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d portion of the prison term was remitted "on the condition that he shall not ag
ain violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Subsequently, the widow o
f deceased Samaco filed a complaint praying that respondent Atty. Gutierrez be r
emoved from the roll of lawyers. Respondent Atty. Gutierrez admitted the facts a
lleged by the complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the con
ditional pardon in defense.
Issue: Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent Atty. Gutier
rez places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment.
Held: No. A lawyer is bound to uphold the laws. He may be removed or suspended f
rom his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the rule that pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted applies only where the pardon is abs
olute.
In the case at bar, since the crime of murder done by respondent
Atty. Gutierrez involves moral turpitude and the pardon granted to him was only
a conditional pardon, he was therefore ordered disbarred and his name stricken
from the roll of lawyers.
38) Oronce v. CA, 298 SCRA 133 (1998) De Ello
Oronce v. CA
G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998;
DE ELLO
J. Romero;
Digested by P.E.
Facts: A motion to cite in contempt of court was filed against petitioner Rosita
L. Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano. Rosita is one of th
e petitioners in this case involving a parcel of land, the ownership of which is
the issue in the MTC. The Private respondent in the lower court is Priciliano B
. Gonzales Development Corporation.
This was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at th
e contested property, deriving his right to do so from private respondent corpor
ation Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation that is owned by his family
. Dr. Tadeo Gonzales alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano a
nd her husband entered the property through craftiness and intimidation:
At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate. When
the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians tentatively, th
e two men told him that they would like to visit Gonzales mother who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened t
he gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gon
zales went outside the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) t
rucks entering the driveway. The person he asked regarding the presence of those
people inside the property turned out to be the brother of petitioner Flaminian
o. That person said, Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo an
g dapat sa labas. After Gonzales had told him that the property was still under l
itigation before this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court
Supreme Court. When
Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to order the
people to leave, she said, Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay a
ko ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap. When a power gener
ator was brought inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out b
ecause the noise it would create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonza
les, petitioner Flaminiano said, Walang awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano butted i
n and, referring to Gonzales mother, said, Ialis mo na, matanda na pala.
When Gonz
ales prevented the switching on of some lights in the house due to faulty wiring
, Atty. Flaminiano suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo
5 million, madali lang yan. Short circuit.
Since the Flaminianos and their crew w
ere not about to leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Anton
housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operation
s of the sugarcane farm For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the up
per floor of the house there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner
moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered var
ious ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August,
1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of
the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over fou
r months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confi
ned for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from Dec
ember, 1983 to January, 1984. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesse
s, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued
to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private r
espondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written de
mands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apo
lonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for
the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon. Petiti
oner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission against p
rivate respondent for illegal dismissal. The case was specially unique as it inv
olved a father and his only son whose relations became sour. Respondent Father a
lleges that there was abandonment on the part of his son. NLRC dismissed the pet
ition on ground of abandonment. MRs were denied.
ISSUE: WON the respective counsels of the parties failed to encourage their clie
nts to avoid litigation?
HELD: The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the r
ecords, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well
be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with z
eal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It
is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reas
onable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and espec
ially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between t
heir clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is n
ot only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising sett
lement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic e
xploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator fo
r concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicali
ty in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(
a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if
it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel he
rein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as off
icers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate ste
ps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrar
y, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the sit
uation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their re
spective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable
case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mand
ating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlem
ent of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controve
rsy are barren of any reflection of the same.
40) Pajares v. Abad Santos, 30 SCRA 748 (1969) Emas
Gloria Pajares vs. Judge Estrella Abad Santos and Udharam Bazar & Co.
30 SCRA 748, November 29, 1969
Ponente: Teehankee, J.
FACTS: In 1961, Pajares ordered from Udharam Bazar quantities of ready-made good
s which were delivered to her in good condition and some were already sold, but
she did not make the full payment. She was sued before the Municipal Court of Ma
nila for recovery of a certain sum of money because of her indebtedness in the a
mount of Php 354.85. Instead of answering the complaint against her, Pajares, ho
wever, moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require Udh
aram Bazar to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the
said company, the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were receiv
ed as well as their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would n
ot be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint. The motion, and the motio
n for reconsideration was denied, she then brought the incident on certiorari to
the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her petition that
in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion. It was again denied so Pajares undertook the present
appeal to the SC, contending under her lone assignment of error to maintain her
appeal, that the lower court erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari wit
h preliminary injunction. The simple collection case dragged on for seven (7) ye
ars.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant s lawyer properly performed his duty to society
HELD: NO. It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse
of discretion, was committed by respondent judge in denying appellant's motion f
or a bill of particulars. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed
appellant of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action ag
ainst her, in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
It was therefore improper for Pajares, through her counsel, to insist on her mot
ion that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein
in detail the goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the da
tes and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amoun
t due on each such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars so
ught all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule
12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definit
e statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive
pleading or to prepare for trial."
The simple collection case needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven y
ears. Had Pajares been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment
and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing
fees in the CFI, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, pri
nting of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been much more th
an sufficient to pay off her just debt to Udharam Bazar. Yet, here she still rem
ains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having
spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause
.
The SC declared that the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed
so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be a
voided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules
of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certifi
cate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
The order appealed from was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and petitioner-appell
ant's counsel was ordered to pay the treble costs in all instances. The decision
was noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in th
e Supreme Court for future reference.
Tria. FESC subsequently filed its petition on September 26, 1997 this time beari
ng verification and certification against forum shopping executed by Teodoro Lop
es on September 24, 1997. The petition filed by MPA in Gr.no. 130150 then pendin
g in the third division was duly filed on august 29, 1997 with a copy furnished
on the same day to FESC. Thus, the Court concluded that when FESC filed its peti
tion in Gr no. 130068 on September 26, 1997, it would already have received a c
opy of the former and would then have knowledge of the pendency of the other pet
ition in other division. For failure to make such disclosure, it would appear th
at the certification against forum shopping is defective.
ISSUE: whether or not the counsels are guilty of forum shopping.
HELD: YES. Even assuming that FESC has not yet received its copy of MPA's petiti
on at the time it filed its own petition and executed said certification, its si
gnatory did state "that if I should thereafter learn that a similar action or pr
oceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of App
eals or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the fact within five
(5) days therefrom in this Honorable Court." Scouring the records page by page
in this case, we find that no manifestation concordant with such undertaking was
then or at any other time thereafter ever filed by FESC nor was there any attem
pt to bring such matter to the attention of the Court. Moreover, it cannot feig
n non-knowledge of the existence of such other petition because FESC itself file
d the motion for consolidation in G.R. No. 130150 of these two cases on April 24
, 1998.
It is disturbing to note that counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and
Del Rosario, displays an unprofessional tendency of taking the Rules for granted
, in this instance exemplified by its pro forma compliance therewith but apparen
tly without full comprehension of and with less than faithful commitment to its
undertakings to this Court in the interest of just, speedy and orderly administr
ation of court proceedings.
As between the lawyer and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good fa
ith to the court. He is an officer of the court exercising a privilege which is
indispensable in the administration of justice. Candidness, especially towards t
he courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts a
re entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them.Candor in all dealings is the very essence of honorable membership i
n the legal profession More specifically, a lawyer is obliged to observe the rul
es of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice It behooves
a lawyer, therefore, to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist i
n the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Being an officer of the co
urt, a lawyer has a responsibility in the proper administration of justice. Lik
e the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends -- the speedy, effic
ient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt sa
tisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objec
tives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task o
f assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
This undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required p
leadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the tax-paying public and can only
be categorized as censurable inefficiency on the part of the government law off
ice. This is most certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG.
Another thing that baffles the Court is why the OSG did not take the initiative
of filing a motion for consolidation in either G.R. No. 130068 or G.R. No. 1301
50, considering its familiarity with the background of the case and if only to m
ake its job easier by having to prepare and file only one comment. It could not
have been unaware of the pendency of one or the other petition because, being c
ounsel for respondent in both cases, petitioner is required to furnish it with a
copy of the petition under pain of dismissal of the petition for failure otherw
ise
We find here a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of the OSG in
the handling of its cases and an almost reflexive propensity to move for countle
ss extensions, as if to test the patience of the Court, before favoring it with
the timely submission of required pleadings.
It must be emphasized that the Court can resolve cases only as fast as the respe
ctive parties in a case file the necessary pleadings. The OSG, be needlessly ex
tending the pendency of these cases through its numerous motions for extension,
came very close to exhausting this Court's forbearance and has regrettably falle
n short of its duties as the People's Tribune.
The OSG is reminded that just like other members of the Bar, the canons under th
e Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal force on lawyers in gover
nment service in the discharge of their official tasks.These ethical duties are
rendered even more exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they have
the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard o
f ethics in public service. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part o
f the government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its duties with the highe
st degree of professionalism, intelligence and skill and to extend prompt, court
eous and adequate service to the public
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its
associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition o
f the same or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the R
ules shall be dealt with more severely.
The original members of the legal team of the Office of the Solicitor General as
signed to this case, namely, Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. Del Rosario an
d Solicitor Luis F. Simon, are ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the sa
me or similar acts of unduly delaying proceedings due to delayed filing of requi
red pleadings shall also be dealt with more stringently.
the manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D which indicated that Jose was ac
tually appointed as PC agent during the year 1968 of the Pampanga Constabulary c
ommand. The Solicitor General then concede to a new trial. The court then bends
the rules of procedure and allowed the re-trial of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the Solicitor General is correct in informing the court of
its findings despite the fact that the court did not order it to do so.
Held: Yes. The SC commended the Solicitor General and his Staff for their effort
in researching the case and informing the court of their findings. A prosecutin
g officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shal
l be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt s
hall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565, quoting Ju
stice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No
. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice wi
ll best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.
ner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law.
Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar s Bakery in
the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Met
ropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from suc
h isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counse
l while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the R
ules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosp
er.
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be
decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the So
licitor General.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot pro
sper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decid
ed in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this
wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only w
here there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and ha
s performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." Th
e Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.
Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still i
t would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appea
rances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertain
ed that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public tr
ust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only
to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated bu
t also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest,
is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuation
s as a member of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts
and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but a
lso for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable pr
ofession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.
50) PCGG v.Sandiganbayan and Mendoza, G.R. No. 151809-12, April 12, 2005 Rojas
FACTS: On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of
then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Phi
lippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, r
estitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, then President
Ferdinand E.Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the
Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Se
cond Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of seques
tration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President
Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petit
ions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullif
y the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comment
s thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) f
or proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represent
ed by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor Gener
al from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos. The P
CGG opined that Atty. Mendoza s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan,
et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking
Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscri
bing former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connect
ion with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for res
pondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction emb
odied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of mat
ter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention m
ade by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in
its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specif
ic party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting governmen
t or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law. Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor Genera
l involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed wit
h the said bank s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation wit
h the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as dayl
ight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agen
cy procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are ac
ts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. It
goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility c
annot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solic
itor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different fr
om the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied b
y the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be con
sidered as innocuous such as xxx drafting, enforcing or interpreting government o
r agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
. The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it ha
s to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza
in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 w
as not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion cau
ses the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individu
al lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawy
er must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. Th
e Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading
of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. T
he case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occup
ied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Sol
icitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the in
nocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend off
icials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the indepe
ndence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the cong
ruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility sho
uld be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, the
y are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor
General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, an
d (2) the bid to, disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time
whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.