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In the Matter of Attorney Lope E. Adriano, Member of the Philippine Bar.

People of the Philippines vs Remigio Estebia
(February 27, 1969, G.R. No. L-26868)

Facts: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of
Samar and was sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. On December, Lope
Adriano was appointed as Estebias counsel de oficio when his case came up
before the Supreme Court on review. Adriano was required to prepare and file his
brief within 30 days from notice. On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought a 30-day
extention to file appellants brief in mimeograph form. On February 18, Adriano
again moved for a 20-day extension. A third extension was filed on March 8 for
15 days. On March 27 Adriano filed for another 15-day extension and on April 11
he moved for a last extension of ten days. However, on April 21 he sought a
special extension of five days. All of these motions for extension were granted by
the Court and the brief was due on April 26, 1967. However, no brief was filed.
For failing to comply, the Supreme Court resolved to impose upon Adriano a fine
of P500 with a warning that a more drastic disciplinary action will be taken
against him upon further non-compliance. On December 5, 1968, Adriano was
ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law
for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as attorney. A resolution
was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968 however Adriano ignored
the said resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E. Adriano as member of the bar
deserve disciplinary action.
Held: Yes, by specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to
employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so
assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for
an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always
exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And
yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment,
and December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court,
more than sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare and file his brief de
oficio.
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in
his motions for extension have gone down to the level of empty and meaningless
words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.

Adrianos pattern of conduct reveals a propensity to benumb appreciation of his

obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be
accorded this Court.
For the reasons given Attorney Lope E. Adriano was suspended from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.

PEOPLE vs. ROSQUETA (55 SCRA 486) Legal Ethics Duty of Counsel to
His Client Failure of Client to Raise Funds for Appeal
FACTS:
Rosqueta Jr and two others were convicted of a crime. They appeal their
conviction until it reached the Supreme Court. Their lawyer (counsel de parte),
Atty. Gregorio Estacio, failed to file their Brief. The Supreme Court ordered Atty.
Estacio to show a cause as to why he should not be disciplined for failure to file
said brief. Atty. Estacio failed yet again to submit his explanation. The Supreme
Court then suspended him from the practice of law except for the purpose of
filing the Brief in this particular case. Atty. Estacio then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration where he explained that he did actually prepare an explanation
the same being left with Rosqueta Sr (father of accused) for the latter to mail it.
But then Rosqueta Sr.s house burned down together with the explanation. He
only came to know of this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Atty. Estacio also explained that his clients are withdrawing their appeal by
reason of their failure to raise the needed fund for the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Estacios suspension should continue.
HELD:
No. His liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court noted that Atty. Estacio has
been irresponsible, has been negligent and inattentive to his duty to his clients.
Atty. Estacio should be aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is
unable to secure from his clients or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his
connection with the case. He should be aware that in the pursuance of the duty
owed this Court as well as to a client; he cannot be too casual and unconcerned
about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must
see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is
inexcusable

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Macoco vs. Diaz 70 Phil 97 (1940)
1. ATTORNEY AT LAW; MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; MALPRACTICE; HOLDING
OF RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICE AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE;
DISBARMENT. Whatever might have been the agreement and with
whomsoever respondent might have entered it into, the undeniable fact remains
that he misappropriated the money in breach of trust. This makes him unfit for
the office of an attorney-at-law. And his being a deputy fiscal and not a law
practitioner at the time of the misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt,
aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

A complaint for malpractice filed by one Marcelino Macoco against Esteban B.

Diaz, attorney-at-law, with license to practice in Philippine courts, in order to
redeem a property belonging to his wife's father, which had been levied upon
sold at public auction, complainant Marcelino Macoco deposited with the
provincial sheriff of Ilocos Norte the sum of P380. As no redemption could be
done, the money was returned by the sheriff to one Alberto Suguitan, then
counsel for Marcelino Macoco. Suguitan used the money according to himself and
failed to turn it over to Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrusted its collection to
respondent herein, Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in collecting
P300 from Suguitan, but he also misappropriated this amount. Respondent
admitted the misappropriation. He averred, however, that he had an agreement
with Macoco for the payment of the money by him misappropriated; that when
this agreement failed, he again entered into a similar arrangement with
Hermenegildo Galapia, Lope Ragragola and Pedro Ragragola, who, as he
attempted to prove, were the persons to whom the sum of P300 was really due,
Macoco being merely a trustee thereof; and that in pursuance of this
arrangement whereby he would pay the sum of P300, deducting there from 20
per cent for his attorney's fees, he had already made partial payments to said
persons. Macoco, however, and Lope Ragragola denied this agreement. Whatever
might have been the agreement and with whomsoever respondent might have
entered it into, the undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in
breach of trust. This makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-at-law. And his
being a deputy fiscal and not law practitioner at the time of the misappropriation,
far from mitigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Wherefore,
respondent Esteban B. Diaz is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and is
hereby ordered to surrender his certificate to the clerk of court within five days
from notice. This Solicitor General is hereby ordered to investigate the conduct of
Attorney Alberto Suguitan and files later the corresponding report.

Pimentel Jr. vs. Llorente and Salayon, A.C. No. 4690, August 29, 2000,
339 SCRA 154
Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente
and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation
of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members
of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then
election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated
chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig
City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now
a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.
Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents
tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for
particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of
votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative
complaint for their disbarment. Respondents denied the allegations against them.
They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing
committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They
claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
Issue: Whether the respondents are held guilty of misconduct.
Held: YES. A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here,
by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of
Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no
falsehood. It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service,
respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the
profession because a public office is a public trust.
Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal
profession, in general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct
in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the
ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have
merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first

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administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public
service. Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00
for each of the respondents should be sufficient and issued a stern warning that
similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:

1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial

difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating
it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks
assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General
Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of
Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta
marami sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration
on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented
the respondents.
1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his
participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of
the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan
group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Mendoza did not take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central
Bank. And Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory
period since he retired in 1986.
Issue:
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito
Mendoza
Held:
No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank.

This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from
the matter involved in the PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.
The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and
important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered
insubstantial.
SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the
motion to disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases
against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate
Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03
will make it harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work
for them because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were
related to ones work as a government counsel.
Concurring Opinions:
Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should
have a prescriptive period
Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was
Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03 yet)
Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and if applied retroactively
Notes:
Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related
to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with the government and
the interests of the current and former are adverse
Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a
misnomer, it does not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from
representing a private person even if the interests of the former government
client and the new client are entirely parallel
Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party
Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others

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Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others
in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty.
Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as
partial fulfillment of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however,
never told his clients of the amount he had received and never remitted the same
to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his coplaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act
amounted to serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment
in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such
right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money
intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in
litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in
dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for
1 year.

In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs.

Severino G. Martinez
FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to
the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the
information in his application for such Bar Examination. Upon further
investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and
neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College
in 1941. Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US
army, and took the General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is
equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for
such claim from any proper school officials. The claim was doubtful, however, the
second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degree from
Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and asserts
that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still
unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the
University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second

semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar,
as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education
(AA) as required by the Department of Private Education
Issue: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be disbarred
Ruling: Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by
falsifying information. Admission under false pretenses thus give grounds for
revoking his admission in the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only
requirement to become an attorney at law.
Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is
required to return his law diploma within thirty days.

Reyes vs. Wong

63 SCRA 667 Legal Ethics Grossly immoral Act
FACTS:
Reyes and Wong were classmates in the college of law at MLQ University in 1960.
Wong and Reyes became sweethearts. Later on, Wong requested Reyes to fill out
an application for a marriage license which the latter did. Later on still, Wong
requested Reyes to sign a marriage contract, and the marriage contract made it
also appear that their solemnizing officer was a Supreme Court justice.
Apparently, Reyes believed that shes already married to Wong by virtue of those
papers she was made to sign. So she gave in to Wongs request to have sexual
intercourse in hotels. Reyes became pregnant twice and she gave birth to two
daughters.
Eventually, Wong became a lawyer while Reyes was still in the college of law.
Wongs engagements as a lawyer kept the couple apart. But later on, Reyes
found out that Wong got married somewhere. This also led to her discovery that
her marriage with Wong was not registered. She now comes before the Supreme
Court asking for Wongs disbarment on the ground of grave immorality.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong should be disbarred.
HELD: No. The acts imputed against him may constitute immorality for surely,
cohabitation is immoral for lack of marriage. But the same is not sufficient to
disbar him for in order for such result to take place, the act complained of must
not merely be immoral; it must be grossly immoral it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. And the same must be established by clear and convincing

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proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the
Court of its disciplinary power. In the case at bar, its highly impossible that
Reyes actually believed that shes married to Wong. Shes a law student and as
early as the first year of law studies, the essential requisites of marriage is
discussed. She could have not believed that there was a valid marriage
considering that no celebration actually took place plus other infirmities in the
alleged marriage. Further, the Supreme Court said:
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, is neither so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.

ROYONG VS. OBLENA

AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member
of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an
investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge
between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other
misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with
Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old
Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court
render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer
and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrant disbarment
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice
of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or

disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for
disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may
justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed, An applicant for license to practice law is
required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles,
and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status,
did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his
immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
member of the bar.

Bolivar vs. Simbol

[A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966.]
FACTS: Concepcion Bolivar lived with and financially supported Abelardo Simbol y
Manuel in his studying for law school and other personal necessities since he
promised marriage to Bolivar. But as soon as Simbol finished his studies he
married another woman while keeping it a secret from Bolivar and continuing to
get money from her. But when Bolivar found his secret, Simbol still tried to ask
money from her and persuade her to continue their relationship. This prompted
Bolivar to file a Civil Case of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court against
Simbol but this did not prosper since Atty. Simbol and Miss Concepcion had
executed a compromise agreement.
But the Sol Gen filed for disbarment
proceedings on moral grounds against Atty. Simbol. So, on October 31, 1963,
the Clerk of Court sent a mail to respondent thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro, his
counsel of record, a letter with a copy of the foregoing complaint. Atty. Castro
replied that after the execution of the compromise agreement between Bolivar
and Atty. Simbol, he no longer heard from Atty. Simbol. He further stated that
he tried to get in touch with the respondent but was unable to do so and he
requested that copy of the complaint be sent directly to said respondents
address. So the Court did as what was requested but the letter returned with the
notation on the envelope that said respondent was no longer in that city. At the

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hearing set by the Court on February 3, 1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and
Atty. Tomas Yumul for complainant appeared and they submitted the case for
decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for respondent.

ROSARIO DELOS REYES vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR

(A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989)
FACTS:

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case against Atty. Simbol can prosper even though he did
not respond to the letter of the Solicitor General.
2. Whether or not Atty. Simbol is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" under
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

RULING:
1. Under Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states that Attorneys
has to be heard before removal or suspension. But if upon reasonable notice he
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine
the matter. In view of this rule, respondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession was at stake. He
could ill-afford to just stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate.
He was hidebound by his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts.
Furthermore, notice of hearing was sent to him at both his Manila and
Dumaguete addresses and he did not bother to get it from the post-office. Even
his two attorneys of record, who received said notice, did not appear before this
Court. On the face these facts, respondent gave the Court ample reason to
believe that he purposely stayed away and waived his right to be heard.
Therefore, the case can prosper.
2. Respondent's acts of making a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and
allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as
he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her
to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his immoral
acts, are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The fact
that complainant has withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not wipe
out the grievous offense he had committed. Respondent "has failed to maintain
the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
Therefore, he is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern

University in which respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of
Medicine. Complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent for three
days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat of
respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in
all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern. After due
investigation, the Solicitor General found the respondent guilty of gross immoral
conduct and recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having
gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man, with children, a rich man and is not practicing his profession before the
court, he should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than
three (3) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper
HELD: NO.
The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a
lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence
of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue
in the practice of law.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, among others,
by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken
advantage of his position in asking complainant to go with him under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED