Carriage as a contract.

The elements of a contract of

carriage are as follows:
(1) Consent of the parties; a passage ticket is evidence of
consent
(2) Object of the contract is the transportation of the subject
(good or passengers) from the place of departure to the
place of destination stated in the ticket.
(3) Consideration is the fare paid
Public Duty- A contract of carriage to transport
passengers generates a relation attended with public duty.
Consequently, the neglect or malfeasance of the carriers
employees gives grounds for an action for damages.
Classifications of a Contract of Carriage
1. Common or Private
2. Goods or Passengers;
3. For a Fee/ for Hire or Gratuitous;
4. Land, Water/Maritime, or Air; and
5. Domestic/ Inter-island/ Coastwise or International/
Foreign
Parties to a Contract of Transportation
I. Carriage of Passengers
1. Common Carrier persons, corporations, firms or
associations engages in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goofs or both, by land, water,
or air, for compensation offering their services to the
public
It has also been defined as one that holds itself out as
ready to engage in the transportation of goofd for hire as a
public employment and not as a casual occupation
2. Passenger
One who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of
contract, express or implied, with the carrier as to the
payment of fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent
thereof.
II. Carriage of Goods
1. Shipper any person, partnership or corporation who
delivers the goods to the carrier for transportation and
pays the consideration or on whose behalf payment is
made
2. Carrier
3. Consignee- The person to whom the goods are to be
delivered.
The consignee may be:
a) the shipper himself as in the case where the goods will
be delivered to one of the branch offices of the shipper; or
b) any 3rd person, natural or juridical, who is not a party to
the contract

The consignee is bound by the agreement between the

shipper and the carrier where it is established that he
accepted the terms thereof and is trying to enforce it.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law,
or then it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation required the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
Art. 1680. (2) Extraordinary fortuitous events are
understood to be: fire, war, pestilence, unusual flood,
locusts, earthquake, or others which are uncommon, and
which the contracting parties could not have reasonably
foreseen.
Concept of Fortuitous Events. an occurrence or
happening which could not be foreseen, or even if
foreseen, is inevitable. The definition is comprehensive
enough to cover events beyond the control of the obligor
which prevents him from fulfilling his obligation.
The sudden illness or death of a person is considered force
majeure. Force majeure includes, any accident due to
natural causes directly and exclusively without human
intervention which could not have been prevented by any
kind of foresight, pains and care reasonably to have been
expected.
Classes of fortuitous events. Fortuitous events may be
classified as follows:
(a) as to origin or cause
(1)Fortuitous event- absolutely independent of
human intervention such as earthquake. It is called an act
of God.
(2) Force majeure (fuerza mayor)- event caused by
the legitimate or illegitimate acts of persons other than the
obligor. There is human intervention such as war.
Essentially, there is no substantial difference between the
two events. Both refer to events which are independent of
the will of the obligor, but not of third persons. War, for
instance, is caused by the will of men.
(b) as to foreseeability
(1) Ordinary fortuitous events- events which
ordinarily happen or which could be reasonably foreseen
but are inevitable. Ex: Flooding or lowly areas during
typhoons and thunderstorms.
(2) Extraordinary fortuitous events_ those which
do not usually happen and could not be reasonably
foreseen. Ex: Earthquake, fire, or conflagration, war,
pestilence.
If the obligor failed to perform his obligation by reason of
fortuitous events, the general rule is that he is excepted
from aby liability. The reason is that the obligation has
already been extinguished.
Requisites to Except Obligor from Liability by reason of
fortuitous event. In order that an act of God will exempt

the obligor from responsibility, the following

circumstances must concur:
(a) The cause of the breach must be independent of the
debtors will
(b) the event must either be unforeseeable or unavoidable
(c) The event must be of such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
It is incumbent for the party charged with the
responsibility to prove the force majeure.

* A common carrier is not an absolute insurer against the

risks of travel. Art 1743 provides for the exception when a
common carrier is not liable for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods. With regard to the safety of
passengers, the common carrier is liable for injuries or
death suffered by them unless the cause is fortuitous
events or if they can prove that they exercise the
extraordinary diligence required by law.
The common carrier cannot avail itself of the defense that
it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees.

As an exception to the general rule, an obligor is liable

despite the occurrence of the fortuitous event in the ff.
cases(1) when expressly stipulated that he shall be liable
(2) When the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk
(3) when the obligor is in delay
(4) When the obligor has promised the same thing to two
or more persons who do not have the same interest
(5) When the possessor is in bad faith and the thing is lost
or deteriorated due to fortuitous event.
(6) When the obligor contributed to the loss of the thing.
(7) When the obligor is guilty of fraud, negligence or delay
or if he contravened the tenor of the obligation
Cases involving common carriers- Mechanical defects in common carriers, like
vessels or vehicles are not fortuitous events
- Blowout of tire of a passenger truck is not
considered a fortuitous event
- Defective brakes of a vehicle do not constitute
fortuitous event.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a cautious person,
with due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
Articles 1755 and 1756.
Extraordinary Diligence- that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their own
property or rights.
The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers
is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic
mishap that frequently occur in connection with modern
rapid transportation. This high standard of care is
imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life
and by the consideration that every person must in every
way be safeguarded against all injury.

This high degree of care is imperatively demanded by the

preciousness of human life, and by the consideration that
every person must in every every way be safeguarded
against all the injury.
* The norm of utmost diligence required of common
carriers, such as an airplane, refers not only to the safety of
the passengers but also to that of the crew, particularly the
pilots and the stewardesses.
The degree of care required of a common carrier is not
capable of precise formulation, applicable to all situations
that may arise.
A carrier is not an absolute insurer of Safety of its
passengers- Carriers are not required to exercise all the
care, skill and diligence of which the human mind can
conceive nor such as will free the transportation of
passengers from all possible perils. Passengers necessarily
should take upon themselves all the usual and ordinary
perils incident to the mode of travel, and if the carrier
exercised all the care, skill and diligence required by law
and nevertheless the incident occurred, said carrier will
not be responsible therefor.
Example: Where a passenger rested his arm on the
window sill of the bus he was riding, sich that his arm
protruded out and was hit by a recklessly driven vehicle
coming from the opposite direction, such negligence and
imprudence could not be charged upon the carrier.
Phrase with due regard for all the circumstances
meaning- The circumstances refer to the nature of the
obligation, circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place. These are factors to be considered in
determining fault or negligence.
Liability of carrier is direct and immediate- where there is
breach of the carriers contractual obligations to carry his
passengers safely to their destination, the liability of the

carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct

and immediate.

Meaning of passengers- Not all who have taken a ride on a

common carrier are passengers
A passenger is a person who rides on a vehicle of a
common carrier with the consent of the latter for the
purpose of reaching a particular destination, and generally
for a fixed fare.
Nature of the contract of carriage of passengers- A
contract of carriage is a consensual contract. Even if the
passenger has not yet boarded the vehicle, the contract is
perfected as soon as there has been meeting of minds as by
a purchase of a plane or bus ticket and the simultaneous
issuance thereof by the carrier.
However for the attachment of the liability of the common
carrier, the reckoning point is the time when the passenger
has actually boarded the means of transportation. It is only
then that the party becomes a passenger. This is equivalent
of delivery in real contract.
Specific passengers- There are some people already inside
the means of transportation like a vessel or train who do
not pay transportation fare, yet are considered as
passengersEx: concessionaires doing business in a vessel or train
Stowaway persons- The following are not considered
passengers
- A rider who enters a vessel or a train or bus
surreptitiously without any intention of paying
the required fare
- A rider who when required to pay the
transportation fare refused to make any payment
- A rider who refuses to alight for an unreasonable
length of time after having been accorded several
opportunities to safely alight from the train, vessel
or vehicle.
The diligence required to be exercised is merely the
diligence of a good father of a family.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art
1733 and 1755.
When is there and automatic presumption of fault or
negligence in a contract of carriage? When there is death
or injuries caused to passengers, the common carrier is
AUTOMATICALLY presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. There is no need to have an
express finding of fault or negligence to hold the common
carrier liable for damages.

The injured passengers, or in the case of death, their heirs

need only to prove the (1) existence of the contract of
carriage and (2) its non-performance. It is not incumbent
upon them to establish the fault or negligence of the
common carrier. It is already presumed. This is an exception
to the general rule that fault or negligence must be proven.
The burden of proof is shifted to the common carrier to
prove its strong and convincing defenses, if any, in order
to overcome the presumption. To avoid liability, it must
succeed in proving that (1) it has observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of its contractual obligations,
or (2) that the death or injuries suffered by the passenger/s
is due to a fortuitous event.
Remedies of a passenger who is injured due to the
negligence of the driver of a common carrier. The
passenger who suffered injuries due to the negligence of
the driver of the common carrier may pursue any of the
following remedies in court(1) he can file a criminal case against the driver under Art
365 of the RPC (reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries). The civil aspect may be prosecuted in the dame
criminal case. If the driver is found guilty and is
condemned to pay indemnity and damages, the carriers
liability is subsidiary.
(2) he can file the criminal case (as above) but may
prosecute the civil aspect separately as an independent
civil action under Art 33 of the NCC. But there shall be no
double recovery of damages
(3) he can institute a civil case based on the violation of the
contract of carriage against the common carrier. If the
common carrier is adjudged to pay, and paid the plaintiff,
it can seek reimbursement from the errant driver.
* In common carrier, the injured passenger cannot seek
moral damages because this situation is not included in
Art 2219 of the CC. However, if there is death, instead of
mere injuries, moral damages may be awarded. Moral
damages may also be granted, if the breach of the contract
is fraudulent or attended with bad faith.
Liability in case of Transfer of Ownership of the Common
Carrier. If the transfer of ownership is not registered, it is
the registered owner and not the transferee who is liable
for the resulting breach of contract of common carriage.
The transferee, in turn, is liable to the registered owner. So
a 3rd party claim may be filed by the registered owner
against the transferee.
Kabit system- The kabit system is an agreement
whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of
public convenience allows other persons who own motor
vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a
fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to
such agreement are not out rightly penalized by law, the
kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to
public policy and therefore void and inexistent. --- It

would seem that the thrust of the law in enjoining the

kabit system is to identify the person upon whom
responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the
end in view of protecting the riding public.
Principle of last clear chance- The principle of last clear
chance does not apply where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligation. However, it applies to a suit between the
owners and drivers of 2 colliding vehicles.
Art 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the
safety of passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755
cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by
the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or
otherwise.
The norm of diligence cannot be compromised or be the
subject of stipulation for its elimination or mitigation.
Public policy is involved. Notices, printed statements on
tickets whether on fine prints or not, or by any other
means of publication, dispensing with the specified
responsibility or its lessening, are not binding to the
passengers. They are void.
Mitigation of liability with regard to the safety of GOODS
is, however allowed under Art 1744, but not with the lives
and limbs of passengers
Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, as
stipulation limiting the common carriers liability for
negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross
negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of
the common carriers liability.
If a passenger is accorded a free or gratuitous ride, the
liability of the common carrier for negligence may validly
be limited by the parties. That is only fair. The said
passenger may not get all the benefits. However, even if
there is an agreement on the limitation of liability, the
same is not effective should the carrier or its employee/s
be guilty of (a) willful acts, or (b) gross negligence
resulting in death or injuries to the free-riding passenger.
Riding on reduced fares. A passenger who rides on a
reduced fare like child or senior citizen, is entitled to
stringent norms of extraordinary diligence on the part of
the common carrier. The reduced fare does not make them
less human. The reduction of the fare, unlike a free ride,
does not justify any limitation the carriers liability.
Status of some non-paying riders- The ff. are considered
passengers even if they are non-paying riders with the
consent of the carrier.
(1) a public officer who is granted free passage
(2) a stranger who rides free but with the consent of the
carrier or a person who rides on a free pass

(3) an employee of the carrier who rides not as an

employee but as an ordinary stranger to attend to his own
affairs.
Bus conductors or inspectors Not considered passengers
but employees of the carrier. If something happened to
them during their trips, they are entitled to different rights
and privileges under the Labor Code and special laws.
1. Jesusa vda. de Nueca v. MRR 85 OG (No. 13) 3151; 13
CAR 49
FACTS: Fermin Nueca bought 7 sacks of palay to Manila
Railroad Co. (MRC) at its station. To be shipped to another
municipality in the same province. He paid the freight
charge and was issued a Way Bill. The cargo was loaded
on the freight wagon. The passengers boarded the train
and the shunting operations started to hook the wagon on
too it.
Before the train reached the turn off switch, one of the
passenger coaches fell on its side and the wagon pinned
Nueca, killing him instantly. Nuecas heirs are now
bringing this claim for damages caliming that Nueca was a
passenger and his death was caused by MRCs negligence
MRCs defense: (1) it exercised due care in safeguarding
the passengers during the shunting operations. (2) Nueca
was not a passenger but a trespasser, (3) even if Nueca
were a passenger, he illegally boarded the train without
permission by not paying the fare, (4) the mishap was not
attributable to any defect in MRC equipment , (5) the
accident was due to forece majeur
MRC however did not show how or why the accident
occurred.
ISSUES: (1) W/N Nueca was a passenger? (2) W/N MRC
is liable (3) W/N the accident was due to force majeur? (4)
W/N Nueca is liable for contributory negligence.
HELD: (1) NO. he was not a passenger thus, MRC did not
owe him extraordinary diligence.
A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by
virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the carrier as
to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an
equivalent.
The relation of passenger and carrier commences when
one puts himself in the care of the carrier, or directly under
its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a
passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier as
where he makes a contract for trasportation and presents
himself at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported.
Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming
Nueca intended to be a passenger, he was never accepted
as such by MRC as he did not present himself at the
proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.
(2) Yes, the liability of railroad companies to persons upon
the premises is determined by the general rules of
negligence relating to duties of owners/occupiers of
property.
While railroad companies are not bound to the same
degree of care in regard to strangers who are unlawfully

upon the premises of its passengers, it may still be liable to

such strangers for negligent or tortious acts.
Here, Nueca was not on the track, but either unlawfully
inside the baggage car or beside the track.
It is normal for people to walk on the track or roadbed
when there is no oncoming train and to walk beside the
track when a train passes. This practice is tolerated by
MRC. Generally, MRCs stations are not enclosed, and is
easily accessible to the public.
(3) MRC is negligent; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.
The train was under the complete control of the railroad
company at the time of the accident. The baggage car
would not have been derailed if the train had been
properly operated.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
(4) No.
An invitation to stay in the premises is implied from the
lack of prohibition to outsiders to keep off the premises,
hence, a stranger who is injured by a derailed train while
staying beside a railroad track is not guilty of contributory
negligence.
2. Lara v. Valencia 104 Phil 65; 55 OG 4436
FACTS: Jose Mendoza was the owner of the Cita Theater
in Naga where he would exhibit movie pictures booked
from movie producers or film owners in Manila. The fiesta
or town holiday of Naga is held on Sept 17 and 18,
annually and is usually attended by many people.
Mendoza took advantage of the circumstances and
decided to exhibit a film which would fit the occasion. A
month before the holiday, he contracted with LVN
pictures inc., a movie producer in Manila for him to show
Himala ng Birhen. He made extensive preparations such
as printing posters which were distributed in various
neighboring towns.
The agreement between Jose and LVN was that the
package which contained the film saw to be delivered to
PAL on Sept 17. Pal has regular trips from Manila to Naga.
PAL issued an Air way bill and the film was loaded on one
of PALs flights. It was scheduled to arrive a little later
than 4:00pm.
For reasons not explained by PAL, the can of film was not
unloaded and was brought back to manila. Mendoza
failed to show the film that night despite the big crowd.
The film only arrived the next day. He missed the
opportunity to show it the day before and this resulted in
substantial losses thus he brought this case against PAL.
ISSUE: W/N PAL is liable.
HELD: PAL is not liable for damages for lost earnings.
Although PAL was not obligated to load the film on any
specified plano or on any particular day, once said can of
film was loaded and shipped on one of its planes making
the trip to Cam Sur, then it assumed the obligation to
unload it at its point of destination and deliver it to the

consignee and its unexplained failure to comply with this

duty constituted negligence. The court however found that
fraud was not involved and that PAL was a debtor in good
faith.
A debtor in good faith is liable only for the foreseen losses
and damages at the time of constituting the obligation
which are necessary consequence of the failure to perform
it. In asmuch as PAL could not have foreseen the losses of
Mendoza when it accepted the can for shipment, Mendoza
may not recover the damages sought.
On Aircrafts being common carriers
The principles which govern carriers by other means, such
as by railroad or motor bus, govern carriers by aircraft.
The rules governing the business of a common carrier by
airship or flying machine may be readily assimilated to
those applied to other common carriers.
The test of whether one is a common carrier by air is
whether he holds out that he will carry fir hire, so long as
he has room, goods of everyone bringing goods to him for
carriage, not whether he is carrying as a public
employment or whether he carries to a fixed place.
The Code of Commerce (art 358) which provides that if
there is no period fixed for the delivery of the goods, the
carrier shall be bound to forward them in the first
shipment of the dame or similar march which he may
make to the point of deliver, and that upon failure to do
so, the damages caused by the delay sbould be suffered by
the carrier. The damages caused here are ORDINARY
DAMAGES, not special damages like those suffered by
Mendoza.
Prompt delivery is not required of common carriers,
unless they previously assume the obligation.
On Mendoza being a party to the contract of transportation.
LVN pictures and Mendoza on one side, and PAL on the
other, entered into a contract of transportation. One
interpretation is LVN acted as mendozas agent when the
sent the film through PAL. Another interpretation is that
Mendoza was a consignee, and made himself a party to
the contract of transportation when the appeared at the
Air port with the copy of the Air Way Bill.
Basically, in situations where failure to exhibit films on a
certain day would spell substantial damages or
considerable loss of profits, for their security, exhibitors,
should either get hold of the films well ahead of time or
enter into a special contract with a suitable arrangement
with the common carrier for the prompt delivery of the
films, calling attention to the carrier of the circumstances
surrounding the case and the approximate amount of
damages to be suffered in case of delay.
3. Heirs of Encarnacion Canas et al v. Dabatos et al 8
CAR 918
13 persons were on board the vessel of defendant not as
passengers but as 'cargadores' of the shipper's goods. They
were there with the consent and knowledge of the owner
of the vessel. Despite the absence of a passenger-carrier
relationship between them, the appellate court, just the

same, held the patron thereof liable as a common carrier.

The appellate court ruled:
There is no debate as to the fact that not one of the thirteen
passengers have paid an amount of money as fare for their
conveyance from Hingotanan to Cebu. The undisputed
fact, however, is that all of them were in the boat with the
knowledge and consent of the patron. The eleven
passengers, other than Encarnacion and Diosdado were in
the boat because they have helped in loading cargoes in
the boat, and "to serve as cargadores of the
cargoes," presumably, in unloading them at the place of
destination. For those services they were permitted to be
in the boat and to proceed to their destination in Cebu. The
services rendered were the valuable consideration in
exchange for the transportation fare. "In onerous contracts
the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party,
the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other;
. . ."
4. Tamayo v. Pascua et al 8 CAR 711
Between the plaintiff and the defendant, there was a
contract of carriage because of the concurrence of OFFER
on the part of appellant and acceptance on the part of the
appellees to take him as a passenger when the bus slowed
down, apparently in the act of allowing and enabling
appellant to board it. Although the bus did not make a
complete stop the fact that is slowed down to a turtle pace
was an indication that people on the island could board it
as a public carrier. A bus need not come to a dead stop to
allow passengers to board it. It is enough that is slows
down to a negligible speed, allowing people to board it
without danger to their lives and limbs. Under such
circumstances it is the drivers duty to see to it that every
person who wants to board the bus is sage inside before
picking up speed and moving forward.
Tamayo was considered a passenger because there was no
concurrence of offer- the signal to stop made by Tamayoand acceptance by the bus company- though the act of the
driver in slowing down the bus
If the accident involving Tamayo was caused by the
carelessness of the defendant driver by accelerating his
speed without making sure that he was safely inside the
bus, the driver was negligent, and the defendant company
is liable as a common carrier under Art 1759 of the CC.
This liability does not cease upon proof that an employer,
the company exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
This defense is available only in Quasi-Delicts where no
contractual relation between the injured and the one
causing the injury exists.
5. Dangwa Transportation Co. v. Court of Appeals 202
SCRA 574
Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus
belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)

The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when

Pedro alighted
Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward
Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to
their respective destinations before bringing Pedro to
Lepanto Hospital where he expired
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against
Dangwa for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the co.
and the supervision of the employees even as they are not
absolute insurers of the public at large
RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent
and his negligence was the cause of his death but still
ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral
damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of
the suit
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the
negligence of its driver Theodore
HELD: YES. CA affirmed.
A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a
continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as
long as it is still slow in motion)
Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the
effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is
attempting to board the same
Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of
duty
Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is
already considered a passenger and is entitled all the
rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual
relation
Duty extends to boarding and alighting
GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination
safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier
EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil
Code
Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital
despite his serious condition = patent and incontrovertible
proof of their negligence
Hospital was in Bunk 56
1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later
called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and
deliver a refrigerator
6. Peralta de Guerrero v. Madrigal Shipping Co. Inc. 106
Phil. 485

On Nov. 1, 1949, Pacifico Acacio entered into a contract of

carriage with Madrigal Shipping, whereby for certain
consideration the latter undertook to carry the former on
its vessel "M.S.Regulus" from Zamboanga to Manila. The
vessel capsized during the voyage, which resulted in the
death of Pacifico. His wife and daughter filed a
complaint for damages against Madrigal Shipping, but
was dismissed by the lower court due to prescription for
being filed (on April 30,1957) beyond the 6-year period of
prescription for oral contracts.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint is proper NO
HELD: The Court considered that the complaint implied
that there was a written contract by virtue of a passenger
ticket usually issued in contracts of carriage, therefore the
prescription period is 10 and not 6 years. The case
was remanded to the lower court for hearing on the
merits, including the presence of the written contract.
Where the complaint shows that appellants' cause of
action is predicated on the failure of appellee to comply
with its contract of' carrying safely the deceased from one
place to another, in that the vessel on which he was riding
belonging to appellee capsized because of the reckless and
imprudent manner it was managed and steered by its
crew, it can be implied that the transportation was
undertaken by virtue of a written contract of carriage.
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a
passenger boards a ship for transportation from one place
to another he is issued a ticket by the shipper which has all
the elements of a written contract, namely: (1) the consent
of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the
passenger boards the ship and the shipper consents or
accepts him in the ship for transportation; (2) causeo r
consideration which is the fare paid by the passenger as
stated in the ticket; and (3) object, which is the
transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination which are stated in
the ticket.
7. Philippine Airlines (PAL) v. Court of Appeals 106
SCRA 391
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of
common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as
for the members of the crew or the complement operating
the carrier, the airplane in the case at bar. And this must be
so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly
result to the damage, prejudice, any injuries and even
death to all aboard the plane, passengers and crew
members alike.
The request for waiver of physical standards is itself a
positive proof that the physical condition of Capt.
Bustamante was short of the standard set by the CAA. The
CAA granted the request, relying on the representation

and recommendation that Bustamente would only be

flying as a co-pilot. For having allowed Bustamante to fly
as a first officer, defendant is guilty of gross negligence
and therefore should be made liable for the resulting
accident.
Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did
not affect the pilot I managing the plane, the evidence
shows that the overshooting of the runway and crashlanding at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for which
acts the defendant must answer for damages caused
thereby. And for this negligence of defendants employee,
it is liable. At least, the law presumes the employer
negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees.

8. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals 138 SCRA 553

Facts: MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila
and bounded for Cebu. Its officers were aware of the
upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already building up
somewhere in Mindanao.
There being no typhoon signals on their route, they
proceeded with their voyage. When they reached the
island of Romblon, the captain decided not to seek shelter
since the weather was still good.
They continued their journey until the vessel reached the
island of Tanguingui, while passing through the island the
weather suddenly changed and heavy rains fell. Fearing
that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility,
the captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that
they could weather out the typhoon by facing the strong
winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef
near Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually
sunk.
The parents of the passengers who were lost due to that
incident filed an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for
damages. The defendant pleaded force majeure but the
Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower
stating that the incident was a force majeure and absolved
the defendants from liability.
Issue: Whether or not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for
damages and presumed to be at fault for the death of its
passenger?
Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer
Lines failed to observe that extraordinary diligence
required of them by law for the safety of the passengers
transported by them with due regard for all necessary
circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to
tragic mishap. Despite knowledge of the fact that there
was a typhoon, they still proceeded with their voyage
relying only on the forecast that the typhoon would

weaken upon crossing the island of Samar. The defense of

caso fortuito is untenable. To constitute caso fortuito to
exempt a person from liability it necessary that the event
must be independent from human will, the occurrence
must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, the obligor must be free
from any participation or aggravation to the injury of the
creditor. Filipina Pioneer Lines failed to overcome that
presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of
death or injuries to passengers
9. Benito v. PANAM 10 CAR 149
Conditions in a plane ticket exempting the common carrier
from liability for damages caused to its passenger due to
its negligence are offensive to public policy and void.
The condition/stipulation in the ticket provided: Carrier
undertakes to use its best efforts to carry the passenger
and baggage with reasonable disparch, but no particular
time is fixed for the commencement or completion of
carriage. Subject thereto, carrier may without notice
substitute alternat carriers or aircraft and may alter or omit
the stopping place shown on the fact of the ticke in case of
necessity. Times shown in timetables or elsewhere are
approximate and not guaranteed, and form no part of this
contract. Schedules are subject to change without notice.
Carrier assumes no responsibility for making
connentctions
Failure of a common carrier to notify a passenger of the
alteration or non-availability of a connecting flight to his
place of desitination, of which the carrier was aware before
the passengers departure, is omission to act with diligence
and to exerceise the necessary precaution in connection
with its contract of carriage with the passenger.
The court held that the condition in the teickets exempting
a common carrier from liability for damages caused to its
passengers due to its negligence, are offensive to public
policy and are thus void. Art 1760 of the CC prohibits the
elimination or limitation of pecuniary responsibility, even
by common stipulation, as far as common carriers are
concerned.

10. Vda de Abelo v. PAL 115 SCRA 489

Judge Quirico Abato boarded the Philippine Airline plane at the
Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City forManila
The plane did not reach its destination and there was news
that the plane went missing.
After 3 weeks, it was
ascertained that the plane
Province of Mindoro.

crashed at Mt. Baco,

All the passengers have been killed including Judge Quirico

Abeto. Condrada Vda. de Abeto , the wife of the
deceased,was appointed administratrix of the estate of
JudgeAbeto.
Condrada, together with her children filed a complaint for
damages against Philippine Airlines for the death of Judge
Abeto.
Philippine Airlines, on the other hand, contends that the
plane crash was das due to a fortuitous event.
DEFENSES:
Plane Crash was beyond the control of the pilot.
The plane was airworthy for the purpose of conveying
passengers across the country as shown by the certificate
of airworthiness issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
There was navigational error but no negligence
or malfeasance on the part of the pilot.
The plane had undergone pre-flight checks, thorough
checks, terminating checks and after-maintenance checks.
The deviation from its prescribed route was due
tobad weather condition.
ISSUE: Is Philippine Airlines liable for violation of
its contract of carriage?
RULING: Yes. Art. 1756 fixes the burden of proff by
providing that in case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extrordianty diligence.
The prescribed airway of the plane with Cap. De Mesa as
plot was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila. The fact is, the plane did
not take the designated route bevause it was some 30 miles
to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. According to the
defendants witness, administrative assistant of PAL, this
tragic crash would not have happened had the pilot
continued on the route indicated
At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by
the appellant as to how the accident occurred, the
presumption is, it is at fault.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need
not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of
carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination safely and to
observe extraordinaty diligence with a due regard fot all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered
by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved.
11. Bacarro v. Castano 118 SCRA 187

FACTS:
Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner
Montefalcon who thereafter drove it at around 40
kilometers per hour. While approaching Sumasap Bridge
at the said speed, a cargo truck coming from behind,
blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep.
The jeep, without changing its speed, gave way by
swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by
side for a distance of around 20 meters. Thereafter as the
jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its
former lane and instead it obliquely or diagonally ran
down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into
a ditch pinning down and crushing Castanos right leg in
the
process.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro,
William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon. Defendants
alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking
cargo truck. After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental
ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay
Castano. It was affirmed by the CA upon appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on
the part of the jeepney driver.
2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of
the jeepney driver.
3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.
HELD:
1.) Yes. X x x. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did
not slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep
at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the
overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about
twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to
the driver of the truck.
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at
the time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running
side by side with the cargo truck, there would have been
no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at
the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer
the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck
would be too close to the jeep and would eventually
sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened
his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the
truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge
at the same time.
2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage
between the private respondent and the herein petitioners
in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which
require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part
of petitioner Montefalcon.

Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand

extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with
public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being
required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common
carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a
passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not
reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are
presumed to be at fault.
3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find
fault upon respondent court in not freeing petitioners from
any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous
event. But, We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in
this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo
truck, was something which could have been avoided
considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which
was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by
the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the
occurrence of the mishap.
12. Gatchalian v. Delim 203 SCRA 126
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at
Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the same
province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the
side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell
into a ditch.
Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg,
arm and forehead
Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for
their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also
gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from
the hospital and they were made to sign a Joint
Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a
complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and
owner of the said Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to
recover compensatory and moral damages stating that the
mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar
measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating
mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part
as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away
from her friends
scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment Delim averred that it was a
fortuitous event
ISSUE:

W/N

Gatchalian

is

entitled

to

damages

HELD: YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1)

P15,000 actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost
of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's
forehead; 2) P30,000 moral damages; and 3) P1,000
attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the

legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the

promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof

that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such

plastic surgery is not unreasonable

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place

be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him.

moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence

on the part of the common carrier

while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but

that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered
injuries sign the document, she too signed without
bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.
Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of
the Joint Affidavit

FACTS: Severina Garces and her one year old son,

Precilliano Necito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger
auto truck a bus of Philippine Rabbit Bus lines at
Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco
Bandonell, then proceeded on its regular run. Upon
entering a wooden bridge, the front wheels swerved to the
right. The driver lost control, and after wrecking the
bridges wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into
the creek where water was breast deep.

To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim

damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances
like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and
weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by
the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable.

13. Necessito v. Paras 104 Phil 76; 56 OG 4023

The mother was drowned; The son, was injured suffering

abrasions and a fracture. He was brought to the Provincial
Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with
fragments one centimeter out of line.

To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or

physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force
majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the
efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of
the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid.

The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost.

This case was file however the carrier pleaded that the
accident was due to engine or mechanical trouble
independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of
the driver Bandonell.

The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone

wrong with the bus after the snapping sound

CFI: the bus was proceeding slowly die to the bad

condition of the read; the accident was caused by the
fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was defective
in that its center or core was not compact but bubbled
and cellulous, a condition that could not be known or
ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular
thirty day inspections were made of steering knuckle,
since the steel exterior was smooth and shiny. The
knuckles are designated and manufactured for heavy duty
and may last up to ten years.
Hence, the trial court held that the accident was
exclusively due to fortuitous event.

Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the

accident, she was no longer employed in a public school
since, being a casual employee and not a Civil Service
eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent
upon the availability ofvacancies for substitute teachers.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual
injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition
that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on
the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of
injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving
rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio
ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously
disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be expected
to be correspondingly modest.
In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable
amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which
may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very
probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider

ISSUES:
1. W/N the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of
the steering knuckle
2. W/N the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the
carrier exercised the diligence required by law.
HELD: Yes for both.
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the
passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is
considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from
liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact
that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer
of the defective equipment; hence he has no remedy
against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect

could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the

steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care
and foresight can provide and therefore the knuckles
failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from responsibility.
14. Villa et al v. Dalisay et al 63 OG (No. 21) 5209
Plaintiffs were passengers of a jeepney driven and
operated by Bartolome when a pick-up vehicle driven by
Dalisay heading in the same direction attempted to
overtake the jeepney. In doing so, he committed a
miscalculation and bumped the rear part of the jeepney,
the latter turning turtle and causing injuries to the
passengers. There was no question that the one who was
at fault in the incident was the driver of the pick-up
vehicle, Dalisay. The lower court also found the driver of
the jeepney, Bartolome, to be likewise at fault, reasoning
that he committed a breach of contract when he failed to
deliver the passengers safely to their respective
destination.
The SC disagreed with the lower court and ruled that
Bartolome was not liable. It held that while common
carriers are enjoined to exercise the highest degree of care
in transporting their passengers, nonetheless, a defendant
carrier in line with the prevailing doctrine, is not liable for
the injury of a passenger suffered as a result of a collision
caused by another vehicle, without contributory
negligence on the part of the defendant carrier, or that the
collision occurred due to those events which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable.
15. Quisumbing ,Sr. v. Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 605
Petitioners seek to recover from the Philippine Airlines,
Inc. the value of jewelry, other valuables and money taken
from them by 4 armed robbers on board one of the latters
airplanes while on a flight from Mactan City to Manila, as
well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation.
The court agreed with the lower courts which rejected the
passengers argument that the use of arms or irresistible
force referred to in Art. 2001 constitutes force majeure
only if resorted to gain entry into the airplane, and not if it
attends the robbery itself. The court ruled that under the
facts, the high jacking/ robbery was force majeure
observing that hijackers do not board an airplane though a
blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms,
hand grenates, dynamite and explosives are introduced
into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost
cunning and stealth, although there is an occasional use of
innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a
plane is given to the hijackers complete disposal. The
Objective of modern-day hijackers is to display the
irresistible force amounting to force majeure only when it
is most effective and that is when the jetliner is winging its

way at Himalyan altitutes and ill-advised herotics by

either crew or passengers ould dent the multi-million peso
airplane and the priceless lives of all its occupants; into
certain death and destruction.
The Court also ruled that in light of the evidence PAL
could not be faulted for want of diligence, particularly for
failing to take positive measures to implement Civil
Aeronautics Administratiojn regulations prohibiting
civilians from carrying firearms on board aircraft and that
the absenve of coded transmissions, the amateurish
behavior of the pilot in dealing with the NBI agent, the
alleged.y open cockpit door, and the failure to return to
Mactan, in the light of the circumstances of the case were
not negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure
nature of the armed robbery. In fact, the court went on to
say, that it is illusive to assume that had these precautions
been taken, the hijacking or the robbery would not have
succeeded.
The mandatory use of most sophisticated electronic
detection devices, the imposition of sever penalties, the
development of screening procedures, the compilation of
hijacker behavioral profiles, the assignment of sky
marshals, and the weight of outraged world opinion may
have minimized hijackings but all these hqave proves
ineffective against truly determined hijackers. World
experience shows that if a group of armed hijackers want
to take over a plane in flight, they can elude the latest
combined government and industry measures. And our
own experience in Zamboanga City, illustrates the use of
force to overcome hijackers, results in the death and injury
of innocent passengers and crew mwmbers. We are not in
the least bit suggesting that PAL should not fo everything
humanly possible to protect passengers from hijackers
acts. We merely state that where the defendant has
faithfully compled with the requirement of government
agencies and adhered to to the established precautions of
the airline industry at any particular time, its failure to
take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes
should have been taken is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active
and cooperative cause.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the acts of the
airline and its crew cannot be faulted as negligence. The
hijackers had already shown their willingness to kill. One
passenger was in fact killed an another survved gunshot
wounds. The lives of the rest of the passengers and crew
were more important than their properties. Cooperation
with the hijackers until they released their hostages at the
runway end near the South Superhighway was dictated by
the circumstances.

16. Yobildov. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1

FACTS

Respondents, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy together

with their children Ardee and Jasmin (Tumboys), boarded
a Yobido bus bound for Davao City at Surigao del Sur.
While traveling, the left front tire of the bus exploded,
causing it to fall into a ravine and hit a tree. Tito died from
the accident while the rest of the family suffered injuries.
The Tumboys filed a complaint for breach of contract of
carriage against petitioners Alberta Yobido (Alberta), the
owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido (Cresencio), its
driver.
The Tumboys asserted that the Cresencio failed to exercise
the diligence required of the carrier because he was
driving fast even with the poor condition the road and the
rainy weather.
Alberta and Cresencio claim that the explosion of the tire
was a fortuitous event which could not have been foreseen
or avoided, considering the following: it was a new tire,
the bus going at a slow speed because it was traversing a
zigzag road, and the bus was traveling below full capacity.
The trial court ruled in favor of Alberta and Cresencio.
The Court of Appeals reversed and awarded damages for
the Tumboys.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES/HELD
Was the bursting of the tire a fortuitous event which
would exempt Alberta and Cresencio from liability? NO.
Judgment affirmed.
RATIONALE
When a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the
risks incidental to the mode of travel he has taken because,
after all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its
passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to
carry them safely and without injury.
However, as expressed in Art. 1756, when a passenger is
injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes that the
common carrier is negligent.
Consequently, the court need not make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it
responsible for damages sought by the passenger.
This disputable presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of
the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger
was due to a fortuitous event.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following
characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and

unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to

comply with his obligations, must be independent of
human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obliger must be
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the
new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event because
there are human factors involved in the situation.
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from
liability by the mere fact that fortuitous event had
occurred; the common carrier must still prove that it was
not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from
an accident.
It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took
precautionary measures considering partially dangerous
condition of the road.
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the
presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages.
17. Gacal v. PAL 183 SCRA 189
Plaintiffs were passengers of defendants airplane which
was hi-jacked by members of the Moro National
Liberation Front. They alleged that the main cause of the
unfortunate incident is the gross, wanton and inexcusable
negligence of respondent Airline personnel in their failure
to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover
hidden weapons in the bodies of the 6 hijackers. They
claimed that despite the prevalence of sky jacing, PAL did
not use a metal detector which is the most effective means
of discovering potential sky jackers among the passengers.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not
hijacking or air piracy during marital law and under the
circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso fortuito or force
majeute which would excempt an aircraft from payment of
damages to its passengers whose lives were put in
jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost during
the incident.
The source of a common carriers legal liability is the
contract of carriage and by entering into said contract, it
binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this
obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence
according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of
the utmost diligence of a very cautios person
In order to constitute a case fortuoto or force majeure that
would except a person from liability, it is necessary that
the following elements must concur:

(a) The cause of the breach of the obligation must be

independent of the human will
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor
Caso fortuito or force majeoure by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events
that could not be foreseen, or which, though forseen, are
inevitable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should
have been foreseen or anticipated, as ias commonly
belived, but it must be one impossible to forsee or to avoif.
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same.
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the
failure to transport petitioner safely from Davao to Manila
was due to the skyjacking incident staged by 6 passengers
of the same plane,. All members of the MNLF, without any
connection with private respondents, hence, independent
of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen
the skyjacking incident which could have been avoided
had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers
and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. no. 6235.
But the incident in question occurred during marital Law
where there was a military take-over of airport security
including the frisking of passengers and the inspection of
ther luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights. IN fact military take oever was
specifically announced by the commanding General of the
PAF in a letter to the director of Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for
PAL to perform its obligations in a normal manner and
obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the
performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to the exclusiokn of the former
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also
been satisfied. Consequently the existence of force mejeore
has been established excempting respondent PAL from the
payment of damages to its passengers who suffered death
or injuris in ther persons and for loss of their baggages.