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HAZOP Study
Fire & Explosion Index
Process Hazards Analysis - Methods
HAZOP Study

Hazards in Process Industries

Three main hazards in chemical industries:
Fire, explosion and toxic release

Fire & Explosion:

3 elements for a fire to occur:
To control a fire Remove at least one element
How to quantify risk from hazards due to
fire/explosion? Use F&E Index

Dows Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI)

A standard reference to evaluate hazards due
to fire and explosion
F&EI = MF x F3
Where,
MF = Material factor , a measure of inherent
rate of potential energy release due to
fire and explosion produced by
combustion and chemical reaction
F3 = Process unit hazard factor

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F&EI

Degree of Hazards

1 60

Light

61 96

Moderate

97 127

Intermediate

128 158

Heavy

159 +

Severe

Source: AIChE, 1994

Objectives of F&EI
QUANTIFY the expected damage of potential
fire, explosion and reactivity incidents in
realistic terms
IDENTIFY equipment that would be likely
contribute to the creation or escalation of an
incident
COMMUNICATE the F&EI risk potential to
management

Process Hazards Analysis - Methods

Checklist

Indexing

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

What-If
What-If/Checklist
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Fault Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis
Interface Hazards Analysis

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HAZOP Study - Features

HAZOP Analysis: A systematic technique for
identifying hazards and operability problems in a
process plant facility
HAZOP Usefulness: To identify potential hazards in
the design of a facility due to lack of information,
changes in process conditions/operating
procedures
Objectives of a HAZOP Study: To detect predictable
deviations in a process plant/system through a
systematic study of the operations in each process
phase

HAZOP Study The Method

1. Define the objectives and scope of the study, e.g. hazards
having only off-site impact or only on-site impact, areas of
the plant to be considered
2. Form the Team to do the HAZOP study
3. Collect information, e.g. relevant documents, drawings
and process description
4. Analyse the hazards for each major item of the operating
system that includes equipments and all supporting
components (piping and instrumentation)
5. Document the findings as consequences of any deviation
from normal
6. Priortise the deviations for preventative actions/control
measures.

HAZOP Study Team

Multi-disciplinary members in the team
Usually two types of team members:
Those with technical expertise
Those with management expertise

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HAZOP Study Analysis Technique

1. The operating system is divided into functional
blocks/units
2. The study is organised around the functional blocks,
each analysed as a node
3. A node represents a section of the process where a
significant process change takes place, examples:

Transfer of material from one vessel to another through

a pump => increase in pressure and flow is the process
change
An overhead air-cooler on a distillation column =>
Temperature and Phase are the process variables that
change.

Node Selection and Purpose An Example

Node 1 (blue line):
Tank, T-100, with its
associated equipment and
instrumentation (the process
change is level in the tank)

Node 3 (green line):

Pressure vessel, V101, with associated
relief valve, etc

Node 2 (red line):

Two pumps, P-101 A/B, and the
flow control valve, FCV-101 (the
process changes are flow rate and
liquid pressure)

Nodes: Description & Purpose

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HAZOP Study Continue

4. Every part of the plant process is examined
for: Possible deviations from the design intent
Every deviation identified is considered in order
to decide how it could occur and what would
be the consequences.

5. How To?:
Questions are formulated around a list of guide
words

Hazards Deviations & Causes

HAZOP Matrix
Guide
word
No

Low

High

Part of

Also

Other than

Reverse

No
flow

Low
flow

High
flow

Missing
ingredients

Impurities

Wrong
material

Reverse
flow

High
interface

Processvariable
Flow

Level

Pressure
Temperature

Empty

Low
level

High
level

Low
interface

Open to
atmosphere

Low
pressure

High
pressure

Freezing

Low
temp.

High
temp.

Auto
refrigeration

Irregularmixing

Vacuum

Agitation

No
agitation

Poor
mixing

Excessive
mixing

Foaming

Phase
separation

Reaction

No
reaction

Slow
reaction

"Runaway
reaction"

Partial
reaction

Side
reaction

Wrong
reaction

Decomposition

Utility
failure

External
leak

External
rupture

Start-up
Shutdown
Maintenance

Other

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HAZOP Study Continue

6. Preventive/Corrective actions are then
defined for each consequence identified.

Consequences

HAZOP Analysis
Priortise consequences How to?
Quantify the relative importance of each failure effect
Example,
1. Using Criticality Method that combines the severity of
an effect and probability or expected frequency of its
occurrence,
Cr = P x B x S
where,
Cr: Criticality number
P: Probability of occurrence in an year
B: Conditional probability that the severest
consequence will occur
S: Severity of the severest consequence

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Example values for P, B and S

Categories
Probability
P
Very rare 1
Rare

Cond. Probabil
B
Very low
1
2

Severity
S
Low
1

Low

Significant

Likely

Significant

High

Frequent

high

Very high

HAZOP Study Reporting

Rank the risks
Summarize and present the Findings,

HAZOP An Example
An exothermic reactor system

Cooling Coils
Monomer
Feed
Cooling Water to Sewer
Cooling
Water In

T
C

A cooling system is provided to remove

the excess energy of reaction. The
temperature within the reactor is
measured and is used to control the
cooling water flow rate by a valve.
In the event of loss of cooling function,
the temperature of reactor would
increase. This would lead to an
increase in reaction rate leading to
additional energy release.
Consequently, a runaway reaction with
pressures exceeding the bursting
pressure of the reactor may occur.

Thermocouple

Perform HAZOP Study

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HAZOP Study Matrix Output

Guide Word

Deviation

Causes

Consequences

Action

NO

No cooling

Cooling water valve

malfunction

Temperature
increase in
reactor

Install high
temperature
alarm (TAH)

REVERSE

Reverse
cooling flow

Failure of water
source resulting in
backward flow

Less cooling,
possible runaway
reaction

Install check valve

MORE

More cooling
flow

Control valve failure,

operator fails to take
action on alarm

Too much cooling,

reactor cool

Instruct operators
on procedures

AS WELL AS

Reactor
product in
coils

More pressure in
reactor

Off-spec product

Check
maintenance
procedures and
schedules

OTHER
THAN

Another
Water source
material
contaminated
besides
cooling water

May be cooling
inefffective and
effect on the
reaction

If less cooling,
TAH will detect. If
detected, isolate
water source.
Back up water
source.

A20131104: Perform a HAZOP study on the process system and

produce an output matrix

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