distinguishing

its own national interests from the universalizable

interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally

acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing

its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally

acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing

its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally

acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing

its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally

acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing

its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptivelydistinguishing
its own national interests from the universalizable
interests that all the other nations could share. This
inability is a function of the logic of practical discourses;
it is not a matter of good or bad will. One can only test
a unilateral anticipation of what would be rationally
acceptable to all sides by submitting the presumptively