Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower
court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an
integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his
estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of
the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land
devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) proindiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate
heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels
of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon
and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because
they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited
by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half
pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to threefourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore,
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their
respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their
claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable
Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective
parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering
judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights
(3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the
said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their claims against each other for
damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the
rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of
land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal interests which
should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within
the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems
to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and
nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven
were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that
of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios
(reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus),
but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large
as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on the subject. After mature reflection,
we have concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one
reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the
third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within the
third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the
law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as
reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied)
See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are
made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el
alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se
crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas
and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889
(Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without
any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession
by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana
vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus
exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from
Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the children of the
decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition
to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case
under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus,
Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole
blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato
ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil
Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of
the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed
ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it
by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario
are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property subject
to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario win
succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the
reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario
receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no
more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the
prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the
debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain

simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour"
through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against
the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, pp. 66-71.
2 Id., pp. 74-75.
3 G.R. No. L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958 (unreported); see 104 Phil. 1065.
4 122 Phil. 319, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
5 105 Phil. 1, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
6 Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960. Dec. 27, 1958, supra; footnote.3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA,
TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition,
accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena
Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,
Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda.
de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel
Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the
Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192
of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the
property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of
the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she
inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document
reads: 1wph1.t
A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta
hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los
hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of
the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree
of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters
and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in
her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that
Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate
of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that
her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter.
This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated
facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal
issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As
the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six
children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third
degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be
useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together
with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly
leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves,
insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de
otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en
favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2)
the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the
said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased
descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or
sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions
precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by
her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p.
203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the
paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact
that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot,
sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41
Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs.
Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed
to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the representative
should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the
time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are
revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil.
349, 353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already
assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this
purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive
(Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so
long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of whom the
reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in
Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa
to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she
had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was
ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the
legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an
inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the
predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has
at the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes
and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those
coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of
his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes
only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from
her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions
were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That
doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of
his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the common
descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in
the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives within the
third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren,
who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have
remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a fullblood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part
of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded
upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891,
should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives
who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part
of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena
Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which
belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14603

April 29, 1961

RICARDO LARCERNA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
AGATONA PAURILLO VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee.
JACOBA MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo declaring that the parcels of land in litigation are property of intervenor
Jacoba Marbebe.
This action was instituted by Ricardo, Patrocinia, Patria, Faustino, Leonor, Ramona, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all
surnamed Lacerna, for the recovery of three parcels of unregistered lands, situated in the municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, and more
specifically described in the complaint, upon the ground that said lands belonged to the deceased Juan Marbebe, and that his cousins,
plaintiffs herein, are his sole heirs.
In her answer, defendant Agatona Vda. de Corcino alleged, inter alia, that Juan Marbebe might still be alive; that she held the disputed
lands under a power of attorney executed by Juan Marbebe; and that, if he has died, she is entitled to succeed him in the same manner
as plaintiffs herein, she being related to him in the same manner as plaintiffs are.
With the court's permission, Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that she is a half sister of Juan Marbebe who died
intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor descendants, and that, as his half sister, she is entitled, by succession, to the properties in
dispute.
After due trial, the court rendered judgment for the intervenor. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs.
The lower court found, and appellants do not question, that the lands described in the complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia
Lacerna. Upon her death in 1932, they passed, by succession, to her only son, Juan Marbebe who was, subsequently, taken to Culion
where he died intestate, single and without issue on February 21, 1943. The question for determination is: who shall succeed him?
It appears that his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna, had a sister, Agatona Paurillo Vda. de Corcino, the defendant herein; that Catalino
Lacerna died in 1950 and was survived by his children, plaintiffs Ricardo, Patrocinia and Patria, all surnamed Lacerna; and that Marcelo
Lacerna who died in 1953, was survived by his children, the other plaintiffs herein, namely, Ramona, Faustino, Leonor, Asuncion
Emiliano, Arsenio and Felipe, all surnamed Lacerna. Upon the other hand, intervenor Jacoba Marbebe is daughter, by first marriage, of
Valentin Marbebe, husband of Bonifacia Lacerna and father of Juan Marbebe, who, accordingly, is a half brother of said intervenor.
With this factual background, the issue is narrowed down to whether Jacoba Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's
side, is his sole heir, as held by His Honor, the Trial Judge, or whether plaintiffs herein, as first cousins of Juan Marbebe, on his mother
side, have a better right to succeed him, to the exclusion of Jacoba Marbebe, as plaintiffs-appellants maintain.
The latter's pretense is based upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, establishing what is
known as "reserva troncal", the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the
line from which said properties came, and that since the same were inherited by Juan Marbebe from his mother, they should go to his
nearest relative within the third degree on the material line, to which plaintiffs belong, not to intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the
greater proximity of her relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal line.
Jacoba Marbebe contends, however, and the lower court held, that brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order
of intestate succession, and that, as Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his
properties.
The main flaw in appellants' theory is that it assumes that said properties are subject to the "reserva troncal", which is not a fact, for
Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis
supplied.)

This article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a descendant, and this is
not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not in point, and the transmission of the aforementioned lands, by inheritance, was
properly determined by His Honor, the Trial Judge, in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles
1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or
brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the
line from which the property of the deceased came.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso
applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of
1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel,
but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named
Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902,
unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.
Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the
registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the
opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by
law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the
subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them
from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his
ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very
definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that
only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in
first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which
establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action;
and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her
son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the
appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's
legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of
collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession by free
disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the
mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the
provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by
law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children and
descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law
could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article
811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to
be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her
son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance
was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of
law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is,
that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be
reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from
the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were
mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the
appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands
by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right
required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it
prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of
law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she
says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in
the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that
guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I
remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action
for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed,
but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by
the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has
prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by
virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage
Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under
article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage
Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the
country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same
merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person
holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right
of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory
obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be
admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only
thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and
ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act
No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as
this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of
place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the
colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the
Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the
law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it
says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for
the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased
spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision
that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws
appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their
father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the
decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the
property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to
the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the
construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with
inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties
that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the
special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the
chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to
be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make
the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against
their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject
to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal
property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly
alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of
jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty
provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives
in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally
represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the
same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to
the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as
thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the
property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to
the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has
prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because
the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right
reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article
refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to
reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which
article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by
the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such
proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved,
but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of
the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage
Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such
right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for
she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance
with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not
exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to
be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the
two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro
Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all
these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the
usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted
the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of
disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose
favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported
by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895,
somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that
the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the
person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as
the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue
of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use,
enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be
no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor
and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the
ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have
any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father
or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his
heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother
in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and
he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except
that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery
thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the
ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve
the right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in
either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving spouse after contracting a
second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as
executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists
(to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always
that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of
the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is
alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is
reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having
disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way
absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected;
while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to
exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator
expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first
marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the
right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the
relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and
therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and form
already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose
of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the
registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property
reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought
not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason
that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be
alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil
Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death
relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such
relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can
freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and
encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and
nothing more because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and
revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant
lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person
who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be
reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct.
He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under
an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the
right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first
because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the
right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of
the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after
their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his
act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine
the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right
required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to
reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the
right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in
ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to
know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved
must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by
some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in
whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil
Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has
during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The
question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of
the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and
recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the
whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal,
himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made
degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its
attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if
the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee
the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee
may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and
the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in
the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely
contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of
the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee
under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her
own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by
article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special
findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14856

November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon,
Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for
Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y
Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot nine children
called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on
becoming a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of
the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th
of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any
ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose
Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the
legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the children of
Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur,
instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that
he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property
marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay,
some personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession
of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the
complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property;
that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described
in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the
reservable property described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the
reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for
its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty
pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of
fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fiftyeight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing property
is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the
aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be
condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.

To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is based on the obligation of
the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in
turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by the
plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object
of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of
the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz
de Leon (property which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes
Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not
pass after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having
been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely
inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the
possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her
mother, lost the character of reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed
her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of
strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress,
entitled to the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is
secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect
the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of
the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of
January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of
the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the
said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the
plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the complaint and condemned the
plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the
plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this
court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the
latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor
change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well
as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of the court the said judge,
disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by
condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined
themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because
undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be
the same which the defendants would allege in their answer those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have
to decide and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist they could do no less upon alleging the
same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said
complaint with costs against the plaintiffs in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack
the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary as in this case what has been done does
not prejudice the parties the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to
the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is
now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the
property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited
said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and
reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were born, namely the defendant
Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a
will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the
aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded
by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by
will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left by
her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited
by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and
forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the
common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of law)
to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by
inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property thus
acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for
the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the
said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of
said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) said property reverts
to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of
reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter,
is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own
property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear,
the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can
transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property,
pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such
property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not
within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These
reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and
relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate
children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are
both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have the right to
represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of
the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their
aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro
Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other
children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with
them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos
son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his

three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his
daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the
third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three
half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation,
all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to
Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs
and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to
the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property
came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes,
being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of
her mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was
thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had
been avoided; and that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio
III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of
legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable
right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the
precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases
expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the
provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether they property left at the death of
Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was
received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the
common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the
hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of
the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order
of person other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said
property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon
inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or
of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's
relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from
his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own
property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses
such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her
son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon,
her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are
entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no
way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property,
there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third
degree, to participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable
right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal
participation with the defendant in the litigated property.

The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the
deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore,
had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for
the reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a
forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received
from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question, same
did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no
reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within
the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as
reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the
violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or
impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation,
that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third
degree of the person from whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased
reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an
exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain
portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not
proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the
second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in
the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining
seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby
do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of
said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her
husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land
and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed
for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A,
entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the
lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua,
his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the
first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the
Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre
died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the
first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11,
1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code,
Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from
which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2)
that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that
there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the
foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952;
he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died,
Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador
Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de
la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest
and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in
question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's
complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art.
891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
"The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the
property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an
act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving
the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person
who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the
record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose
Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito
Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose
Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros
cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion
de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos
resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not
change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva
troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon
by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed
Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of
the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of
the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to
deduce that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs to
prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact
they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose
Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la
Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua
has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners
therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua
and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre
and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Exh. D, pp. 8-14, Folder of Exhibits.
2 Exh. C, p. 6, Ibid.
3 pp. 3-7, Record on Appeal.
4 pp. 8, Record on Appeal.
5 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. III, p. 300(1973).
6 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p.294, citing 6 Manresa 399.
7 p. 15, R.A.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to
appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly
and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge
or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such
sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof.
They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been
in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further
alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument
of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of
adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea
Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is
denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes
involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part
of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of
Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court
erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando,
Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record were left
to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and
Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot
3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him,
declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco
died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument
Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused,
thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such
had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was
inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that
Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952
(Exh. 10).

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that
the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life
usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire
ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property.
Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous
sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in
exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of
the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the
property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in equity
the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and
DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated cases in
Civil Case No. SC-956 1 and Civil Case No. SC-957. 2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3)
interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in Civil Case
No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels
of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista,
who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo,
as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario
del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto
hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia
de edad sin dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera
formosa, legitima y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto
padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H.
Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by
Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The
documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles
were issued. The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3
share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of
Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable
character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first
named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they
claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates
of the conveyances but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over
the parcel of land described in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2)
of this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and
over the ten (10) parcels of land described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two
(2) and three (3) of this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein ordered to be conveyed to them
by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving onethird (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of
the produce from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment of
income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to pay plaintiffs
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration
was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for value and in good faith of the
properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.

II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest of the reservee in the properties
covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of
Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not
innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called
reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that there was
no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were
inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit was, in its form,
declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language,
the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving
properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the
source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is
sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496)
which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to
all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27,
July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title.
Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to
know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by
proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the mere entry of a document in the day book without
noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases
of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380,
388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction
was made between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon
execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of voluntary registration of documents an
innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder
of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is
entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title
covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his power to
perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).

In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property
was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the
Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title
cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before they
bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita
Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo
dated December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to Raul
Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of
any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put
Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva
troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable character of the
property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of Director
of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the
reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as
made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural
and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If
the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having the status provided
in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to
said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be
determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the
regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of
the reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with
whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is
nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also
Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof
and cannot now register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee
simple, which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said
land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not
to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is
not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise that

he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the
land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina
Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note
the same in their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised
in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in
the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a
descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate
also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal
insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with
the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative
act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected (either
actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause
of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of
the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is
reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the
reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they
take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo,
G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of
full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within
the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601,
October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the
reserved property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the
reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's
fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully
belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Entitled Amado, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, Plaintiffs versus Mariquita O.
Sumaya, Villa Honorio Development Corporation and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., Defendants.
2 Entitled Amado, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, Plaintiffs, versus Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and Laguna Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., Defendants.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership
and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff
and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and
related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards,
donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific
items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus
costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four
months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo
Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo
City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his
estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of
a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia
about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the
purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted
by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father

of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in
good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister,
Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA.
DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under
Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by
the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two
months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the
deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial
court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein
she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery
of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the
Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while
the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there
being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the
estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did
not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the
settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7,
1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required
by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late
Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp,
14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and
recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court
denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate
action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is
inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio,
70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra;
Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous
marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during

his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased,
that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal
to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No.
2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will
not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise
to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly
Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban,
Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate,
were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that
extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of
March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented
a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a
trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment
itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the
controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw
his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the
judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the
equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated
party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly
his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented
a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into
the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v.
Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the
taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible
cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary
proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and
thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they
agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required
to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's
original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order
of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305,
Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was

not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the
same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as
the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite which the
present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new
trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no
subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his
father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating
and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did
not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not
such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d
622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule
79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as
his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which
reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property
from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The
reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother
or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers,
sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which
provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral
line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57,
Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen
and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did
agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be
presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18
SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478;
and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could
have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito
Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to
dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the various fields
of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after
its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able to
alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ
the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation
possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their

equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth,
their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source,
to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as
shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or
any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes
herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in
1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum
Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by
the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It
gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising
drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE.
Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably
with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each
shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer
the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an
inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22601

October 28, 1966

PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and appellees.
Filemon Cajator for plaintiffs and appellants.
Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a suit to recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of
1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak
sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak died.
Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle
the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family (parents
Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo; and children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3, which the court approved on November 19,
1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No. 221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as
heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista). From
1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the
Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the survivorship
presumption [Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first his properties
went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4 each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next Honoria's and
Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel; those of Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;1 (3) Isabel died next her
properties went to her son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo died last his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina. Agustina
thereby succeeded to the properties that came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including of Lot No.
221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as
Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been possessed
by Francisca Salak de Paz.
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23, and
further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the execution of the judgment therein. Said
petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after a copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the latter being a party thereto as
administratix of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina. Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order of November 14,
1950, which reads in part:
. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doa Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo, declares all the interest of the
said reservista Doa Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo as well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to
the reservista, definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the minor Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to
him of the said three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8, 1950. . . .
(Record on Appeals, pp. 213-214)
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of dismissal reads in part:

By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot No. 221, inherited by Agustina de
Guzman was never released from the reserva, so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one.
Upon her death on April 24, 1950, therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs, but rather reverted to
the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line. Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the Present plaintiff in this
case, has no cause of action against the defendants.
In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the late Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo, which
included Lot No. 221, has become res judicata which cannot be disturbed in this case. (Record on Appeal, p. 209)
On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against Francisca Salak
de Paz and Ernesto Bautista.2
On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that the cause
of action is barred by prior judgement and by the statute of limitations.
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, finding the suit barred by the order of
delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law.
Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the
statute of limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of res judicata, it did not totally
disregard the defense of prescription. Thus, said court pointed out that:
Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother, she is also deemed to have been notified of the petition
for execution of judgment in Special Proceeding No. 23, and of the order of November 14, 1950. As of then, therefore, Prima
Carrillo (even though as administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista claimed to be the sole reservee of all the
properties inherited by Da. Agustina from the Salak Family, among which was Lot No. 221 in question, but she did not file any
opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert her right as reservee by opposing the petition or, failing in this, to contest or
to ask to be relieved from the order of November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed about thirteen (13) years before she
commenced the present action. (Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 214-215; emphasis supplied)
At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As ruled in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon,
40 Phil. 943 and Relativo v. Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when the trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain ground, the
appellate court may uphold the decision below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor of the
appellant by the trial court.
Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which states:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The reserva troncal arose as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 when Agustina
acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother).
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the
part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for
recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription:
Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian por completo las relaciones y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las
cosas, como ya se ha indicado. La obligacion de reservar se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien correspondan, obligacion que
pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben complir sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el derecho al dominio
pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte del reservista se comple la condicion resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer grado que
pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa desde aquel momento por ministerio de la ley el dominio
absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por consiguiente, el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer libremente de aquellos o de este, y
transmitirlos a sus herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y si no sobrevive al reservista ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la
obligacion de reservar, por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno
dominio del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art. 651. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario, tenemos por
indudable que no tiene el caracter de personalisimo ninguno de esos derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la reserva, pertenecen a la
herencia y se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no los hubiere ejercitado por si mismo, salvo cases de renuncia, incapacidad o
prescripcion.
xxx

xxx

xxx

C) Extincion de la reserva.Las mismas condiciones exigidas para el nacimiento de la reserva son necesarias para su existencia. Al faltar
una de ellas, la reserva muerte. Tres son, por tanto, las principales causas de extincion:
1.a. Muerte del ascendiente.Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes, en virtud de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que
crea el art. 811, es lo cierto que la reserva, como tal, una vez necida a compaa al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte. Muerto el
ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de reservar; falta el sujeto pasivo de la reserva.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden sealarse otras que expondremos a continuacion.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los herederos del ascendiente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones
marcadas por la ley. (Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).

Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios to cut off their right to the reservable property:
f) Prescipcion.Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo applicacion a los parientes del tercer grado del descendiente, porque no
habiendo reserva si no acepta el ascendiente, no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.
Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la doctrina, porque pueden no ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte del
descendiente opor otra causa.
Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho real sobre bienes inmuebles, prescribira a los treinta aos (art. 1.693) (1),
contados desde la aceptacion de la herencia por el ascendiente, momento determinante del derecho al ejercicio de la reserva (art. 1.969) ;
transcurridos, pues, treinta aos desde la aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la constitucion de la
reserva, se extenguira esta, y el ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de los bienes reservables por su
naturaleza, pero que no fueron objeto de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360).

Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 from Francisca Salak de
Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals'
decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had
accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffsreservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover real property, counted from
the time the cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "Prescription
already running before the effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force."
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has
prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether the suit is also barred on the
ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of prescription, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1

Thus, Ernesto Bautista was an heir in both Special Proceeding No. 3 and Special Proceeding No. 23.

Plaintiff Prima Carrillo claims to be a reservatario (as sister of Isabel Carrillo and aunt of propositus Adolfo), while plaintiff Lorenzo Licup is
the surviving husband of Luz Carillo (likewise a sister of Isabel Carrillo and aunt of prepositus Adolfo). Prima and Lorenzo claim to be heirs of
Luz.