25-June 2013 Compilation

115. Guevara vs. Guevara (G.R. No. L 5405.
January 31, 1956)

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills modes of probate
Facts:
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made

various bequests to his wife, stepchildren, and wife in the
second marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a
natural daughter Rosario. Wherein, he acknowledged Rosario
as his natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for
probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It
appeared that only his son Ernesto possessed the land which
he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in
her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as
well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her
legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land
invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based
on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because
his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in
favor of Ernesto should be disregarded. The lower court and
the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with?
Held/ Ratio:
No. It violates procedural law and is considered as an attempt

to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and
its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for
without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory.
Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del Mundo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot. Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del Mundo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot. Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del Mundo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot
116. Gan v. Yap (SUPRA)

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills requirement for probate
to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

11.
Facts:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of

heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings
in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed
any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the
Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the
alleged will. A seventypage motion for reconsideration failed.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of

witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it
was in the handwriting of the testator?
Held/Ratio:
NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a
lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only
medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to
establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up
117. Rodelas v Aranza

of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the

probate court.
Facts:
On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court

of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on
the various grounds.
Issue:
Whether the holographic will which was lost or cannot be

found be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of

holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after
its due execution has been proved. The probate may be
uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may
be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses
are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there
be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of
the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator.
The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity
118. FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO

SINGSON, oppositor-appellee. (G.R. No. L-14003. August 5, 1960)
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died. Francisco Azaola, petitioner

herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said
holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the
sole heir.
Witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic
will (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the death of the
testatrix and witnessed testified he recognized the signatures
therein presenting as evidence residence certificates, special
power of attorney, mortgage document etc
Testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as
well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary
evidence
An opposition was raised based on two grounds: execution of
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife testatrix did
not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will
Probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 (3
witnesses to proven handwriting and signature)
Azaola appealed
PARAGRAPH IF 811 IS MERELY DISCRETIONARY NOT

MANDATORY!
RATIO:
Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not
required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new
Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the
control of the proponent
There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give
a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently
the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes
that in the absence of any competent witness referred to in
the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to Our conclusion is that the
rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is
merely directory and is not mandatory.
ISSUE:
Was Azaola bound to present 3 witnesses even though the will

was not contested?
Held:
NO, REQUIREMENT OF 3 WITNESSES APPLIES ONLY

WHEN WILL IS CONTESTED Was the requirement under 811
mandatory? ACCORDING TO THE SC IN THIS CASE 1ST
119. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY

(G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999)
Facts:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay and two other devisees

and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the will
who died on January 16, 1990.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy filed an
opposition to the petition alleging that the holographic will was
a forgery. Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and
various documentary evidence. Herein petitioners filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the lower court.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal and in support they
reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely:
1.Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, where the probate of the
holographic will was filed; 2. Generosa Senon, election
registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce the
voter's affidavit of the decedent, however, the voters' affidavit
was already destroyed; 3. Matilde Binanay, testified that the
deceased was her aunt, and that she lived with her for eleven
(11) years, During those years she acquired familiarity with her
signature as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals
from her tenants and the deceased always issued receipts,
moreover, she assisted in posting the records of the accounts,
and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors;
4. Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that he handled all the
pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in
connection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband,
he testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will
was similar to that of the deceased but he cannot be sure;
and, 5. Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the DENR who
testified that she processed the application of the deceased for
pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the
deceased; 6. Evangeline Calugay testified that she had lived

with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the
latter. She testified that the signature appearing in the
holographic will is true and genuine.
The Court of Appeals held that even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code in
requiring the production of three witnesses is merely
permissive. Thus, the Court of Appeals sustained the
authenticity of the holographic will and allowed the will to
probate.
Issue:
WON the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are

permissive or mandatory?
Held:
It is MANDATORY under Article 811 of the NCC.
Ratio:
The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a

contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine
signature of the testator. We are convinced, based on the
language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory.
The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order.
In the case at bar, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ
means to defeat the wishes of the testator. It will be noted that
not all the witnesses were familiar with the handwriting of the
testator.
In the case of Augusto Neri, he merely identified the record of
the Special Proceedings. Generosa E. Senon, did not even
produce the voters' affidavit as it was no longer available. The
will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased
but with Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
possession as early as 1985. There was no opportunity for an
expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents. Even the former lawyer of the
deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature. A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different; there were uneven
strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. In the letters, there
are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no
hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,
therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin.
120. NEPOMUCENO vs CA

DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry is

limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practical
considerations may compel the probate court to pass upon
matters of intrinsic validity. A dispositioj in favor of a mistress
is void and a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in
Nuguid v Nuguid, may pass upon such provision for the
purpose of declaring its nullity.
Issue/Held:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a

last will and testament.
It is clear that the testator was legally married to Rufina
Gomez by whom he had 2 legitimate children. but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife (Rufina
Gomez) and had been living with petitioner (nepomuceno) as
husband and wife In the will: petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno is
the sole heir and only executor. Totally Excluding Rufina and
his children.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament but was opposed by legal wife and children.
Respondents: the fact that the last will and testament itself
expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the
fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence
on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator,
which led private respondents to present contrary evidence,
merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid vs
nuguid.
The admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between
him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.
WON testamentary provision in favor of nepomuceno is null

and void.----> YES. void
Ratio:
Facts:
RTC: denied probate CA: set aside the decision ofRTC.

declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of
the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation
to Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
The court of appeals is correct. The contention of respondents

are correct. the admission of testator in the will of its illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the
legality of the devise.
The donation between persons who are guilty of adultery of
concubinage at the time of the donation intervivos is void and
the prohibition applies to testamentary provisions. The devise
of him to nepomuceno is void, therefore Rufina and his
children are the right heirs to inherit.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
In Nuguid v Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the
testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this
nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Article 739 CC (void donations) 1) those made between
persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of donation. Xxx Article 1028 provides that 739 apply to

testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior
existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his will. There is
also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together
in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his
death.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is
against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
121. Gallonosa vs Arcangel

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills Effects of decree of
probate
SUMMARY:
Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80

years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in
1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he
bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second
wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the
said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro
& Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also
gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as
executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the
recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed
on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate,
another acton against Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a
result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect when he

was 80 years old. He died. He survived by his brother.
A petition for the probate of his will was filed in the
CFI.Florentino bequeathed his one- half in the conjugal share
to his second wifeTecla and should Tecla predecease him, his
one- half share would be assigned to spouses Pedro
Gallonosa (child of Tecla from her first marriage)who grew up
with Florentino.
The testator's legal heirs, the surviving brother,nephews and
nieces filed an opposition. However, oppositors did not present
any evidence in support of their opposition.
JUDGE: admitted the probate of the will
The testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses submitted a

project of partition covering the 61 parcels of land. The project
partition was approved by the Judge.
Leon Hitosis instituted an action against Pedro Gallanosa for
the recovery of 61 parcels of land that they themselves had
been in continuous possession of those land. They wanted to
be declared the owner of the land. Later on, another acton
against Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the
lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the
lower court set aside the 1939 decree of probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hitosis have a cause of action in filing the

annulment of the will of Florentino Hitosis for the recovery of
61 parcels of land even if the will is already probated?
HELD:
No. There should be no annulment of the will once it is

probated.
RATIONALE:
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial

testament duly probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The
proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands
adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by
virtue of the probated will.
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will.
In Manahan vs Manahan--- If the legal requirement in the
execution of the will has been complied with,these facts
cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not
even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will In Austria vs.
Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was
not entertained after the decree of probate had become final.
That case is summarized as follows: Wills; Probate; Alledged
Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted to

probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said
order. It was admitted that due trial legal notice had been
given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order,
a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will
declared null and void, for the reason that fraud had been
practised upon the deceased in the making of his will.
Held:
That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given
parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate
a will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinary
actions; but without deciding whether or not an order admitting
a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed
for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an
order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent
litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to
its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its
due execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of the
testator. IN SHORT,
RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the
due execution of the will. Due execution means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud or undue influence.
Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities
provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already
expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the
grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law,
and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic
collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the
discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and
testament.
122. Roberts vs. Leonidas (G.R. No. L 55509. April 27, 1984)
probate
case should be consolidated with the estate proceeding and

the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the cases.
Facts:
Grimm, a US citizen living in Manila executed two wills in San

Francisco, California.
One will disposed of his Philippine estate and the other
disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. Ethel, Grimms
daughter from the first marriage, filed a petition for intestate
proceeding and was named as the special administratrix.
Maxine, Grimms second wife, opposed on the ground that
their was a pending probate proceeding in Utah, USA.
Maxine later filed a petition for probate of the 2 wills, already
probated in Utah and prayed that she be appointed as special
administratrix. Since the parties wanted it, Maxine, Edward
(son Maxine and Grimm), and Ethel were all appointed as joint
administrators of the estate. The joint administrators submitted
an inventory of the estate and the project of partition was
approved by the intestate Court knowing that the testator left
two wills.
Issue:
Whether or not the intestate court should continue with the

intestate proceeding and continue with the project of partition?
Held/Ratio:
No. A testate proceeding was proper in this case.The probate

of the will is mandatory because Grimm died with two wills and
"no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).
It was anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. The intestate
123. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

probate
Facts:
Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he

instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It
was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina
Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal
wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that there
was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the
testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will
invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner
which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only

since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look
into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a
donation
made
between
persons
guilty
of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art,
1028 it is also prohibited.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a

will
RULING:
Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's

area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however
not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the
will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between
the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the
court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
124. De la Cerna v Rebaca-Potot

probate
include the disposition of said joint will, in so far as the estate

of the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo.
Facts:
Spouses. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,

executed a joint last will and testament. The Court of First
Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the
testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code
of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on
appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals
reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939
was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on
the due execution of the testament.
Issue:
Effects of validity of joint will as to share of wife who dies later

than the husband.
Held/Ratio:
Where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon the
death of the husband said will was admitted to probate by a
final decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife dies
later, it is held that the said first decree of probate affects only
the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the
wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of each
testator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the estate of
the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and
not to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will is
shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentary
heir is the only heir of said wife.
A final probate decree of a joint will of husband and wife
affects only the share of the deceased spouse and cannot
125. TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased,

ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. PEDRO DE LA CRUZ,
ET AL., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-24819. May 30, 1969
Topic: Grounds for disallowance
FACTS:
2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any

surviving descendant or ascendant, died. Petition for the
probate of her alleged will was filed by Andres Pascual, who
was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent.
Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews
and nieces of deceased contested the validity of the will on the
grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied
with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of
her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the
testatrix was obtained through fraud.
Probate court rendered judgment upholding the due execution
of the will and appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor
and administrator of the estate
Oppositors filed directly with SC because estate was worth
more than 300k. Oppositors claim that the lower court erred in
giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing
witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies
According to the Lower court the inconsistencies were
acceptable since the will was signed in 1954 and the
testimonies were taken in 1962. It was understandable and
reasonable to expect that said witnesses will not retain a vivid
picture of the details surrounding the execution and signing of
the will
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
1.) Were the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses a
ground for disallowance of probate? NO
We agree with the trial judge that the contradictions
and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the
witnesses and the notary relate to unimportant details
of the impressions of the witnesses about certain
details which could have been affected by the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory, and which
inconsistencies.
2.) Was there fraud, undue influence in the signing of the will
NO
Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses
were better known to proponent Andres Pascual than
to the testatrix suffices to render their testimony
suspect. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the
mere fact that a Will was made in favor of a stranger is
not in itself proof that the same was obtained through
fraud and undue pressure or influence, for we have
numerous instances where strangers are preferred to
blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case
at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood
to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not
a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her
own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de
la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but
also her sisters held him with affection so much so that
Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her
sole heir to her property in her Will without any
objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
included in the decedents testamentary dispositions annulled

was filed.
126. Austria v Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079, 27 February 1970)

Topic: Institution of heirs, devisees, legatees - FALSE CAUSE
Issue:
Facts:
Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante

mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was
opposed by the present petitioners who were nephews and
nieces of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the
probate of the will was allowed.
Under the will of Basilia, the bulk of her estate would pass on
to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani
Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Lyn Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally
adopted children. More than two years after her will was
allowed, Basilia died.
The respondent Perfecto Cruz was subsequently appointed as
executor of her estate. However, the petitioners filed in the
same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition
alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin of Basilia
and that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law. Such petition in intervention
was allowed. More than three years after they were allowed to
intervene, the petitioners moved the lower court to set for
hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the
respondents, rendering these respondents mere strangers to
the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Before
the date of the hearing arrived, one of the respondents
Benita Cruz Meez filed a motion asking the lower court to
confine the petitioners intervention to properties not disposed
of in the will of the decedent.
The court granted the said motion. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the lower
court.
Hence, this instant petition for certiorari to have the order
restricting petitioners intervention to properties that were not
WON the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the

event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by
the decedent was false?
Held:
YES, under Article 850 of the Civil Code provides: The

statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause. As such the extrinsic validity
of the will is controlling (there were no evidence that deceased
hesitated or was mistaken in bequeathing her estate to the
adopted children) and the court respects the wishes of the
deceased in giving the bulk of her estate to her adopted
children.
Ratio:
Under this provision, before the institution of heirs may be

annulled, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause
for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second,
the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
From the use in the will of the terms sapilitang tagapagmana
(compulsory heirs) and sapilitang mana (legitime), the
petitioners contended that the institution of the respondents as
heirs was only impelled by her belief that they were her
compulsory heirs. However, the Court made mention of the
fact that if such reason indeed prompted the testatrix in
instituting the respondents, Basilia did not make it known in
her will.
The Court found petitioners theory to be highly speculative of

what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed the
will. The Court could not annul the institution of heirs on the
basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. The phrases,
"mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana" were
borrowed from the language of the law on succession and
were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs
instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance.
They offered no absolute indication that the decedent would
have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had
known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for
legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate
which largely favored the respondents showed a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than
what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. This
may be taken in comparison with the relatively small devise of
land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives,
including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. If
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al, were excluded from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and
nieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy
a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
127. AZNAR VS DUNCAN
Topic: Preterition - manner

DOCTRINE:
The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is

explained in this case. While the traditional concept of
omission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory
heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so
that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in
the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said
compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in

the Philippines, died leaving a will. It was admitted to probate
by the Court of First Instance of Davao and declared Helen
Garcia as his natural child.
CFI approved project of partition. It was divided between Lucy
Duncan and Helen Garcia, both his daughters. The said order
was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had
been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir
was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of
them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the
legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies
have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to
the legatees.
In the will: it was only lucy duncan who were declared as
daughter and helen not in any way related to him but she was
given some legacy.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there
has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the
direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir,
pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code.
Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is

governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code which says: "Any
compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less
than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same
be fully satisfied." And considering the provisions of the will
whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with
Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless, although
less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918
In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to

the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the
institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to
him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in
his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In order
words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as
heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen, Helen Garcia is not
mentioned as an heir - indeed her status as such is denied but is given a legacy of Php3,600.00.
HELD/RATIO:
(Manresa cited three cases in spanish) In each one of those

cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy
worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of
the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815
applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs
be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the
expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may
be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He
refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter,
and limited her share to a legacy of Php3,600.00. The fact that
she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such

status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration
come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her
would have undergone any change and that he would have
willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone
was expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri et al. v Akutin, 74 Phil 185, is
cited by appellees in support of their theory of preterition. That
decision is not here applicable, because it referred to a will
where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to
them, or at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator
did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left
her a legacy of Php3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death
consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen
Plantation company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth
(1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime.
Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of
the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is
entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or
increments thereof subsequently accruing. These include the
stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of
Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according
to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in
effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with
respect to her legitime.
Decision: giving Helen Garcia no more than the portion
corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4)
of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges
which shall not include those imposed in the will of the
decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code
128. Tirso Reyes vs Lucia Baretto- Datu (Gr. No. L-17818)
Topic: Preterition - manner

Preterition - The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
FACTS:
Bibiano Barreto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their

lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real
properties in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan. When Bibiano
Barretto died. He left these properties in a will to the following:
Salud Barretto, mother of the plaintiff's ward Lucia Milagros
Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters
Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
The usufruct of the fishpond that was situated in Hagonoy,
Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria
Gerardo was appointed as administratix.
There was a project partition and it was approved by the court.
As a result, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates
of title and the issuance of new tittles in her own name.
Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the
distribution of the said estate until the widow Maria Gerardo
died.
Upon Maria's death, it was discovered that she executed two
wills: FIRST WILL: instituted Salud and Lucia Milagros (was a
minor when she signed the partition and Maria signed as the
guardian of Lucia) as her heirs SECOND WILL: she revoked
the first will and left all the properties in favour of Milagros
Barretto alone. THUS MAKING THE LAST WILL ALLOWED
AND THE FIRST WILL REJECTED
RTC ruled that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent
Maria by her husband Bibiano Barretto. As the legitimate heir
of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff Tirso falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given
in the usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo, Hence, this
ACTION IS FOR THE RECOVERY OF ONE-HALF PORTION.
RESPONDENT LUCIA contends that the project partition from
which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud
Barretto did not acquire any valid title
RTC ruled that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Bibiano Barretto to be null and void ab initio because Salud
was not the a daughter of Bibiano and Maria. Also, the court
REJECTED the contention that since Bibiano Barretto was
free to dispose of the 1/3 of his estate under the old civil code,
his will is valid in favour of Salud to the extent of the free
portion because under the New Civil Code, the property
acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied
trust for the real owner.
NOTE: PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: the fact that Salud
happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being the one of his heirs expressly named in the
testament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SALUD is precluded from acquiring property

from the will?
HELD:
No. She was not precluded.
RATIONALE:
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and

guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have ignored that the
distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in
agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud
on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place,

there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto
was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor,
Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's
child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria
Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor
her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable
therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such
fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from
its discovery, and the record shows that this period had
elapsed long ago.
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud
and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is
not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the,
Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to
contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by
the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiffappellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should
account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by
Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows
that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described
in the complaint should have been given due course.
129. Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72706. October
27, 1987)
Ratio:
Topic: Preterition compulsory heirs

Facts:
Constantino Acain filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition

for the probate of the will of his late uncle, Nemesio Acain, on
the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the
former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs.
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia
Fernandez and Rosa Diongson Vda. De Acain, a legally
adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively,
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino
Acain had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) He
is merely a universal heir; and (3) The widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited.
Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and
Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains
motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson Vda.

De Acain had been pretirited?
Held:
1.) Yes. (Virginia Fernandez)
2.) No. (Rosa Diongson Vda. De Acain)
Article 854 of the Civil Code: The preterition or omission of

one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted
daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he/she were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person
a legal heir of the adopter.
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear
case of preterition of the legally adopted child (Virginia
Fernandez).
To tolerate the probate of the will and allow the case to
progress when on its face the will appeared to be intrinsically
void as allowing the petitioner and his brothers and sisters to
be instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact
that one of the private respondents had been preterited would
have been an exercise in futility.
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus

added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will
was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid,
supra.) The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written.
130. REMEDIOS NUGUID, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA

NUGUID
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December

30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
Remedios Nuguid Petitioner prayed to the CFI to admit to
probate a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her
demise and that letters of administration with the will annexed
be issued to her. The will instituted Remedios as universal heir
and omitted Felix and Paz completely.
CFI held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
Issues/Ratio:
(1) WON this is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition. From this, petitioner draws the conclusion
that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention
and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by

law. "
Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's
parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced
heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from
preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir".
This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as
it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived.
(2) WON compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to

receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is
reduced to the extent of said legitimes. Yes, they are entitled
to their legitimes but the institution of heir is still invalidated by
law not just merely reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall
into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing
the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles
814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the
institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will
never have any application at all. And the remaining
provisions contained in said article concerning the

reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would
be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by
Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is
due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs
from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to article 814, which
is the only provision material to the disposition of this
case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is
therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterments. And they are separate and
distinct not only because they are distinctly and
separately treated in said article but because they are
in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ...
But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. The disputed order, we observe, declares the
will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the
Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of
heir". Considering, however, that the will before us
solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.
Decision: Order affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
131. Balanay, Jr. v Martinez

Facts:
Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973 survived by her

husband, Felix Balanay Sr., and by their six legitimate
children, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban
and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the
probate of his mother's notarial will. In that will Leodegaria
Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern
half" of nine conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute owner
of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that
their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties.
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her
husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's onehalf share of the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate
of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors
claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached
thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay Sr. wherein he withdrew
his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he
was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay

Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of
Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he
manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and
renounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their
six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the
agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her
death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended
that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay Sr. were
void. The lower court in its order denied the opposition and
reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay Sr.
Issue:
Whether Felix Balanay Sr. could validly renounce his

hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, Felix Balanay Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary

rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art.
179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar as said renunciation
partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half
share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1050(1), Civil Code), it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance.
Or at least his legitime should be respected.
132. ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA,
respondents (G.R. No. L-41971. November 29, 1983)

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation. (814a)
FACTS:
Undisputed facts:
Deceased Solano was married to Pilar Riosa (died),
then married Lily Gorand (french who he later
divorced), in 1930 he had an amorous relationship with
Juana Garcia (mother of petitioners) then in 1935
started living with Trinidad Tuagnon (mother of
respondent)
During the Japanese occupation, Solano divorced
Gorand and executed an "Escritura de Reconocimiento
de Unit Hija Natural" acknowledging ZONIA as a
"natural child"
SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento"
instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his
personal and real properties
During his lifetime, Deceased Solano filed a petition for
probate of his will in which Zonia Solano was instituted
as heir and executrix.
Bienvenido and Emerita Garcia (Garcias) filed an action for
recognition against Deceased during his lifetime, the deceased
denied paternity. Deceased died, hence was substituted by

Zonia as the deceased's sole heir.
ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitute
defendant" claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of
her father, SOLANO, and asking that she be allowed to
assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the
least interference from the GARCIAS
GARCIAS impugned the recognition of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child praying the latter be declared as
an adulterous child of the decedent and also impleaded the
estate of Solano
Trial Court: three (3) children shall share equally the estate or
one- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given to
Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the estate. -Affirmed by the CA
SC -- bound by facts found by TC and SC (above mentioned
undisputed facts)
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) Were the Garcia's entitled to a claim in the estate of the
DECEASED SOLANO? -- YES
(2) Did the lower court in declaring null and void the institution of
heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacy
resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in
SOLANO's estate when said estate was under the jurisdiction
and control of the Probate Court in Special Proceedings act
beyond its jurisdiction? -- NO
RATIO:
SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the Will

during his lifetime. That proceeding was not one to settle the
estate of a deceased person that would be deemed terminated
only upon the final distribution of the residue of the hereditary
estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have
terminated except that it appears that the parties, after

SOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings therein.
It is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to
its due execution. A probate decree is not concerned with the
intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will.
Lower court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the facts,
the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as
illegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a
"natural child" in a notarial document executed by SOLANO
and Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous
because at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still
married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only
in 1943
Being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact,
pretended from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that
as a result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole
heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the
Civil Code.
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
The pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of
ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs
is impaired. It is a plain that the intention of the testator was to
favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under
the law, he had a right to dispose of by will, so that the
disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half
(1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freely
dispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists
of one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and
ZONIA each have a right to participation therein in the
proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary share
will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while
the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of

the value of the estate.
133. Seangio v Reyes (G.R. No. 140372-72. 27 November 2006)
direct line. (Basing also its decision in the case of Acain vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court).

ISSUE:
FACTS:
Private Respondents, Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the settlement

of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio
opposed said petition, contending that Segundo left a holographic
will disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the disinheritance
was due to Alfredos maltreatment (lapastangan at isang beses
nagsalita ng masama sa harap ng kanyang ama dahil siya ay
nangutang ng 1million noon at ginamit pa ang pangalan ng kanyang
ama) to his father Segundo.
In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in
the event the decedent is found to have a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings of the will.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not
contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased (thus does not
meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code) and
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir.
Devisee or legatee hence there is preterition (disregarding or
omitting) which would result to intestacy.
Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition (disregarding or
omitting) does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute
a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsory
heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
The RTC dismissed the petition for probate holding: A perusal of the
document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only
heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs
being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned,
Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the
WON the compulsory heirs in the direct line were preterited

(disregarding or omitting) in the will?
HELD:
No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited
(disregarding or omitting) in the will as it abide with the requirements
under Article 810 of the Civil Code which described a holographic
will.
RATIO:
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is

not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking
into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will
is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
According to the SC, it was Segundos last expression to bequeath
his estate to all his compulsory heirs with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her
as the universal heir. Her name was included only as a witness to
the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
134. ESQUIN VS ESQUIN

Topic: Preterition completion of legitime
FACTS:
Jan. 19, 1899. Emilio Antonio Esquin de los Santos executed

a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, staging therein
that he was
a. a Native of Cavite;
b. has 2children but one deceased;
c. that he was married about six months previously to
Maria Teresa Ponce De Leon;
d. Had no lawful descendants
e. IN
CASE
HE
HAS
DULY
REGISTERED
SUCCESSOR, HIS CHILD WOULD BE HIS SOLE
AND UNIVERSAL HEIR
f. BUT THAT AS IF, AS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE
CASE, THERE SHOULD BE NO SUCH HEIR, HE
NAMED HIS FATHER FRANCISCO ESCUIN, AND
HIS WIFE MARIA PONCE DE LEON AND HIS
UNIVERSAL HEIRS, THEY TO DIVIDE THE ESTATE
IN EQUAL SHARES BETWEEN THEM.
Testator died on Jan. 20, 1899
Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners
were appointed to consider claims against the estate.
The lawyer for the widow and for the minors, appealed to CFI
from the findings of the aforesaid commissioners.
The proposed partition: testator left only P8k+ pesetas. From
the said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded
to be admitted by the commissioners, 10% remuneration due
to the administrator, all legal expenses paid and approved.
Deducted the above mentioned amounts, there remains a 5k+.
The partition and adjudication was proceeded with the sum of
P5k+ into three shares to each one of the parties in interest,
that is,
a. the natural son, Emilio Esquin y Batac, in full control as

general heir;
b. the widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of one
half of the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition;
and the said widow the usufruct of the other half of the
aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition,
c. the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by
the widow being adjudicated to Francisco Escuin, as
legatee taking into account the provisions of Article 817
of the Civil Code upon making the division.
The representative of the minor natural child of the testator
objected in writing to the partition proposed by the
administrator, and for the reason he set forth asked that the
same be disapproved, and that in lieu thereof the entire estate
be adjudicated to Emilio y batac, the said minor.
It was also presented that in a certified proceeding, plaintiff
asked that an allowance be granted to him for subsistence for
account of the estate of the late testator, and that the same be
paid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered
declaring that the minor, is a natural child of the testator.
The administrator in answer to the complaint denied all facts
alleged.
TC: escuin y batac was the recognized natural child of the late
Emilio Escuin de los Santos, has by Julia Batac. And one of
the heirs of the late testator.
By an order of the lower court, the judge expressed an opinion
that a natural child is only entitled to one fourth of the
hereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled only
in so far as the amount to be divided should be reduced,
taking into account the share due to the natural son and the
right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one half of the remainder of the property of the estate.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. WON there was preterition YES
There is preterion to1/3 of the estate, which amount

constitutes the legal portion of a natural child;and for
the reason that minor was ignored in the will, the
designation of heirs made therein was, as a matter of
fact annulled by force of law; in so far as the legal
portion of the said minor was thereby impaired.
Legacies and betterments shall be valid insofar as they
are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot
deprive the heirs of their legal portions, express in the
cases expressly indicated by law.
2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate

NO
notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of
heirs was annulled and that the law recognizes the title
of the minor. Esquin y Batac, to one-third of the
property of the natural father, as his lawful and general
heir, it is not proper to asset that the late Emilio Escuin
de los Santos died intestate in order to establish the
conclusion that the said natural child is entitled to
succeed to the entire estate under the provisions of
article 939 cc, in as much in accordance with the law a
citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate. It is
clear and unquestionable that it was the wish of the
testator to favor his natural father and his wife with
certain portions of his property which under the law he
has the right to dispose of by will, as he has done,
provided the legal portion of his general heir was not
thereby impaired. The two former persons being
considered as legatees under the will.
135. Palacios v Ramirez (Gr. No. L-27952)

Topic: Substitution of HDL Kinds (a) simple; (b) compendious; (c)
reciprocal; (d) fideicommisary
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez, a Filipino national died in Spain with only his

widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by
the CFI Manila
Petitioner Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed as
administratrix of the estate. She submitted a project of partition
as follows: the properties of the deceased shall be divided into
two parts: ONE PART shall go to the widow in satisfaction of
her legitme THE OTHER PART or free portion shall go to the
respondents Jorge and Roberto Ramirez and 1/3 of the free
portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining
2/3 with a usufruct in favour of Wanda.
Respondents Jorge and Roberto opposed the partition on the
following grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution
of usufruct in favour of Wanda is invalid; (b) that the provision
for fideicommisary substitutions are also invalid because the
first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree based on Article 863 of the NCC; (c) that
the grant of usufruct over real property in the Philippines in
favour of Wanda, who is an alien, violates Section 5 Article III;
(d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Escolta Building between the widow Marcelle and the
appellants, violates the testator's express will to give it to them.
RTC ruled to approved the project of partition. The
respondents appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents' contention as regards the

fideicommisary substitution in favour of Wanda over two thirds
of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v.

Ramirez is invalid?
HELD:
Yes. The respondents are correct, the fideicommisary is

invalid.
RATIONALE:
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void

because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently
because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before
the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it
also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the
appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the
following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is
explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura,
and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of
Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need
not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and
Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. By providing
that the substitution shall not go beyond one

degree "from the heir originally instituted." The
Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir
must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can
only be either a child or a parent of the first heir.
These are the only relatives who are one
generation or degree from the fiduciary
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any

alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by
paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, SC uphold the
usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in
the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land
in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit

the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and
867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners.
The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real
properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides
as follows: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
(Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct
given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but
also testamentary succession. SC pointed out that
the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the
136. Vda. De Mapa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-38972.

September 28, 1987)
Facts:
Concepcion Mapa De Hidrosollo died leaving a will and

designating her spouse Ludivico Hidrosollo as the universal
heir of her estate having died without any descendant or
ascendant. Ludivico was designated as universal heir but with
the obligation to hold the residue of her estate in trust for their
nephews and nieces.
Issues/Held/Ratio:
b.) Whether or not a trust can be created without consideration of

the legitimes of the compulsory heirs? - NO
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the
surviving spouse of the testatrix, Ludivico was entitled
to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate.
As that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory
heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed
upon the legitime by the testator. (Art. 904, second
paragraph Civil Code of the Philippines).
The trust created by Concepcion should therefore be,
as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the free
portion of her estate; that portion not covered by
Ludivicos legitime.
a.) Whether or not a trust was created? YES

Although the word "trust" did not appear in the will, the
testatrix's intent to create one was nonetheless clearly
demonstrated by the stipulations in her will. In
designating her husband as universal and sole heir
with the obligation to deliver the properties to
petitioners and private respondents, she intended that
the legal title should vest in him, and in significantly
referring to petitioners and private respondents as
"beneficiarios" she intended that the beneficial or
equitable interest to these properties should repose in
them.
These designations, coupled with the other provisions
for co-ownership and joint administration of the
properties, as well as the other conditions imposed by
the testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of the
parties over the properties adverted to in the will.
"No particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended. " (Art. 1443, Civil Code of the Philippines).
137. CRISOLOGO v SINGSON

FACTS
Action for partition by Sps Crisologo against Singson. This

involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged
that Singson owned half pro-indiviso of said prop and that
Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly probated
last will of Singson (the orig owner).
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a
mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of
the property in question, and that therefore, she was not
entitled to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson
appealed.
At the time of the execution of the will, the nearest living
relatives of the orig owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel
and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad,
and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion

vulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria? SUSTITUCION
VULGAR
RATIO:
The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only
designate heirs wholl succeed him, but also substitutes in the
event that said heirs dont accept or are in no position to
accept inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.
Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person
w/ obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to another,
totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event.
The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of

heir in this manner: upon death of Consolacion Florentino,
whether before or after that of testatrix, property bequeathed
to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to
testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their
forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion
Florentino.
If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be
that Consolacion Florentino, upon death of testatrix, became
owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided
for sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing
more than usufructuary rights over same half. In the former,
she would be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As
Manresa says, if fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of
property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights until
time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario,
its obvious that nude ownership over property, upon death of
testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and
the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario.
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution
that an obligation be clearly imposed upon first heir to
preserve & transmit to another the whole or part of estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon happening of
particular event. For this reason, Art 785 of old Civil Code
provides that fideicommissary substitution has no effect unless
made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing
upon first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance
to a substitute or second heir.
The substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly
made of fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear
statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall
only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to
her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of
the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
appellee's death, whether before or after that of testatrix, her
share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
138. Rodriguez v Court of Appeals
Topic: Substitution of HDL void conditions
Held/Ratio:
Facts:
Whether the trust created is nullified because of the perpetual

prohibition to alienate provided in the will.
Dona Margarita Rodriquez died leaving a last will and

testament. There was no issue and to its extrinsic validity. The
executor then presented a project of partition which was
approved without opposition. The testatrix did not leave any
compulsory heirs or forced heirs but the testatrix created a
trust in favor of herein petitioners which the herein
respondents who are allegedly the first cousins of the
deceased objected to. The objection was overruled and upon
appeal to the CA, the decision was affirmed.
The disputed clause reads thus: [Clausula Decima O Pang
Sampu] ipinag uutos ko na ang mga pag-aaring nasasabi sa
Clausulang ito ay pangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga
ang ipagbubukas ng Fideicomiso sa Juzgado sa pagkatapos
na maayos ang naiwan kong pag-aari. Ang pangangasiwang
pag-aari ay ang mga sumusunod: xxx. Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang generator at
automobile) hindi maisasanla or maibgbibili kailan man,
maliban sa pag aaring nasa Quezzon Boulevard, Maynila, na
maaring isanla kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa
ipagpapaigi o ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa
kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.
Upon reconsideration, the CA held that clause 10 of the will
perpetually prohibits the alienation of the testatrixs property in
contravention of Articles 867 and 870 of the civil Code (which
are against perpetuities and the limitation regarding the
inalienability of the hereditary estate). Thus, since the trust
created is null and void and there being no institution of heirs,
the rules of intestacy is entitled to inherit. The case was then
remanded to the lower court.
No, to cause partial intestacy in this case is uncalled for. For

the first twenty years, the prohibition to alienate is valid, but
not for the period in excess of twenty years. Article 870
provides that the disposition of the testator declaring all or part
of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years is void.
Therefore, what is declared void is the testamentary
disposition prohibiting alienation after the 20-year period. In
the interim, the provision is not invalid. The will should be
interpreted liberally and in favor of making the disposition
operative. The function of the courts in cases where the
testatrix has no forcible heirs and is thus absolutely free to
give her estate to whomsoever she choose (subject to the
payment of her debts) is to carry out the intention of the
deceased as manifested in the will.
Issue:
139. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS

AND MARIA MARLENACOSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
Respondents. [G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
TOPIC: Testamentary dispositions - MODAL
A modal imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.On the other hand, in
a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or
be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator.
The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates
but does not suspend
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of

testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-ininterest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee. Codicil was duly probated.
Pertinent portions of the codicil:
a. give, leave and bequeath the property owned by me to
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
b. Should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already
received the ownership also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire,
Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies,
every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) piculs of Export sugar and
Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the
said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
c. Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall
give Lot shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the
sugar as specified
d. That in the event that the one to whom I have left and
bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee,
shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver

yearly the sugar
The lot was transferred to the name of Jorge Rabadilla, when
he died he was survived by his wife and children
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil (heirs
failed to deliver sugar)
Plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return to the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza Johnny Rabadilla (son of Jorge Rabadilla)
filed an answer -- reached an amicable settlement to deliver
No compliance with the amicable settlement - except for partial
compliance
RTC dismissed -- CA reversed
ISSUE/HELD:
Does Art 882 on modal institutions apply in this case? -- YES.

Testratix intended the property to be inherited by Jorge
Rabadilla
RATIO:
Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
The Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof
would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property,
and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver
the fruits.
In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's
near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article
882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion
sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the
testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose
or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the
charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other
hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition
must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.
It can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation
on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar. testatrix did not make Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in
nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
140. Francisco v Francisco-Alfonso (354 SCRA 112, G.R No. 138774.

March 8, 2001)
Topic: LEGITIMES - Definition

FACTS:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the sole legitimate

daughter of Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz while
petitioners are illegitimate daughters (total of seven children)
of the latter with his common law wife Julia Mendoza.
Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land
situated in Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital
in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificate of
title of his property were in the possession of the petitioners.
When Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificate of title
from petitioners and they informed her that Gregorio had sold
the land to them in 1983 as executed by a Kasulatan.
After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of petitioners. In 1991, Aida filed with the
RTC, Bulacan, a complaint against petitioners for annulment of
sale with damages. In their joint answer, petitioners denied the
alleged forgery or simulation of the Deed of Sale.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
while upon appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
The SC find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could

raise the amount of P10,000.00 , or that earnings in selling
goto or lugaw could save enough to pay the deceased
15,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners
were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to
whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to
whether the property was bought below or above its supposed
market value. They could not even present a single witness to
the Kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
The petition is hereby denied and decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
Also under the Civil Code, the legal heirs such as in this case,
the respondent cannot be deprived of her share in the estate
of her deceased father by a simulated or even in a valid
contract transferring the property of her father to his
illegitimate children, because it is her vested right under Article
888 of the Civil Code.
Lastly, the legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be
determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for
settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir cannot be
deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.
ISSUE:
WON the Kasulatan or Deed of Sale is valid?
HELD:
No, the Kasulatan was simulated. There was no cause or

consideration for the contract of sale. The same was a
simulation and hence, null and void.
RATIO:
141. SPOUSES JOAQUIN vs CA
Topic: LEGITIMES - Definition

DOCTRINE:
The legitime of a compulsory heir is merely inchoate and vests

only upon the death of the parents. While still alive, the
parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided such
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
FACTS:
Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the

parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad,
as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds
of sale of real property executed by defendant parents in
favour of their co-defendant children.
The plaintiff children are claiming that no valid consideration
for the deeds of sale were made and that the purported sale
was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.
Compulsory heirs have the right to legitime but such rights is

contingent since said right commences only from the moment
of death of the decedent.
There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their
parents. In determining the legitime, the value of the property
left at the death of the testator shall be considered.
The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time
as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot
claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father
will show that the deeds of sale were all executed for valuable
consideration.
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the deeds of sale
were absolutely simulated.
ISSUE/HELD:
Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant

children valid? --->YES
RATIO:
The right of children to the properties of their parents, as

compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the
parent's death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of
their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in
fraud of creditors.
143. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio (G.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972)
Topic: Legitimes Compulsory heirs
Held/Ratio:
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against

Eufemio S. Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly
on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.
They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman
named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance
of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before
the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to
present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969.
Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June
1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the
one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved tosubstitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Yes. An action for legal separation becomes abated, by the

death of the plaintiff even if property rights were involved.
These rights were mere effects of the decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself. Without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of
a decree, these claims were merely rights in expectation.
If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and
academic and there could be no further interest in continuing
the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by
either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in

an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights?
144. Balanay v Martinez

FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her husband and 6

children as heirs.
Her son Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of her
will contained declarations of her ownership of the southern
half of their conjugal properties and that her properties be left
undivided during her husbands lifetime and the heirs
legitimes be satisfied from the fruits of the properties.
Felix Balanay, Sr., though initially opposed to the probate for
he was preterited, later on relented and renounced his share in
her estate.
The CFI gave effect to the widowers conformity and appointed
its clerk of court as special administrator.
When a purported lawyer for Felix Balanay, Jr. came and filed
a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will, the
CFI declared the will void and converted the testate
proceedings into intestate proceedings and ordered the
issuance of notice to creditors.
Felix Balanay, Jr. asked that the lower court reconsider
alleging that the purported lawyer was terminated hence the
withdrawal of the probate was unauthorized. Denied.
validity before formal validity can be established. The probate

of the will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
But the probate court erred when it converted the proceedings
from testate to intestate despite the fact that it gave effect to
the conformity of the widower. The rule is that the invalidity of
some of the dispositions will not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions unless it is presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made. The illegal dispositions such
as the statement of the testatrix claiming ownership of the
southern part of the conjugal lands and the provision that her
properties be left undivided contrary to law does not nullify the
entire will. Such may be disregarded. But by reason of the
widowers conformity, it had the effect of validating the partition
in the will without prejudice to the rights of the creditors and
the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Hence the lower court
erred when it did not proceed with the probate. Except in
extreme cases where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it
is the probate courts duty to pass first upon the validity of the
will.
ISSUE:
W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic

validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity.
RATIO:
The SC ruled that in view of certain unusual provisions in the

will, which are of dubious legality and because of the motion to
withdraw assumed to have been filed with authorization, the
trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic
145. Solano v Court of Appeals
the property that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the
legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the
hereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right
to participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each.
ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2)
or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be
entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate. The
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the properties
indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
Topic: Legitimes compulsory heirs

Facts:
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad

y Testamento", instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his
personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao,
all in the province of Albay, except for five parcels of land in
Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given to Trinidad
Tuagnon in usufruct Upon SOLANO's petition, the Will was
duly probated on March 10, 1969 in Special Proceedings.
Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that the GARCIAS
and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the
DECEDENT.
Issue:
Disposition:
The hereditary share in the estate of the decedent of petitioner

Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of
1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while that of private respondents,
Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be
(1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The usufruct in favor of
Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected.
Whether Zonias acknowledgment as a natural child in a

notarial document executed by Solano and Trinidad Tuagnon
is valid thus considering her as compulsory heir.
Held/Ratio:
No. at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married
to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943,
and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, that being
compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended from
SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of
said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by
SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code.
It is a plain that the intention of the testator was to favor
ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, under the
law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that the disposition
in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of
146. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.

ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA
ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO
ROSALES, respondents. (G.R. No. L-40789. February 27, 1987)
FACTS:
Mrs. Petra V. Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her

husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children
Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the
herein petitioner
Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate, she was appointed administratix
Trial court declared the following the legal heirs: Fortunata T.
Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales,
son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a

widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation.
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate
children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing,
legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or
widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred
to in article 287;
The aforesaid provision of law # 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law. We so hold, that a surviving spouse
is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother

can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. Daughter in law
cannot inherit
RATIO:
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,

namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who
inherit by the right of representation.
147. Acain v CA (155 SCRA 100)
Topic: LEGITIMES Compulsory Heirs
No, insofar as the widow is concerned under Article 854 of the

Civil Code, but YES in the case of the legally adopted child
Virginia, basing in the will of the deceased.
FACTS:
RATIO:
In 1960, Nemesio Acain wrote a will (written in Bisaya which

was translated in English) giving all his properties to his
brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo predeceases Nemesio,
to Segundos children. Segundo died before Nemesio.
Petitioner Constantino is one of Segundos children. In 1984,
after the death of Nemesio, Constantino petitioned the court to
have the will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson,
Nemesios wife, and Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted
child of Nemesio and Rosa on the following grounds for the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings
(Supreme Court held under Article 782, petitioner has no legal
standing because he is not an heir of the testator and Atty.
Ignacio Villagonzalo was appointed as the executor of the
testament); (2) he is merely a universal heir (he was yes
declared as universal heir see Ratio); and (3) the widow and
the adopted daughter have been pretirited (partly see held).
The opposition was denied by the trial court, hence Diongson
and Fernandez went to the SC, which transferred the case to
the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate
petition since Diongson and Fernandez were preterited.
Constantino went to the SC on certiorari, contending that the
CA could not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before it is
admitted for probate. Diongson and Fernandez opposed,
contending that certiorari is not a proper remedy.
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she
is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
Yes. Her legal adoption by the Nemesio has not been
questioned by Constantino. Under Article 39 of P.D. No.
603,known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear
case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing
was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided
in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents have been pretirited? (the widow

and the legally adopted daughter).
HELD:
148. CASTRO vs CA (GR NO. L-50974 ;May 31,1989)

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro
v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of
properties against the defendant alleging that they are the
forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac.
Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an
action for partition of properties against defendant Benita
Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also
compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc,
Tarlac and that they are entitled to the partition of the
properties of said deceased.
The defendants in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval
is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said
Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the
complaint for partition has no cause of action.
The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana
Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro
who was already dead were the children of the deceased
spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina
Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the
surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro.
Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth of
benita castro naval gave the date indicated in the civil registry
that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the
Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the
baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen.
When Eustaquio Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the
immediate members of the family in mourning were present,
among whom was Benita Castro Naval.
On this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No.
3762 admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced
heir of Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio

Castro in Civil Case No. 3763.
The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the
natural mother of Benita C. Naval was wedded to Felix de
Maya against her wishes. While the celebration of the wedding
in Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the guests soon
found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party
and went to the house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan
at Barrio Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling, Tarlac, and
there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix de
Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San
Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real
sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro
Naval.
Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who
was then in the wedding party learned of the disappearance of
his sister. He finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro. A
few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two persons
went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac
and informed them that Pricola was already living with him as
husband and wife. Pricola's parents mere submitted to their
daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio Castro and Pricola
Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the death of
Pricola.
There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived
with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore,
free to marry Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita
Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born on March 27, 1919.
After the death of her mother, when she was only five years
old, she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until
his death on August 22, 1961.
Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got married to Cipriano
Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in
marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of
by her father.
TC: Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized

child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to
participate in the partition of the properties left by him. These
properties are the subject of the civil cases.
CA: The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the
private respondent is an acknowledged and recognized child
of Eustaquio Castro
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the

acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio
Castro -----> YES
RATIO:
Provisions of new family code applies in this case and not the
old law as contested.
There is no question that the private respondent is an
illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio
was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to
live with him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage
because when Pricola fled from her own wedding party on
May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already
been solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated
although it could not be consummated because the bride
hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved.
Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late
Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she
was conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919
until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years,
Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that
a parent bestows on an only child. The private respondents,
themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762
that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family
is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother
Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of

Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a
legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.
It was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported
and registered. There is no indication in the records that
Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from
reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the
certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or
that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial
action to establish her status as his recognized natural child
during the reglementary period to do so.
It was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to
Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father
even after the wedding and until the latter's death. the
certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family
during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of
recognition under the Civil Code but they add to the equities of
this case favoring the petitioner.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the
respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are
only two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The
fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated.
Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children."
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate
children provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (265a, 266a; 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending
her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim
legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.
Petition dismissed. Decision of CA AFFIRMED

25-June 2013 Compilation

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

25-June 2013 Compilation

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

115. Guevara vs. Guevara (G.R. No. L 5405.

January 31, 1956)

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made

Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with?

No. It violates procedural law and is considered as an attempt

116. Gan v. Yap (SUPRA)

to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of

WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of

117. Rodelas v Aranza

of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the

On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court

Whether the holographic will which was lost or cannot be

Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of

118. FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO

Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died. Francisco Azaola, petitioner

PARAGRAPH IF 811 IS MERELY DISCRETIONARY NOT

Was Azaola bound to present 3 witnesses even though the will

NO, REQUIREMENT OF 3 WITNESSES APPLIES ONLY

119. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay and two other devisees

deceased; 6. Evangeline Calugay testified that she had lived

WON the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are

It is MANDATORY under Article 811 of the NCC.

The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills requirement for probate

The general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry is

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a

WON testamentary provision in favor of nepomuceno is null

RTC: denied probate CA: set aside the decision ofRTC.

The court of appeals is correct. The contention of respondents

of donation. Xxx Article 1028 provides that 739 apply to

121. Gallonosa vs Arcangel

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80

Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect when he

The testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses submitted a

Whether or not Hitosis have a cause of action in filing the

No. There should be no annulment of the will once it is

What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trial

Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted to

case should be consolidated with the estate proceeding and

Grimm, a US citizen living in Manila executed two wills in San

Whether or not the intestate court should continue with the

No. A testate proceeding was proper in this case.The probate

123. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he

nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only

Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a

Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's

124. De la Cerna v Rebaca-Potot

include the disposition of said joint will, in so far as the estate

Spouses. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,

Effects of validity of joint will as to share of wife who dies later

125. TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased,

2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any

included in the decedents testamentary dispositions annulled

126. Austria v Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079, 27 February 1970)

Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, ante

WON the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in the

YES, under Article 850 of the Civil Code provides: The

Under this provision, before the institution of heirs may be

The Court found petitioners theory to be highly speculative of

127. AZNAR VS DUNCAN

Topic: Preterition - manner