A.M. No.

MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

Presumptive Death - Family Code
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit
acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said
affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the
marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding
outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of
the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

[G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 179474]
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Article 39 Prescription
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the
latter being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi. At the PCH, upon a prearranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same,
he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and
wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the
Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics
and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming that his story is impossible and that his
action of fraud has already prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which requires
that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four
years after the discovery of the fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to file an action to nullify a marriage due to fraud is subject to
prescription.

HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage
for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to
1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and
that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set
in.This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that
it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may
be raised any time.

G.R. No. 160172

February 13, 2008

REINEL
ANTHONY
B.
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DE

CASTRO, petitioner,

Void ab initio marriages

Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license
in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994,
and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating
that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back
to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995,
Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, the
mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his
wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the
marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was
only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage
may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as
the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of Appeals
denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals
frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as

well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is
the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action
for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the
parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can
be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement
for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.
G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED
AZHAR
vs.
GLORIA GOO-ABBAS, Respondent

ABBAS, Petitioner,

Civil Law Family Code Bigamy Void Ab Initio Marriage Lack of a Marriage License
Remedial Law Evidence Probative Value Public Records

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria
Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the
Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually his
marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as
well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained
the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the marriage
license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to Abbas but to
someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued to
Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the
issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrars certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil
registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in
fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was
issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio. Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning.
G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR
B.
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

I.
V.
Binamira
&
F.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

B.

Barria

for

plaintiff-appellant.

15 Phil 355
Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the
knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was
celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church
wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that
Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2
years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she
subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes
asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal
separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim
by the Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to
public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the
marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was
dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be
awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of
Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry,
the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by
Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded
and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper
conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00
to P5,000.00 only.

[G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
Article 26 of the Family Code Divorce
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the
Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.
HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the

naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred
from remarrying

G.R. No. 138322

October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
366 SCRA 437 Civil Law Conflict of Laws Foreign Law Divorce
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,
1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian
Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently,
Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October
22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of
divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court
rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both
parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to
remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records,
the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was
really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.