EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1595

October 28, 1905

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUANA

VALENCIA,Defendant-Appellant.
Chicote, Miranda and Sierra for appellant.
Palma, Gerona and Mercado for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This was an action by the plaintiff to recover possession of a parcel
of land in the city of Manila occupied by the defendant.
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During the trial in the court below the plaintiff offered certain
documents, showing her title to the land in question. The defendant
introduced several witnesses for the purpose of showing that she
had been in possession of the land in question since 1858 and that
she went into possession of said parcel of land by virtue of a certain
document showing that she had purchased said land of one German
Bate. This document was offered in evidence as proof of defendant's
title to said parcel of land, which document, however, the court
refused to admit in evidence, upon the ground that the said
document only referred to defendant's right to the house erected
upon said parcel of land. The defendant claimed that said document
showed her right to the possession not only of the house, but the
said parcel of lands as well.
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The defendant duly excepted to this ruling of the court and assigns
such ruling as an error in this court. The alleged document does not
appear here as a part of the bill of exceptions, the defendant
evidently believing that because the court refused the admission of
the same as evidence in the court below that she had no authority
to make the same a part of the bill of exceptions. The document
should have been attached to the record and made a part of the bill
of exceptions.
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By reason of the fact that the defendant claims that said document
clearly shows her title to the parcel of land in question and by

reason of the fact that said document is not here, we are unable to
decide what bearing said document has upon the question of the
right of possession to said parcel of land. We are of the opinion that
the inferior court committed an error in refusing to admit said
document in evidence as proof, and therefore hereby revoke the
sentence of the inferior court and order that after the expiration of
twenty days judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and said
cause be returned to that court for trial de novo. So ordered.
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Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Willard, J., did not sit in this case.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3826 December 7, 1907
CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUANA
VALENCIA,Defendant-Appellant.
Ramon Diokno, for appellant.
Rafael Palma, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
This is the second time this case has appeared here. The first appeal
is reported in Volume V, page 182, of the Philippine Reports.
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The evidence presented by the plaintiff to show her ownership of

the land in question is the same evidence presented in the case of
Carmen Ayala de Roxas vs. Agapita Maglonso 1 (4 Off. Gaz.,
459). We there held that such evidence was sufficient. We see no
reason for changing our views upon that subject.
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chan roble s virtua l law lib rary

The defendant and appellant claims that the tract of land occupied
by her is not included in the large tract of land described in the
plaintiff's deeds. We think that the contrary appears, not only from
the admissions made in the answer of the defendant but also from
the admissions made at the trial, to the effect that the tract of land

occupied by her is included in the plan offered in the evidence in the

court below. Comparing that plan with the certificate of the registry
of property, we think that it shows that it is a plan of the land
described in the plaintiff's deeds. That the tract of land claimed by
the defendant is situated in the middle of the land shown in this
plan is apparent from an examination thereof.
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chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

The principal question in the case is whether or not the defendant

has acquired title to the tract of land occupied by her by adverse
possession or not. That she has been in possession of the same
since the 7th of December, 1858, is admitted. The only question is
whether she occupied the land as owner or whether she was there
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff. This question must be determined
by reference to the document under which she entered into
possession. That document is a contract made between her and
German Bate on the date last mentioned. It is claimed by the
defendant that contract conveyed to her the land in question, as
well as the house situated thereon. It is claimed by the plaintiff that
it was only a conveyance of the house and the improvements, and
was not a conveyance of the land. After careful examination of the
document, we adopt the view of the plaintiff. Nowhere in express
terms does this instrument convey the land. It contains the
following phrases:
German Bate has sought and is seeking to sell the house and the
improvements on his lot . . . as he did actually sell to Juana
Valencia the above said house and improvements on said land; . . .
states that the sum of one hundred pesos is the true and reasonable
value and price of said improvements and building . . . and that the
above-cited improvements and building are free; . . . henceforth
conveys and cedes to the purchaser the title and the right of
possession which he has and may have on the said hose and
improvements.
On the same day, apparently, the purchaser, the defendant in this
case, caused thegobernadorcillo to put her in possession, and it is
said that the record of this act indicates that she was put in
possession of the ground as well as of the house and improvements.
It is true that she asked for the measurement and boundaries of the

lot and that she be protected in the possession of it. It is also true
that the gobernadorcillomeasured the ground and caused her to
walk about it and to execute acts of dominion over it, such as were
customary in such proceedings, but it appears that, when he made
his final declaration as to the property of which she thereby became
the owner, he states that it was the improvements and the house,
and nothing is said about her being the owner of the land.
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No title by prescription can be acquired unless the person claiming

the same occupied the land as the owner. We hold in this case that
the defendant did not occupy this land as owner, but was there by
the mere tolerance of the plaintiff, and, consequently, that she, the
defendant, has not acquired the ownership thereof.
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cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

What was said in the decision in the case of Carmen Ayala de

Roxas vs. Agapita Maglonso, above mentioned, is applicable to this
case, so far as it relates to occupation by permission of the
owner.
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The judgment of the court below is affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
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Arellano, C.J., Torres and Tracey, JJ., concur.

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Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., dissent.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5028 February 20, 1909
JUANA VALENCIA,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CARMEN AYALA DE
ROXAS,Defendant-Appellee.
Hartigan and Rohde for appellant.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellee.
WILLARD, J. :

chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

After the judgment of this court in the case of Carmen Ayala de

Roxas vs. Juana Valencia (9 Phil Rep., 322) had been entered, the
record was returned to the court below where an execution was
issued directing the sheriff to put the plaintiff in that suit, who is the
defendant in this suit, in possession of the real property there in
question. The defendant in that suit, who is the plaintiff in this suit,
then brought this action, asking that she be not ejected from the
property until the defendant had paid her for the improvements
which she had made thereon, which she alleged were of the value of
P8,000. A preliminary injunction was granted restraining the
eviction until the termination of the suit. The defendant in her
answer set up a counterclaim for the use and occupation of the
premises from the 1st day of September, 1901. The judgment of
the court below acquitted the defendant of the complaint, and
ordered judgment against the plaintiff on the counterclaim for the
sum of P15 a month as rent from the 1st day of September, 1901.
From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed.
chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Article 453 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Necessary expenses are refunded to every possessor, but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to
him.
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chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Useful expenses are paid the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in his
possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or paying him the increase in value the thing has acquired
by reason thereof.
So far as the plaintiff's claim to recover for the improvements is
based upon the first paragraph of this article, it can not be
sustained. The improvements consisted in filling the lot and erecting
a house thereon. The term "necessary expenses" was considered in
this court in the case of Alburo vs. Villanueva (7 Phil. Rep., 277),
and it was there held that the filling in and improvement of a lot
could not be brought under this head. The construction of the
house, of course, could not, because that was not at all necessary
for the preservation of the lot.
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The plaintiff's principal reliance is, however, upon the second

paragraph of article 453, and her claim is that she was a possessor
in good faith. The status of the plaintiff with reference to third
property was conclusively settled by the decision in the former case.
(Sec. 306, Code of Civil Procedure.) In that case it was said (9 Phil.
Rep., 324):
We hold in this case that the defendant did not occupy this land as
owner, but was there by the mere tolerance of the plaintiff, and,
consequently, that she, the defendant, has not acquired the
ownership thereof.
The question whether a person who occupies by the mere tolerance
of the owner is entitled to recover for the improvements, has
already been decided by this court. In the case of De Guzman vs.
Rivera (4 Phil. Rep., 620), the court said (p. 624):
From the foregoing it follows that the plaintiff occupied the land
unlawfully and by mere tolerance of the actual owners thereof. She
did not acquire when she bought the house any more rights than
those which the former tenant had. She acted in bad faith when she
instituted this action and she can not now avail herself of the
provisions of articles 361 and 434 and other corresponding articles
of the Civil Code.
Without considering the other objections raised to the complaint, we
hold that it can not be maintained because the plaintiff was not an
occupant in good faith.
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The only evidence in the case to show the value of the use of the
land occupied by the plaintiff from the 1st of September, 1901, is
the following agreement made by the parties at the trial:
The parties agree that the lot next to the lot mentioned in the
complaint, occupied by the Chinese Pio Barretto, pays as rent to
Doa Carmen Ayala P237 a month for an area of 4,000 meters.
The lot occupied by the plaintiff has an area of 479.49 square
meters. There is no evidence to show whether the location of the lot
occupied by Barretto is better or worse than the situation of the lot

occupied by the plaintiff. There is no evidence to show what the

natural features of the two properties are so that it can not be said
that one is just as valuable as the other for the purposes of leasing.
The mere isolated fact that one piece of property is actually rented
for a certain sum of money is not sufficient evidence of the value of
the use of an adjoining piece of property without some evidence to
show that they are similarly situated and that one, for the purposes
of renting, has the same value as the other.
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The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the

complaint is affirmed. It is reversed so far as it orders judgment
against the plaintiff for P15 a month from the 1st day of September,
1901, and the plaintiff is hereby acquitted of the counterclaim
contained to either party in this court.
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chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.