Gregorio Aglipay v.

Juan Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts: In May 1936, Juan Ruiz, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President
of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney,
the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by
the petitioner and it is alleged that this action of the respondent is
violation of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines and in as much as it benefited a
particular religion.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of
the Constitution.
Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case
at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications & the President of
the Philippines, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs
"as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. SC on
examining the facts, discovered that that the stamps instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a
map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7,1937. The only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist to this country and thus it was held that the stamp
issue was not invalid.

Alvarez vs Guingona
Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement Income Inclusion of IRAs
FACTS: In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. In
May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that
of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, the HB
8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate
conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for
approval of HB 8817, as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Alvarez et al are
assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per
annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the
reported average income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which
should not be.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the
HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an
LGUs income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill
as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any
hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd
reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the
said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in
anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs
average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are
items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further
action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds.

JEAN ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

Art 21. Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
FACTS: This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the
acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates thru Rural Progress Administration
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to examine by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L.
Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor, Ernest H. Burt. During the Senate
investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing
Arnault to the custody of Leon Nazareno, the Sergeant-at-Arms
and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing
to the Senate the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to
answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in
carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it
must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a
query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too
long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

BARBERS VS. COMELEC

FACTS: On 2 June 2004, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC
04-005 proclaiming Rodolfo G. Biazon as the 12th ranking duly
elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The COMELEC
stated that after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from
Maguindanao (Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in
Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained 10,635,270 votes nationwide. On the
other hand, Robert Z. Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes. Thus,
Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC
stated that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes
in certain precincts where there was failure of elections. Claiming that
Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the
proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
with the COMELEC on 7 June 2004. In his petition, Barbers asserted
that the proclamation of Biazon was illegal and premature being
based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining
uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections,
which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results
of the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not SC can take cognizance of this case.
HELD: The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction
over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The
authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
instant petition.19 Since Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint.

BAYAN(Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora

G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
FACTS : On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of
America forged a military bases agreement which formalized,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the
US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory,
armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. In 1991, with the expiration
of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises
between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the
defense and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to
a consolidated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually,
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA. On October 5, 1998
President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary
of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora officially transmitted to the
Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the
VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its
members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an
exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador
Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and
defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of
the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
ratifying the agreement.
ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING : Petition is dismissed. The 1987 Philippine Constitution
contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which
respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the
expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that

purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the other

contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and
international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject
matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular
designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve
presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the
Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground.
The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec.
21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same
provision is immaterial.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant
case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently
meet the following requisites :
a) it must be under a treaty
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and
when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes
cast by the people in a national referendum
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third
requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement
is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon
nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the constitution.
The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA.

Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. vs. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the
Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez.
The complaint alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with
then President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the
latter spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Filipino people. Conflicting reports on the
disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez corporations were carried in
various newspapers. Other newspapers declared that shortly after the
1986 EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez companies were sold for P5
million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by
Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President Aquinos brother-inlaw, had effectively taken over the firm. In the Senate, Senator Enrile
delivered a speech on the alleged take over by Lopa of SOLOIL
Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of
Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator Enrile also called upon the
Senate to look into the possible violation of the law, particularly with
regard to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
matter was referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has
valid legislative purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21.
Held: The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of
both Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art. VI, Sec. 21, the
investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to
testify against ones self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or
investigations is specifically provided in the Senate Rules of Procedure.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all
matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate
alone. The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into
a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of

President Aquino, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection

with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez
to the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. This matter appears to be more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Petition
GRANTED.

ROMULO NERI VS. SENATE

Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
FACTS: On 21 April 2007, Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic
of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN
deal. On the other hand, Businessman Jose De Venecia III issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). Romulo
L. Neri, the former Director General of NEDA, was then invited to
testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Chairman Benjamin Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited
Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be
answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter

into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature

has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
PETITION GRANTED.

Philippine Constitution Association vs Gimenez

Political Law Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument
FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA)
assails the validity of RA 3836 entitled An Act Amending
Subsection C, section 12 of CommonwealthAct No. 3096 insofar
as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective
officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement
gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase
of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation
because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after
twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to
one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable
in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least
twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any
case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected
to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation
within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation.
The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under
the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the
gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of
seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of
travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the
case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said

compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation
for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only
P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as
follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other
words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power
of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no
increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to
the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article
VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the
pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the
retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the
purview of the term other emoluments.
Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that
which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to
the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect
upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
was immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs
counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

Question Hour EO 464
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
(North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group) North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in
the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
R. ERMITA submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S.
Senga Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Franklin Drilon, the senate
president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents
approval. The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with
only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos
order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is
alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To

determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on
the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in
aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is

based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of
the Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but
the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue
statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the
same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not
only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action
by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass
3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because
the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon

the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings

on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.