Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Correction" of Heidegger

Author(s): Walter Lammi

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1991), pp. 487-507
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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Hans-GeorgGadamer's
"Correction"of Heidegger
WalterLammi

Among the remarkablerange of thinkersto have come under the

influenceof MartinHeidegger,the figureperhapsmost deservingto be
"heir" has been Hans-Georg
regardedas Heidegger'sproperand faithful
Gadamer. Gadamer himselfhas alwaysbeen quick to acknowledgethe
intellectualdebt to his predecessor.Althoughthe two men were only
elevenyearsapart in age, theirrelationshipto all appearanceswas very
muchone ofmasterand pupil;neverdoes Gadamerseemto takeumbrage
I Indeed, he has characterized
at being describedas a "Heideggerian."
himselfas a "studentofHeidegger"whohas "learnedthecraftofclassical
philology."2
to theclassicsin thisconnectionraises
However,Gadamer'sreference
an interesting
question.Gadamerhas also beenknownto say,quiteflatly,
"I am a Platonist."3How could thisbe possible?How could Gadamer
considerhimselfa "Heideggerian"and a "Platonist"at the same time?
At theleast,theexpression"HeideggerianPlatonist"is an oxymoronthat
mustreferto a strangesortof paradoxicalfigure.
We may add to thisthe puzzlingdifference
simplyin the surfaceof
the two thinkers'work,in theirwritingstyles.AlthoughGadamer has
describedhisprojectin Truthand Method,hismagnumopus,as following
thelaterHeidegger'slineofinquiry,4
his straightforward
discursiveprose
standsin markedcontrastto the laterHeidegger's"oracular" or quasipoeticruminations.
Clearlylanguageplays a centralrole to both thinkers-it is the "house of the truthof Being" to Heidegger,and according
to a celebratedformulation
byGadamer,"Languageis [thatkindof]being
1 See forexampleLeo Strauss'sdescription
of Truthand Method(henceforth
TM) as
themostimportantworkby a "Heideggerian"(CG 5).
2Jiirgen Habermas,Philosophical-Political
Profiles,tr.FrederickG. Lawrence(Cambridge,1983), 190.
3 "Gadamer on Strauss:An Interview,"
12 (1984), 10.
Interpretation,
4 "*Onthe Problemof Self-Understanding,"
in PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
tr. David
E. Linge (Berkeley,1976), 50.

487
Copyright 1991 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.

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WalterLammi

488

is
which can be understood."5Consequently,this "surface"difference
unlikelyto be superficial.
to posit that Gadamer is in a
has led commentators
The difference
sense domesticating
Heidegger.JiirgenHabermasin a well-knownlaudatio to Gadamer describesthe effectas "urbanizingthe Heideggerian
province."6In Habermas's view,the extremeradicalityof Heidegger's
thoughtcreatesa gulfbetweenhimselfand his readers,an isolationthat
calls fora "bridge" to renderhis insightsaccessible.Gadamer's great
achievement,
then,has been to effecta kindof tamingthatnonetheless
succeeds in followingHeidegger"far enough to promotehis thought
and on a soundbasis."7
productively
of languageto both thinkers,could such a
But giventhe centrality
substance?Could
changein styletake place withoutdecisivelyaffecting
notone argue,on thesamegroundson whichHabermaspraisesGadamer,
thatGadamer has on the contraryrenderedHeideggerfamiliarand acAs indicatedbythepoetic
histhought?8
ceptableat thecostoftrivializing
stylisticdevelopmentof Heidegger'sown work afterBeing and Time,
the "divinemadness"of the philosophertranslatesratherpoorlyinto a
scholarlymedium.9
ofHeidegger
itwillbe arguedhere,Gadamer's"translation"
In reality,
correctiveto Heidegger'sthought.The correcalso offersa fundamental
tiveis connected,in turn,to Gadamer's"Platonism"and to his embrace
ofthe"craftofclassicalphilology."To graspthenatureofthiscorrective,
it is necessaryto sort out the rathercomplicatedrelationshipbetween
Gadamerand Heidegger(boththe "early"Heideggerand the"late"). Of
specialimportanceare fourissues:(1) thelinkbetweenGadamerand the
postures
early Heideggeron the questionof "truth";(2) the different
assumedbyGadamerand Heideggertowardphenomenology
("method");
forGadamerofthelate-Heidegger
essay,"The
(3) thespecialsignificance
of
Work
of
most
the
thinkers'
the
two
Art"; and,
critically,(4)
Origin
in relationto (a) theimportance
treatments
oftime,particularly
different
of continuity
and (b) orientationtowardthe future
versusdiscontinuity
versusorientation
towardthepast.At theend ofthisexplorationwe will
discoverthat Gadamer is indeed in a sense a Platonist,havingturned
froma Heideggerianto whatis arguablya morePlatonicunderstanding
werdenkann,istSprache,oftenbutsomewhatobscurelyrendered
5 Sein,das verstanden
as "Being thatcan be understoodis language."The sentenceis italicizedin the original
below.
althoughnotin thetranslation
(TM,432;WM,450).We willreturnto thisstatement
6 Habermas,Profiles,
190.
7Ibid., 190-91.
8 RobertBernasconi
offers
thiscritiqueofGadamerin "BridgingtheAbyss:Heidegger
16 (1986), 4.
and Gadamer,"Researchin Phenomenology,
9 See StanleyRosen, Hermeneuticsas Politics(New York, 1987), 94: "Philological
in the face
sobrietyis a veryadmirablequality,but it pales intohistoricalinsignificance
of philosophicalmadness."

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Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger

489

of reason,and of the relationbetweenreasonand experience,or reason

and revelation.
I. The Questionof Truth
It could be said thatthetitleof Gadamer'smagnumopus Truthand
Methodis a misnomerbecause thebook containsno theoryof truthand
The failureof Truthand Methodto provideany
is not about method.10
has been citedas a primeexample
explicitlydevelopedtheoryof truth11
of how Gadamer reststhe entireedificeof his thoughton appeals to
Heideggeriangrounds.12 Indeed,Gadamerdoes not hesitateto acknowledge his debt to Heideggerin regardto his approachto the meaningof
"truth."
This debtinvolvesboththeearlyHeidegger,whoseworkculminated
in Beingand Time,and the laterHeideggerfollowingthe experienceof
the "turn,"or Kehre.It is of some interestin examiningtheinfluenceof
ofthetwo.Gadamerhimself
Heideggeron Gadamerto sortouttheeffects
withthelaterHeidegger.He has described
identification
professes
primary
Truthand Methodas an attemptto express"withinthe hermeneutical
consciousnessitself' Heidegger'sline of inquiryfollowingthe Kehre;13
termthe
and, in contextof both "truth"and what we may tentatively
he makes particularreferenceto Heidegger's
"way" of hermeneutics,
groundbreaking
essay,"The Originof the Workof Art."'14
is
However,it also the case thatthe conceptof truthin Gadamer's
is basedon Heidegger'sradicalizationof"herphilosophicalhermeneutics
circlein Beingand
withhis conceptof the hermeneutical
meneutics,"l5
10

it lacks force
Althoughthisargumentis trueenoughas faras it goes, ultimately
becauseit missesthepointof Truthand Method.Brieflyput,thatpointis to describehow
we findtruth,whichis notat all throughany"theoryoftruth."As for"method,"we will
see that while Gadamer's hermeneutical
approach to truthis relevantto judging the
limitationsof any formalmethodof gainingknowledge,includingthe "scientific,"it is
itselfsimplydescriptive
as opposedto "methodological."
a coher" "Gadamerhimselfseldommentionstruthdirectlyand nowhereformulates
of it in his own terms."Francis J. Ambrosio,"Dawn and Dusk:
ent characterization
Gadamerand Heideggeron Truth,"Man and World,19 (1986), 39. A listofcriticswho
havefastenedon thislacunain Truthand Methodis providedbyBriceR. Wachterhauser,
"Must We Be WhatWe Say?Gadameron Truthin theHumanSciences,"inHermeneutics
and ModernPhilosophy,
ed. BriceR. Wachterhauser
(Albany,1986),220 and n. 7, 238.
12
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss,"3.
13
50.
Gadamer,"On the Problemof Self-Understanding,"
14 See Gadamer'sdescription
of the deep impressionthisworkmade on Heidegger's
216-17.
studentsin "Heidegger'sLaterPhilosophy(1960)," inPhilosophical
Hermeneutics,
15 Earlier"hermeneutics"
oftheBible;but notuntil
referred
usuallyto interpretation
ofhumanbeing-in-the-world.
Heideggerwas it universalized
to referto theverystructure
as Method,Philosophy
and
See JosefBleicher,Contemporary
Hermeneutics:
Hermeneutics
Critique(London, 1980), 11-26.

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WalterLammi

490

circleper se is limitedto theearlyHeidegger,

Time.16The hermeneutical

althoughtheconceptreappearsin alteredformin Heidegger'slaterthinking. In fact,aftertheKehre Heideggerabandoneduse of the veryterm

an abandonmentthatGadamer considersto have been
"hermeneutics,"
17
a mistake.
rolein theearlyHeidegcirclehad a fundamental
The hermeneutical
ger'sthought.In Beingand TimethecircledescribesDasein's privileged
To
ofunderstanding.
forestructure
access to Beingby wayofan intrinsic
where
and
but
is
"vicious"
the
circle
not
whether
is
the
issue
Heidegger
of thetruth,is
how we enterintoit. That entry,Dasein's understanding
alwaysa temporalevent.
circle is the basis for human
In similarfashionthe hermeneutical
as to Heidegger,underTo
work.
Gadamer,
in
Gadamer's
understanding
based modeofhumanbeingand notat all an
standingis an ontologically
It is stillto be conceivedof dynamically"8-itis
" 'act' of subjectivity."
alwaysan "event"-but thiseventcannotaccuratelybe characterizedas
a subject'sbecomingconsciousof somethingas an object.19Gadamer is
of
entirelyin agreementwithHeidegger'sanalysisof the forestructure
whichhe calls the "readingof what is there."20But to
understanding,
to be understoodas
or paradigmatically
Gadamerthecircleis primarily
and text,in whichthe forestructure
betweeninterpreter
the movement
consistsof the expectationsor "prejudices"withwhichthe interpreter
circle,
beginshis reading.21Thus in Gadamer'shermeneutical
necessarily
so thattherecan
standsunderanticipations
as in Heidegger's,everything
"22
thatis simply"there.
be no objectof understanding
that
In otherwordsthereis no pureperceptionor perfectobjectivity
allows us to separateobjectsof knowledgefromacts of interpretation.
The mindsofreal peoplecan neverbe likenedto a "blankslate,"and the
areshapedbypersonalexperience.
thatcolorourperceptions
anticipations
is unquestionGadameradds thatwhilethegoal oftextualinterpretation
an author"in his sense,"theexpression"in his sense"
ablyto understand
16
and Modern
in Hermeneutics
Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Text and Interpretation,"
378-79.
Philosophy,

17

Ibid.,380.

ofGadamer
See TheodoreKisiel,"The HappeningofTradition:The Hermeneutics
and Praxis,ed. RobertHollinger(NotreDame, 1985),
and Heidegger,"in Hermeneutics
is an undergoing."
9: ". . . understanding
19See, for example,Hans-GeorgGadamer, "The PhilosophicFoundationsof the
125.
TwentiethCentury,"PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
20 TM, 239.
21
to CurrentTheories
An Introduction
Roy J. Howard, ThreeFaces ofHermeneutics:
(Berkeley,1982), 147.
of Understanding
22
At issue,Gadamerpointsout,is the"astoundingnaiveteofthesubjectiveconscioushere!"
that"thatis whatis written
ness,"whichapproachesa textwitha senseofcertainty
("PhilosophicalFoundations,"121).
18

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ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction"

491

as subjective
onlyto theauthor'sintentions
is notto be takenas referring
acts of meaning.23
has led to thecriticism
thatGadamer,
ofsuchinfluences
Consideration
an
is fundamentally
to the contrarynotwithstanding,
his protestations
To buttressthis conclusion,one need merely
"early Heideggerian."24
referback to the questionof how the two thinkersexpressthemselves.
Gadamer'sdiscursivestylebears muchcloserrelationto thespeculative
Heideggerof Beingand Time thanto the quasi-poeticHeideggerof the
Gadamer'sviewof philosoworkswrittenaftertheKehre.Furthermore,
seemsto accordnotwiththelater
phyas a "natural"humaninclination25
Heidegger's"end of philosophy"but withDasein's intrinsicdesirefor
the truthof Beingin Beingand Time.26
understanding
of
The force thiscriticismis thatifin thesecrucialrespectsGadamer
is in factan "earlyHeideggerian,"it is hardto see how he avoidsfalling
into the same linguisticand conceptuallimitationsof the traditional
of presence"thatled Heideggerto whatGadamerhimself
"metaphysics
ofBeingand Time.The earlyHeidegger
has calledthe"dead-endstreet"27
believedthatphilosophicalproblemsremainconstantdue to the "constancyof human nature,"28and in his earlierworkshe attemptedto
provideanswersto thoseproblemsby way of scholarlyanalysis.Since
therewas no reason
bothoftheseassumptions,
Beingand Timereflected
to finishthebook iftheywerewrong.Heideggerbelievedthattheerrors
thefundamental
ofBeingand Timewerenotat all personalbutreflected
This failure,summedup in
Westernmetaphysics.
failureofpost-Platonic
ofpresence,"consistsofviewingtruthnotas the
thephrase"metaphysics
temporaloccurrenceof unconcealednessbut as the constantpresenceof
eternalobjects.29
circleand Gadamer'sadditionor
121-22.BetweenHeidegger'shermeneutic
fromHeidegger's
"radicalization"(122) is thedecisiveimpetusof the "universalization"
"The Originof theWorkof Art." See below,Part III, 11ff.
24
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss," 12.
25 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "On the Natural Inclinationof Human Beings Toward
Philosophy,"in Reason in theAge of Science,tr. FrederickG. Lawrence(Cambridge,
1984), 139-150.
26
Bernasconi,"BridgingtheAbyss," 12.
27 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Heidegger'sPaths,"tr.C. Kayserand G. Stack,Philosophical Exchange2 (1979), 87.
28 Quoted fromthebeginning
by Otto Poggelerin
of Heidegger'sHabilitationsschrift
tr.Daniel Magurshakand SigmundBarber(Atlantic
MartinHeidegger'sPathofThinking,
Highlands,1987), 13.
of presence"is clearlyexplainedin his
29 Heidegger'scritiqueof the "metaphysics
seminalessay"Plato's DoctrineofTruth,"tr.byJoanStambaughin W. Barrettand H. D.
Century
(New York, 1962),251-270.Gadamer's
in theTwentieth
Aiken(eds.), Philosophy
does notimplyendorsement
withthelaterHeidegger'semphasison temporality
agreement
criticism
by
whichhas beensubjectedto devastating
ofHeidegger'sPlatonicscholarship,
a numberof scholars.(See, forexample,William A. Galston, "Heidegger'sPlato: A
Critiqueof Plato's Doctrineof Truth,"The PhilosophicalForum,13 [1982], 371-84.The
23 Ibid.,

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WalterLammi

492

ofthequestionoftruth
and ultimateelimination,
The transformation,
in a different
and
influenced
Gadamer
in Heidegger'slaterwritingshas
moresubtledirection.Thiswillbe takenup afterdiscussionofthequestion
ofmethodbecause it involvesa thematiccollapseofthetwo questionsin
of thephilosophicaltradition-a treatment
that,it
Gadamer'streatment
way.
willbe argued,endsup bydepartingfromHeideggerin an important
and the Questionof Method
II. Phenomenology
That Truthand Method fails to address issues of methodologyis
stressedby Gadamerhimself.In no wayis thatbook intendedto provide
a methodin the sense of normativerules of procedureforthe human
ofthenatuparallelto themethodologies
sciencesor Geisteswissenschaften
in
to
the
second
edition
takes
foreword
Gadamer
and
the
sciences,
ral
His concern
to thecontrary.30
care to correcta commonmisapprehension
is insteadsolelywithwhatwe actuallydo whenwe seek understanding,
whetherof texts,worksof art, or the world,whetherwe are aware of
as developedby
whatwe are doingor not.3"The scope of hermeneutics
and consequentlyhe insiststhat
Gadameris intendedto be universal,32
Herunderliesthenaturalas well as thehumansciences.33
hermeneutics
meneutics"onlydescribeswhatalwayshappenswheneveran interpretation is convincingand successful."This means thatit is nothingother
Hermeneuticsis "practicalphilosophy,"by which
than-philosophy.34
Gadamermeans "a theoreticalattitudetowardthe practiceof interpretation."35
Thus the "method"of Truthand Methoditselfis descriptiveor, as
Whilegranting
thatthismayseem
Gadamerputsit,"phenomenological."
is avowedlybased on Heidegparadoxical,inasmuchas his hermeneutics
phenomenolger's "turn"away fromthe last vestigesof transcendental
retain
a meaningpossible
to
Gadamer
that
it
is
nonetheless
believes
ogy936
ful sense of "phenomenology"from both Husserl and the early
history
ofscholarlycriticism
is discussedinRobertJ.Dostal, "Heidegger'sPlato,"Journal
23 [1985],71-98.)
of theHistoryofPhilosophy,
30 TM, xvi-xvii.
31
Kisiel, "Heideggerand Gadamer,"5.
32
See, forexample,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"in PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
103.
33TM, 432-33.
34Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Hermeneutics
as PracticalPhilosophy,"Reason in theAge
of Science,111.
35Ibid., 112.
36Gadamerhas describedtheKehreas preciselyHeidegger'sattemptto "reshapehis
own projectso as to dissociateit completely
fromtheHusserlianmodel...." "Heidegger
and the Historyof Philosophy,"437.

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Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger

493

"theoryof the real experiencethat thinking

Heidegger'shermeneutical
is."37

In thelate 1950sHeideggervisiteda seminarconductedby Gadamer,

in the course of whichhe asked the studentswhat the connectionwas
and his own
betweenHusserl'sanalysisof internaltime-consciousness38
studyof timein Being and Time. Rejectingeveryattemptedanswer,he
finallyexplained:Therewas none!39Gadamertellsthisanecdoteto illustratethe decisivenesswithwhichthe laterHeideggerrejectedthe entire
approachofhis teacherHusserl'sphenomenology-adecisivenessthatis
justifiedas applied to the Heideggerof Being and
hardlyhistorically
Time.4
Gadamer is not in accord withthis attitude.4However,he is also
a univocalmeaning,in recognition
unwillingto grant"phenomenology"
of Husserl'sfailureto establishit as a "strictscience."In philosophy,he
says,therecan be no such thingas an objective"methodologicaltechnique": "One's own philosophicalstandpointalways shines through
This is
[one's] descriptionof the basic meaningof phenomenology."42
consistentwithhis refusalto supplyany methodin Truthand Method;
his own
but it leaves unclearwhat Gadamer means by characterizing
otherthan the vague or tautological
procedureas phenomenological,
meaningof "descriptive."
bylookingat specificinsightsthatGadamer
Thisissuecan be clarified
in variouswritingssays he has appropriatedfromHusserland the pheFor thepurposesofthepresentdiscussiontwo
nomenologicalmovement.
conceptof
of theseare of particularimportance:the phenomenological
object,"
analysisofthe"intentional
"horizon"and thephenomenological
in regardto the "thing-in-itself."
particularly
Huswas notoriginally
The conceptof "horizon"in phenomenology
fromFriedrichNietzsche.The conceptof "horiserlianbutappropriated
zon" plays an importantrole in Nietzsche'sthought.It is a limiting
conceptinthathumanbeingscannotseebeyondtheirhistoricalorcultural
forhealth,and ultimately
horizons.Yet thislimitationis a prerequisite
forlifeitself.Nietzscheformulates
thisas a "generallaw": "Everyliving
37TM,

xxiv.

38 Heideggerwas theeditorof thepublishedportions

ofHusserl'svoluminousstudies

of internaltime-consciousness.
39 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sPaths," 83.
40To simplify
somewhat,Heidegger'sanalysisin Being and Time retainsHusserl's
but reappliesit from"consciousness"to Dasein's entirebeing-innotionofintentionality
[St. Louis, 1972],129).
the-world
(JitendraNath Mohanty,The ConceptofIntentionality
41 He speaks of the "phenomenological
that was "all too quickly
craftsmanship"
forgotten
by the scholarshipof the time." Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Heideggerand the
230.
Languageof Metaphysics(1967)," PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
42 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"The Phenomenological
Movement(1963)," Philosophical
143.
Hermeneutics,

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WalterLammi

494

onlywithina horizon. . ."

thingcan becomehealthy,strongand fruitful
Everything
dependson a person'sabilityto "forgetat the righttimeas
well as to rememberat the righttime."43Accordingto thisperspective,
of all
the term"historicism"means insightinto the essentialrelativity
truth
horizons.HistoricismforNietzscheis a greatbut life-destroying
Nothing
becauseittakesawayourabilitytobelieveabsolutelyin anything.
in itself,yetit is essentialthatwe believein somethingis meaningful
whichcan apparentlybe almostanything-forin freeingourselvesfrom
ofcapriciouslaws" by recognizingthattheyare capricious,
"the tyranny
the sourceof culturalvitality."
we end up destroying
to Husserl,notso much
The conceptof"horizon"is also fundamental
in the sense of overall culturallimitationsas on the level of personal
experience,whereimplicithorizonsof beforeand afterrequirefocusing
or ignoringan infinity
of
on one thingat a necessarycost of forgetting
whichultimately
concerned
others.However,in Husserl'sinvestigation,
thehorizonsofone experience
theinnerexperienceoftime-consciousness,
flowintothoseof anotherso thatin the continuumof experiencesthere
is a constantfluxofhorizons."Horizon,"then,to Husserlas opposedto
Nietzsche,is in no way a staticconcept.45
FromHusserl'sstudiesGadamerdevelopedtheconceptof "horizon"
for hermeneuticalpurposes of his own. In so doing he reexamined
criNietzsche'sconceptand arrivedat whatamountsto a fundamental
tiqueoftheassumptionthatknowledgeis relativeto temporalor historical
"horiconditions.On theone handGadamer,likeNietzsche,understands
of any particularperspective
at any
zon" to denotethefinitelimitations
Nietzscheas believingthat a
particulartime.46However,he interprets
horizoncan be simply"closed,"whichin Gadamer'sjudgmentconstitutes
a kindofRobinsonCrusoedream,"47
becausejust
a "romanticreflection,
as no individualexistswithoutothers,no culturalor historicalhorizon
existsin staticand totalisolationfromothers.48
Horizons,mostparticularlythehorizonofthepastthatwe call "tradition,"are alwaysin motion
Thereis no historicalconsciousjust as humanlifeis alwaysin motion.49
insight"thatsetsthehorizons
nessin thesenseofNietzsche's"historicist
intomotion;all historicalconsciousnessdoes is makethatmotionaware
43 Friedrich
Nietzsche,"On theAdvantageand DisadvantageofHistoryforLife,"tr.
PeterPreuss(Indianapolis,1980), 10.
44See FriedrichNietzsche,BeyondGoodand Evil, tr.WalterKaufmann(New York,
1966), 100-102(aphorism188).
45 Cf. TM,216.
46 TM, 269.
47 Ibid.,271.
48 Gadamer'sinterpretation
ofNietzscheis problematicon thispoint.Whetheror not
his critiqueis on target,however,Gadamer'spositiveargumentforthedynamicconcept
of "horizon"remainscogent.
49 Ibid.,217.

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Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger

495

The awarenessthatour horizonsare fluid,ratherthanteaching

ofitself.50
thatnothingis true,makesit possibleto findnewtruths-to "expandour
horizons,"as the sayinghas it.
Thus the self-awareness
of historicalconsciousness,farfrombeinga
of all values,is forGadamerthe key
"deadlytruth"about the relativity
thepossibility
forreachingbeyondor behinda givenhorizonto confront
thatthereis truthto be learnedfromthepast."I am convincedofthefact
that,quitesimply,we can learnfromtheclassics,"Gadamerconcludes.5"
is truein thesensethattimeand place set limits:
Nietzsche'shistoricism
meansthatknowledgeofoneselfcan neverbe com"To existhistorically
plete."52But it failsto understandtemporaldistanceas a positiveaid to
whichis thewayGadamerunderstands
theinterpretdiscovering
truth,53
situationonce it is broughtto self-consciousness.
This
er's hermeneutical
is whathe terms"consciousnessofthehistoryofinfluself-consciousness
ence,"54and to Gadamerthe wholepointof historicalstudiesis to trace
to thepointofawakconceptsback throughthehistoryoftheirinfluence
At thatpoint,the intereningtheir"real, living,evocativemeaning."55
"fusionofhorizons."Gadamer
preterhas achievedthebefore-mentioned
of
whichhe callsthe"problem
viewsthe"centralproblem" hermeneutics,
of application,"as preciselythe task of thattracing-the task,in other
words,of "consciousnessof the historyof influence"to bringabout the
of a text's claim to truth,which is what
interpretive
understanding56
a "fusionof horizons."57
constitutes
from
It is clearthatthissortofhistoricalstudydepartsfundamentally
as pure ahistoricaldescriptionof
Husserl'sapproachto phenomenology
experience58
despiteitsdebtto hisconceptof"horizon."The purposehere
approachfrom
"phenomenological"
is to explicateGadamer'sself-termed
notto conflateand thereby
itsrootsin thephenomenological
movement,
confusethe two.
The second"methodologically"
important
conceptthatGadamerapthe
concerns "intentionalobject." This
propriatesfromphenomenology
50Ibid.,271.
51Ibid., 490.
52Ibid., 269.
148.
53Cf. Howard, ThreeFaces ofHermeneutics,
54 The GermantermsWirkungsgeschichte
are
Bewusstsein
and wirkungsgeschichtliches
misleadinglytranslatedthroughoutthe Englishtranslationof Truthand Methodand
consciousness."Here theywill
and "effective-historical
elsewhereas "effective-history"
be renderedmoreaccuratelyas "historyoftheinfluence"and "consciousnessofthehistory
(I am indebtedto ProfessorGeorge L. Kline at BrynMawr
of influence"respectively.
the solution.)
College forbothpointingout thisproblemand suggesting
55" PhilosophicalFoundations,"127.
56 Understanding
See, forexample,TM,
to Gadamer alwaysinvolvesinterpretation.
is the explicitformof understanding."
274: "Interpretation
57 TM, 274.
58
"PhilosophicalFoundations,"127.

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WalterLammi

496

in consciousness.
constituted
is theobjectof consciousnessas temporally
Gadameragreeswith
Gadamer'sis also a highlyselectiveappropriation.
Heidegger'srejectionof thenotionofa pureconsciousnesscharacterized
but nonethelesshe sees meritin the notionthatany
by intentionality,59
object, i.e., somethingthat is "out there,"only exists for us via our
perspectiveson it. This does not mean thatthe objectis simplyrelative
Gadamerdoes notdenyits
conditioned)perspectives;
to our (historically
But he followsHusserl's
realityas itself-as, thatis, the"thing-in-itself."
whichis to saythatphenomenologically
approachto the"thing-in-itself,"
withwhichthe shades
speaking,it is "nothingotherthanthecontinuity
of the various perspectivesof the perceptionof objects pass into one
To turnthispointaround,in everyperspectiveon the world
another."60
is implied.The presenceof many
the existenceof a "world-in-itself'
does not relativizethe worldthatis beingviewed.
world-views
This is whyGadamercan say in the Forewordto the secondedition
divorcedfromits
of Truthand Methodthat"the idea of a work-in-itself,
constantlyrenewedrealityof being experienced,always has something
abstractaboutit." This meansthatwhileit is quitepossibleand mayeven
to intendor seekto understandthework
be necessaryfortheinterpreter
goal is in realityunattainable.
as it is in itself-thatis, definitively-that
necessarilyinvolvesinterpretaGadamer's principlethatunderstanding
can neverbe
tion61means that while on the one hand understanding
or merelysubjectivebehaviortowardthegiven"object,"on the
arbitrary
is necessarilya "dogunderstanding
otherhand theclaimto a definitive
maticsolution."62
In lightof the above discussion,it becomes clearerwhy Gadamer
shouldchoose to call his approach"phenomenological"despitehis Heideggerianroots.This bears directlyon the issue,whichhas been raised
of
but not resolved,of Heidegger'sinfluenceon Gadamer,particularly
therelativeinfluenceoftheearlyand late Heidegger.Thereare twoways
which
to look at thematter.One is to viewthisdebtto phenomenology,
evidencethatdespite
is largelyin accordwithBeingand Time,as further
based on thepost-Kehre
Gadamer'sown beliefthathis workis primarily
Heidegger,he is reallyjust an earlyHeideggerianwho is consequently
of presence."The otheris
entangledanew in theperennial"metaphysics
in
his phenomenology
may
at
his
which
case
to take Gadamer
word,
indicatenotso mucha dependenceon theearlyHeideggeras an independence fromHeideggeraltogether.To resolvethisissue it is necessaryto
examinefirst,
Gadamer'sclaimeddebtto thelaterHeidegger,and second,

9 Cf. Mohanty,The ConceptofIntentionality,

129-32.
TM, 406.
61
Ibid., 274.
62 Ibid., xix.
60

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ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction"

497

of the "metaphysicsof
his relationto the traditionand understanding
presence."
III. Legacies of the Later Heidegger:The Workof Art
In "The Originof the Workof Art," Heideggerdiscussesa number
For Heidegger
thinking.
ofthemesthatare centralto hislater,post-Kehre
not,as "commonsense"and nineteenth-century
theworkofartoriginates
aestheticswould have it,fromthe artistor his "genius"but ratherfrom
The workof art,thatis, the
the "essence" of art,whichis its truth.63
oftruth,butan "event"
"great"workofart,is notmerelya manifestation
in whichtruthcomesto be as something"standingin itself'that"opens
up its own world."64In the creationof the workof artthe happeningof
by virtuenot of entering,but of "making"
truthshows its historicity
historyanew. The foundingof a politicalstateis anothersuch event.A
thinker'sessentialquestioningprovidesyetanother.65
the
In all of theseevents,forwhichthe workof art is paradigmatic,
stands
is an historicaleventwhosemeaningconsequently
accomplishment
quite apart fromthe subjectiveintentionsof the artist,statesman,or
extendsthehermeneutical
analysis
thinker.Heidegger'sessayeffectively
of Dasein's truthand Being in Being and Time into the realmof art,66
of the
and behindthe experienceof art appears"the whole universality
betweenthe meaningof the
The distinction
experience."67
hermeneutic
workof art and its creator'ssubjectiveintentionsunderliesGadamer's
of"what
a textis independent
hermeneutical
principlethatunderstanding
the authormeant."68
The idea thattheworkofartbringsitsownworldwithitleadsdirectly
to Gadamer'sfocuson therelationbetweentheworkand our encounter
withit; thisrelationto Gadamer,as to Heidegger,has priorityover its
discussed"fusion
relata.The relationis nothingotherthanthepreviously
Thus Gadamer'suse oftheconcept"horizon"is developed
ofhorizons."69
63 Heidegger,"Origin," 57 ff.The issue of "genius" in the theoryof aestheticsis
discussedin Part I of TM.
6 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy,"222.
65 Heidegger,"Origin,"62.
66
(Evanston,1969), 159. The circlealso reappears
RichardE. Palmer,Hermeneutics
in aesthetics:we can knowwhatthe workof art is onlyfromthe essenceof art; yetwe
mustinferthe essenceof art fromworksof art. Heidegger,"Origin,"18.
67 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"MartinHeideggerand MarburgTheology(1964)," Philo201.
sophicalHermeneutics,
68Ibid.,210.
69 "Editor's Introduction"
to Hans-GeorgGadamer,The Relevanceof theBeautiful
and OtherEssays,ed. RobertBernasconi(Cambridge,1986),xiii.Cf. TM, 273: "Understanding... is alwaysthe fusionof thesehorizonswhichwe imagineto existby themselves."

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WalterLammi

498

ofHusserland theearlyHeideggerbut
notonlyfromthephenomenology
of Heidegger'sKehre.
also and moredirectlyfromthe transformations
It is now generallyacknowledgedthattheKehredid not constitutea
of it as
Even the characterization
"reversal"in Heidegger'sthought.70
of the
a shiftin perspectivefromDasein's understanding
representing
to whatHeidegger
meaningofBeingto thetruthofBeing(and eventually
calls the"topologyofBeing")71appearsin thepresentcontextnotexactly
wrongbut overlysimplistic.The questionis, whatdoes such a "shiftin
perspective"mean?The laterHeidegger'sabandonmentofsuch termsas
and even"truth"itselfdoes notmeanthathe
"Dasein," "hermeneutics,"
by thoseterms.It is rather
simplyabandonedthe conceptsrepresented
the case thathe reassessedand reworkedthemagain and again,so that
to conveythe "way" of his thoughthe was forcedto findnew meansof
linguisticexpression.
For example,the eliminationof "Dasein" in the effortof the later
Heideggerto think"Being"withoutbeingsbyno meanscallsfora concept
of "Being" as somehowdisembodied.It meansratherthatthemanifestaso that
"epochs" take on variedsignificance,
tionsof Being in different
thereis no single,univocalsense of "There-being"to warrantthe term
"Dasein." The "historyof Being" is no less essentiallytied to human
WhileGadamer'srefusalto followthe path of the laterHeidegbeing.72
explained,it is
ger's quasi-poeticexpressionremainsto be satisfactorily
now possibleto understandhow he could claim to be expressingthe
keytermsofthe
thoughtoftheKehrein Truthand Methodwhileretaining
earlyHeidegger.It has becomeclearwiththeconceptsof"hermeneutics,"
"horizon,"and the"meaning"oftheworkofartthattheissueis whether
of termsfoundin the early
and development
and how his appropriation
of theKehre.
Heideggerreflectthe transformations
it is usefulto returnto thediscussion
In lightoftheseconsiderations,
of Gadamer's notionof truthas it relatesto the later Heidegger.The
of "truth"in "The Originof the Work of Art" may be
transformation
summedup as "puttingtruthto work."73In the work of art truthis
establishedin an absolutelyuniqueway,as the"bringingforthofa being

70
This is thethrustof Heidegger'sletterto Richardsonin the Forewordof Through
to Thought.See also David Krell, "Nietzsche in Heidegger'sKehre,"
Phenomenology
198-99,and Calvin 0. Schrag,"The Transvaluationof Aestheticsand theWorkof Art,"
ThinkingAboutBeing,123.
71 The "topologyof Being" is among the late Heidegger'smost opaque and poetic
concepts.To explainit wouldbe beyondthescope ofthisessay,as wellas thecompetence
poeticallyto "locate" Being
is thatHeideggerattempts
summary
ofitsauthor.A simplistic
by bringingits traces"home" in language.
72 David FarrellKrell,Intimations
ofMortality:Time,Truth,and Finitudein HeidegPark, 1986), 103.
ger's ThinkingofBeing(University
73 Cf. Heidegger,"Origin,"39.

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Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger

499

such as neverwas beforeand will nevercome to be again."74The origin

oftheworkofartconcernsthattruth"fromwhichan opennessofbeings
can firstactuallyshow itself."75
of truth,Gadamer conFrom the uniquenessof art's manifestation
and
cludesthatphilosophycannotsubsumeart.As muchas commentary
can facilitate
theexperienceoftheworkofart,theycannot
interpretation
exhaustitsclaimto truth.Art,Gadamersays,"resistspureconceptualization."76This is notto denythatit can be understood.Thereis a "language
ofwhichrequiresa combinationofhistorical
ofart,"77theunderstanding
consciousnessand opennessto thework'sclaimto truth
or hermeneutical
In Gadamer's
as it "addressesus directlyas ifit showedus ourselves."78
or ultimateresistanceto translationof
the inexhaustibility
formulation
meaningin theworkofartshowsan "excessofmeaning"thatis present
in each workof the "languageof art."79
What,then,"is" thistruththatis beingclaimed?Here, once again,
thequestion"whatit is" becomesinseparablefrom"how it is." Truthin
the originof theworkof art comesto be as an interplayor "dialectic"80
of truthand untruth,or a-Tetheiaand Tethe.In this contextHeidegger
introducesthe conceptof "earth,"whichwiththe term"world" constiofhislaterdevelopment
ofthe"fourfold"
formulation
tutesa preliminary
of the concept"truth"(and abandonmentof theterm)in thepreviously
mentioned"topologyofBeing"(in whichtheterm"Being"is also eventually abandoned).
Gadamer views the conceptof "earth" as the "new and startling"
elementin the "Originof the Work of Art.""8The conceptof "world"
had been developedin Beingand Timeas thehorizonofDasein's forestructureof knowledge,but "earth" added an essentiallypoetic note, a
"mythicaland gnostic"counterpartto "world."82The truthof art as
of Being comes to presencethroughthe struggleof
self-presentation
"world" and "earth"in whicha "clearing"(Lichtung)or open space is
as
createdforthe eventof truth."Earth" representsself-concealment
arises,
"world"does openness.It is thatoutofwhichtheself-presentation
and intowhichit disappears.83
Everygenuineworkof art carrieswithit
74
75

Ibid.,62.
Path,107.
P6ggeler,

Gadamer,"The Relevanceof the Beautiful,"Relevance37.

" TM, 432.
76

11.
102.
PhilosophicalHermeneutics,
79Gadamer,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"
78Ibid.,

80 C. D. Keyes,"Truthas Art:An Interpretation

ofHeidegger'sSein undZeit (Sec.44)
Des Kunstwerkes,"
in Sallis (ed.), Heideggerand thePath of Thinking,
and Der Ursprung
70-71.
81 Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy,"
217.
82
83

Ibid.
Ibid.,223.

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WalterLammi

500

concealmentand unconcealment
an "incompletehistory"ofsimultaneous
or "unfathomable
variability
displaystheinfinite
so thatitsveryfiniteness
In the tensionof world and earthis the abidingor
depth" of truth.84
alongsideofwhichthebeholdermustalso
reposeofthatself-presentation,
Thus it is only a step beyond Gadamer's own explanationto
tarry.85
of "earth" and
the importof the struggleand interconnection
interpret
"world" as a matterof time.
artis an eventnot only
As the "becomingand happeningof truth,"86
or understandin itsoriginbutin everyinstanceofgenuineinterpretation
of
art
is
its
representation,87
of
truth
the
ing. Thus an essentialelement
experioccasionswe to whomit is represented
and in each ofitseventful
In theseclosely
ence the presenceof its truthas suddenand unfamiliar.
relatedaspectsof the workof art we come to the centerof Heidegger's
analysis.
The suddenarrivalof meaningin the workof artcombinedwiththe
characterize
necessityof tarryingalongsideits abidingself-presentation
and continuity
withintemporality.
the criticalelementsof discontinuity
Since the workof art is historyin the "essentialsense that it grounds
and continuity.
at issueis thenatureofhistoricaldiscontinuity
history,"88
is expressedin a conceptthatHeidegger
The elementofdiscontinuity
the
appropriatesfromhis studyof early or "primordial"Christianity,
in
linear
not
fashion
but
according
kairos
is
time
reckoned
The
kairos.89
to significant
events,in thefirstinstancethe comingof Christ.Thus the
kairosreflectshow historyis made and made anew in a way thatcannot
be calculatedin advancebut appearsas a suddenarrival,"as a thiefin
the night."90
a decisivedevelopHeidegger'sanalysisofthe workof artrepresents
mentofthekairosnotsimplyas thesuddennessofnoveltyin thehistorical
momentbut as a presentdependentupon a futuretowardwhichthereis
a gatheringof the past in "fulfilled"time.91This is the "abiding" or
"tarrying"withinthetensionof worldand earthin the workof art.The
strangenessof truthhappens in the "intimacyof the battle"92of this
abidingof worldand earth.
Work,"63.
Gadamer,"Heidegger'sLater Philosophy,"222-23.
86 Heidegger,
"Origin,"71. Emphasisin the original.
87 TM, 104. Gadamer goes on to characterizethis representation
as "play": "We
startedfromthe positionthattheworkof artis play,i.e., thatits actual beingcannotbe
the unityand identityof
and thatin the representation
detachedfromits representation
a structureemerge"(109).
88
"Origin,"77.
89
in Poggeler,
See the discussionof Heidegger'srelationto primordialChristianity
Path, 24-31.
90I Thess., 5.
91P6ggeler,"Historicity,"
60.
92
Heidegger,"Origin,"77.
84 P6ggeler,"'Historicity'in Heidegger'sLate

85

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ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction"

501

to thehistorical
To explicatetheconceptof"abiding,"Gadamerrefers
ofdance
originsofartin religiousdance and festivals.In theperformance
and, more clearly,the re-creationof festival,the eventsare joined not
simply"in" time,but takeon a timeoftheirown. "Festivaltime"is not
just a span of hours or days,but a special kind of timewitha special
mood (Stimmung)-thatis,a specialwayofbeing.Fulfilledtimeis autonomous time,thatis, timethatstandsapart fromthe ongoingtemporal
In the specialway thatwe have to learn
movementof externalnature.93
how to tarrywiththeworkofartin orderto experienceit,Gadamerfinds
thatis "perhapstheonlyway thatis grantedto us
a kindoftemporality
finitebeingsto relateto whatwe call eternity."94
and
In orderto understandHeidegger'srejectionof transhistorical
atemporaltruth,thecriticalquestionbecomes:whatsortofdiscontinuity
does thisspecial sortof timeimply?"Real knowledge,"
and continuity
But forGadamer,
"has to recognizethekairos."95
Gadamerhas written,
of timehas
thateveryunderstanding
above all it is "preciselycontinuity
of a workof
to achieve,even when it is a questionof the temporality
art."96For Heidegger,as we see in the nextsection,thisis not so clear.
IV. Continuity
vs. Discontinuity
mostapparentand perhapsalso mostfundamental
The substantively
betweenHeideggerand Gadamer,whichbears on theircondifference
toward
trastingmodes of expression,is betweenGadamer's orientation
towardthefuture.For
the historicalpast versusHeidegger'sorientation
Gadamer the primarytask may be describedas one of remembrance,
whichrequiresan "unceasingconversation"withthetradition.For Heitowardthe
deggerconversationwiththe traditionis only instrumental
ofBeing,so remembrance
alwaysremainsa secondarytask.97In
thinking
a well-known
passage Gadamerhimselfarticulatesthisdifference:
determias theuniversal
theideaofunderstanding
described
whofirst
Heidegger,
ofundercharacter
[Dasein],meanstheveryprojective
ofThere-being
nateness
of There-being
[Dasein].I shallnotdeny,
character
i.e.,thefutural
standing,
I
ofunderstandings
oftheelements
context
theuniversal
thatwithin
however,
of whatis pastand handed
of theassimilation
theelement
haveemphasized
feelthelackof
wouldprobably
down.Heidegger
also,likemanyofmycritics,
of[my]conclusions....Whenscience...
inthedrawing
an ultimate
radicality
that
ofbeing,"thenihilism
bringson the"cosmicnight"on the"forgetfulness
lightofthesunthat
thenmayonelookat thelastfading
prophesied,
Nietzsche
93 Gadamer,"The
94

Ibid.,45.

Relevanceof theBeautiful,"42.

as a Theoreticaland PracticalTask," Reason in theAge

95 Gadamer,"Hermeneutics
ofScience,121.
96 TM, 109.
97FrancisJ. Ambrosio,"Dawn and Dusk: Gadamerand Heideggeron Truth,"47.

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WalterLammi

502

shimmer
ofturning
aroundtolookforthefirst
sky,instead
hassetintheevening
ofitsreturn?98
In thisdescriptionGadamer seemsto be expressingno morethan a
merelyofemphasisratherthanofsubstance.It is
a difference
preference,
turnsout
fairto accuse Gadamerof beingdisingenuousifhis preference
to have substantiveimplications.To the extentthatGadamer's view of
fromthatof Heidegger,thisdifference
the historyof philosophydiffers
Is
disagreement.
of temporalfocuswill magnifythe importanceof-their
about the depthof his disagreement
Gadamerbeingless thanforthright
withHeidegger?
Such in factseemsto be the case. It is no mereconflictof tastethat
an essentialcontinuity
where
Gadamersees in historyor the tradition99
This distinction
Heideggerfindsan irreducibleelementof discontinuity.
is assumedin Habermas'slaudatioto Gadamer,withits contrastof Heidegger'sradicalbreakand Gadamer'sattemptto build a bridge.??
This argumentgoes to the heartof Gadamer's intellectualrelation
to Heidegger.One way to conceptualizeHeidegger'sview of historical
of "epochs" of Being:
is in termsof his formulation
discontinuity
boththesending
ofBeinginwhosesendings
ofBeingmeansdestiny
Thehistory
with
their
To hold
self-manifestation.
hold
back
sends
forth
and theIt which
the
of
the
of
in
Hence
we
of
Being
destiny
epochs
speak
backis, Greek,epoche.
as
necesbe
calculated
of
The
[Seinsgeschick].... sequence epochs[cannot]
sary.... The epochsoverlapeachotherin theirsequenceso thattheoriginal
in different
is moreandmoreobscured
ways.101
ofBeingas presence
sending
The sequencecannotbe calculatedas necessarybecauseitis notsimply
continuous.What is "sent" in the historyof Being thatin an essential
sendsitself,can be described(insofar
sense"holdsback," yetnonetheless
at all) as an "excess"
description
as thematter-the"mystery"-permits
thathistoryas continuofBeing.In thiscase "anyattemptto understand
ous expels the excess of Being," therebydenyingHeidegger's"central
insight."102

Thus epochal eventsare those in which the overlappingepochs of

whichculminate
Beinghave been "sent" to foundtheepochsof history,
That Gadamer
in the"greatestdanger"ofthemodemage oftechnology.
agreesat leastto some extentwiththisviewis indicatedby his mention
ofBeing";withHeidegger,he
ofthe"cosmicnight"ofthe"forgetfulness
98

TM, xxv,translationslightlyrevised.

99The close relationship

of "history"and "the tradition"is expressedin Gadamer's

workby the conceptof "consciousnessof the historyof influence,"to whichwe return

below (TM, 416).
100Cf. Bernasconi,"Bridgingthe Abyss,"5.
101Heidegger,"Time and Being,"9.
102 Bernasconi,"Bridgingthe Abyss,"5.

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ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction"

503

is defined"quiteunequivocally"bytheemergence
thinksthatmodernity
ofmodernscience.103 That is Heidegger'sgrandview,in whichthekairos
of temporaltruth.In
is the epochal sendingof Beingas thedelimitation
order to understandwhat will turnout to be a subtlebut ultimately
importantcorrectionof this view by Gadamer,it is helpfulto turnto
anothersense or "level" of the kairos,also suggestedby the Biblical
comethuponthem,as travailupon
reference:
"[T]hensuddendestruction
or as the ever-unexpected
arrivalof our own
a woman withchild,"104
death.
of
to thefuturein thetemporalconstitution
Heideggergrantspriority
Dasein in Being and Time. This priorityis consistentwiththe epochal
giftsof Being: "the originalwayscomes to meetus fromthe future."105
This consistency
providesanotherreminderof theelementof continuity
in Heidegger'sthoughtaftertheKehre;as Heideggerhimselfhas stressed,
aftertheKehreis onlypossibleon thebasisoftheexistential
theorientation
analyticofBeingand Time.106 The reasonforDasein's future-orientation
turnsout to be its ultimatepossibility-its"ownmostpotentiality-forBeing"-which is nothingotherthandeath.107 Dasein's discoveryofhow
to liveauthentically
dependsuponan anxiousand resolutebeing-towardtowardthefuture.108
death,and consequently
On thisissueGadamertakesspecificexceptionto Heidegger'sanalysis.
is unnecessary
forestablishing
the
He pointsout thatbeing-toward-death
or finiteness
of Dasein, since its basic constitution
essentialtemporality
as "care" (Sorge)alreadyestablishesthatfiniteness.
ofbeing-in-the-world
Indeed,afterBeingand TimeHeideggerhimself"neveragainplaced the
Thus whileHeidegofdeathat thecenterofhis thought."109
problematic
ger retainedhis sense of the priorityof the futureafterthe Kehre,in
respectto its originalbasis in thetemporalanalyticofDasein it becomes
to Gadamerhighlyquestionable.
Probablybecause of Gadamer'sgeneralreluctanceto takeissue with
ofhis moregentleaffirmaHeidegger,as wellas therelativeprominence
in the Forewordto the second editionof Truthand
tion of difference
103 Gadamer,"Science and Philosophy,"
Reason in theAge ofScience,6.

Thess.: 5,3.
105Heidegger,"Dialogue on Language," 10.
104I

Heidegger,"Letterto Richardson,"xvi-xx.
MartinHeidegger,Being and Time,tr. JohnMacquarrieand Edward Robinson
(New York, 1962), 307, emphasisin the original.
108 Cf.Beingand Time,311 (Sein und Zeit, 266): "[A]nticipation
revealsto Dasein its
and bringsit face to face withthe possibilityof being itself,
lostnessin the they-self,
primarilyunsupportedby concernfulsolicitude,but of beingitself,rather,in an impassionedfreedomtowardsdeath-a freedomwhichhas been releasedfromthe illusionsof
the 'they,'and whichis factical,certainof itself,and anxious." The entirepassage is
italicizedin the original,withthe phrase"freedomtowardsdeath" boldfacedforadded
emphasis.
'09Gadamer. "HeideLLer'sPaths." 85-86.
106
107

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504

WalterLammi

has notgenerallybeenremarkedupon
Method,thispointofdisagreement
of its "urgency"to him.110
despiteGadamer's characterization
Yet its
to overemphasizebecause it showsthatthereis a
importanceis difficult
serioussubstantive
basis forwhatotherwiseappearsas a merepreference
againstHeidegger'sgrantingof priorityto the future.
Thereis anotherinteresting
wayin whichGadamer'sdeparturefrom
to thefuturecan be seento havesubstantive
Heidegger'sassigningpriority
foundation.Gadamersuggeststhatunderstanding,
farfromconsistingof
"loss of self."'11In termsof
the act of a subject,involvesa momentary
human knowledge,he consequentlyconcludesthat thereis a kind of
priorityof the past. "It is not reallywe ourselveswho understand:it is
alwaysa past thatallows us to say, 'I have understood'."'112
of history,forGaOn the level of the workof art and consequently
damer the kairosof fulfilledtimeis seen as consistingof an "absolute
113 Hence
present"in whichis gatheredthepastin readinessforthefuture.
theequivocationin describingGadameras grantinga "kindof"'priority
thedifference
of emphasisfromHeideggerand
to thepast. Nevertheless
basisremainclear.The question,then,is howthisdifference
itssubstantive
and discontinuity.
bearson the issue of historicalcontinuity
Thereis a certainlack ofclarityin Heidegger'sviewofhistorythatis
broughtout withsome forceby Gadamer.The elementof discontinuity
in Being's epochs or "fate" (Geschick)is crucial for the possibilityof
intothe "other
Heidegger'sown fateful"step back" out of metaphysics
whichalone can awaitthe"savingpower."This is a matternot
thinking"
butofwhatBeinghas allottedto man.Its
at all ofHeidegger'sowneffort,
kairos.Yet on theotherhand,Heidegger
appearanceis theunforeseeable
in thatit represents
ascribesto history"a kindofinnerconsequentiality"
of Being.Gadamer'sconclusionis
a processof the increasingforgetting
summedup in tworhetoricalquestions:"Does nothistoryalwayspresent
a continuity?
Comingto be in passingaway?"'114
Clearlythisconclusionis not simplycontraryto Heidegger.It representsa choiceofone tendencywithinHeideggeroveranother,conflicting
tendency.Yet it amountsto a decisivecorrectionofHeidegger'sthought.
In partits substantive
basis has provento be a difference
of emphasisin
the existentialanalyticof Dasein as well as in the phenomenological
descriptionof the act of understanding.
Also, however,the correctiveis
carefulscholarshipand consedictatedas a matterof straightforward,
quentlyof whatcould be viewedas Gadamer'sintellectualhonesty.
1

IIbid., 86.
I "On the Problemof Self-Understanding,"
51.
112 Ibid., 58.
113 Cf. "Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"
104.
114 Gadamer,"Hegel and Heidegger,"Hegel's Dialectic:Five Hermeneutical
Studies,
tr.P. Christopher
Smith(New Haven, 1971), 109.

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" ofHeidegger
Gadamer's "Correction

505

becomes
Gadamer's argumentfor continuity-within-discontinuity
ofwhatitcan possiblymean
description
clearin his owncommonsensical
to speak of timein termsof "epochs." He startsby lookingforelements
in thecourseofevents.He findsfour.First,there
ofgenuinediscontinuity
events
that so changethe face of the worldas to
certain
historical
are
deservebeingcalled "epochal"; thereleaseofatomicpoweris theexample
he gives. Second, he considersthe experienceof timewithinour lives.
While this happens gradually,therecomes a point when incremental
changesadd up to qualitativeones,suchas whenwe say ofsomeone,"she
is no longera child," or "he is an old man now." Third,the transition
as we
an epochal time-span,
fromone generationto anothermay signify
can see clearlyin the transitionof rulersin changingdynasties.And
fourth,thereare what he calls "absoluteepochs" in eventsfromwhich
historicaltimeis measured,suchas thekairosofthebirthofChrist.While
the latterusuallyrefersto religiousevents,Gadamer also includesthe
possibilityof absoluteepochsin termsof the historyof ideas.II5
In supportof Heideggerand as opposedto the Greekviewthatonly
the ahistoricalconstantsof human lifeare genuinelyreal,116Gadamer
whichto him
findsthe realityof historyin the experienceof transition,
is whatconstitutes"fate" or "destiny"(Geschick).To thisextent,then,
ofthekairos.Yet itis quiteobvious
he grantsprimacyto thediscontinuity
even-or especially-in thecase of "absoluteepthatthisdiscontinuity,
poses the
ochs" is anythingbut absolute.To Gadamer, "discontinuity
117
questionof in whatsenseit containscontinuity."
kindoftruthin remembered
The answeris thatthereis an important
as thedeathofan acquainin
so
a
matter
simple
reality.This mayappear
tance,whichsuddenlycastshis lifein a new light,perhapsidealized,but
out of the streamof history,standingstill. This
now and henceforth
"seemsto helpthetruthto speak." Thus
suddenstillnessor discontinuity
is containedwithindiscontinuto Gadamerthesensein whichcontinuity
of historical
ity is found in rememberedreality.In the remembering
consciousness(the problemof "application"of the "historyof theinfluence") the past-the tradition-is not turnedinto an objectbut understood afreshas an eventof truth.
An important
mustbe added to thisemphasison rememqualification
bering.GadamercreditsHeideggerwiththe "greatinsight"thattheway
in memory,
butin
thatthepastbelongsto humanrealityis notprimarily
mode
of
is
the
is forgotten.
That whichis transitory
Memory
forgetting.
sinkingaway in forgetthatis constantly
amidsteverything
preservation
cannot
fulness.Thereforehistoryis notsimplycontinuous;its continuity
115 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"The Continuity
of Historyand the ExistentialMoment,"
tr.Thomas Wren,PhilosophyToday,16 (1972), 230-240.
116 Ibid., 235.
1'7

Ibid., 237.

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WalterLammi

506

Gadamer
a humantaskofrenewal.118
be takenforgrantedbutconstitutes
oftruth
"how
it
is"
structure-the
has appropriatedfromHeideggerthe
(aletheia)arisingfromand in tension
thatwe haveseenas unconcealment
betweenthem is that where
with concealment(rethe).The difference
HeideggerseeksdirectinsightintothetruthofBeing(or Beingoftruth),
Gadamer looks for help in conversationwith the tradition.This very
muchresemblesSocrates's"flightintothelogoi"fromPlato's Phaedo.119
The basicforminwhichthepastis handeddownis language.Gadamer
sharesthe laterHeidegger'semphasison the importanceof language.A
detailedcomparisonoftherelationbetweenthetwoin thisregardwould
maybe
studyof its own. However,theirdifference
requirea full-length
quotedat the beginning
succinctlysummedup in Gadamer'sstatement,
ofthisarticle,that"languageis [thatkindof]beingwhichcan be underofBeingis the"EventofApprostood."To Heidegger,theunderstanding
priation"(Ereignis),whichinvolvesan instantaneous"flash" of insight
thatis ultimatelywordless.To Heidegger,then,it seemsthatspeech is
"may
saysGadamerto thecontrary,
basedon silence.120 "Hermeneutics,"
whatis said or written
to speech
be preciselydefinedas theartofbringing
as
again. 121 He has describedthelaterHeidegger'squasi-poeticwritings
122
ofa linguistic
needthanofitsovercoming."
moreexpressive
"sometimes
In Gadamer'sthinking
It wouldbe easyto exaggeratethisdifference.
as
we
have
for
the
seeninhisdescription
a
instantaneous,
thereis also place
and he
of the momentary"loss of self' in the act of understanding,
whichat leastin thecase ofperception
describesknowledgeas intuition,
123 In no way does the
involves"directgivennessof what is known."
statement"languageis [thatkindof]beingwhichcan be understood"despitethe appearanceof its more commonEnglishrendition,"Being
whichcan be understoodis language"-implythatGadameris a nomiassernalist.He explainsthatthisshouldnotbe takenas a metaphysical
tion.It is onlyintendedto explainthe universalscope of hermeneutics:
of meaningat the same
In everywordof languageis impliedan infinity
exemplitimethateach wordappearsat theexpenseofall others,thereby
fyingineluctablefinitude.Gadamer explainshis pointwitha sayingof
is a symbol,"whichmeansthatanygiventhing
Goethe'sthat"everything
else thatthereis. The assertion
is relatedto and henceimplieseverything
is notaboutthe"whatis" ofeach being,butratherabout"how itencoun124
tersman's understanding."
Nonetheless,withall caveatstakenintoaccountthereremainimpor118

Ibid., 239-40.
cf. TM, 414.
120
See StanleyRosen,Nihilism:A PhilosophicalEssay (New Haven, 1969),87ff.
121
Gadamer,"Hermeneuticsas a Theoreticaland PracticalTask," 119.
122
Gadamer,"The Heritageof Hegel," Reason in theAge ofScience,57.
123
Movement,"132.
Gadamer,"The Phenomenological
124
Gadamer,"Aestheticsand Hermeneutics,"103.
119

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Gadamer's "Correction"
ofHeidegger

507

betweenGadamerand Heidegger.It is instructive

tantdifferences
to note
of
the conceptualization art as containingan excess of meaning.In one
sense theserepresentthe same thought.The meaningof the workof art
in its advent as kairos but of
is to Gadamer its truth,self-contained
inexhaustibledepth;the "excess" of Being as what Being "sends" is to
Heideggeralso thetruthofart,and the"sending"can also be understood
in termsof the kairos.
of perspective,in Heidegger'scase from
Yet behindthe difference
Beingand in Gadamer'sfromtheworkofart,restsa fundamental
difference betweenthe two. Heidegger'sapproach is "grandlyspeculative"
whereGadamer'sis merely"commonsensical"-or"phenomenological."
Heideggercan be understoodas basinghis entireway of thoughton an
foundation125
ultimately
experiential
or,whichamountsto thesamething,
126 Gadamer,on the contrary,
not on "reason" but on "revelation."
abstainsfromfaithwitha kind of determinedsobrietythatneitherstarts
fromnothingnor ends in the infinite.In so doing,he can be seen as
of reason,whichby virtueneitherof
revivingthe Greek understanding
mattersaboutwhichitis necessarily
dogmatically
denyingnorofaffirming
127
most
ignorant,"remainsat
just open to revelation."
in Cairo.
The AmericanUniversity

125

146.

See, forexample,Grimm'sIntroductionto P6ggeler,"Being as Appropriation,"

126 Michael Allen Gillespie,"MartinHeidegger,"Historyof PoliticalPhilosophy,

ed.
Leo Straussand JosephCropsey(Chicago, 1972), 903.
127 FrederickLawrence,"Gadamer and Lonergan:A DialecticalComparison,"Inter20 (1980), 31. Lawrence'spointseems to be that the
nationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,
ofreasonentailsa kindofagnosticism:
intheGreekunderstanding
avoidanceofdogmatism
Reason permitsofrevelation"in principle,"so to speak,eventhoughas "beyondreason,"
revelationis ultimately"unreasonable."

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