GOLDEN FARMS V.

SECRETARY OF LABOR 234 SCRA 517 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioner Golden Farms Inc is a corporation engaged in the production and
marketing of bananas for export. In 1992, private respondent Progressive Federation of
Labor (PFL) filed a petition for certification election among the monthly paid office and
technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner
1. Golden Farms moved to dismiss the petition the on the following grounds:
a. Respondent PFL failed to show it was organized as a chapter within the
petitioners establishment
b. There was already an existing CBA between the rank-and-file employees
represented by the National Federation of Labor (NFL) and the petitioner
c. The employees represented by PFL had allegedly been disqualified from
bargaining with management in an earlier case (Golden Farms Inc v. FerrerCalleja)
2. Respondent PFL countered that the monthly paid office and technical employees
should be allowed to form a separate bargaining unit because they were
expressly excluded from coverage in the CBA between petitioner and NFL.
3. In its reply, petitioner argued that the monthly paid office and technical
employees should have joined the existing collective bargaining unit of the rankand-file employees if they are not managerial employees
4. Med-Arbiter granted the petition. Upon appeal, Secretary of Labor affirmed the
same.
ISSUE: WON petitioners monthly paid rank-and-file employees can constitute a
bargaining unit separate from the existing bargaining unit of its daily paid rank-and-file
employees (definition of bargaining unit)
HELD: Yes.
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which
the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The
community or mutuality of interest is therefore the essential criterion in the
grouping. "And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.'
In the case at bar, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In
contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the
cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of petitioner have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and-file
employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates,
and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even

been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees.
This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct
bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To
rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization
for purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will also
expose them to the exploitations of management.

SAN MIGUEL CORP. VS. LAGUESMA 236 SCRA 595

FACTS: 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (respondent union for
brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition for certification election among all
the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.
Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit sought to be represented by respondent union. It claimed that its bargaining history
in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each
sales office.
Subsequently, Atty. Batalla (petitioners counsel) withdrew petitioner's opposition to a
certification election and agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as
one bargaining unit.
Respondent union won the election held on November 24, 1990. Mediator-Arbiter
Benalfre J. Galang certified respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy
Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Secretary of Labor, denied SMC's appeal
and affirmed the Order of the Med- Arbiter. Hence this petition.
Petitioners contention: That its collective bargaining history, which is to have
a separate bargaining unit for each sales office, had been disregarded. It insists that its
prior collective bargaining history is the most persuasive criterion in determining the
appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining unit.
HELD: YES.
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and

(4) similarity of employment status.

This Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining
history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit.
The test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to
be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual
interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work
they perform.
In the case at bar, respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the
various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is similarity of employment
status for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They
have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and
working conditions. The commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north
Luzon sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on
November 24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted respondent union as their
exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of Magnolia should constitute only
one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager number of
sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north Luzon
sales area consists only of approximately fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not
be for the best interest of these employees if they would further be fractionalized. The
adage "there is strength in number" is the very rationale underlying the formation of a
labor union.

PHIL. LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION VS. CIR, 110 PHIL. 176

FACTS: CIR ordered the holding of a certification election to determine which of the 2
contending labor union, Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) or Allied
Workers Association of the Philippines (AWA), as the sole collective bargaining agent
to the employees of the San Carlos Milling Co., Inc.
1. The certification election was held with 390 ballots recorded as challenged, 242
of them by PLASLU and 148 by AWA. They contest the election on the ground of
the ineligibility of the voters cast, as they were the votes of piece work (pakiao)
workers and stevedores.
2. CIR ordered that all the 390 challenged ballots were opened. The final count
showed respondent AWA garnered the majority of votes.
3. CIR certified AWA as the sole collective bargaining agent of the employees of the
San Carlos Milling, Co.
ISSUE: WON CIR in not excluding the 242 votes challenged by PLASLU from the total
number of votes credited to AWA.
HELD: The Court held that the 242 votes challenged should be excluded, it appears
that the 242 stevedores and piece workers were employed on casual or day to day
basis and have no reasonable basis for continued or renewed employment and had
work of a different nature from those of the laborers permitted to vote in the certification
election, they cannot be considered to have such mutuality of interest as to justify their
inclusion in a bargaining unit composed of permanent or regular employees.
The Court had occasion to rule that in the determination of the proper constituency
of a collective bargaining unit, certain factors must be considered, among them,
the employment status of the employees to be affected, that is to say, the
positions and categories of work to which they belong, and the unity of the
employees' interest, because the basic test of a bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether it will best assure to all employees is whether it will be assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
Disregarding the votes cast by stevedores and piece workers which were counted in
favor of the respondent AWA, the final results of the certification election show that the
petitioner PLASLU garnered a majority of the votes cast by eligible voters. Petitioner
should be certified as the sole collective bargaining representative of the employees of
the San Carlos Milling Co.

PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH VS. CALLEJA, 181 SCRA 119

Facts:
The petitioner is the recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Triumph International with which the latter has a valid and existing
collective bargaining agreement effective up to September 24, 1989.
On November 25, 1987, a petition for certification election was filed by the respondent
union with the Department of Labor and Employment.
On January 30, 1988, a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election was filed
by Triumph International on the grounds that the respondent union cannot lawfully
represent managerial employees and that the petition cannot prosper by virtue of the
contract-bar rule. On the same grounds, the petitioner, as intervenor, filed its opposition
to the petition oil February 18, 1988.
On April 13, 1988, the Labor Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for certification
election and directing the holding of a certification election to determine the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all monthly-paid administrative, technical,
confidential and supervisory employees of Triumph International.
Issue: Whether or not the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in ordering
the immediate holding of a certification election among the workers sought to be
represented by the respondent union.
Held:
We find the aforesaid contention of the petitioner meritorious in the absence of a
showing that there are compelling reasons such as the denial of the right to join the
petitioner which is the certified bargaining unit to the members of respondent union or
that there are substantial distinctions warranting the recognition of a separate group of
rank-and-file employees even as there is an existing bargaining agent for rank and file
employees.
Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial
action. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and file
employees for purposes of this Book.
The public respondent, in its factual findings, found that the supervisory employees
sought to be represented by the respondent union are not involved in policy-making and
their recommendatory powers are not even instantly effective since the same are still
subject to review by at least three managerial heads (department manager, personnel
manager and general manager) before final action can be taken. Hence, it is evidently
settled that the said employees do not possess a managerial status. The fact that their

work designations are either managers or supervisors is of no moment considering that

it is the nature of their functions and not the said nomenclatures or titles of their jobs
which determines their statuses
There is no evidence in the records which sufficiently distinguishes and clearly
separates the group of employees sought to be represented by the private respondents
into managerial and supervisory on one hand or supervisory and rank-and-file on the
other. The respondents' pleadings do not show the distinctions in functions and
responsibilities which differentiate the managers from the supervisors and sets apart the
rank-and-file from either the managerial or supervisory groups. As a matter of fact, the
formation of a supervisor's union was never before the Labor Arbiter and the Bureau of
Labor Relations and neither is the issue before us. We, therefore, abide by the public
respondent's factual findings in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of Triumph International. A careful
examination of the records of this case reveals no evidence that rules out the
commonality of interests among the rank-and-file members of the petitioner and the
herein declared rank-and-file employees who are members of the respondent union.
Instead of forming another bargaining unit, the law requires them to be members of the
existing one. The ends of unionism are better served if all the rank-and-file employees
with substantially the same interests and who invoke their right to self-organization are
part of a single unit so that they can deal with their employer with just one and yet
potent voice. The employees' bargaining power with management is strengthened
thereby. Hence, the circumstances of this case impel us to disallow the holding of a
certification election among the workers sought to be represented by the respondent
union for want of proof that the right of said workers to self-organization is being
suppressed.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT
UNION, 2011
FACTS:
In San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the
Court declared that the employees from three different plants of SMC Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community
or mutuality of interests, constitute a single bargaining unit. They perform work
of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most
importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities. It was immaterial that
the three plants have different locations as they did not impede the operations of
a single bargaining representative.
Pursuant to the above decision of the court, the DOLE-NCR conducted preelection conferences.
ISSUE: WON the three different plants of SMC having different location can constitute
a single bargaining unit
HELD: YES.
An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which
the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The Court stated that there should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in
Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in
dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken
operations.
Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of
work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or
impede their commonality of interest.
Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of
each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests
which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.

SMC EMPLOYEES UNION VS. CONFESOR, 262 SCRA 81 [1996]

FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union entered into a CBA with
private respondent San
Miguel Corporation (SMC)
It provides that the agreement SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECTIVE
until 1992, and the terms of the agreement shall be for 5 years. from 1989
to1992.
For purposes of business expansion, the SMC would undergo with
reconstructing, the magnolia and the Feeds and livestock Division were spun-off
and become two separate and distinct corporation. But the CBA remain in forced
and effective.
During the negotiation the petitioner union insisted that the bargaining unit of
SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations, which is the
MAGNOLIA and SMFI and that the renegotiation terms of the CBA shall be
effective ONLY for the remaining period of 2 years.
On the other hand the SMC contended that the members or employees WHO
HAD MOVED TOMAGNOLIA AND SMFI, SHALL AUTHOMATICALLY CEASED
TO BE PART OF THE BARGAINING UNIT atthe SMC, and that the CBA shall be
effective for 3years in accordance with ART.253-A
Unable to agree with these issues of bargaining unit and duration of the CBA,
petitioner union declared a deadlock and filed a notice of strike.
ISSUE: WON Spin-off of Magnolia and San Miguel Foods Companies from the San
Miguel Corporation are separate corporate entities
HELD:
YES. In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or
commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective
bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and
working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed
Existing CBA included all four divisions. During the renewal or renegotiation for two
years on the economic provisions, spin-off corporations were already in existence. The
Union insisted that the employees of the spun-off corporations were still to be
considered as part of the appropriate bargaining unit.
Considering the spin-off, the companies would consequently have their respective and
distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other
conditions of employment. The interests of the employees in different companies would
perforce differ. SMC is engaged in beer manufacturing; Magnolia with manufacturing
and processing of dairy products; SM Foods with production of feeds and processing of

chicken. The nature of the products and sales of business may require diff. Skills which
must necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages; different
volumes of work and working conditions. It would then be best to have separate
bargaining units for different companies where the employees can bargain separately
accdg. to their needs and working conditions.

PHILTRANCO VS. BLR, 174 SCRA 388

Facts:
1. Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. is a land transportation company
engaged in the business of carrying passengers and freight. The company
employees included field workers consisting of drivers, conductors, coach
drivers, coach stewards and mechanics and office employees like clerks,
cashiers, programmers, telephone operators, etc.
2. On February 15, 1988, the Kapisanan ng mga Kawani, Assistant, Manggagawa
at Konpidensyal sa Philtranco (KASAMA KO), a registered labor organization
filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor and
Employment, alleging among others that:
3. Petitioner desires to represent all professional, technical, administrative, and
confidential employees personnel of respondent at its establishments in Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao for purposes of collective bargaining;
4. The aforementioned employees were always expressly excluded from
participating in the certification election conducted among the rank and file
employees (drivers, conductors, coach drivers, coach stewards, and mechanics)
of respondent and are excluded from the bargaining unit covered by the CBA
between respondent and its rank and file employees. In addition, there exist
substantial differences in the terms and conditions of employment between the
above-mentioned employees, hence, the former are covered by another
appropriate bargaining unit which is separate and distinct from that of the rank
and file employees of respondent and; which has been recognized by the Bureau
of Labor Relations and upheld by the Honorable Supreme Court
Issue: whether or not there is a need for the formation of a new bargaining unit.
Held: No.
Ratio:
It is natural in almost all fairly sized companies to have groups of workers discharging
different functions. No company could possibly have all employees performing exactly
the same work. Variety of tasks is to be expected. It would not be in the interest of
sound labor-management relations if each group of employees assigned to a
specialized function or section would decide to break away from their fellowworkers and form their own separate bargaining unit. We cannot allow one unit for
typists and clerks, one unit for accountants, another unit for messengers and drivers,
and so on in needless profusion.

PHILTRANCO is a large bus company engaged in the business of carrying passengers

and freight, servicing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Certainly there is a commonality of
interest among filing clerks, dispatchers, drivers, typists, and field men. They are all
interested in the progress of their company and in each worker sharing in the fruits of
their endeavors equitably and generously. Their functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them all. The drivers,
mechanics and conductors are necessary for the company but technical, administrative
and office personnel are also needed and equally important for the smooth operation of
the business. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments
but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of separate unions. The
private respondent has not even shown that a separate bargaining unit would be
beneficial to the employees concerned. Office employees also belong to the rank and
file. There is an existing employer wide unit in the company represented by NAMAWUMIF. And as earlier stated, the fact that NAMAWU-MIF moved to intervene in the
petition for certification election filed by KASAMA KO negates the allegations that
"substantial differences" exist between the employees concerned. We find a
commonality of interest among them. There are no compelling reasons for the formation
of another union.

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL WORKERS UNION V. CALICA 205 SCRA 697 (1992)
FACTS: Petitioner Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with DOLE and is the exclusive bargaining agent of all
rank-and-file employees of Indophil Textile Mills Inc. Calica is impleaded in his official
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator of NCMB, while private respondent Indophil Textile Mills
Inc is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and export of yarns of various
counts and kinds
1. Petitioner union and private respondent Indophil executed a CBA covering April
1987 to March 1990
2. Subsequently, Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corp was formed. When Acrylic
became operational, it hired its own workers. Sometime in 1989, the workers of
Acrylic unionized and a CBA was executed between both parties
3. Petitioner union claimed that the plant facilities built and set up by Acrylic should
be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of private respondent
company pursuant to Art 1 of its CBA. Petitioner now contends that Acrylic is part
of Indophil bargaining unit
4. Respondent Voluntary Arbitrator held against petitioner union and held that
Acrylic is separate and distinct from Indophil Textile Mills
5. Petitioner argued that the articles of incorporation of the two corporations
establish that the two entities are engaged in the same of kind of business
6. On the other hand, public respondent through OSG, contended that Acrylic is not
an alter ego or an adjunct or business conduit of private respondent because it
has a separate legitimate business purposes.
ISSUE: WON the Indophil Acrylic Corp is an extension or expansion of private
respondent company; WON the rank-and-file employees working at Acrylic should be
recognized as part of, and/or within the scope of the bargaining unit
HELD: No. In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of
Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade the application
of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent Company. The fact that
the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the
employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning and
providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical
plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, are not sufficient
to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.
In the case of Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the ULGWP v. Ople, the SC held
that that it is grave abuse of discretion to treat two companies as a single
bargaining unit when these companies are indubitably distinct entities with
separate juridical personalities.

Hence, the Acrylic not being an extension or expansion of private respondent, the rankand-file employees working at Acrylic should not be recognized as part of, and/or within
the scope of the petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private respondent.

KNITJOY MANUFACTURING VS. FERRER-CALLEJA, 214 SCRA 174

FACTS: Petitioner KNITJOY had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
Federation of Filipino Workers (FFW). The bargaining unit covered only the regular
rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. It did not
include regular rank-and-file office and production employees paid on a monthly basis.
The CBA expired on 15 June 1987. Prior to its expiration, the FFW was split into two (2)
factions -- the Johnny Tan and the Aranzamendez factions. The latter eventually
became the Confederation of Filipino Workers (CFW).
On 24 June 1987, during the pendency of the said negotiations, private respondent
KMEU filed a petition for certification election among KNITJOY's regular rankand-file monthly paid employees with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The Knitjoy Monthly Employees Association and Confederation of Citizens Labor Union
(KMEA-CCLU), another union existing in the said company, and petitioner CFW
intervened therein.
The petition for certification was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz.
Then, respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director of the BLR, reversed the order of MedArbiter de la Cruz.
Knitjoy and CFW moved for a motion for reconsideration alleging that the present CBA
included the monthly paid employees. And that to remove the monthly-paid employees
from their present bargaining unit would lead to the division thereof, contrary to existing
labor policies favoring larger units.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner KNITJOY'S monthly-paid regular rank-and-file
employees can constitute an appropriate bargaining unit separate and distinct
from the existing unit composed of daily or piece-rate paid regular rank-and-file
employees, and
2. Whether or not the inclusion in the coverage of the new CBA between KNITJOY
and CFW of the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees bars the holding of a
certification election among the said monthly paid employees.
HELD:
1. YES.
The one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form
unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter
into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution
guarantees.

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two

(2) broad notions, to wit:
(a) the liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of restraint which guarantees that the
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law, and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain
from joining an association.
It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or
not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty
and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time.
it is not denied that in the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been
consistently limited to the regular rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate
basis. On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were
never included within its scope. Respondent KMEU's membership is limited to the latter
class of employees; KMEU does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the former.
Records show that the monthly-paid employees were expressly excluded. Thus, the
negotiations between CFW and KNITJOY could only logically refer to the rank-and-file
employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis.
Clearly therefore, the monthly paid employees constituting a separate bargaining unit
with the appropriate union as sole bargaining representative, can neither be prevented
nor avoided without infringing on these employees' rights to form a union and to enter
into collective bargaining negotiations. KMEU had the unquestioned and undisputed
right to seek certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the monthly-paid
rank-and-file employees
2.NO.
Regardless of the date when the new CBA was executed, whether on 27 November
1987 as contended by KNITJOY and CFW or 12 December 1987 as claimed by the
respondents -- the fact remains that it was executed before the resolution of
KMEU's petition for certification election among the monthly paid employees
became final.
If it was executed by the parties on 27 November 1987, both KNITJOY and CFW would
have immediately filed the appropriate pleading with the BLR informing it of such
execution and moving for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it has been
rendered moot and academic.
Moreover, the parties could not have signed the said CBA on 27 November 1987,
contrary to their allegation, because from 4:00 - 10:00 p.m. on the same day, 27
November 1987, the parties still attended a conciliation conference.

Considering that (a) the TUPAS solicited certification election was strictly confined to
the rank-and-file employees who are paid on a daily or piece-rate basis, (b) the results
of the election must also necessarily confine the certified union's representation to the
group it represents and (c) the issue of the plight of the monthly-paid employees was
still pending, KNITJOY and CFW clearly acted with palpable bad faith and malice in
including within the scope of the new CBA these monthly-paid employees.
It goes without saying then that the new CBA cannot validly include in its scope or
coverage the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of KNITJOY. It does not bar the
holding of a certification election to determine their sole bargaining agent and the
negotiation for and the execution of a subsequent CBA between KNITJOY and the
eventual winner in said election.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code expressly
provides:
"SEC. 4. Effects of early agreements. -- The representation case shall not, however, be
adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the
last 60 days of a agreement or during the pendency of the representation case."
The public respondent then committed no abuse of discretion in ordering a
certification election among the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees, except
managerial employees, of KNITJOY. The choice however, should not be, as correctly
contended by CFW, limited to merely (a) KMEU and (b) no union. The records disclose
that the intervenors in the petition for certification are the KMEA-CCLU and CFW. They
should be included as among the choices in the certification election.

BARBIZON V. NAGKAKAISANG SUPERVISORS 261 SCRA 738 [1996]

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for certification election among its rank-and-file
employees, 2 union sought recognition namely: Philippine Lingerie Workers UnionALAB (ALAB) and Buklod ng Manggawa ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (BUKLOD).
BLR certified Buklod as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
regular-rank-and-file employees of Barbizon Philippines Inc.
1. Petitioner negotiated with Buklod as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative. A CBA was signed by petitioner and Buklod.
2. While CBA was still in force, several employees organized themselves into the
Nagkakaisang Supervisors ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the
Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc
(NEMPEBPI) allegedly because they were excluded from the coverage of the
existing CBA between petitioner and Buklod.
3. Undersecretary of Labor rendered a decision directing the conduct of
certification election among the subject employees excluded from the coverage
of the bargaining unit of the existing CBA of rank and file employees not
otherwise excluded/disqualified by law.
4. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the employees
designated as supervisors cannot legally form a supervisors union since said
employees were declared mere rank and file workers. Being part of the rank and
file, petitioner avers that said employees belong to the employee wide unit,
which is already represented by Buklod as the sole certified bargaining agent.
ISSUE: WON the respondent supervisors local union cannot form a supervisor union
when there is an existing sole bargaining representative (Buklod)
HELD: No, Buklod cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly
represent petitioners supervisor employees since the latter were expressly excluded
from the appropriate bargaining unit.
Petitioner obstinately believes that NSBPI's petition for certification election was granted
because the employees carrying the appellation "supervisor" were deemed supervisory
employees. The status of the subject employees is not the issue. NSBPI's petition for
certification election was granted because the subject employees, including petitioner's
monthly paid employees, were expressly excluded from the bargaining unit and from the
coverage of the CBA executed between petitioner and BUKLOD. The exclusion of
petitioner's "supervisors" from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees
indiscriminately curtailed the right of these employees to self-organization and
representation for purposes of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by our
labor laws and "accorded the highest consideration."
The Court declare in the recent case of Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor: The
monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been excluded from the bargaining
unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the
formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file

employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of
employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Without
the shield of an organization, it will also expose them to the exploitations of
management. . . .
The "one union one company" rule is not without exception. The exclusion of
the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the CBA is
indefinitely a "compelling reason" for it completely deprived them of the chance
to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no recourse but to
group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own
organization. The rationale behind the exception to the aforementioned policy is further
elucidated in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja: The usual exception, is
where the employer unit has to give way to the other units a subdivision thereof; the
recognition of these exceptions takes into accountant the policy to assure employees of
the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one
union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for
purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining
negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees.
The receipt by petitioner's "supervisor" employees of certain benefits under the CBA
between BUKLOD and petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification
election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded employees. It is not
equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded
employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. What is crucial and of
paramount consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees are
afforded the right to bargain collectively. The SC ruled that the employees excluded
from the coverage of the CBA, who not being excluded by law, have the right to
bargain collectively. The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were
extended to the monthly paid employees, even if true will not preclude them from
entering into a CBA of their own. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall petitioner
for having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees
of their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining.
The petition for certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit the
excluded employees of petitioner. The claim as to the applicability of the contract bar
doctrine could have not gained ground. A contract bar applies in a situation where the
petition is directed towards one and the same bargaining unit. This does not appear to
be so in the case considering the built-in-limitation in the CBA excluding the workers
sought to be represented by herein petitioner from its coverage, albeit, their being
admittedly rank and file employees. The certification election as ordered would only
affect those rank and file employees who are excluded from the coverage of the existing
CBA. Those who are already represented in the existing collective bargaining
agreement may rest secured in the bargaining unit that considers them as members of
its family. A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, hence, an
employer lacks the personality to dispute the same.

PHIL. TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE VS. LAGUESMA, 223 SCRA 452

Facts:
respondent PT&T Supervisory Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a
petition before the Industrial Relations Decision of the Department of Labor and
Employment praying for the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation
PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground that UNION
members were performing managerial functions and thus were not merely supervisory
employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a certified bargaining unit already existed
among its rank-and-file employees which barred the filing of the petition
Issue: Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
rule on the additional evidence submitted by petitioner which would have buttressed its
contention that there were no supervisory employees in its employ and which, as a
consequence, would have barred the holding of a certification election.
Held:
The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of the Labor Code. It reads:
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a
petition by a legitimate labor organization (emphasis supplied).
The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to
represent them at the time the UNION, which is legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, filed the petition for
certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented the supervisory
employees, PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of
Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already represented by a
certified bargaining agent doe not make PT&T an organized establishment vis-a-vis the
supervisory employees. After all, supervisory employees are "not . . . eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees, PT&T did not
possess the legal personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for certification
election even if based on the ground that its supervisory employees are in reality
managerial employees. It is well-settled that an employer has no standing to question a
certification election since this is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception to
this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself
pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain
collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a collective bargaining agent is
purely the internal affair of labor.

What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of any disqualified
employee in the certification election during the exclusion-inclusion proceedings before
the representation officer. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the exclusioninclusion proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the employees are entitled to vote
and be part of the bargaining unit sought to be certified.
Then Acting Secretary Nieves D. Confesor therefore did not abuse her discretion when
she opted not to act upon the additional evidence by petitioner PT&T. For, the holding of
a certification election in an unorganized establishment is mandatory and must
immediately be ordered upon petition by a legitimate labor organization, which is the
case here.
At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner failed to sufficiently show
that the supervisory employees who sought to be included in the bargaining unit were in
fact performing managerial functions. On the contrary, while these supervisory
employees did excercise independent judgment which is not routinary or clerical in
nature, their authority was merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they
were still accountable for their actions to a superior officer, i.e., their respective
superintendents.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS vs. LAGUESMA 263 SCRA 68, 1996

FACTS:
A petition for certification election among the monthly-paid employees of the San
Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant was filed by respondent labor
federation Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM).
Petitioner SMFI filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition.
Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of private respondent
IBM.
ISSUE: WON employer can resist the holding of a certification election among its
employees
HELD: NO.
It showed in this case that It is the petitioner which resisted to the holding of a
certification election among its monthly-paid rank-and-file employees.
The employers role in a certification election was described in TUPAS v. Trajano. It has
no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or
appeal the Med-Arbiters orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself
in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an
attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor.
While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such
nature, they should not, however, be considered parties thereto with the
concomitant right to oppose it. Sound policy dictates that they should maintain a
strictly hands-off policy.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification
elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. The
certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the
laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their
dealings with the establishment where they are working. It is the appropriate means
whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the
unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial
democracy.

CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOP. VS. SEC. OF LABOR, 201 SCRA 584
FACTS: As culled from the records, it is the submission of CENECO that the withdrawal
from membership in the cooperative and, as a consequence, the employees' acquisition
of membership in the union cannot be allowed for the following reasons:
1.
It was made as a subterfuge or to subvert the ruling in the BATANGAS case:
2.
To allow the withdrawal of the members of CENECO from the cooperative
without justifiable reason would greatly affect the objectives and goals of petitioner as
an electric cooperative;
3.
The Secretary of Labor, as well as the Med-Arbiter, has no jurisdiction over the
issue of the withdrawal from membership which is vested in the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) which has direct control and supervision over the operations of
electric cooperatives; and
4.
Assuming that the Secretary has jurisdiction, CURE failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by not referring the matter of membership withdrawal to the
NEA.
ISSUE: WON the petition is destitute of merit
HELD: Yes.
Right to withdraw from the organization: the right of the employees to selforganization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be
allowed. As pointed out by the union, the resignation of the member-employees is an
expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the
cooperative.

The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the
primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and join
unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.
Membership in an electric cooperative, which merely vests in the member a right to vote
during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis--vis the primordial
and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice.

ILAW AT BUKLOD VS. CALLEJA, 182 SCRA 561

NATURE Appeal from an order of the Director of Labor Relations

FACTS
- This is a certification election case. The Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly
registered labor union and a member of Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
(TUCP), filed with the Ministry of Labor a petition for certification election.
- Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the record of the
case to the TUCP, a federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement
between the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving its memberunions must first be referred to it for possible settlement in accordance with its Code of
Ethics.
- The TUCP has not decided the controversy. Thus the IBM filed in this Court the instant
petition for mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide the case, or,
in the alternative, to require the TUCP to return to the Director the record of the case.
ISSUE
WON it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to refer to the TUCP the
appeal of the Associated Labor Unions in a certification election case.
HELD
NO.
Ratio The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations should
abdicate, delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in favor of a private
person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender of official functions
is an anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation of the Director's adjudicatory
jurisdiction in representation cases.
Reasoning
a. Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the Bureau of Labor
Relations and the labor relations divisions in the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor
"shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request
of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the
subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration."
b. Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases shall be decided
within twenty (20) working days. " Article 260 of the same Code provides that the
Bureau of Labor Relations should decide appeals in representation cases "within fifteen
(15) working days", or twenty working days, according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides
that "the decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable."

DISPOSITION

The president, secretary, or any responsible officer of the TUCP is ordered to return to
the Director of Labor Relations the original record of the case. The Director is directed
to decide the appeal within ten days from the receipt of the record.

ALGIRE V. DE MESA 237 SCRA 647 (1994)

FACTS: Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU),
through private respondent de Mesa, filed a petition for the holding of an election of
union officers. Acting on the petition, the Med-Arbiter issued an order directing that such
an election be held.
1. In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be
conducted between petitioners Algire and private respondents de Mesa under
the supervision of DOLE
2. The secret ballot contained instructions to mark check or cross inside the box
specified for the candidates. It also indicated not to make any additional markings
3. In the election Algire and de Mesa both had 133 votes while there were 6 ballots
declared as spoiled
4. Algire, then, filed a petition to include one spoiled ballot in his favor. Said ballot
contained two checks inside the box opposite the name of Algire. Algire argued
that the two checks made it even clearer that the voter intended to vote for Algire
5. The Med-Arbiter declared the questioned ballot valid and counted the same in
Algires favor. Accordingly, Algires group was elected as the unions officers
6. Upon appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the Med-Arbiters order and issued
a new one calling for a re-election of union officers of URTMSEU
7. Algire filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner argued that a representation officer can validly rule only on on-the-spot
questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the
validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. As such, any ruling
made by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is an
absolute nullity for being done with lack of jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON DOLE representative acted in excess of his jurisdiction in not counting the
disputed ballot in favor of Algire
HELD: No. To resolve the issue at hand, it must be identified first if the election was a
consent election or a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent
election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being
merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has
nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.
The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled
is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such
officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written
instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings
thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in
order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the
contending parties.

If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that
the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the
canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a
waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.

FOITAF VS. NORIEL, 72 SCRA 24

FACTS: On March 20, 1975, the Federation of Free Workers (Associated AngloAmerican Employees Chapter, hereinafter referred to as FFW), filed a verified petition
for certification election among the employees and workers of the Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation (company for brevity), alleging that more than 30% of its rank and
file workers support the same.
The company opposed the petition alleging that the petitioning union did not have the
support of at least 30% of the more than 1,000 workers of the company.
The company alleged that there are 941 rank and file workers under its employ. Since
respondent FFW had then already submitted 283 signatures, the Med-Arbiter ruled
that FFW had complied with the 30% written consent requirement.
On the same date, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores
de Filipinos (FOITAF for short) Associated Anglo-American Chapter, moved to
intervene.
FOITAF filed a motion and manifestation calling attention to an alleged retraction or
revocation of signatures to the petition coming from thirteen (13) employees. All claims
that they were forced to sign. (It is worthy of note that the letters of retraction by the
thirteen (13) employees were not under oath and none of them was presented during
the hearings to confirm their alleged retractions.)
Med Arbiter issued an order declaring the following to be contenders in the election:
1. FOITAF
2. FFW
3. No union desired.
FOITAF filed a letter appeal from the aforesaid order of the Med-Arbiter on the sole
ground that FFW failed to comply with the 30% requirement.
The Bureau of Labor Relations in an order of even date suspended the holding of a
certification election.
4 additional signatures supporting the petition for certification election were presented
by FFW. Furthermore, FFW prayed for the exclusion of 124 employees from the
company's list of 941 employees on the grounds that some have either resigned, with
double name entries, casual employees with less than six months of service and still
others are confidential employees or are part of management.
FOITAF again filed a motion to dismiss, this time attaching merely an affidavit of its
president, a certain Timbungeo, alleging to the effect that a total of 45 workers have
retracted their signatures. (It is worthy of note that the signatures of these alleged 45
retractors were not presented.)

The company was then requested to submit the job descriptions or other proofs relative
to the duties of the 124 employees sought to be excluded by FFW from the company's
list of 941 but despite repeated request therefor, the company submitted only the job
descriptions of only 9 employees. Likewise, FOITAF did not present proof as to the
alleged retraction of the 45 workers.
The Bureau of Labor Relations then issued a resolution sustaining the previous order of
the Med-Arbiter for a certification election.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a FFW failed to comply with the 30% requirement of
the Labor Code.
HELD: No.
It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest
election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling.
There can then be no legitimate objection to the holding of a certification election not
only in the light of the basic theory of labor statutes from Commonwealth Act 213 to the
present Labor Code, but also in view of the factual finding that the verified petition by
private respondent labor union had the support of more than thirty percent of the
rank and file employees. Such being the case, it becomes, in the language of the new
Labor Code, "mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the
purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit."
The 13 employees who allegedly retracted were not even present before the medarbiter
and that the alleged additional 45 employees who supposedly likewise changed their
minds, were also not called to testify to that effect, petitioner satisfying itself with their
being named in an affidavit executed by its president. That would make, so it is
plausibly contended, such alleged retraction to be highly dubious in character.
The petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted.

AIRLINE PILOTS V. CIR 76 SCRA 274

FACTS: Gomez, who claimed to be the President of the Air Line Pilots Association of
the Philippines (ALPAP) filed a petition with the CIR praying for certification as sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all pilots under employment of Philippine Airlines
and are on active flights or operational assignments. ALPAP led by Gaston, who also
claimed to be its President, opposed said petition on the ground that the CIR had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
1. Judge Salvador rendered a decision certifying that ALPAP composed only of
pilots employed by PAL with Capt. Ben Hur Gomez as its president, as the sole
and exclusive Bargaining representative of all the pilots employed by PAL and
are on active flights and/or operational assignments, and as such is entitled to all
the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to
its office and its union funds.
2. Prior to the filing of the said certification petition, an ALPAP meeting where 221
out of 270 members adapted a section which amended ALPAPs constitution and
by-laws, it provided that any member who shall be forced to retire or to resign or
otherwise terminated for union activities may either continue his membership, or
resign from the association.
3. PAL and ALPAP were locked in a labor dispute as certified to the CIR. A returnto-work order was then issued by the CIR to all participants of the strike while
PAL was ordered not to dismiss or terminate any employee
4. Despite of a no-work-stoppage order of the CIR, a majority of ALPAP members
filed resignation / retirement letters. PAL accepted the said letters with the
caveat that the pilots will not be entitled to any of the benefits / privileges since
their acts constituted violation of the order of the CIR.
5. Thereafter, Gaston was elected as President of ALPAP on the election held on
18-22 December 1970 by 181 votes. Meanwhile, 45 pilots who did not resign /
retire from PAL elected Gomez as President on 23 December 1970. The CIR
granted the certification petition filed by Gomez and thus, he was declared as
President of ALPAP and entitled ALPAP to all the rights and privileges of a
legitimate labor organization.
6. Among the grounds cited by the CIR that justified said decision were (1) the PAL
pilots belonging to the Gaston Group retired / resigned en masse from PAL and
accompanied this with actual acts of not reporting, (2) that the pilots associated
with the Gaston group tried to relieve their deposits from the ALPAP Credit Union
on the ground that they had resigned /retired from PAL.
ISSUE: Whether the Gomez faction in separating themselves from ALPAP as headed
by Gaston could take over and appropriate the corporate name, office and funds of
ALPAP, as authorized by respondent court.
HELD: The Court ruled that the mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take
over the office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of discretion. The
Court cannot hold as valid and binding the election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of
ALPAP. He was elected at a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day

after the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a
majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270. tender the provisions of section
4, article in of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers of that
association shall remain in office for at least one year.
The restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization,"
which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or association of employees which
exist, in whole or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the
condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor
organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident
from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which
a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein
should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Under Section 2(h) of
R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor organization or
any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the
employer or employee whom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized
likewise that labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee. Furthermore, nothing in the
constitution and by-laws of ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to
PAL pilots alone
However, it is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization,
through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain
collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment
share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union
members, on matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular
employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar presently stand, ALPAP
(Gaston) has extended recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude collective
bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it would be
clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use
of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be
required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated
authority to bargain collectively with PAL.
In the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to the
leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own
separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a
separate labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation
they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of their
membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members
of the association.

REYES VS. TRAJANO, 209 SCRA 484

FACTS:
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20,
1987. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be
qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the
provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their
votes were 141 members of the INK.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course,
for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEUOLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third
choice: "NO UNION."
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between
the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK
members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any
union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections."
The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes.
They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result
thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEUOLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of
either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization.
HELD: Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining." This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of
the Philippines
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union
or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the
protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests. 5
Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or
resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist
any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor
organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right.

It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact
that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his
subsequently opting to renounce such membership
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the
majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be
represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular
labor organization The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to
vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" "but
members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or
forming any labor organization" and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for
certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law,
administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any
labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly
discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees
in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because
they "did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason
that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,"
persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of
the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.
In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the
public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively
and gravely abused the same.

TUPAS vs LAGUESMA 233 SCRA 565

FACTS:
TUPAS-FSM filed a petition for certification election for the purpose of choosing a
bargaining representative for the rank-and-file employees of Transunion
Corporation's industrial plant.
Before the filing of said petition, Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.) was
duly certified by DOLE as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rankand-file employees of Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division.
ILO-Phils., intervened in the certification election proceedings initiated by
TUPAS-FSM. It opposed the petition in view of the existing CBA between ILO
and the Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division. It stresses that the petition
for certification election should be entertained only during the freedom period, or
sixty day before the expiration of the CBA.
ISSUE: WON TUPAS-FSM can conduct certification election
HELD: NO.
It is crystal clear from the records that the rank-and- file employees of
respondent's Glassware Division are, at present, represented by ILO-PHILS.
Hence, petitioner's reliance on the Certification issued by Director Bautista, Jr., is
misplaced.
The Certification of ILO-PHILS. "as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file workers of Transunion-Glassware Division," means it shall remain
as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor
organizations, including petitioner, and no petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained, nor shall
certification election be conducted, outside of the fifty-day freedom period
immediately before the expiry date of the five-year term of the CBA.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS VS. LAGUESMA, 263 SCRA 68 [1996]

FACTS:
A petition for certification election among the monthly-paid employees of the San
Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant(SMFI, for brevity) was filed by
private respondent labor federation Ilaw at Buklodng Manggagawa (IBM, for
brevity) before Med-Arbiter alleging, inter alia, that it is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Department of labor and Employment
(DOLE).
Petitioner is a business entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines which employs roughly seventy-five (75) monthly paid employees,
almost all of whom support the present petition.
It was submitted in said petition that there has been no certification election
conducted in SMFI to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent thereat
for the past two years and that the proposed bargaining unit, which is SMFIs
monthly paid employees, is an unorganized one.
It was also stated therein that petitioner IBM (herein private respondent) has
already complied with the mandatory requirements for the creation of its local or
affiliate in SMFIs establishment.
ISSUE: WON that it was necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested
by the chapter officers.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be
certified and attested by the local/chapter officers.
The contention of the respondent that unless and until the issue on who is the legitimate
national president, of the Ilaw at Buklodng Manggagawa is resolved, the petitioner
cannot claim that it has a valid charter certificate necessary for it to acquire legal
personality is untenable. We wish to stress that the resolution of the said issue will not
in any way affect the validity of the charter certificate issued by the IBM in favor of the
local union. It must be borne in mind that the said charter certificate was issued by the
IBM in its capacity as a labor organization, a juridical entity which has a separate and
distinct legal personality from its members. When as in this case, there is no showing
that the Federation acting as a separate entity is questioning the legality of the issuance
of the said charter certificate, the legality of the issuance of the same in favor of the
local union is presumed. This notwithstanding the alleged controversy on the
leadership of the federation.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification
elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. The certification
election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely
determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the
establishment where they are working. It is the appropriate means whereby
controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal
vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

NUHRWRAIN MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER VS. SEC. OF LABOR, BLR,

HOLIDAY INN MANILA
FACTS:
A certification election was conducted on June 2006 among the rank-and-file employees
of Holiday Inn. Petitioner and another union (HIMPHLU) refer the case back to Med
Arbiter to decide which among those votes be opened and tallied. 22 votes were
segregated because; (1) eleven were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of
their dismissal is still pending before CA, (2) six were cast by those already occupying
supervisory positions; and (3) five were cast by probationary employees, and pursuant
to the CBA, such employees cannot vote.
The Med Arbiter ruled to open the votes cast by dismissed and by those holding
supervisory employees. The union appealed to SOLE, arguing that the vote of
probationary employees should likewise be opened and tallied. The SOLE affirmed the
decision of Med Arbiter. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification
election should be
allowed to vote.
RULING:
The court ruled in affirmative. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not
because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to
vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should
thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. FErrer-Colleja, 180 SCRA
749, holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote.
Petition is granted. The decision of CA is annulled and set aside.

NUWHRAIN-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER V. SECRETARY OF LABOR

G.R. NO 181531 (2009)
FACTS: In a certification election held among the rank-and-file employees of Holiday
Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel, petitioner NUWHRAIN-MPHC garnered 151 votes while
private respondent HIMPLU had 169 votes.
1. Because of the number of segregated votes (22 votes), NUWHRAIN-MPHC and
HIMPLU referred the case to the Med-Arbiter to decide which among those vote
should be opened in tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were
cast by dismissed employees (although their dismissal was pending before CA),
6 other votes were cast by employees who were already occupying supervisory
positions at the time of the election, and 5 were cast by probationary employees
(which, pursuant to the existing CBA cannot vote). It must be noted, though, that
one vote by a probationary employee (Gatbonton) was counted
2. Med-Arbiter ruled for the opening of 17 out of 22 segregated votes, particularly
those of the 11 dismissed employees and those cast by the 6 supposedly
supervisory employees of the hotel
3. As such, NUWHRAIN-MPHC appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that
the votes of the probationary employees should be opened since Gatbontons
vote was tallied. And should the 5 votes be included, the majority would be
169+1 (151+169+1+17)
4. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the Med-Arbiters order on the basis that
according to Sec 5 Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
probationary employees cannot vote.
5. CA affirmed the ruling of the Secretary of Labor and held that the ruling in Airtime
Specialist v. Ferrer-Calleja applies only to situations where the probationary
employees were already employed as of the date of filing of the petition for
election. But in this case, the 6 probationary employees were not yet employed
by the hotel at the time the order of the certification election was issued. As such,
they were not entitled to vote. CA also ruled that since the inclusion of
Gatbontons vote was nor properly challenged, its inclusion could no longer be
questioned, nor could it be made the basis the include the votes of the 6
probationary employees
ISSUE: WON employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections
should be allowed to vote; WON HIMPLU was able to obtain the required majority for it
to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
HELD: Yes. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not
questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification
election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been
counted. As held in Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This
principle is clearly stated in Art 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor

organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate

bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for
purposes of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the
employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all
employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or
permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative.
The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in
supporting the petition for certification election.
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot
override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to self-organization, as well as
the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections
and jurisprudence thereon.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes
of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining
unit.
While the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees should be
included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the period of time which it
took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six supervisory employees must be
excluded because at the time the certification elections was conducted, they had
ceased to be part of the rank and file, their promotion having taken effect two months
before the election.
HIMPLU cannot be considered as the exclusive bargaining agent of the hotel. It is wellsettled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification
election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must
have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Under Art 256 Labor Code, the union
obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining
unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not
able to obtain a majority vote.

MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS VS. SEC OF LABOR ET AL, [2009]

FACTS: On May 4, 2005, respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa

Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as
a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union
Registration against respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor
Code for not complying with the 20% requirement, and that it committed massive fraud
and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239[6] of the same code.
Petitioner contended that there was a disaffiliation from the total number of union
members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union membership
The Regional Director of DOLE granted the petition, revoking the registration of
respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions.
Respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the latter granted the
appeal. Petitioner sought recourse with the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition
for Certiorari; but the CA denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership
requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization.
HELD: NO.
From inspecting the affidavits of recantiong, evidently, these were written and prepared
in advance, and the pro forma affidavits were ready to be filled out with the employees
names and signatures.
The first common allegation in the affidavits is a declaration that, in spite of his
hesitation, the affiant was forced and deceived into joining the respondent union. It is
worthy to note, however, that the affidavit does not mention the identity of the
people who allegedly forced and deceived the affiant into joining the union, much
less the circumstances that constituted such force and deceit. Indeed, not only
was this allegation couched in very general terms and sweeping in nature, but more
importantly, it was not supported by any evidence whatsoever.
Simply put, through these affidavits, it is made to appear that the affiants
recanted their support of respondents application for registration.
In appreciating affidavits of recantation such as these, our ruling in La Suerte
Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is enlightening:
Withdrawals made before the filing of the petition for certification election are
presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary. Whereas
withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made
before the filing of the petition, the names of employees supporting the petition are
supposed to be held secret to the opposite party. Logically, any such withdrawal or

retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the contrary. Moreover, it

becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of the
petition, hence the subscription requirement has not been met.
When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition is filed, the
employees who are supporting the petition become known to the opposite party since
their names are attached to the petition at the time of filing. Therefore, it would not be
unexpected that the opposite party would use foul means for the subject
employees to withdraw their support.
In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after the identities of the
union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a petition for certification
election, since the names of the members were attached to the petition. The purported
withdrawal of support for the registration of the union was made after the documents
were submitted to the DOLE. The logical conclusion, therefore, following jurisprudence,
is that the employees were not totally free from the employers pressure, and so the
voluntariness of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
Accordingly, we cannot give full credence to these affidavits, which were executed
under suspicious circumstances, and which contain allegations unsupported by
evidence. At best, these affidavits are self-serving. They possess no probative value.
A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason,
retractions are looked upon with disfavor and do not automatically exclude the original
statement or declaration based solely on the recantation. It is imperative that a
determination be first made as to which between the original and the new statements
should be given weight or accorded belief, applying the general rules on evidence. In
this case, inasmuch as they remain bare allegations, the purported recantations should
not be upheld.
Nevertheless, even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the
legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be affirmed. While it is true
that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the
fact remains that at the time of the unions application for registration, the affiants
were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20%
membership for purposes of registration as a labor union.
. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership
during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union
must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its
existence.
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that
there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; the minutes of
ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of

officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of
the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason
to cancel respondents certificate of registration. The cancellation of a unions
registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to selforganization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of
union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of
a majority of union members.
In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not have
possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The alleged
failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of
employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment, especially as it was able to comply
with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Even if the total number of rank-andfile employees of petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only be 455,
it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the
registration requirement.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT PIZZA UT V. LAGUESMA 271 SCRA 593

FACTS: Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggawa (NLM)-Katipunan filed a petition for

certification election with the Dept. of Labor on behalf of the rank and file employees of
the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut).
1. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and
misrepresentation in the respondent unions registration making it void and
invalid. They alleged that a) respondent union registration was tainted with false,
forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the
ratification of the unions constitution and by-laws and in the election of its
officers; b) the charter certification issued by federation Katipunan was one day
prior to the formation of the chapter, thus there were serious falsities in the dates
of the issuance of the charter certification and the organization meeting of the
alleged chapter.
2. Petitioner also filed a petition seeking the cancellation of the unions registration
on the grounds of fraud and falsification, motion was likewise filed by petitioner
with Med-Arbiter requesting the suspension of proceedings in the certification
case until after the prejudicial question of the unions legal personality is
determined.
3. Med-Arbiter directed the holding of a certification election among petitioners rank
and file employees. The Med-arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioners
prayer that the he look into the legitimacy of the respondent union in holding that
the alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the
issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which could be ventilated
in the cancellation proceedings.
4. On appeal, the labor undersecretary affirmed the Med-Arbiters decision inspite of
the question of the Unions legitimacy was squarely put in issue and that the
allegations of fraud and falsification were adequately supported by documentary
evidence.
ISSUE: WON after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor
organization recognition by the BLR merely becomes a ministerial function.
HELD: The requirements embodied therein are intended as preventive measures
against the commission of fraud. After a labor organization has filed the necessary
papers and documents for registration, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to
check if the requirements under Article 234 have been sedulously complied with.
If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities,
especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents,
a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor
organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of
registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor
Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for
certification election. Registration requirements specifically afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. Such requirements are a

valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations,
associations and unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and
should be protected.
The Labor Code itself grants the BLR a period of thirty (30) days within which to review
all applications for registration. The thirty-day period in the provision ensures that any
action taken by the BLR is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code,
which, it bears emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a
certificate of registration should be compliance with the requirements for recognition
under Article 234. Thus, the recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not
merely a ministerial function
The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized establishments, a petition
for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. The
acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a
petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not
the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization. It
cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by petitioner for the cancellation of
respondent Union's registration fall under paragraph (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the
Labor Code. The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with
Article 239 of the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to the right of respondent
Union to ask for certification election. The Med-Arbiter should have looked into the
merits of the petition for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification
election. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer
no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on
to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being a
legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for
certification election in a bargaining unit.
The fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a legitimate
labor organization are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral
issues. The invalidity of respondent Union's registration would negate its legal
personality to participate in certification election. Once a labor organization attains the
status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights and
privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately
affect areas which are constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and unions are engaged directly affect the public interest
and should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's
requirements for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in
order. The Med-Arbiter and public respondent should have granted petitioner's
request for the suspension of proceedings in the certification election case, until
the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have been resolved.
Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted
a grave abuse of discretion.
PEPSI COLA VS. SEC. OF LABOR, 312 SCRA 105 [1995]

Facts:
The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification
election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of
supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI).
On July 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it
was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with
two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees
Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
On July 23, 1990, PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set
Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEUUOEF and docketed as Case No. 725-90, on the grounds that (a) the members of the
Union were managers and (b) a supervisors union can not affiliate with a federation
whose members include the rank and file union of the same company.
Issue: Whether or not a supervisors union can affiliate with the same Federation of
which two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of
the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715, which provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees.- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
Held:
It is a well-settled rule that a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense that
the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact
finding character.
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at
the time of the enactment, to be an all embracing legislation maybe inadequate to
provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the
law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication xxx, Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. Ex necessitate legis
xxx if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests. The Union can also become company dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership. Stated differently, in the collective

bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the

employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well
protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees
themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become
one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they
could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers.
Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are
supposed to act in the interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of
collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty bound to
protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs. FerrerCalleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc., NLRC, that confidential
employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having
access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said
employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees.
A careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they dont lay down company
policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies since they have to
report to their respective superior. The mere fact that an employee is designated
manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd
situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member
of a union

TOYOTA MOTOR vs. TOYOTA MPC LABOR UNION 268 SCRA 571, 1997

FACTS:
Toyota MPC Labor Union (TMPCLU) filed a petition for certification election for
all rank-and-file employees of the Toyota Motor.
Petitioner seeks the denial of the issuance of an Order directing the holding of a
certification election on two grounds:
i. that the respondent union, being "in the process of registration" had
no legal personality to file the same as it was not a legitimate labor
organization as of the date of the filing of the petition; and
ii. that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees in violation of law.
ISSUE: WON respondent labor union is entitled for certification election.
HELD: NO.
Under Art 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are prohibited from
joining labor organizations consisting of rank-and-file employees because the
two groups are normally disparate and contradictory.
Clearly, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
legitimate labor organization and it doesnt have the right to file a petition for
certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes
necessary therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing for a certification
election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whatever the status of
the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Art 245 Labor Code
It is clear from a reading of the Labor Code's definition of the term that those employees
of the petitioner occupying Level 5 positions are unquestionably supervisory employees.
They are involved in the independent assessment of factors affecting production, which
in turn affect decisions to hire or transfer workers.
The rationale behind the exclusion of supervisors from unions of rank-and-file
employees is that such employees, become the alter ego of management in the making
and the implementing of key decisions at the sub-managerial level. Certainly, it would
be difficult to find unity or mutuality of interests in a bargaining unit consisting of a
mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees..
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of
at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions. The
union could not attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one,
it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification
election.

TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTL GOLF CLUB, INC. VS TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS

EMPLOYEES UNION PGTWO, 395 SCRA 699 [22 JAN 2003]
FACTS:
The Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU)Philippine Transport and
General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter No. 776, a legitimate
labor organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file employees of
THIGCI, filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE MediationArbitration Unit, Regional Branch No. IV.
THIGCI, in its Comment] filed on November 27, 1997, opposed THEUs petition
for certification election on the ground that the list of union members submitted
by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of
supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees,
as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and
separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71
were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI.
THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names of its 71 actual rank-and-file
employees which it annexed to its Comment to the petition for certification
election.
THIGCI also alleged that some of the signatures in the list of union members
were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means, and submitted copies of
the handwritten denial and withdrawal of some of its employees from
participating in the petition.

ISSUE: WON mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a
petition for certification election.
HELD: This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota
and Dunlop and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition
against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court
held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the
rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its
legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration,
unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or
fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.
It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with
Sec 5 of Rule V, Book IV IRR (see: Rule IV Sec 8, DO 40-03)
RURAL BANK OF ALAMINOS EMPLOYEES UNION VS. NLRC, 317 SCRA 669
(1999)

FACTS:
Subsequent to its certification on December 12, 1989 as the sole bargaining agent of
the employees of RBAI, the Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union (hereinafter
called the Union) submitted sometime in February 1989 proposals with respect to
salary/wage increases.
RBAIs counter-proposals not (sic) acceptable to it, the Union, which had earlier filed a
notice of strike on March 3, 1989, went on strike on April 3, 1989. Its position being that
the strike staged by the Union is illegal and in violation of Article 248 (e) of the Labor
Code, RBAI instituted a petition for the declaration of the strike as illegal and for actual
damages.

RULING: NLRC charged RBAI with unfair labor practice and the Labor Arbiter
concluded that the Bank employed all available means to further delay the resolution of
the dispute, thus creating a scenario of an illegal lock-out. A lock-out means the
temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.
As correctly found by the NLRC, in the case under consideration evidence of illegal
lock-out is wanting such that there can be no conclusive determination by the NLRC as
to the charge. Petitioners failed to present sufficient proof to support the allegation of
illegal lock-out. No evidence was adduced by the Union to show that the Bank really
refused them employment during the pendency of the strike. As to the allegation that
the Bank was interfering with and restraining the employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, suffice it to state that filing a petition for
cancellation of the Unions registration is not per se an act of unfair labor
practice. It must be shown by substantial evidence that the filing of the petition
for cancellation of union registration by the employer was aimed to oppress the
Union.

PORT WORKERS UNION V. UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR 207 SCRA 329 (1992)

FACTS: When the CBA between the company ITCSI and private respondent APCWU
was about to expire, other labor unions sought to represent the laborers in the
negotiation of the next CBA. In line with this, SAMADA, another labor union, filed a
petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the
employees in the bargaining unit were submitted 11 days after the petition
1. Another petition for certification election was filed by PEALU. Subsequently, the
petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated.
2. APCWU filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that SAMADA and PEALU did
not comply with the requirement provided in Sec 6 Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code which provides that the petition should be
accompanied by 25% consent signatures at the time of filing. The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the consolidated petitions
3. PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Art 256 Labor Code did
not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition
for certification election. However, the principal petitioners, SAMADA and
PEALU, did not appeal. Undersecretary of Labor Laguesma affirmed the order of
the Med-Arbiter
4. Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new CBA
5. Petitioner PWUP argued that under Art 256 Labor Code, the Med-Arbiter should
automatically order election by secret ballot when the petition was supported by
at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
complied with this requirement when they submitted the required consent
signatures several days after the filing of the petition. In dismissing the petitions
for certification election, Laguesma was, in a way, indirectly certifying APCWU as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of ICTSI employees
6. Private respondent ICTSI contended that the decision in TUPAS v. Inciong is
applicable in this case where the SC held that since 499 out of the total working
force of 641 have not only ratified the CBA concluded between UMI and
LUSTEVECO, but affirmed their membership in UMI, there is no more need for
holding a certification election.
ISSUE: WON contract-bar rule applies in this case
HELD: Yes. The administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be
strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the
workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Art 256 Labor Code,
the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at
best be given only a directory effect. Accordingly, the mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance
of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the submission of
the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing. It is not
denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified
that decision in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja: The petitioner was obviously
referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of certification
elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an attempt to
avoid the holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial
stability is clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this singular exception,
contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in
doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the
workers. As stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, any
stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the
law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real
representative.
The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an
affirmation of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation
issue moot and academic and conclusively barring the holding of a certification election
thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say that the mere
ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of
membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA,
the second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating union. The second
requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not show
that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally
affiliated with APCWU.

PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH VS. CALLEJA, 181 SCRA 119

FACTS: The petitioner, PMTI-ULGWF is the recognized collective bargaining agent of

the rank-and-file employees of Triumph International with which the latter has a valid
and existing collective bargaining agreement effective up to September 24, 1989.
On November 25, 1987, a petition for certification election was filed by the respondent
union, PEU-TIPI with the DOLE.
After 2 months, a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election was filed by
Triumph International on the grounds that the petition cannot prosper by virtue of the
contract-bar rule.
Labor Arbiter issued granted the petition for certification election and directing the
holding of a certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all monthly-paid administrative, technical, confidential and supervisory
employees of Triumph International.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of immediate holding of a certification election is
corect.
HELD: YES.
Contract-Bar rule means if a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a petition for
certification election can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry
date of said agreement.
Respondent union's petition for certification election was filed on November 25, 1987. At
the time of the filing of the said petition, a valid and existing CBA was present between
petitioner and Triumph International. The CBA was effective up to September 24, 1989.
There is no doubt that the CBA constituted a bar to the holding of the certification
election.

FVC LABOR UNION-PGTWO V. SAMA SAMANG NAGKAKAISANG

MANGGAGAWA SA FVC-SIGLO [2009]

FACTS: Petitioner FVCLU-PGTWO the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees of the FVC Phil. Inc. signed a five year CBA with the company. At the
end of the 3rd yr of the 5-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PGTWO and the
company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other
provisions, the CBAs duration, extending the original 5-year period of the CBA by 4
months.
1. 9 days before the Jan. 30, 2003 expiration of the originally agreed 5-year CBA
term, the respondent SANAMA-SIGLO filed before the DOLE a petition for
certification for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PGTWO CBA.
2. FVCLU-PGTWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification
election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside the 60 days
before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003.
3. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60day period counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the amended CBA.
DOLE Secretary sustained SANAMA-SIGLOs position and ordered the conduct
of a certification election in the company.
4. FVCLU-PGTWO moved for the reconsideration of the Secretarys decision.
DOLE Acting Secretary granted the motion and held that the amended CBA has
been ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of whom later organize
themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election applicant. Acting
Secretary also rationalized that they also accepted the extended term of the
CBA and cannot now file a petition for certification based on the original
expiration date.
5. SANAMA-SIGLO sought relief from the CA contending that the Secretarys new
ruling is patently contrary to the express provisions of the law and established
jurisprudence. CA set aside the DOLE Secretary decision and reinstated her
earlier ruing calling for a petition for a certification election and held that the while
the parties may renegotiate the other provisions of the CBA, this should not affect
the 5-yr representation aspect of the original CBA.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the amended or extended term of the CBA on the exclusive
representation status of the collective bargaining agent and the right of another union to
ask for certification as exclusive bargaining agent?

HELD: Despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than 5 years, either as
an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive
bargaining status is effective only for 5 yrs and can be challenge within 60days
prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.
Article 253-A of the Labor Code covers this situation and it provides:
Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement
that the parties may enter into, shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned,
be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election

shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the

sixty day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.
FVCLU-PTGWO has taken the view that its exclusive representation status should fully
be in step with the term of the CBA and that this status can be challenged only within 60
days before the expiration of this term. Thus, when the term of the CBA was extended,
its exclusive bargaining status was similarly extended so that the freedom period for the
filing of a petition for certification election should be counted back from the expiration of
the amended CBA term.
FVCLU-PTGWO is correct, but only with respect to the original five-year term of the
CBA which, by law, is also the effective period of the unions exclusive bargaining
representation status. While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original
five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or
term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive
collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A,
the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon
In the case at bar, the CBA was originally signed for a period of five years, with a
provision for the renegotiation of the CBAs other provisions at the end of the 3rd year of
the five-year CBA term. Prior to January 30, 2001 the workplace parties sat down for
renegotiation but instead of confining themselves to the economic and non-economic
CBA provisions, also extended the life of the CBA for another four months. This
negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs
exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years
ending on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this
date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-SIGLO could properly file a petition for
certification election. Its petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or nine (9) days before the
expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining status, was
seasonably filed
In the event however, that the parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated
contract with a term of three (3) years or one which does not coincide with the said fiveyear term and said agreement is ratified by majority of the members in the bargaining
unit, the subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting parties.
The same will however not adversely affect the right of another union to challenge the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent within sixty (60) days before the lapse
of the original five (5) year term of the CBA.

KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA VS. TRAJANO, 201 SCRA 453

FACTS: The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) was declared the exclusive
bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron Garments
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (VIRON).
More than four years thereafter, or on April 11, 1985, another union, the Kaisahan ng
Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL Katipunan filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for certification election among the employees of VIRON. The petition allegedly
counted with the support of more than thirty percent (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition, as might be expected. The Med-Arbiter however ordered,
on June 14, 1985, that a certification election be held at VIRON as prayed for, after
ascertaining that KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that since
the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining representative in 1981, no collective
bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU appealed. It contended that at the time the petition for certification election was
filed on April 11, 1985, it was in process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there
was in fact a deadlock in the negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike;
and that these circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance
with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
HELD: It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification
election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification
election result' in this case, from February 27, 1981, the date of the Resolution
declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of
VIRON can have no application to the case at bar. That one-year period-known as
the "certification year" during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the
employer, and certification election is prohibited has long since expired.
Again it seems fairly certain that prior to the filing of the petition for election in this case,
there was no such "bargaining deadlock ... (which) had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout." To be sure,
there are in the record assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the
negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and
unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; 3 but there is no proof that it had taken any
action to legally coerce VIRON to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It
could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone
on a legitimate strike in protest against VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and
compel it to do so; but it did not. There are assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts
to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution
pronouncing it the sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate
substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process
between it and VIRON.
The stark, incontrovertible fact is that from February 27, 1981 when NAFLU was
proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON employees to April
11, 1985 when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a period of more

than four (4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no
deadlock ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in
conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU on October 26, 1986 for refusal
of VIRON to bargain and for violation of terms and conditions of employment, which was
settled by the parties' agreement, and to another strike staged on December 6, 1986 in
connection with a claim of violation of said agreement, a dispute which has since been
certified for compulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Labor & Employment. Obviously,
however, these activities took place after the initiation of the certification election case
by KAMPIL, and it was grave abuse of discretion to have regarded them as precluding
the holding of the certification election thus prayed for.

CAPITOL MEDICAL VS. LAGUESMA 267 SCRA 503, 1997

FACTS:

 After respondent union was certified as the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited
the employer hospital to the bargaining table by submitting its economic proposal
for a CBA.
However, CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and instead
challenged the latters legal personality through a petition for cancellation of the
certificate of registration which eventually reached this Court.
The decision affirming the legal status of respondent union should have left CMC
with no other recourse but to bargain collectively, but still it did not.
Respondent union was left with no other recourse but to file a notice of strike
against CMC for unfair labor practice with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board.
This eventually led to a strike on April 15, 1993 .
Petitioner union on the other hand, after the Court issued an entry of judgment on
March 23, 1994, filed the subject petition for certification election on March 24,
1994, claiming that twelve months had lapsed since the last certification election.
ISSUE:
WON certification election can now be conducted as more that 12 months have lapsed
since the last certification election was held
HELD:
Petitioner insists that the circumstances prescribed in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code where a certification election should be conducted,
viz:
(1)that one year had lapsed since the issuance of a final certification result; and
(2) that there is no bargaining deadlock to which the incumbent or certified
bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to conciliation or arbitration, or
had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout, are present in this
case.
It is true that in this case one year had lapsed since the time of declaration of a
final certification result, and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock.
There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed forces. It presupposes reasonable effort at good faith
bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between
the parties.
But what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC
employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the

bargaining agent and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with
respondent union. Thus, we can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate
and reach an agreement with respondent union.
In this case, there was proof that the certified bargaining agent,
respondent
union, had taken an action to legally coerce the employer to comply with its
statutory duty to bargain collectively, i.e., charging the employer with unfair labor
practice and conducting a strike in protest against the employers refusal to
bargain. It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should
be considered as similar in nature to a bargaining deadlock when no
certification election could be held
.
This is also to make sure that no
floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous
employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA.
Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules should be interpreted
liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could not be
concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform its duty to bargain
collectively.

ALU VS. TRAJANO, 172 SCRA 49

FACTS:

Petitioner Associated Labor Unions (ALU, for brevity) instituted this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition to overturn the decision of the respondent
director dated December 10, 1986, which ordered the holding of a certification
election among the rank-and-file workers of the private respondent GAW
Trading, Inc
Public respondent ordered the holding of a certification election ruling that the
"contract bar rule" relied upon by her predecessor does not apply in the present
controversy.
According to the decision of said respondent, the collective bargaining
agreement involved herein is defective because it "was not duly submitted in
accordance with Section I, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130.
" It was further observed that "(t)here is no proof tending to show that the CBA
has been posted in at least two conspicuous places in the establishment at least
five days before its ratification and that it has been ratified by the majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit."

ISSUE: WON there is reversible error in the challenged decision of respondent director
HELD: None. The collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective
hence unproductive of the legal effects attributed to it by the former director in his
decision which was subsequently and properly reversed.
CONTRACT BAR RULE - during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
except within the freedom period;
This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an
existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a
petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the said agreement is
about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the relationships of the
workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective
bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period.