embodiment (mbd i mnt)

n.
1. something or someone that embodies a spirit, principle, etc.; incarnation.
2. something embodied.
3. the act of embodying or the state of being embodied.
[182030]
Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary, 2010 K Dictionaries Ltd. Copyright 2005, 1997,
1991 by Random House, Inc. All rights reserved.

Thesaurus Legend:

Synonyms Related Words Antonyms

Noun 1. embodiment - a new personification of a familiar idea; "the

embodiment of hope"; "the incarnation of evil"; "the very
avatar of cunning"
avatar, incarnation
personification - a person who represents an abstractquality;
"she is the personification of optimism"
deification - an embodiment of the qualities of a god; "the
capitalists' deification of capital"
reincarnation - embodiment in a new form (especially the reappearance or
a person in another form); "his reincarnation as a lion"
2. embodiment - a concrete representation of an otherwise nebulous
concept; "a circle was the embodiment of his concept of life"
shape
concrete representation, concretism - a representation of an abstract idea
in concrete terms
3. embodiment - giving concrete form to an abstract concept
objectification - the act of representing an abstraction as a physical thing
soul - the human embodiment of something; "the soul of honor"
personification, incarnation - the act of attributing human characteristics
to abstract ideas etc.
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. 2003-2012 Princeton
University, Farlex Inc.

embodiment

noun personification, example, model, type, ideal, expression, symbol,representation, m

anifestation, realization, incarnation, paradigm, epitome,incorporation, paragon,
perfect example, exemplar, quintessence,actualization, exemplification, reification A
baby is the embodiment of vulnerability.

Embodied cognition
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In philosophy,

the embodied mind thesis holds that the nature of the

human mind is largely determined by the form of the human
body. Philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and artificial
intelligence researchers who study embodied cognition and
the embodied mind argue that all aspects of cognition are shaped by
aspects of the body. The aspects of cognition include high level mental
constructs (such as concepts and categories) and human performance on
various cognitive tasks (such as reasoning or judgment). The aspects of
the body include the motor system, the perceptual system, the body's
interactions with the environment (situatedness) and
the ontological assumptions about the world that are built into the body and
the brain.
The embodied mind thesis is opposed to other theories of cognition such
as cognitivism, computationalism, and Cartesian dualism.[1] The idea has
roots in Kant and 20th century continental philosophy (such as MerleauPonty). The modernversion depends on insights drawn from recent
research in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, dynamical
systems,artificial intelligence, robotics and neurobiology.
Embodied cognition is a topic of research in social and cognitive
psychology, covering issues such as social interaction anddecisionmaking.[2] Embodied cognition reflects the argument that the motor
system influences our cognition, just as the mind influences bodily actions.
For example, when participants hold a pencil in their teeth engaging the
muscles of a smile, they comprehend pleasant sentences faster than
unpleasant ones, while holding a pencil between their nose and upper lip to
engage the muscles of a frown has the reverse effect.[3]
George Lakoff (a cognitive scientist and linguist) and his collaborators
(including Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, and Rafael E. Nez) have written
a series of books promoting and expanding the thesis based on

discoveries in cognitive science, such as conceptual metaphor and image

schema.[4]
Robotics researchers such as Rodney Brooks, Hans Moravec and Rolf
Pfeifer have argued that true artificial intelligencecan only be achieved by
machines that have sensory and motor skills and are connected to the
world through a body.[5] The insights of these robotics researchers have in
turn inspired philosophers like Andy Clark and Horst Hendriks-Jansen.[6]
Neuroscientists Gerald Edelman, Antnio Damsio and others have
outlined the connection between the body, individual structures in the brain
and aspects of the mind such as consciousness, emotion, selfawareness and will.[7] Biology has also inspired Gregory
Bateson, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan
Thompson to develop a closely related version of the idea, which they
call enactivism.[8] The motor theory of speech perception proposed by Alvin
Libermanand colleagues at the Haskins Laboratories argues that the
identification of words is embodied in perception of the bodily movements
by which spoken words are made.[9][10][11][12][13]
Contents
[hide]
Philosophy[edit]
In his pre-critical period, philosopher Immanuel Kant advocated a similar
embodied view of the mind-body problem that was part of his Universal
Natural History and Theory of Heaven (1755).[14][15] Jos Ortega y
Gasset, George Santayana, Miguel de Unamuno, Maurice MerleauPonty, Martin Heidegger and others in the broadly existential tradition have
proposed philosophies of mind influencing the development of the modern
'embodiment' thesis.[16]
The embodiment movement in AI has fueled the embodiment argument
in philosophy.[17] It has also given emotions a new status in philosophy of
mind as an indispensable constituent, not a non-essential addition to
rational intellectual thought. In philosophy of mind, the idea that cognition is
embodied is sympathetic with other views of cognition such as situated
cognition or externalism. This is a radical move towards a total relocalization of mental processes out of the neural domain.[18]
Psychology[edit]

Visual Search[edit]
One embodied cognition study shows that action intention can affect
processing in visual search, with more orientation errors for pointing than
for grasping.[19] Participants either pointed to or grasped target objects of 2
colors and 2 orientations (45 and 135). There were randomized numbers
of distractors as well (0, 3, 6, or 9), which differed from the target in color,
orientation, or both. A tone sounded to inform participants which target
orientation to find. Participants kept their eyes on a fixation point until it
turned from red to the target color. The screen then lit up and the
participants searched for the target, either pointing to it or grasping it
(depending on the block). There were 2 blocks for pointing and 2 for grasping, with
the order counterbalanced. Each block had 64 trials.[19]

Graph of the visual search task results showing that participants made less object orientation
errors when grasping than pointing.
Results from the experiment show that accuracy decreases with an increase in the number of
distractors.[19] Overall, participants made more orientation errors than color errors.[19] There was no
main effect of accuracy between the pointing and grasping conditions, but participants made
significantly less orientation errors in the grasping condition than the pointing condition.[19] Color
errors were the same in both conditions.[19] Because orientation is important in grasping an object,
these results fit with the researchers' hypothesis that the plan to grasp an object will aid in orientation
accuracy.[19] This supports embodied cognition because action intention (planning to grasp an
object) can affect visual processing of task-relevantinformation (orientation).[19]

Distance Perception[edit]
Internal states can affect distance perception, which relates to embodied cognition.[20] Researchers
randomly assigned college student participants to high-choice, low-choice, and control conditions.
The high-choice condition signed a freedom of choice consent form indicating their decision to
wear a Carmen Miranda costume and walk across a busy area of campus. Low-choice participants
signed an experimenter choice consent form, indicating the experimenter assigned the participant
to wear the costume. A control group walked across campus but did not wear a costume. At the
conclusion of the experiment, each participant completed a survey which asked them to estimate the
distance they walked.[20]
The high-choice participants perceived the distance walked as significantly shorter than participants
in the low-choice and control groups, even though they walked the same distance.[20] The
manipulation caused high-choice participants to feel responsible for the choice to walk in the
embarrassing costume.[20] This created cognitive dissonance, which refers to a discrepancy
between attitudes and behaviors.[20] High-choice participants reconciled their thoughts and actions
by perceiving the distance as shorter.[20] These results show the ability of internal states to affect

perception of physical distance moved, which illustrates the reciprocal relationship of the body and
mind in embodied cognition.[20]

Perspective[edit]
Researchers have found that when making judgements about objects in photographs, people will
take the perspective of a person in the picture instead of their own.[21] They showed college
undergraduate participants 1 of 3 photographs and asked where 1 object in the picture was
compared to the other object. For example, if the 2 objects were an apple and a banana, the
participants would have to respond to a question about the location of the apple compared to the
banana. The photographs either had no person, a person looking at the object, in this case the
banana, or a person reaching for the banana. The photograph and question appeared in a larger set
of questionnaires not related to the study.[21]

Graph depicting the percentage of responses by perspective for each photograph condition.
Results show that participants who viewed photographs that included a person were significantly
more likely to respond from another's perspective than those who saw photographs with no
person.[21] There were no differences in perspective of responses for the person looking versus
reaching.[21] Participants who saw the scene without a person were significantly more likely to
respond from their own perspective.[21] This means that the presence of a person in the photograph
affected the perspective used even though the question focused solely on the two objects.[21] The
researchers state that these results suggest disembodied cognition, in which the participants put
themselves into the body of the person in the photograph.[21]

Language Comprehension[edit]
See also: Embodied language processing
The motor system is involved in language comprehension, in this case when sentences were
performable by a human, there was a change in participants' overall movement of
a pendulum.[22] Researchers performed an experiment in which college undergraduate participants
swung a pendulum while completing a "sentence judgement task." Participants would swing the
pendulum with both hands for 10 seconds before a prompt and then a sentence would appear on the
screen until the participant responded. In the control condition, participants swung the pendulum
without performing the "sentence judgement task." Each trial had half "plausible" and half
"implausible" sentences. The "plausible" sentences made sense semantically, while the
"implausible" ones did not. The "performable" sentences could be performed by a human, while the
"inanimate" sentences could not. Participants responded by saying "yes" to the "plausible"
sentences.[22]

The change in "relative phase shift" for different conditions in the study. Participants had a
significantly larger change for "performable" sentences than "inanimate" sentences and
swinging only.
Results show a significant "relative phase shift," or overall change in movement of the swinging
pendulum, for the "performable" sentences.[22] This change did not occur for "inanimate" sentences
or the control condition.[22] The researchers did not expect an overall phase shift, instead they
expected a change in the variability of movement, or the "standard deviation of relative phase
shift."[22] Although not entirely expected, these results support embodied cognition and show that the
motor system is involved in the understanding of language.[22] The researchers suggest that the
nature of this relationship needs to be further studied to determine the exactcorrelation this task has
to bi-manual motor movements.[22]
Some researchers extend embodied cognition to include language.[2] They describe language as a
tool that aids in broadening our sense of body.[2] For instance, when asked to identify this object,
participants most often choose an object near to them.[2] Conversely, when asked to identify that
object, participants choose an object further away from them.[2] Language allows us to distinguish
between distances in more complex ways than the simple perceptual difference between near and
far objects.[2]

Memory[edit]
A study examining memory and embodied cognition illustrates that people remember more of the
gist of a story when they physically act it out.[23] Researchers divided female participants randomly
into 5 groups, which were "Read Only," "Writing," "Collaborative Discussion," "Independent
Discussion," and "Improvisation." All participants received a monologue about teen addiction and
were told to pay attention to details about the character and action in the monologue. Participants
were given 5 minutes to read the monologue twice, unaware of a future recall test. In the "Read
Only" condition participants filled out unrelated questionnaires after reading the monologue. In the
"Writing" condition participants responded to 5 questions about the story from the perspective of the
character in the monologue. They had 6 minutes to answer each question. In the "Collaborative
Discussion" condition participants responded from the character's perspective to the same questions
as the "Writing" group, but in groups of 4 or 5 women. They were also given 6 minutes per question
and everyone participated in answering each question. The "Independent Discussion" condition was
the same as the "Collaborative Discussion," except 1 person answered each question. In the
"Improvisation" condition participants acted out 5 scenes from the monologue in groups of 5 women.
The researchers suggest that this condition involves embodied cognition and will produce better
memory for the monologue. Every participant played the main character and a supporting character
once. Participants were given short prompts from lines in the monologue, which were excluded from
the memory test. Participants had 2 minutes to choose characters and 4 minutes for improvisations.

The recall test was the monologue with 96 words or phrases missing. Participants had to fill in the
blanks as accurately as possible.[23]
Researchers gave the recall test to a group who did not read the monologue. They scored
significantly lower than the other groups, which indicated that guessing was not easy.[23] In coding
the answers to the recall test, exact words were labeled "Verbatim", and correct content but varied
wording was labeled "Gist". The combination of "Verbatim" and "Gist" was called "Total Memory."
The "Improvisational" group had more "Gist" memories than any other group and had more "Total
Memory" than both of the discussion groups.[23] The results fit the researchers' hypothesis that the
"Improvisational" group would remember more because they actively rehearsed the information from
the monologue.[23] Although other groups had also elaborately encoded the information, the
"Improvisation" group remembered significantly more than the discussion groups and marginally
more than the "Reading Only" and "Writing" groups.[23] Simply experiencing the monologue in an
active way aids in remembering the "Gist."[23] There were no differences across groups for
"Verbatim" memory, which they suggest could take longer than the limited time during the
experiment to develop.[23]

Reasoning[edit]
A series of experiments demonstrated the interrelation between motor experience and high-level
reasoning. For example, although most individuals recruit visual processes when presented with
spatial problems such as mental rotation tasks [24]motor experts favor motor processes to perform
the same tasks, with higher overall performance.[25] A related study showed that motor experts use
similar processes for the mental rotation of body parts and polygons, whereas non-experts treated
these stimuli differently.[26] These results were not due to underlying confounds, as demonstrated by
a training study which showed mental rotation improvements after a one-year motor training,
compared with controls.[27] Similar patterns were also found in working memory tasks, with the ability
to remember movements being greatly disrupted by a secondary verbal task in controls and by a
motor task in motor experts, suggesting the involvement of different processes to store movements
depending on motor experience, namely verbal for controls and motor for experts.[28]

Approach and Avoidance[edit]

In research focused on the approach and avoidance effect, people showed an approach effect for
positive words.[29] In the "positive toward condition," participants moved positive words toward the
center of the screen and negative words away. In the "negative toward condition," participants
moved negative words toward the center and positive words away. Participants were given feedback
about their accuracy at the end of each of the 4 experimental blocks. In the first experiment the word
at the center of the screen had a positive valence, while in the second experiment the central word
had a negative valence. In the third experiment, the center of the screen had an empty box.[29]

Table showing response times for the positive, negative, and neutral valence conditions in the
approach and avoidance experiment. Participants were significantly faster for the "positive
toward" condition regardless of the central word's valence.

As predicted, in the first experiment participants in the "positive toward condition" responded
significantly faster than those in the "negative toward condition."[29] This fits the approach/avoidance
effect in embodied cognition, which states that people are faster to approach positive things and
avoid negative ones.[29] In the second experiment, researchers expected participants in the "negative
toward condition" to be faster, yet those in the "positive toward condition" responded significantly
faster.[29] Although effects were smaller in the third experiment, participants in the "positive toward
condition" were still faster.[29] Overall, people were faster in the "positive toward condition,"
regardless of the valence of the central word. Despite mixed results regarding the researchers'
expectations, they maintain that the motor system is important in processing higher level
representations such as the action goal.[29] In this study, participants showed strong approach effects
in the "positive toward condition," which supports embodied cognition.[29]
As part of a larger study, researchers separated participants into 5 groups with different
instructions.[30] In the "approach" condition, participants were instructed to imagine physically moving
the product toward them, but in the "avoid" condition, participants had to imagine moving the product
away from them. In the "control" condition, participants were instructed to simply observe the
product. The "correction" condition involved the same instructions as the approach condition, except
participants were told that the body can affect judgment. In the "approach information" condition,
participants had to list 5 reasons why they would obtain the product. After viewing a picture of an
aversive product, participants rated on a scale of 1 to 7 how desirable the product was and how
much they approached of or avoided the product. They also provided how much they would pay for
the product.[30]
An approach/avoidance effect was found in relation to product evaluation.[30] Participants in the
"approach" condition liked the aversive product significantly more and would pay more for it. There
were no differences between the "avoidance," "control," "correction," and "approach information"
conditions. Simulation of approach can affect liking and willingness to pay for a product, but the
effect can be reversed if the person knows about this influence.[30] This supports embodied
cognition.[30]

Self-Regulation[edit]
As part of a larger study, one experiment randomly assigned college undergraduates to 2
groups.[31] In the "muscle-firming" condition participants grasped a pen in their hand, while in the
"control" condition participants held the pen in their fingers. The participants were then asked to fill
out donations to Haiti for the Red Cross in sealed envelopes. They were told to return the envelope
regardless of whether they donated. They also filled out questionnaires about their feelings about the
Red Cross, their tendency to donate, their feelings about Haiti, what they thought the purpose of the
study was, etc.[31]
Significantly more participants in the "muscle-firming" condition than in the "control" condition
donated money.[31] Condition did not affect the actual amount donated when participants chose to
donate. As the researchers predicted, the "muscle-firming" condition helped participants get over
their physical aversion to viewing the devastation in Haiti and spend money. Muscle-firming in this
experiment may also be related to an increase in self-control, suggesting embodied cognition can
play a role in self-regulation.[31]
Some suggest that the embodied mind serves self-regulatory processes by combining movement
and cognition to reach a goal.[32] Thus, the embodied mind has a facilitative effect. Some judgments,
such as the emotion of a face, are detected more quickly when a participant mimics the facial
expression that is being evaluated.[20] Individuals holding a pen in their mouths to freeze their facial
muscles and make them unable to mimic the expression were less able to judge emotions. Goalrelevant actions may be encouraged by embodied cognition, as evidenced by the automated
approach and avoidance of certain environmental cues.[20] Embodied cognition is also influenced by
the situation. If one moves in a way previously associated with danger, the body may require a

greater level of information processing than if the body moves in a way associated with a benign
situation.[32]

Social Psychology[edit]
Some social psychologists examined embodied cognition and hypothesized that embodied cognition
would be supported by embodied rapport.[33] Embodied rapport would be demonstrated by pairs of
same-sex strangers using Arons paradigm, which instructs participants to alternate asking certain
questions and to progressively self-disclose. The researchers predicted that participants would
mimic each others movements, reflecting embodied cognition. Half the participants completed a
control task of reading and editing a scientific article, while half the participants completed a
shortened version of Arons self-disclosure paradigm.[33]

Results from the social embodied cognition study that illustrate the relationship between positive
emotions, observed behavioral synchrony, and embodied rapport.
There is a significant correlation between self-disclosure and positive emotions towards the other
participant.[33] Participants randomly assigned to the self-disclosure task displayed more
behavioral synchrony (rated by independent judges watching the tapes of each condition on mute)
and reported more positive emotions than the control group.[33] Since bodily movements influence
the psychological experience of the task, the relationship between self-disclosure and positive
feelings towards one's partner may be an example of embodied cognition.[33]

Evolutionary View of Embodied Cognition[edit]

Embodied cognition may also be defined from the perspective of evolutionary
psychologists.[34] Evolutionary psychologists view emotion as an important self-regulatory aspect of
embodied cognition, and emotion as a motivator towards goal-relevant action.[34] Emotion helps
drive adaptive behavior. The evolutionary perspective cites language, both spoken and written, as
types of embodied cognition.[34] Pacing and non-verbal communication reflect embodied cognition in
spoken language. Technical aspects of written language, such as italics, all caps,
and emoticons promote an inner voice and thereby a sense of feeling rather than thinking about a
written message.[34]

Cognitive science and linguistics[edit]

George Lakoff and his collaborators have developed several lines of evidence that suggest that
people use their understanding of familiar physical objects, actions and situations (such as
containers, spaces, trajectories) to understand other more complex domains (such as mathematics,
relationships or death). Lakoff argues that all cognition is based on knowledge that comes from the
body and that other domains are mapped onto our embodied knowledge using a combination
of conceptual metaphor, image schema and prototypes.

Conceptual metaphor[edit]
Main article: Conceptual metaphor
Lakoff and Mark Johnson[35] showed that humans use metaphor ubiquitously and that metaphors
operate at a conceptual level (i.e., they map one conceptual domain onto another), they involve an
unlimited number of individual expressions and that the same metaphor is used conventionally
throughout a culture. Lakoff and his collaborators have collected thousands of examples of
conceptual metaphors in many domains.[35][36]

For example, people will typically use language about journeys to discuss the history and status of a
love affair, a metaphor Lakoff and Johnson call "LOVE IS A JOURNEY". It is used in such
expression as: "we arrived at a crossroads," "we parted ways", "we hit the rocks" (as in a sea
journey), "she's in the driver's seat", or, simply, "we're together". In cases like these, something
complex (a love affair) is described in terms of something that can be done with a body (travel
through space).

Image schema[edit]
Main article: Image schema

This section
requires expansion.(December 2011)

Prototypes[edit]
Main article: Prototype theory
Prototypes are "typical" members of a category, e.g. a robin is a prototypical bird, but a penguin is
not. The role of prototypes in human cognition was first identified and studied by Eleanor Rosch in
the 1970s.[37] She was able to show that prototypical objects are more easily categorized than nonprototypical objects, and that people answered questions about a category as a whole by reasoning
about a prototype. She also identified basic level categories:[38] categories that have prototypes that
are easily visualized (such as a chair) and are associated with basic physical motions (such as
"sitting"). Prototypes of basic level categories are used to reason about more general categories.
Prototype theory has been used to explain human performance on many different cognitive tasks
and in a large variety of domains.[39] George Lakoff argues that prototype theory shows that the
categories that people use are based on our experience of having a body and have no resemblance
to logical classes or types. For Lakoff, this shows that traditionalobjectivist accounts of truth cannot
be correct.[39]

Artificial intelligence and robotics[edit]

History of AI[edit]
The experience of AI research provides another line of evidence supporting the embodied mind
thesis. In the early history ofAI successes in programming high-level reasoning tasks such as chessplaying led to an unfounded optimism that all AI problems would be relatively quickly solved. These
programs simulated intelligence using logic and high-level abstract symbols (an approach
called Good old-fashioned AI). This "disembodied" approach ran into serious difficulties in the 1970s
and 80s, as researchers discovered that abstract, disembodied reasoning was highly inefficient and
could not achieve human-levels of competence on many simple tasks.[40] Funding agencies (such
as DARPA) withdrew funding because the field of AI had failed to achieve its stated objectives,
leading to difficult period now known as the "AI winter". Many AI researchers began to doubt that
high level symbolic reasoning could ever perform well enough to solve simple problems.
Rodney Brooks argued in the mid-80s that these symbolic approaches were failing because
researchers did not appreciate the importance of sensorimotor skills to intelligence in general, and
applied these principals to robotics (an approach he called "Nouvelle AI"). Another successful new
direction was neural networksprograms based on the actual structures within human bodies that
gave rise to intelligence and learning. In the 90s, statistical AI achieved high levels of success in
industry without using any symbolic reasoning, but instead using probabilistic techniques to make
"guesses" and improve them incrementally. This process is similar to the way human beings are able
to make fast, intuitive choices without stopping to reason symbolically.

Moravec's paradox[edit]

Main article: Moravec's paradox

Moravec's paradox is the discovery by artificial intelligence and robotics researchers that, contrary
to traditional assumptions, high-level reasoning requires very little computation, but lowlevel sensorimotor skills require enormous computational resources. The principle was articulated
by Hans Moravec (whence the name) and others in the 1980s.
As Moravec writes:
Encoded in the large, highly evolved sensory and motor portions of the human brain is a billion years
of experience about the nature of the world and how to survive in it. The deliberate process we call
reasoning is, I believe, the thinnest veneer of human thought, effective only because it is supported
by this much older and much powerful, though usually unconscious, sensorimotor knowledge. We
are all prodigious olympians in perceptual and motor areas, so good that we make the difficult look
easy. Abstract thought, though, is a new trick, perhaps less than 100 thousand years old. We have
not yet mastered it. It is not all that intrinsically difficult; it just seems so when we do it.[41]

Embodiment as an approach to artificial intelligence [edit]

Solving problems of perception and locomotion directly[edit]
See also: Nouvelle AI, Situated, Behavior based AI and Embodied cognitive science
Many artificial intelligence researchers have argued that a machine may need a human-like body
to think and speak as well as a human being. As early as 1950, Alan Turing wrote:
It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the machine with the best sense organs that
money can
buy, and then teach it to understand and speak English. That process could follow the normal
teaching of a
child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc. (Turing, 1950).[42]
Embodiment theory was brought into Artificial Intelligence most notably by Rodney Brooks in the
1980s. Brooks showed thatrobots could be more effective if they 'thought' (planned or processed)
and perceived as little as possible. The robot's intelligence is geared towards only handling the
minimal amount of information necessary to make its behavior be appropriate and/or as desired by
its creator.
The embodied approach to AI has been given several different names by different schools of
researchers, including:Nouvelle AI (Brooks' term), Situated AI, Behavior based AI and Embodied
cognitive science.

Simulating the brain[edit]

See also: Artificial brain and Neural network

This section
requires expansion.(December 2011)
Simulating the brain requires 3 biological mirrors. 1 topological and functional connected with
a sensor (audio topic or visiotopic, an "ear" in the temporal cortex or an "eye" in the occipital cortex),
1 reflecting and representing the body position, a task of the cerebellum, and 1 reflecting the past,
its memory, a task of the hippocampus in connection with the frontal mirror, its re-projection on the
sensor mirror being a sound, image, word...If the mirrors were made of biological transistors (switch
carriers), layered in a non-linear gradient for instance a log2 gradient, the system of 3 mirrors would
also be able to compute its environment, its memory (the past) and even connect its past memory's
in logic, predicting the future. (log(2)1=0, log(2)2=1...). As its body position is projected in the center
of the 3 mirrors this machine would see and hear as being in the center of a sensor and the center of

its thoughts (re-projections from the frontal cortex to the sensor mirror). A mechanical system
(muscle apparatus) in connection with a motor cortex would redirect its position of interest (logical
attraction or avoidance).

Neuroscience[edit]
This section may need to be rewritten entirely to comply with
Wikipedia'squality standards, as comprehensive. You can help.
The discussion page may contain suggestions. (December 2011)
One source of inspiration for embodiment theory has been research in cognitive neuroscience, such
as the proposals ofGerald Edelman concerning how mathematical and computational models such
as neuronal group selection and neural degeneracy result in emergent categorization.
Rohrer (2005) discusses how both our neural and developmental embodiment shape both our
mental and linguistic categorizations. The degree of thought abstraction has been found to be
associated with physical distance which then affects associated ideas and perception of risk.[43]
The embodied mind thesis is compatible with some views of cognition promoted in neuropsychology,
such as the theories of consciousness of Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Gerald Edelman, and Antonio
Damasio.
The modeling work of cognitive neuroscientists such as Francisco Varela and Walter Freeman seeks
to explain embodied and situated cognition in terms of dynamical systems theory
and neurophenomenology, but rejects the idea that the brain uses representations to do so (a
position also espoused by Gerhard Werner).

Criticisms of Embodied Cognition[edit]

Research on embodied cognition is extremely broad, covering a wide range of concepts. Methods
to study embodied cognition vary from experiment to experiment based on the operational
definition used by researchers. There is much evidence for embodied cognition, although
interpretation of results and their significance may be disputed. Researchers continue to search for
the best way to study and interpret embodied cognition.

Infants as Models of Embodied Cognition[edit]

Some[44] criticize the notion that pre-verbal children provide an ideal channel for studying embodied
cognition, especially embodied social cognition.[45] It may be impossible to know when a pre-verbal
infant is a "pure model" of embodied cognition, since infants experience dramatic changes in social
behavior throughout development.[44] A 9-month old has reached a different developmental stage
than a 2-month old. Looking-time and reaching measures of embodied cognition may not represent
embodied cognition since infants develop object permanence of objects they can see before they
develop object permanence with objects they can touch.[44] True embodied cognition suggests that
children would have to first physically engage with an object to understand object permanence.[44]
The response to this critique is that infants are "ideal models" of embodied cognition.[45] Infants are
the best models because they utilize symbols less than adults do.[45] Looking-time could likely be a
better measure of embodied cognition than reaching because infants have not developed
certain fine motor skills yet.[45] Infants may first develop a passive mode of embodied cognition
before they develop the active mode involving fine motor movements.[45]

Overdrawn Conclusions?[edit]

Some criticize the conclusions made by researchers about embodied cognition.[46] The pencil-inteeth study is frequently cited as an example of these invalidly drawn conclusions. The researchers
believed that the quicker responses to positive sentences by participants engaging their smiling
muscles represented embodied cognition.[3] However, opponents argue that the effects of this
exercise were primed or facilitated by the engagement of certain facial muscles.[46] Many cases of
facilitative movements of the body may be incorrectly labeled as evidence of embodied cognition.[46]

Six views of embodied cognition[edit]

The following Six Views of Embodied Cognition are taken from Margaret Wilson:[47]
1. "Cognition is situated. Cognitive activity takes place in the context of a real-world
environment, and inherently involves perception and action." One example of this is moving
around a room while, at the same time, trying to decide where the furniture should go.
2. "Cognition is time-pressured. We are 'mind on the hoof' (Clark, 1997), and cognition must
be understood in terms of how it functions under the pressure of real-time interaction with
the environment." When youre under pressure to make a decision, the choice that is made
emerges from the confluence of pressures that youre under. In the absence of pressure, a
decision may be made differently.
3. "We off-load cognitive work onto the environment. Because of limits on our informationprocessing abilities (e.g., limits on attention and working memory), we exploit the
environment to reduce the cognitive workload. We make the environment hold or even
manipulate information for us, and we harvest that information only on a need-to-know
basis." This is seen when people have calendars, agendas, PDAs, or anything to help them
with everyday functions. We write things down so we can use the information when we need
it, instead of taking the time to memorize or encode it into our minds.
4. "The environment is part of the cognitive system. The information flow between mind
and world is so dense and continuous that, for scientists studying the nature of cognitive
activity, the mind alone is not a meaningful unit of analysis." This statement means that the
production of cognitive activity does not come from the mind alone, but rather is a mixture of
the mind and the environmental situation that we are in. These interactions become part of
our cognitive systems. Our thinking, decision-making, and future are all impacted by our
environmental situations.
5. "Cognition is for action. The function of the mind is to guide action and things such as
perception and memory must be understood in terms of their contribution to situationappropriate behavior." This claim has to do with the purpose of perception and cognition.
For example, visual information is processed to extract identity, location, and affordances
(ways that we might interact with objects). A prominent anatomical distinction is drawn
between the "what" (ventral) and "where" (dorsal) pathways in visual processing. However,
the commonly labeled "where" pathways is also the "how" pathway, at least partially
dedicated to action.
6. "Off-line cognition is body-based. Even when decoupled from the environment, the
activity of the mind is grounded in mechanisms that evolved for interaction with the
environment- that is, mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control." This is shown
with infants or toddlers best. Children utilize skills and abilities they were born with, such as
sucking, grasping, and listening, to learn more about the environment. The skills are broken
down into five main categories that combine sensory with motor skills, sensorimotor
functions. The five main skills are:
1. Mental Imagery: Is visualizing something that is not currently present in your
environment. For example, imagining a future activity, or recalling how many
windows are on the first floor of a house you once lived in (even though you did not
count them explicitly while living there).

2. Working Memory: Short term memory

3. Episodic Memory: Long term memory of specific events.
4. Implicit Memory: means by which we learn certain skills until they become automatic
for us. An example of this would be an adult brushing his/her teeth, or an expert
race car driver putting the car in drive.
5. Reasoning and Problem-Solving: Having a mental model of something will increase
problem-solving approaches.

Criticism of the Six Claims[edit]

Margaret Wilson adds: "Some authors go so far as to complain that the phrase 'situated cognition'
implies, falsely, that there also exists cognition that is not situated (Greeno & Moore, 1993, p.
50)."[48] Of her six claims, she notes in her abstract, "the first three and the fifth claim appear to be at
least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability.
The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention, but
it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims."[49]

body, embodiment

Body is defined most commonly in terms of the human body,

the material frame of man, viewed as an organic entity. Though
it sometimes refers only to the main portion of an animal or unit,
it may also refer to a series of organized units, a collective whole,
of things or persons. Within science it refers to any substance,
simple or compound, solid, liquid or gaseous. Within Christian
texts the body is understood as the sacrament, the
metaphorical body of Christ. To Embody is to put into a body
an idea or spirit, to give a concrete form to or to express
(principles, thoughts, or intentions) within art, action, word
combinations, or institutions. Thus, an embodiment of an idea or
principle is its physical form, realization or expression, or the
incarnation of that idea.
Media theorists discuss the body primarily as the site of
the senses, (see senses) however Descartes began his
discussion of the body as an assertion from the mind. The
Cartesian man establishes his existence and the limits of his
physical being through the existence and limits of his senses. "I
think therefore I am" most simply articulates the self identifying
the senses of the self, to the self's body. Lacan complicates this
understanding of the body, though, with his discussion of the
"mirror stage" of child psychological development. Lacan
theorizes that man, sensing himself from within his own body, is

only able to conceive of his body as an accumulation of pieces--or

other bodies. This accumulation is only truly composed, when
the whole is viewed in reflection, at a distance, alone. For Lacan,
bodily integrity or wholeness is only achieved with the assistance
of an 'other' seemingly detached object--the mirror. This differs
from Descartes because the Cartesian man is an accumulation of
parts sensed simultaneously as one whole body, whereas the
Lacanian subject can not conceive of the whole body until the
entire entity is visualized--a primitive media interaction.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty engages these conflicting arguments,
claiming that while the Lacanian man feels disembodied by this
distanced image of his whole, the Cartesian man feels
comfortable with his self-sensed self, and identifies the image as
a model of himself, rather than his detached self. (173)
In Lacan's model, selfhood may only be understood with the
assistance of an outside object--i.e. one mirror. Lacan reflects on
the destabilizing effect this discovery can have--realizing that
identity is only definable with the aid of an outside object. This is
the beginning of the new thoughts on embodiment.
Philosophers rethought Descartes earlier mediation of the body
and the mind, relating the two at varying degrees of
interdependence, or of insurmountable burden. Foucault
summarized the debate of the inherent relationship, in the
question, "is the body the prison of the mind, or the mind the
prison for the body?" Foucault rethinks both the Cartesian man
and the Lacanian subject because now the body's focus is not
how or where to define itself, but rather how to rid itself of its
own confinement--i.e. the mortality of the body and the social
constraints of the mind.
Marshall McLuhan rethinks these debates when he asserts that
media act as extensions of the human senses.(3) McLuhan
establishes every technological advancement as an extension of
the body's senses. Clothing is an extension of our skin, housing is
a collective skin, and cities create technological organisms from

these collective membranes. (McLuhan, 123-4)

McLuhan's definition of media as bodily extensions establishes the
possibility for further bodily alienation. As media build upon each
other, telescoping further and further from our human skin, the
limits of our body become less and less definable. For McLuhan,
the Lacanian mirror is not simply an object to reference the
dislocation of self, but rather it is a media tool which acts as an
extension of self--like a physical prosthesis--through which self
embodies or becomes the media tools. This experience is
apparent within the film, eXistenZ . The film establishes a series
of layered hyper-realities for the players of a virtual reality game.
[see Reality, Hyperreality , (2)] In order to enter each new layer
of the game the players must "plug in" to the game, allowing it to
directly enter theirnervous system (sensory center) in order to
leave their physical body behind. At each plug-in layer they
experience a new persona, and a "sense" of their body
embodying a computer-generated reality, while their physical
body remains at rest. They are willfully disembodied from their
physical reality. Each plug-in is reminiscent of hitting play on a
VCR, or turning the power on a television remote, or reading
the first line of a novel.
The irony of the film is delivered at the end, when we (the
viewer) discover that the film's 'real' action only exists or grounds
itself, when the characters choose to enter another reality--at the
moment of plugging in. Since the movie begins at the second
plugging-in without referencing the first, Cronenberg suspends all
reality to imply that no reality is grounded. In other words, the
viewer's act of playing the film, was the first "plug in" to an
alternate reality. The film engages the disembodiment that
media offers and threatens us. The viewer embodies media,
because media becomes an escape from the body through its
prosthetic extensions. (McLuhan, 319)
McLuhan suggests both the re-fragmentation of the self through
extension into media realities, and the re-unification of humanity
through media's overlapping extensions. (347) Merleau-Ponty

suggests an alternative model. Though "our instruments have

become detachable organs," this need not displace ourselves. As
with the proposed Cartesian view of the Lacanian mirror stage,
these detached senses need not create a sense of
disembodiment. Our physical body may be seen as a point (0,0)
within a graph, and our senses, however extended, may perceive
the surrounding world at a higher andmore distant magnitude
with removing our grounding within them. (Merleau-Ponty, 178)
With these detachable organs, our senses are no longer limited to
our physical bodies. Consequently, we can no longer define our
bodies as the embodiment of our senses, nor define our bodies'
limits, within the confines (or lack of confines) of our senses.
Yet this limitless sensory system should not create a loss of bodily
placement, as our bodies remain as the receptor to the wide
variety of stimuli--our ground zero.
While McLuhan sees media as an object, which we may embody
by flipping a power switch on and off, or plugging ourselves in
and out. As is apparent in eXistenZ, these media extend our
senses, but allow us to leave the game. Where McLuhan sees the
transition from embodying media object to embodying our limited
bodies, as a clear break, Cronenberg illustrates the complications
in returning to our own zero, or grounding within our real bodies.
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of an internal third ear
or third eye (see Ear and Eye and Mind) in creating this
grounding. For Merleau-Ponty our body is unique as a medium,
in that it both sees and is seen; our bodies are sensory objects
and objects to be sensed. Consequently our senses are selfconscious. We can sense ourselves sensing, and therefore
gain perspective on our own point of view. (see Perspective)
This "third eye" acts as intermediary in determining the relevance
and reality of our senses, creating the proper calibration for our
sensory information. (169) Cronenberg's eXistenZ may
demonstrate how the advancement of
media technology complicates the calibration of our senses, back
to true reality.
Slavoj Zizek argues that recalibration to a pure reality is

impossible. Though man controls the speed of, and input into
computers and other media, this control does not protect us from
the sensory transformations media cause us. Media offer a
perceptual disjunction of senses similar to anorexia nervosa or
schizophrenia, where the patient's view of his own embodiment
becomes skewed from his bodily reality. Our human tendency to
anthropomorphize media objects, along with the intimacy allowed
by many media, allows us little perspective on the machines as
machines. Zizek argues that the greatest difficulty in detaching
from the media, or flipping the switch back to pure reality, is the
media's semblance to our own senses. Once familiar with the
general workings of the media, we are only able to perceive our
own senses with respect to their mechanical extensions, even if
we are able to sense without the media. Though our skills at
math and grammar are not necessarily hindered by repeated use
of a computer, our understanding of how we do calculations and
editing, continues to be in terms of the computer's computational
and editorial programs. We view the brain as a "flesh computer,
but never the computer as an imitation of man." While we plug
out, and seize to embody the media objects, the never seize to
embody us--we continue to think of ourselves manifesting their
actions or extensions of our own senses.

Human Embodiment
Human existence is all too mysterious to be studied in a purely objective way using the lenses of
science. The experience of embodiment articulates, enriches, and engages us into a broader and a
deeper context of human reality. We express ourselves most fully in conscious freedom. This
self-expression finds its definitive course through our embodiment, whereby we encounter real
people, dwell in the world as such and walk unto the shores of being carrying the eternal hope of
finding
the
meaning
of
ones
self.
From a scientific perspective, we do use concepts in order to describe human experience.
Deriving such clear concepts about things requires objective distance. In trying to understand
ones bodily existence, by way of an example, the very specimen, your body, becomes a
body,[1] the object of study or investigation. In such an examination, the body is observed and
analyzed. In this process of abstraction or analysis, the investigator divides into parts the reality
of one's body in order to understand it.

An incarnate being
The human body is not an object. It is not something that exists as a mere physical entity. There
is no formula as to how the experience of embodiment can be approached. It is for this reason
that we have to see our experience of human embodiment from within. We look at it from the
point of view of a unity of self. In understanding human embodiment, one is always trying to
know oneself. The fact that you are who you are means that we just cannot separate the human
body, or your body, from the self that is wholly you. This is because one is an incarnate
being.
The human body, according to Paul Ricoeur, is not the object of some action but essentially the
very organ by which human action is fulfilled. It is through this body that one is able to do
something for someone, suffer on behalf of the other, and live or even die for some reason or a
noble cause. The actuations of our bodily existence hence remind us of who we really are to
someone. One cannot be this body and yet be another person. You are what you do to
someone.
One cannot rightly speak then of ones body as an instrument and thus a mere possession.
Objectively, our hands are useful and we find the functionality of our eyes and the other parts of
our body important. However, you are not just some body, but you are your body. The
person and his body in this sense are a unity. The experience of embodiment is always at the
same time a reflexive experience of subjectivity, personal and existentially intertwined with
ones being.
Human incarnate existence is essentially a lived reality. My body is not an object for another
persons disposal. My body demands respect for it is the person that I am. It should not be
subjected to any exploitation or abuse because it bears the mark of ones being human. Respect
for the human body is therefore respect for the human person that one is.
The human subject as embodied is rooted in a world where it discovers relationships that
concretize or actualize what it means to be human. The human subject is not an alienated entity.
He reveals himself through self-expressions. These self-expressions entail the sufferings, pains,
desires, endeavors, ambitions, failures, achievements, and the tasks of man as a being in the
world.
Unity of mind and body

The notion of the separation between mind and body has been brought about by the dualism
proposed by Rene Descartes. The dictum I think, therefore, I am,[2] [cogito ergo sum]
indicates that man is a thinking substance. Descartes used the methodic doubt as basis of
knowing in which everything is subjected to in order to arrive at the indubitable. Certainty is
therein grounded on self-consciousness. The world is outside and the mind, inside. Thus, we
speak of the gap between the mind and the world.[3]
This dualism speaks of the separation between the body as an instrument and the mind as the seat
of control. The emergence of the scientific era meant that method acted as the source of
knowledge. This paved the way for the dichotomization of the subject from the object, man from
the world, and the soul from the body.
However, human embodiment speaks of the very unity between the mind and the body since man
is an incarnate existence. Mans awareness of humiliation, for example, is always a real
experience of personal pain and anguish, inseparable from ones subjectivity. The being that I
am cannot be separated from the body that I am. Essentially, the fact that I am means that
I am my body.[4] It is not like some water being put inside a vessel. Rather, the body as an
organ is like some water that flows from a spring [self]. It is one that is lived. Fr. Jose Cruz, SJ,
cites the case of Schneider:
Schneider, a German soldier, was wounded by shrapnel in the thalamus of the brain. As a result
of this incident, Schneider emerged as a man who was a victim of disconnected
sensationsSchneider could only respond in vague, clumsy sweeping movements of the hand in
the general direction of his head but it was only through the aid of his doctors pointer which
directed his hand that he was able to reach and point to his forehead. Without the doctors
assistance, Schneider would return to the series of general, vague clumsy directional
gesturesBut while all of this was going on, a fly would settle on Schneiders forehead and
immediately in one graceful sweep of his hand, he would touch his forehead and flick the insect
off.[5]
Fr. Cruz explains that the first case was a description of mans body reaction to a whole
command, or verbal communication. The second is a description of the reaction of embodied
knowledge, a knowledge which is integrated in lived experience.[6] We can point to the idea
that one does not and cannot separate the human body from ones consciousness of the world.
Human consciousness is thus embodied. The body and the human mind are united in our
experiences. When one thinks, one thinks of oneself at the same time. The subject as self is
thrown in front as one thinks. In this regard, human consciousness is not an abstract reality; it is
one that truly feels regret, pain, sadness, disappointment, fear, guilt, love, hatred, or happiness.

Mans incarnate existence reveals that the reality of mans bodily existence cannot be separated
from the truth of his soul. Every dream, every passion and all the things that the individual
endeavors to attain entail an understanding of the very capacities of his body as an organ. And
this organ is his unified existence as one whole self. Thus, the human body is at the same time
the person that one is since it enables the individual to actualize a sense of being whole. Jose
Calasanz writes in the paper My Body that for Gabriel Marcel, mans embodiment is not
simply a datum alongside other data but the primary datum that is the starting point and basis of
any philosophical reflection.[7] Calasanz explains that for Marcel, Descartess failure lies in the
imprisonment of his methodic doubt which aspires for mathematical-like truths.[8]
Freedom of movement
Human embodiment is realized most fully in human action. Acting is mans freedom of
movement. Human action essentially reveals the being of man as a situated consciousness. Man's
being is concretized in human action. Man acts in view of the situation he struggles in, enjoys, or
suffers from. This situation defines the whole horizon of human activity. Human action, in turn,
characterizes the person that he is. Man is a sinner, a worker, a father, a friend, a child man as
person is that being who essentially lives. Human action, thus, essentially reveals the qualities
that we possess as persons.
The embodiment of human freedom means that man sees the world as a real horizon that opens
him up to his existential possibilities. It brings forth in the person whatever is possible or not
possible so that he can truly and fully act as a human being. The possibility of evil then is there
because of the freedom of man.
The world is not some abstract entity.[9] The world is real. The events in any man's life can
enhance or diminish its value. The relationships we develop with people make manifest the real
person in each one of us. Acting then is our means of doing something for others in such a way
that it intimately reveals who we actually are. So as long as man is, he possesses an existential
capability for action.
To be a finite being means, as stated above, realizing whatever possibilities our finitude offers.
Being finite does not mean that we are always bound to be broken, for essentially as a person we
are whole. This is what being oneself means. The very vast expanse of the universe which serves
as the background for all human subjectivity manifests the latters realization in responsible
human action.

People express themselves from the vantage point of ones bodily existence from what one
feels. You cry when you are hurt. Crying does not do anything to your pain. But you shed
some tear in order to show what you feel. You are what you feel. Thus, the human body is not
just some kind of a tool. It cannot be judged, on this basis, from the point of view of function.
Calasanz, in explaining the idea of being ones body:
But what is meant by my in my body? Is it the my of possession that I refer to when I talk of
my ballpen or my dog? Is the logic of I have a body the same as I have a dog?[10]
Functionality is just one aspect of our being. Responsible human action cannot be collapsed into
the idea that everything must have some use or purpose. For instance, no one is really disabled.
One can only be differently-abled. But this categorization comes about because people equate
meaning with function. It is wrong to ground our notion of embodiment solely on the idea of
functionality precisely because persons are not objects. Objects are of value because of their
usefulness. The same cannot be said of persons.
For instance, an incapacitated boy may not be able to speak, or think the way normal children
do, or play and enjoy things the way others would. But it is utterly wrong to define the meaning
of his movement and action on the basis of a prior bias or prejudice set forth by the conventions
or norms which define the meaning of usefulness, or in a summative way, the so called normal
ways of doing things. He can also feel hurt when denied something that he really enjoys from
though he wont speak about it.
The young boy may enjoy things in such a way that his joys are outside the very definitions or
descriptions of what people mean by enjoyment, but it is simply wrong to segregate his
experience as one that is peculiar. It is not as if there are different worlds out there that each of
us are supposed to discover. There is just one world and it is possible that a particular child sees
this world in his own way.
It is by way of responsible action that we find ourselves emancipated from the fetters of cynicism
and doubt. Responsible human action means the refusal to be held up by very limiting or myopic
points of view that somehow impede our understanding of the world. If it is in self-fulfillment
that we find the meaning of being a person, this self-fulfillment must not be dictated by the
monologues of dominant cultures or the impositions of doctrine.
The above articulates for us the reality that the very meaning of our lives is something that is
personal. The individual will have to determine for himself the authentic meaning of his
humanity. The body as organ allows man to reach out to others in order to find a mature and

morally plausible way of living in the world that does not put to waste human life as it is.
Freedom of movement or moral action then leads the person to discover his self. It is this mode
of self-discovery whereby one can live most fully in being.