Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
HSE GUIDELINE
Document Authorisation
Document Authority
dapo Oguntoyinbo
Ref. Ind: CSM
Date: 15/07/02
Document Custodian
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02
Document Author
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02
The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
Version No.
Version 2.0
Date
Jul 2002
Version 1.0
Jul 1998
Author
Hamad Khalfeen,
CSM/11
Scope / Remarks
Editorial changes, new format.
Original issue as HSE/97/13.
User Notes:
This document is a guideline only.
A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference
to this document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is
current. For assistance, contact the Document Custodian.
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of
this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior
written consent of the owner.
Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing
constructive feedback.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page ii
HSE GUIDELINE
Contents
ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................IV
1.0
INTRODUCTION............................................................................1
1.1 PURPOSE...................................................................................................... 1
1.2 SCOPE.......................................................................................................... 1
1.3 BACKGROUND................................................................................................ 1
1.3.1 Pre Fire Planning..................................................................................1
1.4 DISTRIBUTION AND TARGET AUDIENCE................................................................2
1.5 DOCUMENT REVIEW........................................................................................2
2.0
2.1 GENERAL...................................................................................................... 3
2.2 DOCUMENTS REQUIRED...................................................................................3
2.2.1 Area Facility FES and Fire Protection Equipment Description..............3
2.2.2 Fire Protection Systems Maintenance Plans.........................................5
2.2.3 Pre-Fire Plan/Operator Response Sheet...............................................7
2.2.4 Fire Responder Capabilities.................................................................3
2.2.5 Shortfall Listing....................................................................................5
2.3 FIRE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT..........................................................................6
2.3.1 General................................................................................................ 6
2.3.2 Resource Levels for Scenarios.............................................................6
3.0
3.1
3.2
EXAMPLES...................................................................................8
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE PLANS.................................................8
FIRE SCENARIO WORKSHEETS.........................................................................10
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Abbreviations
GU-230
AFFF
AFO
BA
BLL
BLEVE
BPD
Breathing Apparatus
Barrels
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
Barrels Per Day
CAA
DCS
EOM
EP
ERD
ESD
FCP
FERM
FES
FMECA
HSE
ICAO
IR
IT
LEBC
LEL
LPG
lpm
MAF
Mina Al Fahal
NED
NGL
NFPA
oo
ORC
OWS
PDO
PPE
PS
QRA
RCM
RFF
RFFS
RMS
REVISION 2.0
Page iv
HSE GUIDELINE
GU-230
SCBA
SIEP
UL
UV
Underwriters Laboratory
Ultra Violet
VESDA
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
1.0Introduction
1.1
Purpose
The prime objective of a FERM Facility Plan is to minimise the risk to life
and assets by maximising the potential for risk mitigation with manual
intervention, utilising available manpower and equipment.
It is intended that FERM Facility Plans be produced in a consistent manner
for both new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Presently,
throughout PDO facilities there are differences in procedures, available
equipment, manpower and capability. The purpose of this Guideline is to
provide a consistent approach to identified fire hazards, by setting
standards for the preparation of specific pre-fire planning documents for
each PDO location.
This document supports the requirements provided in SP 1075,
Specification for Fire and Explosion Risk Management, and provides
examples where applicable.
1.2
Scope
This guideline is focused on FERM Facility Plans.
1.3
Background
Automated systems have the advantage of rapid response but are limited
in terms of assessment and usually follow a single pre-determined pattern
initiated by condition sensors. Only trained personnel can provide the
necessary assessment of a situation but their performance is very much
improved if all of the possibilities for escalation have been considered and
fully understood prior to any occurrence.
By preparing specific action plans for manual response based on identified
fire hazards and scenarios, simulated response exercises can be tested and
practised. The testing aspect provides information regarding any
weaknesses in the systems, or failures on demand; whilst the practice
induces a level of familiarity with tasks which then become routine, and
therefore more reliable. During an emergency, fire responders rely on their
ability to use equipment safely and effectively.
1.3.1
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REVISION 2.0
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1.4
1.5
GU-230
Document Review
This Guideline shall be reviewed as necessary in line with any review and
modification of the related Specification.
REVISION 2.0
Page 2
HSE GUIDELINE
General
This section provides guidance on how to prepare a FERM Facility Plan, and
provides a list of documents for a typical plan.
In establishing facility plans it is necessary to prepare a list of company
facilities, then list the processes, plants, operation, structures and
personnel within the facilities. From this list the numbers and types of
potential (moderate, serious and major fire) incident scenarios should be
further listed. It is anticipated that company personnel in the vicinity
would deal with minor or incipient fires and therefore such incidents should
not be used for pre-plans.
After confirming the credibility of the draft fire scenarios with line
management, supervisor actions to prepare for the event can be
developed. These should be in line with an emphasis on the impact on
operations, facility, plant and equipment to ensure accuracy of planning. A
final list of scenarios should then be converted into fully prepared pre-fire
plans with further investigative work on impact on the environment and
the public.
Establishing a pre-fire plan for every single potential fire incident in all
company facilities serves little useful purpose since it would take many
years to exercise the response to these incidents. Operators pre-plans
should be developed as well as those for fire fighters and the two should
be coordinated on a scenario basis.
2.2
Documents Required
The following documents are required in order to complete a FERM Facility
Plan:
1. Area Facility FES and Description of Fire Protection Equipment, for
reference, information and possible inclusions in the HSE Case.
2. Fire protection systems maintenance plans, for inclusion in the site
EPMARS.
3. Pre-fire plans/Operator response, for inclusion in the Site Emergency
Procedures, Part III.
4. Fire responder capabilities, for inclusion in the Operator Competency
Assurance Scheme and/or the Fire Brigade Training Programme.
5. Shortfall Listings, for inclusion in the EOM, Staff Training Plan and FCP
as required.
2.2.1
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
2 x CO2 extinguishers
The extinguisher type and number are appropriate to the facilities. There
are no fixed fire systems at any RMS in accordance with strategy level 1.
The following fire and gas detection is in place:
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 4
HSE GUIDELINE
RMS 1 to 4 and 6 to 10
H2S gas detection (DCS building)
(external) only
Smoke detection (DCS building)
Break glass units (external)
RMS 5
Break
glass
units
Actuation of any of these devices will alarm in the control room and ESD
the respective RMS.
Conclusion:
Stations.
2.2.2
GU-230
1.1
Weekly
Check all valves on the foam system and ensure they are all in the
correct stand-by positions;
Inspect firewater supply system to ensure pressure and flow
required for the SSSFIS;
Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank, ensure
foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated and run foam pump
and verify the duplex gauge foam pressure indicator is working;
Check foam tank and fittings for leakage;
Check storage temperature of foam concentrate to ensure it is
within manufacturers limits.
1.2
Monthly
Inspect full system for physical wear and tear or damage;
Remove, clean, inspect and reassemble foam concentrate line and
sensing line strainers;
Check foam generators air inlet screens and clean if necessary;
Align valves to circulate foam concentrate back to tank and ensure
foam discharge to surge tank is fully isolated then run foam pump
and check for leakage, excessive noise, vibration or overheating in
the pump or driver motor;
Ensure foam tank is isolated and water supply is isolated and cycle
REVISION 2.0
Page 5
HSE GUIDELINE
1.3
GU-230
valves from the control room fire and gas control panel or by
manual override at valves;
Inspect foam tank pressure/vacuum vent to ensure free movement
and that screens are clean.
Quarterly
Reassemble solenoid
1.4
6 Monthly
Check complete system, all valves, fittings and connections for
leakage
Check flange bolts for tightness
Isolate and remove hose container from tank and inspect hose
condition, and return to service.
Check system for any external damage to paint surfaces.
Check supervision of control circuit and check air supply. Check low
air supply alarm and check for leakage/passing valve seats.
Remove, clean, test and reassemble the pressure vacuum vent on
the tank.
Remove, clean, test and recalibrate the duplex foam/water gauge.
Check that proper control system indicators are present, check
supervision of all circuits, check alarm operation, check system
operation and check that all indicators illuminate.
Isolate duplex foam/water gauge and clean water and foam lines to
gauge. Flush and pressure test gauge for water and foam
indications
1.5
Annually
1. Carry out annual discharge test, ensuring discharge to surge tanks
is fully isolated and check foam solution proportioning, foam
expansion and drainage in accordance with NFPA 11.
2. Check foam pump alignment in accordance with the manufacturers
instructions
3. Check that proper voltage is available at pump motor.
4. Check motor for proper rotation and rotate pump by hand to
ensure free movement.
5. Check that foam pump can supply adequate pressure for the foam
supply system by observing the duplex water/foam gauge. The
foam needle indicator (red) should be approximately 1 barg higher
than the water pressure.
6. Remove water filter from line and clean, inspect for damage and
reassemble.
7. Strip, clean, test and reinstall the system deluge valves in
accordance with manufacturers instructions.
8. Check foam pump relief valve setting for proper operation.
9. Take sample of foam concentrate and submit for analysis on
sedimentation, corrosion, dilution or contamination to an approved
foam supplier.
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
2.2.3
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 1
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ONGOING POTENTIAL HAZARDS : Crude oil boilover will occur if tank fire extinguishment is unsuccessful. Boilover event may overflow bund walls.
Fireball may achieve heights of 100m with resultant high radiant heat levels dangerous to fire responders and observers.
Probable escalation involving adjacent tank or separators once a boilover occurs. More than one boilover is possible . Personnel should not re-enter LPS after a first or second
boilover. The fire incident will only be safe once the tank fire, or fires, are burned out.
GU-230
Check tanks foam system valves have actuated and advise LEBC
Check ESD operated for tanks and station - confirm to LEBC shutdown status.
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
2.2.4
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 3
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COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
Area emergency plan, emergency team members and team call out system, emergency incident command structure and fire responder responsibilities.
Station firewater system normal flowrate and pressures, the location of firewater system isolation valves, how to use a fire hydrant safely and how to avoid water
hammer.
Function of surge tanks and basic tank design including roof-to-seam design and main gas and oil piping connections.
Types of portable water monitor and foam monitor in use at the station in particular and the area in general.
Types of delivery fire hose and connections in use at the station and the area.
Types of fire hydrants and number of hydrant outlets on hydrants at the LPS.
Types of foam in use at the station in the surge tank foam system and in the station fire cabinets and their correct proportioning ratio.
Types of portable foam inductors and foam branches in use in the station and the station area and their respective flowrates and pressures.
Hazards associated with crude oil boilover events.
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
GU-230
REVISION 1.0
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GU-230
REVISION 1.0
Page 5
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2.2.5
Shortfall Listing
This section should list all shortfalls identified during the preparation of the
pre-fire plan in comparison to the FERM Specification requirements. The
listing should include statements regarding whether or not the shortfall is
acceptable and that a waiver from the Specification should be obtained. In
those shortfalls which are not acceptable, a priority shall be assigned,
together with personnel designated for action.
Examples of shortfall listings are provided in the worked examples of Fire
Scenario Worksheets in Section 3.2.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
2.3
2.3.1
The fire scenarios identified should then be listed. Section 3.1 of this
Guideline provides examples of typical major fire scenarios. Guidance is
provided below on how to complete the resource levels for scenarios.
A blank work sheet example showing the format and information
requirement is shown in Attachment I.
2.3.2
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
Monitors
Judgemental based on practical fire ground experience and/or surface area
or number of exposure hazards to be cooled if for water monitors, or foam
solution capacity if for foam monitors.
Manpower
Based on the number of monitors or handlines to be deployed or SCBA to
be used. Typically, three men are needed for deploying a single monitor
and fire hose to the monitor, maintaining the flow direction of the water
stream or for maintaining the foam supply and direction of the foam
stream. Where obviously practical, man power for monitors are also used
to supply foam concentrate to foam hand lines if they are also in use.
For foam hand lines, typically, a minimum of 2 fire responders are needed
for each hand line excluding foam re-supply.
Vehicles
Generally, there is only one fire truck listed although a foam tanker may
also be used.
Specialist Equipment
Mainly SCBA sets. Based on one set per person for scenarios where
personnel may be exposed to smoke conditions or atmospheres.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
3.0EXAMPLES
3.1
GU-230
2.1
Weekly
Check all valves to ensure they are in the normal stand-by mode;
Inspect firewater supply to ensure water supply will be operational
if required;
Check water supply and air supply valves for leakage;
Check deluge valve pressure gauges to ensure pressure differential
is maintained at the required settings.
2.2
Monthly
Check for system hardware wear and tear or physical damage;
Check for corrosion at drain/weep holes on discharge piping;
Check low air supply alarm for deluge valve;
2.3
Quarterly
Override or isolate executive actions on the fire detection and
alarm panel;
Override Solenoid switch for deluge valve operation
Remove solenoid, inspect, clean and test operation
Reassemble solenoid
Test solenoid actuator on deluge valve;
Actuate the system (from different detection or manual device
each time) to check each nozzle water pattern;
Remove and clean any blocked water nozzle;
Flush the discharge piping and nozzles;
Remove terminal nozzles from the discharge piping array;
Run deluge system for minimum 2 minutes with terminal nozzles
and any blocked nozzles removed for flushing purposes;
Close water discharge valve;
Reassemble all removed nozzles;
Reset the deluge valve;
Reinstate the fire detection system to normal operation;
Ensure discharge piping drain/weep hole is functioning correctly.
2.4
6 Monthly
Remove and clean water screen/filter and reassemble.
REVISION 2.0
Page 9
HSE GUIDELINE
2.5
Annually
Strip, clean, test and reinstall the deluge valve in accordance with
manufacturers instructions;
GU-230
3.1
Weekly
Check all CO2 status lights are indicating outside the turbine
enclosures
The following maintenance, inspections and tests and frequency
applies to the CO2 system for the power station either in addition to
the existing maintenance requirements or to enhance the
requirements. Check system is on automatic release at F & G panel
and at enclosures
Check CO2 cylinders are in position and are securely fastened.
Check slave cylinder is in position
Check manual isolation device is available in the cylinder room
Check there are no fault signals on the fire and gas panel for the
generators
Test automatic/manual switch at enclosure and ensure this
indicates at F & G panel. Return switch to automatic.
3.2
Monthly
Check general condition of heat detectors,flame detectors and gas
detectors in the enclosures.
Check enclosure doors are properly closed and door seal is in good
condition.
3.3
6 Monthly
Check cylinders CO2 content either by non intrusive level detection
or by weighing cylinders. Any cylinder showing a net loss of 10% or
more should be refilled or replaced.
Check all piping and flexible hoses for wear and tear or damage.
Ensure system is isolated if weighing cylinders
Return system to service on completion of cylinder content checks.
Check flame detectors positioning and ensure they are aimed in
accordance with design intent.
Isolate or override flame detectors executive actions and test using
UV test lighting device.
Reinstate UV executive alarms.
3.4
5 yearly
All high pressure hoses should be removed and tested by hydrotest to
a pressure of 175 barg. Pressure to be maintained for one minute. Any
hose and/or coupling developing a leak during this time should be
replaced
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
3.2
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 1
REFERENCE: XXX-1
FACILITY
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel not normally on the tank roof. If internal explosion occurs,
roof may totally separate resulting in spiralling heavy object. Personnel in the
general area may be at risk from this event. Radiant heat at grade level should
not present a life threatening condition from the full surface fire.
Environment Initially, smoke pollution only. Some crude may have spilled into
bund on roof separation but this will be retained in bund.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank damaged due to loss of roof and
burning surface. Immediate production deferment, will be approximately 14,000
m 3.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Adjacent surge/dewatering tank roof would be subjected to moderate radiant heat
that may result in roof damage or failure in the order of 50/60 minutes if no
cooling actions were taken. Radiant heat effects may increase if wind direction
and speed causes flame to tilt toward adjacent tank and therefore time to failure
may be much less than the above.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
If fire is not extinguished within first 1 or 2 hours, boilover will result some time
after this. Crude boilover may overflow tank bunds and then would involve
adjacent surge tank and possibly some of the bulk and/or test separators outside
the tank bund.
Post Escalation
Life safety Fire responders may be fatally or seriously injured if caught in the
vicinity of a crude boilover.
Environment Soil contamination will occur if crude overflowed bunds. Continued
smoke pollution.
Business interruption Prolonged station shutdown.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of both surge tanks due to escalation.
Production deferment would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process Tank low and high level alarms. High level trips tank inlet and outlet and
causes hydrocarbon ESD.
Fire Event Fusible plug heat detection ring on tank roof rim with 3 pressure
switches voting 2 out of 3 to cause tank ESD, hydrocarbon ESD, site fire siren,
foam pump start and foam system valve to tank opened.
Gas Event Not applicable for this event.
Mitigation
Process Controls Tank inlet/outlet valves, hydrocarbon ESD, Station ESD.
Containment Tank acts as containment. Tank walls will fold inward during fire
event. Bund acts as containment for oil spillage/release.
Drainage Bund drains provided and normally closed.
Passive Fire Control Single bund and intermediate bund between tanks.
Active Fire Control Fixed automatic semi sub-surface injection foam system
serving both tanks. Quantity of foam concentrate required in foam storage tank is
not precisely indicated but appears to be in the order of 8,500 litres. (See section
2.2.5). Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is not known if
the water pressure and supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the tanks. No fixed water monitors.
12
x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein foam
concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water
branch.
EFFECTIVENESS OF FIXED FIRE SYSTEMS
Applicability of Type
Applicable for the type of tank and tank duty although a base injection system is
the preferred foam system for such tanks. Use of a Universal foam concentrate is
unnecessary as a standard approved fluoroprotein concentrate would be just as
effective.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 12
HSE GUIDELINE
System/Hardware Suitability
The firewater supply is pressure governed and during a test with a water monitor
only 3 barg was achieved. It was stated that the pressure would rise after a short
time but on a later foam discharge test the pressure was again low. The foam
discharged appeared to be weak although visual indications cannot prove
inaccurate proportioning. It is therefore necessary to carry out tests as soon as
practically possible to ensure correct proportioning across a range of pressures.
The foam concentrate storage tank has had leaks and the tank level is difficult to
read.
There is no clear level gauge and there is no information available as to the
minimum operating foam concentrate quantity that should be maintained in the
tank. There are 3 high backpressure foam generators (HBPG) but one of these is
normally valve locked closed, acting as a stand-by for maintenance. Generally,
the hardware is suitable but there are shortfalls as noted.
Reliability
System has actuated in 1996 although cause was a spurious fire alarm. The
design of the foam hose deployment inside the tank is unknown, i.e. is it vertical,
horizontal or inclined ? Sludge build-up in the tank over the course of 5 years
may prevent foam hose deployment and thus prevent foam application on the
tank fire. The foam inlet is less than 1 metre from the tank base.
During a discharge test, the foam/water duplex gauge did not function, indicating
blocked water and foam lines. The drain valves for the gauge did not work,
indicating lack of effective maintenance.
Operability
System is automatic from heat detection or remote at control room or locally by
pneumatic switch actuation. System actuated during test when pressure was
reduced in the fusible plug line. There are no instructions posted at the foam
station for manual operation of the system or which valve to open for which tank.
Also, the tank numbers cannot be seen from the foam station.
There are questions over the pressures available from the water injection supply
header. The pressure regulators appear to be set at a maximum of 10 barg but on
testing it was obvious that the pressure was much lower than this.
This scenario envisages use of water monitors and a foam monitor that will result
in an obvious pressure drop. It is not clear if this will impact on the foam system
and it is also not clear if the control valves on the water supply header can be
altered to meet water demand under emergency conditions.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam inlets are at lower tank area. Roof separation would not affect foam system
operation unless roof blow-off descends and impacts on foam inlets or inlet
piping.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Tank inlet/outlet ESD and hydrocarbon ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank - Fire
brigade response - Fire brigade deploy cooling water monitors on adjacent tank
roof - Foam application until extinguishment and thereafter until a secure foam
blanket is achieved - Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in case foam system
requires supplementary application - Fire brigade stand-by until incident declared
over.
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REVISION 2.0
Page 13
HSE GUIDELINE
Firefighting Tactics
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
ensure tank ESD has initiated and foam system has actuated. Control room
selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated and alerts fire
brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Fire brigade deploys and actuates cooling water monitors on adjacent
tank roof to prevent potential fire escalation.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploys foam monitor in event additional foam application
is required.
Stage 6 OSC monitors fire size and severity for foam system control impact and
ensures water streams are not affecting foam application.
Stage 7 Foam system application continued until extinguishment and thereafter
to ensure a secure foam blanket is achieved on the liquid surface.
Stage 8 Fire brigade actuate portable foam monitor if fire is controlled by foam
system but not fully extinguished due to fire trap areas of folded tank shell
maintaining minor fire pockets.
Stage 9 Fire brigade checks to ensure fire is totally extinguished and a secure
foam blanket is achieved.
Stage 10 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Not applicable.
Alarm system
For Operator
Site Alarm
Process Control
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 14
HSE GUIDELINE
system.
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
foam system.
Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures
Hose
monitors.
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
None
6 fire responders for portable water monitors
3 fire responders for foam monitor
Total of 9 fire responders
Vehicles
1 x fire truck
1 x 9000 litre 3% flouroprotein foam tanker
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 15
HSE GUIDELINE
The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed systems or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up rests
solely with the fire brigade who may be on stand-by at the airstrip when
this scenario develops.
ii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3
Issue)
iii)
A total of 9 fire responders are required for this scenario. There are only 5
fire brigade personnel to respond and the operators cannot back-up the
fire brigade due to lack of training in use of monitors and hose handling
etc.
iv)
v)
The maximum firewater demand for this scenario is 16,357 lpm but the
design firewater supply is listed as 12,000 lpm (720 m 3/h) @ 10 barg.
There is no known procedure or method for increasing firewater
pressure/supply under emergency conditions where additional water is
required. Although not listed in the Specification, this would be part of a
requirement for fire water pumps.
vi)
There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the
foam station. These should be provided.
vii)
viii)
ix)
It is understood that there is a sludge build up in the tanks over the course
of 5 years. It is possible, given the low location of the foam injection
system inlets, that depending on the design of the foam inlet within the
tank (vertical bend or straight pipe inlet) sludge will prevent or obstruct
the deployment of the foam hose in the tank. It is necessary to check the
inside of a tank to ensure the foam hose can be deployed.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 16
HSE GUIDELINE
x)
The foam system flexible hose inspection quoted as every 5 years when
tank is down for maintenance but it is possible to remove the hose
container and visually inspect the hose as there is a tank isolation valve
downstream of hose unit and this should be done.
xi)
xii)
xiii)
xiv)
Spare foam concentrate is located in drums at the foam station but there
is no identification of the concentrate type or expiry date or UL approvals
normally associated with approved foam concentrate supplies. The source
of the foam concentrate is unknown. It appears to be a polymer AFFF
(Universal type) but this cannot be confirmed without detailed analysis. It
is possible that this concentrate is decanted from the original
manufacturers drums but this is not confirmed.
xv)
The original concentrate in the system was a universal 3 & 6% AFFF foam
for use at 3% on hydrocarbon fires and 6% for polar solvent fuels. This is a
polymer-based concentrate. It is unclear if the spare drums concentrate is
the same type and if it has UL approvals etc.
594 m2
Foam Concentrate
3% AFFF
55 minutes
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 17
HSE GUIDELINE
3,400 lpm
Application Time
30 minutes
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 18
HSE GUIDELINE
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 2
REFERENCE: XXX-2
FACILITY
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life Safety Personnel not normally on the tank floating roof. Immediate life
safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only. Fire is contained in the tank rim seal area.
Business interruption Immediate shutdown on detection of rim seal fire, plus all
incoming oil MOV/ESDV from all areas will close-in.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Involved tank seal damaged due to fire.
Production deferments from all gathering stations when surge tanks and storage
tank high levels are reached.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Rim seal fires have burned for several hours without escalation and in at least two
known cases, for more than 24 hours without escalation. However, this was due to
the high standard of effective maintenance of the tanks involved and it should not
be assumed that these time frames would apply to every floating roof tank rim
seal fire.
The main concern is that if the fire is unchecked it will continue around the full
seal circumference and thereafter the flame impingement would affect the tank
shell and roof. It is therefore prudent to expect escalation within a few hours if no
fire control or extinguishing actions are taken. Escalation would occur if the roof
tilted/jammed or sank, creating a full surface fire event.
Post Escalation
Life Safety Fire responders on the gaugers platform may be injured by burns if
they are at the tank top when the roof jams or tilts. Such an event should be
noticeable and therefore the risk to responders is considered low.
Environment Continued smoke pollution. Fire would still be contained.
Business interruption Prolonged shutdown.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
regularly turn the pump over and cycle the foam concentrate back to foam tank.
Given the operating environment, it is important that a high frequency of foam
pump flushing or circulation running is provided, otherwise this system will
become very unreliable.
Operability
Foam system is manual only and requires operators or firefighters to actuate
during a fire event. There are no instructions on how to operate the system and
there are no foam tank valve and system valve identification labels. The original
labels have been damaged or the combination of sand and heat has erased them.
Survivability (in incident)
Foam system pourers are above the rim seal and therefore above the fire area. If
the tank roof is high and the rim seal fire is high the pourers may be subjected to
radiant heat and damage. Therefore it is important that the foam system is
actuated as quickly as possible to extinguish the fire.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm and halon discharge - Tank inlet/outlet ESD, Station ESD
- Operator confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed foam system to affected tank Fire brigade response - Fire responders check if rim seal fire is extinguished and
a secure foam blanket is achieved in the rim seal area - Portable foam application
into rim seal to support fixed system application if required - Fire brigade standby until incident declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Rim seal heat detection alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire
event and halon discharge and ensure tank ESD and Station ESD has initiated.
Control room selects relevant pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has activated
and alerts fire responders.
Stage 2 Fire responders select relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
Stage 3 Control rooms alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Operator actuates the rim seal foam system for the affected tank.
Stage 5 Fire responders don SCBA and ascend tank and check to ensure rim
seal fire is extinguished and foam application covers all the foam dam area.
Stage 6 Fire responders in SCBA run a foam handline to the tank top and apply
foam into the rim seal to support the rim seal system if necessary. (This may
require responders to move on to the roof as there is no wind girder (walkway)
around the tanks)
Stage 7 OSC verifies fire is extinguished and a secure foam blanket is achieved
in the rim seal foam dam area.
Stage 8 Rim seal foam dam blanket is topped up to ensure foam blankert is
maintained effectively, acting as a vapour suppression blanket.
Stage 9 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down is
announced.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Fire Event
Gas Event
Not applicable.
Alarm system
For Operator
alarm.
Process Control
Pre-fire plans
Emergency response procedures
Hose
Monitors
None.
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
= 690 litres.
Minimum 4 x SCBA sets
Vehicles
GU-230
1 x fire truck
REVISION 2.0
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The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed foam system or to assist the fire brigade. Reliance for back-up
rests solely with the fire brigade who stand-by for most of the daylight
hours at the airstrip, about 17 km distant and may be there when this
scenario develops. (Strategy Level 3 Issue)
ii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes. (FES Strategy Level 3
Issue)
iii)
There are no instructions on the operation of the fixed foam system at the
foam station and no valve labels or descriptions. These should be
provided.
iv)
Fire crews are not trained in the use of the fixed foam system.
v)
Fire crews are not trained to use foam handlines on a rim seal fire or for
moving on to a floating roof tank.
vi)
The foam system is not fully protected against direct sunlight and sand
erosion. This is leading to poor system condition.
vii)
viii)
It is understood that the commissioning tests for the fixed foam system did
not include a foam proportioning, expansion or drainage test. This could
not be confirmed during the study period.
ix)
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
x)
Foam was discharged from the valve manifold connection during a brief
flow test (not to the tanks) and although there was no method of checking
the quality or proportioning of the foam the visual observations raised
doubts over the produced foam effectiveness for firefighting, mainly due
to the firewater contamination.
xi)
of
29.2 m
Tank Circumference
95 m
0.6 m
95 x 0.6 = 57 m2
Foam Concentrate
3% Fluoroprotein
20 minutes
450 lpm
Application Time
20 minutes
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 24
the
HSE GUIDELINE
SCENARIO WORKSHEET 3
REFERENCE: XXX-3
FACILITY
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety Personnel are not normally present in the gas conditioning area.
Personnel in the general area may be at risk from radiant heat on ignition.
Compressor is on upper level but two escape routes provided. Grade level Pumps
area is open on all sides. Life safety risk is considered low.
Environment Smoke pollution only.
Business interruption Immediate propane compressor and gas conditioning ESD.
No hydrocarbon ESD but operators would probably shut down the station for such
an incident.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Damage to insulation and instrument fittings
and cabling on compressor and associated equipment. Would shutdown
immediately with resultant initial production deferment of approximately 14,000
m3/day.
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Escalation would be caused by a prolonged jet fire or diffused gas fire impinging
on adjacent gas containing piping or scrubber vessels or the propane accumulator
vessel. For gas jet fires, time to failure of other equipment would typically be in
the order of 10 minutes or less for piping and vessels if no cooling or control
actions are taken. Gas jet flame impingement would involve radiant heat levels of
up to 300 kW/m2. It should be noted that cooling must be effective where the
flame impingement occurs rather than having a light water screen for radiant
heat general protection.
Post Escalation
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Life safety Fire responders will be at serious risk if flame impingment occurs on
gas containing piping or equipment and no cooling takes place. All non-fire
responders should have evacuated the station.
Environment Air pollution only.
Business interruption Total station oil and gas shutdown due to hazards
presented by potential explosions and BLEVEs.
Asset Loss/Production Deferment Loss of propane compressor, vessels and
piping would result in several months shutdown. Production may be permitted for
several days or more without gas sweeting facility but wet gas export and heavy
flaring would eventually impact on equipment and enviroment. Therefore,
production would be halted. Production deferment for gas conditioning down time
would be approximately 14,000 m3/day.
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Compressor has seal gas leak detection alarm, vibration monitor
alarm, high temperature alarm, low pressure suction and high pressure discharge
alarms as well as suction low flow alarms.
Fire Event Single heat detector located over compressor will cause a
compressor ESD and gas conditioning ESD, will activate the propane accumulator
water deluge valve and site fire siren.
Gas Event No gas detection provided.
Mitigation
Process Controls Compressor has seal gas leak detection trip, vibration monitor
trip, high temperature trip, low pressure suction trip/high pressure discharge trip
and suction low flow trip.
Containment Not applicable.
Drainage No spill drainage. Compressor base slab drains away from centres out
to open ground areas.
Passive Five Control Adjacent propane accumulator has fireproofing of vessel
saddles/support. No passive protection on vessel or compressor associated
vessels.
Active Fire Control Firewater system taken from water injection header but it is
unknown if the water supply can be increased under fire/emergency conditions.
Fire hydrants in the general area of the export pumps. No fixed water monitors.
12 x fire boxes with typical contents as 6 fire hose, 120 litres 3% fluoroprotein
foam concentrate, 1 x 225 lpm foam branch and inductor and 1 x 450 lpm water
branch.
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire System (for Propane Accumulator Vessel)
Applicability of type
Water deluge system is applicable for cooling gas vessels and protecting from
radiant heat where no gas jet impingement is anticipated. Gas jet fires, being
pressurised, can penetrate a water screen and cause vessel failure. The most
effective method of protection where gas jet fires may impinge is passive fire
protective coatings.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
However, the location of the propane accumulator to the high pressure propane
compressor is such that gas jet fire impingement is not likely. Any gas jet fire
would diffuse on the suction and interstage scrubber vessels in between the
compressor and the accumulator. These vessels will depressurise/blowdown but
they should still be cooled if this scenario occurs.
System/Hardware Suitability
The fixed system hardware consists of open ended deluge nozzles with system
kept normally dry. There are no terminal flushing connections on the branch lines
to ensure solids are flushed out.
Reliability
The system failed to operate from a heat detector during a test requested by the
study team. The control room fire and gas panel indicated the system was
activated and this led the operators to believe the system was working since the
panel was indicating this was the case.
The manual pneumatic valve had to be actuated at the deluge valve station to
make the system work. The pneumatic valve release solenoid switch was
defective. In addition to this defect, 10 of the 35 deluge nozzles failed to operate
due to nozzle blockage by either corrosion particles or other solids. It is necessary
to provide screw plugs or valves at the terminals of the deluge pipe branches to
permit flushing after use. This will reduce, though not eliminate nozzle blockage.
Operability
Automatic, remote manual and local manual operation all occur by pneumatic
release. However, from known jet fire potential, the manual actuation at the
deluge valve station is within radiant heat levels of 37kW/m 2 and above from a jet
fire event on the propane accumulator vessel or associated equipment. The
maximum radiant heat level allowed at a deluge station is 5 kW/m 2 and therefore
radiation protective screening is considered necessary.
Survivability (in incident)
If a jet fire impinges on the system piping or valving for <5 minutes without water
flow then system may fail.
An additional concern is that if a large propane liquid release occurs on the
accumulator this may quickly migrate toward the deluge valve controls because
the vessel slab slopes toward the water deluge valve. Calculations should be
made to check if pool migration to the valve assembly is possible.
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Heat detection and alarm - Compressor and gas conditioning ESD - Operator
confirms fire event - Actuation of fixed water deluge for propane accumulator Fire brigade response - Fire brigade deploy portable water monitor to cool any
heat affected exposures - Cooling maintained until depressurisation - Fire brigade
stand-by until incident is declared over.
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1 Heat detector alarms in control room. Operators confirm fire event and
ensure compressor and gas conditioning unit ESD. Control room selects relevant
pre-fire plan and ensures site alarm has actuated and alerts fire brigade.
Stage 2 Fire brigade selects relevant pre-fire plan and responds to incident.
GU-230
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Stage 3 Control room alerts LEBC who designates OSC for the incident and
requests call out of emergency team.
Stage 4 Fire brigade arrive and ensure propane accumulator vessel water
deluge is activated.
Stage 5 Fire brigade deploy and actuate portable water monitors to cool
heat/fire affected vessels and piping.
Stage 6 Fire brigade evacuates to a safe distance to await gas depressurisation.
Stage 7 Cooling operations maintained until depressurisation of gas fire. Any
residual minor gas flame extinguished by dry powder extinguisher if considered
safe to do so.
Stage 8 Fire brigade stand-by until incident is declared over and stand-down
announced.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator Low flow alarms, high pressure alarms, vibration alarms, high
temperature alarms on compressor. Heat detection alarm. Site Alarm.
For Fire Brigade
Process Control
As Existing FERM.
GU-230
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Monitors
Manpower
Vehicles
1 x fire truck.
ii)
The operators do not have the necessary fire training to act as back-up for
the fixed systems. Reliance for back-up rests solely with the fire brigade
who may be on stand-by or out on maintenance work or at the airstrip
when this scenario develops.
iii)
Radiant heat potential from a gas jet fire on the propane accumulator in
the direction of the water deluge valve will exceed the limit of 5 kW/m 2,
there is no protection for personnel who may have to manually operate the
deluge system.
iv)
v)
vi)
The water deluge valves on the discharge piping are correctly wire
padlocked in the open position but the valve can actually be closed with
this wire and padlock in place.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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vii)
Fire cabinets and equipment within are intended for operator use but
operators are not trained to use equipment in boxes.
viii)
ix)
No reference to gas detection in SP 1075 for propane vessels (propane
accumulator).
x)
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
GU-230
1)
2)
The second work sheet is blank for copying for use (4 pages).
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
Operation or process
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
FUNCTION
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Environment
On enviroment
Business interruption
Environment
As above
Business interruption
As above
As above
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Mitigation
Process Controls
Containment
etc.)
Drainage
Operability
operation.
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
What hardware, systems and/or equipment is required for operations or other non
fire brigade personnel to deal with the incident in accordance with the chosen
strategy. To meet the strategy the requirements may be more than the existing
FERM but should still be listed below. The short falls are itemised as part of the
facility plan.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Hose
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
Vehicles
REVISION 2.0
Self explanatory.
Page 34
HSE GUIDELINE
SCENARIO REFERENCE:
FOAM/WATER CALCULATIONS SHEET
Fire Area
m2
Foam Concentrate
lpm/m2
lpm/m2
minutes
litres
m3
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
SCENARIO WORKSHEET
REFERENCE:
FACILITY
FERM STRATEGY LEVEL
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
FUNCTION
SCENARIO
CONSEQUENCES
Immediate
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
Escalation Route and Time Estimates
Post Escalation
Life safety
Environment
Business interruption
Asset Loss/Production Deferment
EXISTING FERM
Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Mitigation
Process Controls
Containment
Drainage
Passive Fire Control
Active Fire Control
Effectiveness of Fixed Fire Systems
Applicability of Type
System/Hardware Suitability
Reliability
Operability
Survivability (in incident)
FIRE PROTECTION & FIREFIGHTING STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
FIREFIGHTING TACTICS
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3 etc.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Resources for Other than Fire Response Group
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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Detection
Process
Fire Event
Gas Event
Alarm system
For Operator
For Fire Brigade
Process Control
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
Fixed Syst. Firewater Flow
Resources for Fire Brigade
Procedures
Hose
Monitors
Foam Concentrate
Specialist Equipment
Manpower
Vehicles
Port. Equip. Water Flow
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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ACTIONS
1st RESPONSE
RESOURCES REQUIRED
The obvious hardware resources necessary to carry out the actions.
ACTIONS
2nd RESPONSE
Typically, this will involve the
fire brigade or OSC or other
identified person.
RESOURCES REQUIRED
As above
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
Any actions which could assist in the control of the incident of which the responders should be aware. Any concerns which may impact on the course of actions
to control the incident.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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CONTROL ROOM
1
2
3
4
5
6
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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1st RESPONSE
2nd RESPONSE
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
ACTIONS
RESOURCES REQUIRED
OTHER ACTIONS/CONCERNS:
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
CONTROL ROOM
1
2
3
4
5
6
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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GU-230
REVISION 1.0
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COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
Describe what the responder knows.
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
To list what the responder can demonstrate, eg. wearing of PPE, method of running hoses etc.
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
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HSE GUIDELINE
COMPETENCIES
RESPONDER KNOWS:
RESPONDER DEMONSTRATES:
GU-230
REVISION 2.0
Page 47