Sunteți pe pagina 1din 10

1.

Police Power

Binay vs Domingo; G.R. No. 92389


Sept 11, 1991
Ponente: Paras, J.
CASE: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Commission on Audit
FACTS
CoA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement
of funds for the implementation.

Resolution No. 60 is a Burial Assistance Program for poor families (gross family
income <P2000 a month) and receive 500 cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.
Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay contend that the intendent disbursments fall within the
twin principles of police power and parens patriae.
The CoA said that it sees no perceptible connection or relation between the
objectives sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of
the inhabitants of Makati.
ISSUES

WoN Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause?

RATIO

YES Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution 243 is a paragon the
continuing program of our government towards social justice.
o The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty
o The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power.
o No violation of equal protection clause
Police power
a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government.
Founded largely on the maxims,
o Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas- So use your own as not to
injure another's property
o Salus populi est suprema lex- The safety of the people is the
supreme law
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.

Inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations


o Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there
must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which
is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid

delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or


be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their
creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the
things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the
safety of the people.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
clause
o clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure
the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149,
177 and 208, BP 337)
Police power
o power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.
o most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers
o In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government
o It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions.
(Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719)
o On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of
the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated
community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the
beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very
foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896)
However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal
progress of a democratic way of life

US vs Pomeya

o
Ichong vs Hernandez

Police Power
so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep.
It derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does
not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive with self-protection and survival,
o most positive and active of all governmental processes
o most essential, insistent and illimitable
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare
in this constantly changing and progressive world,
o so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police
power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or
achieve interest or welfare.
o So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof.
most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Due Process
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power.
o Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved?

Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the


legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive?
Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power?
Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it
not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the
law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

DOCTRINE
Equal protection is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality
Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
FACTS

RA 1180: An Act to Regulate the Retail Business


o Nationalizes the retail trade business
Main provisions
1. Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines and
associations, partnerships or corporations capital of which are not

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the


retail trade
Exception: aliens actually engage in business on May 15, 1954 are
allowed to continue business unless their licenses are forfeited, until
death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for 10
years after approval of the Act or until expiration of term in case of
juridical persons
Exception: citizens and juridical entities of US
Forfeiture of licenses for violation of laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry
Prohibition against establishment by aliens engaged in retail business
of additional stores or branches of additional stores or branches
Require aliens actually engaged in retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
Provision allowing heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
who die, to continue business for 6 months for purposes of liquidation

Petitioner RA 1180 is unconstitutional because:


1. Denies alien residents equal protection and deprives them of liberty and
property without due process
2. Subject of act not expressed in title
3. Act violates international and treaty obligations of RP
4. Against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession and requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
Solicitor-General and City Fiscal of Manila:
1. Valid exercise of police power
2. Act only has one subject in the title
3. No treaty or international obligation infringed
4. RE: Hereditary succession only the form is affected but value of property
not impaired
ISSUE/HELD:
1. W/N the exercise of police power violates due process and equal
protection of the laws
NO, difference in alien aims and purposes is sufficient basis for
distinction
Economic problems sought to be remedied
Mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between
the alien and the national as a trader
Alien replaced native retailer
o Statistics: Alien participation has steadily increased during the
years

2.

Alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official


statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino
community
3. Danger of alien control and dominance in retail endanger the national
interest
4. Present dominance of alien retailer becomes a potential source of danger
on occasions of war or other calamity
Law is not a product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination but
a legitimate desire and determination of the people to free the nation
from economic situation
Aim or purpose of stay of alien for pure gain and profit: neither
illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country, lacking sympathy and
prevents him from taking advantage
Alien does not make a genuine contribution to national income and
wealth
2. W/N citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification
YES, Aliens do not possess the sympathetic consideration and regard
for customers with whom they come in contact with or patriotic desire
to bolster the nations economy except in so far as it enhances their
profit nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the
land
3. W/N exclusion in the future of aliens from retail trade is unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner
which aliens are engaged
TEST OF REASONABLENESS appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into
effect
Removal and eradication of shackles of foreign economic control and
domination noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue
Part of scope of legislative power
Principal objective in preamble of consti conservation of the
patrimony of the nation
Sec 8 Art XIV
o Nationalization of retail trade only continues nationalistic
protective policy
Provision of law is not unreasonable
o Law is prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in retail to continue during the rest of
their lives
o The right and privilege is denied to those only convicted of
certain offenses

2.

4. W/N there is a defect in the title of the law


NO, General rule: use of general terms in the title of the bill and title
need not be an index to the entire content of the law
5. W/N there is a violation of international treaties and obligations
NO violation of the Charter of the UN and of the Declaration of HR adopted by the
UN Gen Ass
Treaty is always subject to qualification and amendment by
subsequent law
Most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic
trade are adopted
CONCLUSION
Law enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control
Not only appropriate but actual necessary
Provisions of the law are clearly embraced in title
Cant be void if theres a supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty actually entered into in the subject and police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered to by any treaty
Agustin vs Edu
Petitioner Lleovillo Agustin
Respondent:
Romeo Edu (Land Transportation Commissioner)
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister of National Defense)
Alfredo Juinio (Minister
Of
Public Works, Transportation
Communications)
Baltazar Aquino (Minister of Public Highways)
FACTS

The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Safety and the
United Nations Organization recommended the enactment of
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.
The Philippines ratified said convention through PD No. 207.
It was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 which allows owners of motor
vehicles to procure from any source as long as it fits the specifications provided by
the Land Transportation Commission.
Respondent Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, issued Memorandum
Circular No. 2 which provides for the implementation of LOI 229 as amended,
Petitioner, an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car Model 13035, already
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which
could well serve as early warning device, assailed LOI 229 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 and filed a petition for prohibition with a writ of prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction on the following grounds:
1. LOI 229 violates provision and delegation of police power because it is
oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and therefore
unconstitutional.
2. It will make manufacturers and dealers of early warning device (EWD)
instant millionaires. Owners of motor vehicles can provide practical
substitutes to the required EWD.
ISSUE

RATIO

and

On December 2, 1974, President Marcos issued on Letter of Instruction No.


229 requiring all motor vehicles to be equipped with and early warning
device which shall be used whenever a vehicle is stalled, disabled or
parked for 30 minutes or more.
There are two reasons for the issuance of the letter:
1. Statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious
road accidents is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor
vehicles without early warning device

WON LOI 229 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 exceed the proper exercise
of states police power

No. Police power is the states authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with the personal liberty and property in order to promote
general welfare (Calalang v. Williams). It is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety and general welfare of the public (Primicias v. Furgoso).
The particular police power that was being challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. The president presented the
necessary statistics to back his claim of the need to issue LOI 229.
It is also not true that LOI 229 as amended forces owners of motor vehicles
to purchase EWD. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity,
motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this EWD as
long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in LOI 229.
The alleged infringement of fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power is equally without any support from well-settled legal
doctrines. To avoid any taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a

standard, which implies at the very least that the legislative itself
determines and lays down the fundamental policy. LOI 229 contains such
standard which the Land Transportation Commission followed in the
issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2.
*Finally, The declaration of Principles in the Constitution provides:
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such character.
Since we ratified it, we have to abide by its provisions.

People vs Siton

2. Power of Taxation
Mactan Cebu
PBCOM
Commissioner v Court of Appeals
Gerochi v Department of Energy

3. Eminent Domain
Eslaban vs. De Onorio

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals,


249 SCRA 538 GR No. 102976
Ponente: Feliciano, J.
TC
Dismissed petition of ISA
Denied motion for reconsideration
CA
Affirmed TC
SC
Reversed and Set aside CA decision and Remanded to the court a quo,
substituting RP for petitioner ISA

CASE IN BRIEF
Petitioner ISA created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and
promote the iron and steel industry.
Initial term of 5 years and extended for 10 more years to expire in Aug 11,
1988.
In 1983, ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private
respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC).
While trial was ongoing, ISA would expire and MCFC filed a motion to
dismiss the case contending that no valid judgement could be rendered
against ISA which had ceased to be a judicial person.
SC held that RP can substitute for petitioner ISA.
o ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities
are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and
hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory
provision having been shown to have mandated succession
thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

FACTS

Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to


develop and promote the iron and steel industry.
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August
9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term
was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of


the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly
owned by the National Government, embarked on the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was
considered a priority and major industrial project of the government.
Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was
issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in
Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a nonoperational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November
16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed, and LOI No 1277 directed ISA
to exercise its power of eminent domain under PD 272 and initiate
expropriation proceedings.
Sept 17, 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favour of
ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied
by MCFC.
Case proceeded to trial. However, statutory existence of ISA expired on
Aug 11, 1988.
MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss contending that no valid judgment
could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person.
TC: granted MCFC's motion to dismiss
o Based on Rules of Court stating that "only natural or juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
case."
o Also referred to non-compliance by petitioner ISA with the
requirements of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Reconsideration of the TCs Order
o Petitioner ISA contending that despite the expiration of its term,
its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs
could be completed.
o In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the
Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to
be substituted for petitioner ISA. In this connection, ISA referred
to a letter from the Office of the President dated 28 September
1988 which especially directed the Solicitor General to continue
the expropriation case.

o Motion for reconsideration denied by TC


CA affirmed the order of dismissal of the TC
o Held that petitioner ISA, "a government regulatory agency
exercising sovereign functions," did not have the same rights as
an ordinary corporation and that the ISA, unlike corporations
organized under the Corporation Code
Not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after
expiration of its legally mandated term, with the result
that upon expiration of its term on 11 August 1987, ISA
was "abolished and [had] no more legal authority to
perform governmental functions."
Action for expropriation could not prosper because the
basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its
delegated authority to expropriate, had become
ineffective as a result of the delegate's dissolution, and
could not be continued in the name of Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the SG.
o Held that it was premature for the trial court to have ruled that
the expropriation suit was not for a public purpose, considering
that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.

ISSUE
WON the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of
the expiration of ISA's term?

RATIO
YES. Allowed the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for
petitioner Iron and Steel Authority and for further proceedings
Who may be parties?
o Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
Who May Be Parties:
(a) Only natural or juridical persons
(b) Entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action
ISA is (b) and also under PD No. 272 contains express authorization to ISA to
commence expropriation proceedings.

Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally
associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD
No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in
fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the
Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate

form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,


sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly
vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic.
The Court considered that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or
delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical
person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as legal personality.
When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,
duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g.,
devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to
some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as
folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
Republic.
ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent
or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the
Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate
user of the properties involved.
The Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a
little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself
require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the
legislative department of the government,
o Court held that no new legislative act is necessary should the
Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to
continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings
o The legislative authority enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the President of the Philippines to
exercise, or cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain

1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect


at the time of the commencement of the present
expropriation
Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the
President of the Philippines

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in


force has substantially reproduced the foregoing
provision in the following terms
Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. The
President shall determine when it is necessary
or advantageous to exercise the power of
eminent domain in behalf of the National
Government, and direct the Solicitor General,
whenever he deems the action advisable, to
institute expopriation proceedings in the proper
court.
President, exercising the power duly delegated under
both the 1917 and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes
in effect made a determination that it was necessary and
advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain
in behalf of the Government of the Republic and
accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed
with the suit.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil v Comelec

Telecommunication
B. State Immunity from Suit
1. When is a suit against a state
Republic v. Sandoval
G.R. No. 84607
Date of Promulgation: March 19, 1993
Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.
Petition: Suit
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, Gen. Ramon Montano, Gen. Alfredo Lim,
Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Col. Edgar Dula Torres, Col. Cezar Nazareno, Maj. Filemon
Gasmen, Pat. Nicanor Abando, PFC Serafin Cebu, Jr., Gen. Brigido Paredes, Col.
Rogelio Monforte, PFC Antonio Lucero, Pat. Jose Mendiola, Pat. Nelson Tuason,
Police Corporal Panfilo Rogos, Police Lt. Juan B. Beltran, Pat. Noel Managbao,
Marine Third Class Trainee (3CT) Nolito Nogato, 3CT Alejandro B. Naguio, Jr., Efren
Arcillas, 3CT Agerico Luna, 3CT Basilio Borja, 3CT Manolito Luspo, 3CT Cristituto
Gervacio, 3CT Manuel Dela Cruz, Jr., Marine (CDC) Bn., (Civil Disturbance Control),
Mobile Dispersal Team (MDT), Lt. Romeo Paquinto, Lt. Laonglaang Goce, Majr.
Demetrio De La Cruz, Police Captain Rodolfo Naval, John Doe, Richard Doe, Roberto

Doe and other Does


Respondent: Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC Manila Branch IX, Erlinda C. Caylao,
Anatalia Angeles Perez, Myrna Bautista, Cipriana Evangelio, Elma Grampa, Amelia
Gutierrez, Nemesio Lakindanum, Purita Yumul, Miguel Arabe, Teresita Arjona,
Ronaldo Campomanes and Carmencita Ardoni Vda. De Caylao, Rogelio Domunico in
their capacity as heirs of the deceased (Roberto C. Caylao, Sonny Boy Perez,
Dionesio Bautista, Dante Evangelio, Adelfa Aribe, Danilo Arjona, Vicente
Campomanes, Ronilo Domunico) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured
victims) Eddie Aguinaldo, Felicismo Albasia, Napoleon Bautista, Danilo Cruz, Eddie
Mensola, Albert Pitalbo, Vicente Rosel, Ruben Carriedo, Joy Cruz, Honorio Labamba,
Jr., Efren Macaraig, Solomon Manaloto, Romeo Duran, Nilo Tagubat, Jun Carsellar,
Joey Clemente, Gerardo Coyoca, Luisito Daco, Benjamin Dela Cruz, Arthur Fontanilla,
Wilson Garcia, Carlos Siray, Jose Perras, Tomas Vallos, Arnold Enaje, Marianita
Dimapilis, Francisco Angeles, Marcelo Esguerra, Jose Ferrer, Rodel de Guia, Elvis
Mendoza, Victoriano Quijano, Joey Adime, Resieno Adul, Alberto Tarsona, Carlos
Alcantara, Mamerto Alias, Emelito Almonte, Benilda Alonuevo, Emma Abadillo,
Reynaldo Caballes, Jr., Jaime Caldeto, Fabian Cantelejo, Rodrigo Carabara, Enrique
Delgado, Jun Delos Santos, Mario Demasaca, Francisco Gonzales, Ernesto Gonzales,
Ramiro Jamil, Juan Lucena, Perlito Salaysay, Johnny Santos, Marcelo Santos, Emil
Sayao, Bayani Umali, Remigio Mahalin, Bong Manlulo, Armando Matienzo, Carlo
Medina, Lito Novenario, and Rosella Robale
Facts:
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what
they called "genuine agrarian reform". On January 22, 1987, the group decided to
march to Malacaang to air their demands, joined by other leftist groups (which
were infiltrated by CPP/NPA). There was a marchers-police confrontation which
resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded.
President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11 creating the Citizens
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The
Commission recommended the prosecution of the head of the rally for holding the
demonstration without permit, to the military officers involved who ordered the
unnecessary firing, and for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be
compensated by the government.
Pres. Cory Aquino also had acts and utterances which were sympathetic to the
cause.
Issues/Held:
WON the State has waived its immunity from suit - NO
WON this case qualifies as a suit against the State - NO
Ratio:

Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution says that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The Citizens Mendiola Commission created by Administrative Order No.
11 was only for investigation purposes; its findings and recommendations do not
bind the State immediately. The speeches of President Corazon Aquino are also not
binding on the State, they dont amount to any waiver or admission of liability of
the State.
It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. While the
Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government.
The military officials are personally held liable for the damages for their official
functions ceased the moment they exceeded to their authority.
Decision:
Petitions are dismissed.
Notes:
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: (Doctrine of immunity of the government from
suit expressly provided in the Constitution)
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government.
Phil Agila Satellite vs. Lichauco
Department of Health vs. Phil Pharmawealth
Farolan vs. Court of Appeals

Lansang vs. Court of Appeals


Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind,
Inc., and Jose Iglesias, respondents.

No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.


Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit
must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment
against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a
positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for
having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
2. Express Consent

February 23, 2000


Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc vs UP
Quisumbing, J:
Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded
a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear
because there was no document or instrument involved.
With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J.
Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement
with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.
The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias,
allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he
was deceived into signing the notice.
On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the
complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without
its consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled
that a government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to
protest such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his
authority.
Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as
Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued
without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment
of private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.