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testimonies of the witnesses at the hearing of this case on this subject were unrebutted by the appellant. (Ibid, pp.
28; 29 and 30).
Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical compositions in question had long become public property, and
are therefore beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
3.
Bayanihan vs. BMG, G.R. No. 166337, March 7, 2005
Facts: On July 16, 1973, private respondent Jose Mari Chan (Chan) entered into a contract with petitioner
Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc. (Bayanihan), whereunder the former assigned to the latter all his rights, interests
and participation over his musical composition "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While". On March 11, 1976, the
parties entered into a similar contract over Chan's other musical composition entitled "Afraid For Love To Fade".
On the strength of the abovementioned contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the National
Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for each of the two musical compositions, thus: November 19, 1973,
for the song "Can We Just Stop and Talk A While" and on May 21, 1980, for the song "Afraid for Love To Fade."
Apparently, without the knowledge and consent of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co-respondent
BMG Records (Pilipinas) [BMG] to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then
recently released album of singer Lea Salonga.
Issue: Whether or not BMG violated the copyright law?
Ruling: Unquestionably, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2)
songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably with Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code, Section 172.2 of which reads:
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well
as of their content, quality and purpose.
It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1978, respectively, there
being neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the
two-year period agreed upon by the parties.
Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say 'that such
purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual
Property Code,[10]cralaw because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof.
It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost two
years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the
recent "use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love to Fade,'" or almost
three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive
relief. By then, it would appear that petitioner had no more right that is protectable by injunction.
4.
Kho vs. CA, 379 SCRA 410
Facts: The petitioner's complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the name and style of KEC
Cosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream
Container/Case, as shown by Certificates of Copyright Registration No. 0-1358 and No. 0-3678; that she also has
patent rights onChin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from
Quintin Cheng, the registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office on
February 7, 1980 under Registration Certificate No. 4529; that respondent Summerville advertised and sold
petitioner's cream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby
misleading the public, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner's business sales and income; and, that the
respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the petitioner.
The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive and authorized
importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory of Taiwan; that the
said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated
Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and other appropriate governmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics
Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights through misrepresentation and falsification; and, that the
authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patent registration certificate, to distribute and market Chin Chun Su
products in the Philippines had already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the exclusive title over the distribution and sale of the patented products?
Ruling: Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged
with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services
(service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods.12 In relation thereto, a
trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise.13 Meanwhile, the scope of a
copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and
artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation.14 Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to
any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is
industrially applicable.15
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its container. The
name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls
squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream
product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The petitioner's
copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use
of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a
preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear
right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a
trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
5.
Unilever vs. Procter & Gamble, G.R. No. 119280, Aug. 8, 2006
Ruling: After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA and affirm its decision in toto:
Petitioner does not deny that the questioned TV advertisements are substantially similar to P&GPs "double tug" or
"tac-tac" key visual. However, it submits that P&GP is not entitled to the relief demanded, which is to enjoin
petitioner from airing said TV advertisements, for the reason that petitioner has Certificates of Copyright
Registration for which advertisements while P&GP has none with respect to its "double-tug" or "tac-tac" key visual.
In other words, it is petitioners contention that P&GP is not entitled to any protection because it has not registered
with the National Library the very TV commercials which it claims have been infringed by petitioner.
We disagree. Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a work or intellectual creation subsists from the
moment of its creation. Accordingly, the creator acquires copyright for his work right upon its creation. Contrary
to petitioners contention, the intellectual creators exercise and enjoyment of copyright for his work and the
protection given by law to him is not contingent or dependent on any formality or registration. Therefore, taking
the material allegations of paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 of P&GPs verified Complaint in the context of PD 49, it cannot be
seriously doubted that at least, for purposes of determining whether preliminary injunction should issue during the
pendency of the case, P&GP is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its Complaint.