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Joe Haslag
Department of Economics, University of Missouri
E-mail address: haslagj@missouri.edu
URL: http://www.
The author thanks students for years of honing the topics covered in this
text..
Abstract. Replace this text with your own abstract.
Contents
Introduction
1. A One-Period Model
2. Competitive equilibrium
3. Pareto optimum
4. Comparative statics
11
5. Government
14
6. Problems
18
21
1. Consumers
21
2. Firm
25
3. Competitive equilibrium
25
4. Problems
28
31
44
iii
Introduction
\chapter*{Preface}The purpose of this book is to develop a one-semester
course that covers the essential topics for a first-year graduate course in
macroeconomic theory. The material is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate course.
CHAPTER 1
1. A One-Period Model
Consider a model economy in which all trades take place in a single period. Imagine after that period that the economy ends and market participation is not permitted. Though perhaps unrealistic, such an environment
permits us to see how a general equilibrium is constructed. The economy
has two types of participants: consumers and firms. We now turn to a
description of consumers and firms.
1.1. Consumers. Consumers are endowed with one unit of time and
some quantity of physical capital. The total amount of capital endowed
is represented by k0 . Consumers decide how to divide their time between
leisure, which is enjoyable, and labor, which is not. When consumers provide
labor services, they receive wages. Capital is owned by consumers and can be
rented to firms or be permitted to lay idle. Consumers are compensated for
the quantity of capital they rent to firms. In addition to leisure, consumers
also enjoy eating quantities of the single, perishable consumption good.1
The quantities of the consumption good are nonnegative.
We assume there are N of these consumers populating this economy.
Each consumer has preferences over the consumption good, denoted by c,
and leisure, denoted by l. Consumers are identical in the sense that they
each have the same endowment and the same preferences. Formally, each
consumer is endowed with one unit of time and the same quantity of capital,
k0
N.
1For readers who want something more concrete, think of the single perishable good
as apples.
1. A ONE-PERIOD MODEL
Formally, we assume the utility function is strictly increasing in each argument and strictly concave. This feature is captured as: uc (c, l) , ul (c, l) > 0
with ucc (c, l) , ull (c, l) < 0 such that ucc (c, l) ull (c, l) [ucl (c, l)]2 > 0.2 To
ensure that we obtain an interior solution, we further assume that Inada
conditions hold; specifically, limc0 uc (c, l) = and limc uc (c, l) = 0.
Likewise, for leisure, we have liml0 ul (c, l) = and liml1 ul (c, l) = 0.
Because each consumer is identical, we can solve the problem for a representative consumer. Formally, the problem is represented as:
(PC)
max u (c, l)
c,l
c w (1 l) + rks
0 ks
k0
N
0l1
c0
where k s is the quantity of capital rented to a firm, w is the wage rate
and r is the rental rate paid per unit of capital. Note that w and r are both
measured in units of the consumption good.3 In other words, consumption
is picked as the numeraire so that its price is set to one. The prices of other
goods, capital and labor, for instance, are measured relative the price of the
numeraire good.
For a constrained optimization problem, we apply the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. The Lagrangean is
2Here, the notation is u (c, l) = du for i = c, l and u (c, l) = d2 u for i, j = c, l.
i
ij
di
didj
3More concretely, trade for one unit of labor will cost w units of the consumption
good.
(1.1)
k0
= u (c, l) + w + r wl c
N
= uc (c, l) = 0
c
= ul (c, l) w = 0
l
k0
c =0
w (1 l) + r
N
1. A ONE-PERIOD MODEL
constraint holds as a strict equality. Formally, c = w + r kN0 wl. If we substitute for consumption, the problem can be rewritten as an unconstrained
optimization problem; that is,
k0
max u w + r wl, l
l
N
At the maximum, the following condition is satisfied:
(1.2)
k0
k0
w uc w + r wl, l + ul w + r wl, l = 0
N
N
1.2. Firms. Firms can be thought of as being endowed with a production technology. In other words, the firm is the only entity that knows how
to combine labor and capital to produce units of the consumption good.
Firms then pay the factors of production.
The technology used to combine labor and capital to produce the consumption good is captured by the production function.
Formally,
fk (k, n) , fn (k, n) > 0 and fkk (k, n) , fnn (k, n) < 0. To ensure that both
inputs are used, we assume f (0, 0) = f (0, n) = f (k, 0) = 0. Some positive
quantity of both inputs are necessary to obtain any output. Lastly, we assume the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale; formally,
for any > 0, zf (k, n) = y.
There are M firms in the economy. The constant returns to scale assumption greatly simplifies the analysis. To see this, consider the expression
that defines a constant returns to scale function; that is, zf (k, n) = y.
Next, dierentiate this expression with respect to , obtaining
(1.3)
(1.4)
max zf (k, n) rk wn
k,n
where r is the rental rate on capital and w is the wage rate. Both
the rental rate and wage are measured in units of the consumption good.
Each firm takes the rental rate and wage rate as given. Profit maximum is
identified by dierentiating the profit function with respect to k and n and
setting the derviatives equal to zero.
(1.5)
zfk (k, n) r = 0
(1.6)
zfn (k, n) w = 0
It follows from (1.5) and (1.6) that zfk (k, n) k + zfn (k, n) n = rk + wn.
In a competitive environment, no one firm will earn positive profits. If
profits were positive, production could expand until zero profits are realized.
Or, zf (k, n) rk wn = 0, which implies that zf (k, n) zfk (k, n) k
2. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
2. Competitive equilibrium
We define a competitive equilibrium as an allocation, {c, l, n, k}, and
prices, {w, r}, such that
(i) consumers choose the quantity of the consumption good and leisure
to maximize 1.1, taking wages and rental rates as given;
(ii) firms choose the quantity of labor and capital to employ to maximize
1.4, taking wages and rental rates as given;
(iii) markets clear: formally, k0 = k, y = Nc, N (1 l) = n;
The necessary and sucient condition for the consumers maximization
problem are provided by equation (1.2). The necessary and sucient condition for the firms maximization problem is given by equations (1.5) and
(1.6). Combined with the market clearing conditions, we have six equations
and six unknowns.
We next illustrate how one would solve for the equilibrium values. Because the consumer is a representative consumer, we can assume that N = 1
without loss of generality. Thus, 1 l = n. We substitute for wages and the
rental rate, applying market clearing conditions for the capital stock and for
employment, obtaining
(2.1)
Note that we have rearranged the expression so that there is one unknown. For strictly concave utility, there is one value of leisure that satisifes
equation (2.1), which is denoted as l . Plug l into equation (1.5) to obtain the equilibrium value of the rental rate; that is, zfk (k0 , 1 l ) =
the market clearing condition for labor; that is, 1 l = n and the equilibrium quantity of capital is determined by the endowment of capital; k = k0 .
Finally, the equilibrium quantity of consumption determined by the consumers budget constraint; that is, w (1 l ) + r kN0 = c .
The intuition is familiar. Consumers choose the quantity of labor to
supply and firms choose the quantity of labor to employ and the wage rate
is determined so that these quantities are equal. Likewise, the quantity
of capital rented by firms is equal to the quantity of capital supplied by
consumers and the rental rate ensures that these two quantities are equal.
Consumers demand the consumption good and supply labor and capital,
firms demand labor and capital and supply the consumption good, and
prices adjust so that the quantites demanded equal the quantities supplied.
Note that there are three market clearing conditions. Only two of these
equations are linearly independent. To show this, we multiply the price
of each good by the excess demand for each item. Formally, (c y) +
w [n (1 l)] + r (k k0 )
Because the consumers budget constraint holds with equalityc = w (1 l)+
rk0 and because the firm has zero profitszf (k, n) = y = rk + wn, we combine the two, implying that
(2.2)
(c y) + w [n (1 l)] + r (k k0 ) = 0.
the terms on the right-hand-side of the equation from both sides of the expression and
rearranging, we have (c y) + w [n (1 l)] + r (k k0 ) = 0.
3. PARETO OPTIMUM
for capital. Or, if the markets for consumption goods and capital clear
c = y and n = (1 l) it follows that k = k0 . We use this interdependence
to ignore one equation in our model economy. Only two of the excess demands are independent. At the point at which we have six equations and
six unknowns, the linear dependence implies that we drop one market clearing condition. For example, if drop c = y w [n (1 l)] , we have five
equations and five unknowns.
3. Pareto optimum
We begin with the definition of an allocation as a production plan and
a distribution of goods. An allocation is Pareto optimum if there exists no
other allocation which is strictly preferred by some agents but does not make
any other agent worse o.
To illustrate this point, consider a fictious social planner that can costly
acquire all the production and factors of production. In our simple static
economy, the social planner then chooses the quantity of capital and labor
that each agent will supply to the production process and the distribution
of consumption good received by each agent. Since all our agents are identical, the social planners problem reduces to solving the problem for one
representative agent. Formally,
max u (c, l)
c,l
(SP)
c = zf (k0 , 1 l)
Thus, the social planner is benevolent in the sense that the objective is
to maximize the welfare of the representative agent subject to the boundary
of the feasible set. One can think of the feasible set as being the budget constraint faced by the omniscient, benevolent social planner. We assume the social planner can freely dispose, but since the marginal utility
10
of the consumption good is positive, the planner will exhaust any production that is available. In other words, we are concentrating on cases that
lie on the frontier of the production possibilities curve. The upshot is that
we can substitute for consumption in the planners problem, rewriting it as
maxl u [zf (k0 , 1 l) , l].
The necessary condition for solving this unconstrained maximization
problem is
(3.1)
(3.2)
zfn (k0 , 1 l) =
ul [zf (k0 , 1 l) , l]
.
uc [zf (k0 , 1 l) , l]
(2.1). Since the latter was derived in our eorts to derive the competitive
equilibrium and the former was the solution to the social planners problem. With the planners allocation being Pareto optimal, this equivalence
suggests a general result: namely: (i) A competitive equilirium in which
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
11
there are no externalities, markets are complete and there are no distorting
taxes is Pareto optimal; and (ii) Any Pareto optimum can be supported as
a competitive equilibrium with an appropriate choice of endowments. Condition (i) is the First Welfare Theorem and Condition (ii) is the Second
Welfare Theorem. A connection between the two Welfare Theorems and
the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem is presented in the Apprendix.
4. Comparative statics
In this section, our aim is to find how changes in the exogenous variables aect the equilibrium prices and quantities. To assess the eect on
quantities, it is convenient to use the allocation determined by the social
planner and rely on the Second Welfare Theorem is to ensure the eects we
find from the solution to the social planners problem will be the same as
the solution in the competitive equilibrium allocation.
We begin by looking at the eect of change in technology on lesiure. We
obtain this by totally dierentiating (3.1), setting dk0 = 0, yielding
12
goods. With uc , ucl > 0, ull < 0, however, the sign of the numerator is
indeterminate.
4.1. On income and substitution eects. The Slutzky equation
tells us that we can decompose the total eect that a change in total factor
productivity has on leisure into two components: the income eect and the
substitution eect. The decomposition rests on the ability to assess the
impact of the parameter, holding utility constant. To illustrate this point,
start with the following expression:
(4.1)
u (c, l) = h
combined with the equation (3.1), we can proceed with deriving the
substitution eect. Totally dierentiate (4.1) and (3.1), setting dh = 0.
From (3.1), one obtains the following expression (note that terms inside
parethenses are omitted)
dl
dz |subst
to distinguish be-
tween the substitution eect and the total eect. Next, we use the fact that
-zfn uc + ul = 0, which implies that zfn = uucl , which yields the following
expression
(4.2)
dl
fn uc
|subst =
< 0.
2
dz
zfnn uc + (zfn ) ucc 2zfn ucl + ull
dl
dl
dl
dz = dz |subst + dz |inc (the
zfn f ucc f ucl
> 0.
zfnn uc +(zfn )2 ucc 2zfn ucl +ull
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
13
dl
dz
dn
dz
dl
= dz
. The change in the equilibrium
dc
dz
= f + zfn dn
dz .
dw
dz
= fn +zfnn dn
dz . If
14
5. Government
In this section, we extend the model economy to consider a role for fiscal
policy. The modification involves a government that collects goods from
consumers by a lump-sum tax. These units of the consumption good are
transformed into a government good at a one-for-one rate. We assume that
the government goods provide some utility to the representative consumer.
We further assume that any such utility is separable in the sense that the
marginal utility of leisure and the consumption good is independent of the
quantity of government goods that are consumed. The level of lump-sum
taxes are set exogenously and consequently, the level of government goods
is exogenously determined. The upshot is that any utility derived from the
government good is akin to a constant level added to the consumers welfare
level.
Formally,
u (c, l) + (g)
s.t. c = w (1 l)
where denotes the quantity of goods collected in the form of lump-sum
taxes. The government budget constraint is represented by the expression,
g = .
We proceed along the same lines as we did in the economy without
government. Specifically, substitute for consumption and solve the following
unconstrained maximization problem:
max u [w (1 l) , l] + (g)
l
wuc [w (1 l) , l] + ul [w (1 l) , l] = 0
5. GOVERNMENT
15
max zn wn
n
where z = w.6
A competitive equilibrium is defined as an allocation {c, l, n, } and a
price {w} which satisfies the following conditions:
(i) the representative consumer chooses c and l to maximize utility, taking w and as given;
(ii) the representative firm chooses n to maximize profits, taking w as
given;
(iii) markets for the consumption good and labor clear;
(iiia) the government budget constraint is satisfied.
In the absence of any externality, the Second Welfare theorem will hold,
implying that we can employ the solution to the planners problem to determine the quantities. Formally,
u (c, l)
s.t. c + g = z (1 l)
where the constraint is intrepreted as the economys resource cosntraint.
After substitution, the first-order condition for the planners maximization
6This condition ensures that the firm will satisfy the zero-profit condition. If z > w,
the firm would maximize profits by employing the full amount of labor. If z < w, the
shutdown condition applies.
16
problem is
(5.1a)
zuc [z (1 l) g, l] + ul [z (1 l) g, l] = 0
zucc + ucl
dl
= 2
dg
z ucc 2zucl + ull
(5.2)
If leisure is a normal good, the denominator is negative and the numerator is positive, implying that
dl
dg
dl
dg
dc
dg
= z
dl
dg
1.
zucl ull
dc
= 2
<0
dg
z ucc 2zucl + ull
5. GOVERNMENT
dl
dg ,
17
dy
dg
= z
dl
dg .
Substitute
dy
z 2 ucc zucl
= 2
.
dg
z ucc 2zucl + ull
dy
dg
18
6. Problems
(1) Consider the following representative agent model. The representtive consumer has preferences given by
u (c, l) = c + l
where c is consumption, l is leisure, and > 0. The consumer has an
endowment of one unit of time and k0 units of capital. The representative
firm has a technology for producing consumption goods, given by
y = zk n1
where y is output, z is total factor productivity, k is the capital input, n
is the labor input, and 0 < < 1. The market real wage is w and r denotes
the rental rate on capital.
a. : solve for all prices and quantities in a competitive equilibrium
(there are two cases to consider).
b.: determine the eects that a change in z would have consumption,
output, employment, the real wage, and the rental rate on capital.
Explain your results.
2. Consider an economy with a continuum of consumers, and normalize the total mass of consumers to one. Each consumer has
preferences given by
U (c, l, c) = u (c, l) + v (
c)
where c and l are the individuals consumption and leisure, respectively,
and c is the average consumption across the population (note that, because
any individual is very small relative to the population, each consumer will
treat c as given). Assume that u (c, l) has standard properties and that v (
c)
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice dierentiable. There is an
6. PROBLEMS
19
y=n
where y is output and n is the labor input.
a.: Determine the Pareto optimum (confine attention to allocations
where all consumers consume the same quantities).
b.: Determine the competitive equilibrium, and show that is not
Pareto optimal.
c.: Now suppose that the government subsidizes each individuals
consumption. that is, for each unit he or she consumes, a consumers receives s units of consumption from the government. the
government finances subsidies to consumers by imposing a lumpsum tax on each consumer. Show that, if the government sets the
subsidiy appropriately, then the competitive equilibirum is Pareto
optimal. Determine the optimal subsidy, and explain your results.
CHAPTER 2
Intertemporal models
The purpose of this chapter is two fold. First, we extend the basic static
model to include decisions that explicitly take decisions across time into
account. Second, we develop a model that distinguishes between complete
and incomplete markets. In doing so, we can see how incomplete markets
invalidates the Second Welfare Theorem.
1. Consumers
The consumers problem changes in one important aspect. In this model
economy, the consumer is infinitely lived. We continue with the assumption
that all consumers are identical. Their preferences also depend on the quantity of the consumption good and quantity of leisure in a specific time period.
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... We further assume that the utility function is separable across time periods. We formalize the consumers lifetime
preferences as
U=
t u (ct , lt )
t=0
22
2. INTERTEMPORAL MODELS
a means to ensure that lifetime utility is finite. The intuitive appeal is that
the future requires patience. Suppose c0 = c1 and l0 = l1 . With discounting,
we are saying that future quantities do not yield as much date-0 utility as
current quantities do, holding everything else constant. The time that one
has to wait to enjoy the future quantities is captured by the discount factor,
.
At each date t, the consumer faces a budget constraint represented as
(1.1)
ct = wt (1 lt ) t st+1 + (1 + rt ) st
f or t = 0, 1, 2, ...
where all terms have the same meaning as in the static model. Note
that we have introduced s to stand for the stock of government bonds that
consumers possess. To be more concrete, think of this as consisting of the
quantity of the perishable good that traded to the government. At date t,
st+1 denotes the the quantity of the consumption good traded for one-period
bonds, i.e., bonds that mature in one period. Here, st stands for the quantity
of bonds that mature this period. We assume that bonds acquired at date
t 1 (that is, st ) will yield 1 + rt units of the consumption good at date
t. Hence, the last term on the right-hand-side (hereafter, rhs) of equation
(1.1), combined with wage income (the first term on the rhs) represents the
resources available for consumption at date t after taxes and newly acquired
government bonds are subtracted.
For now, we will assume the production technology employs only labor.
For simplicity, let the technology be a linear function of the quantity of labor
employed. Formally, yt = zt nt .
The government faces a budget constraint. We permit the government
to issue one-period bonds. At any date, the quantity of government bonds
can be either positive or negative. In each period, the governments budget
constraint is represented as
1. CONSUMERS
(1.2)
gt + (1 + rt ) bt = t + bt+1
23
f or t = 0, 1, 2, ...
bT
1
T
i=1 (1+ri )
that as the economy approaches a limit that is infinitely far into the future,
the present value of outstanding government bonds will be equal to zero.
The counterpart for consumers is that the present value of government
bonds, as one looks out infinitely far into the future, will also equal zero
because of the no-Ponzi condition. Formally, limT
sT
1
T
i=1 (1+ri )
= 0. For
the consumer, the intuition is borrowed from finite horizon problems. The
idea is essentially as follows: if the economy ends at date T , a consumer
would have no incentive to store goods at date T . Rather, the consumer
would gain utility from eating the consumption good since the marginal
utility of the consumption is positive for any finite quantity of the good.
With the no-Ponzi condition, it is possible to restate the sequence of
budget constraint into a single budget constraint. To do so, note that s1 =
c1 +s2
1+r1
w1 (1l1 ) 1
.
1+r1
c2 +s3
(1+r1 )(1+r2 )
w2 (1l2 ) 2
(1+r1 )(1+r2 )
24
2. INTERTEMPORAL MODELS
and so on. Because the limiting condition stipulates that the present value
of saving will equal zero, we can substitute for government bonds in the
consumers budget constraint, rewriting as
(1.3)
c0 +
X
t=1
X
ct
wt (1 lt ) t
=
w
(1
l
)
+
0
0
0
t
i=1 (1 + ri )
ti=1 (1 + ri )
t=1
where the consumers budget constraint says that the present value of
goods consumed equals the present value of after-tax resources paid to the
consumer. This representation of the budget constraint establishes a subtle
form of equivalence; that is, there is no dierence between the sequence of
budget constraints corresponding a markets meeting at each date t and the
charaxterization of an economy in which all markets meet at the beginning
of time and all goodspresent and futureare traded at that Arrow-Debreu
spot market. I am not suggesting that these perishable goods are literally
traded at date t = 0. Rather, it is equivalent to think of the date-0 market
as trading claims against future work and consumption goods.
The first-order conditions for the consumers constrained optimization
problem is represented as
(1.4)
t uc (t)
ti=1 (1
(1.5)
t ul (t)
wt
t
i=1 (1 + ri )
+ ri )
=0
for t = 1, 2, 3, ...
=0
f or t = 1, 2, 3, ...
(1.6)
uc (0) = 0
(1.7)
ul (0) w0 = 0
3. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
25
max (zt wt ) nt
nt
taking { t }
t=0 and {wt , rt+1 }t=0 as given;
get constraints;
26
2. INTERTEMPORAL MODELS
(4) markets for the consumption good, for labor, and for government
bonds clear.
By Walras Law we can eliminate one market. We choose the market for
the consumption good, leaving us with
st+1 = bt+1
f or t = 0, 1, 2, ...
1 lt = nt
f or t = 0, 1, 2, ...
and
So the basic intertemporal model can be written in either of two equivalent ways. The first way is to solve it as a sequence of markets each meeting
at a dierent point of time. Alternatively, each date market is a date good;
there is an infinite variety of goods available at one date. The trade can
occur in a spot market just as Arrow and Debreu and MacKenzie developed the model. The implication is that there is a complete set of ArrowDebreu markets for an infinite dimensional variety of goods. Moreover, we
have prices for these dierent goods; a date-t consumption good sells for
1
ti=1 (1+ri )
wt
ti=1 (1+ri )
units of
(3.1)
g0 +
X
t=1
X
gt
t
=
+
0
t
t
i=1 (1 + ri )
i=1 (1 + ri )
t=1
3. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
27
to any sequence of taxes that satisfies (3.1). In other words, taxes can rise
today and fall in the future, or vice versa and the equilibrium prices will be
the same. It further follows that consumers allocation and firms allocation
are also invariant to the timing of taxes. To illustrate the consumers invariance, substitute the government budget constraint into the consumers
intertemporal budget constraint, yielding
(3.2)
c0 +
X
t=1
X
ct
wt (1 lt ) gt
=
w
.
(1
l
)
g
+
0
0
0
t
ti=1 (1 + ri )
(1
+
r
)
i
i=1
t=1
Equation (3.2) indicates that the timing of taxes does not matter since
taxes do not enter into the expression.
This invariance is known as Ricardian Equivalence. For a given present
value of government purchases and taxes, the timing of the governments
actions do not aect the equilibrium allocations.
Ricardo mentioned to something like this in his analysis. An increase
in government spending today is oset by an increase in future taxes. If
the present value of government purchases is constant, this pattern has no
impact on consumption, labor supply, wages, or interest rates. The key
feature of this model is that there exist a complete set of markets on which
consumers trade. These complete set of markets rest on the notion that
taxes are nondistortionary, consumers are infinitely lived, private firms and
consumers can borrow or lend at the send interest rate (capital markets
are perfect), consumers and firms are identical in the sense that there is no
distributional eects associated with the government actions. In the next
chapter, we examine an economy in which consumers are not infinitely lived.
The upshot is that some consumers cannot trade with future consumers,
rendering markets incomplete.
Thus, one initial result is that if markets are complete, the timing of
consumption is invariant to movements in the nondistortionary taxes. The
consumer has access to markets that permit consumption smoothing. More
concretely, borrowing and lending markets are perfect so that in periods in
28
2. INTERTEMPORAL MODELS
which disposable income is low, the consumer can borrow and repay the
loan when disposable income is high.
4. Problems
(1) Consider the following representative agent model. There is a representative consumer with preferences given by the utility function
u (c, l), where c is the consumption good and l is leisure. Moreover,
the utility function has the properties that we assumed in class.
The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of time and
k0 units of capital. Let the production technology be given by
y = zf (k, n) where y is output, z is total factor productivity, k is
the capital input, n is the labor input. Assume that f (k, n) has
the properties we have assumed in class. Finally, the government
purchases g units of the consumption and finances these purchases
by imposing a lump-sum tax, denoted , on consumers.
a.: Determine the equilibrium eects of a change in government purchases on consumption, employment, the real wage, and output.
Assume that consumption and leisure are normal goods for the
representative consumer. Explain your results.
b.: Determine the equilibrium eects of a change in total factor productivity on consumption, employment, the real wage, and output.
Show that your results depend on income and substitution eects
and, where possible, determine the income and substitution eects.
Explain your results
2. Consider a representative agent model where the representative
consumer has preferences given by:
E0
X
t=0
4. PROBLEMS
29
CHAPTER 3
Overlapping generations
In this chapter, we develop an economic environment in which physical restrictions keep some markets from being available. The overlapping
generations economy is an environemtn in which agents are born and die.
The overlapping part comes from the fact that at any particular date, multiple generations coexist. For simplicity, we focus on an economy in which a
consumer lives for two periods. Thus, two generations are alive at any one
point in time. Here, market incompleteness owes to the physical inability
for agents born at date t to be unable to enter into a market trade with
consumers born at date t + 2 or later. More concretely, Abraham Lincoln
cannot trade with Michael Jordan. At least in the model economy populated
with infinitely-lived households, the decendents of Abraham Lincoln could
trade with Michael Jordan.
There is an infinite sequence of dates, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... The
physical environment initially focuses on the description of the factors of
production. We assume that the initial aggregate stock of capital is K0
and the economy is endowed with this quantity. The population follows a
simple path over time, growing geometrically. Let Lt denote the number of
consumers born at date t growth, then Lt = L0 (1 + n)t , where L0 denotes
the number of consumers at date t = 1 that live for only one period. We
refer to this group as the initial old.
Consumers born at date t 1 are endowed with one of productive
time when young and nothing when old. Here, young refers to the first
period of the consumers life and old refers to the second period of their life.
Preferences are such that consumers want to eat in both periods of their
31
32
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
life. Formally, U (c1t , c2t+1 ) where c1t is the quantity of goods consumed
when young and c2t+1 is the quantity of good consumed when old. Further,
we assume that M RS1,2 =
U (.,.)/c1
U (.,.)/c2
= as c1 0 and M RS1,2 = 0 as
(0.1)
The left-hand-side of equation (0.1) represents the total value of resources that are available for this economy, while the right-hand-side talleys
up the potential uses. In words, total output plus the value of the existing
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
33
(0.2)
c2t
1+n
max U (c1 , c2 )
c1 ,c2 ,k
s.t. f (k) nk = c1 +
c2
.
1+n
34
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
(0.3)
(0.4)
U1 (1 + n) U2 = 0
(0.5)
f 0 (k) n = 0
Equation (0.5) says that the marginal product of capital must equal
the economys net propulation growth rate. Equation (0.4) says that the
consumer is will substitute an infinitesmial amount of consumption when
young provided the utility lost is oset by the marginal utility of the extra
utility that can be gained by consuming when old. Because of the population
growth, every unit of the consumption good that is foregone at date t will
be transformed into 1 + n units of the date-t + 1 consumption good.
It is useful to make two points in order to ease intrepretation later. First,
the two first-order conditions for the planners problem can be rearranged,
yielding
(0.6)
U1
= 1 + n = 1 + f 0 (k)
U2
which says that the marginal rate of substitution for the two consumption goodsconsumption when young and consumption when old is equal for
all consumers. This condition is one of two necessary conditions for Pareto
optimality. Equation (0.6) further states that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Second, the allocation
that satisfies the first-order conditions is ecient in the sense that all resources are used in their most highly valued fashion, as consumption for
young or old and for investment. There is free disposal in this economy, but
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
35
max
U (c1t , c2t+1 )
(0.7)
s.t. c1t = wt st
(0.8)
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 ) st .
Note that each unit saved at date t yields 1 + rt+1 goods at date t + 1.
The consumer receives wages, wt units of the consumption good when young.
In a competitive market, the consumer takes w and r as given.We substitute for consumption when young and consumption when old, rewriting the
consumers program as an unconstrained maximization problem. Formally,
36
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
(0.9)
= 1 + rt+1 .
The firm seeks to maximize profits. Profits are written as the dierence
between sales of output produced and expenses, with the latter consisting
of wages and rental rates; formally
F (Kt , Lt ) wt Lt rt Kt .
With constant returns to scale, F (Kt , Lt ) = Lt f (kt ). We can rewrite
the profit function, after dividing by Lt , as
max f
kt
Kt
Lt
wt rt
Kt
Lt
(0.11)
f 0 (kt ) rt = 0
(0.12)
f (kt ) f 0 (kt ) kt wt = 0
Together, there are two first-order conditions. The first implies that
the marginal product of the capital-labor ratio equals the rental rate on
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
37
capital and the zero-profit condition implies that output minus the expense
on capital equals the wage rate.
With the ooptimizing conditions for the two market participants, we can
specify the following definition.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of quantities
{kt+1 , st }
t=0 and prices {wt , rt }t=0 such that: (i) consumer chooses st to
maximize utility; (ii) firm chooses kt to maximize profit; (iii) markets clear,
given k0 .
The market clearing conditions amount to ensuring that the supply of
capital is equal to the demand for capital. In the aggregate, we can write
Kt+1 Lt+1
Lt+1 Lt
(0.13)
where we substitute for wages and rental rates from the first-order conditions for the firms maximization problem. Given k0 , it is possible for
solve sequentially for the entire path of the capital-labor ratio. Once we
have the path for the capital-labor ratio, we can solve for the sequence of
wages and rental rates.1 With these prices, it is straightforward to solve for
saving, for consumption when young and consumption when old.2 Indeed,
1Note that the first-order dierence equation for capital is obtained by satisfying
termined by f 0 (kt ). Plug these values into the saving function, st = s (wt , rt+1 ), implying
that c1t = wt s (wt , rt+1 ) and c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 ) s (wt , rt+1 ).
38
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
the rental rate is determined by (0.11) and the wage rate by (0.12). With
the rental rate and wage rate, we compute the level of saving from (0.13).
Consumption when young and when old are determined by equations (0.7)
and (0.8), respectively. Thus, the equilibrium values are obtained.
Next, we turn to a comparison of the optimal allocations under the social
planners and the decentralized market ones. One comparison is with respect
to the first-order conditions depicting the trade-o between consumption
when young and consumption when old. Recall that the social planners
problem yielded
U1
U2
U1
U2
(0.14)
(0.15)
st =
wt .
1
kt
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
39
(1 + n) kt+1 =
(1 ) kt .
1
(1 + n) k =
We solve for k , obtaining
(0.17)
k =
(1 ) (k ) .
1
1+
(1 )
1+n
1
1
(1 + ) (1 + n)
r =
(1 )
and
(1 )
w = (1 )
(1 + ) (1 + n)
c1 =
w
1+
and
c2
= (1 + r )
1+
w .
Our first comparison is between the rental rate and the population
growth rate. In doing so, we are making a comparison between the allocations obtained in the decentralized economy and those obtained by the
40
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
(1+)(1+n)
(1)
i
, it is only a happy coincidence
that r = n. In general, this condition will not hold. Let ksp denote the
stationary value of the capital stock under the social planners program.
1
1 . In words, the long-run
For our setup, (ksp )1 = n, or ksp =
n
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
41
The purpose of the next extension is to describe a mechanism that permits transfers between the young and the old. In a lump-sum form, these
intergenerational transfers can eliminate the wedge between the marginal
rate of technical substitution and the rental rate determined in the competitive equilibrium. As such, the mechanism designed originally by Diamond
(1965), demonstrates a more general characteristic; there exists a mechanism that guarantees that restores the equality between the competitive
equilibrium allocations and those determined by the social planner.
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3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
In this setup, suppose the government issues bonds and collects taxes
in order to meets its principal and interest expenses. Taxes are lump-sum
payments made by young consumers. Formally, the government budget
constraint is
Bt+1 + Tt = (1 + rt ) Bt
where Tt = t Lt . To represent the government budget constraint in
per-young-consumer terms, we divide by Lt to get
b + t =
(0.18)
1 + rt
b
1+n
After collecting terms and rearranging to solve for the tax, we get
(0.19)
t =
rt n
1+n
b.
taking wages, the real interest rate and taxes as given. The first-order
condition yields a saving function that is written as st = s (wt t , rt+1 ).
Thus, the market clearing condition in the asset market is (in per-youngperson terms): kt+1 (1 + n) + b = s (wt t , rt+1 ), where the left hand side
is interpreted as the supply of asset and the right hand side is the demand.
Because government bonds and capital are perfect substitutes, we do not
need to distinguish between the two on the demand side of the marketclearing expression.
We can further substitute for equilibrium values of wages, the rental and
lump-sum taxes, representing the market-clearing expression as
f (kt ) n
(0.20) kt+1 (1 + n) + b = s f (kt ) f 0 (kt ) kt
b, f 0 (kt+1 )
1+n
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
43
f [k (b)] n
0
k (b) (1 + n)+b = s f [k (b)] f [k (b)] k (b)
b, f [k (b)]
1+n
f [k (b)] n
0
b, f [k (b)]
b = k (b) (1 + n)+s f [k (b)] f [k (b)] k (b)
1+n
(b)]n
that t = f [k1+n
b from equation (0.19). It follows immediately that
lump-sum taxes will equal zero since the numerator of this expression vanishes.
Second, there is an intergenerational transfer operating. By assumption, b is a constant that is interpreted as the quantity of bonds issued per
young consumer. Thus, the aggregate quantity of bonds must grow at the
same rate as the population grows. If b > 0, there is a transfer of goods
44
3. OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
1. Problems
(1) Consider the Diamond economy.
a. Verify that function k (b) is a continuous function in the bond-peryoung-consumer ratio.
1. PROBLEMS
45
b. Derive the derviative of the function k (b) with respect to the bondper-young-consumer ratio. State sucient conditions under which
the derivative is increasing; that is, k 0 (b) > 0.