Historia y Desarrollo Moral en Kant

North American Philosophical Publications
Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development

Author(s): Pauline Kleingeld
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 59-80
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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of Philosophy Quarterly
16, Number
1, January 1999
History
Volume
KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF

MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Pauline Kleingeld
Kant defends a teleological
view of history. While
grant
of
direction
of history as a whole
the
that
ing
knowledge
general
Immanuel
as a
he argues
that we do have reason
to assume,
is impossible,
regulative
principle,
ment
of the rational
rational
arts
and
that history
potential
manifests
development
but also
sciences,
is characterized
of humankind.
itself in progress
in politics,
education,
is to culminate
in the
rality. Moral
development
and the transformation
humanity
The
fact that Kant

does
however,
not
On
of society
been
only in the
religion, and mo
status to this view,

only regulative
from the exigencies
of conceptual
its weak
status, Kant's
epistemic
phi
as incompatible
criticized
with central
attributes
absolve
said
not
"moralization"
of
into a "moral whole."1
him
Indeed, despite
consistency.
of
losophy
history has been
tenets of his moral
theory. To many commentators,
moral development
has seemed
inconsistent
with
tenets.
basic
Kantian
notion
his
First,
following
has
by the develop
his view, this
to be
with
the very idea of

some or all of the
of rational
his
claim
devel
the
incompatible
and hence universally
valid (the uni
versal validity problem).
Second, his notion of rational development,
seems to run counter to his
the notion of 'moralization',
especially
is noumenal
thesis that moral
and hence
agency
(the
atemporal
seems
notion
moral
the
of
progress
problem).
Finally,
atemporality
opment
moral
law
that
is unconditionally
to contradict
some
claring
the dignity
'freer' than
and moral
others
of all humans
equality
by de
moral
(the
equality problem).
few philosophers
view of history,
today share Kant's
Although
as a
the attempt to answer
these charges
should not be regarded
matter
of purely historical
interest.
If these
cannot be
charges
not only of Kant's
the coherence
answered,
they jeopardize
philoso
as
of
but
of
his
moral
well.
Two
phy
history,
theory
imperatives
59

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
60
to strive for
command
theory are the moral
to
and
the
command
the highest
promote
perfection,
calls a moral world'
(Cl, A808-819/B836-847),
good, which Kant
laws' (C3 V, 448f.), and an 'ethical common
'humanity under moral
to Kant's
central
one's
moral
own
as
(Rel VI, 131). These moral
imperatives must be regarded
incoherent
if Kant's
notions
of rational
moral
and
development
wealth'
contradict
the universal
of the moral
validity
law, the
the
moral
of
all hu
agency,
atemporality
equality
a
mans.2 After all, striving for
moral
is striving for moral
world
If the notions
of moral
and rational
progress.
progress
develop
ment
lead to problems
of conceptual
then they are
inconsistency,
progress
of moral
problematic
possibility
and
of whether Kant
regardless
speaks
of such development
and progress.
of the reality
or the
In this
I argue
that the charges
paper,
from an insufficient understanding
of inconsistency
stem
of
Kant's
of ra
model
largely
tional development.
Taking the universal
validity problem as a point
of departure,
I start by examining what the 'predispositions
for the
use of reason'
consist in and how Kant thinks they develop over the
course of history. I then explain how this account
allows us to solve
the two other
for assuming
problems.
that there
I end with
a discussion
is historical
progress.
of Kant's
reasons
It is not my aim here to fully vindicate

Kant's
of
philosophy
In fact, Kant's
model
is out
history.
pre-Darwinistic
teleological
dated.
the assumption
that human
is
behavior
Furthermore,
more
moral
has
lost
the
gradually
becoming
empirical
plausibility
can
still thought
it had. But the question
of whether Kant
more
of
conceive
rational
at
all
is
fundamen
progress
consistently
tal than the discussion
of his specific view of history, and it is this
more
fundamental
that is at issue here.
question
Kant
on the notion
For the sake of argumentative
focus, I concentrate
as
of rational,
moral
such
and
from
abstract
especially
development
most of the details of Kant's
view of history. Let me just highlight
some of the most
important features of the latter here, in order to
a
for the discussion
in the following sections.3
provide
background
The main
of Kant's
"idea" of history
is the
ingredient
regulative
that nature
and psychological)
hu
occasions
(both physical
mans
to use their reason and exercise
their freedom of will. As a
their rational predispositions,
which
leads
result, humans
develop
to progress
in all areas
in which reason
is employed,
from science
view
to politics
This
humans
to morality
and
religion.
is not a smooth one. On Kant's

process
developmental
view,
have a peculiar
which
he
calls
psychological
characteristic,

61
KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

"unsocial
This
sociability."
to isolation
is a mixed
inclination
to social
interac
social antagonism
and conflict. The resulting
that people will leave the
to consequences
that are so harmful
reasons
and create a state that
state of nature
for self-interested
to
laws. The same dynam
their interaction
will regulate
according
tion and
leads
in turn, will lead states to wage war at first, but

ics of self-interest,
an international
to bring about peace.
federation
later pursue
is the condition
under
and between
both within
states,
Peace,
can be further developed,
of humanity
which
the predispositions
a more hospitable
environment
for enlight
because
peace provides
enment and moral
than does war. On Kant's
education
view, once
education
is improved and enlightenment

takes hold of the
was
out of self-inter
the
that
established
peace
population,
est and remained
because
of
that
basis
will
finally be endorsed
fragile
reasons
for moral
and thereby made
durable.
Thus, as a result of
moral
broad
the unsocial
sociability,
taste is formed, and by contin

all talents are gradually developed,
a beginning
ued enlightenment
is made with the foundation of a
way of thinking that will over time transform the crude natural
for moral discernment
into determinate
predisposition
practical
and
will
thus
that
able
be
principles,
finally to transform a patho
agreement to a society into a moral whole. (Idea
logically-coerced
VIII,
21)
rational
Thus,
transformation
Kant
by the
VIII,
is ultimately
to culminate
development
of society into a moral
community.4
sees his teleological

facts. He
lists the
view
of history
"constant
growth
of constitutional
27), the "regular process

of the world"
since
the Greeks
part
Frederick
man
race
the Great
the first monarch
(Idea
who
in the
self
confirmed
(not proven)
in civil liberty" (Idea
in our
improvement
VIII,
29),
and
calls
the hu
"emancipated
He thinks that his own
from tutelage"
(WE VIII,
40).
onto the path of
critical philosophy
has finally turned metaphysics
a progressive
science
and formulated
the true principle
of moral
in history,
ity. As for religion, he calls the current era "the best"
is now enlightened
and declares
that the public
about the
sphere
of true religious
"a con
faith, and that we may expect
principles
to the church
that will unite all humans
approximation
which
the
is
and
visible
of an invisible king
forever,
representation
New
dom of God on earth"
Socratic
(Rel VI, 131-2).
pedagogical
methods
have been developed,
and once tkese become widely used,
"human morality
should soon be doing better"
(TP VIII,
288). Al
tinuous
ready, Kant
thinks
that "in our era,
in comparison
with

all previous
62
ones,
race has
the human
the better"
ally towards
should
suffice
history
tails of Kant's
tenets
of the central
for now. As they become
philosophy
Development
I. Rational
considerably
of some
account
This
truly progressed
(TP VIII,
310).
of history
and
will
of Kant's
emerge
the Universal
relevant,
below.
Validity
some commentators
him close to Hegel,
have
Situating
is historicized,"5
that Kant
took the view that "reason
over time. Yirmiyahu
itself develops
that reason
Yovel,
view
other
of
de
Problem
suggested
meaning
the main
is "untenable"
see why. If
to
philosophical
in any significant way, the moral
itself were to change
law
of
would change too, since it is the fundamental
practical
principle
reason. Such a view, however, can be defended by Hegel, but not by
a view of history
such lines, arguing
Kant. Hegel
defends
along
a dialectical
includes
of different forms
that history
development
on
of "ethical life." For Hegel, Kantian
'morality' with its emphasis
defender
within
reason
of this
interpretation,
also
thinks
even mor
framework.6
Kant's
this view
It is easy
is but a stage in this process,

valid principles,
rational, universally
that the moral
law is
albeit a high one. But for Kant, who argues
in
all
valid?at
all
for
every
times,
places,
universally
normatively
to allow for different moral
rational
is impossible
prin
being?it
forms of 'ethical life' being justified at different stages
to Kant,
there is only one moral
According
principle,
and "unless we wish to deny to the concept of morality all truth ... we
as to
cannot dispute
that its law is of such widespread
significance
as
for
not
for
but
all
human
rational
hold,
merely
beings,
beings
ciples and
in history.
such?not
but with
merely
absolute
to contingent
and exceptions,
conditions
seems
it
So
that Kant
(Gr IV, 408).
necessity"
defend the notion of rational development
with
subject
cannot consistently
out giving up the universal
I shall
On Kant's
validity
of the moral
law.
can be solved.
that the universal
validity problem
reason
it
not
is
that
but
rather
the pre
view,
develops,
In order to adequately
for the use of reason.
understand
argue
dispositions
reason and the predispositions
between
how this distinction
for its
use provides
the key to solving the universal
I
validity problem,
start by examining
his notion of a development
of rational predis
positions
[Anlagen].
of the use of reason,

three modes
generally
distinguishes
three corresponding
the
technical,
predispositions:
pragmatic,
of reason. The telos of the development
and moral
of
employments
Kant
with


the predispositions
uses
for these
[moralische
of reason
skill
is, respectively,
and morality.
The process
and 'moral
'cultivation',
'civilisation,'
or
'moralisation'.7
Bildung]
[Geschicklichkeit],
prudence
of their development
is called
education'
63
[Klugheit],
are
in an organism
view, all predispositions
[Anlagen]
some
to
for
The
human
destined
day.
develop
fully
predispositions
use
reason
as
the
of
others do, except
that their
"develop"
just
takes
which
development
physical
predispositions,
longer. Unlike
can in principle be developed
ratio
during the life of an individual,
On Kant's
nal
countless
for their full
require
generations
can
to
be
Kant,
development.
they
According
completely
developed
(Idea VIII,
18).
only by the species, not the individual
predispositions
as a teleological
of development
process
general description
does not yet determine
how exactly
this process
should be con
as growth
can be conceived
ceived.
either
and
Development
or as the continuous
struc
of new organic
emergence
strengthening,
The
or any combination
of these two.8 In the Critique
of Pure
view.
Kant
takes
the
He
first
that
the
says
Reason,
growth of an
occurs
a
new
"not
the
addition
of
but by the
member,
organism
by
tures,
of each member,
without
change of proportion,
stronger
effective for its purposes"
the
(A833/B861).
Especially
of proportion"
"without change
that all essential
phrase
suggests
are already
in place at the start.
elements
rendering
and more
If development
in nothing but growth and strengthen
consists
this
has
for the application
of the concept
ing,
important implications
of development
to the predispositions
use of reason.
for the moral
can defend not a Hegelian
For then Kant
view of historical
develop
ment,
which
ally
but the view that our capacities

of judging and acting morally,
are always already
in an unrefined
present
form, are gradu
improved and strengthened.
we
in his texts on history.

In the
to
Kant
in
attributes
the
humans
History,"
the earliest stages of history not a different, but a rough or "crude,"
uncultivated
for moral
discernment
(Idea VIII,
21).
predisposition
In "Conjectural
of
Human
he similarly claims
Beginnings
History,"
that at the beginning
of history, humans
understood,
"although
And
"Idea
this is indeed
for a Universal
only dimly,"
(CB VIII,
what
that they ought
find
to regard
their fellow humans
as ends
114, cp. also Anth VII, 324; C3 V, 458).
is not to say that they also have a correct reflexive grasp of

of morality. Although Kant thinks that ordinary people
but basically
throughout
history have had an unrefined
good sense
This
the principle

64
of moral
obligation,
retical
attempts
by
exact
principle
the
errors
(Gr
he
also
holds
that
and
theologians
foundation
and
of the
the history
philosophers
of morality
theo
to formulate
is filled
with
441).
IV, 403-4,
as the strengthening
development
are
of rational
faculties
that
and improvement
the same for all
his developmental
humans,
theory can be squared with the univer
law. He thinks that even the earliest humans
sal validity of the moral
If Kant
conceives
a consciousness
had
but structurally
that all humans
of rational
have
similar, Kant's
analysis
the Critique
of Practical
gardless
that was less refined than

obligation
to that of later generations.
On the premise
a moral
consciousness
that is structurally
of moral
similar
of the consciousness
Reason
of their developmental
II. Development
and
applies
level.
the Moral
of moral
to all humans
Equality
obligation
equally,
in
re
Problem
one might
itself changes,
Although Kant does not think that reason
still think that his moral
theory is compromised
by the view that
are said to change.
of humans
If they
the rational predispositions
seem
to
be
less
human
than
earlier
did,
might
fully
generations
are capable
of acting morally,
the
later ones. For even if all humans
seem
are
to
of
would
that
predispositions
imply
development
they
it would
But if this were
the case,
threaten
equally
capable.
are not all equally
If humans
of
human moral
capable
equality.
cannot
all
have
moral
they
equal
morally,
acting
standing.
not
In fact, Kant holds just this sort of view when he compares men
as an anomalous
and women.9 He regards women
kind of human
never
and whose
whose
moral
predisposition
fully develops,
being
a
of tutelage.
condition
permanent
immaturity
perpetual
justifies
are
in flagrant contradiction
theory about "humans," however, and they are notori
is whether he holds a
the question
ously weak. For current purposes,
view
about
earlier generations.
similarly problematic
nonegalitarian
His
arguments
to his general
for women's
inequality
leads us to Kant's
inheritance.
question
theory of biological
if the 'development
of predispositions
of the species'
Because
[An
means
eras have
that humans
of different
lagen der Gattung]
this would
in their
different predispositions,
imply a difference
This
enter the world with more

if some generations
seem to
moral
faculties
than
others, this would
highly developed
are
some
com
to
better
able
and
that
the
moral
recognize
imply
obey
we
a
As
mand
than others.
shall see, however, Kant has
biological
moral
status.
For


theory on which
be said to share
Kant
to say that humans

it is possible
the exact same predispositions.
of all eras10 can
the theory of generic preformation

out of
the view that life emerges
theory'). Assuming
is "contrary to reason,"11 and rejecting occasionalism
for giving too great a role to God,12
preformationism
defends
65
(or 'epig?nesis
lifeless matter
and
individual
opts for
of
merely
"preformed"
species
organisms
which
when he created
the world, giving each its predispositions,
on their own
and reproduce
allow them to develop
subsequently
the view
Kant
the
that God
(C3 V, 424). Thus, God's

activity does not extend
"original organizing"
to each and every individual organism, but only to the first exemplars
of each species. After creation, nature does everything itself.
the essential
creation
predisposi
a
are
of
born do not change.
which members
species
can modify the development
External
influences
of individuals
and
of the same species, but they
explain differences between
exemplars
cannot produce a change in heritable
essential qualities. The essential
predispositions
given to each species at creation are all inherited.13
Kant
also
thinks
after
that
tions with
he
Although
a predisposition
Kant
does not
sometimes
allows
to be transmitted
think
this
is the
for an advance
in development
of
to
later
biologically
generations,
case for the rational
predisposi
skin color, he hypothesizes

that later
regard to human
are born in a further developed
state. He defends
the
once
was
a
root
that
there
which
hypothesis
species
[Stammgattung]
had undeveloped
for different
skin colors. After
predispositions
over
humans
out
face
of
the
the
this
spread
earth,
predisposition
tions. With
generations
in accordance
developed
climates,
leading
committed
here
the results
of which
nal
faculties,
this way. He
with
the demands
to increasingly
different
to a multi-generational
are
inherited. With
regard
does not conceive
Kant
however,
motivates
posed by the different

skin tones.14 He is clearly
of development,
process
to the human
ratio
of development
in
to the fact that

this simply by referring
evidence
does not support
such a view (CB VIII, HOL).
empirical
Later generations
do not enter this world in a state in which they have
their
developed
ability to use reason any further than previous ones.
The
with
clear
been
of this is that humans

of all eras enter the world
same rational
This conclusion
has
predispositions.
in light of Kant's moral
theory, and that may have
advantages
reason why he endorses
it. Had he conceived
of the
another
upshot
the exact
development
ported
on analogy with the pur

predispositions
of skin color, he would
have had to regard
of rational
development

66
humans
eras
of different
or some other
tures,
to climate)
(and
difference
as having
III.
perhaps
in moral
'environment'
different moral
increasingly
as
Development
of different
humans
a Learning
cul
analogous
potential.
Process
do not
view that these predispositions
themselves
course
of
the
arises:
the
What
generations,
question
change
over time? If later genera
to say that they develop
does it mean
in a further developed
tions do not come into the world
state, how
Given
Kant's
over
does
of the rational
the development
take place?
predispositions
of human
is
Kant argues that the development
rational
faculties
a learning process.
are transmitted
to
The results of this process
not biologically,
the next generations
but educationally,
mediated
as
as
institu
well
social
and
cultural
through pedagogy
through
and every generation

"[starts]
again from
Every individual,
move
which
its ABCs
and must again
through the entire distance
117 n., cp. Anth VII,
had already been covered"
(CB VIII,
325f.).
it is not literally true that they have to take all the steps
Although
tions.
taken
before,
knowledge
a position
later
individuals
by previous
acquired
to add a step.15
In this historical
defend
themselves
need
to appropriate
generations.
Only
the skills and

then are they in
humans
how to
process,
learn, for instance,
natural
dangers.
They also learn that it
against
is mutually
advantageous
and internationally.
Kant
that once there is peace,
to subject
to laws, nationally
themselves
as
a
for the future,
prospect
suggests,
even if it is brought about by mere
self
can and will channel

into
the energies
that went
interest, people
to
to
which
will
lead
further
warfare
better causes,
rational
devel
is a precondition
for the full
opment. Thus, he claims that peace
development
of all human
predispositions
(Idea VIII,
22, 25).
in his
role here. Education
develops
plays a crucial
a
which
the
historical
cumulative
tory, too,
gives
learning process
on Pedadogy
and self-reinforcing
and in the
quality. In his Lectures
Kant
of Practical
claims that the Enlightenment
Reason,
Critique
Education
has
produced,
for the first time
that
children
encourage
autonomous.
The older,
to think
in history, pedagogical
methods
for themselves
and be morally
aim at producing
methods
to
is guided by the
that
behavior
obedience,
leading mainly
to avoid punishment
inclination
and earn rewards. The new meth
ods take a Socratic, maieutic
and Kant develops
his own
approach,
authoritarian
blind
version
in the Doctrine
of Method
of the Critique
of Practical

Reason.
67
of course,
cannot cause pupils to choose a moral disposition,
own
and
can
worth
to
feel
their
them
but they
do much
recog
help
aware
of their own
Then pupils become
nize what duty demands.
a power, unex
and this "gives
vocation
moral
[the pupil's] mind
even by himself,
loose from all sensuous
to pull himself
pected
Teachers
this new
considers
(C2 V, 152). Kant
to
moral
progress
(Ped IX, 441, 444;
pedagogical
and im
Given
C2 V, 153; cp. also TP VIII,288).
peace,
freedom,
are
to
there
for
humans
the
education,
preconditions
proved moral
on
a
established
transform
society from merely
legal order, initially
into a 'moral whole.' Kant does not claim
the basis of inclinations,
and
attachments"
method
act morally
the key
this ideal state will ever be fully realized,

can be approximated.
but he does
argue
that
it
in
in his own era is expressed
assessment
of the situation
Kant's
are
as
to
follows:
cultivated
"We
the "Idea for a Universal
History"
are civilized
a high degree by art and science. We
to the point of
zum
excess
of
courtesies
and
for
all
kinds
social
[bis
?berl?stigen]
us
to consider
But for
ourselves moralized
very much
proprieties.
progress
26; cp., Ped IX, 451). Yet some moral
in later essays he claims that humankind
has
of
der
several
[Stufen
stages
morality
already
progressed
through
even
to
"our
is
that
era"
all
and
pre
Sittlichkeit]
superior
morally
vious ones (TP, VIII
332). His belief in the power of
310; End VIII,
plays a large role in this optimism.
good education
is still lacking"
been made,
has
(VIII,
and
But Kant's
leads
characterization
of history as a learning process
to two new questions.
The first is whether
this characterization
can be reconciled
with the timelessness
of noumenal
(the
agency
is whether
the concep
The second question
problem).
atemporality
tion of history as a learning process does not lead to another version
I start with the first question.
of the equality problem.
Learning
IV. Moral
Some
authors
and
the Atemporality
Problem
of history
that Kant's
conception
argued
does not solve the tension between his moral
have
process
of history.
and his philosophy
losophy
as
follows:
formulated
the charge
learning
Michel
as
phi
has
Despland
[R]eason, autonomy, and morality are presented in the philosophy

the laws of the
of history as arising within a process, whereas
practical
employment
of
reason,
or
the
laws
of morality,
are
de
duced transcendentally in the second Critique and are found a priori;

it is thereby implied that they are above the time process and are
"eternally
valid".
. . .The
philosophy
of history
. . . undermines

the
68
distinction between objectively practical and subjectively practical.

The philosophy of history shows how the "objective" moral law was
"subjectively" learned by the race, or by some in it, only at some
. . . But this standpoint
in the
point in the process of history.
in
makes
of
of
morality
history
philosophy
something embedded
the
historical
related
process,
to,
say,
historical
experience
. . . and
this cannot but appear to be in tension with the rather timeless

standpoint of the Critique of Practical Reason.16
can
to Despland,
Kant cannot have it both ways: morality
According
not be both valid a priori and the result of a historical learning process.
in this way, however, the tension between the "time
can easily be dissolved.
"historical"
The case for a
on
a
rests
to
failure
contradiction
adequately
purported
distinguish
of a moral
In
and the discovery
between
the creation
principle.
a
a
is
in
which
crude
that
history
capacity
saying
learning process
If formulated
less"
and
the
into a refined one, Kant

is not
develops
are
a
created at
point in time, but
claiming that the moral demands
come to be fully understood.
This
is a
rather that they gradually
one
not
to
draw.
The
fact
that
does
immedi
distinction
plausible
but has to learn it does not mean
something
ately fully understand
for moral
discernment
one learned
it. Similarly,
the
as
of
is
the
autonomy
understanding
morality
is not by itself incompat
result of a long historical
learning process
and timeless
law. For
ible with the absolute
validity of the moral
on
law does not depend
the normative
Kant,
that
it was
fact that
true
not
or valid
before
clear
as such. Conversely, what

its being subjectively recognized
is objec
so
to be
if
it
is
not
does
become
less
learned
valid
(subjectively)
tively
so only at a certain point in time. Thus, Kant's
of
history
philosophy
does not blur the distinction
between
'objective'
and
'subjective'.
in a different
in
Kant makes
this point himself
context, namely,
a discussion
in the Critique
of the sublime
of Judgment.
He says:
of the sublime]
"The fact that [a judgment
culture does
requires
not imply that it is generated
into soci
culture
and
introduced
by
mere
convention"
C3
the fact
V, 265). Similarly,
ety, say, by
(vgl.
some historical
requires
development
judgment
ture') does not imply that it is generated
by this process
into society by mere convention.
introduced
Instead, on Kant's
that moral
it is grounded
A parallel
('cul
and
view,
in reason.
can be made
with regard to Kant's

situates
his own philosophical
sophical
project.
a
as
of
the product
historically
long development
(e.g.,
"Toward
and
the essay
856/B880-884
Perpetual
remark
own philo
Kant

Cl
project
A852
Peace
in

He
Philosophy").
claims
that his
transcendental
of which people
tively explicates
principles
a vague awareness.
But by formulating
the
way
ity in a philosophically
rigorous
claims no less than this?he
history?Kant
into
philosophy
69
defini
had
always already had

true principle
of moral
in
for the first time
does
and
not
turn morality
"introduced
by
contingent
something
merely
something
In the second Critique,
in
for example, Kant
way of convention."
an entirely new principle
of morality.
sists that he is not presenting
his derivation
of the categorical
Instead, he compares
imperative
to a mathematician's
derivation
of a formula (C2 V, 8 n.). For Kant,
it is not morality which needs
Hegel,
cal process,
but our understanding
of it.
unlike
These
considerations
Despland's
objection,
as merely
interpreted
own time,"
that
that Kant
project.
a histori
not
to answer
it possible
only make
not be
also
show
that
Kant
should
they
a
to
moral
"for his
wanting
develop
principle
but
as Allen Wood
"[t]here
historically
the specific
to go through
claims
might be taken to suggest. Wood
is nothing
ahistorical
about Kantian
ethics.
It has a
situated
of itself, and is addressed
to
understanding
cultural needs
of its own age."17 Clearly Wood
is right
a historically
situated
of his own
understanding
can hardly mean
to say that Kant makes morality
since that would go both against Kant's
claim
relative,
has
But
he
historically
that the moral
law is unconditionally
own
valid and against Wood's
of Kant's
work. But
if Kant's
claim of
interpretations
insightful
unconditional
validity is to be taken seriously, we must acknowledge
that there is something ahistorical
about Kant's
philosophy of history.
the absolute
of the moral
above
By elevating
validity
principle
historical
an
Kant
his
of
contingency,
gives
philosophy
history
core. The moral
come
ahistoric
not
does
into
at
existence
principle
a certain
sense
it
time?in
that
is indeed timeless.
It 'merely' be
comes
over time. It was
clearer
and has always been
objectively
in reason, but it is only gradually
valid, since it is grounded
subjec
tively acknowledged
Kant's
claim
contested
and
understood
as
such.
of the absolute
law is of course
in the current philosophical
debate.
For present
highly
the main
purposes,
however,
point is that this claim is compatible
as long as one conceives
with the notion of moral
of
development,
as
a
this development
learning process.

70
AND THE TlMELESSNESS
V. MORALIZATION
OF NOUMENAL
AGENCY
in section
four ap
might now object that the argument
to
is
the
of
into
what
development
morally
plies
only
insight
start with Kant's
but that the real problems
claim that
demanded,
in moral
behavior. Kant
there is an increase
this
rarely discusses
Someone
type of progress. He is in fact better known for seeking to dampen

of his contemporaries,
the feeling of moral
superiority
by invoking,
at
of the "cool-headed
for example,
the somber diagnosis
observer"
of the Meta
the beginning
of the second part of the Foundations
as
saw
we
IV
But
in
section
of
Morals
(Gr
407).
three, Kant
physics
out
the
the
of
moral
for
holds
progress
future, and
prospect
certainly
he sometimes even suggests that some progress has already been made.
This
series
of
up a whole
progress
conjures
to the fact that, in his discussion
of the third
of moral
notion
related
questions
in the Critique
Antinomy
and
is noumenal,
agency
able. That seems to make
to act morally
resolve
cause an agent's moral
of Pure
Kant
Reason,
thus not
timeless
that moral
argues
but also unknow
only
assertion
that humans'
capacity
over time doubly problematic.
increase
his
and
Be
is noumenal,
disposition
[Gesinnung]
insight
in its quality
is impossible.
into any improvements
And because
seem to
it is timeless, which would
this disposition
is noumenal,
to speak of it as undergoing
itmeaningless
in
make
history.
change
seem
to
would
the
third
forbid
Kant
from
Thus,
Antinomy
speaking
of an
in moral
increase
But Kant
does
behavior.
indicate
a way
he does
in which
we
can
think and
speak
not claim the status of knowledge
First,
of his texts on
about
morality. Many
increasing
of the
history start with the claim that we cannot obtain knowledge
course of history as a whole
TP
VII
CF
And
83).
VIII,
307-8;
(e.g.,
to the "Idea for a Universal
in the introduction
makes
he
History"
as a regula
it clear that his view on progress
should be understood
about
dispositions.
for his assertion
Even
tive idea for heuristic
purposes.
seem
to confirm his view
that would
idea
is "useful,"
not that
it is true
after having shown examples

of history, he claims that the
(Idea
VIII,
29).18
in the
he explains
first Critique,
that although
of an agent's noumenal
disposition,
to "think" it as being
"in accordance
with"
we
Moreover,
cannot know
the character
we
nevertheless
have
the
of the agent. And we conceive

character
of the empirical
empirical
on
the basis of the agent's actions
character
This
(Cl A540/B568).
move
to the noumenal
from the empirical
level?in
thought, not
our very practice
of moral blame and
what underlies
knowledge?is

71
someone
all I have
else for immoral behavior,
praise. For if I blame
to go on are this person's
actions as appearances.
Kant's
statements
can
in
about moral
be
history
similarly interpreted as
improvement
we
to
conceive
of
of future gen
how
the
disposition
referring merely
erations,
on the basis
of given
or even expected
appearing
actions.19
a deeper
notion
of moral
faces
level, Kant's
improvement
even
a
a
to
in
time
'think'
another
problem,
namely, how
change
seems to imply
less moral
character.
The very concept
of change
Kant himself acknowledges
of nou
that the possibility
temporality.
At
is indeed incomprehensible.
But, he says, for moral
change
we have
to regard
it as possible
purposes
(e.g., Rel VI, 44-53).
can be known
Here
he falls back on his argument
that nothing
assumes
about the noumenal
and
he
that
if
character,
nothing can be
menal
known
about
improvement,
it, there is no reason

even if our cognitive
VI.
The
Equality
to rule out the possibility of moral

to grasp it.
powers are inadequate
Problem
Revisited
the most
leveled criticism
frequently
against Kant's
phi
is that the notion of moral
conflicts
losophy of history
improvement
with the idea of the equality and dignity of all human beings. Emil
Fackenheim
has criticized Kant
for making
"the free achievements
of some [the] means
to the freer achievements
of others."20 He sees
Perhaps
a twofold problem
for moral
if Kant
says that hu
First,
equality.
mans
more
course
in
become
free
the
of
gradually
history and that
earlier generations
transmit their insight to later ones, he is forced
to qualify the concept of freedom historically.
But this is inconsis
tent with Kant's
calling every human agent free without qualification.
since earlier generations
their insight on to later
pass
Second,
ones without
to act morally,
themselves
able
this re
fully
being
to mere means
duces
earlier generations
to progress
from which
later generations
profit.21
objection depend crucially on whether

the notion of moral
entails that we should regard agents
progress
of the past as less free. But Kant denies this. As we saw in section
are said to be fully free, to have the ability to
two, even early humans
The merits
act morally,
But
of Fackenheim's
and to have
this answer
seems
a generally
to trade
correct
sense
one version
of right and wrong.
of the moral
equality
in combina
progress,
problem
were no less free than
tion with the claim that past generations
more developed
to saying that earlier genera
ones, commits Kant
tions are more morally
than later ones. This is simply
blameworthy
for another.
For
the notion
of moral

72
in his
implied
profit
of moral
talk
from the achievements
progress.
of earlier
clearer moral
learning process,
to
tion enable later generations
ones. Therefore,
someone might
and charge that it is
objection
generations
cannot help
do not have
who
short
falling
But
ones.
do
generations
a
is
Because
history
educa
improved moral
later
insight and
lead more virtuous
wish
unfair morally
this educational
in comparison
lives than earlier
to reformulate
Fackenheim's
to condemn
advantage
to later ones.
earlier
and who
out that if this objection

be pointed
poses a problem
of history,
for Kant,
it is not a problem
specific to his philosophy
can be
but one inherent to the very idea that good moral
education
It should
effective
lead
and
recipients
to
their moral
improve
to
any comparison
equally
disposition.
of, say, two
apply
objection
one of whom
individuals
living in eighteenth-century
K?nigsberg,
is raised by an excellent, Kantian,
the
maieutic
while
pedagogue,
a
in
of religious
climate
and moral
other is raised
superstition
The
would
authoritarianism.
is able
to achieve
issue of whether
The
Kant
the first
If, partly as a result of the good education,
a better character, we would
face the exact same
this "luck" should affect our comparative
evaluation.
reformulated
is not that
objection
is unfair, which
involves a moral
the question
of the normative
perspective
version
of Fackenheim's
but that he
is inconsistent,
That raises
evaluation.
the charge is made, because

Kant's moral
theory would
to be incoherent
only if it turned out that Kant would be
is
unfair in his own terms. If, instead,
the judgment of unfairness
us
from other than Kantian
this
reached
would
send
premises,
at a more
back to a discussion
fundamental
level of moral
theory.
from which
be shown
there is no other option but

framework, however,
to bite the bullet. Given
that Kant believes
every human being to
correct sense of moral
have a basically
progress
obligation, moral
means
were morally worse, and that more
that previous generations
individuals
of those than of later generations
let their will be deter
Within
Kant's
Kant
could not (consistently)
respond
by their inclinations.
to the charge of unfairness
that earlier generations
(or
by arguing
are not fully responsible
individuals
raised by doctrinaire
parents)
for the quality of their dispositions.
From a Kantian
perspective
mined
that would
would
a cure worse
be
deprive
earlier
than
generations
the alleged
because
disease,
of their moral
personhood.
it
or
the actuality
(however
regulatively)
assume
or
he must
also
of moral
the actual
progress,
possibility
at a
fully to speak of our duty to strive for moral
improvement
social
he cannot
avoid granting
the possibility
scale. Therefore,
If Kant
wants
to assume

73
eras were morally worse. Kant goes further and also

that previous
assumes
that there is progress,
and he does not shy
(regulatively)
from
the
He
claims
that both in indi
away
consequences.
drawing
viduals and in the species, the radical evil in human nature manifests
to
itself in the very first use of reason. Humans
have a "propensity
actively
is impermissible,
what
while knowing
that it is im
to evil, . . .which
stirs unavoidably
i.e., a propensity
as the human
(Anth
agent starts to use his freedom"
Because
this evil is the result of a free decision,
the
desire
permissible,
and as soon
324).
full blame. As Kant
agent bears
of Human
"The history
History,"
VII,
characterizes
regularly
toward
the better."23
But
how
history
puts it in "Conjectural
Beginning
of freedom begins with evil."22 He
as the process
of "progressing
bad
is this, really? Without

Kant's
assump
endorsing
I would
moral
like to suggest that it is
progress,
to blame previous
for what we, the
perfectly acceptable
generations
as moral
later ones, perceive
failures?if
could
have done bet
they
tion of wholesale
and moral knowledge

to them. It
available
ter, given the theoretical
is not unfair, for example,
as
to blame Kant
for treating women
lesser human beings. This claim assumes,
of course,
that he could
and
should have known better. But that assumption

is not far
in
terms of
fetched, given that he phrased his moral
theory entirely
to 'finite rational
what applies
women
that
the
status
of
beings,'
was a matter
of debate
in his days, that a K?nigsberger
acquain
a feminist treatise,
tance of Kant's
at
and that women
published
the time confronted Kant about his gender stereotypes.24 Even though
faced more
Kant
arguably
into the moral
day,
Kant
this neither
cultural
obstacles
of men
and women
equality
for defending
VII.
justifies
them.
Why
the nonegalitarian
Kant
Believes
in achieving
insight
to
philosophers
views nor exonerates
than
in Progress
The possibility
of rational
and moral
is indispensable
in
progress
were
Kant's moral
this
theory. If rational development
impossible,
would
"abolish
all practical
im
(Idea VIII,
19). Ought
principles"
and
for
to
the
to
command
strive
be
can,
thus,
plies
example,
morally
is possible
for individuals;
and
progress
perfect implies that moral
because
progress
But
this command
to every finite rational being, moral
applies
on a large scale should be regarded
as possible.
it is a long step from 'can' to 'is', and therefore Kant's

claim
is progress
(even if this claim has only regulative
status)
to moral
be supported
duty. Kant
by a reference merely
that there
cannot

74
take such
does occasionally
we ought to promote moral
assume
invalid.
an approach
that, because
by arguing
we must
of
the
young,
improvement
in history.25 But this argument
is
that there is progress
From the premises
that (1) we ought to promote
the moral
of the young and that (2) ought implies can, it does

improvement
not follow that (3) the young will improve morally,
let alone that (4)
towards this goal has already been made. As Henry Allison
progress
this point elsewhere,

implies can, not shall."26 What
"Ought
follow is only a much more modest
claim, namely, that progress
must be regarded as possible.
But this more modest
claim does not
amount
to a teleological
view of history,
and so it does not lend
puts
does
to Kant's
support
belief
in progress.
he support this belief by arguing that it is necessary

to recognize
one's moral
contradict
the
duty. That would
of
the
moral
unconditional
could
imperative. Nor, finally,
validity
us to believe
in
commands
there is progress
he argue that morality
us
we
to
tells
how
The
act,
imperative
history.
categorical
ought
not which particular
theoretical beliefs we ought to hold. Kant wisely
Nor
could
in order
refrains
how
does
from making
he support
either
of these
the belief
last two arguments.
But
then,
in progress?
first text on history,

"Idea for a Universal
Kant
History,"
a
a
to
of
model
intended
history,
develops
teleological
provide
guid
At the end of the essay, he claims
ing thread for a future historian.
reasons
to adopt this model. Not that the
that there are also moral
In his
on our view of history:

of morality
If
character
depends
binding
our moral
not
there were no hope of progress,
would
obligation
cease
to exist. But, says Kant, we would have to divert our moral
to "another world."
The teleological
away from this world
hopes
view of history avoids such this-worldly despair by portraying
ratio
as
and moral
feasible
nal development
progress
(Idea VIII,
30).
he developed
the idea of history for theoretical
purposes?
Although
to a future historian?the
"consolation"
namely, to provide guidance
it brings to the moral
this model
of history
agent
provides
(ibid.).27
a further motivation
to adopt
of Practical
Reason
provides
Critique
logical space for this
In the Dialectic
of the second Critique,
Kant
that
argues
our
as
it
to do it ("ought
possible
recognizing
duty entails regarding
in turn entails assuming
the existence
of the
implies can"), which
The
move.
conditions
conditions
of this possibility.
But
is open to interpretation.
the precise
of these
character
some
must
sort
involve
They
of harmony
between
the realms
of nature
and morality,
but this
can
in
In
be
conceived
of
different
of
the
ways.
harmony
Critique

75
says in so many words that we have a "choice"

this harmony
Because
noth
(C2 V, 144-5).
in this respect, we are free to represent
this
ing can be known
serves
in
the
that
best
the
In
of
the
interest
way
harmony
morality.
second
Kant
formulates
this
in
terms
of
the
Critique,
harmony
of
a
is
who
to
said
have
about
postulate
God,
brought
purposive
the two realms. Kant
between
conceives
of this God as a
harmony
wise
"author of the world."28 But if we have a "choice"
in the mat
to further
for Kant
elaborate
this
ter, it seems
permissible
Practical
Reason, Kant
as to how we represent
connection
between nature and morality
into the teleo
"purposive"
because
he has already
logical view of history,
especially
argued
that this view of history
is theoretically
defensible.
This elabora
tion would
involve the assumption
that nature
(the human natural
same
com
leads
in
the
in
direction
which
predispositions)
morality
us to go.29 God would
mands
then be conceived
of as "organizing"
the world
in such a way that the rational
can
of humans
potential
over
course
the
of the history of the species. And this
fully develop
is exactly
the conception
that Kant
in the "Idea
for a
develops
Universal
History."
this point a final worry might be raised. Although

suc
Kant
in avoiding
on
heteronomous
of
the
dependence
morality
seem to backfire by taking moral
of history, this might
philosophy
At
ceeds
out of the hands

responsibility
as
does
garded
progressive,
Ever since Hegel,
superfluous?
ing this problem.30 But

view, the ability to use
ment does not by itself
sense. Each person has
individual
improved
any moral
If history
is re
agents.
our duty
make
doing
Kant has been criticized
for ignor
the criticism missed
the point. On Kant's
reason develops
but this develop
gradually,
cause humans
to be moral
in any determinist
a moral
to achieve
disposition
through an
of human
that
not
can
later
struggle.
education
Although
and the
progress
is the result
generations
insights achieved
from
of spontaneous
acts
benefit
from
earlier
ones,
of freedom.31
Conclusion
Kant's
notion
use of reason'
of the
of the predispositions
for the
'development
is compatible
with key aspects
of his moral
theory,
to realize what makes
but it is important
this consistency
possible,
view of the structure
of development
and
namely, a pre-Darwinist
of the nature
of predispositions.
I have defended Kant's
notion of
and moral
rational
in terms of consistency,
not
progress
entirely
truth. It seems clear that Kant's
account
cannot be defended
in un
modified
form. Kant
recommends
epig?nesis
theory
for its "minimal

76
use
of the supernatural"
(C3 V, 424). But he still uses the idea of
as designer
of
of the teleological
order. Moreover,
his model
has
become
obsolete.
Current
moral
Kantian
organic
'development'
of biological
theory in the way
theory can no longer take advantage
God
Kant
did.
of this paper is to show that Kant's moral

the purpose
theory
room for the notion
an
is
issue
of moral
which
progress,
on
at
Kant's
that logically precedes
views
any attempts
improving
room
or actuality
of moral
the possibility
That
there
be
progress.
But
leaves
of Kant
for progress
is vital for the moral
theories
and Kantians.
if one gives up belief in actual moral
the possibility
progress,
at a conceptual
of moral
needs to be consistent
level,
improvement
or else the demands
and this possibility must be assumed
of moral
If it is to be possible
for Kantian
moral
ity are irrational.
theory to
Even
an account
present
the world, and how
of how
the moral
free moral
agency
must
there
be room within
the better,
the idea that rational
capacities
duct may improve over time.
Washington
may
can be realized
demands
can transform the world
the Kantian
develop
and
framework
that moral
in
for
for
con
University
Received November
3, 1997
NOTES
References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pages of the first
(A) and second (B) editions. All other page references are to Kants
of the K?nigliche
Gesammelte
edited under the auspices
Schriften,
der Wissenschaften
Preussische
Akademie
de Gruyter,
(Berlin: Walter
1902-).
Anth
Cl =
Translations
are
Anthropology
my
own.
Abbreviations
from a Pragmatic
Critique of Pure Reason

=
C2
Critique of Practical Reason
=
C3
Critique of Judgment
=
of Human
CB
"Conjectural Beginnings
=
CF
The Contest of the Faculties
used:
Point
History"
= "On the Determination

of the Concept
=
DHR
"On the Different Human Races"
DC
of View
of a Human

Race"

End
= "The End
77
of All Things"
of theMetaphysics
Gr = Groundwork
=
Ideen
HR
Review of Herder's
ofMorals
Idea = "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View"

ofMorals
MM = Metaphysics
=
Ped
Pedagogy
=
PP
Perpetual Peace
=
Rel
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
=
'This May Be True in Theory but It
TP
"On the Common Saying:
Does not Apply in Practice"'
in Philosophy"
UTP = "On the Use of Teleological
Principles
= "What is
WE
Enlightenment?"
1. Idea VIII,
21, 26. See
also
section
3.
2. Recent work showing the social character of the highest good in

Kant has made
this problem urgent. On the social conception
of the
see
Andrews
the
"Two
of
Reath,
highest good,
Conceptions
Highest Good
in Kant," Journal
of Philosophy
of the History
26 (1988):
593-619;
Yirmayahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy ofHistory (Princeton: Princeton
"Kant's Ethical
University Press, 1980), 29-80; Sharon Anderson-Gold,
Commonwealth:
The Highest Good as a Social Goal," International Philo
In the second Critique, however,
sophical Quarterly 26 (1986): 23-32.
Kant's discussion
of the highest good loses its focus on the highest good
as a world in favor of a more individual-oriented
approach.
3. See, Idea, CB, C3 ?83, TP, PP. The second essay in the Contest of
is an exception, however, since here Kant does not employ
the Faculties
the notion of development.
4. The account of Kant's view of history that I present here is not
uncontested. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Otfried Hoffe have argued that Kant's
philosophy of history addresses
legal and political, but not moral progress
(Otfried Hoffe, Immanuel Kant [M?nchen: Beck, 1983], 244f.; Yovel, Kant
and the Philosophy
of History
this is true for part of the
127). While
second essay in the Contest of the Faculties
(CF VII, 92), the evidence
given in note 1 above and at the end of section two shows that in the vast
majority of his texts on history Kant does speak of moral development.
That suffices for the purpose of this paper. For a more detailed defense
of the claim that Kant's view of history includes moral progress, see my
und Vernunft:
Kants
Zur Geschichtsphilosophie
book, Fortschritt
und Neumann,
1995).
(W?rzburg: K?nigshausen
ofHistory, p.
5. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy
on
that
Kant's
essays
history,
gards
maintaining
political history. Instead, he develops his thesis
history of reason' in Kant's work on the basis of
4. Yovel largely disre

they are restricted to
of the non-empirical
the Critiques and the

78
prevents him from seeing that

approach
Religion. This hermeneutical
Kant actually speaks of a history of the development of the predisposi
tions of reason, not of a development of reason itself. It also explains his
thesis that Kant cannot build a bridge between his notion of a history of
reason and empirical history (p. 21).
and
6. Yovel, Kant
7. Anth VII,
of History,
the Philosophy
cp. Idea VIII,
322-24;
271.
26.
8. At the end of the eighteenth century this question was the subject
Kants Kritik
of considerable
debate in biology. See Peter McLaughlin,
der teleologischen Urteilskraft (Bonn: Bouvier, 1989), 9-31, and John H.
Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's
"Critique of Judgment" (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1992), 189-227.
in the Cognitive Power,"
9. See, for instance, "On Mental Deficiencies
of the Sexes," Anth VII 303
Anth VII, 208-12,
and "On the Character
311. I discuss the tensions between Kant's use of the gender-neutral term
"human
and
[Mensch]
being"
his
on
remarks
specific
women
ar
in my
in the History
ticle, "The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language
of Philosophy: The Case of Kant," Philosophical Forum 25 (1993): 134-150.
10. But bear in mind the tension between this view and his views on
women. The same applies to Kant's notion of race. Although his official
race
is put
theory
sionally deteriorate
see,
e.g.,
UTP
in terms
strictly
of
skin
into racist assumptions
color,
Kant's
occa
arguments
regarding mental
capacities,
175-6.
VIII,
11. CJ V, 424. One finds similar remarks as early as

Kants Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft, 26.
1762,
see
McLaughlin,
to occasionalism,
12. According
at
intervenes
God
every
conception
to
in
the manner
of
to the theory of individual pre

give matter its organic form. According
the
for
each
and every individual organism
God
created
formation,
"germs"
at
and
once,
Russian
all
these
miniature
are
organisms
stored
the time of their further development.
dolls, awaiting
Cp. C3 V,
422-3.
13. CB VIII, 110: "because

also be inherited."
were
if [these qualities]
innate, they would
14. DC VIII, 105. Creating a tension with his own general view that
do not change, Kant ventures that the original predispo
predispositions
sition for the other skin tones must have subsequently disappeared.
15.
have
Thus,
the
same
ontogenesis
structure.
486ff.; on phylogeny,
recapitulates
On
ontogeny,
and
phylogenesis,
see, e.g., Idea VIII,
see,
e.g.,
Ped
26; Anth VII,
both
IX,
processes
449L,
455f.,
322ff.; Ped
IX,
451.
Despland, Kant on History

University Press, 1973), p. 67f.
16. Michel
Queen's
and Religion
(Montreal: McGill
17. Allen W. Wood,

"Unsociable Sociability: The Anthropological
Basis
of Kantian Ethics," Philosophical
Topics 19 (1991): 325-351, here p. 336.

79
18. This seems to be contradicted by Kant's talk of 'proofs' of progress in

"On the Common Saying" (VIII, 310). But given that Kant's entire argument
in that essay is premised on the impossibility of any theoretical proofs, and
given
that
he
argues
for progress
on moral
grounds,
term
the
'proof
must
be interpreted in a weaker sense than that of a theoretical proof. Kant also

employs a weaker sense of the term 'proof in the phrase "moral proof for
the existence of God" developed in the Critique of Judgment (?87).
19. Kant occasionally

denies this himself, saying that if one looks at
behavior of others, one will conclude that only self-interest is their mo
tive (e.g., Gr IV 453, CF VII, 91-2). As Christine Korsgaard
has recently
of Ends
the Kingdom
noted, his argument is not valid: Creating
(Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 210.
20. Emil L. Fackenheim,
"Kant's Concept
381-398, here p. 397.
of History," Kant-Studien
(1956-57):
48
21. See
A. Galston, Kant
also William
and the Problem
of History
of
Paul
University
pp.
(Chicago:
231ff.;
Chicago Press, 1975),
Stern, "The
Problem of History and Temporality
in Kantian Ethics," Review ofMeta
physics 39 (1986): 505-545.
22. CB VIII,
115. The same is true of any
historical context, see Rel VI, 39-44.
23. WE VIII, 39; HR VIII,
324; CF VII, 88-9.
24.
The
is
acquaintance
115; TP VIII,
65; CB VIII,
one
individual,
of Kant's
regular
regardless
of
308; Anth VII,

the
guests,
mayor
of
Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel. He is the author of the book,

K?nigsberg,
der Weiber
?ber die b?rgerliche Verbesserung
[On the Civil Improve
ment ofWomen]
(Berlin: Voss, 1792). The reports about women confronting
Kant can be found in J. H. W. Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant
1986 [orig. 1882]), p. 186.
(Lanham: University Press of America,
25. See
appeals
to
the third part of "On the Common

the
duty
to
improve
posterity
Saying."
(e.g.,
In this essay, Kant
by moral
education,
en
in order to justify the assumption

that "humankind
is
lightenment)
towards the better regarding the moral end of its existence,
progressing
and that this progress may at times be interrupted but never broken off"
(VIII, 308f.). But Kant also defends the weaker thesis, that it is possible
that things will be better in the future (e.g., VIII, 309).
26. Henry E. Allison,
"The Gulf between Nature and Freedom
and
Nature's Guarantee
of Perpetual Peace,"
in Proceedings
of the Eighth
International Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson
(Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1995), 37-49, here p. 46. Paul Guyer has argued this
in Proceed
point, too, in "Nature, Morality and the Possibility of Peace,"
the
of
Kant
International
here
p.
51-69,
ings
Eighth
p.66.
Congress,
27. Kant also claims that this view of history "justifies providence,"
in
that the suffering that humans have caused each other throughout his
that brings
tory is redeemed by the fact that it is part of a process
a
to
telos
closer
This
historical
(Idea
30).
VIII,
humanity
theodicy is
good

80
highly problematic within his moral

the question at issue in this paper.
philosophy,
but this does not affect
28. The standard interpretation

that the postulate of God serves to
back up the belief that the virtuous will be rewarded in an afterlife over
looks the fact that Kant primarily describes God as the creator of the
world. E.g., C2 V, 126, 128, 129, 130, 145.
29. Kant wrote in the margin of Perpetual Peace:
"It is best to assume
that nature in the human being works toward the same goal as morality."
ed. Wilhelm
Immanuel
Kant Werkausgabe,
Weischedel
(Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,
1977),
vol.
XI,
p.237,
n.2.
30. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology

ford: Oxford University Press, 1977),
of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller

599-631.
(Ox
??
31. See also Henry E. Allison,

"The Gulf between Nature and Free
dom," p. 47. In light of this acute analysis, it is a bit strange that Allison
in history and the
that the link between purposiveness
also maintains
final purpose of creation (a moral world) is obscure (p. 42).


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Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development

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KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF

fact that Kant

status to this view,

the very idea of

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

It is not my aim here to fully vindicate

is not a smooth one. On Kant's

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KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

in turn, will lead states to wage war at first, but

is improved and enlightenment

taste is formed, and by contin

sees his teleological

27), the "regular process

the first monarch

that "in our era,

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

is but a stage in this process,

of the use of reason,

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KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

but the view that our capacities

in his texts on history.

that they ought

their fellow humans

114, cp. also Anth VII, 324; C3 V, 458).

is not to say that they also have a correct reflexive grasp of

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

that was less refined than

enter the world with more

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KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

to say that humans

of all eras10 can

the theory of generic preformation

(C3 V, 424). Thus, God's

skin color, he hypothesizes

posed by the different

to the fact that

of this is that humans

on analogy with the pur

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

and every generation

the skills and

can and will channel

for the first time

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KANT, HISTORY, AND THE IDEA OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

this ideal state will ever be fully realized,

[R]eason, autonomy, and morality are presented in the philosophy

duced transcendentally in the second Critique and are found a priori;

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

distinction between objectively practical and subjectively practical.

this cannot but appear to be in tension with the rather timeless

into a refined one, Kant

as such. Conversely, what