THE CRISIS OF THE SUBJECT

FROM BAROQUE TO POSTMODERN

Willem van Reijen
For several years the concept of the subject has been the object of a bitter polemic
between German and French philosophers/
Whoever speaks in favor of the realization
of democratic relationships and greater social justice should set herself the task of
preserving the inheritance of the Enlightenmentso says Habermas, and with him, the
"Modems." This is to say that when it is a
question of truth and practical (moral) problems, we should make decisions only with
arguments and, thus, with the help of reason.
Habermas thereby makes it plausible that we
can define what is reasonable not through
recourse to intuitions or metaphysical principles, but rather only through the exchange of
arguments that follow a determinate procedure and, ideally, through consensus.

conceptions of the subject, of thinking, and

of language.
For Modernism, the subject is to be
thought of as an autonomous, thus not otherdetermined, individual. iTiis subject thinks
universally and acts in the assurance of legitimate individual interests. For Postmodernism, in the often cited picture of a drawing
in the sand, Foucault has sketched the individual as something that is in each moment
transitory. What appears again and again is
not so much the complexity of the environment and the unintended consequences of
our actions, but rather the impossibility of
substantiating the separation of reality and
fiction, like the undefinable tension between
structures and interpretations, which puts
into question the putative reliability of our
French Postmodern philosophers like judgments and the legitimacy of the intenLyotard hold, on the contrary, that every con- tions and results of our deeds.
ception of reason based upon argumentation,
In the following I will try to prove that the
thus conceived as procedural and generaliz- uncertainty to which Postmodern philosophy
ing, leads to the exclusion of non-gener- (and no less literature, architecture, and
alizable, but not thereby illegitimate, points painting) gives expression is the conseof view concerning our existencethat is, a quence of the thesis that the self, our thinking
unity suggests itself that is not at all given, and speaking, is necessarily determined anbut in the worst case is forced, and thereby tagonistically. With this I contradict the curoffends against its own basic principles.
rent thesis that Postmodernism is nothing
Habermas responds to this charge with the other than a pluralism, a manifold of styles
counter-accusation of a performative contra- and interpretations. Such pluralism is typical
diction: one cannot, wanting to persuade for Modernism. Postmodernism, on the other
without arguments, support the thesis that hand, confronts extremes with one another
without believing in the possibility of an
one should persuade without arguments.
Without much difficulty, one can see that overarching unity.
the confrontation here is based on different
Self-criticism and the emerging self-re
Translated by Julia Davis

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WINTER 1992

flexivity of the Enhghtenment can be seen as

typical for Modernism. But they are always
articulated in the frame of historical teleology and against the background of the foundation of rational argumentation and activity.
From the Postmodern point of view, these
options' claim to exclusivity, and especially
the teleological and legitimizing program for
the establishment of grounds, is thrown into
doubt. Postmodern philosophy regards reality as thoroughly ambiguous because there
are no overarching linguistic or rational
standpoints from which existing contradictions (practical and theoretical) could be unified. This analysis has consequences for the
question whether it is possible to make a
distinction between reality and fiction that is
supportable. For the question about the subject means that thinking and speaking are
thought of, on one hand, as activities the
individual produces and controls, and, on the
other, as structures determining us "a tergo."
So the self is thought, on one side, as autonomous, and, on the other, as heteronomous.
I will connect my discussion of this antithesis in the conception of the self with an
attempt to clearly show that the Postmodern
disposition is an inheritance of the Baroque
not in order to cause a "deja vu" effect, or, to
draw, however precariously, an historical
parallel, or even to construct a continuity, but
rather to support the claim that Modem and
Postmodem thinking have been systematically linked together since the Baroque. M y
thesis thus begins from the notion that
"thinking," "speaking," and the "subject" are
to be understood only as antagonistically determined concepts. These antagonisms are
rooted in the rational determination of concepts as such. But if one adds the idea of
"being-familiar-with-oneself to the rational
determination of concepts, the antagonistic
dynamic that the Postmodems attribute to the
subject disappears. To the remarks of Frank
on this theme, I, for my part, will add below

the suggestion that "being-familiar-withothers" be enlarged by "being-familiar-withoneself."

I will now discuss the concept of reflection, reaching back to Leibniz and Lyotard,
then tum in section II to the theme of "language" against the background of Walter
Benjamin's analysis of the German Tragedy
and Lyotard's The Differend, and finally the
" s e l f in section III.
I. Reflection
The term "reflection" addresses a twofold
possibility of self-relation. First, there is
naturally thinking about oneself in the hypostatized possibility of immediate self-rela
tion, then there is thinking about oneself as a
" s e l f that, mediated through a mirroring, is
related to the natural and social environment.^
Leibniz
The portrait of Postmodem philosophy
that leads to the commonly held conclusion
that it has no firm basis, does not articulate
its analysis under generalizing perspectives,
but rather situationally: according to it Postmodemism relativizes everything and hurries from one standpoint to another. This
protrayal could be continued in the following
way:
In the course of this intellectual movement
views of things are changed: statements
that were pronounced about one and the
same thing from different standpoints are
likewise transformed. To the same extent,
the meanings of names show themselves as
mobile and shimmering.
Thinking turns out to be a development and
an event, and the meaning of any philosophical terminus becomes a perfect example of a history of aspects. Contradictions
therefore belong to the systematic peculiarity of thinking.

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The philosopher whose thinking is briefly

outlined here at the end of a detailed interpretation is Leibniz. I will examine the systematic affinity of the just mentioned contradictions with topoi discussed in Postmodern
philosophy. As concerns the philosophical
discussion of reflection in the Baroque period, I will limit myself to a short portrayal
of Leibniz's position (1646-1716).^ The monad, which windowlessly mirrors the universe, contains in itself both moments of
mirroring and self-referential thinking. Consider first the topos of the relation between
subject and world.
Leibniz proceeds from the fact that the
monad is a rational entity. Yet the monads
themselves do not have to be conscious of all
ideas of reason in order to be able to have
control over them. Like the painter who
sketches perspective correctly without expressly having to know the rules, so, Leibniz
argues, the monads have an "instinct for reason," which leads them both in regard to
knowledge and morally. (Something similar
is also true for speaking.)
Thus, to use Freudian terms, the monad is
partially unconscious; yet it also has in itself
all ideas of reason and, in this way, a fundamental bond with the world: in activity, in
thinking, and in knowledge, it "represents the
world." The ideas of reason do not reside on
the surface, on the outside and among the
unordered multitude of appearances, but
rather exert a unifying function. To a certain
extent, however, they refer from the exterior
to the interior of things. I say "to a certain
extent," for it is well known that a monad has
no windows. Its relation to the world plays
itself out entirely in the interior on the level
of the ground of ideas of reason: the agreement between the single monad and the other
monads and things is guaranteed by a "preestablished harmony." The monad thereby
represents the world to itself by assuming a
''point de V M ^ , " a standpoint. Through this,
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the term "representation" receives a double

meaning. On one hand, it means that the
monad depicts itself, its standpoint, as an
existing and knowing monad, and, on the
other, it means the monad represents the
world. What this reveals, according to Leibniz, is that the monad imprints itself on the
world. It is active, and, to some degree, as a
rational self, it produces the world. In this
way the new concept of an active, rational
subject, who creates the world from the
strength of its reason, is bom.
We, however, can see that this subject is
caught up in an intrinsically counter-rotating
movement. In one direction, it moves inwards toward the ground in order to reach
from the exterior what is essential, to reach
the ideas of reason in itself. In the other
direction, it moves from the inside out in a
movement directed toward the essence of
things, thus toward the outside. This movement addresses us as a crossing and recalls
Lyotard's "passage." Here the monad is
really unintermpted in movement. The nonspatial monad "moves" (a contradiction for
something in itself non-spatial) always from
the "inside" (ground of reason) toward the
"outside" (world). Furthermore, it always
"moves" as perceiving activity in the world
from ''point de yue" to "point de vue''in
other words, it carries out a perduring change
of perspective, which constitutes the individuality of the monad, and which, as we
shall see, is the condition for the activities of
the monad, activities of representation and
depiction.
We can clearly see just how ambiguous
this conception of the monad is by considering Leibniz's interpretation of the monad,
and, with that the subject, as a "living mirror."
Conceiving the subject in terms of representation reveals it as an act of depiction and
representation. Depiction and representation
are to be understood as a mirroring not in

terms of the sensual-intuitive, for the monad

does not have any windows, but rather as
essential mirroring. The subject, moreover,
does not merely play a passive role, but, as
we have seen, an active one. It crosses the
borders of the sensible appearance of things
"from inside out" into the "inside" of those
same things. The subject, or more precisely
the ideas of reason of the subject, and things,
that is to say, ideas of reason, are reciprocally
mirrored inside of one another. The subject
is caught up in a constant state of transition.
It mirrors the inside of the "outer world," but
by mirroring, it mirrors the world of which it
itself is a partit mirrors itselfthat is, its
relation to the world. The rational subject
continually produces images. What is rational, according to Leibniz, is characterized
precisely by the fact that it is not "firmly
established," but rather is continually in motion. Mirroring is this movement. By placing
a mirror before itself, the rational subject
crosses its restricted spacio-temporal "point
de vue."
The subject holds a mirror before itself; it
is at the same time this mirror, the image in
the mirror, and the beholder of this image.
The idea of such a self-relationship is the
classical metaphor for self-consciousness.
We should, therefore, realize that the mirror offers us a deeper insight into the essence
of things and into our own essence. The
mirror image in the mirror, as an image of
reason, presents a higher standpoint than the
world of appearances, which knows no selfrelation. Leibniz understands this self-relation as the continuous production of images,
images that, of course, at the same time condition the material existence of things. The
subject which produces images continuously
re-executes what God, the central monad,
does as he constantly creates the world.
Leibniz, however, speaks not only of a
mirror, but of a "living mirror."
As a "living mirror" I give the manifold of

mirrored "objects" unity. Now one could

think that with such unity the restricted
standpoint, the subjective "point de vue," is
not yet overcome. But it is precisely in the
fact that the subject is related to itself that
Leibniz sees the guarantee that the subjective
standpoint is overcome, for it is the continual
self-reflection in the enduring confrontation
with the "other" that insures that no merely
particular standpoint is taken.
Interestingly, Leibniz compares this conception of the subject with the Copemican
revolution. His philosophy aims to offer the
possibility of drawing a distinction between
the deceptive, sensual intuition according to
which the sun rises and the reality that the
Earth turns. But the parallel to Copernicus
reveals a point of contrast as well. Following
the discovery of Copernicus, the world is no
longer the center of the universe. But according to Leibniz, the subject is always at the
same time a point of departure, thus a quasicenter from out of which everything is mirrored, and thus takes a universal precedence
over the world. This ambiguity is characteristic of the Leibnizian conception of the
monad. On one hand, the monad mirrors
(according to the understanding) the empirical world. On the other hand, it at the same
time exceeds that which can be understood
in the way it moves toward inner reason. A
further contradiction lies in the fact that,
according to Leibniz, the monad is most essentially itself when it resides not in the
abstractions of reason, but rather in the concreteness of the empirical world.
The conception of the subject in Postmodernism can be connected to Leibniz in two
respects.
With Leibniz the point of departure was,
as we have just seen, the thesis that the subject (as energetic monad) imprints itself on
the world and creates a unity. The recognizability of the world is secured in this way. In
Postmodern philosophers and authors we can

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likewise find the thesis that the subject produces the world.
We strive, whenever possible, to order
chas and have the world make sense; and do
so all the more when we discover that order,
sense, and meaning are not objective. This
attempt to give the world sense must fail.
From the Postmodern perspective, reason
creates order by simplifying a manifold into
a homogeneity. In this way the meaning we
give the world is a product of our own reflection. This returns us to our self-experience.
The representation of that self-experience as
a stable, hypostatized, autonomous self is
shown to be the product of a circular process."^ But did we not also find in Leibniz the
idea that the subject is led by an unrecognizable, in any case unknowable power the
rational instinct? The rational instinct, which
is non-rational as an instinct, refers to reason.
Here Leibniz's trust in reason appears unbroken, but again that looks different when one
consults the metaphor of the living mirror.
The discussion of the living mirror, which
is at the same time mirror, mirror image,
relation of mirror image and world, and
lastly, of mirror image and self, can probably
be correctly designated as ambiguous, even
as antagonistic. We are dealing here with a
mirror that is simultaneously receptive, passive, and productive, actively producing. The
mirror "makes" what mirrors itself in it, but
mirrors nothing other than that which is
given outside of it. The mirror does not only
mirror "something" outside of it, rather it
also mirrors its relation to the mirrored objectbut to that end, strictly speaking, it
would require another mirror. A further discussion in German Idealism will in fact instruct us that this repetition must be called to
a halt if one does not want, or have to (Postmodernism to the letter), permit that there is
not secure foundation for our knowledge,
either in us, or outside of us.
The metaphor of the living mirror shows

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above all just how much Leibniz, despite his

undisputed hold on the reasonability of reality, and, therewith, on the "fullness of being,"
already had to take into account the fact that
the transparency of the subject is not given
to itself to the extent compellingly suggested
by the rationality of the world.
Lyotard
From the beginning, Lyotard's philosophy
stands under the sign of the question of the
unification of what cannot be unified.
In his Libidinal Economy Lyotard relates
Marx and Freud to each other in a non-discursive way. He sketches the picture (which
we know so well), of a young, beautiful
woman from the Rheinland with a bearded
head. Marx appears not as the emancipator
of the proletariat, but as a public prosecutor.
He indicts pleasure while he himself is a
vicitim of it. The book unmistakably paints
Lyotard's own crisis in thinking, which he
later acknowledged in an interview.^ What is
interesting here is Lyotard's affinity with
those philosophical reflections (Marx,
Freud, Nietzsche) in which an unresolved
tension between consciousness/unconciousness, or reason and body, is not only asserted,
but is positively introduced as the basis for
the critique of the one-sided perspective of
reason. Such an option, to which the cited
authors among others attest, cannot be articulated in a discursive way. Thus, they chose
narrative or poetic forms of depiction , not
from a tendency to self-fulfilling prophecy,
but as the most appropriate way to criticize
academic disciplines. With The Dijferend,
however, Lyotard lets his attempt at an argumentative presentation follow the narrative
depictions of the Libidinal Economy and The
Postmodern Condition. I will return later in
section II to the conception of lanaguage that
stands at the center of this work. At this point
I will briefly explain the theme of reflection.
As already in the The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard in The Dijferend attacks the

concept of a comprehensive reason. So while mension, which is not intersubjective.

Hegel counts as the examplary repreBut man is also isolated, or even objecsentation of such a position, Lyotard also tivized, in his moral aspect: he stands eye to
sees in Kant a philosopher who posed the eye with the moral law, not with his fellow
problem of the orderly arrangement of rea- human beings. The question whether man
son. Indeed, it is quite significant that Kant sees himself led to moral activity, depends on
wrote three "Critiques" that thematize three whether he lets himself be seized by this
very different forms of our knowledge: that lawfulness, which is absolutely different
of pure (theoretical), practical (moral), and from him (does it happen?)
"aesthetic" reason. For the heterogeneity of
Human activity can thus only succeed if
language, which Lyotard often mentions, is we adopt the idea that we actively control our
mirrored in the heterogenity of our reason. own actions, and that we, by carrying on an
Thus while, according to Lyotard, Kant first argumentative conversation with others, can
believed, as in The Critique of Judgment, that agree on the validity of certain norms. Yet the
theoretical and practical reason could be main reason for Lyotard's position here is
brought together, he himself recognized that Kant's discovery that there exists unbridgesuch a synthesis could not succeed. Rather, able contradictions between different forms
the critiques of pure and practical reason use of thinking. From Kant's arguments for the
an analogous procedure like that of The Cri- fact that our knowledge always refers to a
tique of Judgment: they proceed "as-if' there unity that it cannot achieve, we must draw
were another critique, and are mirrored in the conclusion that the various contents of
one another. This does not mean, however, our knowledge cannot be synthesized^they
that there is no point of reference that they remain both antagonistic with respect to one
would have in common. Lyotard designates another and in themselves. There is at best,
this point as the tacit question, "arrive-t- as Lyotards thinks, a ferry boat, which creil?""does it happen?" What can happen is ates the ties (crossings, "passages") between
the materialization of a work of art or knowl- the different islands of our cognitive abilities.
edge that does not follow pre-given rules, but
II. Language
rather itself creates a new rule. The artist
refers to the sublime, the philosopher to a
Since, at the latest. Strich's decisive essay
"phrase," that is, to a sentence that is not of 1916, "Der lyrische Stil des siebzehnten
verbalized. For Lyotard, the sublime is that, Jahrhunderts," the view that Baroque poetry
like infinity, of which we have a concept, but thematizes particularly antagonistic relations
no intuition. The experience of the sublime and fashions these relationships allegorically
first shocks us, then we recognize that sen- can be regarded as secure: "this century
sual intuition is lacking, then we realize, [seeks] dissonances and contradictions"
according to Kant, that we are intelligible (Strich, 1916-1975, p. 42), "the poems frecreatures, and this assessment lifts us beyond quently end up in an unfathomable antithethe sphere of the material. To this we finally sis" (p. 46). Strich further emphasized that
owe our dignity. The feeling of displeasure the vanity and transience of everything
about the limitation of our sensual intuition earthly stands in the center of this poetic
appears simultaneously with a feeling of work.
pleasure (in that we are rational creatures). It
The interest in contradictions that are nonis characteristic of Lyotard that he interprets Hegelian, that are non-dialectical and cannot
the aesthetic experience of man in this di- be sublated, or more precisely, in antagonis-

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tic relations, certainly also guided Benjamin's steps when he came upon Baroque
tragic drama. Benjamin's first intuitve insight is that the Baroque period lacked the
certainty of salvation that was present to
suffering people in the Middle Ages without
thereby giving up the hope for redemption,
an insight which later research has confirmed. This insight forms the background
against which Benjamin sees tragic drama as
an interpretation of the world, that is, as the
linguistic constitution of the world. In agreement with his linguistic-philosophical reflections, Benjamin distinguishes between the
material of the theater piece and the ideas that
mark it. As concerns material, he develops an
anthropological-political typology of human
beings and conflicts in the absolutist state.
The prince is apparently the most powerful,
but in the moment in which he carries out a
decision, he shows himself as absolutely
powerless. A n unbridgeable gap opens between having the power to rule and being
able to rule. The absolutist prince, who carries cruelty against his adversaries to an extreme, knows that he himself will finally be
a victim of their cruelty. The tyrant is at the
same time the martyr, for oppression necessarily draws self-annhilation after it. And
from this it follows that the courtly nobleman
is at the same time he who has perfect manners at his disposal and the perfect schemer,
who, with the next opportunity, betrays the
prince.
Thus, in contrast to Greek tragedy, German tragic drama knows no cosmic order
that reconciles human beings with their fate.
World-reality is hopeless; beauty is transitory; values are corrupted; salvation is uncertain. In contrast to the Middle Ages, the Baroque man is denied any immediate way into
the next world (1:258-59 [8283]).'
Yet because he cannot give up hope, his
experience of both vanity and the expectation
of salvation that has become uncertain

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plunge him into despair. This contrast inspires Benjamin's conviction that a tension
reigns between the material of tragedy and
its idea. Benjamin sees this tension concretized in melancholy. Sadness and melancholy make one speechless, but it is precisely
this speechlessness that can depict the essence of language.
In terms of their linguistic form, German
tragedies are allegories, that is, concrete depictions of abstract concepts. For Benjamin,
allegory articulates the parallel tensions between eternity and transience, idea and intuition: one of the strongest motives in allegory
is the insight into the transitory nature of
things and the concern to eternally save them
(cf 1:397 [223-24]). This antagonism between insight and concern determines less
the material than the idea of tragedy. It makes
us sad, and this sadness is revealed as the
"mother of allegories and their content"
[1:403]. But according to the antique tradition, which was renewed in the Renaissance,
the relationship to that which is creative and
saving is secured precisely in mourning and
in melancholy. The creative, genial perspective of the world finds its appropriate form in
the allegory. Thus, on the one hand, allegory
has the power to save the transitorythat, so
says Benjamin, is what the Baroque discovers^but, on the other hand, salvation can
only take place if organic life is destroyed
beforehand [1:669-70]. The allegorical, melancholic perspective must smash the world.
"That which lies here in ruins, the highly
significant fragment, the remnant, is, in fact,
the finest material of baroque creation."
(1:354 [178])
If it wants to save things, the allegory must
"hold the remains tight" [cf 1:666]. It offers,
by destroying things in trying to save them,
"the picture of rigid unrest" [1:227]. Baroque
is thus shown as the "fashion of antithetical
feelings about life" (Hbscher), but is no less
itself an ontological constitution: the anti-

thetical nature of melancholy corresponds to

the antithetical nature of the political constellation of absolutism as the constitution of the
silent and speaking creature. It takes form in
allegory, which correspondingly means that
"the only pleasure the melancholic permits
himself, and it is a powerful one, is allegory."
(1:361 [185]).
By making a show of serving up corpses,
bowls with blood and hacked off heads, by
being "resplendent with pale corpses," the
bow of this period tenses to the sphere of
transcendence. Even "seen from death, the
production of corpses may be the meaning of
life." Thus, it becomes clear that mere transience is not the last word. Yet Benjamin
certainly denies the jump into transcendence.
Of course, the Epistemo-Critical Prologue of
The Origin of German Tragic Drama opens
confidently, and it concludes with a view
toward a "ponderacion misteriosa," a possible intervention of God into history (as the
redemption from history^not in history),
but the middle of the book is filled with total
despair. At this point, however, we are not at
all concerned with the speculative interpretation of Benjamin's philosophy of history,
but rather the meaning of his teaching on
allegory with respect to his philosophy of
language. Benjamin himself did not establish
the connection between tragic drama and his
philosophy of language. Rather, most clearly
in the letter with which he offers Scholem a
self-interpretation of the "Epsitemo-Critical
Prologue," he designates tragic drama as an
idea. Here Benjamin thematizes the notion of
"form." "Form" should not be understood as
the opposite of content, but rather as that
which makes the verbalized text, or, generally, the phenomena, legible as idea. Benjamin explains the tension between phenomenon and idea with the help of a metaphor about stars and constellations. "And so
ideas subscribe to the law which states: all
essences exist in complete and immaculate

independence, not only from phenomena,

but, especially, from each other. . . . Every
idea is a sun and is related to other ideas just
as suns are related to each other" (1:241 [37]).
Thus, although phenomenon and idea stand
in a certain correspondence to one another,
their difference is not discursively thinkable.
Rather it must be thought as an "origin"
manifested in German tragedy, "the science
of the origin, is the form which, in the remotest extremes and apparent excesses of the
process of development, reveals the configuration of the ideathe sum total of all possible meaningful juxtapositions of such opposites" (1:227 [47]).
This "meaningful juxtaposition" refers,
on one hand, to the destruction of a rigid
order, and, on the other, to the production of
a climate of true humanity, which can only
be thought in the form of allegory and under
the spell of melancholy.
Benjamin's philosophy of language is developed from the irreconcilable opposition
between a linguistic and spiritual essence in
order to escape the paradox of its "inconceivable identity." The linguistic and spiritual
essence can be partly brought into agreementinsofar as the spiritual essence is
even communicableonly insofar as the
spiritual essence is revealed in the way it
articulates itself in language. Yet precisely
this way of speaking clearly points to the
question whether the spiritual essence communicates completely, that is, through language.
Surprisingly enough, what follows from
these presuppositions is the apparently tautological conclusion that what language
communicates is the linguistic essence of
things, thus language itself [II: 142]. The tautology is dissolved when we see that the word
"lamp," as Benjamin says, does not somehow communicate the lamp, but rather the
"language-lamp." What is finally revealed
here is that every language communicates

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317

itself, that is, its immediate spiritual essence. communicability per se" [II 14546]. The
One can, according to Benjamin, name this self-reflexive character of this relationship,
magic. Benjamin first elaborates the explica- which Benjamin does not bother with in his
tion of the magic of language against the later works, makes it clear that we are conbackground of the Romantic philosophy of cerned with a metaphysical discussion that
language and the story of revelation. What emphasizes the clarification of the condition
communicates in language is not only the of our speaking. The concept of revelation is
thing, but man as well. Yet in contrast to decisive for this, as Benjamin articulates in
things, man communicates in words. Man conjunction with Hamann (who says: "lancommunicates his spiritual essence in nam- guage, the mother of reason and revelation,
ing all other things [II: 143]. In so doing, man their A and O") and the Romantics [11:146].
communicates his linguistic essence. But He does not concede that there are things that
"things" like the "mountain" and the "fox" are unpronounced or unpronouncable. The
also communicate. To whom do they com- more spiritual this unpronounced thing, the
municate? To man: they communicate be- more linguistic it will be, for, after all, its
cause man names them. This naming should validity in terms of its spiritual essence is
not be confused with an ordered activity that completely known not in the word but in the
is undertaken to estabUsh.ontic access by name. Clearly, Benjamin justifies this coninstrumental means. We are concerned with ception of language as magic, as immediate
the communication of a spiritual essence in knowledge of existing things in the name,
from the Biblenot, however, by underlanguage.
With whom, Benjamin then asks, does standing it as the codex of a determined
man communicate? The answer cannot be religion, but rather as a document of the
given in the framework of communication or conviction that language is "the last . . .
of an information theory, in other words, with inexplicable and mystic reality" [11:147].
the help of a sender-information-receiver
Actually, every attempt to constructively
schema. Rather, according to Benjamin, the thematize human reality and the knowledge
sole "authority" who can become the "ad- of human reality leads, into a form of self-redressee" outside of the ontic order for com- flexivity thf cannot be gis^sp^ analytically
munication of the spiritual, linguistic essence and can, therefore, be rightly called magical
of man is God. That may be surprising, but a or mythical. It is, however, important to keep
closer discussion of the nature of language in mind that this magic^ets its elucidating
shows that its "innermost essence" is not the power not from determined content, but
word, but rather the name. The language of rather only from the determination of its
the name is the most original language and form. This formal determination is indiffercannot be adulterated, for it is in the name, ent to its materialindifferent just as the
rather than in words, that true knowledge of original act of creation (and the creative act
men and things is established. Adam's nam- of the artist whoimperfectlycopies it) is
ing of things completes God's creation: "in indifferent with respect to its material. Bennames, the essential law of language ap- jamin gives a significant example of this
pears" [11:145]. This essential law of lan- indifference when he, explicating the deterguage means that the essence of language mination of form in reference to the allegorimust not be seen in the communicability of cal form of tragic drama, remarks that in the
the contents of information, but rather can extreme case the matter of tragic drama can
only be grasped as a "communication of be happy without damaging the character of
PHILOSOPHY TODAY

318

tragic drama. This questionable indifference

does not mean that there is no relation between name and creationon the contrary,
there reigns between them a magical "nonsensuous correspondence" that enables man
to know things. This "non-sensuous correspondence" is founded in God's leaving the
language of creation to humans as the language of the name [II: 149]. However, human
language, not only the language of the word
but also the language of the name, can never
reach the level of God's language: it remains
a "reflection of [God's creative] word in
names." Yet it is also true for Benjamin that
the name of a man guarantees his community
with the creative word, which, in turn, guarantees a "simultaneity" of "reception and
spontaneity" [11:150].
Lyotard
Jean-Frangois Lyotard, likewise, develops
his critique of the philosophical tradition on
the basis of a philosophy of language. Initially, his thought aims at the "great narratives" of the Enlightenment, Idealism, and
Marxism. This is especially true in The Postmodern Condition. The intentions that underlie these narratives, which are to free humanity from political repression, uncertainty
and poverty, have over and over again led to
more terror in practice. Like Habermas, Lyotard also thinks it is not advisable to again
bring into play some principle or overarching
ordering system. We would do better to see
and accept that our world is heterogenous.
That is, we should not try, like traditional,
theoretical philosophical systems of which
Hegel's dialectic is paradigmatic, to do away
with contradictions and to destroy heterogeneity with homogeneity. In his subsequent
major work. The Differend, Lyotard subjects
this historical-practical option to a philosophical line of argrumentation. He thinks he
can assert that language, which, according to
popular opinion, is the medium whose regularity reflects that of reality, is itself to the

highest degree heterogenous. Lyotard distinguishes between differing genres of discourse like the philosophical, the scientific,
and the juridical, and different phrase regimens like questioning, commanding, describing, and so forth. Of course Lyotard
thinks that we must always react in some way
to that which another says and does, but that
does not determine whether we do so in the
way initiated by our partner. For example, we
can react to a command with irony or also
with a discourse about hierarchies. In other
words, language itself does not contain a
metadiscourse that governs in a comprehensive way all other discourses; rather language itself is heterogenous through and
through. For Lyotard, this has the consequence that all comprehensive ideas, like
human rights, education, and emancipation,
cannot be legitimized philosophically. This
does not mean, however, as is occasionally
implied of him, that such ideas would be
worthless or should not be practiced. Lyotard
only cautions against their being held as universally valid and rationally justifiable,
which would lead to the suppression of alternative ideas and ways of legitimation that
cannot be so justified.
III. The Self
If we want to bring together the above
considerations with the following discussion
of the self, then we must stress that reflection
and speaking have revealed an analogous
structure insofar as they can be understood
in reference to something which itself cannot
be understood linguistically or in terms of
reflection. Thus in Leibniz, the instinct for
reason designates that which is in accordance
with reasonas instinctwithout being itself reasonable. In Lyotard, the different
ways in which we are able to know refer to
something which cannot be depicted, or the
sublime, which cannot be "caught up with"
and which, of course, does not serve our
T H E CRISIS O F T H E S U B J E C T
319

different ways of knowing as a "goal," but,

so to speak, as a guide. In Benjamin, the
notion of the "form" or reality-content of the
world understood as linguistically constituted goes back to the Baroque idea that
precisely the undeniable disaster gives the
hint that everything is related to salvation.
(Shakespeare: "Readiness is all.") And in
Lytoard's philosophy of language the question "arrive-t-iW also stands in the center of
an expectant readiness: all discursive speaking is related to a "phrase" which cannot be
verbalized, something that cannot be depicted. If we limit ourselves in this context to
the " s e l f as something constituted through
reflection and language (thus if we do not
want to discover the self by way of the theme
of the body), then we can isolate an element
common to these sometimes very different
perspectives. I would like to illustrate this
moment using the work of Manfred Frank
and the problem of self-reflection as a background.
Against the background of neo-structuralism, as well as in reference to the attempt of
German idealism and hermeneutics (especially Fichte and Schleiermacher) to establish a ground for the self, Frank has given a
detailed analysis of the topos of the insufficient subject from different perspectives.
(Frank, 1977, 1983, 1986). To the heirs of
Saussure, who advocate the heteronomy of
the subject and who attribute to structure all
power and the capability of self-reflection,
Frank responds by claiming that they give in
to an anthropormorphizing of structure. One
is only shifting the problem, so says Frank,
when one denies human beings self-reflection and then addresses structure, or grants
being. But more important is recognizing
that the problem of self-reflection has no
philosophically sufficient solution if one defines it as the ability to simultaneouly think
something (the subject) as the object and as
the subject of thinking. Again and again this

PHILOSOPHY TODAY
320

unavoidably leads into a logical circle that

does not offer the possiblity of establishing
anything or only offers an endless repetition
of the steps that would lead to the establishment of something.
Frank sketches the path of the development of self-reflection from Kant to Heidegger and Derrida. Kant's "I think" ("that
which must be able to accompany") marks
the beginning of the history of a confusion
immanent in the concept of self-reflection
itself. The self-reflexivity of the "I think,"
which Kant took from Leibniz, is expressed
in the doubling of "perception in general"
and "self-preception" (thinking that is itself
aware of itself) (Frank, 1986, p. 28). Fichte
then saw, according to Frank, that Kant could
never reach a valid explanation of self-reflection with this doubling. If, in order to
attain consciousness of myself, I must presuppose that I must make my own consciousness the object of a new consciousness, then
I will never reach the end of such a process.
Fichte does away with separation without
further ado: "there is a consciousness in
which the subjective and objective cannot at
all be separated, but rather are absolutely one
and the same. Such a consciousness therefore
would be what we need in order to explain
consciousness in general." (Werke, 1, p. 527;
quoted by Frank, 1986, p. 33) But because he
thinks it necessary to put an eye into the
active I of active deeds, Fichte also does not
escape from endless repetition. A solution,
which helps out of the perplexity of the doubling, first emerges with Schleiermacher.
Schleiermacher speaks of an "immediate
self-consciousness" or "feeling" in his Dialectic. According to Frank, "immediate"
means here that the relata, which are reflected upon, and the relata, which perform
the reflection, no longer " f a l l apart"
(Schleiermacher, Dialektic 286-87, quoted
by Frank, 1977, pp. 93-94). Schleiermacher
turns this analysis into something positive

ing organizations and a growing number of

minute activites. On the one hand, rationalization compels the generalization of criteria,
and on the other, demands pluralizing. Individuals see themselves as more than ever
thrown back on themselves, yet we are more
and more becoming objects of guardianship:
we establish more than ever before that we
control nature and social conditions, yet we
are ever increasingly losing control over our
activities.
Walter Benjamin expressed these pardoxes, which perhaps we only now have
massively before our eyes, in the formula of
the mythologization of our consciousness.
Capitalism therefore represents for him the
consequence of antique mythology. The
whole of Benjamin's striving is aimed at
rupturing this mythical spell, and at "waking
up from the dream of the nineteenth-century"
(see N . BolzAV.v. Reijen, 1991).
In fact it can be asserted with good reason
that, since its origin, bourgeois society has
On the one hand, the self is determined
held its members under the spell of a parathrough the consciousness of the lack, of the
doxical constellation. On the one hand, indiinability to comply with the demand for selfviduals feel that social relationships are ungrounding, which at the same time produces
just and unchangable; on the other, they see
a real content. On the other hand, the self
that bourgeois culture offers them instruestablishes its ability to transcend the borders
ments to bring about a positive Utopia, or at
of individuality. The "general individual,"
least to improve their living conditions. Litwhich, according to Schleiermacher's thorerature gives us many examples, Anton
oughly paradoxical formulation, combines
the "singularity of the general and the univer- Reiser, the young Werther, Niels Lyhne.
sality of the individual as the indivisible mo- They articulate that state which one can dements of a unified whole" (Frank, 1977, pp. scribe as melancholic. This teaches us that
156-57), constructsin an intersubjective the Baroque, no less than the Postmodern,
perspectivethe analogy of a rift which di- should not be confused with pessimism, resvides the self reflexively and linguistically. ignation, or nostalgia. Insofar as it takes into
The rift and the consciousness of this rift are account the antagonistic constellation of soequally conditioned by the form of socializa- cial conditions, it forms the foundation for
tion that can be concretized as the paradox of the insight that the final goal of our thinking
modernization (v, d. Loo/v. Reijen, 1990). and acting cannot be rationally grounded
We simultaneously see ourselves confronted without having that mean, in turn, that we
with the formation of parasitically proliferat- should not practice such thought and action.

when he lays the basis for what Frank understands as the solution of the problem: selfconsciousness should not be understood in
terms of non-identity between thinker and
thought, but rather as "being-familiar-withoneself' (Frank, 1986, pp. 62-63). With such
familiarity a pre-reflexive, conscious selfexperience is addressed that depicts an
"unanalyzable ground" of that self-experience. I wish to further this approach, adding
to it that this "being-familiar-with-oneself'
needs to include a pre-linguistic, but conscious experience of "being-familiar-withothers."
Only this combination sufficiently explains how, according to Schelling, (and with
this phrase I quote the title of another book
by Manfred Frank), an "infinite lack of being" can be ascertained in consciousness,
while we also understand others and can act
communally (at least in regard to their activities). This lack legitimizes speaking about
the crisis of the subject.

THE CRISIS OF THE SUBJECT

321

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ENDNOTES
1. See, among others: Habermas, Die Neue
lichkeit and Der Philosophische

Unbersicht-

Diskurs der Moderne',

Lyotard, The Differend', Manfred Frank, What is Neo-

sprozesse," both published in

Sozialwissenschaft-Liter-

arische-Rundschau.
2. Mirror and "Trompe l'oeir'-effects played an important role

(1990); and van Reijen, "Verstndingung

in the Baroque. Just think of the hall of mirrors in the castle

ber die Grenzen der Verstndigung" and "Verstndigung-

of Versailles and of the fountains in the park with their large

Structuralism?

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

and lavishly fashioned figures, which are reflected in the

forces in reference to the rational determinacy of man, as

water. The central meanings of mirrors and the phenome-

suspected by Nietzsche and Heidegger, the "masters of

non of mirroring in our culture, and especially in Baroque

suspicion."

culture, is excellently portrayed in Hart Nibbrig's study

(1987). We will see that the phenomenon of mirroring also
played an important role in Leibniz's discussion of reflection. Also in postmodern art, which thematizes what has
become the precarious relation between reality and fiction,
mirroring is a medium of experience.

5. Die Aufklarung, das Erhabene, Philosophie,

Aesthetic.

Gesprch mit W.v. Riejen und D. Verrman. (Lyotard, 1988)

6. The reference here is to Walter Benjamin, Gesammlte
Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Theodor W. Adomo und
Gerschom Scholem, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann

3. In the following I am referring to Kaulbach (1976), whose

and Hermann Schweppenhuser, I, I, Abhandlungen,

continuation of reflection philosophy with Fichte, the Ro-

Frankfurt a.M., 1974. Pages 204-430 comprise the Ur-

mantics and hermeneutics can here only point to the ex-

sprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, which has been trans-

hausting analyses of Manfred Franck, which are cited in

lated by John Osboume and introduced by George Steiner.

the bibliography. During a conference in Barcelona, Alain

I cite this translation, but will also include the original page

Renaut called my attention to the fact that my interpretation

references in brackets. The author also refers to, but does

of Leibniz showed a certain parallel to that of Deleuze in

not cite, later sections of the Gesammlte Schriften that are

Le Pli.

not yet translated. These references will also apprear in

4. The self is determined through unknowable, uns way able

brackets.Trans.

University of Utreclit, The Netherlands 1NL 3707

THE CRISIS OF THE SUBJECT

323