ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.

, ET AL vs THE HONORABLE
CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
[G.R. No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.]
FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter
of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of
the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative
of due process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels; that the provision in the
same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times
and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth,
the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if
any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of OMKA
That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the OMKA of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4
of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process
clause.
In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that
the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality,
a
valid
and
proper
exercise
of
the
police
power.
The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of Manila
to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760
would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been
enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities
of their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not
be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of
police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual
foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption
of
constitutionality
must
prevail.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside

POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a
manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As
such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great
public
needs.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the
stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful
occupations are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from
applying the well known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who
might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor
in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922],
42 Phil,, 818, 828).
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common
inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable
nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence
of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

Police Power Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was
approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It
classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checksin to their rooms. It compelled
hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons.
Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and
against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of ErmitaMalate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There
is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain

practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the
revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The
due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has
reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was
to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on
certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face.
Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance
of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed
and injunction lifted.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative ofdue process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.

There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative
of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant andlaundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of
the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process,equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiryinto fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale
of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as
a policepower measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILAFacts:

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative
of thedue process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable
or oppressive butalso vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the
invasion of the right to privacy and theguaranty against self-incrimination.Ordinance
No. 4760
proposes
to check
the clandestine harboring
of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all
times, and by introducing several other amendatoryprovisions calculated to shatter
the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
fromo p e r a t i n g f o r p u r p o s e o t h e r t h a n l e g a l " a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e , t o

i n c r e a s e " t h e i n c o m e o f t h e c i t y government."The lower court ruled in favor of the

petitioners. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held:
No.
Rationale:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not
cover petitioners.This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard publicmorals is immune from such imputation
of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported byanything of substance.
To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
policepower which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers,
4
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if itcould be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,
publicmorals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that
inherent and plenarypower in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.On the legislative organs of the
government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exerciseof the police power,
which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations
topromote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people.In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutionalguaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect
the life, liberty or propertyof any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered aseither capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call
for correction by the courts.The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted
the injuction on the Ordinance inquestion.
***
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevailover authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD
Print this Page

Case Basics
Petitioner
Dartmouth College
Respondent
Woodward
Decided By
Marshall Court (1812-1823)
Opinion
17 U.S. 518 (1819)
Argued

Tuesday, March 10, 1818

Decided
Tuesday, February 2, 1819
Facts of the Case
In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a
privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's
corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an
attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed
suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.
Question
Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights
under the Contract Clause?
Conclusion
Decision: 5
votes
for
Dartmouth
Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 10

College,

vote(s)

against

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a
contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that
the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil
institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to
transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the
government and its citizens."

Dartmouth
Contract

College
Clause,

v.
Woodward
Limitations
on

(17
the

U.
Powers

S.
of

518,
the

The
Under the Constitution, can a state legislature change the charter of a college?

1819)
States
Issue

What's
at
Stake?
Whether Dartmouth College would remain private or become a state school. More broadly,
what is protected by the Constitution's "contract" clause?
Facts
and
Background
In 1769 the King of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. This document spelled
out the purpose of the school, set up the structure to govern it, and gave land to the
college. In 1816, the state legislature of New Hampshire passed laws that revised the charter.
These laws changed the school from private to public. They changed the duties of the
trustees. They changed how the trustees were selected.
The existing trustees filed suit. They claimed that the legislature violated the Constitution. They
said that Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution prevented a state from "impairing" (that is,
weakening or canceling) a contract.
The
Decision
By a 5-1 margin, the Court agreed with Dartmouth. The Court struck down the law, so
Dartmouth continued as a private college. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion.
He said that the charter was, in essence, a contract between the King and the trustees. Even
though we were no longer a royal colony, the contract is still valid because the Constitution
says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract.

The
Impact
of
the
Decision
Historians believe that the decision greatly encouraged business investment and growth.
Corporations are also chartered by states. It states can't pass laws to impair those charters,
then businesses are more secure. They are also more apt to attract investors, employ
workers, and to add to the national prosperity.
The decision, handed down on February 2, 1819, ruled in favor of the College and
invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth to
continue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority
opinion of the court was written by John Marshall. The opinion reaffirmed Marshall's belief in
the sanctity of a contract (also seen in Fletcher v. Peck) as necessary to the functioning of a
republic (in the absence of royal rule, contracts rule).
The Court ruled that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private
parties, the King and the trustees, with which the legislature could not interfere. Even though
the United States are no longer royal colonies, the contract is still valid because the
Constitution says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract. The fact that the
government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil
institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to
transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the
government and its citizens.[2]
Significance[edit]
The decision was not without precedent. Earlier the Court had invalidated a state act
in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), concluding that contracts, no matter how they were
procured (in the case of Fletcher v. Peck, a land contract had been illegally obtained),
cannot be invalidated by state legislation. Thus, the court, though working in an early era,
was treading on Dartmouth. Fletcher was not a popular decision at the time, and a public
outcry ensued. Thomas Jefferson's earlier commiseration with New Hampshire
Governor William Plumer stated essentially that the earth belongs to the living. Popular
opinion influenced some state courts and legislatures to declare that state governments had
an absolute right to amend or repeal a corporate charter. The courts, however, have
imposed limitations to this.
After the Dartmouth decision, many states wanted more control so they passed laws or
constitutional amendments giving themselves the general right to alter or revoke at will,
which the courts found to be a valid reservation.[3][4] The courts have established, however,
that the alteration or revocation of private charters or laws authorizing private charters must
be reasonable and cannot cause harm to the members (founders, stockholders, and the
like).[5][6][7]
The traditional view holds that this case is one of the most important Supreme Court rulings,
strengthening the Contract Clause and limiting the power of the States to interfere with
private charters, including those of commercial enterprises.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), was a

landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with the application of theContract
Clause of the United States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the
president of Dartmouth College was deposed by its trustees, leading to the New
Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and
thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor. The Supreme
Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which pre-dated the

creation of the State. The decision settled the nature of public versus private charters and
resulted in the rise of the American business corporation.[1]
Contents

1 Facts
2 Judgment
3 See also
4 Notes
5 External links

Facts
In 1769 King George III of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. This document
spelled out the purpose of the school, set up the structure to govern it, and gave land to the
college.
In 1815, over thirty years after the conclusion of the American Revolution, the legislature of
New Hampshire attempted to alter Dartmouth's charter in order to reinstate the College's
deposed president, placing the ability to appoint positions in the hands of the governor,
adding new members to the board of trustees, and creating a state board of visitors with
veto power over trustee decisions. This effectively converted the school from a private to a
public institution. The College's book of records, corporate seal, and other corporate
property were removed. Thetrustees of the College objected and sought to have the
actions of the legislature declared unconstitutional.
The trustees retained Dartmouth alumnus Daniel Webster, a New Hampshire native who
would
later
become
a U.S.
Senator for Massachusetts and Secretary
of
Stateunder President Millard Fillmore. Webster argued the college's case against William H.
Woodward, the state-approved secretary of the new board of trustees. Webster's speech in
support of Dartmouth (which he described as "a small college," adding, "and yet there are
those who love it") was so moving that it apparently helped convince Chief Justice John
Marshall, also reportedly bringing tears to Webster's eyes.
Judgment
The decision, handed down on February 2, 1819, ruled in favor of the College and
invalidated the act of the New Hampshire Legislature, which in turn allowed Dartmouth to
continue as a private institution and take back its buildings, seal, and charter. The majority
opinion of the court was written by John Marshall. The opinion reaffirmed Marshall's belief in
the sanctity of a contract (also seen in Fletcher v. Peck) as necessary to the functioning of a
republic (in the absence of royal rule, contracts rule).

Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)

CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers.
A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Q u i m p o ( o n e o f t h e
petitioners) in his
capacity as an
Executive
Officer
of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,
and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice,
the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their

President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay)

with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City
to
stop
the
demolition
of
the
private
respondents'
stalls,
saris a r i s t o r e s , a n d c a r i n d e r i a a l o n g N o r t h E D S A . T h e complaint was docketed as
CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist
from
demolishing
the
stalls
and
shanties
at
North
EDSApending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaintbefore the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order,
dated 25 September1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
carryingo u t t h e d e m o l i t i o n o f t h e s t a l l s , s a r i - s a r i s t o r e s a n d carinderia
despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. Issue: Whether or not
the CHR has jurisdiction :a)to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights"
of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b)
to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt; Held:
a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, afore-quoted,
it is readily apparent
that the
delegates
envisioned
a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases
of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned s u c h a r e a s a s t h e
" ( 1 ) p r o t e c t i o n o f r i g h t s o f p o l i t i c a l detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention
of t o r t u r e s , ( 3 ) f a i r a n d p u b l i c t r i a l s , ( 4 ) c a s e s o f disappearances,
(5)
salvagings
and
hamletting,
and
(6)
otherc r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e r e l i g i o u s . " W h i l e t h e e n u m e r a t i o n h
a s n o t l i k e l y b e e n m e a n t t o h a v e a n y preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation
of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
withinthea u t h o r i t y o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t i t s
recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to
be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's
Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is,
in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis
the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order
for
the
demolition
of
thes t a l l s , s a r i s a r i s t o r e s a n d c a r i n d e r i a o f t h e p r i v a t e respondents can
fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by
the Constitution. b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized
to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its p o w e r " t o c i t e o r h o l d a n y
person in
d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t e m p t , a n d t o i m p o s e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p e n a l t i e s i n acc
ordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in t h e
Rules
o f C o u r t . " T h a t p o w e r t o c i t e f o r c o n t e m p t , however, should be understood to
apply
only
to
violations
of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of proceduree s s e n t i a l t o c a r r y o u t i t s i n v e s t i g a t o r i a l p o w e r s . T o exe
mplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to
cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline
to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative w o r k . T h e
" o r d e r t o d e s i s t " ( a s e m a n t i c i n t e r p l a y f o r a restraining order) in the instance
before
us,
however,
is

noti n v e s t i g a t o r i a l i n c h a r a c t e r b u t p r e s c i n d s f r o m a n adjudicative
that it does not possess.

power

ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the
CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the
CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate,
on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and
political
rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that
the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the
Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) VS. PHILIPPINEBLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC.G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
FACTS:Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a
massdemonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
and thatthey informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their
proposeddemonstration.The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after
learning the about theplanned mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union,explaining further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because theunion has no quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed out
that thedemonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of
thelaborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
andfreedom for petition for redress of grievances.Company informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the unionguaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for thatmatter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For whichreason, the Company warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who withoutprevious leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present whoare the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work shall bedismissed.Another meeting was convoked Company.
It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEOrepresentatives that while all workers may join the
Malacaang demonstration, those fromthe 1st and regular shifts should not absent
themselves to participate, otherwise, theywould be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel
the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and
NoLockout clause of their Collective Bargaining
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
foundguilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently
deniedby the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.ISSUES:1.
Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA2.
Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employeesRULING:1.

No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because
these
freedoms
are
"delicate
andvulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat ofsanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently
as
the
actual applicationof sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting governm
entregulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription;
but
human
rights
are
imprescriptible.
If
human
rights
areextinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attemptto limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs

political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and
of
assemblyoccupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation andvitality of o
ur civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives theseliberties the sanctity and the san
ction not permitting dubious intrusions."The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and ofpetition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed agai
nst publicofficials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.
2. Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on its part to permit
all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses
and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) workers from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an unfair labor practice defined
in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

Opinions

Executive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004.

07/06/2010
0 Comments

Facts: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila
Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine
Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as
unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m),
Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
respondents
therein
from
enforcing
the
assailed
provisions
of
the
law.
Peitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have
stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of
a
law
that
are
unjust
and
unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a
period of only twenty (20) days therefrom. After the petitioners filed their comment on the
petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the
inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its
members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k)
and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections
11
and
40
of
Rep.
Act
No.
8042.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. 5 According to the respondent, Section 6(g) and (i)
discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal
protection clause, as well as Article II, Section 12 6 and Article XV, Sections 1 7 and 3(3) of
the Constitution. 8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino workers, only
overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers
also
have
the
right
to
seek
employment
abroad.
According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated
because they are prevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. It
cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while
unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and
unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition
of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal
recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning
agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid
classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property
and due process and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to

prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and registered recruiters is
unconstitutional.
The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with
illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters
who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act
No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based
on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides
being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the
Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of
recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal
recruitment
under
Rep.
Act
No.
8042
is
life
imprisonment.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8,
9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22, Article III of the Constitution 10
prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume
that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the
law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of
the
said
prohibited
acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within
which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and could deprive
licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the
summons and the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the
filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days. This would thereby shift
on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign
employers.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall
be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was
committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated
provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at
the
time
of
the
effectivity
of
this
Act.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent
has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules
implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions
do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by
Congress
in
the
exercise
of
the
police
power
of
the
State.
In opposition to the respondent's plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that: As
earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of
petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from
the
defect
and
impropriety
of
the
petition.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision
dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration
of
the
said
decision.

Issue: The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
on
a
bond
of
only
P50,000;
and
Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's order and the writ of
preliminary
injunction
issued
by
it.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated
August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
it
in
the
said
case
on
August
24,
1995
are
NULLIFIED.
No
costs.
SO

ORDERED.

Ratio: The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the court commits grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may
be
nullified
via
a
writ
of
certiorari
and
prohibition.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an
injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on
its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to
be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits,
or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of
hardships
tips
decidedly
in
its
favor.
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them
unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of
certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying
out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful
conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the
Constitution.
One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the

other

departments

(Garcia

vs.

Executive

Secretary,

204

SCRA

516

[1991]).

In

view
of
petitioner's
standing
The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, nonprofit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although
the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and
registered recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its
Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members authorizing it to represent
the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as
to vest in it a personality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while
the
recruitment
agencies
it
purports
to
represent
are
profit-oriented.
The petition is meritorious. The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in
representation of the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in
the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of
injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its
members. 16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct
interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the
concerns
of
its
constituents.
We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the
purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the
manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing,
creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general
membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino
workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association
on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities
necessary
to
accomplish
the
purposes
embodied
therein.

In

view
of
standing
in
behalf
of
unskilled
workers
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of
unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.
Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section
2 of Rule 63 20 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the
petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.

In

view
of
retroactivity
In People v. Diaz, 24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied
retroactively.

In

view
of
equal
protection
clause
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing

or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid
written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the
assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or
class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which
it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality,
but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges
conferred
and
liabilities
imposed.

In

view
of
the
VALIDITY
of
Sec.
6
of
RA
8042
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment
agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment has been upheld in People v.
Chowdury: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may
be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously
participated
in
illegal
recruitment.
By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural
provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court,
by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of
the
said
provisions
cannot
be
enjoined.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and
employees and their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the
enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who
commit large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may
be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the
prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered
recruitment agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the
assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The
respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the
enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that,
because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases
before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or
difficulty
is
hardly
irreparable
injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent
people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led
to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at
affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on
existing laws in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the
trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed
them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment
abroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52
embedded
in
Rep.
Act
No.
8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason
that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

Case Doctrines- Constitutional Law 2

SECTION 1

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

A. Life, Liberty or Property

American Inter-Fashion v. Office of the President export quota allocation
Glorious Suns export quota allocation was a initially a privilege evolved into some form of
property which should not be removed arbitrarily and without due process and hurriedly
confer it to another.
Chavez v. Romulo citizens right to bear arms - The right to bear arms cannot be classified
as a fundamental right under the 1987 Constitution the right is a mere statutory privilege,
not a constitutional right. It is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the
people
the
right to bear arms. The Second Amendment pertains to the citizens collective right to
take arms in defense of the state, not to the citizens individual right to own and possess
arms.
Exec. Secretary V. CA Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 A profession,
trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees; one
cannot be deprived of the right to work or the right to make a living because these rights
are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes
an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute and the proper regulation of a
profesion is a valid exercise of police power.
Duncan v. Glaxo not ed to have a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. (related topic: equal protection)
Alejano v. Cabuay Oakwood Mutiny Case writ of habeas corpus is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but also
unnecessary, and where a deprivation og freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. (related topic: privacy of communication and correspondence)

B. Procedural Due Process

Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca mortgage foreclosure due process implies that: 1)
there must be a court or tribunal clothed with the power to hear or determine the matter
before it; 2) that jurisdiction has been lawfully acquired; 3) defendant shall have to
opputunity to be heard; 4) judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing. | NOTICE must
be given
Bautista v. CA land dispute When a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process
Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA bank receivership; insolvency there is no requirement whether
express or implied that a hearing must first be conducted before a banking institution may
be placed in receivership
Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA untreated wastewater discharged to sewer Ex parte
proceedings - permitted by law in situations like these because stopping the discharged of
the
wastewater
cannot
be
made to wait until protracted litigation; standards set by the board enough not required
to prove immediate danger to life, health et. al
Fabella v. CA public school teachers striking DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

requisites: 1) actual or constructive notice of the institution of the proceedings which may
affect ones legal rights; 2) real opportunity to be heard personally or with counsel; 3) to
present
witnesses
and
evidence is ones favor and to defend his rights; 4) tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; 5) finding is supported by
substantial
evidence

contained and made known to the parties

Guzman v. CA kicked out from school DUE PROCESS IN STUDENT DISCPLINE
PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) student must be informed in writing the nature and cause of
the accusation against him; 2) right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of
counsel
if
desired;
3)
they
shall
be informed of the evidence against them; 4) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or officials hearing the
case
Lao Gi v. CA DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS same requisites as those
required in criminal proceedings (Rules of Court) Secretary of Justice v. Lantion extradition
case of Jimenez - DUE PROCESS IN QUASIJUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) taking and
evaluation
of
evidence;
2)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; 3) rendering an order based upon
the facts proved Chavez v. COMELEC billboard of Chavez as endorser A statute or
regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutionality principle
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations
may
nor
be
achieved
by
means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade protected freedoms

SECTION ONE of Article III of 1987 Constitution Due Process

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(Lets try to understand the provision)

Q: What does the law mean when it says PERSON

A: All person.
Natural (Citizen or Alien)
Juridical ex. corporations and parnership See: ?? Constitutional Law, Cruz pp. 101]
Q: So what does this provision have to do with persons?
A: It guarantees all persons security against deprivation of their life, liberty (freedom) or
property without due process. That natural or juridical person may invoke this right whenever
the government deprives them of such rights.
Q: What does the law mean when it says deprive?
A: To deprive is to take forcibly, to prevent from possessing, enjoying, or using something.
Denial of right to life, liberty, property. Deprivation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional
but deprivation of life, liberty and property WITHOUT DUE PROCESS is unconstitutional.
Q: What are the protected rights under this section?
A: Life, Liberty and Property
Q: What does law mean when it says LIFE
A: It means the integrity of the physical person, the individual or any part of his body. [Cruz]
It also means good life or quality living or a decent standard of living. See: ?? The 1987
Constitution A comprehensive reviewer, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, pp. 24]
:right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment and extends
to the use of his God-given faculties, which makes life enjoyable. Read : ??Buck vs. Bell 274
SCRA 200
Q: Does this include the life of the unborn?
A: Yes. Article II, section 12 says the state shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
Q: What does law mean when it says LIBERTY
A: Mabini once said, Liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong. <There is no such
thing as freedom to sin or to do wrong as the consequence of the latter is not just shame
but even slavery and condemnation. Slavery and condemnation are inherent in every
wrong or sin no matter how freely youve done it. So there is really no freedom in sinning or
doing wrong.
Hence, the law speaks of liberty regulated by law. ??Cruz
Liberty includes the right to exist free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. Read:
??Rubi vs. Provincial Board ofMindoro, 39 Phil 660
Limitation: We may freely exercise our rights or perform duties so long as we do not violate
the law or injure the rights of others.Remember the Latin: Salus Populi Est Suprema Lex The
welfare of the people is the supreme law
Q: In ?? Block vs. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, military detainees question the correctness of the
jails policy of denying them contact visits with spouses, children, relatives and friends. (In
relation to denying detainees the liberty to meet with their families and friends without due
process of law)
A: The U.S. Supreme court upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as entirely
reasonable response to legitimate security reasons. Contact visits invite security problems
and expose the detention facility to drug, weapon or contraband introductions. Nothing in
the constitution requires detainees to be allowed such visits.
Q: What does law mean when it says PROPERTY
A: Anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of a contract; it
includes the right to secure, use and dispose. ALL THINGS: Real, Personal, Tangible and
Intangible within the commerce of man. ??Cruz
Q: Employment, profession or trade property right?
A:Yes. Read?? Crespo vs. Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66
Q: Are licenses property rights?
A: Licenses (mere privilege) are not property rights and may be revoked at will;
Read?? Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil 123
However, a mere privilege may evolve into a property right as when a privilege has been
enjoyed for so long, has been subject of substantial investment and has become the source
of employment for thousands. Read?? American Inter Fashion Corp. vs. Office of the
President, 197 SCRA 409
Q: May the license of harbor pilot be cancelled without due process (hearing)?

A: No. ??Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.

Vested right to a public office is not regarded as property. However, salaray already earned
is considered as property. ??Cruz
Q: On classification of property into historical treasures.
A: Should be done with both substantive and procedural due process because it involves
imposition of limits on ownership.
Q: Right to collect pension plan
A: Employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of
the terms of employment. ?? GSIS vs. Montescarlos, GR no. 146494, July 14, 2004
*Human rights enjoy a higher status than property rights.
Q: What is Due Process?
A: It is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and render
judgment only after trial.
Two Kinds of Due Process:
1. Substantive due process -requires that the law itself is FAIR, REASONABLE and JUST (FRJ)
-done in due process if under the authority of a valid law; requires the intrinsic validity of the
law (Cruz)
-did the law itself comply with the constitution as to its validity and effectiveness? is the law
valid and unconstitutional?
-it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws (Bernas)
-heart is reasonableness and absence of exercise of arbitrary power of the government
Requisites:
Valid governmental objective Public interest
Means employed (intrinsic procedure how the law will be enforced) are reasonably
related and necessary for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly oppressive
Presumption on states act interfering with life, liberty and property:
GR: Valid
XPN: In case of prior restraint
Void-for-vagueness rule a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so
indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for
vagueness. Constitutional vice is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.
Law is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of oridnary intelligence
must guess as to the meaning and as to the application.
Vague law is repugnant to Constitution in 2 aspects:
1. Violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and it can
become an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle.
Overbreadth doctrine - decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the are of protected
freedoms.
Facial Challenge - allowed to be made to a vague statue and to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
On its face invalidation - results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might
be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Conclusive Presumption of knowledge of law presupposes that law has been published.
(Art. 3, NCC)
2. Procedural Due Process - refers to method or manner by which the law is enforced
- Strike, but hear me first. -Themistocles
Twin requirements:
1. Notice
2. Hearing

2 Kinds of Procedural Due Process

1. Judicial
2. Administrative
Judicial Due Process:
1. Impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the
property which is the subject matter
over person (civil) through valid service of summons -w/o this judgment will be
unconstitutional; (criminal) during arraignment the court acquires jurisdiction of the accused
over subject matter determined by Congress through law (Law may attribute jurisdiction to
RTC, MTC)
3. Notice and Hearing - right to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute the
evidence submitted by the other party
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing decision based on the merits,
evidence presented
Administrative Due Process:
1. notice and hearing (may or may not be assisted by a counsel)
2. court with competent jurisdiction
3. judgment upon lawful trial
Difference between the Judicial notice and hearing and that of Administrative:
Judicial: needs public trial
Administrative: no trial type proceedings, submission of position papers only; exception is
Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board which requires trial and hearing
**if the rule of any quasi-judicial proceeding requires trial type then it should be followed
otherwise there will be NO due process
Quasi-judicial function notice and hearing are required
Executive/legislative
function

not
required
Q: Is appeal part a natural right and part of due process?
A: No. GR: may be allowed or denied by legislature; XPN: where Constitution gives the
person right to appeal, denial of such right is a violation of due process
Q: Is preliminary investigation a right
A: No. May be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it.
EXTRADITION delivery of an accused or a convicted individual to the requesting state in
whose territory he is alleged to have committed a crime
>There is no legal obligation to surrender a fugitive unless theres a treaty
>Religious or Political offenses are generally NOT extraditable
Q: Is an extraditee entitled to a notice and hearing before the issuance of the warrant of
arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court?
A: No. See ??Govt of US vs. Purganan

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988
GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.
Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.

Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

PADILIA, J.:
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of
1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private
respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. 1 As
required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with
administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5,
Republic Act No. 5185. 2
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial
Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing,
private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and
documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent
Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office
as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial
Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding
further with the administrative case.
According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51
issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly
violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of
the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of
preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated
the fundamental and elementary principles of due process. 4
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the petitioner that
he was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held:
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized
in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a
"property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.
The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. 7
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a
chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the
scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty.
Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing,
sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the
explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's
meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner
mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." 8
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or
evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing
therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted
by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of
the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said:

From the earliest inception of instutional government in our country, the
concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice
and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent
ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to
overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure.
Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr.
Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due
process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society.
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a
lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of
procedural due process.
We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which,
unlike the case before us now, was only a summary action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a
judgment, based only on plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and
rendered without hearing defendant's evidence, should be
avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be
imputed to the judge, he should have the patience and
circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his
evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of
petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of
conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge". 10
The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the
last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3
May 1971 is LIFTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST

FACTS: IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO.04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF
APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TOONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTSASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THEPPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVESECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C.
CORONA, DISMISSED THEAPPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUEDEARLIER

RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THEREGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF
RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME
COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST
CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS ADEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUTPROPER
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICEAND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS OFPROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN ANADMINISTRATIVE BODY
EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. INTHE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVEBODY NEED NOT COMPLY
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE ANDHEARING
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT.
IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO
ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT.
BLOCK v. RUTHERFORD, 468 U.S. 576 (1984)
468 U.S. 576
BLOCK, SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL. v. RUTHERFORD ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No.
Argued
Decided July 3, 1984

83-317.
March

28,

1984

Respondents, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail, brought a class
action in Federal District Court against the County Sheriff and other officials, challenging, on
due process grounds, the jail's policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits with their
spouses, relatives, children, and friends, and the jail's practice of conducting random,
irregular "shakedown" searches of cells while the detainees were away at meals, recreation,
or other activities. The District Court sustained the challenges, and ordered that low risk
detainees incarcerated for more than a month be allowed contact visits and that all
detainees be allowed to watch searches of their cells if they are in the area when the
searches are conducted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Where it is alleged that a pretrial detainee has been deprived of liberty without due
process, the dispositive inquiry is whether the challenged practice or policy constitutes
punishment or is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 . In considering whether a specific practice or policy is "reasonably
related" to security interests, courts should play a very limited role, since such considerations
are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials. Id., at
540-541, n. 23. Pp. 583-585.
2. Here, the Central Jail's blanket prohibition on contact visits is an entirely reasonable,
nonpunitive response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Contact visits invite a host of security problems. They open a detention facility
to the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Moreover, to expose to others
those detainees who, as is often the case, are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses or
have prior convictions carries with it the risks that the safety of innocent individuals will be

jeopardized. Totally disallowing contact visits is not excessive in relation to the security and
other interests at stake. There are many justifications for denying contact visits entirely, rather
than attempting the difficult task of establishing a program of limited visits such as that
imposed here. Nothing in the Constitution requires that detainees be allowed contact visits;
responsible, experienced [468 U.S. 576, 577] administrators have determined, in their sound
discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility and other persons. Pp. 585589.
3. The Central Jail's practice of conducting random, irregular "shakedown" searches of cells
in the absence of the cell occupants is also a reasonable response by the jail officials to
legitimate security concerns. Bell v. Wolfish, supra. This is also a matter lodged in the sound
discretion of those officials. Pp. 589-591.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 9480. November 13, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BALBINO VILLAREAL, Defendant-Appellant.
G. E. Jose, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS

1. WEAPONS; POWER TO MAKE REGULATIONS. There is nothing in the Constitution of the

United States nor the Philippine Bill of Rights which forbids the enactment of penal statutes by
the Philippine Legislature prohibiting the carrying of concealed deadly weapons, or the use
of firearms without a license.
DECISION
CARSON, J. :
The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant of the offense of
carrying a concealed deadly weapon as defined and penalized in section 26 of Act No.
1780. The weapon was a sort of dagger or sharp-pointed knife with a blade about 8 inches
long. It was carried in a leather sheath, attached to a belt which was strapped round the
body, and hung down on the left hip of the accused concealed from public view inside his
trousers.
The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim
that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping
and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the
Philippine
Bill
of
Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against
the infringement of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S.
Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in
passing, to point out that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on
the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine
Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in
State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc.,
853, note 18); and further, because even in those jurisdictions wherein the constitutional
guaranty of the right to keep and bear arms is in force, while it is beyond the power of a
legislature or municipal body to prohibit entirely the keeping and use of military arms, it may,
in the exercise of its police powers, for the purpose of suppressing crime and lawlessness,
lawfully regulate the use of such weapons by providing that they shall not be carried in a
concealed manner, or that they shall not be pointed at another, or fired within the limits of a
city.
(See
many
cases
cited
in
40
Cyc.,
p.
853.)

Counsels contention seems to be based on those provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights
which prohibit the enactment of a law depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. He
insists that restrictions placed on the carrying of deadly weapons have the effect of
depriving the owner of the free use and enjoyment of his property, and that the granting of
licenses to some persons to carry firearms and the denial of that right to others is a denial to
the
latter
of
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws.
Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights with which it is
claimed it is in conflict were enacted under American sovereignty, and both are to be
construed more especially in the light of American authority and precedent. The earliest
English statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the bearing of arms, enacted in the year 1328 A.
D., was but an affirmation of the common law offense of going around with unusual and
dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. Many statutes have been enacted since
that time in England and the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of weapons,
and these have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially when the prohibitions
have been directed to the wearing or carrying of deadly weapons in a concealed manner.
(See
48
Cent.
Digest,
tit.
Weapons,
and,
many
cases
there
cited.)
There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to regulate the use of
deadly weapons for the purpose of suppressing or restraining crime and lawlessness.
Undoubtedly there are many deadly weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like
which every citizen has a right to own and to use in the various activities of human life. But
the right to own and to, use such weapons does not carry with it the right to use them to the
injury of his neighbor or so as to endanger the peace and welfare of the community. "It is a
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under his implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community." Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) , 53, 84.) Provided the means adopted are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the end in view, not unduly oppressive
upon individuals, and in the interest of the public generally rather than of a particular class,
the legislature may adopt such regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and
regulating the use of private property in the exercise of its police power. (U. S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil.
Rep.,
85.)
We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to
restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We
do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the
security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein
the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly
oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the
legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe the conditions under which they
may be kept and used by their owners rests upon substantially similar grounds. The general
provisions touching the licensing of the use of such arms are mere police regulations,
intended to limit such use so that firearms will not fall into the hands of persons whose use of
them might endanger the peace of the state or the safety and security of individuals. While it
may be true that those charged with the issuing of such licenses willfully or mistakenly decline
to issue or approve licenses in some cases in which the applicants are equally entitled with
others to receive them, nevertheless the regulations themselves are of general application
and in no wise deny the equal protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such cases
is
not with
the law, but with those
charged with its
administration.
We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The judgment
entered in the court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance

against

the Appellant.

So

ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Chavez vs. Romulo

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004A mere license is always revocable
FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order
to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In
evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance
of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D.
No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of
firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed
logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under
our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields,
may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege
to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to
impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by
the selectmenat their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does
not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of
these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins.
Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
petitioner
vs
.HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;DIRECTOR GENERAL
HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THECHIEF OF THE PNP,
et al
.,
respondents
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004
Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines
inthe Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence
(Guidelines)issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has
been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading

public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and
Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
Issues:
1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
2.
whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?;
Ruling:1 . A u t h o r i t y o f t h e P N P C h i e f
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within
its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. The power to make laws the legislative
power is vested in Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and
void, on the principle that delegata potestas non potest delegari delegated power
may not be delegated. The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however,
is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain
persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners,
auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate
necessary rules and regulations. Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now
the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for
a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other
lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue
regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. By virtue
of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).Consequently,
the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters
licensing authority.
Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the
possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the
PNP Chiefs power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions on such
matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of
the PNP.
2.Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach
of the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.
The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:(1)The
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and(2)The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for
peace and order in the society.
Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples
Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it
best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance
of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. The only question that can
then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the
assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the
comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to
roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to
apprehend them. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.