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On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good Disposition and Moral Character

Richard D. Osguthorpe
Journal of Teacher Education 2008 59: 288 originally published online 7 July 2008
DOI: 10.1177/0022487108321377
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On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good

Disposition and Moral Character
Journal of Teacher Education

Volume 59 Number 4
September/October 2008 288-299
2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0022487108321377
http://jte.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
Richard D. Osguthorpe
Boise State University
The point of this article is to make a case for teachers of moral disposition without regard for the moral development of
students. The article concludes that there are multiple reasons for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character;
that teachers dispositions are best conceived as modifiers to the methods that they employ; and that the crux of the dispositions debate is ultimately grounded in avoiding poor moral character. Implications of the article point teacher educators
toward a conception of teacher education that focuses on preparing teachers of good disposition and moral character simply
for the sake of teaching that accords with what is good, right, and virtuous. The analysis suggests that the scope of a
teachers dispositions should be broadened to include all matters of classroom life and teacher effectiveness.
Keywords:
teacher dispositions; teacher education; moral character; moral development; moral education
f there is a truism in education, it is that good teaching

requires a teacher to be knowledgeable in content,
skilled in method, and virtuous in disposition and character. The first two stipulations are most often and easily
connected to student learning; it is readily accepted that
a deep understanding of subject matter and an ability to
effectively employ methods to convey that subject matter
might increase a students opportunity to learn. Thus, we
want teachers to be experts in their content areas, and we
want them to be able to convey that content in ways that
make it accessible to students. But why do we want
teachers to be of good disposition and moral character?
Presumably, we want teachers to be virtuous for reasons
that extend beyond reading, writing, and arithmeticwe
want them to be of virtuous disposition because they
inescapably influence the moral development of the
children in their charge. In other words, a purported reason for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral
character in the classroom is that teachers act as moral
exemplars and models, which in turn is believed to have
a direct effect on the moral development of students.
This presumption of a relationship between the moral
dispositions of teachers and the moral development of
students is one rationale for attending to dispositions in
teacher preparation programs, but it does little to quell the
debate swirling around the definition of dispositions, their
potential for development in teacher preparation, and the
best methods of assessing them in teacher candidates. In
288
fact, such a rationale has potential to create even more

controversy by bringing issues of moral education and
moral development to bear on considerations of teacher
candidate quality. Furthermore, although it might be the
case that there is a strong relationship between the moral
dispositions of a teacher and the moral development of a
student, it might also be the case that the relationship is
a weak one or even nonexistent, that the moral qualities of
a teacher do not have quite their assumed impact on the
development of similar qualities in students. Given the
potential for additional controversy and the possible indeterminacy of such a relationship (see Osguthorpe, 2009),
this article builds on the notion that there are reasons for
wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character
that transcend any connection to the moral development of
studentsall in an effort to clarify the priority placed on
dispositions in the preparation of teachers.
Thus, the purpose of this article is to put forward a
more robust rationale for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character, one that is rooted in the claim
that good dispositions are immanent in good teaching
connecting dispositions to the activities of teaching and
learning and moving them away from a narrow focus on
moral development. This rationale is derived from a consideration of three provocative questions that bring important issues to bear on the dispositions debate: (a) Why do
we want teachers of good disposition and moral character? (b) How morally good does a teacher need to be?
Osguthorpe / Good Disposition and Moral Character 289
and (c) What if a teacher is of poor moral character or

disposition? In the first section of the article, I provide
some background for the current inquiry as it pertains to
the controversy surrounding dispositions and teacher
education. The purpose of this section is to show how
attention to moral dispositions in teacher education has
often been closely connected to the moral development
of students.
In the remaining sections, I examine each of the questions described above with special consideration for the
possibility that the putative relationship between the
moral dispositions of teachers and the moral development of students is nonexistent. The purpose of these
sections is to unearth some of the most commonly held
assumptions regarding the moral character and dispositions of teachers and to suggest alternative reasons for
placing an emphasis on dispositions in teacher preparation. The questions I raise have particular relevance to
the preparation of preservice teachers, and in conclusion,
I explore the applications of these questions (and subsequent discussion) for the practice of teacher education.
These applications point to different ways that teacher
preparation programs might attend to the moral character of teacher candidates, and they also suggest different
reasons for wanting teachers of good disposition and
moral character in the first place. The purpose of this
final section is to provide possible directions for future
practice and research.
Conceptual Framework
My point of entry into this article is via the Manner in
Teaching Project (MTP), a philosophical and empirical
study aimed at understanding how the expression of
moral character traits and dispositions (manner) is made
manifest in classroom teaching.1 The MTP research team
was particularly interested in how teacher manner (the
expression of virtuous traits and dispositions) is made
visible in classrooms and what effect manner has on
moral development. As Richardson and Fenstermacher
(2001) state, We wanted to know whether teachers did
in fact posses such traits, how they displayed them in
their conduct, and what influence they might have on
students (p. 632). It was assumed that if teachers possessed such traits, then the research team stood a good
chance of observing them in teachers actions. A particularly Aristotelian perspective on moral development
provided the conceptual frame for the MTP inquiry,
wherein the young acquire virtue by being around virtuous people (see Aristotle, 2000, translation; Dearden,
Hirst, & Peters, 1972; Ryle, 1972). That is, virtue is not
taughtat least not in the way that mathematics or

biology is taught. Instead, virtue is caught or picked
up by interacting with those who seemingly possess it
through habituation.
Thus, MTP researchers entered schools and classrooms with Aristotelian-colored lensesexpecting to
see virtues expressed by teachers and subsequently
picked up by students. For example, Richardson and
Fenstermacher (2001) initially believed that if teachers
were to contribute to the moral and intellectual development of their students, the teachers themselves had to
possess and exhibit the moral and intellectual traits they
sought for their students (p. 632). The emphasis of the
study was on detecting the exhibition or display of virtuous character traits and understanding how teachers
employed these traits in the course of everyday instruction. It also relied heavily on the assumption that once
displayed, these virtues were caught by students in the
classroom.
A similar theoretical framework guides the argument
in this article because this same language of virtue and
this conception of moral development often frame discussion of dispositions and the reasons that are put forth
in the literature for wanting teachers of good disposition
and moral character. Use of the term moral, then, in this
article assumes a normative sense of morality, in that it
refers to what is morally good rather than what is,
more broadly, morally salient (Sanger, 2003). In addition, the following assumptions are made about dispositions and moral development: (a) Moral dispositions are
a developed feature of what a teacher is and does, what
she already has, as opposed to what she is coming into,
and (b) moral development refers to what happens to a
student, what a student is becoming in a moral sense (see
Burnyeat, 1980). Thus, as it modifies character and
development, the term moral in this article implies character or development over time that is consistent with
what is morally good or virtuous.
Regarding dispositions, important distinctions can be
made between what is, for example, virtuous or right
(see Sockett, 2006), and these differences would certainly prove analytically useful in furthering our understanding of the questions that guide this inquiry.
However, they are not necessarily germane to the primary argument in this article (although certainly pertinent to outgrowths of the argument) because these
differences are related more to what makes actions right
than to the practical manifestations of each theory:
The two main modern competitors to virtue ethics are
utilitarianism and Kantianism. It is important to recognize that these three theories may largely converge in
290 Journal of Teacher Education
their practical conclusions [italics added]. They may all,

for instance, recommend that one be generous, or just.
But the reasons that the theories offer differ greatly.
According to utilitarianism, what makes actions right is
their producing the largest amount of well-being overall.
According to Kantianism, what makes actions right is
their being in accordance with the law of reason. We
might understand Aristotle, and a pure virtue ethics, as
claiming that what makes actions right is their being
virtuous. (Crisp, 2000, p. xvii)
This article is primarily concerned with the practical

conclusions of attending to dispositions in teacher preparation. Thus, an attempt is made in this article to employ
an inclusive and normative sense of moral, encompassing that which is considered good, virtuous, caring, right,
proper, and so on (see Sockett, 2006, p. 20), but it favors
the Aristotelian conception because the roots of the relationship that guides this inquiry typically lie therein.
As a result, the term moral often designates the use of
trait language in this article, such that moral character or
moral development will connote the possession or development of certain moral traits or dispositions (e.g., honesty, responsibility, fairness, kindness, compassion, etc.).
Furthermore, reference is made to good dispositions and
bad, or poor, dispositions (see Urmson, 1980, p. 158),
where what is good represents excellence and what is
bad or poor represents excess or deficiency, following a conception of dispositions as virtues (see Crisp,
2000, p. xiv-xv). That said, following the conclusions
of the MTP regarding teacher manner, an Aristotelian
framework likely does not capture all of the complexities
associated with dispositions in teacher education (Sanger
& Fenstermacher, 2000). However, it is most closely
connected to the trait language that often frames the
debate, making it a useful theoretical frame for the argument in this article.
The primary data source for this article is the scholarly literature that assumes a connection between the
moral dispositions of a teacher and the moral development of a student. These assumptions are incredibly
common in the moral education and moral development
literature, ranging from philosophical claims (see
Campbell, 2003; Fenstermacher, 1990, 2001; Hansen,
1993, 2001; Noddings, 1984, 2002; Sockett, 1993; Strike
& Soltis, 1992; Tom, 1984) to more practice-based or
programmatic claims (see Benninga, 1993; Lickona,
1991; Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). Scholars working from a
social or behavioral science perspective have also made
claims of a relationship based on quantitative or surveybased research (see Hartshorne & May, 1928-1930; Peck
& Havighurst, 1960), whereas more recently, others have
taken a more ethnographic approach (see Jackson,

Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993) or have combined philosophical and empirical modes of inquiry (see Campbell,
2003; Richardson & Fenstermacher, 2001). Although
these scholars come to different conclusions (and arrive
at these conclusions in different ways), the relationship
between the moral character of a teacher and the moral
development of a student is at or near the forefront of
each study. Most important, they all offer different
insight and direction for exploring the critical questions
that frame the query of this article and for analyzing the
recent scholarship related to the development and
assessment of dispositions and moral character in
teacher education programs.2
The correlative (but not often connected) literature on
dispositions makes similar arguments for attending to
dispositions in teacher education and also offers alternative rationales and definitional or conceptual work. In the
context of teacher preparation, it would likely be difficult
to find a teacher education program that did not place
good moral character and dispositions (or some derivative) as a high priority for its teacher candidates. Calls
for such an emphasis have come in a variety of forms, the
most influential of which has come from the National
Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)
itself. When NCATE revised its standards in 2000, it
determined that teacher educators ought to more seriously undertake the development of moral dispositions
in teacher candidates (despite little consensus about what
it might mean): NCATE believed that the time had
come for teacher educators to pay attention not merely to
knowledge and skill development and teaching and
learning but also to the moral and ethical development of
teachers (Wise, 2006, p. 5). But since this relatively
benign acceptance in the NCATE Standards, dispositions
have been the focus of much controversy, resulting in
various revisions of the definition of dispositions. The
current definition reads as follows:
Professional attitudes, values, and beliefs demonstrated
through both verbal and non-verbal behaviors as educators interact with students, families, colleagues, and
communities. These positive behaviors support student
learning and development.
NCATE expects institutions to assess professional
dispositions based on observable behaviors in educational settings. The two professional dispositions that
NCATE expects institutions to assess are fairness and
the belief that all students can learn. Based on their mission and conceptual framework, professional education
units can identify, define, and operationalize additional
professional dispositions. (NCATE, 2008, pp. 89-90)
This glossary definition differs primarily in its elimination of a prescription of specific traitssuch as honesty,
caring, and responsibilityfor possible use in teacher
education programs. And, although the term social justice was controversially removed from the definition, the
executive board also issued a call for action that draws
attention to it in the introduction to the current standards
(NCATE, 2008, pp. 6-7). In the end, it appears to be much
ado about something, but the crux of the issue is still
difficult to define, as multiple perspectives on the issue
continue to flourish in the scholarly literature.
For example, prior to this call from NCATE, many
scholars explored the moral dimensions of teaching and
learning and argued for increased attention to dispositions and character in teacher education. Goodlad (1994)
postulates that robust programs of teacher education
should admit only students who are committed to the
moral dimensions of their practice and that these programs should help prepare them for those responsibilities. However, even stronger pleas come from teacher
educators who argue that teacher preparation programs
should, first and foremost, foster the moral development
of teacher candidates. These teacher educators contend
that good teacher preparation must begin with the personal ethical/moral development of the prospective
teacher (Weber, 1998, p. 87), primarily because these
prospective teachers will themselves need to be moral,
caring, and socially skilled so that they can demonstrate
important skills and understandings in word and deed
(Watson, 1998, p. 65).
The strength of such a position relies on the potential
impact on a teachers students. In his argument for placing
emphasis on dispositions in teacher education, Wasicsko
(2007) points out that the dispositions of teachers are key
to making a meaningful moral impact on students:
It is not so much what the teacher knows or does rather
it is who the person is that makes all the difference. It is
particular human qualities or dispositions in combination with, and shining through, their knowledge and skills
that allow some teachers to transform many students
lives. (p. 55)
Thus, an additional perspective to consider in the dispositions debate is that teacher education programs
should attend to the moral dispositions and character of
a teacher because of the possible influence it might have
on the moral development of future students. This presumed relationship is one prominent justification put
forth in the teacher education literature.
Similarly, there are recent calls to reclaim the moral
in the preparation of teachers (Burant, Chubbuck, &
Whipp, 2007) and, more broadly, to move toward a

moral or civic professionalism and away from such a
narrow conception of method and skill:
The idea of the professional as neutral problem solver,
above the fray, which was launched with great expectations a century ago, is now obsolete. A new ideal of a
more engaged, civic professionalism must take its place.
Such an ideal understands, as a purely technical professionalism does not, that professionals are inescapably
moral agents whose work depends upon public trust for
its success. . . .
A new civic awareness within professional preparation could go a long way toward awakening awareness
that the authentic spirit of each professional domain represents more than a body of knowledge or skills. It is a
living culture, painfully developed over time, which represents at once the individual practitioners most prized
possession and an asset of great social value. (Sullivan,
2004, pp. 2-3).
Additional contributions put the concept of dispositions in psychological context and offer definitional
and historical perspective (Damon, 2005, 2007; Murray,
2007; see also Freeman, 2007; Raths, 2007), create a
moral framework for teacher dispositions (Sockett,
2006; see also Burant, Chubbuck, & Whipp, 2007; Oja &
Reiman, 2007), and provide principles for assessment
(Diez, 2006, 2007a; see also Wilkerson, 2006). Many of
these contributions assume or argue that dispositions are
an important component of teacher preparation.
However, even with recent increased attention to dispositions in the scholarly literature, there is no definitive consensus regarding the definition of dispositions or
the role dispositions should play in teacher education
(see Borko, Liston, & Whitcomb, 2007). Furthermore,
the current direction of the debate appears to be one of
exploring multiple perspectives and entertaining multiple definitions (Freeman, 2007). The argument that
follows in this article assumes that attention to these
issues surrounding dispositions in teacher education is a
healthy development and merits further conceptual work.
Thus, it does not seek to offer a definitive response to the
questions surrounding dispositions. Instead, it offers an
additional perspective on the important issue of dispositions in teacher education that suggests how dispositions
might be defined in relation to methods and skills and,
subsequently, how they might be assessed in teacher
candidates. This perspective builds on similar calls for
an integration of knowledge, skills, and dispositions in
teacher education (see Diez, 2007b), holding that dispositions are best conceived as modifiers to the methods
that teachers employ.
Why Do We Want Teachers of Good

Disposition and Moral Character?
If we make the assumption that there is a relationship
between the moral dispositions of a teacher and the
moral development of a student, then we want teachers
of good disposition and moral character for at least three
reasons. The first reason is that we want students of good
disposition and moral character. This reason for wanting
morally good teachers is the most obvious. The longheld assumption that children catch or pick up character traits from those with whom they associate dictates
why we want teachers to possess and exhibit desirable
traits. Not much explanation of this reason is needed.
That we want students to develop good moral character
is the primary reason proffered in the moral education
and moral development scholarship for wanting morally
good teachers. It also accords to common sense and
appeals to our intuitive sense of how moral development
occurs in the young. The typical contention is that a
teachers example is his or her most powerful tool of
moral education and that any attempt at moral education
will be unsuccessful if the teacher is not of good disposition and moral character (see Ryan & Bohlin, 1999).
We want our teachers to be good examples of virtue and
to display certain character traits and dispositions so that
students will, in turn, pick them up and acquire them.
The second reason is that we want teachers to both
consciously and unconsciously convey good dispositions
and moral character. This reason for wanting teachers of
good disposition and moral character is grounded on the
premise that what the teacher consciously conveys is an
idealized expression of morality, and the more the
teachers idealized expression and real expression (the
dispositions and character traits a teacher possibly possesses) resemble each other, the more apt it is to have
some influence on the student. In other words, there is
less of a chance for misunderstanding (even minor signs)
on the part of the student and less of a propensity for
misrepresenting on the part of the teacher (see Goffman,
1961). And if any relationship is to obtain between the
moral character of a teacher and the moral development
of a student (however indirect that connection might be),
then what is conveyed by the teacher must first be connected to what is possessed by the teacher, and what is
interpreted by the student must be an accurate construal
of both.
The third reason is that we want teachers to teach
morality programmatically. That is, we want teachers of
good disposition because not only do we want teachers to
consciously and unconsciously express moral character, but we want them to provide moral instruction via
specific curricula. A common refrain from proponents of

character education is that the programmatic aspects of
character education will not be effective unless the
teacher is of good disposition and moral character. For
character educators, direct instruction is the primary
means of teaching students to be good, but they contend
that this type of instruction is meaningless if a teacher
asks students to do as I say and not as I do. In other
words, teachers have to walk the talk and practice
what they preach; a teachers actions speak louder than
words (see Benninga, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Ryan &
Bohlin, 1999). Thus, if a character education program is
going to have any effect, teachers will need to possess the
traits that they are espousing. This reason for wanting
teachers of good disposition and moral character rests on
the assumption that morals can be taught, not just
caught and that a teachers moral character is integral to
both. Thus, the dispositions possessed by the teacher and
those conveyed by the teacher are just as important to
learning virtue as they are to catching virtue.
However, if we do not assume that such a relationship
obtains, and we consider, instead, the possibility that the
relationship is nonexistentthat the moral character of
the teacher has little or no effect on the moral development of studentsthen why do we want teachers of
good disposition and moral character? We still want
teachers of good disposition and moral character in this
case for three primary reasons, each of which has no
direct connection to the moral development of the
student and provides the basis of a more robust rationale
for attending to moral dispositions in teacher education.
First, we still want morally good teachers in this view
because we want teachers to be what they convey. Just
because there is no relationship does not relieve teachers
of the professional responsibility to be of good disposition and moral character. Teachers simply have a moral
and professional obligation to present an accurate picture
of themselves to their students. There is a kind of social
contract at work here that requires teachers to be what
they conveyto be who they say they are (Goffman,
1959). Teachers then are obligated to be the person they
claim to be by virtue of a basic societal principle. We
want teachers of good disposition in this case simply
because we want teachers to uphold their end of this contractto be what they convey in a moral sense.
The second and more salient reason is that we want
morally good teaching. Recall that we wanted teachers
of good disposition and moral character because we
wanted teachers to teach morality. When we consider
that the relationship between the moral dispositions of a
teacher and the moral development of a student is nonexistent, then we do not want teachers of good disposition
and moral character because we want them to teach

morality but because we want them to teach in moral
ways. The important distinction here is between teaching
morality and teaching in moral ways. Teaching morality
is grounded in the moral development of students, whereas
teaching in moral ways is based on good teaching
being a good teacher. The content of teaching morality is
morality itself, whereas the content of teaching in moral
ways is whatever content the teacher is teachingbe it
social studies, math, French, science, and so forth. The
assumption here is that good teaching requires teachers
to be morally goodable to teach in ways that accord
with virtue.
Making this assumption, character traits and dispositions, or virtues, take on a different grammatical form
they are used to describe the practice of teaching, not
what is actually taught. As Peters (1981) suggests, the
importance of terms such as character and trait (and their
hyphenated form) is found in their use as adverbs: Their
significance is primarily adverbial. They usually indicate
a manner or style of behaving without any definite implication of directedness or aversionunlike the terms
motive, attitude, and sentiment (p. 25). Thus, we
want teachers of good disposition and moral character
because we want them to exhibit a certain manner or
style of teachingnot because we want them to exhibit
certain traits or dispositions (to be picked up by students).
This reason lies in stark contrast to those presented previously, where our reasons for wanting morally good
teachers were grounded in a desire to develop morally
good students. In this view, we want morally good
teachers because we want morally good teaching. We
want teachers to teach in moral ways, to allow their moral
inclinations to inform their practice. The emphasis here is
on the activities of teaching and how they are aligned
with virtue; morally good teaching is practice that is modified by what is good, right, and proper.
Finally, the third reason that we want teachers of virtuous disposition (in this case, of a nonexistent relationship) is that we want teachers to be practically wise, and
as Aristotle contends, practical wisdom entails virtue:
For virtue makes the aim right, and practical wisdom
the things towards it (Aristotle, 2000, VI.12, 1144a).
The claim here is that virtues of intellect (e.g., practical
wisdom) require virtues of character (e.g., traits and dispositions). The example Aristotle offers in support of this
contention illustrates how moral dispositions and virtue
are foundational to the capacity to be practically wise:
There is a capacity that people call cleverness. This is
such as to be able to do the actions that tend towards the
aim we have set before ourselves, and to achieve it. If the
aim is noble, then the cleverness is praiseworthy; if it is

bad, then it is villainy. This is why both practically wise
and villainous people are called clever.
Practical wisdom is not the same as this capacity,
though it does involve it. And, as we have said and is clear,
virtue is involved in this eye of the souls reaching its
developed state: Since such-and-such is the end or chief
good, whatever it is (let it be anything you like for the
sake of argument). And this is evident to the good person
alone, since wickedness distorts our vision and thoroughly
deceives us about the first principles of actions.
Manifestly, then, one cannot be practically wise without being good. (Aristotle, 2000, VI.12, 1144a)
In this way, there appears to be a direct connection

between teachers aims and their dispositions (or virtues
of character), resulting in the exercise of practical wisdom or intellectual virtue in classrooms. Thus, we want
teachers of good disposition and moral character because
we want these virtues of character to inform the aims that
teachers put forward for the multifarious decisions they
make both in planning and in carrying out those plans in
practice. Importantly, the connection here does not seem
to be based on arbitrary virtues or dispositionsit obtains
between specific aims and corresponding dispositions
(e.g., between aiming for all students to learn and being
disposed to justice and fairness). Furthermore, this stipulation suggests that we want teachers who not only teach
effectively but also know that they are teaching effectively
and for the right reasonsuch that their virtues and dispositions make their aims right.
To summarize the responses to this first question, if
the relationship obtains, we want teachers of good disposition and moral character because we want students of
good disposition and moral character; we want teachers
to both consciously and unconsciously convey good dispositions and moral character; and we want them to be able
to effectively provide moral instruction via curricula. If
the relationship is nonexistent, we still want morally
good teachers because we want teachers to be who they
claim to be, but primarily because we want morally good
teaching and we want teachers to be practically wise
(without any necessary desire to affect the moral development of students).
How Morally Good Does a

Teacher Need to Be?
Wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character for any of the above mentioned reasons raises the
question of just how good teachers need to be to carry out
their corresponding aims. If there is a relationship between
the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student, then the teacher must be a perfect
example of virtue. This claim implies that the moral character and dispositions of the teacher are directly connected
to the moral development of the student and that the
student acquires the dispositions and moral character possessed by the teacher. This requirement of excellence and
perfection is, perhaps, unrealistic. However, it is difficult
to suggest a less stringent requirement; we simply do not
speak of varying degrees of good moral character, and
when we do, we are merely speaking of its opposite. To
argue this point, we need only to consider what it means
for a person to be at work on his or her character. The
expression is almost euphemistic in its usea person
working on character is, simply put and by definition, not
a person of good character. In other words, if we say that
a person is working on being honest or caring, we mean
that she or he is not an honest or caring person. Trait language, in this way, is all-or-nothing languagetraits of
moral character are either possessed or they are not. There
is no room for slips or lapses in character. As Goffman
(1959) suggests, the conscious or unconscious expression
of any undesirable trait or disposition is enough to disrupt
the tone of an entire performance (p. 52).
Furthermore, the only consideration we might make
for a supposed deficiency in moral character on the part
of teachers would be in their conduct outside the classroom and purview of students. That is, teachers need
only convey the moral dispositions that they express and
expect in their classrooms. As Ryle (1972) asserts,
[A person] could not, indeed, be a spokesman for standards if he did not have them. But his having these standards is primarily his being fair-minded, considerate,
self-controlled, etc., and only secondarily is it his being
a reliable authority on these standards or an honest
confessor to them. (p. 445)
This type of virtuous expression (disconnected from

the dispositions and moral character possessed by the
teacher) is possible because teachers can convey their
ideal selves during their performance as teachers (see
Goffman, 1961). However, in the classroom, the teacher
must embody good dispositions and be a model of
perfection in virtue if there is a relationship between the
moral dispositions of teachers and the moral development of students.
Only when we consider the possibility that such a relationship is nonexistent do we relinquish the need for a
teacher to be a perfect example of virtue. It might be the
case that we want teachers of good disposition and moral
character because we want teachers to teach in ways that
align with what is good, and right, and virtuous (instead of
teaching morality) or because we want them to be practically wise, but there are no demands here for virtuous
character traits to be possessed by or conveyed by a
teacher for the purposes of student emulation. In this view,
teachers need only to teach honestly, respectfully, responsibly, caringly, and so on, or align their aims with virtuous
dispositions of character. The argument still holds that
teaching in moral ways and exercising practical wisdom is
connected to who teachers are in a moral sense in their
classrooms (the dispositions and moral character that are
part of the persona teachers adopt), but the connection is
not one that necessarily holds for who teachers are in a
moral sense outside the classroom. Instead, this perspective suggests that demands for teachers dispositions are
more defensible in their relation or connection to teachers
methods and in their modification of method, such that a
teacher, for example, not just lecture but lecture with compassion for the uninitiated, with open-mindedness to different points of view, and with patience for speakers of
other languages (and correspondingly without arrogance,
arbitrariness, and impatience).
The troubling possibility here is that teachers can be
good teachers without necessarily being correspondingly
good people outside the classroomor at least without
making their dispositions and character visible to others;
teachers can teach in virtuous ways (fairly, responsibly,
etc.) without necessarily revealing their own moral character. This possibility runs contrary to the claim that
students can see right through their teachers (Ryan &
Bohlin, 1999), and it suggests an undesirable state of
affairs for teaching and teacher education (see Sockett,
2006), but it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that
teachers might adopt a persona in the classroom that
embodies moral dispositions connected specifically to
the activities of teachingsuch that teachers dispositions are made visible only in connection with methods
that teachers employ.
In summary, if the relationship obtains, then a teacher
must be a model of excellence and perfection in relation
to what is conveyed to students. We simply have no way
of talking about degrees of good dispositions and moral
charactertrait language does not allow for it. In answering this question, we would not say that a teacher just
needs to be kind of good, really good, very good, or
even almost perfect. There is no scale for dispositions
and moral charactertraits are possessed or they are not.
Only in the nonexistent form of the relationship do we
relieve the teacher of this unrealistic requirement and
place emphasis on the interaction between dispositions,
knowledge, and skillsin particular on the ways that
dispositions might be conceived as modifiers of method.
Also, it is likely that there is a connection between who a
teacher is (the dispositions a teacher possesses) and how

a teacher teaches (whether in virtuous ways or not), but it
seems possible to teach morally and exercise practical
wisdom while not making ones dispositions and moral
character visible.
What If a Teacher Is of Poor Moral

Character and Disposition?
This final question is at the heart of the debate surrounding an emphasis on dispositions in teacher education. Perhaps the most basic reason for wanting teachers
of good disposition is that we do not want the opposite,
and likewise, the most basic requirement for how good a
teacher needs to be is akin to do no harm. So, what if a
teacher is of poor moral character and disposition? And
what is the nature of the concern that such teachers might
do harm to students? If there is a relationship between
the poor moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a studentif a teachers poor moral character
rubs off on students in the same way that a teachers good
dispositions and moral character are caught or picked up
by studentsthen the answer to these questions is clear.
We would want to avoid teachers of poor moral character
because of the immediate or potential effect they might
have on the students in their classrooms. For example, we
would not want dishonest teachers if it was a given that
this trait of dishonesty rubbed off on students. Whether
the effect is direct or indirect is of little consequence in
relation to poor moral character.
However, when we consider the possibility that the
relationship between the moral dispositions of a teacher
and the moral development of students is nonexistent, we
begin to see a contrast in the way that we respond to concerns about the poor moral dispositions of teachers. This
contrast is likely related to the deep-seated concern we
have for poor moral character, in any of its possible
forms. For example, if the relationship is nonexistent,
then our concern about teachers of poor moral character
and disposition should subside in large measure.
However, this concern does not seem to abate. Even if
we assume there is no connection, we would still likely
be wary of putting a teacher of poor moral character in a
classroom because we would simply want to avoid poor
moral character. Here, our concern for teachers of deficient disposition and poor character seems to far outweigh
our desire for a teacher of good disposition and moral
character. In other words, it might be that in our emphasis on dispositions, we do not necessarily want morally
good teachers; we might just want to avoid morally poor
teachers.
To illustrate, picture a continuum titled Effect on Moral

Development, ranging from having no effect on moral
development to having a clear effect on moral development. We likely would not give much thought or care to
where the morally good teacher comes down. It would be
acceptable for the morally good teacher to have a neutral
effect or even no effect at all. However, we would likely
not afford this same luxury to the morally poor or deficient
teacher. Whether or not morally poor teachers have an
impact on the moral development of students, we are still
unlikely to permit them entrance into classrooms. In this
way, it is apparent that we worry about submitting
students to a teacher of poor moral disposition. Whether or
not poor or deficient moral character has an effect on
moral development is of lesser consequence than the inclination to simply steer clear of poor moral character.
The nature of this inclination is only partly explained
by a desire to avoid teachers with drastic deficiencies in
character and disposition (e.g., a child abuser, a murderer,
a child pornography addict, etc.), and it is not difficult to
argue that such teachers do not belong in classrooms. But,
again, if we assume that there is no relationship between
the moral dispositions of teachers and the moral development of students, then why are we so readily inclined to
avoid teachers of supposed poor moral character (e.g.,
teachers who are irresponsible, unjust, and uncaring, etc.,
in their practice)? The reason, here, becomes apparent:
We worry that teachers of poor moral character will not
be good teachers. We do not necessarily worry that
students will pick up these less-than-virtuous traits (and
become irresponsible, unjust, and uncaring). Instead, we
worry that their opportunity to learn will be compromised, that such teachers will not be prepared for class,
will be unfair in their grading procedures, and will disregard students special needs. In short, our concerns for
teachers of supposed poor moral character have a strong
connection to our conception of effective and responsible
teaching (and less regard for the possible effects on the
moral development of students).
Discussion
Examination of these three provocative questions
gives rise to various considerations related to the appropriateness of attending to dispositions in teacher education. The first question examines reasons for wanting
teachers of good disposition and moral character. The
second question addresses the moral depth a teacher
must possess to bring about the desired outcomes. And
the third question attends to how a teacher of poor moral
character might have an effect on the analysis of this
relationship and the concomitant emphasis on dispositions

in teacher preparation. In my discussion of responses to
these questions, I suggest that there are multiple reasons
for wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character (of which the most important are not connected to
the moral development of students); that teachers can be
good teachers without necessarily revealing their moral
character and dispositions to students; and that the crux
of the dispositions debate is ultimately grounded in
avoiding poor moral character.
Considered in terms of educational research and practice, these conclusions have particular relevance to the
preparation of teachers. For example, in the context of
teacher education, the tendency to simply avoid poor
moral character is often evident in certain program
policies and procedures, such as the typical program
requirement that applicants must submit to a criminal
background check before entering a public school classroom in any capacity (be it observer, participant, tutor, or
teacher). This criminal background check is part of a
teacher candidates record that programs keep on file to
assure parents, teachers, administrators, and students (as
well as program officials) that a teacher candidate will do
no harm to children. It is, perhaps, initially, the only document in the file that speaks to the teacher candidates
moral character and dispositions. However, the point
here is that the emphasis in such policies and procedures
is not on good dispositions and moral character, per se,
but on the avoidance of poor moral character.
This type of program policy or procedure is probably
necessary, but it does not seem sufficient for sustaining
any commitment to good moral character and dispositions in teacher preparation. What is lacking in the scholarship of teaching and teacher education is an exploration
of additional, more robust, rationales for wanting teachers
of good disposition and moral character. The analysis in
this article provides one: Teacher education programs
want teacher candidates of good disposition and moral
character because they want morally good teaching. That
is, they want to prepare teachers who educate in ways that
align with what is virtuous and good (and not necessarily
teachers who teach the virtues).
In other words, we want teachers of good disposition
and moral character not because we want them to teach
fairness, respect, magnificence, honesty, compassion, and
so on, but because we want them to teach fairly, respectfully, magnificently, honestly, and compassionately. The
distinction here is more than semanticsit represents a
fundamental shift in the moral nature of education and in
the rationale for emphasizing teacher dispositions. Instead
of focusing on the moral development of students, this
reason reflects the importance of the practice of teaching
itself, for its own sake. A teacher who teaches fairly

addresses multiple learning styles, gives appropriate and
relevant homework, and does not favor one student or
group over another. Teaching respectfully requires a
teacher to give due attention to individual students, show
consideration for different viewpoints and opinions,
and refrain from embarrassing or humiliating students.
A teacher who teaches magnificently exceeds students
highest expectations and impresses colleagues, administrators, and parents with the greatness of her practice.
Honest teaching demands that a teacher present controversial issues in an impartial way, be truthful in giving
feedback to students, and refrain from cheating students
out of worthwhile learning experiences. Finally, a
teacher who teaches compassionately shows sympathy
for students inability to comprehend difficult problems,
exhibits concern for students who fall behind in their
work, and spends time after school helping students. The
point here is that we want teachers to teach compassionately or fairly for the sake of good teaching, not because
we necessarily want them to foster compassion and fairness in students.
This rationale for moral character is comparable then
to the reason we want teachers to be knowledgeable in
content and skilled in method. We want teacher candidates to be knowledgeable in content and skilled in methods of delivering that content because we want effective
teachingwe want students to learn that content.
Successful or effective teaching is primarily the domain
of method and content (knowledge of the subject matter
and of the corresponding pedagogy), but could it be that
we want teachers to be morally good in character for the
same reasonbecause we want effective teaching, and
not for the possible moral effects on students?
An affirmative response has an important application
to the practice of teacher education, one that places great
emphasis on the moral base (see Sockett, 1993) that
teacher candidates bring to their preparation programs,
and on the way such a base is consequently articulated
and developed in ways that emphasize its relationship to
effective and successful (as well as good) teaching.3 In
this way, the scope of a teachers moral character is not
limited to matters of a students moral development only;
it is broadened to include all matters of classroom life and
teacher effectiveness, regardless of any effect or influence
on the moral development of students.
Recent research in this domain has indicated a connection between the moral character of a teacher and
the effectiveness of classroom practices. For example,
Richardson and Fallona (2001) show that effective classroom management skills and the moral character (or
manner) of a teacher are tightly connected: Classroom
managementand particularly effective classroom

managementis interwoven with the goals and beliefs
of the teacher, and with his or her manner (p. 724).
Fenstermacher (2002) argues that exceptional teaching
requires teachers to have a profound conception of morality that is in concert with their methods and styles. And
others, such as Campbell (2003), describe the importance
of a teachers ethical grounding in making pedagogical
decisions (see also Ball &Wilson, 1996; Hansen, 2001).
Although such scholarship often makes a corresponding
claim about the moral development of students, it
nonetheless surfaces the often overlooked possibility of
a relationship between the moral character of a teacher,
morally good teaching, and effective or successful teaching. And it is this possibility that broadens the influence
of a teachers moral dispositions in the classroom and
points to an alternative purpose for preparing teachers of
virtuous disposition.
Conclusion
The concept of dispositions needs further refinement
and analysis if it is to be a core element and standard in
the preparation of teachers. However, the controversy
surrounding dispositions is not likely to be settled in its
current form if the nature of the recent debate and discussion continues its current course. That is, teacher educators
(particularly NCATE, their accrediting body) are being
asked the wrong questions and subsequently forced to
respond to misguided inquiries or inquisitions. Before
teacher educators can explore the place or importance of
dispositions relative to knowledge and skills and before
they can examine accusations of political conformity and
thought control related to an emphasis on dispositions, they
must ask a series of prior, more fundamental questions
such as those detailed in this analysisthat address the
fundamental purposes of attending to the moral and
ethical development of teacher candidates. This article
provides one such account, describing a rationale for
wanting teachers of good disposition and moral character
and also pointing teacher educators toward a conception
of teacher education that focuses on preparing teachers
of good disposition and moral character simply for the
sake of teaching that accords with what is good, right,
and virtuous.
Of course, acknowledging such a rationale necessitates
the design of a teacher preparation program that attends
to the development of teacher candidates who have the
knowledge, skills, and dispositions to teach in virtuous
ways. What such a program might look like is beyond the
scope of this article, but it certainly suggests a need to
move away from the moral dispositions police

approach to teacher educationthe approach that merely
seeks to identify teacher candidates of deficient disposition and poor moral character for the purpose of removing them from the program. The assumption might also
be made that the primary alternative to avoiding poor
moral character in teacher candidates is to simply identify
and seek out teacher candidates of good disposition and
moral character. However, to make such an assumption
would be to miss an important implication of the preceding analysis. That is, preparing moral educators entails
more than identifying teacher candidates with desired
traits and dispositions; it suggests that teacher educators
design programs that attend to what it means to teach in
moral ways (and not necessarily the development of
teacher candidates moral character).
It might be argued that this type of teaching is closely
related to the moral character of a teacher candidate;
thus, seeking such candidates is sufficient. However, an
approach to teacher education based on the rationale
provided in this article recognizes that seeking such candidates is not sufficient (and, perhaps, not even necessary). Put another way, an approach to teacher education
grounded in the preparation of teachers who teach in
moral ways acknowledges two distinct possibilities: (a)
Teacher candidates who display virtuous attributes and
traits both in and outside the classroom might still be
unable to translate them into practice and teach in virtuous ways (in fact, it is not difficult to imagine an honest,
responsible, caring person who fails miserably at the task
of teaching), and (b) teacher candidates might be able to
teach or perform morally in the classroom without displaying virtuous behaviors, ideas, and beliefs outside the
K-12 classroom (or, perhaps, even within the teacher
education classroom).
Acknowledging these possibilities alters the focus that
teacher educators might place on dispositions. If there is
a criticism of teacher education in this analysis, it is that
teacher preparation programs focus primarily on the
knowledge, skills, and perhaps, even the dispositions of
teacher candidates without attending to the moral manner
with which a teacher candidate adeptly delivers that content. To teach in moral ways is to connect content knowledge and methodological skill with its moral manner of
conveyancebe it the way teachers interact with students,
interpret tests, deliver instruction, talk with parents, and
so on. In this sense, dispositions are not an entity in and
of themselves that are somehow assessed in their own
right. Instead, they become visible via the practice of
teaching as a modifier to methoddisplayed in a teachers
manner. Future research, then, is needed to both (a) identify visible and definable ways that dispositions as moral
manner modify methods of instruction aimed at improving students opportunities to learn academic content and
(b) study the appropriateness and feasibility of teacher
education practice that emphasizes dispositions for the
purpose of preparing teacher candidates to teach morally
and on developing dispositions related to such virtuous
teaching.
Notes
1. The Manner in Teaching Project was conducted from 1997 to
2000 under the direction of principal investigators Virginia Richardson
and Gary D Fenstermacher at the University of Michigan.
2. No distinction is made in this article between a persons character and a persons disposition. Although definitions of dispositions
have been proffered (see Damon, 2005), it is still difficult to distinguish something we might call a character trait from a dispositional
trait: Dispositions are guided by beliefs and attitudes related to values
such as caring, fairness, honesty, responsibility, and social justice
(National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, 2002, p. 53).
Furthermore, this article assumes that dispositions, like character
traits, are moral in nature (Sockett, 2006; Wise, 2006).
3. Making distinctions between good, effective, and successful
teaching also reveals important implications for teacher education,
but they lie beyond the scope of this inquiry. Fenstermacher and
Richardson (2005) offer a compelling analysis of these distinctions in
their discussion of quality teaching.
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On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good Disposition and Moral Character

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On the Reasons We Want Teachers of Good