-------------------------------------------------------

(C) by Carlyle A. Thayer

SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:   

THE THIRD INDOCHINA WAR 

[Paper delivered to Conference on “Security and Arms

Control in the North Pacific,” co-sponsored by the
Peace Research Centre, Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre and the Department of International Relations,
Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian
National University, Canberra, A.C.T., August 12-14,
1987]

Carlyle A. Thayer

Introduction 

The current on-going armed conflict between Vietnam and

the guerilla forces of the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK]1 has been dubbed the Third
Indochina War by academic analysts. It is
conventionally dated from December 1978 when Vietnamese
military forces launched an all out invasion and
occupation of Democratic Kampuchea. In February-March
1979, in retaliation for Vietnam's assault on its ally,
the People's Republic of China [PRC] launched a massive
attack on Vietnam's six northern border provinces. For
the past eight years, neighbouring states grouped in
the six-member Association of South East Asian Nations
[ASEAN]2 have termed Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea
as the greatest security threat to the region. As
recently as June 15, 1987, for example, Singapore's
Prime Minister termed the Kampuchean issue "ASEAN's
major security problem."3

The Third Indochina War may be described best as a low

intensity conflict. It is being waged on two fronts,
along Vietnam's border with China, and along the Thai
frontier with, and in the interior of, Cambodia. A
  2 

review of the salient military actions since the crisis

period of 1978-79, indicates that the various
protagonists have deliberately kept the fighting
limited, that the conflict itself is unlikely to
escalate dramatically, and that the direct military
intervention by external powers is improbable. Thus,
the Third Indochina War has evolved into essentially a
stable bilateral conflict between China and Vietnam.
While Thailand's physical security is directly
threatened by artillery shelling and Vietnamese
military intrusions, it can hardly be said in 1987 that
the conflict in Kampuchea is the region's main security
concern.4 The main security problem facing Southeast
Asia is the political stability of the Philippines,
the growing Communist insurgency there, and the future
of U.S. military bases and facilities at Subic Bay and
Clark Air Force Base.

This paper provides a political-military assessment of

the Third Indochina War in two parts. The first
section examines briefly Vietnamese security
perceptions. It is then followed by an analysis of the
Sino-Vietnamese border war.

1.  Vietnam's Security Perceptions 

One widespread and commonly held view of Vietnam is

that its Communist leaders are attempting to fulfill an
age-old dream of their party's founder, Ho Chi Minh, to
create an "Indochinese Federation" embracing the three
states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The evidence
advanced to support this view rests, in part, on the
fact that Ho Chi Minh founded the Indochinese Communist
Party, that party documents have called for the
formation of an Indochinese Federation, and that Ho Chi
Minh's "Last Will and Testament" repeated the call for
the formation of such a federation. Other more extreme
views maintain that Vietnam seeks to annex Thailand's
seventeen northeastern provinces as well,5 if not also
foment revolution throughout the region with the
ultimate aim of creating a "Union of the Socialist
States of Southeast Asia".6
  3 

The historical record sheds a different light on this

matter. Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnam Communist
Party in February 1930. This party changed its name in
October of that year to Indochinese Communist Party at
the explicit direction of the Communist International
in Moscow. As Nayan Chanda correctly points out,
recent research has demonstrated that in the 1930s the
Vietnamese Communists had little interest in promoting
revolution in Laos and Cambodia.7 The formation of the
Indochinese Communist Party, instigated from without,
cannot be cited as evidence that Vietnamese
revolutionary leaders held plans for a grand federation
at that time.

An examination of the historical record also reveals

that the notion of an Indochina-wide federation, on a
voluntary basis, was only mentioned fleetingly in party
documents in the mid-1930s and early 1940s. It was
dropped in 1951 at the party's Second Congress when the
Indochinese Communist Party was dissolved. There is no
mention of the idea of an Indochinese Federation
subsequently, or in Ho Chi Minh's 1969 "Last Will and
Testament". One comprehensive review of Vietnamese
policy statements on this subject concludes:

removed from its historical setting, the concept

of 'Indochinese federation' has assumed an
unintended connotation. Ambiguity and incomplete
documentation surrounding the origins of the
concept compounds this dilemma. Consequently, the
usage of 'Indochinese federation' to explain
recent developments in Southeast Asia infers
biases which merit careful attention. When these
deficiencies of context and ambiguity are ignored,
the consequence emerges that Vietnamese actions in
Indochina are potentially being interpreted within
a limited spectrum of possible Vietnamese
intentions.8

The notion that Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam form a

distinct sub-region, called Indochina, is a product of
the colonial era and can be traced directly to the
formation of a French Union linking these three
countries. As a consequence, Vietnamese
  4 

revolutionaries devised their anti-colonial strategy on

a regional, Indochina-wide, scale. As early as 1950,
General Vo Nguyen Giap wrote:

Indochina is a single strategic unit, a single

battlefield. For this reason, and especially
because of the strategic terrain, we cannot
consider Vietnam to be independent so long as
Cambodia and Laos are under imperialist
domination, just as we cannot consider Cambodia
and Laos to be independent so long as Vietnam is
under imperialist rule. The colonialists used
Cambodia to attack Vietnam [in 1947].9

This view, that Indochina constitutes a "strategic

unit, a single battlefield" remains very much in the
minds of Vietnamese leaders today as a result of
subsequent historical events. Vietnamese officials
claim that their opponents - the French, Japanese,
Americans and Chinese - have also viewed Indochina as a
strategic unit in their efforts to suppress the
Vietnamese revolution. However, since the Communist
victories of 1975, the relationship between the three
states has been transformed into a "regional strategic
alliance" which is part of the Soviet Union's global
network of alliances. The late Senior General Hoang
Van Thai has written, for example:

We, the Vietnamese Communists, clearly understand

that the Vietnam-Laos-Kampuchea solidarity bloc is
a regional alliance that is part of the
international alliance of member countries of the
socialist community of which the Soviet Union is
the pillar.10

Finally, on this point, in perhaps one of the most

significant articles on Vietnamese military strategy in
Cambodia, then Col. Gen. Le Duc Anh, has written:

First, there is the view that Indochina is a

single battlefield, the view that a strategic,
militant alliance among the three countries of
Indochina is a law in the survival and development
of each country as well as all three countries....
  5 

Today, the path of building and defending the

country must also be the path of special
solidarity, or close strategic and militant
alliance among the three countries, the three
nations under a common plan for coordinating their
strategy....

Giving full expression to the view that 'Indochina

is a single battlefield' also means respecting one
another's independence and sovereignty and
overcoming all big country nationalist thinking as
well as narrow-minded nationalist thinking while
being extremely vigilant against and taking
determined steps to thwart the plans and tactics
of the enemy to undermine the solidarity of the
three countries of Indochina, to divide Vietnam
and Cambodia.11

Under the terms of a "Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation" signed with the Lao People's Democratic
Republic [LPDR], in July 1977, both signatories pledged
themselves:

to wholeheartedly support and assist each other

and carry out a close co-operation aimed at
reinforcing the defence capacity, preserving the
independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity... [of each party] against all schemes
and acts of sabotage by imperialism and foreign
reactionary forces.12

A similar article in the treaty between Vietnam and the

People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], signed in
February 1979, states:

On the principle that national defence and

construction are the cause of each people, the two
Parties undertake to wholeheartedly support and
assist each other in all domains and in all
necessary forms...13

Since the signing of these treaties, the pattern of

interaction between Vietnam and its neighbours on the
political-military level has not taken on the trappings
of a formal "Indochina federation", in which the powers
  6 

of the states involved have been given up to some

higher central authority. Neither have the three states
moved, in constitutional terms, to create a
confederation, that is, a form of cooperation in which
a central authority is dependent on the component units
(to the point where its acts may be constrained by
them).

The term alliance (an agreement to cooperate in the

military defence of common interests), while it implies
a form of cooperation considerably less tight than
federation or confederation, captures only some aspects
of Vietnam's extensive and intensive relations with
Laos and Kampuchea. These include party-to-party
relations, coordination of foreign policy, and various
forms of economic cooperation bordering on the initial
phases of economic integration. Vietnam employs terms
such as "solidarity bloc" and "special relations" to
describe these relationships. In light of the military
dimension just discussed, perhaps the term "regional
security community" is more appropriate.

2.  The Sino‐Vietnamese Border War 

Since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, the military

situation along the frontier dividing these two
countries has stabilised. Since at least 1980,
Vietnamese leaders have concluded that they no longer
face the imminent possibility of a "second lesson".14
Low-level, seemingly random, incidents occur almost
daily. These sorts of occurrences stand in marked
contrast to the major flare-ups which occur annually
and which are orchestrated by both sides to serve
propaganda and political ends. In this section, it
will be argued that the Sino-Vietnamese conflict has
evolved into a kind of "phony war" which has been kept
limited by the protagonists. Since 1979, the intensity
of the border conflict has been regulated mainly by
China. Major flare-ups on the border have been
provoked to serve foreign policy objectives elsewhere
in the Asian region and have little to do with the
actual military situation along the border.

Apart from the Cambodian issue, there are no directly

  7 

conflicting national interests between China and

Vietnam which would necessitate this state of
hostility. For example, when China invaded Vietnam in
1979, Beijing claimed that it was launching a
"counterattack in self-defence" in order to pacify the
border area, which had been in turmoil since 1977, so
that Chinese inhabitants could resume a normal life.
The weight of evidence suggests, however, that China
had other, more important, objectives. In the short-
term, China sought to relieve pressure on the Khmer
Rouge forces along the Thai-Cambodia border by
diverting and tying down Vietnamese forces on a second
front. Chinese objectives also included: "teaching
Vietnam a lesson" for its regional pretensions, and
"punishing" Vietnam for having invaded a Chinese ally;
demonstrating that China, rather than the Soviet Union,
was a reliable ally; demonstrating China's military
prowess by reasserting the traditional Chinese
prerogative of "chastising the barbarians" within
China's sphere of influence; and testing and evaluating
the People's Liberation Army in actual combat.15

Over the past eight years, there has never been an

occasion which threatened to reach the intensity of the
border war fought in February-March 1979. At that
time, a task force composed of eight army corps (of 20
divisions) and support units, totaling 300,000, was
assembled in southern China. They were equipped with
1,000 tanks, at least 1,500 artillery pieces and nearly
1,000 aircraft. At the height of the fighting,
approximately 80,000 People's Liberation Army [PLA]
regulars entered Vietnam's six northern provinces in
strength. The majority were committed to the successful
attack on Lang Son, a provincial town. After its fall,
the Chinese declared that their objectives had been
attained, and they proceeded to withdraw. According to
one assessment, "(a)ll told, at least 30,000 V[P]A
(Vietnam People's Army) and PLA men died between
February 17 and March 15. Total dead and wounded on
both sides, including civilians, certainly exceeded
75,000."16 Wu Xiuquan, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff,
admitted that the PLA had suffered 20,000 casualties of
whom less than half were killed.17

Since 1979, there have been at least six major flare-

  8 

ups on the border [July 1980, May 1981, April 1983,

April 1984, June 1985 and December 1986/January 1987],
all of which have been provoked or orchestrated by
China to serve broader foreign policy objectives. Each
of these case studies has been selected because it was
described by military observers at the time as "being
the most serious incident since 1979" or the most
serious incident since the previous one. Each of these
major flare-ups will be examined below.

Case Study One:  The Shelling of Cao Bang, July 1980 
During the first six months of 1980, both China and
Vietnam reported an increasing number of border
incidents. In early July, both sides exchanged notes
protesting the others' actions. On July 4th, for
example, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry charged that
Chinese artillery had heavily shelled Vietnamese
territory on several occasions since June 28th, killing
or wounding scores of civilians.18 The following day,
Chinese border guards reportedly fired hundreds of
shells into Cao Bang province19 in a bombardment which
lasted three days. In a note dated July 6th, China
justified its actions by claiming it was responding to
"incessant armed provocations" on its border. Its
diplomatic note listed 114 armed provocations by
Vietnamese forces in May and June, including five
particularly severe incidents in which Vietnamese
forces either intruded upon or fired into Chinese
territory.20 The events of this period led one
correspondent to report that "tension on the border had
reached flashpoint."21 Then, as quickly as it had
begun, the conflict subsided. On September 12th Vietnam
renewed its request for a resumption of peace talks.

Despite the official Chinese rationale for its actions,

diplomatic and other observers reported that China had
stepped up its military pressure on the Vietnam border
in response to Vietnam's dry season offensive in
Cambodia. As late as June 23rd, China suggested to
Hanoi that it would resume peace talks in Hanoi "as
soon as an active factor in favour of the talks
emerges, even if it is a small one." The following
week, VPA forces made a major incursion into Thailand
and the July artillery barrages resulted.22
  9 

Other analysts suggested that China sought to take

advantage of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan
by harassing Vietnam while Moscow was otherwise
preoccupied.23 China's artillery barrage in July may
also be seen as a response to Vietnamese requests to
resume their talks on normalising relations which had
broken down in December 1979, and to a Vietnamese
proposal that both sides should observe a cease-fire to
mark their respective new year festivities.24 In other
words, China sought to demonstrate its determination to
keep up pressures on Vietnam in order to force it out
of Kampuchea.

Vietnamese officials tried to exaggerate the

seriousness of this incident by charging that China had
sent three divisions to the border and was preparing to
attack Vietnam. Western military sources in Beijing,
however, denied Vietnamese claims and reported that
there was "no sign of any marked build-up" on the Sino
Vietnamese border which would precede a second
strike.25 Later in the year, a large number of China's
frontline engineering and support units were
= returned to their home military regions.26

Case Study Two: Seizing High Ground in Lang Son and Ha Tuyen provinces, 
May 1981 
The year 1981 began with a repeat of the previous year.
On January 2nd, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry
proposed a cease-fire to mark new year celebrations.
This proposal was rejected by Chinese officials on the
20th. Nonetheless, both sides proceeded to exchange
prisoners. Over the next several months the frontier
area was relatively quiet.

In May another major flare-up occurred with fighting

that month reaching an intensity unparalleled since the
February-March 1979 border war. On May 5th-6th,
Chinese local forces, operating in regimental strength,
attacked and occupied a narrow strip of the frontier,
containing hill 400, in Cao Loc district, Lang Son
province, and also occupied a number of strategic hills
(numbered 1800a, 1800b, 1688 and 1059) in Vi Xuyen
district, Ha Tuyen province. As before, China
  10 

justified its actions by alleging that it was

responding to Vietnamese-instigated border incidents
during the first quarter of the year.

Vietnam responded by counter-attacking and intruding

into Chinese territory. On May 5th-6th, Vietnamese
forces raided the Fakashan area, Guangxi province. The
following day, one Vietnamese company attacked Mengdong
commune, Malipo county, Yunnan province. China said its
border guards repulsed the intruders, inflicting more
than 100 casualties, making this the most serious
border clash in two years. This was surpassed nine days
later, when Chinese border guards reportedly killed 150
Vietnamese who were part of a regiment sent into the
Fakashan area. In all, China claimed to have repulsed
five separate Vietnamese assaults into Guangxi. A
nd
further serious clash occurred on May 22 when China
claims to have killed 85 Vietnamese who entered the
Koulin area of Yunnan. On the same day, Vietnamese
sources reported that a Chinese battalion had occupied
and established control over a hill in Vi Xuyen
district. By May 25th, total Vietnamese casualties for
the month stood at 300 killed, according to Chinese
figures.27 The fighting eased off, and on June 13th, as
during the previous year, the Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry again requested a resumption of peace talks.

As in July 1980, the major flare-up in fighting in May

1981 was provoked by the Chinese to serve broader
political ends.28 Diplomats in Beijing quickly linked
the upsurge in fighting to China's Kampuchea policy.
Plans were then underway to merge the three main
Cambodian resistance groups into an anti-Vietnamese
united front. According to this view, attacks along
the northern border were designed to keep Vietnam on
the defensive.29 Diplomats also noted that a UN
sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea was
scheduled and it would suit Beijing's purpose that
Vietnam be portrayed as a "warmonger."30 Further, it
was also in China's interests to appear firm in its
policy of "bleeding Vietnam"31 and also dissuading the
doves in ASEAN from adopting a conciliatory posture at
their forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in
Manila.32 Chinese firmness, according to this view,
would persuade others that unrelenting pressure on
  11 

Vietnam was the only way to bring about a withdrawal

of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Finally, China was
motivated to prevent Vietnam from reinforcing troops in
Cambodia with units from the Chinese border.33

It should be noted, despite the intensity of the May

fighting, that at no time did China reinforce its
frontier troops with PLA regulars.34 It was clear to
most observers from the very beginning that a second
Chinese "lesson" was not on.35 The views of some
Western defence analysts were summarised by one source
as follows: "(d)espite the recent increase in border
tensions, [they] are betting against another Chinese
'lesson' in Vietnam. They say the cost would be too
high in terms of lives, money and diplomatic prestige,
especially as Vietnam has beefed up its regular army
forces on the frontier and gained a clear superiority
in equipment."36 Other analysts pointed out that the
rainy season was approaching, and that recent cuts in
China's military budget militated against a major
second invasion.37

Case Study Three:  The Symbolic Offensive, April 1983 
After the May 1981 clashes, tensions on the China-
Vietnam border remained at a relatively low level until
April 1983. It would appear that initiatives to
improve Sino-Soviet relations, as well as rumored
secret contacts between China and Vietnam, may account
for this lull. The Soviet Union's refusal to pressure
Vietnam, coupled with Vietnamese intransigence over
Kampuchea, probably accounts for the violent flare-up
which erupted in April 1983.

Efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations may be dated

to September 1981, if not earlier,38 when the Soviet
Union sent a note to China proposing reopening
discussions on border problems. China responded
cautiously, stating that substantial preparations were
necessary. General Secretary Brezhnev gave increased
momentum to improving relations with China in a major
address in Tashkent in March 24, 1982.39 In May, a
major commentary in Pravda declared that the time for
Sino-Soviet normalisation talks was long overdue.40
Chinese leaders then unveiled their new approach to the
  12 

USSR at a party Congress held in early September, when

a resumption of regular high-level talks was
announced.41 Brezhnev then repeated his earlier call
for discussions in a major address delivered on
September 26th in Baku.42 The first high-level round was
then held in October.

From the moment Brezhnev declared his interest in

improving relations with China, Chinese leaders sought
to play on Soviet-Vietnamese differences on the
question of relations with China. These were plainly
evident at the time. For example, in March when
Brezhnev declared that China was a socialist state, the
Vietnamese were arguing just the opposite.43 In March
April, at the Vietnam Communist Party's 5th Congress,
the Central Committee's report declared that "Chinese
hegemonists and expansionists in collusion with U.S.
imperialists" remain the "dangerous and direct enemy"
of the Vietnamese people." Elsewhere the Central
Committee's report advocated restoring normal relations
with China. In the aftermath of Tashkent, Vietnam
obviously made some policy readjustments.

Following the 5th Congress, Vietnam embarked on a peace

offensive. In mid-year (July 6-7), at the 6th annual
meeting of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers, major
modifications were made in previous declaratory policy.
In an unexpected move, Vietnam announced its intention
to withdraw unilaterally a portion of its troops from
Cambodia. Thailand was offered non-aggression pacts
with each of the three Indochinese countries, as well
as the establishment of a "safety zone" along its
border with Cambodia to be patrolled by Thai and
Kampuchean forces. Thailand was then invited to take a
"second step" towards peace.44 Token withdrawals by
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia were in fact carried
out in July, although outside observers termed them
merely "troop rotations."

In September 1982, for the first time, Vietnam

suggested that China and Vietnam should observe a
cease-fire to mark their respective national days.
(Earlier in the year, it had advanced yet again a
proposal to observe a cease-fire during new year
festivities.) In October, SRV deputy foreign minister,
  13 

Hoang Bich Son, announced that Vietnam stood ready "at

any level, at any place and at the earliest possible
time" to hold discussions with China on normalizing
their relations. Secret Chinese-Vietnamese diplomatic
contacts were strongly rumoured around this time (from
September 1982 to March 1983.45

In October, at the first round of Sino-Soviet

discussions, China tabled a secret five-point plan to
settle the Cambodian issue. According to press reports,
the Chinese plan called for a complete, phased
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea over an
unspecified "reasonable period of time" in return for a
corresponding gradual improvement in Chinese-Vietnamese
relations.46 The Soviet Union initially rebuffed this
initiative, suggesting instead that the Chinese make
direct contact with Vietnam. China kept pressuring the
Soviet Union, expecting a positive reply on or before
the next round of normalisation talks scheduled for
March 1983 in Moscow. Then, on the eve of the second
round of talks, acting out of pique at the lack of an
encouraging Soviet response, they released their
confidential five-point plan to the public.47 Thus,
onus was then placed on the Soviet Union for the lack
of progress, and the way cleared for the military
action which followed.

In February 1983, Gen. Yang Dezhi, the PLA Chief of

staff, visited Thailand and made a public commitment to
come to Bangkok's assistance if it were threatened by
Vietnam.48 That month, the first-ever Summit Conference
of the three Indochinese countries was held. Its final
statement declared, "(f)ollowing the withdrawal in
1982, some more units of Vietnamese volunteers will be
withdrawn from Kampuchea in 1983." In late March,
however, Chinese forbearance was overcome when
Vietnamese forces renewed their annual dry season
offensive and overran Phnom Chat, a Khmer Rouge
stronghold which had just been resupplied with Chinese
military stores.49 O'Smach, a Sihanoukist camp, was
overrun on April 3rd. Vietnamese hot pursuit raids
into Thailand were also quite flagrant, presenting a
challenge to China to make good on General Yang's
pledge.50
  14 

Given these circumstances, China's hand was forced. On

April 10th the Chinese Foreign Ministry delivered a
protest note to the SRV Embassy in Beijing protesting
recent "provocations and border intrusions". Six days
later (April 16th), citing "attacks of intolerable
proportions," Chinese artillerymen opened up with a
four-day artillery and mortar barrage "marking the
highest tide of hostility" since the May 1981
clashes.51 The first substantial ground clash occurred
on April 20th when Chinese frontier guards reportedly
killed 16 Vietnamese in Yunnan province.52 Minor
skirmishing and artillery shelling continued for
several days but began to taper off at the end of the
month when VPA forces grouped to attack two KPNLF
camps, Ban Sangae and Nong Samet, withdrew.53 At the
same time, Thai gunners began to retaliate against
Vietnamese shelling of Thai territory.54

As in previous military flare-ups, diplomatic observers

were quick to point out that China's military actions
had less to do with the military situation on its
border with Vietnam than with the situation in
Kampuchea.55 In 1983, China was put in the position of
having to make good its pledge to Thailand while
dissuading Vietnam from fully prosecuting its war
against the guerilla insurgents in Cambodia.56 China
may also have intended to scotch the desire, evident
among some regional countries, such as Australia and
Indonesia, to conduct a dialogue with Vietnam.57

The events of April 1983 have been labelled by veteran

Indochina correspondent Nayan Chanda as "a symbolic
offensive." According to his analysis, "Peking's
military move appears to be an exercise in symbolism -
at worst a half-hearted attempt to sustain its
credibility as a regional peacekeper."58 Chanda also
quotes one Western military analyst as observing,
"(t)hey [the Chinese] don't seem to be attempting to
hit any particular target, just firing shells as far as
they go. The purpose is purely to make a political
point." The connection between events in Kampuchea and
the upsurge in violence along the Sino-Vietnamese
border was made explicit in late April by Li Xiannian,
a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist
Party, who warned Vietnam of the consequences of
  15 

"threatening the security of China and the peace and

stability of Southeast Asia." Li continued, "We will
never stop our support [for Thailand] so long as
Vietnam does not stop such aggression."

Chanda concluded:

China has taken care not to talk of another

'lesson' that would call for a much more serious
effort and would provoke incalculable
consequences. By ordering a limited action
against Vietnam well after the Hanoi offensive had
come to a halt, China has also avoided a situation
in which the success of its operation would have
to be measured in terms of a battlefield situation
1,000 km away. 'China knows very well that short
of another invasion of Vietnam, no action would
make any difference to Vietnam's military position
in Cambodia,' said a source close to official
thinking in Peking. 'It is just a symbolic act.'59

China signaled the "symbolic" nature of its intentions

by keeping the conflict limited to small unit
engagements by frontier and border troops.60 These are
lightly equipped military forces.61 The April flare-
up witnessed some minor skirmishing; casualties
amounted to only a few dozen in the fortnight of
maximum tension, and hundreds of rounds of mortar and
artillery fire were exchanged.

China also timed its response to follow Vietnam's

offensive in Cambodia, and came on the eve of the wet
season when VPA operations there could be expected to
scale down.62 Vietnam, for its part, signaled its
intentions by announcing a partial troop withdrawal
from Cambodia in the very midst of China's intensive
artillery barrage on its northern border. This
decision was ostentatiously conveyed to Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko on April 16th.63

Perhaps most revealing, was the rare opportunity to

compare Hanoi's and Beijing's reports of the April
events with accounts by Western eye witnesses. Two
Western diplomats visited Lang Son on April 17th and
spent six hours there without hearing the sound of
  16 

exploding shells or seeing any damage. The local

militia appeared relaxed, and the diplomats were
permitted to picnic close to the border. The previous
day Vietnam claimed China had fired a 1,000 round
barrage on the area.64 To take another example, on
April 18th, Xinhua claimed that Vietnamese shelling of
Pingmeng, Napo district, Guangxi resulted in the
destruction of the local commune's hospital, primary
school, bank, food grain management office and some
houses. Three thousand inhabitants were reportedly
evacuated.65 In July, a group of 44 foreign
correspondents was permitted to visit Pingmeng. They
found little evidence of recent damage.66 In brief,
both sides engaged in a charade. China exaggerated its
case to satisfy Thailand; while "'(t)hen Vietnamese
went along because, if they hadn't, that would have
forced the Chinese to really do something,' a European
diplomat said. 'It would have moved the war from the
desk to the gun.'"67

Finally, it was quite clear to military and other

analysts in Beijing and elsewhere, that China was
unprepared to launch an attack on Vietnam on a scale
approximating 1979.68 Norodom Sihanouk, for example,
was quoted on April 19th, in the midst of this flare-
up, that China did not want to be considered a
provocateur by public opinion.69 There were no major
troop movements by PLA regulars into the border region
during this period.

In the aftermath of this major flare-up, both China and

Vietnam returned to diplomatic maneouvering. China made
clear its dissatisfaction at Soviet inaction, and
hinted at "direct confrontation."70 The Soviet Union,
for its part, chided China for refusing to engage in
talks with Vietnam.71 Both China and Vietnam also made
conciliatory gestures. In June, Foreign Ministern
Nguyen Co Thach was quoted as saying "(w)e are trying
our best to have contacts and negotiations with
China".72 Later that month, China proposed a 48-hour
cease-fire to enable the return of military
prisoners.73 In October, Nguyen Co Thach accepted the
invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Wu Xeqian, to
attend an official Chinese reception at the United
Nations to celebrate China's national day. Thereafter,
  17 

rumors began to surface that both parties were once

again engaged in quiet diplomacy.74 The military
situation on the border returned to its normal pattern,
with Nguyen Co Thach declaring that it was "rather
quiet" in December 1983.75 This situation generally
prevailed until April 1984.

Case Study Four: "Land‐Grabbing" in Vi Xuyen District, Ha Tuyen province, 
April 1984 
The quietness along the border was shattered in April
1984 in a major escalation of hostilities as Chinese
artillerymen rained down upon Vietnam the heaviest
bombardment since 1979. This was followed up by an
assault on Vietnamese hills in Vi Xuyen district of Ha
Tuyen province by PLA regulars. Fighting continued
well into May as VPA forces tried unsuccessfully to
dislodge them. This upsurge in fighting temporarily
slowed the pace of Sino-Soviet normalisation, as Moscow
cancelled the scheduled visit of Mikhail Arkhipov to
Beijing. In a new development, the Third Indochina war
took on a maritime dimension as naval demonstrations
were conducted in the South China Sea. By mid-year the
tensions eased once again as Vietnam announced its
third withdrawal of "volunteer forces" from Cambodia.
As in the previous year, the latter half of 1984
witnessed relative quiet along the China-Vietnam
border.

Up until April 1984, Vietnam characterised its border

conflict with China as a "war of sabotage." By this
was meant that the main features of the conflict
consisted of small raids, occasional shelling, the
destruction of property, and various acts of
psychological warfare designed to undermine the
security of Vietnam's northern border provinces. The
events of April transformed the pattern of conflict in
a major way. The conflict now became one "territorial
encroachment."76

On April 2, 1984, in retaliation for "ceaseless armed

provocations," Chinese gunners opened up a massive
artillery barrage over a 400 km front.77 During the
period April 2nd-27th, more than 60,000 shells
were estimated to have been fired into 16 border
  18 

districts. Chinese troops then launched battalion

sized attacks into Vietnamese territory in Ha Tuyen,
Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Hoang Lien Son provinces. A
major battle was fought for hills 636 and 820 in Trang
Dinh district, Lang Son on April 6th.78

On April 28th, more than 500 artillery pieces conducted

a further bombardment of Vietnamese positions. Chinese
ground troops, comprising three full regiments from the
PLA's 40th division, followed up by attacking and
overrunning three heights in Ha Tuyen. This attack
was termed the "most serious Chinese incursion since
1979" in press reports.79 A later account indicates
that Chinese forces also gained control of a cluster
of heights (hills 1250, 1509, 1030, 772 and 233)
in Vi Xuyen and Yen Minh districts, Ha Tuyen.80

Fighting continued on a lower scale during May and June

as Vietnamese forces attempted to reclaim the lost
heights in Ha Tuyen.81 There was a brief flare up on
July 12th when Vietnamese units renewed their assault
on these hills. American intelligence sources reported
in August that Vietnam was unsuccessful and that China
retained control of at least eight hills.82 Official
Vietnamese reports for the period April 2nd - June 2nd,
state that Vietnam decimated one Chinese regiment and =
nine battalions and "put out of action" 5,500
Chinese.83 In August, Vietnam raised these figures to
7,500 "put out of action" in the past four months.84

The events of April 1984 were clearly different in

magnitude than previous flare-ups. On April 13th-16th,
the Soviet Union was moved to warn off China by
conducting the first-ever joint naval exercises with
Vietnam.85 These took the form of practice amphibious
landings of Soviet marines near the port of Haiphong.
China responded by sending a naval squadron to sail
around the Spratly Islands. On their return, they
conducted their own landing exercises on Hainan
Island.86

The danger of escalation was quickly quelled by

conciliatory signals from all concerned. On May 3rd, a
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that it
would not be necessary to deploy regular army units to
  19 

the border area as the local militia and border guards

had been able to cope.87 On May 5th, both Pravda and
Izvestia urged the Chinese to take up Vietnam's offer
to conduct "serious, businesslike talks...with a view
to settling all questions of bilateral relations by
peaceful means." On May 8th, Pham Van Dong once again
reiterated Vietnam's formula that it would meet with
China "no matter where, when and at what level."88 In
early June, Xinhua announced that "China does not want
to involve itself in a military adventure that might
hinder the realization of its modernization plan."89
Then, Zhang Ai-ping, China's Defence Minister, on the
eve of his visit to the United States, declared that
the situation along the border had quietened.90 Vietnam
chimed in with the announcement that it would soon
withdraw "three brigades and regiments and a certain
number of battalions" from Cambodia. The stage was now
set for a resumption of Sino-Soviet talks. In late June
it was announced that the Chinese deputy foreign
minister (Qian Qichen) would visit Moscow at the end of
the month.

What prompted the sudden flare-up in April 1984?

Chinese officials once again blamed Vietnam for
provocations along their border. They also suggested
that Vietnam was deliberately trying to sabotage Sino-
Soviet normalisation efforts.91 But, as on previous
occasions, Vietnamese actions in Cambodia appeared to
be the direct cause. In March 1984, Vietnamese forces
mounted a major assault on a Khmer Rouge stronghold in
the tri-border region.92 In the course of fighting,
Vietnamese troops entrenched themselves on hills inside
Thai territory. This prompted a Thai counter-attack
and overt gestures of Chinese support for Thailand.93

In April, Vietnamese troops over ran the Khmer Rouge

base of Tamnak Ched and the KPNLF's headquarters at
Amphil. Thus, China's attacks in April were designed
to affect Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia by
tying down forces in the north, as well as imposing a
cost for Vietnamese intransigeance.94 China also took
advantage of the timing of a visit to Beijing by
President Reagan in April to demonstrate its resolve to
stay the course in pressuring Vietnam.
  20 

The change in Chinese tactics, from symbolic shelling

to "land-grabbing" must have been borne from the
realisation that past military pressures had not
succeeded in deterring Vietnam from attaining its
objectives in Cambodia. China chose its target with
care. In all future flare-ups Chinese gunners on top
of the heights in Vi Xuyen district would take full
advantage of their position to shell Vietnamese
territory below. Once again, China demonstrated that
its objectives were limited to forcing the Vietnamese
to come to an agreement over Cambodia. In the aftermath
of the April-June fighting, tensions subsided to
"normal" levels.95 In February 1985, for example,
Vietnam's proposal for a new year cease-fire was
"basically observed" by the Chinese.96

Case Study Five:  The Shelling of Vi Xuyen district, June 1985
During the 1984/85 dry season in Cambodia, Vietnamese
military forces attacked and successfully overran all
major guerilla bases along the Thai-Kampuchea border.
Worst hit were the KPNLF whose forces retreated in
disarray back to Thailand where they subsequently fell
prey to fratricidal political in-fighting. Sihanouk's
ANS likewise retreated into Thailand where, after a
period of recuperation and rethinking of tactics, they
began to mount guerilla forays into Cambodia's
northwest quadrant. The Khmer Rouge managed to keep
their forces intact and conduct an orderly retreat into
the interior of Cambodia.

Vietnam's stunning military victories in Cambodia

prompted a different Chinese response from previous
years. Throughout most of 1985 and into the early
months of 1986, Vietnam's border provinces were subject
to intense artillery and mortar shelling. During the
month of June, at the close of the 1984/85 dry season,
Chinese forces launched particularly fierce
bombardments of Vietnam's Vi Xuyen district, Ha Tuyen
province.

Incomplete Vietnamese figures97 suggest the following

order of magnitude of the Chinese bombardment of Vi
Xuyen district (see Table 1):
  21 

Table 1 

Chinese Shelling of Vi Xuyen District, 1985 

Month 1985  Shells Per Day 

March  2258 

April  1633 

May  1255 

June  7563 

July  433 

August  n.a. 

September  5333 

October  n.a. 

November  n.a. 

December  2451 

Average as per column  3235 

Average on gross figures  2740 

Chinese border units began employing what Vietnamese

officials termed new "land-grabbing" tactics.98
Further, China introduced another twist in the
pressures being applied to Vietnam. Beginning in May
1985, according to Vietnamese accounts, China began to
feed plastic mines into rivers which flowed into
Vietnam. By the end of 1986, Vietnam reported 100 mine
explosions in various provinces, resulting in 30 killed
and 60 wounded.99

Quite clearly Vi Xuyen district was singled out for

special attention. Vietnamese accounts state, for
example, that over one million shells were fired into
an area of the district measuring 10 square kilometers
in 1985 alone.100 Strategic hills (such as 233, 300,
400, 468, 500, 673, 685, 812, 900, 1100, 1509, Quan Sat
  22 

and Co Ich), particularly around the Thanh Thuy

crossroads area, were subject to repeated shelling and
ground attack. During the period from May 27th to June
13th, Chinese gunners fired 226,900 artillery shells
into Vi Xuyen. And from June 1st-7th, Chinese forces
reportedly launched six attacks on hills 400 and 1509.
A review of the first half of the year stated that
China had launched 60 or more platoon to regimental
sized attacks on Vietnam in various locations.101

A review of Chinese military activity in 1985 suggests

that China has chosen Vi Xuyen district as a target for
its "tit for tat" reply to Vietnam's successful sweep
of the Thai-Kampuchea border.102 Radio Hanoi, in a
broadcast on December 26, 1985, reviewing the events of
the past year, highlighted the matter in this way:

China has continued a form of border land-grabbing

war against Vietnam in a fierce manner, especially
in the border area of Vi Xuyen district, Ha Tuyen
province. It can be said that the Chinese
shellings there have never stopped since 1984.
Noteworthy was that the shellings were fierce and
new combat tactics were used in grabbing our
hills. Some of the enemy's typical land-grabbing
operations [took place in Vi Xuyen in May-June
1985]...

China clearly re-thought its tactics and chose its

target with care. The terrain in Ha Tuyen is relatively
speaking low-lying and has traditionally constituted a
point of entry for Chinese invaders. Yet Ha Tuyen is
located far from Hanoi. Thus, an assault on Ha Tuyen
does not immediately threaten the Vietnamese heartland,
as say an attack on Lang Son does. Given the distances
involved and the state of the roads, defending Ha Tuyen
imposes certain logistic difficulties on Vietnamese
commanders. More importantly, the location of Ha Tuyen
enables the Beijing authorities to signal their
attitude towards Vietnam, by increasing or decreasing
the intensity of the conflict at will. In sum, the
remoteness of Vi Xuyen provides an excellent location
for the prosecution of a "phony war."

For example, fighting in Vi Xuyen flared again in

  23 

September 1985 when China was once again accused of

launching ground attacks under cover of fierce
artillery shelling. During a four-day period, September
5-8, nearly 60,000 rounds of heavy artillery reportedly
rained upon Vi Xuyen.103 This was a one-off affair
designed to underscore China's rejection of renewed
Vietnamese suggestions that month to hold talks on
normalising relations.104 China also rejected another
conciliatory gesture, that of reopening the rail link
between them.105

Despite the June shelling, an upturn in Sino Vietnamese

relations was noticeable during the last quarter of
1985. On September 1st, PRC President Li Xiannian sent
greetings to his SRV counterpart, Truong Chinh, on the
occasion of Vietnam's 40th national day. After noting
the "time-honoured traditional friendship" between
China and Vietnam, Li called for a positive response
from Hanoi on the question of normalisation. While in
November, a Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and
Industry delegation attended the International Asia and
Pacific Area Trade Fair in Peking at the invitation of
ESCAP and China's Association for International Trade
Promotion.

After September, reports of heavy fighting tailed off.

There was a brief flurry of fighting during the first
week of December when Chinese forces were once again
reported to be engaged in "land-grabbing" activity in
Vi Xuyen district. Vietnam charged that China lobbed
more than 60,000 shells into the province, with 34,900
Shells falling on December 2nd alone. At the same time,
Vietnam reportedly also beat back five separate ground
attacks aimed at hill 685 in Ha Tuyen, in which it
killed 470 Chinese soldiers.106 China counter-charged
that Vietnam had committed more than 500 "armed
provocations" since September and was solely to blame
for the current round of fighting. Xinhua, in the same
commentary, linked the intensification of fighting on
the border with a build-up of Vietnamese forces in
Kampuchea in preparation for another dry season
offensive.107 Indeed, on December 13th, Vietnamese
forces were reported to have heavily shelled O Bek
Chan, a KPNLF stronghold.108 The year ended with
further reports of shelling by Chinese artillerymen.
  24 

Case Study Six: The "Phony War," December 1986/January 1987 
Throughout 1986, China kept up pressure on Vietnam by
incessantly shelling; at mid-year it was reported that
nearly a quarter of a million artillery and mortar shells
had been fired into Vietnamese territory. Table 2 below,
based on Vietnamese media reports, lists the monthly

Table 2 

Chinese Shelling of Vietnam’s Border Provinces, 1986 

Month 1986  Number of rounds 
Reported 

 January  40,000 

February  70,000 

March  20,000 

April  20,000 

May  67.000 

June  15,000 

Sub‐total  232,000 

July  27,000 

August  27,000 

September  4,600 

October  52,000 

November  n.a. 

December  n.a. 

January 7, 1987  60,000 

figures. What is not revealed by these figures is that

Vi Xuyen district was especially targeted. In 1985, Vi
Xuyen experienced twenty separate shelling incidents,
involving more than 800,000 incoming rounds, out of a
total of one million fired into Vietnam that year.109
  25 

In mid-1986, Vietnamese officials reported that four-

fifths of all shells fired had landed in Vi Xuyen.110
On October 14,1986, Thanh Thuy village in Vi Xuyen
received 35,000 shells, the "highest density of
shelling for a day" since the start of the year. The
most intense barrage occurred in January 1987 when on a
single day Chinese Artillery pumped 60,000 artillery
and mortar shells into Vi Xuyen.111
Reports of ground fighting gradually declined by July
1986, and then an unusually long lull followed.112 No
doubt the Chinese were responding to General Secretary
Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok which called for an
improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations. This speech,
and the impetus it gave to the process of Sino-Soviet
normalisation, set the agenda for the remainder of the
period under consideration here. In October, at the
ninth round of Sino-Soviet talks, China finally
succeeded in getting the Soviet Union to agree to
discuss the Kampuchean question, a heretofore
sacrosanct "third country" issue.113

Immediately following his Vladivostok address,

Gorbachev flew to Moscow to brief Truong Chinh,
Vietnam's new party chief. Thereafter, Vietnam once
again made conciliatory gestures towards Beijing. On
July 13th it unilaterally released 72 Chinese fishermen
which had been apprehended in Vietnamese territorial
waters. On August 1st, the Red Cross Association in
Lang Son sent its "deep sympathies" to the people of
Guangxi for losses suffered during a recent typhoon. On
August 13th, Vietnam announced that on the occasion of
the national days of China and Vietnam, it would
release 27 Chinese prisoners. The exchange was carried
out on September 6th when China released 34 Vietnamese
and Vietnam freed 26 Chinese. On October 3rd, a
Vietnamese table tennis team left for China where it
attended the eighth Asian Table Tennis championships in
Guandong province. And most significantly, Vietnam's
Communist Party dropped its reference to China as a
"direct and dangerous enemy" at its 6th Congress in
December; it retained instead the proposal to meet with
China "any where at any time" to discuss normalisation.
Vietnam too began to reach out to entice non-Communist
members of the CGDK, Norodom Sihanouk in particular,
into discussions about power-sharing with the regime in
  26 

Phnom Penh.114
In the midst of these positive developments, renewed
fighting broke out on the China-Vietnam border. On
October 14th, Vietnam announced that China had fired
35,000 shells into Thanh Thuy village, in the highest
density of shelling since the start of the year, and
Chinese forces had renewed their "land-grabbing
tactics" in the same area. Vietnam claimed to have
killed 100 intruding soldiers.115 Three days later
Vietnam reported that it had repulsed three attacks
launched against hill 1100 and a point near the Thanh
Thuy bridge in Vi Xuyen district by Chinese units at
company to battalion strength. China accounts reported
that its border guards had counter-attacked intruding
Vietnamese troops. While the events surrounding this
clash are still murky, Vietnamese accounts suggest that
China had launched these "new and fiercer waves of
land-grabbing attacks" in response to Vietnam's recent
conciliatory gestures.116 It is possible that China
was responding to Moscow's refusal to exert pressure
on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, a proposal which
it had advanced early in the month at the 9th round of
normalisation talks.117

There is a third reason for the fighting along the

northern border in October (and subsequently):
Vietnam's plans for, and action during, the 1986/87 dry
season in Kampuchea. Beginning in October, Vietnamese
troops began to intrude into the O'Bok pass area of
Thailand and make contact with Thai troops. These
skirmishes were the preliminary moves in a planned
assault on Khmer Rouge bases in the tri-border region.
Further Vietnamese intrusions, and clashes, took =
place during November/December. According to one =
account, when the= Vietnamese began digging in on
various vantage points 2-3 km across the border, they
violated an unwritten Thai rule that Vietnamese troops
fighting resistance forces would be ignored as long as
they did not venture too far into Thailand, and as long
as their transit was temporary. Thai attempts to expel
the Vietnamese began in earnest in March/April 1987 and
continued until they achieved success in June.

Vietnamese military moves in Kampuchea, although known=

to both the Thais and Chinese, were unpublicised. They
  27 

were accompanied by further conciliatory signals from

Hanoi, suggesting in part, that Vietnam was bowing to
Soviet pressures.118 On November 7th, for example,
Nguyen Co Thach told the Soviet press that Vietnam
"sincerely hopes" to normalise relations with China.
He repeated the well known formula that he was ready to
meet his counterparts "at any time, any place and at
any level."119 Later that month, on November 27th, Nhan
Dan published a long-commentary on Sino-Vietnamese
relations which said in part:

Of late, the Vietnamese party and state leaders

have reiterated Vietnam's readiness to resume
bilateral talks with China at any place, any time
and any level, with a view to seeking a political
solution acceptable to both sides, in order to
early restore the normal relations between the two
countries as well as the long-standing friendship
between the two peoples.

However, goodwill has come only from one side.

For their part, the Chinese ruling circles have
responded by firing hundreds of thousands of
artillery and mortar = rounds and ordered a series
of military attacks
on Vi Xuyen district....

we reaffirm once again that we always treasure the

age old friendships with the Chinese people and
want to restore friendship and normal relations
between the two countries in the interests of
peace and stability in Asia, and of both peoples.

Hopes for a break through were raised, and then dashed,

in December, when the PRC deputy foreign minister Liu
Shuqing visited Laos to discuss normalising relations
which had been badly strained since 1979. Quite
clearly, by late 1986, China had concluded that despite
the winds of change blowing out of Gorbachev's Soviet
Union, Vietnam was in no mood to compromise. China
could draw its own conclusions from the hard-line
approach on Kampuchea adopted by the VCP's 6th Congress
and by reaffirmations of Soviet support given by Igor
Legachev, the CPSU's representative to the congress. In
the words of one commentary, "(t)he donkey's lip does
  28 

not match the horse's jaw."120

Between January 5-7, according to Vietnamese accounts,

Chinese troops operating with artillery cover, launched
large-scale "land-grabbing" attacks into Vi Xuyen
district. On January 7th, Chinese gunners fired a
60,000 artillery and mortar shells into the district, a
record number. This bombardment was followed up by
fifteen Chinese ground attacks in divisional strength
against Vietnamese positions on hills adjacent to the
border (233, 685, 1100, and 1509). Vietnam claims to
have inflicted 1,500 casualties on the attacking force
at this time, including 900 on the third day.121

Predictably, Chinese reports announced that its border

guards successfully repulsed attacking Vietnamese
troops in Yunnan, killing 200 on January 5th alone.
Chinese sources discounted Vietnamese casualties
reports as "sheer boasting". General Yang Dezhi, PLA
Chief of Staff, told Thai officials during the course
of an official visit that the current frontier clashes
involved only three units of border guards and that
total Chinese casualties were far less than the 500
claimed by Hanoi. On January 8th, a PRC Foreign
Ministry spokesman stated that fighting along the
border had tapered off and Vietnamese casualties had
risen to 500. As suddenly as it had begun, the January
clashes abated. Retrospective accounts suggest both
sides, particularly Vietnam exaggerated the ferocity of
the January clash to suit their own propaganda
purposes.

Despite the ferocity of events in Vi Xuyen district,

the military situation along the Vietnam-China border
may be characterised as a "phony war". Vietnam's five
other border provinces have been largely unaffected.
One correspondent who was visiting neighbouring Cao
Bang in January was told that the province had been
shelled only 68 times during the first ten months of
1986, and that only three ground intrusions by Chinese
forces had been reported.122 At no time during this or
any previous flare-up, has China mobilised its PLA
regulars, or given any hint that hostilities would
escalate to 1979 levels. To the contrary, during
moments of heightened tension, China has taken steps to
  29 

indicate its limited objectives. The focus of Chinese

attention is Vi Xuyen district, and outside analysts
assume China instigated the January flare-up123.
Military action there serves larger political ends,
namely to signal Chinese displeasure over Vietnamese
military action in Cambodia.124 Chinese officials have
afforded themselves the luxury of fighting a
"communique war"; in short, Xinhua and Foreign Ministry
spokesmen can play up, or turn down, the appearance of
conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese border to suit
immediate political objectives. Thus military
engagements on the border are not designed to affect
the military balance there, in this sense the represent
a "phony war."

FOOTNOTES 

1 The CGDK, formed on June 22, 1982, is composed of

three factions: Democratic Kampuchea [DK], the Khmer
People's National Liberation Front [KPNLF], and
Moulinaka; their armed forces are termed, respectively,
the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK], KPNLF
and the National Army of Sihanouk [ANS, from its French
title].

2 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand.

3 "ASEAN in a Changing World," Speech by H.E. Lee Kuan

Yew, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore at the
Opening of the 20th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in
Singapore on 15 June 1987, p. 5.

4 The physical impact on Thailand of fighting in

Cambodia should be compared with the longer, endemic
insurgency in Burma, which occasionally spills across
the border.

5 Remarks reportedly made by Thai Lt. Gen. Issarapong

Noonpakdi, commander of the 2nd army region on June
24,1987; Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Costly Containment,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, (July 9, 1987), p. 34.

6 Reportedly discussed at planning sessions at

  30 

Vietnam's Nguyen Ai Quoc Higher Party School; Thai

Quang Trung, "L'enjeu cambodgien dans l'equilibre de
Sud-Est asiatique," Politique Etrangere (September
1981), No. 3, p. 643.

7 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War

(New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich Publishers, 1986),
p. 118.

8 David Harrison, Indochina: The Federation Factor,

M.A. Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, pp. 179-
180.

9 Quoted in Chanda, op. cit., p. 120; the original

reference is Vo Nguyen Giap, Nhiem Vu Quan Su Truoc Mat
Chuyen San Tong Phan Cong (Ha Dong Resistance and
Administrative Committee, 1950), p. 14.

10 Hoang Van Thai, "Ve Quan He Hoc Tap Dac Biet Giua Ba
Dan Toc Dong Duong," Tap Chi Cong San (January 1982).

11 Col. Gen. Le Duc Anh, "The Vietnam People's Army and

Our Noble International Mission in the Friendly Country
of Cambodia," Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (December
1984); translated by JPRS SEA 85-056(April 2,1985), the
quotes are from pp. 82, 83, and 84, respectively. Anh,
who led Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, has since been
promoted to Senior General and a full member of the
Politburo, ranking sixth out of thirteen

12 Article 2 of the Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation signed between Laos and Vietnam.

13 Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

Cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
and the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

14 In February 1980, Phan Hien, Vietnam's then deputy

Foreign Minister, discounted renewed warfare stating
"Maybe the Chinese are preparing for it but their
modernisation is not finished." Interview with AFP
cited in Asiaweek, February 22, 1980.

15 Harlan W. Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on

Vietnam: A Military Assessment," Asian Survey (August
  31 

1979), Vol. XIX, No. 8, p. 802-803.

16 Ibid., p. 812.

17 AFP dispatch from Beijing, May 2, 1979. Wu's

remarks were made to a visiting French military
delegation.

18 AAP-Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra

Times, July 7, 1980.

19 Radio Hanoi, July 6, 1980.

20 AAP-Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra

Times, July 7, 1980.

21 Raymond Wilkinson dispatch from Beijing, The

Australian, July 7,1980.

22 AAP-Reuter, The Canberra Times, July 7,1980.

23 Tony Walker dispatch from Beijing in The Age,

February 1,1980; and Raymond Wilkinson dispatch from
Beijing, The Australian, July 7, 1980.

24 Starting from this time, February 1980, Vietnam has

continued to request a cease-fire to mark new year.
China has rejected each request. Both sides attempt to
score propaganda points by charging the other with
numerous violations.

25 Cited by Tony Walker, dispatch from Beijing, The

Age, July 11, 1980.

26 Nayan Chanda, "Diplomacy at Gun Point," Far Eastern

Economic Review, May 29,1981, p. 10.

27 Tony Walker dispatch from Beijing, The Age, May

25,1981.

28 Reuters dispatch from Beijing, International Herald

Tribune, May 18, 1981; David Watts dispatch from
Singapore, The Times [London], May 25,1981; and Chanda,
"Diplomacy at Gun Point," op. cit., p. 10.
  32 

29 Tony Walker, dispatch from Beijing, The Age, May 9,

1981.

30 Michael Weisskopf dispatch from Beijing,

International Herald Tribune, May 25,1981; and Chanda,
"Diplomacy at Gun Point," op. cit., p. 10.

31 David Bonavia dispatch from Hong Kong, The Times

[London], May 18, 1981; and Chanda, "Diplomacy at Gun
Point," op. cit., p. 10.

32 David Watts dispatch from Singapore, The Times

[London], May 18, 1981; and Chanda, "Diplomacy at Gun
Point," op. cit., p. 10.

33 Chanda, "Diplomacy at Gun Point," op. cit., p. 10.

34 AAP-AP dispatch from Hanoi, The Age, May 19, 1981;

Chanda, "Diplomacy at Gun Point," op. cit., p. 10; and
Michael Weisskopf dispatch from Beijing, International
Herald Tribune, May 25, 1981. A retrospective
Vietnamese analysis declared, "the enemy employed
regional, mountain and border defense regiments and
divisions, which were, strictly speaking, local
forces"; Trung Dung, "Determined to Defeat Beijing's
War on Encroachment and Occupation Along Our Border,"
Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (January 1985), translated by
JPRS SEA 85-080 (May 21, 1985), p. 86.

35 Reuters dispatch from Beijing, International Herald

Tribune, May 18, 1981; David Bonavia dispatch from Hong
Kong, The Times [London], May 18,1981; and AAP-Reuter
dispatch from Peking, The Canberra Times, May 24, 1981.

36 Michael Weisskopf and Howard Simmons, "A Slow Burn

on the Sino-Vietnam Border," Asiaweek (May 22,1981), p.
24.

37 Michael Weisskopf dispatch from Beijing,

International Herald Tribune, May 25, 1981.

38 Mikhail Kapitsa, head of the Soviet Foreign

Ministry's Far Eastern Department, made two
unpublicized visits to China prior to this; during his
May visit, Kapitsa passed on to the Chinese side some
  33 

proposals on the border situation. In September a

"summit meeting" was held in the USSR that included top
party officials from each of the Indochinese states.

39 Nayan Chanda, "Brezhnev Breaks the Ice," Far Eastern

Economic Review (April 2,1982), pp. 12-13.

40 The article was signed by 'I. Alexandrov' a

pseudonym indicating it reflected high-level thinking
inside the Kremlin. Mary Wisniewski, "Smoothing the
Wrinkles," Far Eastern Economic Review (October
1,1982), pp. 30-32.

41 Hamish McDonald dispatch from Tokyo, The Age,

December 30, 1982. This is a retrospective piece based
on interviews with Japanese analysts.

42 Mary Wisniewski, "Smoothing the Wrinkles," op. cit.,

pp. 30-32.

43 See Quan Doi Nhan Dan (March 23, 1982), cited by

Chanda, "Brezhnev Breaks the Ice," op. cit., pp. 12-13.

44 Nguyen Co Thach followed up with visits to

Singapore, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia,
where he impressed upon his hosts the need for
"dialogue".

45 Michael Richardson dispatch from Dong Dang, Vietnam,

The Sydney Morning Herald, April 20, 1983. Nguyen Co
Thach, in denying such contacts, stated that both sides
were observing a de facto cease-fire. Earlier Thach was
quoted as saying, "(r)ecently we offered China a de
facto cease-fire. It has rejected it." Louis
Wiznitzer, dispatch from the United Nations, Christian
Science Monitor, September 29, 1982.

46 Dispatch from Washington in The Washington Post

reprinted in The Age, January 18, 1983.

47 Nayan Chanda, "A Threat from Peking," Far Eastern

Economic Review, June 23, 1983, pp. 13-15.

48 Nayan Chanda, "A Symbolic Offensive," Far Eastern

Economic Review, May 5,1983, pp. 42-43.
  34 

49 "Thunder Out of China," Asiaweek (April 29, 1983),

p. 8; and Michael Richardson, "Eyewitness at the
Dragon's Mouth," Pacific Defence Reporter (June 1983),
p. 42.

50 "Thunder Out of China," Asiaweek (April 29, 1983),

p. 8-10; and Michael Richardson, The Age, April 21,
1983

51 Ibid.

52 Christopher S. Wren dispatch from Beijing,

International Herald Tribune, April 22, 1983.

53 Richardson, "Eyewitness at the Dragon's Mouth," op.

cit., p. 42-43.

54 UPI dispatch from Bangkok, International Herald

Tribune, April 20, 1983.

55 Michael Richardson, The Age, April 21, 1983.

56 Western diplomats are quoted as believing that the

border flare up was meant to disrupt Vietnam's latest
offensive against insurgents in Cambodia and tie down
VPA units on the northern border. Christopher S. Wren
dispatch from Beijing, International Herald Tribune,
April 18, 1983; and Chanda, "A Symbolic Offensive," op.
cit., pp. 42-43.

57 Ibid., p. 43.

58 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

59 Ibid.

60 AAP-Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra

Times, April 20,1983; Mark Baker dispatch from Beijing,
The Age, April 20, 1983.

61 Christopher S. Wren dispatch from Beijing,

International Herald Tribune, April 18, 1983.

62 "Thunder Out of China," Asiaweek (April 29, 1983),

  35 

p. 8-10.

63 TASS dispatch from Moscow, The Canberra Times, April

19, 1983.

64 Bob Secter dispatch from Lang Son, International

Herald Tribune, May 12, 1983.

65 Xinhua cited by Christopher S. Wren in a dispatch

from Beijing, International Herald Tribune, April
20,1983.

66 Mark Baker dispatch from Pingmeng, The Age, July 4,

1983; Christopher S. Wren dispatch from Pingmeng, The
New York Times, July 8, 1983; Melinda Liu, "Tensions on
a Troubled Border," Newsweek, July 18, 1983, p. 30;
Walter A. Taylor, "A Menacing Footnote to Friendship,"
The Bulletin [Sydney], July 26,1983; and Amanda Bennett
dispatch from Pingmeng, The Wall Street Journal, August
11, 1983.

67 Bob Secter dispatch from Lang Son, International

Herald Tribune, May 12, 1983.

68 Paul A. Gigot dispatch from Hong Kong, Asian Wall

Street Journal, April 20, 1983; and Mark Baker dispatch
from Beijing, The Age, April 23, 1983.

69 Christopher S. Wren dispatch from Beijing,

International Herald Tribune, April 20,1983.

70 These remarks were conveyed by CCP General Secretary

Hu Yaobang in the course of a visit to Romania and
Yugoslavia in May 1983; Nayan Chanda, "A Threat from
Peking," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1983, p.
13.

71 Krasnava Zveda, May 31, 1983 cited by Chanda, "A

Threat from Peking," op. cit., p. 13.

72 Paul Quinn-Judge dispatch from Bangkok, Christian

Science Monitor, June 13, 1983.

73 Mark Baker dispatch from Beijing, The Age, June 29,

1983.
  36 

74 Jacques Bekaert writing in The Bangkok Post, January

15, 1984.

75 Ibid.

76 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Memorandum On China's Hostile Policy vis-a-vis
Vietnam, March 10, 1986.

77 Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra Times,

April 3, 1984; Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The
Canberra Times, April 4, 1984 and Mark Baker dispatch
from Beijing, The Age, April 5, 1984.

78 Mark Baker dispatch from Beijing, The Age, April 5,

1984; and Paul Quinn-Judge, "Peking's Tit for Tat," Far
Eastern Economic Review, April 19, 1984, pp. 14-15.

79 Paul Quinn-Judge, "Buffers on the Border," Far

Eastern Economic Review, May 17, 1984, p. 52;
Department of Foreign Affairs [Australia], "Current
China/Vietnam Conflict," Backgrounder, No. 431, May 23,
1984.

80 Trung Dung, "Determined to Defeat Beijing's War on

Encroachment and Occupation Along Our Border," Tap Chi
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (January 1985), translated by JPRS
SEA 85-080 (May 21, 1985), p. 84.

81 Asiaweek, June 29, 1984, p. 16; and "New Salvoes on

the Sino-Viet Front," Asiaweek, July 27,1984, p. 15.

82 "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, August

2, 1984.

83 Paul Quinn-Judge, "Borderline Cases," Far Eastern

Economic Review, June 21, 1984, p. 26.

84 Radio Hanoi cited by The Nation Review [Bangkok],

August 7, 1984.

85 Richard D. Fisher, "Brewing Conflict in the South

China Sea," Asian Studies Center [Heritage Foundation]
Backgrounder, No. 17, October 25, 1984. Vietnamese
  37 

landing ships were joined by the Soviet amphibious

assault ship Aleksandr Nikoleyev, the ASW carrier
Minsk, and other combatants.

86 Fisher, op. cit. The Chinese squadron consisted of

two frigates, a troop ship and an oiler.

87 Mark Baker dispatch from Beijing, The Age, May

7,1984.

88 Pham Van Dong interview with Patricia J. Sethi,

Newsweek, May 14, 1984, pp. 11-13.

89 Xinhua Commentator, "No Basis for Anti-China

Charges," Beijing Review, no. 23, June 4,1984, pp. 12-
13.

90 Quinn-Judge, "Borderline Cases," op. cit., p. 26.

91 Mark Baker dispatch from Beijing, The Age, July 26,

1984.

92 John McBeth, "Raid Into Thailand," Far Eastern

Economic Review, April 19, 1984, p. 14-15; and "Hanoi
on the Offensive," Asiaweek, April 20, 1984, pp. 7-10.

93 The Vietnamese began their assault on March 24th, on

March 26th Thai air, artillery and ground forces
counter-attacked; on April 3rd China announced its full
support for Thailand; on April 5th Thailand finally
expelled intruding Vietnamese troops and secured the
southern end of Phra Palai, including hill 642, in the
tri-border region. Quinn-Judge, "Peking's Tit for Tat,"
op. cit., pp. 14-15; Asiaweek, April 13, 1984, p. 8;
Reuter dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra Times, April
13, 1984; and McBeth, "Raid Into Thailand," op. cit.,
p. 14-15.

94 Quinn-Judge, "Borderline Cases," op. cit, p. 26.

95 See for example the chronology of incidents for the

last quarter of 1984 presented in Vietnam Courier
[Hanoi], no. 2 (1985).

96 Reported by a senior Vietnamese officer, AFP

  38 

dispatch from Hanoi, January 28,1985.

97 Figures were gathered from Vietnamese press and

radio reports for this period. The data are
incomplete, contradictory and missing. These should be
taken as a rough approximation of the intensity of
Chinese shelling. The total of shells fired, based on
irregular reports throughout the year, does not match
Vietnamese figures given for the entire year. Two sets
of figures are therefore provided for the "average"
number of shells fired per day.

98 Hanoi Radio home service, December 26,1985.

99 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Memorandum On China's Hostile Policy vis-a-vis
Vietnam, March 10, 1986.

100 Ibid.

101 Communique of the Vietnam Committee to Investigate

the War Crimes of Chinese Expansionists and
Hegemonists, July 16, 1985.

102 Sqd. Ldr. Prasoong Soonsiri, after returning from

Bejing, declared that China had pledged to keep up
heavy military pressure on the border until Vietnam
withdrew from Kampuchea.

103 Vietnam News Agency cited by BBC, Summary of World

Broadcasts, Monitoring Report, FE/8053/i, September 11,
1985; and Radio Hanoi cited by Jane's Defence Weekly,
October 5, 1985.

104 AP dispatch from Beijing, International Herald

Tribune, September 12, 1985. Xinhua dispatch,
September 13, 1985 cites Hoang Tung as declaring that
"(t)he time has come for Sino-Vietnbamese talks on
normalisation of relations." In rebuffing this
suggestion, Xinhua revealed that Vietnam had proposed
secret talks earlier.

105 "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review,

October 10, 1985.
  39 

106 Hanoi home service, December 12, 1985.

107 Xinhua in English, December 30, 1985.

108 Bangkok World, December 14, 1985 cited by BBC,

Summary of World Broadcasts, Monitoring Report,
FE/8134/i, December 14,1985.

109 Figures from the Vietnam Committee to Investigate

the War Crimes of Chinese Expansionists and Hegemonists
cited by Jane's Defence Weekly, February 1,1986.

110 Communique of the Vietnam Committee to Investigate

the War Crimes of Chinese Expansionists and
Hegemonists, June 7, 1985.

111 Commentary by Vu Dinh Vinh carried by Hanoi home

service, January 8, 1987.

112 "Fresh Fighting on a Troubled Border," Asiaweek,

January 18, 1987, p. 23.

113 AFP dispatch from Beijing, The Canberra Times,

October 6, 1986.

114 At least three confidential approaches to various

diplomatic intermediaries - Austria, Rumania and Sweden
- have been reported in the press; see the author's
"Indochinese Reactions to Gorbachev's Vladivostok
Initiatives", Paper delivered to "Gorbachev's
Vladivostok Initiative: New Directions in Asia and the
Pacific?" University College Symposium, The University
of New South Wales, held at the Australian Defence
Force Academy, Campbell, A.C.T., March 20, 1987.

115 "Fresh Fighting on a Troubled Border," Asiaweek,

January 18,1987, p. 23; and Peter Eng dispatch from Cao
Bang, The Canberra Times, January 9, 1987.

116 Hanoi home service, October 29, 1986.

117 "A Crescedno for Withdrawal," Asiaweek, November

2,1986, p. 11.

118 Shortly after Izvestia carried an interview with

  40 

deputy foreign minister Vo Dong Giang who was quoted as

saying he would make the utmost effort to restore
relations between China and Vietnam.

119 Quoted by Radio Peace and Progress in Standard

Chinese, November 7, 1986.

120 Renmin Ribao, January 13, 1987, in reply to a Quan

Doi Nhan Dan commentary which suggested that "dialogue
is better than confrontation."

121 AFP dispatch from Bangkok, January 12, 1987;

commentary by Vu Dinh Vinh carried by Hanoi home
service, January 8, 1987; and Radio Hanoi, January
9,1987 which made clear that the 1,500 figure included
killed, wounded and captured.

122 Peter Eng disptach from Quang Ha, Cao Bang

province, The Canberra Times, January 9, 1987.

123 Murray Hiebert, "A Border Flare-Up," Far Eastern

Economic Review, January 22, 1987, p. 26.

124 Robert Thomson dispatch from Beijing, The Sydney

Morning Herald, January 8, 1987.
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[This version: 18 March 1994; revised January 9, 2010]