,
failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners
were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which
shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion
was denied.
Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him
since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents,
the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property, and that absent any allegation in the complaint
of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered the
refiling of the case in the proper court.
ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be
based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal
Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00
was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by
the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the
assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the
HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action
is an accion reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of
land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not
the market value thereof. [] In the case at bar, the complaint does not
The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC,
including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an
accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to
be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the
RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accion reivindicatoria or
accion publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit
that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of coownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an
action in ejectment against another co-owner?
Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action
against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset
ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership.
The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession
because as co-owner, he also has the right to possess.
9. San Pedro vs. Asdala
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC since the complaint had
asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual
damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injuction against MTC Judge, COnpac and
Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg's application for
preliminary injunction. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC. Hence this
petition.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for
damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be
recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of jurisdiction has already
been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively
taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek
exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to
seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was
denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of
the RTCs lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses,
excluding moral, nominal damages and attorneys fees, which
determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO
Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no
judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of
fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged
jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does
not control the present controversy. What happened in the
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from
the denial of the RTC of the petitioners motion to dismiss. There is no
final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)
13. Samson vs. Daway
G.R. No. 160054-55 | July 21, 2004 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioner:
Manolo P. Samson
Respondents:
Hon. Reynaldo Daway (RTC Quezon City), People of the Philippines, and
Caterpillar, Inc.
Summary:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with a
criminal complaint for unfair competition with the Quezon City RTC because
he sells imitations of Caterpillar products, to the damage and prejudice of
respondent Caterpillar Inc. He filed a motion to suspend arraignment
because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
another civil case. This was denied by the trial court. Next, he also filed a
motion to quash information alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
him. The Supreme Court ruled against him. In criminal/civil cases involving
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of
origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the RTC, as
provided under RA 166 or the Old Trademark Law. Note that at this time,
the IPC was already enacted. However, the IPC did not repeal the
provisions involving jurisdiction, hence, RA 166 as regards jurisdiction is still
good law. Further, there can be no prejudicial question involved in this case.
It is important to note that under unfair competition,
fraud
is the common element. Also, an independent civil action may be filed
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code for fraud. Being an independent civil action,
there can be no prejudicial question.
Facts:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with two
informations for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code
(IPC). The following are the pertinent portions of the informations:
Samson is the owner
Corporation.
of
Manufacturing
NO.
Ratio
Jurisdiction Issue
Under Section 170 of the IPC, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition,
false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand
Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including
criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169
shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction
under existing laws.
The existing law referred to here is Sec. 27 of RA 166 (The OLD
Trademark Law)
It provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court)
Now, Samson is claiming that RA 166 is already repealed by the IPC.
However, this is not so, because:
The repealing clause of the IPC reads that all acts and parts of Acts
inconsistent herewith, more particularly RA 166 (and goes on to cite other
laws), are hereby repealed).
The use of the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith only
means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not
susceptible of harmonization with the IPC.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293.
O
Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly
stated so under Section163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail.
In this case, the IPC and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction
over violationsof intellectual property rights to the RTC.
It should prevail over RA No 7691 (as cited by Samson) which is a general
law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properlylodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of lessthan 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging
from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving
violations of intellectual property rights under the IPC, the Court issued A.M.
No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002designating certain Regional Trial
Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.
On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating
jurisdiction to hearand decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and
Exchange Commission cases inspecific Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Commercial Courts.
Petitioner also cites the case of Mirpuri in arguing that RA 166 was already
repealed totally by the IPC. However, such argument has no merit because
there is no categorical ruling that violation of IP rights is lodged with the
MTC. Also, the mere passing remark in that case was merely
a backgrounderto the enactment of the IPC and cannot
be construed as a pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual
property rights.
Prejudicial Question Issue
Samson failed to substantiate his allegations of prejudicial question.
In any case, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according tolaw, proceed independently of each other.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair
competition under Section168 of the IPC is fraud
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private
respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Petition for Review Issue
According to the Rules, while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60days reckoned from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office.
Hence, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In this case, Samson failed to substantiate his allegations/failed to discharge
the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his
arraignment.
His pleadings and annexes do not show the date of filing of the petition of
review with the SOJ.
14. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus
15. MADRIAN vs. MADRIAN
GR No. 159374
July 12, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were
married on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their
conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and
subsequently to Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch
things up between her and petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their Barangay, but this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of
their children and deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that
petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and
to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of
the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her
duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,
it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then
that he went to Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of
1997) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner
who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and
drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the
fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213
of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two
younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject
to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under
R.A. 8369.
HELD:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA
8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the
SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the
provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129
(the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by
Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.
In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002,
he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial
regions. By giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the
respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack
of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369.
Moreover, under, RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of
habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by the family courts under
said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction
with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
16. TUCP vs. Coscolluela
17. Primero vs. IAC
18. PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG, September
24,1991
Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were
suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola
bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft
against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal
complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the
complaint was dismissed.
Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were
dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result,
they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and decisions mandateed
reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in the Regional Trial
G.R. 149578
Facts:
Petitioner was the widow of Capt. Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by
Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of
the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. His contract officially began on
November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he
assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel
departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of
the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly
shown to be in good health.
During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from
Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was
drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a
slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly
deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992.
When petitioner filed a complaint with the POEA, transferred to the
DOLE, NLRC, the Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. The NLRC, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor commission had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter filed by petitioner.
bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular
courts not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.
2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by
the labor arbiter (whether the monetary award granted by the labor
arbiter has already reached finality).
ISSUES NOT RAISED IN COURTS A QUO CANNOT BE RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL Petitioner contends that the labor
arbiter's monetary award has already reached finality, since private
respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not
raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not
raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points
of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court
of Appeals need not and ordinarily will not be considered by this
Court. Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its
face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to
due process.
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a
question of fact that cannot be entertained in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review
of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.
23. EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest
FACTS:
Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank
and petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under
which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as
Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with
many proposals which the bank approved and made preparations of. He
was also given privileges like car, renovation of the office, and even a trip to
Singapore at the companys expense. However, the petitioner abruptly
resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment
and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank
filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for
damages brought about his abrupt resignation.
financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition
of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected
every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and
elected Chairman of NCLPIs Board of Directors.
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as
Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the
Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new
set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor
reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and
attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who
was then President of NCLPI.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson
filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have
jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsins removal as
EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, holding that her office acquired jurisdiction to arbitrate
and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case an employeremployee relationship.
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NCLPI raised the issue on
whether the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had jurisdiction over the
dispute.
On August 28, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate
officer. The CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether
elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of PD 902-A provided that intracorporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC. However, after
RA8799 took effect, Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of the said law transferred
said jurisdiction to the RTC.
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to
dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65. We cannot
close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established by
evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose
termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiters jurisdiction to rule
upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the
case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to
hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before
any quasi-judicial officer can act. In the context of the present case, the
Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin
brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the
absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the
law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial
delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the
merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of
an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
The petition is dismissed and the CA decision is affirmed.
26. Mangaliang vs. Catubig-Pastoral-SAME Pg. 8
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses
Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal
interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the
defendants properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had
become final and executor, the court issued a writ of execution against
the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of the writ of execution against
the Suretys bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on
the ground that the
same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the
RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA, which was denied. This time, the
surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion for
reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it
filed a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of which placed
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
action where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00.
The Court of First Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case.
The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from
the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE
LACK OF JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law
and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done
in the case. A party cannot invoke a courts jurisdiction and later on deny
it to escape a
penalty.
Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19
but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as
Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed petitioners
of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen
their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house.
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from
Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of
sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house
was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No.
19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the
swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering that Sps.
Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would
be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore, the RTC
ruled:
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the
defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is
Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly
indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The
contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the
parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake,
hence the same need no longer be reformed.
A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said
writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in
theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga
filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for annulment of
judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
ISSUE:
WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case
HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in
numerous cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction
by estoppel, the Court quoted its decision in said case, to wit:
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x
[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy."
Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked
the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue
of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two
years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ
of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to
them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Petition for review is denied.
30. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. V. Eddy Ng Kok Wei
G.R. No. 139791, 12 December 2003, Third Division, (SandovalGutierrez, J.)
Yet while it may be true that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear
the case, the petitioner companys active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held that it is an
undesirable practice for a party participating in proceedings and submitting
its case for decision and then accepting judgment if acceptable, only to
attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if adverse.
FACTS: Eddy Kok Wei purchased from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Co.
a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Kok Wei and Manila Bankers
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intracorporate disputes involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues
that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular
courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.
ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?
HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that
in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of
an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments
of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.
Ostensibly, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of
nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on
more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations
contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the nature of the question
subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAIs
Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper
interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction
rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol,
admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the
application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAIs Construction
Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the
HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions
over homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC as well as
controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.
Thereafter, with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners
associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)