SISA

Report no. 27 - 2014

Pakistani Taliban in Turmoil

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud and Qayum Khan
Oslo, December 2014

Centre for International and Strategic Analysis

SISA 2014

All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for
International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the
author.

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Introduction1
Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of the Prophets Sword)1 is Pakistan Armys latest military offensive
against both the homegrown and foreign militants in North Waziristan tribal region,
intending to restore the writ of the government and curtail them from using the area as
a haven for carrying out further terror activities across the country. North Waziristan
had been the stronghold of militants led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur2, who signed a peace pact
with the government of Pakistan in 2007.3 However, with the consent of chief of the
group, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)4 along with its foreign
affiliates5 made its entry into the area as a result of the military offensive Raah-e-Nijat6
in neighboring South Waziristan in 2009. Al-Qaeda commander Abu Yahiya Al Libi7 and
Haqqani network military commander Mullah Sangeen Zadran8 played an imperative
role to convince Hafiz Gul Bahadur to allow the TTP to take refuge in North Waziristan
after the latter agreed on shunning attacks against security forces in the area and avoid
using the region as a launching pad for militant activities across Pakistan.9 Meanwhile,
Maulvi Nazir 10 had refused to provide refuge to the TTP in Wana area of South
Waziristan during the same time.

The TTP is chiefly concentrating on targeting Pakistani security forces and challenging
the writ of the state. The TTP along with its foreign militant affiliates continues using
North Waziristan as a launching pad for their attacks across Pakistan. However, Gul
Bahadur Group has close links with Haqqani Network with main focus on their activities
inside Afghanistan. 11 Prominent journalist and Ex-President of Tribal Union of
Journalists (TUJ)12 Safdar Dawar said, It was only after the renewal of 2006 peace
agreement in late 2007 that Hafiz Gul Bahadur asked his fighters to avoid attacks on
Pakistani military and focus on struggle inside Afghanistan. As far as Haqqani Network is
concerned, it has never overtly stated its coalition with Gul Bahadur Group, but both of
them have been assisting one another in their shared activities.13 However, the major
role of Gul Bahadur Group has been three-pronged support for Haqqani Network, which
includes recruiting militants from local Wazir and Dawar tribes, providing bases to the
aforementioned network in the area, and offering reserved force to the same group to
fight against Afghan and coalition troops inside Afghanistan.

The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(NMFA). All views expressed are those of the authors.


On the other hand, the TTP and its foreign associates moved against the promise they
had made with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and intensified their activities in North Waziristan and
used the area as a base for terrorism across Pakistan. The dubious character of the TTP
compelled the government to launch military operation in the area on June 15, 2014.
According to the press release by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) - the media
wing of Pakistans military - on June 15, 2014, the armed forces of Pakistan launched a
comprehensive military operation against foreign and local terrorists in North
Waziristan to eliminate them regardless of hue and color as they were hiding in
sanctuaries in the area and had waged a war against the state.14

Although Zarb-e-Azb has apparently curtailed the incidents of terrorism across the
country as these were feared after the military offensive in North Waziristan, yet the
assault at Army Public School and College in Peshawar on December 16, 2014 predicts a
fresh wave of terrorist attacks. As many as 141 people including 132 students and 9
staffers were massacred, while the Spokesman for the main TTP, Muhammad Khurasani
accepted responsibility for the said attack and the outfit claimed that the massacre was
justified. On the next day of attack, the Taliban also released the pictures of their seven
fighters, who took part in the assault and killed by the Pakistani security forces on the
spot.15

Militancy in North Waziristan
With entry of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, its other foreign
allied militant outfits including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)16, the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)17 and Jundullah18 also took sanctuaries in the area.
The tribal rivalries mainly between Wazir and Dawar tribes in North Waziristan
provided a strong support to the TTP to escalate its influence in the area.

Gul Bahadur Group is chiefly consisted of militants from Wazir tribe as its chieftain hails
from Uthmanzai Wazir tribe and he has been losing support of Dawars due to tribal
rivalry in the area. The TTP exploited the tribal rivalry between majority Wazirs and
minority Dawars in the area, and filled that gap with its focus on the same area, where
Dawar tribe provided them with manpower. Accordingly, Dawar tribe provided main

strength to the TTP to counter Wazirs influence in the area. To counter growing Hafiz
Gul Bahadur led Waziri Talibans influence in North Waziristan, majority of Dawar
Mujahideen affiliated themselves with the Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistan), said a local TTP
commander Jan Alam Dawar.19

Moreover, the TTP intensified their militant activities in the area creating an alarming
situation for the Pakistani government. Pakistan Army issued a number of warnings to
Gul Bahadur Group regarding the presence of the TTP and its allies in North Waziristan,
and their growing influence in the area, but then that was beyond the latters sway to
oust them from the area.20 Resultantly, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in
North Waziristan mainly in Mirali, Miramshah and Datta Khel, which it termed as a
military action against the militants without any discrimination.

21

After the

commencement of military operation, Pakistani mass media quoted Army Chief General
Raheel Sharif by saying the military will target Hafiz Gul Bahadur wherever he is
found.22

Assad Hashim, an Islamabad based journalist, who primarily covers security and human
rights related issues for Al-Jazeera English said, The military certainly claims that it is
going after militants of all hues and colors, but the fact is that it is impossible to verify
this claim, because access to the area is tightly controlled by the same military, which is
carrying it out. However, according to the IDPs of North Waziristan, enough warning
was given before Operation Zarb-e-Azb in order to provide civilians a way out, with
which the TTP fighters also began to leave the area. Today, Miramshah and Mirali are
ghost towns - as are the surrounding areas.23

Assad Hashim maintained, Now it is known that both the Haqqani Network and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur operated primarily out of Datta Khel. In recent days, we have known more
news from the military's PR wing, and thus unverifiable that airstrikes and operations
are being carried out in Datta Khel, amidst reports that Hafiz Gul Bahadur (historically
pro-government) has switched sides.24

Militant Factions in North Waziristan

The entry of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was not a single addition to the
militant groups in North Waziristan as its allies including Punjabi Taliban25 and foreign
outfits namely the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East Turkistan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) and Jundullah, also took refuge in the area after the consent of Hafiz
Gul Bahadur amid Raah-e-Nijat military operation in South Waziristan. According to
Safdar Dawar, things went wrong when the TTP started bringing foreign fighters
specifically the IMU militants into North Waziristan without apprising Hafiz Gul
Bahadur. Accordingly, Hafiz Gul Bahadur took the matter during the joint Shura
meetings of both the factions. Till that time, the TTP was too strong to seek prior
permission from Gul Bahadur for any decision.26

Gul Bahadur Group and Haqqani network were already active in the area. The density of
Gul Bahadur Group was mainly concentrating in Mirali, Miramshah and Datta Khel areas
of North Waziristan. Another senior journalist from North Waziristan Rasool Dawar
perceives the reconciliatory approach of Hafiz Gul Bahadur gave an opportunity to the
cunning TTP to strengthen its hold in Bahadurs domain. Before Zarb-e-Azb, main
concentration centers for Hafiz (Gul Bahadur) were Mirali, Miramshah, Datta Khel,
Danday Darpa Khel and Shawa, but currently, they have shifted their density to Shawal,
Datta Khel, Spin Wam and Kurram Agency, Rasool Dawar said.27

After the death of former TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud in a US drone strike on
November 1, 2013 in Danday Darpa Khel area of North Waziristan, discordance emerged
among the senior leadership of the militant organization over the issue of nomination of
his successor. The appointment of Mullah Fazlullah as a new head of the TTP enraged
Commander Khan Said alias Sajna, who was leading Mehsud Taliban, an influential
faction of the TTP. According to Rasool Dawar, the growing dispute over succession of
Hakimullah Mehsud led to the fragmentation of the TTP.28

Split within TTP
The death of Hakimullah and subsequent events including Operation Zarb-e-Azb paved
the way for fragmentation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and various splinter groups
emerged in the militant organization. Following are the breakaway groups of the TTP.

1- Main TTP
Fazlullah is heading the main TTP. At the moment, there are only few prominent Taliban
commanders left with Fazlullah. But there is understanding between the main TTP led
by Fazlullah and rest of the newly surfaced defected Taliban factions that they would
continue cooperating with each other in terms of planning and executing attacks across
Pakistan. We have an understanding that we would face any threat collectively, if a
group among us cannot deal with it separately, a Taliban affiliated with Commander
Sajna faction said on the condition of anonymity.29

It came forth during the ongoing military offensive in Khyber tribal district against a
local warlord Mangal Bagh led Lashkar-e-Islam. Both main TTP and its breakaway group
Jamaat-e-Ahraar vowed to support Mangal Bagh against Pakistan security forces. In this
critical juncture, the Tehrik-e-Taliban extends its full support to Lashkar-e-Islam.
Dozens of our fighters have already reached Khyber Agency to fight along with our
brother against the army, TTP chief Fazlullah said in an audio message.30

2- Punjabi Taliban
Punjabi Taliban is a splinter group of the TTP led by Asmatullah Muaviya. Previously, the
term Punjabi Taliban was used for all non-Pashtun Pakistani militants, mostly from
Punjab province affiliated with the TTP. However, the split occurred when discordance
emerged between Punjabi Taliban and the main TTP over the continuation of militant
activities inside Pakistan.
After consulting with Ulema (religious scholars) and keeping in view the current
situation in Pakistan, Punjabi Taliban is going to end its armed resistance within
Pakistan and would limit it to infidel forces across the border in Afghanistan,
Asmatullah Muaviya said in a video message.31
3- Commander Sajna Faction
Khan Said Mehsud alias Commander Sajna was the first prominent TTP commander,
who parted ways with Fazlullah led TTP over the latters alleged support to Sajnas main
rival Commander Shehryar Mehsud in May, 2014. Sajna faction described abductions for
ransom, killings, raising extortion money, damaging public properties, etc. as Un-

Islamic activities being practiced by Fazlullah led TTP. Sajna Group tried to reform the
Tehrik-e-Taliban; however, we failed despite our several attempts. Thus Mehsud Taliban
led by Sajna have decided to part ways with Fazlullah led Taliban, Commander Sajna
factions spokesman Azam Tariq said.32

But sources within Mehsud Taliban described Fazlullahs covert support to Shehryar
Mehsud against Sajna was the real motive behind the split. Commander Sajna has long
been asking Fazlullah to stop aiding Shehryar against him. He even delivered messages
to Fazlullah through Gul Bahadur and Khalifa (Sirajuddin Haqqani) to stop bringing
division within Mehsud Taliban by supporting Shehryar, but Fazlullah failed to do so, a
leading Mehsud Taliban commander said on condition of not to be named.33

This infighting between two leading Mehsud commanders cost dearly for the Taliban
and resulted in killing of dozens of their fighters. But recently Fazlullah has sorted out
the differences between commander Sajna and Shehryar in a week long Jirga, which took
place in an undisclosed location in Pakistani tribal area.

In a recent interview, Azam Tariq, a spokesman for Sajna faction also confirmed that the
dispute with Maulana Fazlullah had now sorted out. We dont have any dispute with
Maulana Fazlullah anymore. But we still holds our own independent organizational
structure, Azam Tariq said.34

4- Tehrik-e-Taliban Jamaat-ul-Ahraar
Second major split occurred within the TTP in August, 2014, when a group of senior TTP
commanders announced formation of a new faction, Tehrik-e-Taliban Jamaat-ul-
Ahraar. This new faction is consisted of Omer Khalid Khurasani - former TTP head for
Mohmand tribal district, Qari Shakeel-former member of TTP central Shura, Sajjad
Mohmand alias Ehsanullah Ehsan - former central spokesman of the TTP, etc. This new
faction is led by Mualana Qasim Khurasani, who was previously TTP chief for Malakand
region.

Jamaat-ul-Ahraar defected from the TTP over growing indiscipline, infighting and lack
of coordination within the TTP.35 Ehsanullah Ehsan, spokesman for the TTP-Jamaat-ul-

Ahraar, claimed that the new group had become the real T.T.P. and would refuse to
take orders from Mullah Fazlullah.36

5- Sheikh Maqbool Group
Sheikh Maqbool aka Shahidullah Shahid, ex-spokesman of the main TTP, along with
leading five regional commanders from various tribal districts recently pledged
allegiance to ISIS chief Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi. I pledge allegiance to the Caliph of
Muslims, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi and will follow his orders and instructions, Shahidullah
Shahid said in an email sent to media outlets.37

Soon after the announcement, the main TTP sent an email to the author claiming that
Sheikh Maqbool had been removed as TTP main spokesman before his announcement of
joining the ISIS. Shahidullah Shahid is an imaginary name, which is used by a person,
who becomes the spokesman of the TTP Central. Sheikh Maqbool has also been the
spokesman of the TTP Central; therefore, he was called Shahidullah Shahid. Long ago,
another brother had replaced Sheikh Maqbool and was promoted to the spokesman of
the TTP (means, he became Shahidullah Shahid). We did not announce that due to our
policy. But Sheikh Maqbool used this name (Shahidullah Shahid) for his individual
purpose. We want to make it clear that Sheikh Maqbool is not Shahidullah Shahid (He's
not our Spokesman anymore). As for as the Baiya (pledge of allegiance) to the ISIS is
concerned, Emir of the TTP Central, Mullah Fazlullah has already made it clear that our
Baiya is to Emir al-Momineen Mullah Muhammad Omar38. Lastly, we will soon announce
the name of our new Spokesman", the email says. 39 Now the TTP has announced
Muhammad Khurasani as its new spokesman replacing Sheikh Maqbool aka Shahidullah
Shahid on November 08, 2014.40

ISIS and Pakistani Taliban
So far among Pakistani Taliban, only Shahidullah Shahid has formally linked his group
with the ISIS. Rest of Pakistani Taliban factions have distanced themselves from the ISIS
and stressed that their allegiance is only to Mullah Omar. But also none of Pakistani
Taliban groups have criticized the ISIS despite the fact that the latters chief Abu-Bakr
directly challenged the ideological position and authority of Mullah Omar and Al-Qaeda

by declaring himself as Caliph and leader of the faithful. We have a support of a huge
number of mujahedeen across Pakistan and soon we will decide how to assist our
brother of the Islamic State in Iraq Syria, Muhammad Abu Zar Khurassani, a prominent
commander of the Sheik Maqbool faction, said.41

The common Taliban are questioning the presence of Mullah Omar, whether his alive or
not. They argue that how they can follow a leader whose presence is difficult to
ascertain since a decade, a senior Taliban commander, Maulvi Ahmad Hassan said.42
A senior Islamabad based security official, who monitors militant activities across
Pakistan said, Well, so far nothing serious to worry about, but the TTP is a natural
partner of the ISIS in Pakistan. So far the ISIS has only symbolic presence in different
parts of Pakistan by pasting posters in major cities. However, law enforcement agencies
are taking all appropriate measures to counter it.43

Operation Zarb-e-Azb
Pre-operation Security Situation and Local Opinion
Pakistani Tribal society is religiously and culturally a conservative one providing ideal
ground to Islamist militants to further their activities and sway. Common tribesmen
were already attached to religious obligations and tribal traditions. Therefore, the
Taliban had not affected them with novel restrictions. Meanwhile, Hafiz Gul Bahadur led
faction had already obliged the TTP, the most radical faction, by giving them refuge on a
condition of non-interference in the local tribesmens affairs by any means.

However, the presence of myriad militant factions, both local and foreign in North
Waziristan, caught the local tribesmen in constant feeling of insecurity. Taliban activities
and counter actions of Pakistani security forces and consistent drone strikes by the US in
the region kept on traumatizing the dwellers with acute uncertainty. The militants were
involved in abduction and killing of the locals either under spying charges or demanding
extortion money.

Though we did not flee the area, but we were living under constant fear of possible
abduction or paying extortion money to the Taliban. For tribal elders, its imperative to
maintain cordial relations with the government officials deputed in the area to resolve

10

local disputes. Some of my fellow tribal elders were abducted and later they were
released after paying huge ransom, some of them were asked by the Taliban to leave the
area or they would face dire consequences, a prominent tribal elder said on the
condition not to be mentioned.44

On the other hand, the security forces used to impose days-long curfew in the area
restricting the movement of the locals to their houses. They were not even allowed to
shift their patients to hospitals. The Army also used to carry out unannounced and
indiscriminate shelling and aerial raids against Taliban hideouts in civilian populated
parts of North Waziristan which often resulted in civilian deaths and property
destruction. The government writ could only be observed in the area during the
curfew.45

When proposed peace talks failed with the TTP, Pakistani Army felt the need of military
operation in North Waziristan as the militants were controlling the entire area and using
it as a launching pad to orchestrate attacks across the country. The civilian
administration, locally called as Political Administration, was restricted to its offices,
while the security forces were confined to their forts, barracks and check posts. They
could not even move freely in the area without imposing curfew, while militants hailing
from myriad factions were roaming freely in the area and crisscrossing the security
check posts all the day long. Militants held sway in the area and people were referring
them their long-hauled inter-tribal and intra-tribal disputes as their self-imposed laws
were providing speedy and cheap resolution.46

Due to the aforementioned situation, traders, tribal Maliks and other politically
influential tribesmen had left the area before the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-
Azb. Influential, affluent and pro-government tribesmen in the area were under constant
threat. They were asked for extortion money. They had to stay away from meeting the
government officials as they could face spying charges for the government against the
Taliban.

A local medical store owner Muhammad Din Dawar, a resident of Mirali, the second
largest town of North Waziristan, described life under Taliban, We were never

11

intimidated by the Taliban. My medicine business was running smoothly without being
jeopardized by their activities. I was also exporting medicine to Afghanistan and raising
handsome money. But military operation destroyed everything and now I am taking
loans to meet both ends.47

Commencement of Zarb-e-Azb
Pakistan army had long baulked at launching military operation in North Waziristn; The
Army was overstretched due to its engagements on multiple fronts including offensives
in Swat, South Waziristan and Khyber Agency against the militants, dealing
subsequently with the flow of the IDPs, non-conducive environment for military action
across the country and furthermore, the then Army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani
did not want to give the impression that the operation in North Waziristan was launched
under American pressure. We were finding it more difficult to decide on deploying
troops (in North Waziristan for a full-fledged military operation) as it would have given
an impression that it was done under the US pressure, former DG ISPR Athar Abbas
outlined the factors behind delaying the offensive in North Waziristan.48

Moreover, Pak-US acrimony and trust deficit were running high due to Salala post attack
on Pak-Afghan border in Mohmand tribal region on November 26, 2011, which left 24
Pakistani security personnel killed. Meanwhile, a unilateral pre-dawn raid by US Special
Forces in Abbottabad to kill Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011 further scarred the
relationship between the two allies. However, this time military operations in the other
areas have been concluded and previously fraught Pak-US relations have getting
gradually improving after new political and military leadership of Pakistan has taken the
charge.

Strategically, it had become imperative for Pak Army to flush out militants from their
last sanctuary in North Waziristan which had become a main concentration point for
militants after being driven out from other tribal areas in the wake of several military
operations. Otherwise, militants may have resurfaced in other areas culminating the
success made by the Army. The gains Pakistan Army had made against the Taliban
would have been at risk, if the military operation were not launched in North Waziristan
as militants were gradually sneaking into previously cleared areas, said Islamabad

12

based senior journalist Omar Farooq. 49 Secondly, almost every terrorist act inside
Pakistan was linked to North Waziristan by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA).
Therefore, Pak Army considered it necessary to launch comprehensive and punishing
military operation to contain and dismantle militants in North Waziristan.

Subsequent Events
After the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, exodus of over a
million tribesmen took place. Security forces succeeded in clearing two major towns of
North Waziristan, Mirali and Miramshah in a couple of weeks by applying massive aerial
strikes. Accordingly, the militants moved to other areas of North Waziristan, adjacent
tribal districts and across the border to Afghanistan to evade military operation.

In North Waziristan, the main sheltering areas for the militants are Datta Khel, Shawal
valley and the bordering area with Afghanistan. Amid the military operation, artillery
shelling and aerial strikes besides US drone attacks are continuing against the militants
in the area. Analysts believe that the consistent US drone attacks alongside military
operation in North Waziristan cannot be possible without Pakistani authorities
collaboration. It would certainly be highly unlikely for the US to be carrying out drone
strikes in an active Pakistan Army-controlled conflict zone without at least cursorily
letting them know who was being targeted, when and where, Islamabad based security
and human rights analyst Assad Hashim said.50 US Drone strikes had dried up for several
months before the operation, but the attacks got intensified with the commencement of
Zarb-e-Azb as at least 14 strikes have taken place in North Waziristan until December 10
2014.51

New Sanctuaries of Militants
Though Pakistan army is reiterating that this operation is against all militants factions
without any discrimination52, yet recently Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to the Prime Minister on
National Security and Foreign Affairs uttered the conventional approach of Pakistani
establishment of maintaining discrimination between Good and Bad Taliban during
an interview to the BBC-Urdu. When the United States attacked Afghanistan [in 2001],
all those groups who we had collectively armed and trained were pushed into Pakistan.

13

Some of them are a threat to Pakistan, while others pose no threat to Pakistans security.
Why should we antagonize them all? Sartaj Aziz maintained.53

The military operation was aimed to flush out the militants from the area, but the
Taliban were already aware of the possible offensive in the area and were seen vacating
the area. It was also confirmed by the local residents of Miramshah and Mirali. Just a
few days before the operation, we were observing decreasing Taliban movements in
Mirali and Miramshah Bazaar. Their number was getting lessened with each passing
movement. In Miramshah, I personally saw some Taliban packing their goods and
loading vehicles. And those Taliban had been living there for past five years, Haji Noor
Khan Wazir, a tribal elder from Miramshah said.54

A leading TTP commander also said on the condition of not to be named, We had
already lessened our presence in Miramshah and Mirali almost a week before the
operation. When operation was formally announced, we asked the remaining
Mujahideen to leave the area as security forces were carrying out ruthless air strikes.
But in rest of North Waziristan, our brothers are still present and conducting Jihad.55

A leading TTP commander from South Waziristan, Abu Omar said, We have shifted our
setup to South Waziristan, both to Mehsud and Wazir areas, in the wake of the (military)
operation. Initially, it (Operation Zarb-e-Azb) was a setback, disrupting our activities in
North Waziristan, but now we are getting recovered and soon we will be operational like
before.56

The abovementioned claim seems to have vindicated by the Peshawar massacre, which
left 141 people including 132 children dead.57 Terrorists came from back of the school
and auditorium. They killed children in auditorium through firing. 132 children and nine
staff members embraced Shahadat (martyrdom) at that time. QRF (Quick Response
Force) reached in 15 minutes. Total strength of the children was 1100. Out of which, 960
children were rescued from the school and 121 children injured. The SSG completed the
operation. One terrorist was killed at the auditorium and the rest at the administrative
block. The IED material was neutralized. In the operation, seven SSG jawans (soldiers)
and two officers were injured, a security official said.58

14


After launching a much-hyped military operation in North Waziristan, majority of the
militants left for the adjacent tribal areas or across the border into Afghanistan.
Pakistani military has also an eye on the new sanctuaries of the Taliban, where they can
regain strength to launch terror attacks. Therefore, Chief of Army Staff General Raheel
Sharif visited Afghanistan on December 17, 2014 and held separate meetings with
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and ISAF commander General John F Campbell.
According to ISPR Press Release, the Army Chief discussed security situation at Pak-
Afghan border and shared vital elements of intelligence related to Peshawar incident
with the concerned authorities.59

Other local accounts plainly indicate that militants affiliated with Haqqani Network were
not targeted and they were discreetly given a safe passage to flee the area for adjacent
Kurram tribal area. Javed Hussain Bangash, a resident of Kurram Agency said, We have
been seeing growing number of Afghan Taliban affiliated with Haqqani Network in
different parts of Kurram Agency since military operation in North Waziristan. They are
operating here under government immunity as they are travelling to Afghanistan
without being stopped or questioned on dozens of military check posts on main road
leading to Afghan border.60

On the other hand, Haqqani Network and its local ally Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group fled to
Afghanistan and Kurram Agency. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and other allied outfits fled from Mirali and Miramshah and took refuge in
other nearby areas like Datta Khel and Shawal inside North Waziristan besides fleeing to
the other tribal areas like South Waziristan Agency, Khyber Agency, Mohmand Agency
and upper parts of Orakzai Agency.

The governments claim of no discrimination among militant groups61 might be based
on its sincere efforts to dismantle militancy completely, but Javed Bangash, the local of
Kurram Agency still rebutted it by saying, To us, it clearly shows that there is still
discrimination between Good and Bad Taliban. Our elders have conveyed their
concerns multiple times to both civilian and military authorities to secure the area from
becoming another North Waziristan for the Taliban.62

15


Armys Strategy versus Talibans Tactics
Pak Armys strategy is based on dismantling and wiping out the militants to restore
government writ in North Waziristan. Along with the use of force, efforts are underway
to strike peace pacts with some of the splinter groups of the TTP. In this regard, Mehsud
tribe Jirga has been holding meetings with government on behalf of Mehsud Taliban led
by commander Sajna to pave the way for a possible peace deal. Actually, Sajna faction is
concerned about the plight of Mehsud displaced persons in the wake of 2009 military
operation in Mehsud inhabited part of South Waziristan. Since then Mehsud tribe is
displaced and living under miserable conditions in different parts of the country.

For peace talks with government, rehabilitation of Mehsud tribe would be the top
priority from our side. We understand that Mehsud tribe has been suffering a lot due to
military operation since 2009, Abu Omer, a militant commander linked with Sajna
faction said.63 As a confidence building measure, the government has already released
seven Mehsud Taliban from prison in Wana, South Waziristan and handed over to the
Jirga.64

On ideological front, the long-hauled stance of Pakistani Taliban to fight against Pakistan
Army for being a frontline ally in war on terror is vanishing as the US led international
coalition is also withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan. Furthermore, Punjabi Taliban
led by Asmatullah Muaviya has already announced to end militant activities in Pakistan.
Besides this, Pakistani military is mainly relying on air power throughout the operation
to dismantle the Taliban in North Waziristan which mostly result in infrastructure
destruction i.e. houses, markets, roads, schools, health units, etc. As per a senior military
official account, Pakistani military is applying three-pronged strategy in the ongoing
military operation. In first phase, we carry out aerial strikes and artillery shelling to
soften up the target. In second phase, we deploy our ground forces to physically capture
the target area. Then we conduct search operation to clear the area from possible IEDs
and to confiscate militants leftovers. This strategy has been very successful since Swat
operation in 2009, a senior security official described it on condition of anonymity.65

16

On the other hand, the Taliban are using tactics of IEDs attacks and target killings.
However, significant decrease has been seen in the number of suicide attacks, armed
assaults and ambushes on government installations since the commencement of Zarb-e-
Azb. The decrease in attacks manifests that militants are on the run. They are striving to
find new sanctuaries and establish command and control centers. So far Zarb-e-Azb
seems to have inflicted fatal blow on militants capabilities to carry out major attacks,
senior journalist Omar Farooq said.66

Pakistani security forces also claim to have seized a huge cache of arms and ammunition,
propaganda stuff, laptops, cameras, etc. during the operation in Miramshah and Mirali.
However, the Taliban are persistently denying the governments claims. In this regard,
TTP Jamaat-ul-Ahraars spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan sent an email to media persons,
which reads, These report are almost wrong. Before operation, 99 percent of
Mujahideen goods have been shifted to safe areas. We ourselves shifted everything
except lights and water drums, and there was a long chance for everybody to leave the
area before the operation.67

Conclusion
People of the tribal area have been failed by the Pakistani government since 1947, both
actively and passively, through its inaction and inability to deliver government services
and its insistence on upholding the colonial era draconian law, the Frontier Crimes
Regulations (FCR)68. Ironically, the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) has been
kept isolated from mainstream Pakistan politically, administratively and
constitutionally. Decades of isolation and abandonment of FATA from the state provide
an ample opportunity to the non-state actors to extend their sway. Once, this militancy
was primarily state-sponsored, but that is no longer entirely the case. But these
militants can only survive in FATA particularly North Waziristan, because these areas
are allowed by the governments ineffectiveness to exist as grey areas, outside of its
responsibility and reach.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb may have succeeded in driving certain kinds of militant groups
out, denying them the space to operate, but if these gains are to be solidified and made
meaningful, then the government will have to go further than the strategy seen in South

17

Waziristan and other tribal agencies. Despite the fact that the military operation in
North Waziristan curtailed terrorist incidents up to some extent, but the recent
Peshawar assault by the Fazlullah-led TTP, as per its claim, predicts further bloody
reaction by the terror outfit. Therefore, the government is required to adopt some
drastic changes in its approach in dealing with the tribal belt to restrain the area from
cherishing further militancy due to the current flawed administrative setup.

FATA must be brought into the fold of Pakistan's constitution - the political agent system
of using nominated members to enforce state power must be ended. Government
service delivery must be stepped up in the most basic of areas: education, health, water,
power, sanitation and communications. These are not the ideas of a journalist or an
outsider, but this is precisely what every single resident of FATA demands. The dwellers
of North Waziristan feel trapped between the Taliban and other militant groups on one
side, and the Pakistan Army and the political agent on the other. They have no control
over their own destiny, and merely seek to survive in an environment where the
government's default attitude towards them appears to treat them as terrorists, and the
terrorists' default attitude towards them is to treat them as either sinners, or new
recruits.

18

End Notes

1

Zarb-e-Azb is a code name for Pakistan Armys military operation against militants in North Waziristan, which
has been launched on June 15, 2014
2
Hafiz Gul Bahadur is head of his own faction of the militants, which is often counted among Good Taliban,
mainly operating in North Waziristan
3
Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban to Isolate Al-Qaeda: Successes and Failures by Rohan Gunaratna and
Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, published in 2008, retrieved on December 6, 2014 from
www.pvtr.org/pdf/globalanalysis/makingpeacewiththetaliban.pdf
4
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an umbrella organization of Islamic militants that was formed in
December 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud while uniting 13 militant groups
5
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan foreign affiliates included Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Jundullah
6
Rah-e-Nijat is the first full-fledged military operation against the TTP in Mehsud area of South Waziristan,
which began on June 19, 2009 and ended on December 12, 2009
7
Abu Yahiya Al Libi was killed in US drone strike on June 4, 2012
8
Mullah Sangeen Zadran was killed in US drone strike on September 5, 2013
9
Growing Rifts between North Waziristan Taliban and TTP: A Precursor to Taliban Infighting? published on
April 24, 2012, retrieved on December 6, 2014 from http://www.gctat.org/fr/map-your-mind/198growing-rifts-between-north-waziristan-taliban-and-ttp-a-precursor-to-taliban-infighting.html
10
Mullah Nazir was head of his own faction of Waziri Taliban in Wana area of South Waziristan, who was
killed in US drone strike in January 2, 2013 in Angoor Adda near Wana
11
The Haqqani Network and the Threat to Afghanistan by Jeffrey Dressler, retrieved on December 8, 2014
from https://www.understandingwar.org/otherwork/haqqani-network-and-threat-afghanistan
12
Tribal Union of Journalists (TUJ) is a representative body of journalists from the tribal areas of Pakistan
13
Interview with Safdar Dawar in Peshawar, who is a Reporter at Wall Street Journal and hails from North
Waziristan
14
ISPR Press Release No PR124/2014-ISPR published on June 15, 2014 as retrieved on December 8, 2014 from
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2014/6/15#pr_link2574
15
Report by The Independent, published on December 17, 2014 as retrieved on December 18, 2014 from
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/peshawar-school-attack-taliban-release-images-ofgunmen-who-killed-148-as-they-claim-massacre-was-justified-and-warn-of-further-violence9930805.html
16
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a militant group formed by Uzbek Islamists Tahir Yuldashev
and Juma Namangani in 1998
17
The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is an Islamic separatist group founded by Uyghur militants in
western China
18
Jundullah is a militant outfit that has closed links with Al-Qaeda and Pakistan Taliban
19
Interview with a local TTP Commander Jan Alam in Mirali in 2014
20
Growing Rifts Between North Waziristan Taliban and TTP: A Precursor to Taliban Infighting?, published
on April 23, 2012, retrieved on December 8, 2014 from http://www.gctat.org/fr/map-your-mind/198growing-rifts-between-north-waziristan-taliban-and-ttp-a-precursor-to-taliban-infighting.html
21
Supra Note 15
22
Pakistani electronic media quoted Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif to tell about the military
operation in North Waziristan that it was without any discrimination in militants
23
Interview with Islamabad based Security and Human Rights Analyst Assad Hashim, who works as
correspondent for Al-Jazeera English
24
Ibid
25
The militants affiliated with Sunni extremist sectarian outfits as well as militant groups that are fighting in
Indian Kashmir are collectively called Punjabi Taliban
26
Supra Note 14
27
Interview with Rasool Dawar in Bannu - He is a tribal journalist hailing from North Waziristan and currently
associated with Geo News and Associated Press (AP)
28
Ibid
29
Interview with a Taliban commander of Commander Sajna faction in Wana area of South Waziristan in late
September 2014
30
Official propaganda wing of the TTP, Omar Media released the audio message of the group chief Mullah
Fazlullah last month

19


31

Video message of Asmatullah Muaviya, which was emailed to media persons

Azam Tariq said this in a press conference in North Waziristan on May 28, 2014 as retrieved on December 8,
2014 from http://nation.com.pk/national/29-May-2014/mehsuds-part-ways-with-fazlullah-s-ttp
33
Interview with a leading Mehsud Taliban commander in Wana, South Waziristan
34
Interview with Azam Tariq, the spokesman for Sajna faction
35
TTP-JA spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan emailed a video message to media persons describing the reason behind
the split
36
Hard-Line Splinter Group, Galvanized by ISIS, Emerges From Pakistani Taliban by Ihsanullah Tipu
Mehsud and Declan Walsh, published on August 26, 2014, retrieved on December 9, 2014 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/world/asia/hard-line-splinter-group-galvanized-by-isis-emergesfrom-pakistani-taliban.html?referrer=&_r=0
37
Sheikh Maqbool alias Shahidullah Shahid said in his email sent to media outlets
38
Mullah Muhammad Omar is head of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, who declared himself as Emir alMomineen (Leader of the Faithful) during Taliban rule in Afghanistan
39
Email sent to the author by the TTP after Sheikh Maqbool was removed from the post of spokesman of the
group
40
Report of online version of English daily Dawn News as retrieved on December 09, 2014 from
http://www.dawn.com/news/1143136
41
Interview on phone with Muhammad Abu Zar Khurassani
42
Interview with Maulvi Ahmad Hassan in Peshawar, whose real name has been changed due to security reasons
43
Interview with a senior security official in Islamabad, who spoke on the condition of anonymity as he was not
authorized to speak to the media
44
A prominent tribal elder told the authors on condition of not to be named due to fear of Taliban reprisal
45
The authors visited the area and observed the situation besides interviewing local tribesmen and government
officials
46
Ibid
47
Muhammad Din Dawar, a local medical store owner and resident of Mirali, the second largest town of North
Waziristan
48
Report of English daily Express Tribune on July 1, 2014 as retrieved on December 10, 2014 from
http://tribune.com.pk/story/729499/kayani-delayed-the-operation-athar-abbas/
49
Interview with Omar Farooq, an Islamabad based security analyst, who is also a special correspondent for
Times of India and Daily Times
50
Supra Note 24
51
Data on drone strikes collected from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism as retrieved on December 10,
2014 from http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/06/11/obama-2014-pakistan-drone-strikes/
52
Supra Note 15
53
Sartaj Azizs interview with the BBC-Urdu as retrieved from http://tribune.com.pk/story/792914/fightingmilitancy-why-should-we-antagonise-all-groups-asks-aziz/ on December 10, 2014
54
Interview with the displaced Tribal elder from Miramshah, Haji Noor Khan Wazir in Bannu
55
Interview with a leading TTP commander in Wana, South Waziristan
56
Interview with Abu Omar, A leading TTP commander from South Waziristan
57
Report of The Washington Post Pakistan buries victims of school massacre, published on December 17,
2014 as retrieved on December 18, 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/141_-mostly-children-_-killed-in-pakistan-attack/2014/12/16/f140b30c-8584-11e4-abcf5a3d7b3b20b8_story.html
58
A security official told the author on the day of Peshawar incident on the condition of anonymity as he was not
authorized to talk to media
59
ISPR Press Release No PR277/2014-ISPR published on December 17, 2014 as retrieved on December 18,
2014 from https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&latest=1
60 Interview with Javed Hussain Bangash in Hangu, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
61
Supra Note 15
62
Supra Note 61
63
Supra Note 57
64
Report of English daily The Express Tribune published on November 1, 2014 as retrieved on December 10,
2014 from http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/784379/south-waziristan-political-administration-freesseven-tribesmen/
65
Interview with a senior security personnel in Islamabad
66
Supra Note 50
67
TTP-Jamaat-ul-Ahraar spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsans email sent to media persons
32

20


68

The FCR is a set of laws applicable to FATA, which was implemented during the British rule in 1901

21