Rule 128 Cases Full

G.R. No.
177407
February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza),
which, in turn, assailed the Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in
Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC)
for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal
offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her
Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as
follows:
"EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12,
1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x
Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound
examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the

certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated
March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30,
1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally an Annex
to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein
complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be
also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document marked as
Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex
3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on
May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16,
1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999,
which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the
draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination which is the document
appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr.
Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr.
dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certified
photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a
certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are
the same as that which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies,
not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay.
He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by
the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of
[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation
of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose
they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons
stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8,
2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its
probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the
evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN
HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH
THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO
ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF
RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT
AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN
RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY
RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left
to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that
the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether
the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely
hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant
or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which
reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do
not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on,
is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas medical
case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal
complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who
handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in
evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of
her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory judicial notice.11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting
a matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not
be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that
Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in
their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left nonfunctioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of
Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15
Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals
of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16
Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal
offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Raffle dated
August 2, 2010.
**
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Raffle dated
August 2, 2010.
1
Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (a retired member of this Court), with
Associate Justices Juan Q. Enrique, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp.
95-106.
2
Dated May 26, 2004 and October 8, 2004, respectively; id. at 408-411.
Id. at 95-99.
Id. at 677-678.
Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA
384, 403-404.
6
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839, 845-846 (2003).
Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.
Id., citing People v. Jaca, et al., 106 Phil. 572, 575 (1959).
358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).
10
Rollo, p. 101.
11
RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1.

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
12
13

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
14
Science of life, definition of Websters Third New International Dictionary.
15
16
TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.
G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are asked to play the role of an infallible God by
exercising the divine right to give or take away life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our
error can result in the worst of crimes murder by the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there
pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking her
with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result
thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and lacerations
of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which
are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO,
Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the
2
case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired.
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the
four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his
(Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and
then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length
from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's length from the
house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the window of appellant's house.
She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She
approached appellant's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight
shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to
her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana,
then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and
his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that
the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called
out appellant from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he
was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the
call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed
and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla
and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and
recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a
stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His autopsy report
reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck,
down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior chest
wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd,
left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right
forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum..
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the
promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and

anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL &
RECTAL OPENINGS.
Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that the
proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic) penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum
of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to death by
electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons,
the method of carrying out his sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the grievous
offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court. A
new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant assails the decision
of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both
substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence
and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) of
Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the
list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking
him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to
him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It implements the
constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
3
against him." The new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided
4
by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution. Judicial notice
can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or
5
English language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. The
importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect
known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English
language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what
dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English
was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty transcript during his
6
arraignment, reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.
Interpreter (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated
section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his
7
constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment
of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3
of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a
8
"searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts reveal the following:
Note (After reading the information to the accused,

accused pleads guilty.)
Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the
amended law is a heinous crime, because of your plea
of guilty without the consent or even against the
discretion of the court, the court will give you a
mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged,
do you understand?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary
will or without any force or intimidation from any one or
whatever?
Accused None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or
maltreated by anyone and that will just be the
consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your
body?
Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and
showed to the court his body from waist up.)
Court You were not maltreated in the jail?
Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so
that you will be examined by a physician to the order of
the court?
Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no
use because there will be a mandatory death penalty, do
you still insist on your plea of guilty?

Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will
be some effects on your civil rights hut not until the
decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the
records of this case.)
In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz:
xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready,
Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.
Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of
evidence by the prosecution Arnel Alicando, please
come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near
to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of
evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to the
crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of
rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary
without force, intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of
evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court Okey, proceed.

Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision
10
11
of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. The bottom line
of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about the
personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant
were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that
appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to
explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea
of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he
was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical
abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994
Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by
inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC, informed this
office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM this date when the suspect
ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP,
been arrested and mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in
connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA
Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place who was discovered dead under the
house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on lock up cell was also
mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon him hematoma contusion on different
parts of his body.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death
penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he
has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil
rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that
under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea
of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must
require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is
sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The change is
salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous
conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far
12
worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free.
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. To
13
quote its Decision, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a
14
15
pillow with bloodstains in its center and the T-shirt of the accused colored white with
bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order.
They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.
These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP
as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the
16
benefit of counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel
Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
A Yes, sir.
Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel
Alicando?
A After I finished investigating the body of the victim,
Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel
Alicando was a suspect in the raping of Khazie Mae
Penecilla?
A Yes, sir
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q And who was that person who informed you of the
suspect?
A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the
morning of June 13, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the
morning of June 13, 1994?
A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated
him.
Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in
interrogating and investigating Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the
afternoon of the same date?
A Yes, sir.
Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still
investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and
interrogating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to
this case.
Q What date did you stop your investigation?
A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white Tshirt and pair of earring.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never
informed the court that you apprised the accused of his
constitutional rights, is that correct?
A I apprised him.
Q My question is, during your testimony before this court
under the direct examination of the prosecution you
never informed the court that you apprised the accused
of his constitutional rights?
Pros. Fama:
I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?
Court:
Sustained.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed
Alicando of his Constitutional rights?
A On June 13.
Q On what hour did you inform him?
A After the witness identified him.
Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?
A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer
and I have interpreted in Visayan language.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days
the accused was never represented by counsel, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer
to inform the person of his constitutional rights?
A Yes, sir.
That is all, Your Honor.
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence
uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible against him.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of
the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his right to
silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's
constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly
used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3
17
Tan makes this all clear, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the
incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point?
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he used the fish
basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already dead.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and the pillow wherein
he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla
Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time?
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my companion, who went
to the place of the incident.
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place did you recover those things?
A Inside the room where he raped the child.
Q Whose house is that?
A The house of Imelda Alicando.
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place is that situated?
A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of Imelda Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused Arnel Alicando further
informed me that he kept the gold earring of the victim and her clothes inside the room of the
house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took place hanged
on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the bamboo post of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right side.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items accompanied by the
accused?
A No more, I only followed his direction.
Q He made verbal direction to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)
Q Please examine that white t-shirt?
A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary
rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone
18
v. United States.
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also
19
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it
is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the
State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
20
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case
21
of People vs. Salanga, et al., a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in
the rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took
him into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear
was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons , we ruled
that "the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so22
called "fruit of the poisonous tree."
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court
erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was
raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt
were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they
were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony that the stains were caused
by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was
the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not
unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation. Romeo Penecilla
himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because he used to accompany me
23
during butchering of animals."
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the
prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of
Article III of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge
this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection
to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the
heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should be
concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration against a 4-year old
girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with the multiplication of
malevolence in our midst for there is no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition
of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws of our land. These concerns
are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of time.
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish violators
of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction
and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity
of the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is
involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural
irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs.
24
People, et al., ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can
be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is
void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the
case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment
that allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside
and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Vitug, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution
for the commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly and
repulsive comes along that even an individual usually predisposed towards
rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no longer wish to suffer in silent rage at
society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily opt to exact a
commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so
demand.
Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that
setting absolute outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group
identification and survival. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth
when he wrote, in The Common Law (1881), "The first requirement of a sound body of
law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)." 1
Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton
destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards sustainable development and prosperity while
at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted Republic Act
2
7659, imposing capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.
The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek prefix haton,
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts charged in the case at bench belong to this genre.
A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the
gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the appellant who, according to the prosecution, was
not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death. Whether or
not the circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is the ultimate issue
before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I am afraid, I have to dissent from the
majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the lower court's conclusions. We
should not shirk from our legal duty to impose the death penalty.
I
In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a
drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the appellant.
Appellant was residing at his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's house.
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his wife
looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call of
nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were
informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's
3
length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew.
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of
appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed
the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she crept two
steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the door, and saw
appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada became frightened
and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in
her house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she heard
that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she called out from her window and asked
4
appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was drunk.
With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was arrested.
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing Khazi
5
Mae. The police were able to recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain in the middle,
and a stained T-shirt owned by appellant.
An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following findings:
BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right
anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest
wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero-inferior chest wall.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac
crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
EXTREMITIES:
left forearm.
forearm.
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum.

anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION
6
RECTAL OPENINGS.
Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the crime of rape with homicide, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured cervical vertebra and
lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other
injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for reception of evidence for the accused, if he
8
wished to.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medicolegal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo
Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's father.
The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the
proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.
The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the
accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's imposition of the death penalty the
Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the basis
of the following alleged procedural irregularities:
First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;

Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;
Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
I strongly disagree.
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on arraignment
and plea.
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1) there
is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information was not read in the
language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not absolutely
require that the same be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains
nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was read in the
language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the
lower court.
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:
Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before
the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused
a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record shall
not affect the validity of the proceedings.
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to inform
him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend the charges against him as well as the
circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes the imperative duty
of the lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the information but also to
9
explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.
Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While justice
demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
10
conviction.
Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of
guilty to a capital offense:
(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused's plea;
(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and
(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and
should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to observe this requirement commits a grave
abuse of discretion.
These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of the
appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:
Prosecutor Edwin Fama
Appearing as public prosecutor.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.
Interpreter:
(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note:
(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court:
Question of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a
heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even
against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory
death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand that?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any
force or intimidation from any one or whatever.
Accused:
None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by anyone
and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note:
(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his
body from waist up).
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined
by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your
civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
11
Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more asked
appellant if he was sure of his plea.
Fiscal Fama:
Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera:
For the accused, Your Honor.
Court:
Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the
prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture, Arnel
Alicando, come near to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the
prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape with
homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the
imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Okey, proceed.
12
It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that the
trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea, and that he repeatedly warned the
defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words
A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed manner
suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry
13
as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot we held that:
A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused
has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently other
by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the
judge's, intimidating robes.
xxx xxx xxx
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching
inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused, or as to
the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured
according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age, educational attainment,
and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular
barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself that: (1) the accused,
in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that
there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his testimony. This Court
leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the
same time, that they will be true to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law.
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into
voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and fast
rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded. Judges are
not required to go into obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background
of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of questions he is
fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious
attention to detail which furthers the end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae bordering on
obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law. Apropos to this there
is
B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the appellant.
The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations written
in the English language without any indication, whatsoever, that the same was translated from a language
or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one observes that the bulk of
proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On
the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly bother to point out those sections of
the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English. Because of this widespread practice,
which the section on arraignment in the Rules of Court does not proscribe the presumption of
regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to review the criminal cases decided by
this Court since the imposition of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there
was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal cases were, the records therein then ought to
show, conducted in a language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense
then becomes apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings
were actually conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of
Rule 116 even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea
on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on record whether
proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The
argument that the information was not read in the language or dialect known to appellant merely grasps
on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be bereft of merit.
Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an interpreter
is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the language or dialect
known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic notes submitted to the court
only reflect the court proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records do not
categorically indicate that the information was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant or
that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is presumed, as
we have actually done in many cases before this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence
14
of any evidence to the contrary. In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense
to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of
fastidiousness in the enforcement of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant was
clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of
a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he had every opportunity,
through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of
his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At this
time, appellant had more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible
consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he had enough
time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express reservations about the
same. However, in spite of several warnings given by the trial court on different occasions, appellant
stood pat with his judicial admission.
Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the
trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put up any
defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented against him (in
fact, it was appellant himself who directed the police investigators to the location of the various physical
15
evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings ).
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his arraignment
and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of significance in the context of the majority's
insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void. In the face of the
seriousness of the accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs.
Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of
crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi- confession. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a
matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an

16
inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea
of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that an extrajudicial
confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities
that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and should not be glossed over, his
conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial
confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial confession only
serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial
confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even assuming the
extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed
by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty
on arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of
the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible
eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with
full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise
17
nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty, when formally entered on
18
arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.
19
This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in several cases ) the trial court
received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea,
there was more than sufficient evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts
charged.
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by law
enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial investigation of the accused in the case at
bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other factual
material obtained at trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's conviction
ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown out. I shall discuss them
in the interest of thoroughness.
Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law enforcement
officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused during his uncounseled custodial
investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken supposedly in violation
of the Constitution, the pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have been excluded by the court
below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and
seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals. The fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively flowing from
illegal searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under conditions
proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its exceptions, and the evidence in
dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.
The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law
enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those areas
where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to form two
teams to undertake two separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and one for the
possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered with a thorough
search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was initially conducted
(obviously because of logistical reasons), primarily for a suspect, it would have logically followed had a
suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his voluntary, though uncounselled
confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken, under conditions which would have
validated a warrantless search, where the same physical evidence would have been inevitably
discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's volunteered information, the pieces of evidence
objected to the blood-stained pillow, the T-shirt and the victim's earring would have fallen into police
hands by legal means which would have normally been undertaken by the authorities in any case.
Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of the
poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the more appropriate question in such cases is
whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the
illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality.
Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would
have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.
I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have been
inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that evidence derived from
information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
20
where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.
The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a confession by the accused in a bank
robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason that the information which led to his
confession, though the product of an illegal search would have been discovered in the absence of such
21
illegality. The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a witness is
discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he would have been
22
discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted investigation. These and other recognized
limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the effect of our
exclusionary rules. Rather, they serve the purpose of the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance
between the need to deny evidence come by through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand and the
need to minimize opportunity for the defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially
23
undesirable bonanza. Certainly it could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would
not have gone back to the site for a better inspection.
THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF
THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered by the
police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough review of the evidence utilized by the trial court
leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained, in any case,
24
without the pieces of evidence objected to. Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a shifting of the
pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected to would nevertheless
still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused with moral certainty. These
include:
1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he
committed the acts charged;
2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.
Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion let
pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's testimony, allow me once again to quote
from the transcript:
Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30
P.M.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q Where is your house situated?
A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.
Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Palapala?
A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.
Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?
A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.
Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?
A He was upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.
Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you know?
A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.
Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house of
his uncle, Romeo Alicando?
A Khazie Mae was his companion.
Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae
Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando at
that time?
A No more, only the two of them.
Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you
observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando wherein
Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?
A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a yemas
candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.
Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you
observe after that if there is any?
A The child cried.
Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you said
the child was crying?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed at
that time?
A And then she squealed.
Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child
squealed, what did you do if there was any?
A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando,
where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up two
steps.
Q And then what did you do?
A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there was
an opening.
Q Have you seen anything inside that house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you seen if there is any?
A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top of
the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.
Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae
Penecilla?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do after seeing that?
A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down
from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .
Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your
house?
A My friend.
Q Who is the name of your friend?
A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).
Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your
house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the house
of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of the victim,
Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What action did your compare do if there was any?
A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he
went home.
Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.,
where were you?
A I was inside the house.
Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that
time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you observed?
A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her.
Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of Khazie
Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your mind to report
the incident to the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on what you have
seen at that time?
A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel Alicando.
Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the
evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.
Q Did you talk to him?
A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando and
asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.
Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?
A I was inside my house.
Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel
Alicando's house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?
A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.
Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00 o'clock,
what did you observe in your barangay?
A None.
Q You have not observed anything?
A None.
Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla
found their daughter?
A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.
Q Of what day?
A June 13, 1994.
Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found by
their parents?
A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from their
house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under their
25
house.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or
falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony
was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the credence and
the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on evidence. Such
factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are accorded great weight and
respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial court had the every
available opportunity to observe the demeanor of the lone witness during the trial. Her belated reporting
of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court to accord great weight, is
hardly out of the ordinary.
Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard
norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
26
experience. Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to choose
27
not to get involved when a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few unsolved crimes.
Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation and fear of possible
reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her part to reveal what she
had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm and casual as possible, and pretend
that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when she asked appellant what time Khazi
28
Mae got down from his house following the incident. Given these factors, it would have been too much
to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear, revulsion and instinctive self-preservation to harness
superhuman reserves of courage to stop appellant when she saw him
29
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped. Some individuals
flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing the dead girl's distraught parents, and
overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally driven by
conscience to reveal what she knew the following morning.
The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances.
However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's conclusions were founded principally on the
direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime. It is
worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense crossexamination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi Mae at appellant's house;
that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal, peeped into the opening
and saw appellant on top of the victim. These were the very same declarations she made when she took
the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as to whether it was the right or the
left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk
30
her credibility. She had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant and there were no possible
motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any way related to the Penecillas, and there was no
evidence adduced to show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her
31
credibility is even enhanced by the absence any improper motive.
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence
corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last
seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of Khazi
Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress,
bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of these pieces of evidence
does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly
relevant in the face of ample legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty verdict.
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He argues
that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull movement 2)
the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the presence or absence
of the male semen was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of
death was asphyxiation by strangulation.
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to take a
look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear
was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate facilities of the
NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for
the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as this would only serve as
32
corroborating evidence to the fact of rape.
Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital organ of
33
the victim. The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the
fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object. In view of settled
jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the
vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or absent. Absence of emission
does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she
peeped through an opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the autopsy report
revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to the crime committed and its authorship in the
case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of
Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape
was established by definitive legal evidence.
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation, it
cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the same occasion. As we observed in People
34
v. Yu, unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot be altered by the
circumstances that both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The accused had to choke
35
and strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her.
Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime or
Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 which provides:
Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx
Having thoroughly evaluated the evidence utilized by the trial court in convicting the accused with the
crime of subject to our automatic review, it is painfully clear even to those who have reservations about
imposing the death penalty among us that we have reached the point of moral certainty necessary to
the imposition of the supreme punishment of death in this case.
Convictions for the crime of rape have been sustained by this Court in an overwhelming number of cases
on uncorroborated evidence given almost exclusively by the complainant alone. Against this backdrop (of
most cases of rape where reliance is placed solely on the victims allegations) the trial Court in the case at
bench, arrived at its conclusions principally on the basis of two key pieces of testimonial evidence: 1) the
accused's admission of guilt in not one but two occasions in open court (in the presence of his lawyer)
even after being warned on both occasions by the judge of all the possible consequences of his
admission the accused's admission of guilt; and 2) the essentially uncontradicted testimony of an
eyewitness to the crime itself. Even with the relatively minor inconsistencies of the latter's testimony
which the defense spiritedly tried to magnify the net effect of the same was to enhance, not diminish,
the testimony of the lone eyewitness because minor incongruencies are on the whole indicative of honest
36
and unrehearsed declarations and often amplify the credibility of such declarations. Ordinarily, as
stated earlier, convictions for rape have been obtained on the basis far less evidence. Parenthetically,
either one of these testimonies, standing alone, would have been adequate to obtain the accused's
conviction.
In fine, let me reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death penalty for
specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our courts with no choice but to impose the penalty for
crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone unturned, finds it necessary to
impose the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible God exercising a divine right to give or
take away human life, but as a fallible human institution recognizing the importance of according majesty
to laws so indispensable to maintaining social order. In the instant case, after a thorough and searching
review of the evidence and an evaluation of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced either in
support of an acquittal or of imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly obvious to us that the trial
court committed no error in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature, the
quantum of evidence necessary to convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in conformity
with the mandate of law and the Constitution.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution for the
commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly and repulsive comes along that
even an individual usually predisposed towards rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no longer wish
to suffer in silent rage at society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily opt to exact a
commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so demand.
Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that setting absolute
outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group identification and survival. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth when he wrote, in The Common Law (1881), "The first
requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
1
the community, whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)."
Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton
destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards sustainable development and prosperity while
at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted Republic Act
2
7659, imposing capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.
The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek prefix haton,
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts charged in the case at bench belong to this genre.
A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the
gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the appellant who, according to the prosecution, was
not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death. Whether or
not the circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is the ultimate issue
before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I am afraid, I have to dissent from the
majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the lower court's conclusions. We
should not shirk from our legal duty to impose the death penalty.
I
In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a
drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the appellant at his (Romeo's) house at
Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the appellant.
Appellant was residing at his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's house.
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his wife
looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call of
nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were
informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's
3
length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's distraught parents what she knew.
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of
appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy "yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed
the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she crept two
steps up the appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the door, and saw
appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck. Rebada became frightened
and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in
her house at that time, of what she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she heard
that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she called out from her window and asked
4
appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was drunk.
With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was arrested.
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing Khazi
5
Mae. The police were able to recover from appellant's house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain in the middle,
and a stained T-shirt owned by appellant.
An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following findings:
BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right
anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest
wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right
antero-inferior chest wall.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac

crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
EXTREMITIES:
left forearm.
forearm.
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum.
anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION
6
RECTAL OPENINGS.
Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the crime of rape with homicide, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured cervical vertebra and
lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other
injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for reception of evidence for the accused, if he
8
wished to.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medicolegal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo
Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's father.
The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the
proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.
The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the
accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's imposition of the death penalty the
Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the basis
of the following alleged procedural irregularities:
First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;
Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;
Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were
inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
I strongly disagree.
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on arraignment
and plea.
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1) there
is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information was not read in the
language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not absolutely
require that the same be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains
nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was read in the
language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the
lower court.
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:

Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before
the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused
a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the
complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record shall
not affect the validity of the proceedings.
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not
guilty shall be entered for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to inform
him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend the charges against him as well as the
circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes the imperative duty
of the lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the information but also to
9
explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.
Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While justice
demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
10
conviction.
Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of
guilty to a capital offense:
(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused's plea;
(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and
(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and
should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to observe this requirement commits a grave
abuse of discretion.
These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of the
appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:
Prosecutor Edwin Fama
Appearing as public prosecutor.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.
Interpreter:
(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note:
(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court:
Question of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a
heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even
against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory
death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand that?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any
force or intimidation from any one or whatever.
Accused:
None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by anyone
and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note:
(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his
body from waist up).
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined
by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your
civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
11
Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more asked
appellant if he was sure of his plea.
Fiscal Fama:
Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera:
For the accused, Your Honor.
Court:
Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the
prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture, Arnel
Alicando, come near to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the
prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape with
homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the
imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Okey, proceed.
12
It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that the
trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea, and that he repeatedly warned the
defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words
A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed manner
suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry
13
as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot we held that:
A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused
has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently other
by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the
judge's, intimidating robes.
xxx xxx xxx
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching
inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused, or as to
the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured
according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age, educational attainment,
and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular
barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully convince himself that: (1) the accused,
in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that
there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his testimony. This Court
leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the
same time, that they will be true to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law.
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into
voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and fast
rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded. Judges are
not required to go into obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background
of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of questions he is
fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious
attention to detail which furthers the end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae bordering on
obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law. Apropos to this there
is
B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the appellant.
The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations written
in the English language without any indication, whatsoever, that the same was translated from a language
or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one observes that the bulk of
proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On
the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly bother to point out those sections of
the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English. Because of this widespread practice,
which the section on arraignment in the Rules of Court does not proscribe the presumption of
regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to review the criminal cases decided by
this Court since the imposition of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there
was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal cases were, the records therein then ought to
show, conducted in a language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense
then becomes apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings
were actually conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of
Rule 116 even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea
on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on record whether
proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The
argument that the information was not read in the language or dialect known to appellant merely grasps
on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be bereft of merit.
Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an interpreter
is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the language or dialect
known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic notes submitted to the court
only reflect the court proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records do not
categorically indicate that the information was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant or
that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is presumed, as
we have actually done in many cases before this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence
14
of any evidence to the contrary. In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense
to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of
fastidiousness in the enforcement of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant was
clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of
a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he had every opportunity,
through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of
his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At this
time, appellant had more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible
consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he had enough
time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express reservations about the
same. However, in spite of several warnings given by the trial court on different occasions, appellant
stood pat with his judicial admission.
Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the
trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. He did not put up any
defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented against him (in
fact, it was appellant himself who directed the police investigators to the location of the various physical
15
evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings ).
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his arraignment
and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of significance in the context of the majority's
insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void. In the face of the
seriousness of the accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs.
Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of
crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi- confession. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a
matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an
16
inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea
of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that an extrajudicial
confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities
that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and should not be glossed over, his
conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial
confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial confession only
serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial
confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even assuming the
extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed
by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty
on arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of
the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible
eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with
full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise
17
nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty, when formally entered on
18
arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.
19
This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in several cases ) the trial court
received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea,
there was more than sufficient evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts
charged.
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by law
enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial investigation of the accused in the case at
bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other factual
material obtained at trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's conviction
ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown out. I shall discuss them
in the interest of thoroughness.
Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law enforcement
officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused during his uncounseled custodial
investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken supposedly in violation
of the Constitution, the pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have been excluded by the court
below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and
seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals. The fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively flowing from
illegal searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under conditions
proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its exceptions, and the evidence in
dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.
The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law
enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those areas
where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to form two
teams to undertake two separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and one for the
possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered with a thorough
search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was initially conducted
(obviously because of logistical reasons), primarily for a suspect, it would have logically followed had a
suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his voluntary, though uncounselled
confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken, under conditions which would have
validated a warrantless search, where the same physical evidence would have been inevitably
discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's volunteered information, the pieces of evidence
objected to the blood-stained pillow, the T-shirt and the victim's earring would have fallen into police
hands by legal means which would have normally been undertaken by the authorities in any case.
Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of the
poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the more appropriate question in such cases is
whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the
illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality.
Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would
have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.
I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have been
inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that evidence derived from
information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
20
where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.
The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a confession by the accused in a bank
robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason that the information which led to his
confession, though the product of an illegal search would have been discovered in the absence of such
21
illegality. The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a witness is
discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he would have been
22
discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted investigation. These and other recognized
limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the effect of our
exclusionary rules. Rather, they serve the purpose of the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance
between the need to deny evidence come by through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand and the
need to minimize opportunity for the defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially
23
undesirable bonanza. Certainly it could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would
not have gone back to the site for a better inspection.
THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF
THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered by the
police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough review of the evidence utilized by the trial court
leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained, in any case,
24
without the pieces of evidence objected to. Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a shifting of the
pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected to would nevertheless
still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused with moral certainty. These
include:
1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he
committed the acts charged;
2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.
Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion let
pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's testimony, allow me once again to quote
from the transcript:
Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30
P.M.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q Where is your house situated?
A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.
Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Palapala?
A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.
Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?
A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.
Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?
A He was upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.
Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you know?
A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.
Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house of
his uncle, Romeo Alicando?
A Khazie Mae was his companion.
Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae
Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando at
that time?
A No more, only the two of them.
Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you
observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando wherein
Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?
A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a yemas
candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.
Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you
observe after that if there is any?
A The child cried.
Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you said
the child was crying?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed at
that time?
A And then she squealed.
Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child
squealed, what did you do if there was any?
A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando,
where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up two
steps.
Q And then what did you do?
A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there was
an opening.
Q Have you seen anything inside that house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you seen if there is any?
A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top of
the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.
Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae
Penecilla?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do after seeing that?
A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down
from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .
Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your
house?
A My friend.
Q Who is the name of your friend?
A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).
Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your
house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the house
of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of the victim,
Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What action did your compare do if there was any?
A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he
went home.
Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.,
where were you?
A I was inside the house.

Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that
time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you observed?
A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her.
Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of Khazie
Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your mind to report
the incident to the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on what you have
seen at that time?
A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel Alicando.
Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the
evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.
Q Did you talk to him?
A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando and
asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.
Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?
A I was inside my house.
Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel
Alicando's house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?
A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.
Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00 o'clock,
what did you observe in your barangay?
A None.
Q You have not observed anything?
A None.
Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla
found their daughter?
A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.
Q Of what day?
A June 13, 1994.
Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found by
their parents?
A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from their
house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under their
25
house.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or
falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony
was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the credence and
the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on evidence. Such
factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are accorded great weight and
respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial court had the every
available opportunity to observe the demeanor of the lone witness during the trial. Her belated reporting
of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court to accord great weight, is
hardly out of the ordinary.
Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard
norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
26
experience. Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to choose
27
not to get involved when a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few unsolved crimes.
Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation and fear of possible
reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her part to reveal what she
had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm and casual as possible, and pretend
that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when she asked appellant what time Khazi
28
Mae got down from his house following the incident. Given these factors, it would have been too much
to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear, revulsion and instinctive self-preservation to harness
superhuman reserves of courage to stop appellant when she saw him
29
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped. Some individuals
flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing the dead girl's distraught parents, and
overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally driven by
conscience to reveal what she knew the following morning.
The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances.
However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's conclusions were founded principally on the
direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime. It is
worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense crossexamination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi Mae at appellant's house;
that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal, peeped into the opening
and saw appellant on top of the victim. These were the very same declarations she made when she took
the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as to whether it was the right or the
left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk
30
her credibility. She had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant and there were no possible
motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any way related to the Penecillas, and there was no
evidence adduced to show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her
31
credibility is even enhanced by the absence any improper motive.
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence
corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last
seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of Khazi
Mae. Recovered from the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress,
bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of these pieces of evidence
does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly
relevant in the face of ample legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty verdict.
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He argues
that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not see him in a push and pull movement 2)
the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the presence or absence
of the male semen was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of
death was asphyxiation by strangulation.
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to take a
look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear
was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate facilities of the
NBI Laboratory at Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for
the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as this would only serve as
32
corroborating evidence to the fact of rape.
Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital organ of
33
the victim. The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the
fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object. In view of settled
jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the
vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm are present or absent. Absence of emission
does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she
peeped through an opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the autopsy report
revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to the crime committed and its authorship in the
case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of
Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape
was established by definitive legal evidence.
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation, it
cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the same occasion. As we observed in People
v. Yu, 34 unit
G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,

petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4
and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized
or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents
and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of
the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of
another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation
whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in
the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in
the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the
common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured
the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such
other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio
(supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could
not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer
no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand,
if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy
Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it
being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly
declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared
illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein,
and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants
are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it
is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a
search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return
of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs.
United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a
man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his
filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the
purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November
13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing
what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those
between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought
not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in
MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme
Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further.
Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared
that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the
search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to
Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's
books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of
the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . .
(Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In
Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also
the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that
the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of
the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected
the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor
to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The
papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of
these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held
invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the
records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties
seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out
that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by
the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also
Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises
not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were
suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized,
whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The
uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this
Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal
or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to
the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.
Footnotes
1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro
D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G.
Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio
Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian
Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation,

Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business
Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass
Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing
Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic
Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6
Inter alia.
"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered
in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of
the papers, documents and things from the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S.
Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita,
Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area,
Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development
Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7)
No. 224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9)
Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10)
Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12)
General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic
Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey
Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila;
(16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg.,
18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19)
Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21)
Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24)
IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the
hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the
Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as to the
papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in those of the
residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2)
15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati, Rizal."
8
Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.
Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10
In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287
F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.
11
U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.
12
On March 22, 1962.
13
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
14
Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15
. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16
People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17
Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
18
Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.
19
Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis
supplied.
20
Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs.
United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338
US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d.
1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S.
Ct. 1684.
21
Even if remote.
22
Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93: Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d
650.
CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
*
Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue
of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D',
tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the
P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico
to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10,
1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department
of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33).
When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section
1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear
said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of
evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and
his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to
enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the
sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is
also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an
extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for
an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in
effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the
call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are
made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up
his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under
Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was
never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is
an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for
that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already
widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was
finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party
lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired
communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not
be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then
restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the
decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is
based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization,
and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in
contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co.,
134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the
main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by
wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in
the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one
ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no
violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not
occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out
his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use
an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at
bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals;
the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646;
Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction,
Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search
for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable.
It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only
consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment,
they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the
right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore,
the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the
defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him
to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and
other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be
with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
G. R. No. 172326
January 19, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

vs.
ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Under review is the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR.-HC No. 01493 finding accused-appellant Alfredo Pascual y Ildefonso alias BOYET guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death. Said decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211,
Mandaluyong City, albeit with the modification that granted an additional award of P100,000.00
as civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased-victim.
The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information2 dated February
23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide and Robbery, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December 2000 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by the use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, lie and have carnal knowledge of one LORELYN PACUBAS y TAMAYO, against
the latters will and consent.
During the occasion or by reason of the rape with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength, covered the face of said victim with a pillow, thus suffocating her which ultimately led
to her instantaneous death. Likewise, during or on occasion of the rape with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of Lorelyn Pacubas y
Tamayo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
following, to wit:
a). one (1) gold necklace with pendant
b). one (1) pair of gold earring
c). college ring
d). Seiko ladys wristwatch
all in the total amount of P10,000.00 more or less, belonging to victim Lorelyn Pacubas y
Tamayo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses; namely, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and
Arlene Gorospe, both neighbors of the victim; Eduardo Velasco, a friend of the victims sister;
Police officers (PO)2 Fernando Aguilan and Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Russel Leysa; Dr.
Felimon Porciuncula, Jr., the Philippine National Police (PNP) medico-legal officer; and Lorenza
Pacubas, the victims mother. The prosecutions version of the facts, as narrated in the decision
under review, follows:
The incident xxx happened in a room at the second floor of House No. 724, Ballesteros St.,
Barangay New Zaniga, Mandaluyong City. The sketch of the house (Exh. A, p. 148 Records)
shows it has three (3) rooms; on the first floor, one occupied by Arlene Gorospe and family (exh.
A-1); the second, by Alfredo Pascual and his family (Exh. A-2); and the third is the residence of
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and his family. On the second floor is another room occupied by the family
of the victim Lorelyn Pacubas y Tamayo (alias Ling-Ling) and her siblings.
Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was
preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual who
was with Christopher, his 2-year old youngest child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had liquor
already. For three (3) instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house as he
was already sleepy and drunk but nonetheless will return 10 to 15 minutes later, twice still with
the child and only to continue drinking every time he returned. On the third time, he was without
the child anymore and partake (sic) of liquor until 1:00 oclock a.m. when he left, leaving
Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. alone just outside the aforesaid house at 724 Ballesteros St. (Exh. A-8).
Twenty (20) minutes later, Divina Pascual, appellants wife, came out the house looking for her
husband. When informed that the latter had already left, Divina started looking for him inside the
house and later in the billiard hall 10 or 15 minutes away. Moments later, Divina went passed
(sic) the place where Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was drinking, rushing upstairs to the second floor of the
house. Soon after, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out towards the gate at the same
time asked (sic) Jundos for help saying Kuya, tulungan mo ako, si Boyet (referring to Alfredo
Pascual)). Thinking that Alfredo Pascual was making trouble, Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. joined the
chase but could not catch up as Alfredo was running very fast. So Divina told him to instead go
upstairs as the accused might have done something wrong to Ling-ling (Lorelyn) [T.S.N. pp. 411, October 24, 2002]. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. is the husband of appellants older sister, Laarni.
Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the second floor. As the place was dark, they switched on
the light and there they saw Ling-ling (Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost
naked with arms and legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up
above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-ling but the latter was
already dead. Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. was shocked at what he saw. Divina got hysterical and
repeatedly told Arlene Gorospe what happened (T.S.N., supra, pp. 11-14). It did not take long
before policemen from the Southern Command (SOCO) arrived.
That same morning Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. gave his statement before PO2 Fernando Aguilan (Exh.
C, p. 150 Records) and so did Divina Gorospe Pascual (Exh. D, p. 151). Arlene Gorospe likewise
executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay that same day, December 25, 2000, before Police Inspector
Efren Pascua Jugo. (Exh. B, p. 149, Records) It was this witness Arlene Gorospe who prepared
the sketch (Exh. A, p. 148, Records). Later in (sic) that fateful morning, police investigators
appeared in (sic) the scene of the incident and took pictures of the place and the victim while still
lying on the floor (Exhs. E, E-1 to E-7 and F-1 to F-5 xxx, p. 152, Records).
After proper police investigation and coordination, the victim, Lorelyn Pacubas, was brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory, for autopsy and the examination of the blood found in the place of
the incident (Medico Legal Report No. S 056 00, Exh. M, p. 162, Records). The printed
underwear with suspected seminal stains was likewise examined. Medico-Legal Report No. R007-00 (Exh. N, p. 163, Records) reveal absence of semen. In Medico-Legal Report No. M 932
00 (Exh. O, p. 164, Records), it was determined that the cause of death was asphyxia by
smothering. The same report gave the following postmortem findings on the injuries sustained by
the victim:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Fairly developed, fairly nourished, female cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD
1) Lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring 0.8 x 0.5 cm, along the anterior
midline.
2) Contusion, right cheek, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 7 cm from the anterior midline.
TRUNK
1) Contusion, right pectoral region, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 11 cm from the anterior
midline.
2) Lacerated wound, right nipples, measuring 0.6 x 0.1 cm.
3) Contusion, right pectoral region, measuring 5 x 4 cm, 10 cm from the anterior
midline.
4) Contusion, sternal region, measuring 3 x 1 cm, along the anterior midline.
5) Contusion, left inguinal region, measuring 5 x 3.5 cm, 10 cm from the anterior
midline.
The stomach is full of partially digested food particles.
EXTREMITY
1) Contusion, proximal 3rd of the right forearm measuring 4 x 2 cm, 4 cm lateral

to its posterior midline.
2) Contusion, right ring finger, measuring 0.5 x 0.3 cm.
LARYNX, TRACHEA AND ESOPHAGUS
The larynx, trachea and esophagus are markedly congested and cyanotic with petechial
hemorrhages.
xxx xxx xxx
GENITAL
There is abundant growth of pubic hair, labia majora are full, convex and co-aptated with pinkish
brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed a fleshy type
hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 oclock positions with an abraded
posterior fourchette, measuring 1 x 0.4 cm.
Vaginal and peri urethral smears are POSITIVE for spermatozoa.
xxx xxx xxx
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is Asphyxia by smothering. (p. 164, Records)
with the corresponding location of the said wounds on the attached sketches of the head (Exh. P,
p. 165, Records) and the human body in the anatomical sketch (Exh. Q, p. 166, Records).3
(Emphasis ours)
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He alleged that on December 24, 2000, he
was drinking with Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. and the latters son outside their residence from 10:00
p.m. until 1:00 a.m. of December 25, 2000. When he came home, he had a fight with his wife
Divina Pascual (Divina) because the latter allegedly wouldnt permit him to go to a friends
house in Sta. Mesa, Manila, as he was already drunk. Nonetheless, so accused-appellant claims,
he still went to Sta. Mesa and stayed at his friends house for more or less six days.4 Upon
learning from his wife that Lorelyn Pacubas was raped and killed and that he was the suspect
therein, he requested his wife to contact and coordinate with Major Pealosa for his voluntary
surrender. On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew Lorelyn Pacubas was
staying alone on the second floor of the house on that fateful night, as her two (2) other siblings
had already gone home to the province.5 Moreover, he admitted having called his wife on
December 25, 2000, and was then told about the crime which happened to Lorelyn Pacubas and
that he was the suspect thereof.6
Defense witness Carlito Santos (Carlito) corroborated accused-appellants testimony of having

stayed in his house for six (6) days. Carlito testified that at about 2:00 oclock in the early
morning of December 25, 2000, accused-appellant arrived at his (Carlitos) house and told the
witness that he (accused-appellant) had a fight with his wife, Divina.7
Another defense witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the
specimens submitted by the trial court consisting of the victims vaginal smear and panty.
According to her, no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens.8 On
cross-examination, she declared that based on DNA testing, she could not determine if a woman
was raped or not. She further declared that in this case, it was possible that the stained vaginal
smear prevented a complete and good result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by
the court, the forensic chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the subject specimens was
inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained
vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had already undergone serological analysis.9
In a decision10 dated March 11, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused, ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO alias BOYET
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, under the circumstances
prescribed in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, absent any modifying
circumstance to aggravate or mitigate criminal liability, the court hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Php63,000.00 as actual damages;
the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; Php28,000.00 as burial expenses and the amount of Php250,000.00 for loss of
earnings. Additional actual expenses incurred not supported by receipts are denied pursuant to
Article 2199 of the Civil Code.
In so far as the charge of robbery is concerned, the same is hereby ordered DISMISSED, it
appearing that the valuables and other personal belongings of the victim are intact.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.11
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, in a Resolution12
dated July 26, 2005 and pursuant to our ruling in People v Mateo13 the case was transferred to
the CA.
In its Decision14 dated December 9, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts
decision. Dispositively, the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the heirs of Lorelyn Pacubas is further awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, in addition to the other damages in the lower courts judgment. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the foregoing, accused-appellant comes again to this Court for a final review of his
case.
In a Resolution15 dated June 13, 2006, the Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In their respective Manifestations,16 the parties waived
the filing of supplemental briefs and instead merely adopted their earlier briefs before the CA.
Two (2) questions present themselves for resolution in this case. First, was the circumstantial
evidence presented against the accused-appellant sufficient for his conviction? Second, does the
result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal?
We answer the first question in the affirmative.
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 17 In this regard, we have held that the
crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the
victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of
rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of
rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.18
Considering that no one witnessed the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the
prosecutions evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused
can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence
is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. 19
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.20 Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.21 Thus, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion
that the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged.
The chain of events that led to the subject unfortunate incident was candidly narrated by Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr. Said witness testified that on December 24, 2000 at 10:00 p.m., he, together with his
family and other relatives, was preparing for their small celebration outside the house; that
accused-appellant (who appeared to be already drunk) was also there together with his 2-year-old
child; that accused-appellant stayed with them up to 1:00 a.m. of December 25; that during the
course of his stay with the group, accused-appellant left twice to go inside the house but kept on
coming back to continue drinking; that when accused-appellant left for the third time, he did not
come back anymore leaving him (Jundos) alone as his son, Christopher, also left to go to some
other place.22 Some 20 minutes later, accused-appellants wife, Divina, asked him about the
whereabouts of the accused-appellant and he instructed her to look for her husband in several
places. Having failed to locate accused-appellant, Divina went back inside the house.23 What
transpired next can be gleaned from the following pertinent portions of Jundos testimony:
"Q - When you are still on that particular place where you are drinking alone, do you remember
any unusual incident that happened?
A - Yes sir.
Q - What is that incident?
A - Nong umuwi na po si Divina sa kanila nong sinabi nya na napapagod na sya, maya-maya po
ay nakita ko si Divina na nag-tatatakbo, dumaan po doon sa harap ko at nag-tatatakbo patungong
itaas po.
Q - Itaas ng?
A - Second floor sir.
xxx
Q - And what happened after Divina went up stairs of the second floor?
A - Nakita ko po na naghahabulan si Divina at yong asawa nya si Alfredo Pascual.
Q - Did you see where did they came from?
A - Hindi ko po nakita kong saan sila naggaling, ang nakita ko lang dito po sa gilid ko
papuntang gate.
Q - So, you see them coming out of that building and proceeding towards the gate?
A - Yes sir.
Q - And who was ahead?
A - Alfredo Pascual sir.
Q - And what was Divina doing at that time?
A - Shes chasing Alfredo Pascual.
Q - Did you hear her saying something?
A - Yes sir.
Q - What [did] she say?
A - Humihingi po sya sa akin ng tulong, sabi nya po, kuya tulongan mo ako si Boyet kasi ang
palayaw po ni Alfredo Pascual e Boyet.
Q - And what was your interpretation then when you heard her asking for your help, this Divina,
the wife of the accused?
A - Ang pagkaintindi ko po na humihingi si Divina ng tulong, akala ko po nagwala kasi lasing
po, kaya humihingi po ng tulong yong asawa, kaya (po) ako poy tumakbo doon at nakinakipaghabol po sa kanila.
Q - And what happened next after that?
A - Tumakbo rin po ako at nakihabol rin ako sa kanila, pero nong nandoon na po ako sa kalsada,
yong street po naming Ballesteros, nasa kalagitnaan na po ako, nakita ko na po si Divina at
sinalubong na po ako, ang sabi sa akin, kuya hindi na maabutan kasi mabilis tumakbo tulungan
mo nalang ako, samahan mo ako, aakyat tayo sa taas kasi baka kung anong ginawa nya don kay
Ling-Ling, the victim in this case.
Q - So, what did you do when Divina ask for your assistance?
A - Sinamahan ko po, umakyat po kami sa second floor at nakita namin sa second floor,
madilim, parang walang sindi ang mga ilaw.
Q - What was the condition of the door going inside the second floor when you went up?
A - Open sir.
Q - And did you and Divina do when you were already (inside) in the second floor?
A - Hinanap po nami yong mga switches, kasi ako po bihirang bihira po akong makaakyat don
kaya sabi ko kay Divina hanapin natin yong switch kasi hindi ko kabisado rito, yon kinakapa po
naming kong saan po yong mga switches, habang kinakapa po naming yong mga switches tapos
pinupukpok ko po yong dingding tapos nag-tatawag po ako ng pangalan ni Ling-Ling, Ling
saan ka naroon.
Q - And then what happened next?
A - Yan po habang hinahanap po naming yong mga switches at kinakatok po naming yong mga
dingding bigla pong sumigaw si Divina na kuya halika dito ng marining ko po na tinatawag
yong pangalan ko e lumapit po ako kung saan sya naroon.
Q - What happened next?
A - Nandon po sya sa loob ng kwarto, bukas po yong pinto, doon nakita ko po si Ling-Ling,
yong biktima.
Q - Where was the victim at the first time or instance that you saw her at that particular time?
A - At the floor sir.
Q - What was the physical appearance of the victim when you first saw her?
A - When I first saw the victim she was lieing (sic) in the floor with open arms (sic) and open
legs and her short and panty was already loose off down to her ankle and her (the) shirt is up.
Q - Up to where?
A - Nakataas po, labas ang kanyang didi at nakita ko pong may dugo sa gilid.
Q - Where did you find the blood?
A - On her left side breast sir.
Q - On that particular instance, when heard Divina calling for help, was there already light inside
that house?
A - There was a light sir.
Q - Where was that light coming from?
A - Came from the ceiling.
Q - Inside the room where Divina found the body of the victim?
A - Yes sir.
xxx
Q - When you first enter that room where you find the body of the victim Lorelyn Bacubas, what
was the condition of the room?
A - Nakita ko po na magulo yong kama tapos yong drawer na lagayan ng mga damit kasi
salamin po yong ibaba may mga basag po at may mga patak ng dugo.
Q - What else did you find?
A - May scissor po sa left side ng braso nya, sa gilid po.
xxx
Q - What did you do when you saw the victim in this case already sprawled on the floor?
A - Nung nakita na naming hindi na gumagalaw si Ling-Ling at ang pagkaalam namin ay patay
na, bumaba na po kami.
xxx
Q - After you went down, what did you do next?
A - Pag-baba po namin ni Divina, tumakbo po kami don sa pinto, sa bahay po ng bayaw ko at
humingi po kami ng tulong.
Q - Who is your brother-in-law?
A - Arleen Gorospe sir.
xxx
Q - What did you do with Arleen Gorospe?
A - Pag-bukas po ng pinto, una pong pumasok si Divina at nag-hysterical na nagsisigaw na
Manang Rose, yong asawa po ni Arleen Gorospe, si Ling-Ling ginahasa at pinatay ni
Boyet.
Q - And what next happened?
A - Sinalaysay po ni Divina, pero ako poy na shock at napaupo na lang ako sa sopa, umakyat
din po si Arleen sa taas at may tumawag na rin ng pulis.24 (Emphasis Ours)
Arlene Gorospe corroborated the testimony of Jundos that in the early morning of December 25,
2000, Jundos and the accused-appellants wife, Divina, knocked at his door to inform him of the
incident after which he immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the victim naked and lifeless
with her t-shirt pulled up.25
Prior to the discovery of her dead body, Jundos also testified that the victim was alone in her
room on the second floor of the house.26 This fact was known to accused-appellant who admitted
as much in his cross-examination.27 Eduardo Velasco, who used to visit the sister of the victim
and have drinks with accused-appellant, testified that the latter confided to him his love for the
victim.28
PO2 Fernando Aguilan and P/Insp. Russel Leysa testified that upon arrival at the place where the
subject incident happened on December 25, 2000 at about 2:30 a.m., they found the lifeless body
of the victim lying on the floor naked, with bloodstain on her clothes and appearing lifeless.29
The police also found at the scene of the crime the victims belongings scattered all over the
place.
Dr. Felimon Porciuncula, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the
victim on the morning of December 25, 2000, testified that the victim died of asphyxia by
smothering. The doctor also testified that apart from contusions, hymenal lacerations were
discovered on the body at 3, 6 and 9 oclock positions, but there is an abrasion or abrated
posterior meaning that the injury was fresh30 or was inflicted right before the death of the
victim.31 Dr. Porciuncula further testified that spermatozoa was found in the vagina of the
victim.32
Furthermore, the statements of accused-appellants wife, Divina, immediately after the fateful
incident all the more convince the Court as to accused-appellants guilt. Part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule were Divinas utterances to
Gorospe after seeing the dead and raped body of the victim, i.e., May nagyari sa itaas at galing
doon si Boyet, and her subsequent narration of seeing the accused-appellant going out of the
victims room and running away therefrom.33
In People v Cantonjos34the Court held that:
Res gestae utterances refer to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the
crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. A declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The res gestae or the startling event is the
rape and death of the victim. The statements of Divina to Gorospe were made spontaneously and
before she had the time to contrive or devise such declarations, and said statements all concerned
the occurrence in question or the immediately attending circumstances thereof.
In the absence of evidence that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.35
Here, accused-appellant claimed that at 2 oclock on the morning of December 25, 2000, he was
at his friends house in Sta. Mesa, having left his house in Mandaluyong because of a quarrel
with his wife, Divina. Prosecution witness Jundos testimony, however, positively placed the
accused-appellant near the scene of the crime at the same time on December 25, 2000. Surely,
between the positive assertions of the prosecution witness and the negative averments of
accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and evidentiary weight.36
Thus, accused-appellants twin defenses of denial and alibi pale in the light of the array of
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Equally damning is accused-appellants
failure to prove with clear and convincing evidence that he was at another place at the time the
crime was committed or to demonstrate the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime when the same was committed.
Denial is intrinsically a weak defense and must be supported by strong evidence of nonculpability in order to be credible. Correspondingly, courts view the defense of alibi with
suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it
can be fabricated easily. 37
Furthermore, this Court cannot ignore the positive testimony on record that accused-appellant
was seen running away from the scene of the crime immediately before the discovery thereof. If
accused-appellant was as innocent as he claimed to be, he should have immediately cleared
himself of suspicion. Instead, accused-appellant stayed at his friends house for six or seven
days, despite having learned from his wife he was a suspect in the crime. Undoubtedly, accusedappellants flight is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.38
Accused-appellant makes much of the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the NBI that his
profile was not in the victims vaginal smear. Hence, he argues he is innocent of the crime
charged.
In People v Yatar, we held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.39
Here, while the DNA analysis of the victims vaginal smear showed no complete profile of the
accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was already stained
or contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a
complete and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with
the vaginal smear, they could see if there is a male profile in the smear. However in this case,
when they received the vaginal smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone
serological analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the
specimen subject of this case was inconclusive.40 In light of this flawed procedure, we hold that
the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
Viewed in its entirety, the evidence in this case inevitably leads to the conclusion that accusedappellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide.
Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
(R.A.) 7659, provides that when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death. However, in view of the subsequent passage of R.A. No.
9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, which
was signed into law on June 24, 2006, the Court is mandated to impose on the accused-appellant
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We likewise affirm the CAs additional award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to
current jurisprudence41 that in cases of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of
P100,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. As to moral damages, recent
jurisprudence allows the amount of P75,000.00 to be awarded in cases of rape with homicide.42
Thus, the P50,000.00 award given by the court below as moral damages should be increased to
P75,000.00. The P25,000.00 exemplary damages, however, should be deleted because under
Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal cases may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, and there is none in this
case. The rest of the awards given by the trial court are affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01493 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Lorelyn Pacubas, the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P63,000.00 as actual damages,
P28,000.00 as burial expenses and P250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
TONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by now Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez and former Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-23.
2
CA rollo, pp.13-14.
Rollo, pp. 3-6.
TSN, September 8, 2003, p. 3; Records, p. 410
TSN, October 6, 2003, p. 8; Records, p. 423
Id. pp. 10-11; Records, pp. 425-426
TSN, November 17, 2003, p. 3; Records, p. 436
TSN, June 11, 2003, p. 15; Records, p. 396
TSN, July 2, 2003, pp. 1-5; Records, pp. 399-403
10
CA rollo, pp. 29-54.
11
CA rollo, p. 111.
12
Id. at 165.
13
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640
14
Supra note 1.
15
Rollo, p. 25.
16
Id. at pp. 26-27 & 28-29.
17
People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 362 SCRA 452, 464.
18
Id.
19
People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 513.
20
People v Darilay, G.R. Nos. 139751-52, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45, 61.
21
Id.
22
TSN., October 24, 2002, pp. 3-6; Records, pp. 355-358.
23
Id., pp. 7-9; Records, pp. 359-361
24
TSN, October 24, 2002, pp. 9-13; Records, pp 361-365
25
26
27
TSN , October 6, 2003, p. 8; Records, p. 423
28
TSN, December. 5, 2002, p. 3; Records, p. 329.
29
TSN November 7, 2001, p. 2; Records p. 249.
30
TSN November 28, 2001 p. 8; Records, p. 313
31
Id, p. 19; Records, p. 324
32
Id. pp. 9-10; records, pp. 314-315.
33
34
G.R. No. 136748. November 21, 2001, 370 SCRA 105, 118-119.
35
Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479. February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 668.
36
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 152176, October 1, 2003, 412 SCRA 503, 509.
37
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 152176. October 1, 2003, 412 SCRA 503, 508-509.
38
Id.
39
Supra note 19, at p. 515.
40
TSN, July 2, 2003, pp. 1-5; Records, pp. 399-403.
41
People v. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 152954, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 247, 257; People v.
Darilay G.R. Nos. 139751-52, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45, 64.
42
People v. Sevilleno, id. at p. 258.
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G.R. No.

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.

358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).

RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 1.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 2.

Science of life, definition of Websters Third New International Dictionary.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.

TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.

G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

in an Information which reads:

d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and

Note (After reading the information to the accused,

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Court Okey, proceed.

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;

himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an

5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac

The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:

Appearing as public prosecutor.

Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?

A I was inside the house.

G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,

Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation,

Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

On March 22, 1962.

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.

G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

January 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

1) Contusion, proximal 3rd of the right forearm measuring 4 x 2 cm, 4 cm lateral

Defense witness Carlito Santos (Carlito) corroborated accused-appellants testimony of having

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Rollo, pp. 3-6.

TSN, September 8, 2003, p. 3; Records, p. 410

TSN, October 6, 2003, p. 8; Records, p. 423

Id. pp. 10-11; Records, pp. 425-426

TSN, November 17, 2003, p. 3; Records, p. 436

TSN, June 11, 2003, p. 15; Records, p. 396

TSN, July 2, 2003, pp. 1-5; Records, pp. 399-403

CA rollo, pp. 29-54.