People vs Mamantak

G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009

Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to
a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked
for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat,
Christopher, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from
his mothers sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for
him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the
child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a
woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for
P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when
Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the
ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs
Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresas niece. Together with the
PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and
proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia, two women
came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa
and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a
certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in
Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to
Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them
that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused.
Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher

was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that
the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes
with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer
recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was,
the boy gave a Muslim name with Taurak as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her
niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney
which was parked outside, under Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the
ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF
team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other
hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her
third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged
with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of
the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November
30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and
accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario
represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited
to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for
the victims freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision
dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand
for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending
the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.

G.R. No. 124077

September 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADORACION SEVILLA y JOSON @ BABY and JOEL GASPAR y CABRAL, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic review here is a decision1 handed down by Branch 262 of the Regional Trial Court in
Cabanatuan City, convicting appellants Adoracion Sevilla y Joson @ Baby and Joel Gaspar y Cabral for
violation of Section 8, Article II, Republic Act No. 64253 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and
sentencing both appellants to the supreme penalty of death.
Filed on September 17, 1995 by Prosecutor Amelia C. Tiu, the Information indicting the appellants,
Adoracion Sevilla y Joson @ Baby and Joel Gaspar y Cabral, alleges:
"That on or about the 15th day of September, 1995, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding and abetting each other, without authority of law, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of
marijuana dried leaves with fruiting tops approximately weighing four thousand (4,000) grams.
CONTRARY TO LAW."5
Upon arraignment6 on October 6, 1995 with the assistance of their respective lawyers, appellants
pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, resulting in the rendition of
the judgment of conviction disposing thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, and finding both accused Adoracion Sevilla Y Joson and accused Joel Gaspar Y
Cabral guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 8, Art. II, Republic Act 6425,
as amended by Republic Act 7659, both of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs of suit.

The 4,000 grams, more or less of marijuana is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED."7
Evidence for the People upon which the trial court anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the
testimonies of: 1) ROGELIO S. DE VERA, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the
3rd Regional Field Unit, Nueva Ecija-Aurora Narcotics Command (NARCOM) District Office in Cabanatuan
City; 2) Police Senior Inspector ANDREI FELIX, the Provincial Officer of the NARCOM for Aurora and
Nueva Ecija; 3) SPO1 NESTOR PINEDA, an officer of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) assigned at
Cabanatuan City; 4) DANILO TUMANGAN, Barangay Captain of Bantug Norte, Cabanatuan City; and 5)
P/Capt. DAISY P. BABOR, a forensic chemist assigned at the PNP Camp Olivas in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
The facts and circumstances sued upon are stated by the Solicitor General in the Consolidated
Appellees Brief8as follows:
"On September 15, 1995, at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, a team of police officers composed of
P/Sr. Insp. Andrei Felix and SPO3 Rogelio de Vera of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), and SPO2
Padilla and SPO1 Pineda of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), arrived at 904 Martinez Street, Bantug
Norte, Cabanatuan City, to effect the arrest of Adoracion Sevilla (TSN, October 9, 1995, p. 12).
Prior to the operation, P/Sr. Insp. Felix, being the Provincial Officer of the NARCOM for the provinces of
Aurora and Nueva Ecija, had disseminated to his confidential agents a list of suspected drug dealers.
Among those in the list was Adoracion Sevilla who had a warrant for her arrest issued in Criminal Case
No. 1317 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 6425 (TSN, October 9, 1995, p. 8).
Thus, when P/Sr. Insp. Felix was informed by one of his confidential agents at about 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of September 15, 1995, of the exact whereabouts of Adoracion Sevilla, he immediately
instructed one of his men to verify from the CIS if the warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 1317
was still unserved. On being told that it was still unserved, he then coordinated with the CIS to effect the
arrest of Adoracion Sevilla. Thus, the composite team of police officers from NARCOM and CIS was
formed and proceeded to 904 Martinez Street, Bantug Norte, Cabanatuan City (TSN, October 9, 1995,
pp. 8-10).
The police officers, who were in civilian clothes, were allowed inside the house by Adoracion Sevilla
herself who was seated at the sala. She had a male companion, later identified as Joel Gaspar, who was
standing near the stairs. After the police officers had introduced themselves and stated their purpose,
P/Sr. Insp. Felix observed Adoracion Sevilla instructing Joel Gaspar to bring upstairs a box of Ginebra San
Miguel which was lying on the floor beside him. Suspecting the box to contain illegal drugs, P/Sr. Insp.
Felix followed Joel Gaspar upstairs and there asked the latter what were the contents of the box. Joel
Gaspar readily replied that the box contained marijuana. Joel Gaspar then opened the box and
voluntarily handed it to P/ Sr. Insp. Felix, telling the latter that the box belonged to Adoracion Sevilla.
Inside the box were four (4) bricks of dried marijuana leaves and flowering tops (TSN, October 9, 1995,
pp. 12-15).
Both Adoracion Sevilla and Joel Gaspar were arrested and the bricks of dried marijuana leaves and
flowering tops confiscated. Adoracion Sevilla was brought directly to the office of the CIS while Joel

Gaspar was first brought to the Barangay Hall where his arrest was blottered and, in the presence of the
Barangay officials, the bricks of dried marijuana leaves and flowering tops were inventoried and a
receipt therefor prepared (TSN, October 9, 1995, pp. 15-16). The confiscated articles were consequently
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon physical, chemical and confirmatory tests conducted by
P/Capt. Daisy P. Babor, a forensic chemist, the articles were found to be marijuana, a prohibited drug
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 12-13; Exhibit E)"9
For the defense, appellants took the witness stand.
Expectedly, appellant Sevilla presented a different version of what led to the indictment. In her
Appellants Brief,10Sevilla theorized:
"xxx she was in Cabanatuan City on September 15,1995, particularly at Bantug Norte in the apartment of
her daughter Micaela Santos. She had just arrived from the PJGMRMC hospital where she had gone for
treatment as she was then bleeding. She had just seated in the sala resting for about ten minutes when
several persons numbering about twelve, came, introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and
presented her a warrant of arrest. Some of the agents went at the back of the house and at the kitchen
where they searched every cabinet overturning in the process, the two (2) boxes under the stairs.
Others went upstairs. She did not know what they did upstairs but she heard noise. She asked the
agents if they had a search warrant but they answered that there is no need for a search warrant. The
agents stayed there for 15 to 20 minutes. When they left, Adoracion Sevilla and her companion were
brought with them. Sevilla was first brought to the CIS Office, then at the NARCOM office. Thereat, the
agents typed some papers which they forced her to sign but she refused because it was stated therein
that the house as well as the marijuana belonged to her. She denied seeing the box presented by the
prosecution and claimed that she only saw it in Court. She likewise denied owning the box containing
the marijuana. She did not know who owned the same (TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 2-11)."11
For his part, appellant Gaspar recounted that he was inside the toilet washing his clothes at the time of
the incident, when he heard Sevilla conversing with someone. Upon opening the door of the toilet, he
saw a man standing in front of Sevilla and several other men on the stairs going up the second floor of
the apartment. Then, the men descended from the upper portion of the house with a carton box which
contained the marijuana complained of.12 Gaspar averred that the men were already searching the
house when he saw them.13
Gaspar testified that he did not see who carried the said box upstairs even as he denied any knowledge
regarding the source thereof. According to him, it was only on that day that he went to the house at
Bantug Norte, Cabanatuan City. He had just arrived from Bulacan with the son of his co-accused,14 who
he had befriended at the Luneta Park in Manila when he was a "stow-away" during the previous
summer.
Additionally, Gaspar declared that he was forced to sign a document stating that the box containing
marijuana belonged to his co-accused, Adoracion Sevilla,15 and was requested to point at the marijuana
leaves spread on a table at the CIS office so that pictures of the same could be taken.16 He stressed that
he was not informed of his constitutional rights nor was he given an opportunity to engage the services
of a lawyer during the questioning at the barangay hall17 and at the CIS office.18

Relying on the presumption that the arresting officers performed their official duties regularly and
rejecting appellants defense of denial, the trial court convicted appellants and sentenced them to
DEATH.
Appellant Adoracion Sevilla urges the Court to acquit her on the sole assignment of error, that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ADORACION SEVILLA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.19
Appellant Joel Gaspar theorized that:
"1. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED INSPITE OF THE ABSENCE OF SEARCH WARRANT;
2. THAT EVEN ASSUMING FOR ARGUENDO (SIC) THAT JOEL GASPAR Y CABRAL WAS IN POSSESSION OF
BOX (SIC) CONTAINING PROHIBITED DRUGS BUT HE WAS ONLY INSTRUCTED BY ADORACION SEVILLA TO
BRING UPSTAIRS (SIC) AND NO PROOF HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THIS BOX (SIC)."20
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, the Court is of the finding and
conclusion that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From the aforecited constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that as a general rule, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers or effects of any individual. In People vs. Aruta,21 this Court ruled that "this constitutional
guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites
for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest."
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution of this Republic succinctly declares under its
Article III, Section 3(2) that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." Consequently, evidence derived from an
illegal search is placed beyond the Courts consideration, as a practical means to enforce the
constitutional injunction and to discourage violations of basic civil rights under the guise of legitimate
law enforcement.
Of course, there are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the absence of a warrant.
Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure may be
effected, to wit:
1. Search which is incidental to a lawful arrest ( Rule 126, Section 12, Rules of Court);

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view";

3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.22
The enumeration above being exceptions to the general rule, their application must be limited to the
situations clearly falling within their contemplation. Furthermore, what is sought to be protected by the
proscription being a basic right guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land, no less, the requirement
of a warrant must be construed strictly and cannot lightly be disregarded. To do otherwise would
unnecessarily infringe upon individuals personal liberty and encroach upon a basic right "so deserving
of full protection and vindication".23
In the case at bar, the prosecution posits that the search conducted in subject house at Bantug Norte,
which yielded the corpus delicti of the present accusation, is incidental to the lawful arrest of Sevilla
who had been long wanted by the police in Criminal Case No. 1317. It is the theory of the State that the
act of Gaspar in picking up the box containing the marijuana in question and bringing it to the second
floor of said apartment, allegedly upon Sevillas instruction, gave the arresting officers probable cause to
act upon the idea that prohibited drugs were in such box.
First of all, the Court does not fully subscribe to the submission of the prosecution that the search was in
the course of a lawful arrest. With respect thereto, the Court finds the evidence for the People to be
conflicting. While P/Sr. Inspector Felix and SPO3 De Vera are steadfast in their claim that the search they
conducted was borne of a reasonable suspicion that the box which Gaspar carted away contained
marijuana, SPO1 Pineda, on the other hand, declared quite candidly that the NARCOM officers joined
them in serving the warrant on Sevilla for the specific purpose of making a search. Pineda testified thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL MACARAIG:
Q. When was the time this particular warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla for Violation of Republic
Act No. 6425 served ?
A. September 15, 1995 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sir.
Q. Will you please state how was or what was the manner this particular warrant of arrest implemented
(sic) ?
ATTORNEY BANSALE:
No basis, Your Honor.
FISCAL MACARAIG:

The witness has testified that they served the warrant of arrest, we are asking the manner or
implementation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
We served it at her residence in Bantug, Sir.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
Q. How do you know that it is her residence?
A. We were accompanied by an informant who stayed in that house, Sir.
COURT:
Who stated that she is staying in that house?
A. It was the informant who told us, Your Honor.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
Q. Were you alone in serving the warrant of arrest?
A. We were four (4), Sir.
Q. Who were your companions in serving the warrant of arrest?
A. SPOII Padilla, Capt. Felix and SPOIII Rivera,24 a member of the NARCOM, Sir.
Q. Who in particular among this group are the members of the Narcotics Command?
A. Capt. Felix and SPOIII Rivera, Sir.
Q. How about SPOII Padilla?
A. He is a member of the 302nd CISC, Sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that your office has a copy of the warrant of arrest against four (4) criminal cases
(sic), against Adoracion Sevilla, how were you able to effect the warrant of arrest?
A. Because according to the informant, she lives there and so we went in Bantug, Sir.
Q. Is this informant that you are talking about, is he or she an informant of the CIS?(sic)
A. No, Sir.
Q. To your knowledge, was he or she an informant of the NARCOM?
A. No also, Sir.
Q. Why were the NARCOM elements became (sic) a member of the composite team who served the
warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla?
A. Because according to our informant, there is marijuana in the house of Adoracion Sevilla, Sir.

Q. In other words, it is a joint group undertaken (sic) in the office of the Narcom and CIS regarding the
serving of the warrant of arrest?
ATTY. BANSALE:
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A. Yes, Sir. 25
xxx

xxx

xxx

CROSS EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY ATTY. RAUL N. BANSALE:

ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. How many vehicles did you use in going to the house where you arrested Adoracion Sevilla on
September 15, 1995?
FISCAL MACARAIG:
May we know the materiality of this question, Your Honor because the question has not testified by the
witness (sic), as to whether there were vehicles used!
COURT :
Witness may answer.
A. Two (2) vehicles, Sir.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. What kind of vehicles?
A. Two (2) owner type jeeps, Sir.
Q. How many persons were riding in that jeep when you served the warrant of arrest on September 15,
1995?
A. Two (2) passengers for every jeep, Sir.
COURT:
Q. You mean the Narcom Officers were in a jeep and the members of the CIS were also in another jeep?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. Does that include the driver?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You said that you were accompanied by an informant, how come that you were saying that there
were only two (2) occupants in a jeep?
A. The informant went ahead and was riding in a tricycle, Sir.
Q. So that, in serving the warrant of arrest, you used three (3) vehicles, including the tricycle?
A. Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q. What did you think of using two (2) vehicles when you were only to serve a warrant of arrest?
A. Because there was also a marijuana (sic) in their house, Sir.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. And because of that report, that was the reason why the Narcom agents joined your team ?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And the purpose of the Narcom agents in joining your team is to search and get the marijuana?
A. Yes, Sir.26
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. When did this informant inform you about this Adoracion Sevilla?
A. On that same day we served the warrant of arrest, Sir.
Q. You said that this informant is not connected with the Philippine National Police, do you know the
reason why said informant gave you the information regarding the whereabouts of Adoracion Sevilla, as
well as the marijuana in the house of Adoracion Sevilla?
A. I do not know the reason, Sir.
Q. Did you try to secure a search warrant with respect to the information of marijuana by the
informant?
A. No, Sir.
Q. You did not advise the Narcom agents to secure a search warrant with respect to the seizure of
marijuana?
A. No, sir, what we are concerned only is the warrant of arrest (sic).27
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. What happened after you served the warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla?

A. The Narcom agents searched the house, Sir.

Q. Did they also search the upper portion of the house?
FISCAL MACARAIG:
Your Honor, the witness is no longer in the position to answer that.
COURT:
Okey, what did you understand to (sic) the word "search"?
A. Searching of the house, Your Honor.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. Did they search the other parts of the house?
FISCAL MACARAIG:
He is incompetent, Your Honor. How can he knows (sic) if he is guarding Adoracion Sevilla?
COURT:
Sustained. Do not use him as your witness.
ATTY. BANSALE:
That would be all, Your Honor.28
As can be gathered from the above testimony, the NARCOM officers had every intention of conducting a
search in subject house at Bantug Norte even before they proceeded to the place to arrest Sevilla. Per
SPO1 Pinedas account, they received prior information that there was marijuana in the said house at
Bantug Norte and it was precisely on the basis of such information the NARCOM officers joined in the
service of the warrant. In short, the NARCOM officers were of the impression that they were to search
the house and yet, they failed to even try to secure a search warrant as required by law although there
was opportunity to do so.
Then too, except for the admission that no search warrant was ever procured, SPO1 Pinedas revelation
traversed that of SPO3 De Vera who declared that their only purpose of going to Bantug Norte was to
arrest Sevilla.29 Also, SPO3 De Vera made it appear in his testimony that it was upon the prodding of the
CIS operatives that they decided to join forces, which was not what SPO1 Pineda recounted. SPO3 De
Veras account was as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. The only purpose why you went to Bantug Norte on September 15, 1995 is to arrest Adoracion
Sevilla, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the time, you were only armed with a warrant of arrest dated August 1989, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. You were not there to conduct a buy-bust operation, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many were you when you served the warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla on September
15, 1995?
A. We were four (4), sir.
Q. Who are those four (4)?
A. Me and Police Senior Inspector Andrei Felix, both of NARCOM and two (2) members of the CIC
namely, SPO2 Padilla and SPO1 Pineda.
Q. You said that your only purpose is to serve a warrant of arrest against Adoracion Sevilla: My question
to you is this: Is it your Standard Operating Procedures (sic) when you serve a warrant of arrest to have
assistance from the CIC considering that the person you are going to arrest is a woman?
A. Not all, sir.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. Why did you ask assistance from the CIC on that particular date when the one you are going to arrest
is a woman only?
A. I referred to the members of the CIS the copy of the warrant of arrest considering that the said
document is dated 1989, sir.
COURT:
Q. What was the reaction to you of their office when you referred that date (sic)?
A. According to the members of the CIC, the warrant of arrest is still valid to serve against the person.
Q. Aside from the statement that it is still valid, what was, if any, is the reaction of that office to whom
you referred (sic)?
A. According to them, it was one of their functions, so, we better join forces.
ATTY. BANSALE:
Q. In the warrant of arrest, it was stated there that the address was MS Garcia. How were you able to
know that accused Adoracion Sevilla is at Bantug Norte?
A. Based on the report by a civilian informant that Adoracion Sevilla is now residing at Bantug Norte.
Q. You said a while ago that you conducted surveillance for months against Adoracion Sevilla, when did
you conduct said surveillance?
A. I cannot remember the exact date but it is this year only, sir.
ATTY. BANSALE:

Q. Why did you conduct a surveillance against Adoracion Sevilla?

A. Because many reports were reaching to our office (sic) that she is allegedly involved in transporting
and selling of marijuana dried leaves in the city.30
In light of the testimonies aforecited and evidence on record, the Court entertains serious doubts over
the circumstances under which the NARCOM agents conducted the search. What appears more
probable is that having been informed of Sevillas presence as well as the existence of the contraband in
subject house, the NARCOM agents joined the arresting team and forthwith turned the whole place
upside-down under the assumption that "a search warrant was not needed" - a conclusion consistent
with Sevillas narration of the events and scenario she was in.
The Court is not impressed with the Peoples stance that the search was incidental to a lawful arrest and
therefore did not require the procurement of a search warrant. The facts establishing a probable cause
for the law enforcers to conduct a warrantless search, as theorized upon by the prosecution, do not
seem to accord with human nature and experience. While there is no hard and fast rule to determine
the truthfulness of ones testimony, that which conforms, however, to the quotidian knowledge,
observation and experience of man is often deemed to be reliable.31
The Court finds it hard to believe that appellant Sevilla, supposedly a notorious drug pusher who had a
standing warrant for her arrest, would casually allow and even ask the police officers to enter the house
after introducing themselves.32 If Sevilla had indeed something to hide or be wary of, it would have been
a more natural reaction for her to evade the police officers or at least exert an effort to conceal the box
in which the prohibited article was kept before allowing the arresting officers to enter the premises. The
evidence shows that Sevilla did neither and was even seated at the sala, apparently unaffected by the
arrival of the four men who entered the house to serve the warrant.33
All things viewed in proper perspective, the Court is inclined to believe the posture of the defense that
over the objection and protestation of Sevilla, the arresting officers just barged into the place and
searched the house straightaway. This conclusion is more logical and consistent with the evidence on
record especially in the face of appellants insistence that such transpired on that fateful day.
Also hard to believe is the tale of P/Sr. Inspector Felix that after having introduced themselves as police
authorities, Sevilla instructed Gaspar to bring the carton box to the second floor.34 It is difficult to
imagine why Sevilla would arouse more suspicion by doing such a thing in the presence of the four
arresting officers.
Neither can the Court perceive any plausibility in the allegation that appellant Gaspar readily admitted
that the contents of the carton box were marijuana and the latter voluntarily handed over the same to
the NARCOM officers while confessing that the illegal substance belonged to Sevilla. Suffice it to note
such averment too convenient for comfort considering the vehement denial by Gaspar as well as the
improbability of the same.
Then too, a thorough scrutiny of the testimonial evidence offered by the People reveals inconsistencies
and absurdities which, when viewed in isolation, seem trivial and unimportant. Taken as a whole,
however, the conflicting accounts and improbabilities cast doubt over the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and veracity of their narrations. In People vs. Noay,35 the Court held that where the

testimonies of key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must
be telling a lie and their story a mere concoction.
De Vera, the first prosecution witness to take the stand, categorically declared that he noticed Gaspar
immediately and instinctively cart upstairs a medium-sized carton box when Gaspar learned that they
were officers of the law.36 On the other hand, P/Sr. Inspector Felix later disclosed that it was only upon
receiving instructions from Sevilla that Gaspar carried the carton box upstairs.37
The discrepancy in such testimonies is disturbing given the fact that the same are crucial to the
prosecution of Sevilla, whose only link to the said carton box is the "instruction" which she allegedly
gave to Gaspar. It is noteworthy that apart from the suggestion made by Prosecutor Macaraig in the
course of questioning that an instruction was given by Sevilla (to which the defense counsel timely
objected on the ground that the prosecutor was leading the witness), SPO3 De Vera made no mention
whatsoever of the purported "instruction" which would establish the connection between Sevilla and
the controverted box. It was only when the second prosecution witness (Felix) was called to the witness
stand that the incriminating assertion was made, giving the Court the impression that the prosecution
tailored Felixs testimony to suit that of De Vera in support of the theory the prosecution wanted to
project.
As regards the manner in which entrance was effected in the house at Bantug Norte and how the
warrant of arrest was served on Sevilla, P/Sr. Inspector Felix, SPO3 De Vera and SPO1 Pineda could not
even agree on their respective tales.
For instance, Felix disclosed that when they arrived, the gate was slightly open, Sevilla was standing by
the gate and even asked them to enter the house.38 De Vera, on the other hand, testified that Sevilla
was merely seated inside the house when they arrived.39 To add to the uncertainty, Pinedas account
completely clashed with Felixs and De Veras story when the former testified that the door was closed,
that they had to knock on the door of the house and that they arrested Sevilla by the door when the
latter opened the same.40
Equally sketchy are the subsequent events which happened when Sevilla and Gaspar were taken into
custody by the PNP and NARCOM officers.
SPO1 Pineda recounted that after the arrest of the two appellants, they were directly brought to the CIS
at the same time for booking and that they did not stop at any place in between.41 Meanwhile, De Vera
and Felix maintain that Gaspar was initially investigated at the barangay hall while Sevilla was first
brought to the NARCOM district office.42
According to SPO3 De Vera, Sevilla was not brought to the barangay hall because she refused to
acknowledge that she knew anything about the marijuana.43 P/Sr. Inspector Felix, on the other hand,
disclosed that the reason Sevilla was not brought to the barangay hall, which, according to De Vera, is a
standard operating procedure,44was because she was in an angry mood, and wanted to escape. Yet
strangely, Felix also revealed that Sevilla and Gaspar reached the NARCOM district office at the same
time because the vehicle and troop which accompanied Sevilla stopped along the highway to wait for
Gaspar, who was then being investigated at the barangay hall. If the investigation at the barangay hall
was a standard operating procedure, why was Sevilla not investigated considering that Sevilla had to
wait for Gaspar along the highway?

The Court cannot also understand why the NARCOM agents could not conclusively state when and how
the surveillance was undertaken on the person of appellant Sevilla. If a surveillance had in fact taken
place, they would have discovered that the house did not belong to Sevilla but to her daughter, Micaela.
In view of the foregoing, the Court does not see its way clear to give full faith and credence to the
prosecution evidence on hand. It is not unmindful of the settled doctrine that the assessment by the
trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, as a rule, is binding on appellate
courts, absent any fact or circumstance of weight and substance that had been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.45 In the present case, however, and for the reasons already advanced,
the Court finds it proper to apply the exception rather than the general rule because although
declarations of law enforcers are accorded weight, their testimonies, to be worthy of belief, must
themselves be credible and not suspect.46
Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations
or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.47 Consequently, the acquittal of appellants is indicated.
The illegal search conducted by the NARCOM agents is not the only constitutional infirmity tainting the
case. An exhaustive review of the records discloses that appellants were not duly informed of their
constitutional rights after their arrest. Neither were they assisted by counsel at any stage of the
custodial investigation, despite the lack of waiver of their right to counsel. In his testimony, P/Sr.
Inspector Felix admitted thus:
FISCAL MACARAIG:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Before the accused who goes by the name alias Joel at that time he confessed as to who is the owner
of the marijuana bricks, in connection of your duty what step or steps did you do (sic)?
A. As a police officer, after hearing that the contents of the box is marijuana I apprehended him and I
told him that I will bring him to the Office for investigation and after saying that "you are under arrest
and you have the right to remain silent and if you wish we can provide you with a lawyer" (sic), sir.
Q. So, in other words Mr. Witness, at that point in time after you arrested the accused and before the
same was effected you would like to impress the Court the constitutional right of the accused at that
time was stated by you to him (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened afterwards, Mr. Witness?
A. Afterwards, I called my investigator SPO3 de Vera upstairs and gave to him the marijuana for proper
receipts, sir.
Q. After doing so, what happened afterwards?
A. Afterwards, we went downstairs and left, the others proceeded to the office while we brought Joel
Gaspar at the Barangay Hall, sir.

Q. What about the other accused Adoracion Sevilla was she ever arrested on that occasion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And where was she brought in particular after the arrest was made?
A. In the district office of the NARCOM, sir.
Q. What happened after Adoracion Sevilla was brought over to the Narcom District Office?
A. After bringing to the Narcom District Office we sent her to the Narcom Office for booking blotter, sir.
COURT:
How about the other accused Joel Gaspar?
A. We brought Joel Gaspar to our office for investigation, we separated them, sir.48
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. What happened after both of them were already at your office?

A. The investigation was conducted, sir.
Q. And who conducted the investigation?
A. SPO3 de Vera, sir.
Q. Was that investigation conducted in your presence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before the investigation was made what particular steps did SPO3 de Vera undertook (sic)?
A. de Vera appraised them the constitutional right (sic), sir.
Q. Will you please state what is the constitutional right read or appraised (sic) before the two accused?
A. That they have the right to remain silent and if they wanted a lawyer they can have their own lawyer,
sir.
Q. Aside from these two, were there any other constitution right (sic) that were stated before the two
accused?
A. Yes, sir, we further read the constitutional right, sir.
Q. After the appraisal (sic) of the constitutional right of the accused, what happened afterwards Mr.
witness?
A. They remained silent while Adoracion Sevilla did not give any statement, sir.
Q. How about the other accused Joel Gaspar?
A. Only his confession, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. Upon being informed that both the witness refused to give their statement on their own, what step
did SPO3 de Vera undertook (sic) afterwards?
A. He continued conducting the investigation, sir.49
xxx

xxx

xxx

CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. FERRER:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. The investigation was conducted by the CIS, am I correct in the person of Joel Gaspar (sic)?
A. No, sir.
Q. Who conducted the investigation?
A. SPO3 de Vera, sir.
Q. The investigation was put in writing?
A. Typewritten, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. During the investigation conducted in your office, were you present?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you noticed that there was no lawyer representing the person of Joel Gaspar?
A. Yes, sir, Joel Gaspar stated that he knows nothing.
Q. During the whole investigation conducted in your office you were present?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there was no lawyer?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

FISCAL MACARAIG:
Only one re-direct, Your Honor.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL MACARAIG:

Mr. Witness, when the investigation was conducted at your office and according to the defense there
was no counsel despite the reading of constitutional right, please tell us categorically, was there any
forced (sic) made upon the person of the accused while this investigation was conducted?
A. None, sir. "50
xxx

xxx

xxx

Therefrom, it can be deduced that appellants were not clearly informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to independent and competent counsel, when they were arrested and investigated in
connection with the offense charged. Simply stating the rights to which the arrestee is entitled to or
reading the same to him did not suffice. Under the rulings of this Court, the right to be informed of ones
right contemplates the "transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle".51 The right to be informed consists of no
less than effective communication which results in a full understanding of what is conveyed.
The investigating officer is tasked to explain to the person under custody the significance as well as the
consequences of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and should not simply assume
that the person arrested fully comprehended the same. To merely say that "you have the right to
remain silent and if you want, you can have your own lawyer" is not enough. It is not the appraisal of
rights required by law.
Worth stressing upon are the following guidelines laid down by this Court52 regarding the procedure to
be observed by police officers in effecting an arrest and conducting an investigation:
"At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible, or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
The fact that there was no lawyer present during the interrogation at the NARCOM district office leads
the Court to question the law enforcers adherence to the constitutional mandate relating to persons
held for the commission of a crime. It reinforces the Courts conclusion that the NARCOM officers did
transgress appellants constitutional rights during, and after their arrest. It does not matter that no force
or coercion was ever employed by them during the investigation, as the prosecution is wont to insist,
because in the absence of any showing that the arresting officers properly complied with what was
incumbent upon them in the performance of their functions, any importunings to that effect would be
futile.
Given the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot uphold the trial courts conclusion that the
policemen regularly performed their duties as public officers. Such presumption has been effectively

rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Besides, as correctly argued by appellant Sevilla in her brief,53 the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption
of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.54 It must be emphasized that even
granting that appellants were allegedly drug pushers, they would nonetheless be entitled to their basic
constitutional rights.
In sum, the Court is of the irresistible conclusion that there was no probable cause for conducting an
extensive search in the house occupied by appellants. The truthfulness of the facts in support of
probable cause is doubtful and the Court is of the impression that the search in question was not at all
incidental to the lawful arrest of Sevilla but rather, pre-planned. Therefore, any evidence obtained in the
course thereof must be excluded.1wphi1
The "confession" allegedly given by Gaspar during custodial interrogation must likewise be rejected for
having been extracted without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver of legal assistance. As a side
note, it bears emphasizing that Gaspar did not execute a "confession". More accurately, what the
prosecution elicited from Gaspar was actually an "admission", the difference being that in a
"confession", an accused acknowledges his guilt. There is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an
"admission".55
Furthermore, the totality of the prosecution evidence before the Court does not measure up to the
requisite quantum of proof for conviction. It is a legal truism that an accused in a criminal case is entitled
to an acquittal unless the prosecution shows that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is incumbent
upon the State to establish its case with that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind with evidence which stands or falls on its own merits. The prosecution cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defenses evidence for it has the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove.56
Needless to state, the trial court should have exercised due diligence and prudence in deliberating upon
appellants guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence
offered by both the defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial
court in determining the merits of the present case. The Court is not unaware that in some instances law
enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians.
Consequently, the court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.57
WHEREFORE, the Decision under automatic review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellants
ADORACION SEVILLA Y JOSON @ BABY and JOEL GASPAR Y CABRAL are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellants unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the court of the date of
their release, or the ground for their continued confinement, within ten days from notice. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129380

October 19, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO BALTAZAR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
BONIFACIO BALTAZAR was grazing his carabao outside the cemetery of Bgy. Kaingin, Bongabon, Nueva
Ecija, around seven o'clock in the morning of Christmas Day 1992. When it started to rain he went inside
the cemetery to seek shelter. As he entered, he smelled a foul odor which he thought was coming from
one of the mausoleums. He immediately went to the house of Bgy. Capt. Anastacio Rigdaus to report
the matter; however the barangay captain was not there. Baltazar was able to see him only the
following day. Bgy. Capt. Rigdaus then summoned two (2) of his tanods and told them to proceed to the
cemetery to investigate the report. The tanods eventually found the body of a young girl already in a
state of decomposition, later identified to be that of seven (7)-year old Gladys Joy Marcos who had been
missing since 11 December 1992.
On 1 August 1994, or two (2) years later, Bonifacio Baltazar was charged with murder for the killing of
seven (7)-year old Gladys Joy Marcos in an Information which alleged that about 11 December 1992, at
around five o'clock in the afternoon, he willfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, cruelty, use of
superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense or to insure impunity, hit her head with a
hard object resulting in her instantaneous death.1
Roberto Marcos, father of Gladys Joy, testified that his daughter had been missing since 11 December
1992 and was found dead on 26 December 1992 inside the cemetery in Bgy. Kaingin, Bongabon, Nueva
Ecija. Subsequently, the accused Bonifacio Baltazar, a neighbor living some five (5) houses away, became
a suspect in the killing of Roberto's daughter.
Alejandro Briones, whose house was just fifty (50) meters away from that of the accused, testified that
in the afternoon of 11 December 1992 while he was on his way home from his onion plantation he
passed by the accused Bonifacio Baltazar and Gladys Joy Marcos walking hand in hand near the
cemetery.
That much, unfortunately, was the evidence for the prosecution.
The accused denied participation in the perpetration of the crime. He claimed that he never left his
house on 11 December 1992 and was in fact playing tong-its2 with his neighbors.
Bgy. Capt. Anastacio Rigdaus testified that it was the accused who reported to him the stench supposed
to be coming from one of the tombs in the cemetery. He also said that he saw the accused attend the
wake of the victim.
Rodrigo Lucero, a public school teacher, testified that on 11 December 1992 he and his companions
were at the cemetery constructing a tomb for one of his relatives, and that on that day he saw a person
enter the cemetery but could not identify him as the person of the accused.

Mercy Mercado whose house was near the cemetery testified that between 4:00 o'clock and 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of 11 December 1992 Gladys Joy bought some snack items from her store. She
was riding on a bicycle with a male companion in his 20's.
On the basis of the very scanty evidence herein narrated, the court a quo on 28 March 1997 found the
accused guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Gladys
Joy MarcosP50,000.00 for her death, P50,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the costs.3
Quite obviously, the trial court convicted the accused of murder based on circumstantial evidence. It
thus ratiocinated It is true that no witness testified that it was the accused who had in fact killed the victim. However,
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: a) There is more than one circumstance; b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and c) The combination of all the circumstances are such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution brought to fore the following circumstances which purportedly prove that the accused
is the culprit, to wit: 1. That the accused was seen with the victim in the town cemetery at around 5:00
o'clock of December 11, 1992 and immediately before she disappeared x x x x 2. That the victim was
missing thereafter x x x x 3. That the victim was found dead in the very town cemetery and near the
place where she and the accused were seen x x x x 4. That the accused left and was never seen anymore
in the town after the discovery of the body of the victim on December 26, 1992 x x x x 5. That the
accused has not visited nor condoled with the family during the wake of his neighbor x x x x
There are other circumstances which the Court notes (in) proving the guilt of the accused. For one, while
the accused claims he was at the wake of the victim for three (3) hours x x x there was no witness to
corroborate his presence. On the other hand, Roberto Marcos, the victim's father, as well as witness
Francisco Flores, testified that they never saw the accused at the wake x x x x This casts serious doubt as
to the credibility of the accused's alibi, especially when considered in the light of the fact that he should
have readily been noticed at the wake, being the person who first reported the existence of a dead body
to the authorities. It is likewise strange that the accused, as he himself admitted, never attempted to
talk to the victim's relatives.
Clearly, for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to prosper, the prosecution must establish
more than one circumstance indubitably linking the accused to the commission of the crime. Likewise,
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved and that the combination of all these
circumstances must produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. This is not so in the instant case.
Strictly speaking, the prosecution presented in evidence only one (1) circumstance linking, albeit
indirectly, accused-appellant to the crime, i.e., that he was seen walking hand in hand with the victim
outside the cemetery in the afternoon of 11 December 1992 immediately before the latter's
disappearance. As to the fact that accused-appellant left Bongabon immediately after knowing that he
was being suspected of having killed Gladys Joy, it only remained a mere supposition on the part of the
prosecution. Other than the testimonies of Alejandro Briones and Roberto Marcos to the effect that
they had not seen the accused-appellant after 26 December 1992, no other evidence was presented to
prove their claim that indeed he had already left Bongabon.

On the contrary, their testimonies were belied by the fact that when the warrant of arrest was issued
against accused-appellant, it was stated therein that the latter could be found at his residence in Bgy.
Kaingin, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. In fact, after the warrant of arrest was served, accused-appellant was
found and apprehended in no time at all at his stated address. If indeed he was in hiding as intimated by
the prosecution, then the apprehending officers would have encountered difficulty in finding him. Also,
it is not true that accused-appellant was not at the wake of the victim. On this fact, Bgy. Capt. Rigdaus
corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant that he was at the wake of the victim.
For a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to stand, it is imperative that there be a confluence of
circumstances. These circumstances which are proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.4 We find that the web of circumstances adverted to above does not constitute an unbroken
chain that would fairly lead to the conclusion that it was accused-appellant who killed the victim. In
short, the circumstances laid by the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. There were lapses in the ruling of the court below.
First, it declared that "Briones clearly and categorically identified the accused as the one who took the
victim to the cemetery immediately before the latter was killed or reported missing." This is misleading.
Nowhere in the testimonies of Briones could be found that it was accused-appellant who brought the
victim into the cemetery. He only testified that he passed by the victim and accused-appellant who were
walking towards the cemetery. In fact, upon further clarification, Briones did not even know where
accused-appellant and the victim went after he passed them by.
Second, it was error on the part of the court below to state that "while the accused claims he was at the
wake of the victim for three hours x x x there was no witness to corroborate his presence. On the other
hand, Roberto Marcos x x x as well as witness Francisco Flores, testified that they never saw the accused
at the wake." As culled from the records, Bgy. Capt. Rigdaus corroborated the testimony of accusedappellant that he attended the wake of the victim. Likewise, the records revealed that Flores did not
testify that he did not see accused-appellant at thewake of the victim. In fact, he never mentioned the
wake of the victim at all. All he said was that accused-appellant did not attend the burial of Gladys Joy.
Plainly, wake and burial are two different things. Besides, Flores would have been incompetent to
conclude that accused-appellant did not attend the wake as Flores himself was not present at the wake
all of the time. It was possible then that accused-appellant was there during the time when Flores was
absent. Moreover, it was understandable and not unusual for accused-appellant not to talk to or
approach the parents of Gladys Joy during the vigil. As explained by accused-appellant, he was not
personally acquainted with the Marcoses but, just the same, he went to the wake as was customary for
a neighbor in their place.
Third, the trial court convicted accused-appellant based mainly on the testimony of Briones.1wphi1 The
court a quostated thus: "A perusal of the records shows that perhaps the most important evidence in
the prosecution's favor is the testimony of Alejandro Briones x x x x The fact that witness Rodrigo Lucero
saw a person (enter the cemetery) who was not the accused does not prove that the categorical
identification of Alejandro Briones pointing to the accused as the person seen with the victim is false. In
the first place, the Court noted the demeanor of Alejandro Briones at the witness stand who testified in
all candor." But a closer scrutiny of the records would reveal that Briones was not really straightforward
in his testimony. In fact, at one instance, the hearing of the case was reset due to the confusion

manifested by Briones. The minutes of the hearing held on 7 November 1994 is quite revealing. It stated
When the case was called for hearing, the Public Prosecutor conducted his direct examination of
prosecution witness Alejandro Briones. However, due to an apparent state of confusion manifested by
the witness as noticed by the Court and Cross-Examining Counsel, the continuation of the cross
examination of the witness Alejandro Briones is hereby reset x x x x5
In criminal prosecutions, the identity of the offender must be established.6 In the instant case, the
prosecution endeavored to demonstrate that accused-appellant was the assailant by showing that he
was the last person seen in the company of the victim immediately before she disappeared.
Nonetheless, based on the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases, the evidence presented by
the prosecution would not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of accused-appellant.
It cannot be made to rest on mere speculations or even probabilities.7 It is not sufficient for conviction
that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the crime is required.
At all times an accused is presumed innocent unless proved otherwise. The onus is on the State to
dispose of this presumption. In the case before us, we find that the prosecution miserably failed to
discharge its burden. Although accused-appellant proferred only denial and alibi as defenses, still, the
evidence presented by the prosecution was weaker, and could not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 40, of Palayan City in Crim. Case No.
0534 - P is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bonifacio Baltazar is ACQUITTED on insufficiency
of evidence or on reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to forthwith cause the release of Bonifacio Baltazar unless the latter
is held for another lawful cause and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days on the action
taken hereon.
SO ORDERED.

JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMO ECLIPSE, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolutions of the Ombudsman in OMB-Adm-O-92-0020
dated November 18, 1993[1] and February 28, 1994[2] which dismissed petitioner from the service, with
forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation, and which denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of. NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation
Administration.
On March 21, 1988, K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to
NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation development.[3]
On November 17, 1988, petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT, sent a letter-proposal
requested by ABDN.[4] Another letter was sent by petitioner on January 31, 1989 to Dr. Peiter Roeloffs of
ADBN confirming the availability of NIACONSULT to conduct the training program and formally
requesting advance payment of thirty (30%) percent of the training fees[5] in the amount of US $9,600.00
or P204,960.00.
NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to
March 7, 1989.[6] ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft ) Technische Zusummenarbeit
(GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed
training fee in two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00.[7]
On April 1, 1991, NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner
demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner personally
received.[8] Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting
NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent
OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.[9] Misj uris
Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of
the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an order[10] requiring petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with a caveat that failure to file the same would be
deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the
said order.
A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued another order[11] giving petitioner
another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus, on
April 14, 1993, private respondent was required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence
to support its complaint.[12]
Thereafter, on November 18, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed Resolution, the
decretal portion of which reads:
"Withal, for such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and conduct prejudicial to the service as established by
overwhelming evidences, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be
discharged from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold
office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation; without prejudice to any
civil action NIACONSULT, Inc., may institute to recover the amount so retained by the respondent.
SO ORDERED."[13]
On February 16, 1994 petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he
was denied due process in that the administrative case was resolved on the basis of the complainant's
evidences, without affording him the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to present his evidence.
Petitioner likewise contends that he was not given access to the records of the subject transaction vital

to his defense and in the preparation of his counter-affidavit despite his verbal requests to the graft
investigator.[14]
The respondent OMBUDSMAN denied the motion on February 28, 1994.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition basically reiterating his arguments in his motion for
reconsideration.
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation on May 24, 1997[16] stating that the criminal
complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave
rise to the administrative case, was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the
dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative case can no longer stand on
its own and therefore should be dismissed.[17]
Such manifestation is not well taken. Jj lex
The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give
him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint,
was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which,
though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is
preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[18] Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as
well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings,
the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.[19]
Going now to the crux of the controversy, petitioner asserts that he was denied the opportunity to be
heard.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in
its strict judicial sense.[20]
Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the
complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counteraffidavit. It took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have
waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant's evidence
was set. The March 17, 1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last chance to present his defense,
despite the private respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to comply with the second
order. New miso
Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own
remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMAN has

shown forebearance, petitioner has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly
claim that his right to due process was violated. We need only to reiterate that a party who chooses not
to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process.[21]
Petitioner's claim that he was not given any notice of the order declaring him to have waived his right to
file his counter-affidavit and of allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte is
unmeritorious.
The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and which
was admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was filed
within the given period, a waiver would be considered and the administrative proceedings shall continue
according to the rules. Thus, respondent OMBUDSMAN need not issue another order notifying
petitioner that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way, petitioner need not
be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of private respondent's evidence. As such, he could
not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.
With regard to the petitioner's claim that he made requests for the production of the documents alleged
to be material to his defense, the record is bereft of any proof of such requests. If it were true that the
graft investigator did not act on such requests, petitioner should have filed the proper motion before
the respondent OMBUDSMAN for the production of the documents or to compel the respondent
complainant to produce whatever record necessary for his defense. Petitioner did not. It was only after
the respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed resolution of November 18, 1993 that he bewailed the
alleged failure of respondent's graft investigator to require the production of the records of the subject
transaction.
The record of this case indisputably shows that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial
to the government when he failed to remit the payment of the training program conducted by
NIACONSULT. The evidence presented sufficiently established that petitioner received the payments of
ADBN through its representative, GTZ, Philippines the amount of US $9,600.00 and that he failed to
account this and remit the same to the corporation. All these acts constitute dishonesty and
untrustworthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent
OMBUDSMAN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26647 August 15, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AQUILINO PACALA and TRANQUILINO PACALA,
JR. alias CHACOY, Defendants-Appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for plaintiff-appellee.
Silvino no B. Agudo and Jose J Estrella, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
Automatic Review of the Death Penalty imposed by the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch I, 13th
Judicial District, upon Cipriano Saberon, Patricio Pacala and Aquilino Pacala, and appeal of the sentence
of reclusion perpetua imposed by the same court upon Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., for the death of Jose
Bacsal, in Criminal Case No. 6897, for Robbery with Homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
During the pendency of this appeal, appellants Cipriano Saberon and Patricio Pacala died in the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, the former as an aftermath of a riot committed in prison and the latter
as a consequence of sickness, and the cases against them were dismissed on February 13, 1969 and
October 15, 1972, respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This decision is, therefore, confined to the appeal of Aquilino Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., the only
two remaining appellants in the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 17, 1964, Jose Bacsal was killed by a group of armed
men near his hut in Sitio Binotong, of Barrio Guintarcan, of the town of Villareal, Province of Samar.
Binotong is adjacent to Sitio Burabod, and both are situated along the coast, and are accessible either by
sea or land. The deceased was a farmer of some substance who had just had his old house demolished
for the purpose of building on the same site a bigger one of stronger materials. In the meantime a small
hut with roof and with the floor a meter above the ground, without walls, was constructed nearby
where the deceased and his son stayed to guard the construction materials piled near the place and to
supervise the construction of the house. The hut was about 130 meters from the
seashore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Roque Bacsal, 25 years of age, fisherman, son of the deceased, recounting the incident, testified that at
about 7:30 o'clock on the evening of November 17, 1964, he and his father were in the aforesaid hut
listening over the radio, when they noticed the presence of five men who immediately surrounded the
hut. As the moon was very bright, he was able to recognize the five men as the brothers Patricio Pacala,
Aquilino Pacala, Francisco Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., who were his former classmates, and their
uncle, Cipriano Saberon. When Cipriano Saberon fired his pistol, he and his father immediately jumped
from the hut into the ground and ran. He himself ran to the trail leading to Burabod and hid behind
some tall grasses and bushes about sixty meters from the hut. When he heard his father shouting for
help, he made his way through the bushes and saw, a few meters away, his father, Jose Bacsal, being
held by Cipriano Saberon. As he was thus being held, Patricio Pacala stabbed Jose Bacsal on the right
side below his armpit. After Bacsal was wounded, Cipriano Saberon released his hold. When the victim
started to run, however, Francisco Pacala went after him and slashed him on the back with his bolo. At
this juncture, the accused, including the two appellants, surrounded the wounded Jose Bacsal. Appellant
Aquilino Pacala was holding a firearm pointed forward. Appellant Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., who is also
known by the name of Ambrosio alias Chacoy, was holding a bolo. Although the deceased was already
prostrate on the ground, Tranquilino Pacala, Jr., apparently in response to the orders of Cipriano

Saberon, who told his companions, "Finish him so he won't speak," repeatedly boloed the victim on the
forehead. Afterwards, the five men left the victim and proceeded in the direction of the hut. When he
was certain that the assailants had already left the place, Roque Bacsal approached his father and tried
to assist him. The victim was groaning with pain. In the meantime, in response to shouts for help, the
barrio captain, Victoriano Fortaleza, arrived at the scene of the incident. As the barrio captain attended
to the needs of the wounded man, Roque proceeded to their hut. According to him, that was the time
he discovered that his transistor radio, worth P130.00, which he had left on the floor, and the wooden
trunk, where their clothing and cash in the amount of P1,700.00 were kept, were already
missing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Teresa Ocenar Bacsal, wife of the deceased and mother of Roque, also testified that they counted the
money earlier that day, with the intention of using it for the purchase of galvanized iron sheets for the
roofing of their house; and that she and Roque had intended to take the bus for Catbalogan the next day
to buy iron sheets.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Victoriano Fortaleza, barrio captain of Burabod, Villareal, Samar, confirmed the fact that he went to the
aid of the Bacsal s when he heard their shouts for help. Thus, he declared, on the evening of November
17, 1964, while he was relaxing in the balcony of his house to enjoy the bright moonlight, he heard
shouts for help emanating from the direction of the hut of the Bacsals. But before he could reach the
hut, he found on the way Jose Bacsal, seriously wounded and lying on the ground about twenty (20)
brazas from the schoolhouse. Upon hearing Jose Bacsal faintly utter, "I'll die," he asked him who
wounded him. The latter could only say "Patricio and Francisco" before he died. Fortaleza then
proceeded to the town of Villareal to report the incident to the municipal authorities. In view of this
information, the police of Villareal got the body of the deceased and brought it to the poblacion for
autopsy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Modesto Leyson, a 49-year old farmer living in Sitio Burabod, confirmed the presence of the Pacala
brothers and Cipriano Saberon at the scene of the incident during the night in question. He declared
that he knows Aquilino Pacala, Patricio Pacala and Tranquilino Pacala, who is also known as Ambrosio
Pacala, since their childhood days, and that Tranquilino, Aquilino, Patricio and Francisco Pacala are all
brothers of the full blood, while Cipriano Saberon is their uncle. On the evening of November 17, 1964,
while he was fishing in the sea near Nabu-an Point of Barrio Burabod, of the town of Villareal, he saw
Tranquilino Pacala, Aquilino Pacala, Patricio Pacala, Cipriano Saberon and Francisco Pacala aboard a
banca pass by. He saw the Pacalas land on the shore and observed them moving towards the direction
of the hut of Jose Bacsal. After a while, he heard two (2) gun reports. Upon hearing these, he decided to
go home and report the matter to the barrio captain. The barrio captain then borrowed his motorboat
and fetched the chief of police to investigate the incident. He explained that he was able to recognize
the Pacalas and Cipriano Saberon because it was bright moonlight and they were only four (4) brazas
from the outrigger of his boat when they passed him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The post-mortem findings indicated that the cause of death was profuse internal hemorrhage as a result
of several wounds inflicted upon the deceased Jose Bacsal, to wit:
HEAD: Face; conjunctiva and tongue pale. - Stab wound - 1 inch wide, bony deep located at the right
parietal region.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

- Stab wound - 1 inch wide, bony deep located at the temporal region,
right.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
- Contusion with Abrasion - inch at the back.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
THORAX: Stab wound (front) exit 1 inch left chest 4 inches below the nipple; (back) right scapular region
1- inches 5 inches deep.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
LUMBAR REGION: Stab wound - 5 inches directed upward anteriorly and to the
left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
EXTREMITIES: No sign of Physical Injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
INTERNAL FINDINGS: Abdominal cavity filled with blood (about 3 cups). The stomach was wounded
through and through. Wounding of the abdominal aorta, lower portion of the left lung was wounded.
(Exhibit "A".)
As a result of the investigation conducted by the chief of police of Villareal, a criminal complaint was
filed by him in the Justice of the Peace Court of the said municipality on December 5, 1964 against
Aquilino Pacala, Patricio Pacala, Francisco Pacala, Cipriano Saberon y Pacala and Ambrosio Pacala alias
"Chacoy" for robbery with homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After the accused had waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation, the case
was elevated to the Court of First Instance for trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In the meantime, Francisco Pacala died. Consequently, only Patricio Pacala, Aquilino Pacala, Ambrosio
Pacala alias Tranquilino, and Cipriano Saberon were charged for the crime by the Provincial
Fiscal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Patricio Pacala admitted having killed the deceased with the assistance of his brother Francisco Pacala,
now also deceased. He testified that during the evening in question, there was a heavy rain with strong
winds, consequently, he and his brother Francisco were constrained to seek shelter inside the hut of the
deceased. When the deceased arrived, however, he became angry upon seeing them inside his hut,
drew his bolo and chased Patricio and his brother away from the hut. He pursued the two until they
reached their banca and, upon overtaking Patricio, the deceased Jose Bacsal stabbed Patricio on the
back. In response to his shouts for help, his elder brother Francisco Pacala got hold of a paddle and hit
Jose Bacsal with it, causing the latter to fall on top of a stone. After Bacsal had fallen, he (Patricio) got
the bolo of the victim and used it to stab the victim. He claimed that the wounds on the head of Jose
Bacsal might have been caused by the sharp rocks when Bacsal fell. He denied that his brothers Aquilino
and Tranquilino and his uncle Cipriano Saberon participated in the commission of the crime. Patricio
Pacala further declared that as a result of the incident, he and his brother Francisco did not continue
anymore to Guintarcan to visit their mother as they had originally intended to
do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Both Aquilino and Tranquilino Pacala denied involvement in the crime in question and interposed the
defense of alibi. According to Aquilino Pacala, he could not have been in Sitio Binotong of Barrio
Guintarcan, Villareal, Samar, on the evening of November 17, 1964 because he was then residing with
his wife at Barrio Bagakay, San Miguel, Leyte, his wife being a native of the place. After sawing logs in

the concession of Diosdado Asoy, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, he remained in his house
until the following morning. He stated that on December 17, 1964, he was arrested by the constabulary
and detained, but he was not investigated. He admitted that Patricio Pacala, Francisco Pacala and
Tranquilino Pacala are his brothers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Tranquilino Pacala, 18 years of age, also testified that on the night of November 17, 1964 he was in
Catbalogan, as he had been living there since the month of October, 1964 up to December, 1964, when
he was arrested by the constabulary authorities. On that date (November 17, 1964), he was in the house
of Didang Villanueva in Catbalogan, Samar. He claimed that he had to leave Villareal, Samar, because he
could not find any work there. Upon his arrival in Catbalogan sometime in October, 1964, he was
allegedly employed as a pedicab driver.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Julita Solayco also testified in support of the alibi of Cipriano
Saberon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Cipriano Saberon, however, did not take the witness stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court convicted the appellants for the crime of robbery
with homicide and imposed upon them the penalties aforestated. .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Appellants contend in this appeal that (1) the commission of the crime of robbery was not sufficiently
proven; (2) the testimonies of Roque Bacsal and Modesto Leyson are not entitled to credence because
they are either contradictory, uncorroborated or improbable; and (3) the proceedings before the trial
court are null and void in view of the absence of any certification in the information that a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Provincial Fiscal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
1. In connection with the robbery aspect of the crime charged, two things must be borne in mind: first,
that there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged robbery; and second, that none of the things allegedly
stolen, namely, the transistor radio and the trunk purportedly containing the sum of P1,700.00 was ever
recovered. If there was, therefore, any evidence to support the charge of robbery, the same was entirely
circumstantial in character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Roque Bacsal testified that the five accused surrounded the hut, and after Saberon fired his pistol, he
and his father jumped from the hut into the ground and ran to a place about sixty meters away where
his father was overtaken and attacked by said accused, and, afterwards, the latter left and proceeded
towards the direction of the hut. Roque then went to the succor of his father and tried to assist him until
Victoriano Fortaleza, the barrio captain, arrived. It was only after the arrival of the barrio captain that
Roque was able to return to their hut, and discovered that the radio and the trunk where the money
was kept were missing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is evident from the foregoing that no iota of evidence had been presented showing that appellants
and their companions knew of the existence of the money in the amount of P1,700.00, or of the place
where it was allegedly kept, much less is there any positive proof that when they went to the place of
the victim their intention was to rob the latter. It would seem, therefore, that the trial court's conclusion
that it has been "established beyond peradventure of doubt that, taking advantage of the night, five

men decided to rob the deceased whom they knew to have some money in the trunk. ...," is based on a
mere inference, or conjecture and not upon positive evidence. It is well-settled that in order to sustain a
conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as
conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In order for the crime of robbery with homicide
to exist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually taken place, and that, as
a consequence or on the occasion of such robbery, a homicide be committed. Where the evidence does
not conclusively prove the robbery, the killing of the victim would, therefore, be classified either as a
simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance,
and not the complex offense of robbery with homicide. 1chanrobles virtual law library
2. In contrast to the paucity of proof on the commission of the robbery is the clear and positive
identification of appellants as among the group of five men who attacked the deceased Jose
Bacsal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Modesto Leyson had known the five accused for a long time because they were from Guintarcan, while
he was from Burabod, which are separated by a distance of only about one kilometer. It is not disputed
that on the night of November 17, 1964, he was fishing in his boat at Point Nabu-an, Burabod, Villareal,
Samar, about 100 meters away from Jose Bacsal's hut. He testified that the five accused, who were
aboard another boat, passed by his boat, and it was from a distance of about four (4) brazas that he was
able to recognize them as the moon was then bright at that time. He also declared that he saw the five
disembark from the boat and head in the direction of the hut of Jose Bacsal; and, shortly thereafter, he
heard two gun reports coming from that direction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The other witness, Roque Bacsal, had known four of the accused - the Pacala brothers - for a long time,
for they were once his classmates. He positively identified the appellants as among those who attacked
his father.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
No improper motive has been shown why either of these two prosecution witnesses would falsely
implicate any of the appellants in the commission of the crime. In fact, appellant Pacala candidly
admitted on the witness stand that he does not know whether or not Modesto Leyson and Roque Bacsal
had entertained any ill-will against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants attempt to impugn the credibility of Roque Bacsal by citing certain alleged inconsistencies in
his testimony. Those inconsistencies refer to minor details, and the rule is that inconsistencies in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the alleged contradictions between the affidavit of Roque Bacsal (Exh. "1") executed before the
Municipal Judge of Villareal, Samar, on December 5, 1964, and his testimony in court, it must be noted
that the alleged contradictions are more apparent than real. It is true that in the aforementioned
affidavit Roque Bacsal declared, among others, as follows: " ... I notice (sic) that some of this(sic) five
person (sic) run (sic) after my father and when my father was over taken they stab (sic) my father. My
father shouted for help calling me but because I was afraid of being killed I did not show up. When I
notice (sic) that this (sic) persons were gone I tried to look for my father and I found him laying (sic)
down wounded. I cried and a few minutes the barrio captain Victoriano Portalisa (sic) arrived and my

father was investigated. ..." The aforementioned statement is not in any way inconsistent with his
testimony that he and his father jumped from the hut, hid at a place 30 meters from the hut, and upon
hearing the voice of his father shouting for help, he looked through the tall grasses and saw Cipriano
Saberon and Patricio Pacala holding his father from behind while the other accused were stabbing him.
It is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is often incomplete. An
affidavit, "being taken ex-parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from
partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which
the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction
of the first suggestions of his memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the
subject. 2chanrobles virtual law library
As against their positive identification, appellants interpose the defense of
alibi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We have declared in an earlier case 3that whether or not the defense of alibi has been established is a
question of fact. By its very nature, alibi is established by the testimony of witnesses who confirm the
presence of the accused at some place so far removed from the scene of the crime as to cast reasonable
doubt on his actual participation in the offense charged. "As a consequence, the credibility of an alibi
depends so much on, and may very well be equated with, the credibility of the witnesses who seek to
establish it. On that account, therefore, and in that respect, the relative weight which the trial
magistrate assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with
the evidence on record, be accepted." The trial court flatly rejected the defense of alibi put up by the
appellants and gave sound reasons in support of its action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Appellant Aquilino Pacala's testimony to the effect that on the date in question, November 17, 1964, he
was in Bagakay, San Miguel, Leyte, sawing logs in the forest, and not in Guintarcan, Villareal, Samar,
stands uncorroborated. According to him, his mother-in-law and his wife were then living with him in
Bagakay. They had neighbors. He had a partner in the log-sawing undertaking. Every now and then he
delivered sawn lumber to his employer in Barugo, Leyte. Consequently, as aptly observed by the court
below, this appellant's testimony could easily have been corroborated by any of these persons were it
true; yet none of them was called in court although it would have been of the greatest import to the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On his part, appellant Tranquilino Pacala declared that at the time of the incident he was at Patag
District, Catbalogan, Samar, in the house of Jaime and Didang Villanueva. He was driving a tricycle
belonging to one Clara de la Pea. He stated that Didang's cousin, Tony Nacionales, had informed him
that the Villanuevas left Catbalogan for Manila sometime ago, and he, the appellant, did not know
where to reach them. Assuming this to be true, appellant could have asked someone in Catbalogan to
attest to his presence therein on the day in question. There was the tricycle owner. There could be
neighbors and acquaintances who might remember. According to this appellant, the Villanueva spouses
were still in Catbalogan when he was arrested in connection with the case; yet, knowing how vitally
important to him were these spouses if it were true that he was staying in their house on the night in
question, he did not even exert any effort to contact them, much less did he request that they be
subpoenaed to testify in his behalf.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Added to the utter absence of corroboration of the appellants' testimony on alibi is, of course, the more
important consideration that, as already stated above, these appellants, together with the other
accused, were clearly and positively identified by two witnesses of the prosecution. Well-settled is the
rule that defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by
witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The killing of Jose Bacsal is murder in view of the qualifying circumstance of aid of armed men. Appellant
Tranquilino Pacala, however, must be credited with one mitigating circumstance, i.e., that he was less
than eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. 4chanrobles virtual law library
In passing, it must be said that motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when, as in the
instant case, there is no doubt as the identity of the culprits. 5Despite the absence of proof of motive,
the accused may be found guilty of murder. 6
3. The appellants' contention that the proceedings in the court below, as well as the judgment rendered
by it, are null and void by reason of the absence in the information of a certification by the provincial
fiscal that a preliminary investigation was conducted by him, is untenable.
It appears from the record that the criminal complaint against the accused was filed with the Justice of
the Peace Court of Villareal, Samar, on December 5, 1964, and it was only after the aforesaid court had
conducted the requisite preliminary examination that it issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. On
January 14, 1965, after the herein appellants were arrested and delivered to the court, they expressly
waived their right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation. 7chanrobles virtual law library
As We held in People v. Marquez, 8what is not allowed under Section 14 of Rule 112, Revised Rules of
Court, is the "filing of the information without a preliminary investigation having been previously
conducted, and the injunction that there should be a certification is only a consequence of the
requirement that a preliminary investigation should first be conducted. Logically, therefore, inasmuch as
the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the preliminary investigation itself must be
asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived, it stands to reason that the
absence of the certification is nothing but evidence of a fact, and if the omission of the fact itself to be
certified is waived, if not properly raised before the accused enters his plea, why should the omission
merely of the certification be given more importance than the absence of the fact itself to be certified
to?"chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar, the accused not only expressly waived their right to preliminary investigation but they
also never raised the issue of lack of certification by the fiscal at any stage of the proceedings before the
trial court, except in this appeal. There is no question that the right to preliminary investigation is a
personal right conferred by law and may be waived. Where appellant had waived the preliminary
investigation in the trial court and failed to raise in issue the alleged absence of a valid preliminary
investigation at any stage of the proceedings before the said court, the said question may not be raised
on appeal for the first time. 9chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the two appellants are declared guilty of murder, and the judgment of the lower court is
accordingly modified. Aquilino Pacala is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; and Tranquilino Pacala,
Jr. is sentenced to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)

years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appellants are ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P12,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the costs.