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This document summarizes the 1963 Privy Council case Lim Chin Aik v R which concerned a man convicted under Singapore's Immigration Ordinance for entering and remaining in Singapore without knowledge of an order prohibiting his entry. The Privy Council held that 1) ignorance of the law was a valid defense where there were no provisions for publishing the order or enabling the man to discover the law affected him, and 2) the presumption of mens rea applied because the ordinance did not clearly oust it and imposing strict liability could not reasonably ensure observance of undisclosed orders. The case established that strict liability requires showing it would reasonably enforce the law for the class of people charged.
This document summarizes the 1963 Privy Council case Lim Chin Aik v R which concerned a man convicted under Singapore's Immigration Ordinance for entering and remaining in Singapore without knowledge of an order prohibiting his entry. The Privy Council held that 1) ignorance of the law was a valid defense where there were no provisions for publishing the order or enabling the man to discover the law affected him, and 2) the presumption of mens rea applied because the ordinance did not clearly oust it and imposing strict liability could not reasonably ensure observance of undisclosed orders. The case established that strict liability requires showing it would reasonably enforce the law for the class of people charged.
This document summarizes the 1963 Privy Council case Lim Chin Aik v R which concerned a man convicted under Singapore's Immigration Ordinance for entering and remaining in Singapore without knowledge of an order prohibiting his entry. The Privy Council held that 1) ignorance of the law was a valid defense where there were no provisions for publishing the order or enabling the man to discover the law affected him, and 2) the presumption of mens rea applied because the ordinance did not clearly oust it and imposing strict liability could not reasonably ensure observance of undisclosed orders. The case established that strict liability requires showing it would reasonably enforce the law for the class of people charged.
[1963] AC 160, [1963] 1 All ER 223, [1963] 2 WLR 42, 106 Sol Jo 1028 Court: PC Judgment Date: circa 1963 Catchwords & Digest BRITISH NATIONALITY, IMMIGRATION AND RACE RELATIONS - CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL OF ADMISSION - GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION - REGISTRATION AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS - SINGAPORE IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE 1952--ORDER PROHIBITING ENTRANCE--IGNORANCE OF ORDER In 1959 appellant who previously had lived in Singapore with his family, but had left in 1954 in suspicious circumstances, began to visit Singapore daily. On May 28, 1959, an order was made under Singapore Immigration Ordinance s 9, prohibiting appellant entering Singapore. In June 1959, he began to live with his family again in Singapore. Appellant was convicted under s 6(2), (3) of the ordinance, as amended, which enacted that it should not be lawful for a person prohibited by order from entering Singapore to enter Singapore and rendered such entry into, or remaining in Singapore, an offence. There was no evidence that the order was served on or communicated to appellant, and it was conceded that mens rea on his part had not been proved. Section 9(3) of the ordinance provided for publication of an order directed to an individual. Various provisions of the ordinance other than s 6 and s 9, contained phrases such as 'knowingly,' 'without reasonable cause' or 'without reasonable excuse' in relation to the doing of an act, as distinct from the passive continuance of behaviour previously lawful; but no such phrase appeared in s 9 or s 6. On appeal: Held (1) the principle that ignorance of the law was no excuse was inapplicable where, as here (even if the making of the order prohibiting appellant's entry was a legislative, as distinct from an administrative act), there was no legislative provision for the publication of the order or designed to enable the man concerned to find out by appropriate inquiry what the law affecting him in this respect was: (2) the presumption that mens rea was an essential ingredient of the offence had not been ousted either by the terms of the Singapore Immigration Ordinance, or by its subject-matter, (a) notwithstanding, as regards the construction of the ordinance, the absence from s 6 of such a word as 'knowingly' or a comparable qualification which were to be found in other sections, and (b), in regard to the subject-matter of the ordinance particularly for the reason that to impose absolute liability on a prohibited person could not have ensured observance of the order, since he could not have complied with it if he did not know of it and no practicable means of his ascertaining that he had become a prohibited person was provided by the ordinance. Per curiam: where it can be shown that the imposition of strict liability would result in the prosecution and conviction of a class of persons whose conduct could not in any way affect the observance of the law, then, even where the statute is dealing with a grave social evil, strict liability is not likely to be intended. Cases referring to this case Annotations: All CasesCourt: ALL COURTS Sort by: Judgment Date (Latest First) Treatment Case Name Citations [2006] PNCA 1, [2006] 4 Distinguished R v Christian (No 2) LRC 746 [2004] EWHC 187 Corporation of London (Admin), 169 JP 263, Considered v Eurostar (UK) Ltd [2004] All ER (D) 134 (Jan)
Court Date Signal Pitcairn 02/03/2006 Is CA Admin Ct20/01/2004