Malayan Union Citizenship (Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942-48)

Department of History, National University of Singapore
Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942-48

Author(s): Albert Lau
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Sep., 1989), pp. 216-243
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National University
of Singapore
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Vol. XX, No. 2

- 243
pp. 216
?
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

1989 National University of Singapore
Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional

Controversy inMalaya, 1942-48
September
1989
Change and
ALBERT LAU
a reappraisal of
Second World War, by unleashing new forces, had precipitated
traditional British policy towards Malaya.
It afforded British planners an opportunity to
rationalize the pre-war structures which had kept Malaya constitutionally
disunited and
Colonial Office planners devised
racially divided. Isolated in their offices inWhitehall,
the Malayan Union policy which embraced in a "union" all the Malay states and the
Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca but excluding Singapore which developed as
a separate Colony.1 The new plans also envisaged
the creation of Malayan Union
that would,
for the first time, accept equality of citizenship rights as a
Citizenship
cardinal prinicple of British Malayan policy. The citizenship proposals radically broke
The
with the past practice of preserving only Malay political rights and opened such rights
to Malaya's non-Malay population.
Writers on the Malayan Union have offered different interpretations
for this funda
mental shift in Britain's traditional "pro-Malay" policy. James Allen,
in his pioneering
on the one hand, and Whitehall's
sentiments",
study, surmised that "anti-Malay
on the other, significantly
"admiration for the Chinese",
influenced
the change in
?
an assertion contested by Mohamed
policy2
Sopiee who argued that there was little
evidence to indicate that "there was a significant desire to punish the Malays or that
strong anti-Malay feeling significantly affected the political decision-making".3
Sopiee
a desire
and nationalism,
consciousness
argued that "the desire to create a Malayan
was probably a major
to the ideal of decolonization,
related to the British commitment
saw
motive for the Union policy".4 Cheah Boon Kheng
the need to "inculcate into the
a
as
an
people
loyalty"
important motive for the citizenship proposals.5
Malaya-centred
Others like Stenson saw its real significance "in the recognition, however tentative and
hesitant, of a situation which the British had consistently refused to acknowledge during
?
the existence of a permanently multiracial
the 1930s
society".6
Part of the difficulty in documenting
the rationale behind the Malayan Union Citizen
ship policy arose because of the closure of important British official files at the time
when these major works on the subject were undertaken. Recently opened sources now
1
Union and Singapore:
Statement
Cmd. 6724 (Jan. 1946).
of Policy on Future Constitution,
Malayan
2J. de V. Allen,
The Malayan
Union
(New Haven,
1967), p. 9.
From Malayan
to Singapore
in
3Mohamed
Noordin
Union
Political
Unification
Separation:
Sopiee,
1945-65
the Malaysia
Region
(Kuala Lumpur,
1974), p. 18.
17.
4Ibid.,p.
5Cheah Boon Kheng,
"Malayan Chinese
and Malayan
12, no. 2 (1978): 99.
Affairs
6M.R. Stenson,
"The Malayan
Union
10, no. 2 (1969): 345.
JSEAH),
(hereafter
and
the Citizenship
and
the Historians",
Issue,
1945^8",
Journal
Review
of Southeast
216

of Indonesian
Asian
History
217
Union Citizenship
Malayan
in, the
study of the rationale for, and the key stages

permit a more comprehensive
evolution of the controversial Malayan Union Citizenship policy.
I
By the early decades of the twentieth century, Malaya had been transformed from a
the
states into a politically
of Malay
collection
significant "plural society". While
indigenous Malays formed the majority race in 1911 with 53.8 per cent of the popula
tion, they were already outnumbered by 1931 and by 1941 they formed only 41 per cent
of the population. Of the immigrant races, the Indian population remained fairly stable
around 14 per cent but the Chinese community grew from 34 per cent in 1911 to 43 per
cent by 1941, replacing the Malays as the dominant racial group. In both the Straits
the
and the Federated Malay States (FMS) the Chinese outnumbered
Settlements
who formed a clear majority only in the Unfederated
Malay States (UMS).7
Although many of the immigrants were described as transients, there was nevertheless
a growing trend towards more permanent settlement
in the country. The 1931 census
Malays
report, for instance, indicated that about one-third of the Chinese and one-fourth of the
Indians were locally born.8
com
and more stable non-Malay
of a numerically
The emergence
preponderant
status
the
about
of
the
in
raised
Malaya. The
munity
important questions
non-Malays
a
was
not
the
in
born in
Straits
Settlements
since
person
apparent
problem
immediately
the Colony automatically acquired the status of a British subject. The issue also did not
particularly affect the Indians. Since most Indians hailed from south India, and particu
larly from the Madras Presidency,
they were almost entirely British subjects and the
status
not
of
did
their
the
immediately arise. In the Malay states, however,
question
enactment
absence of a nationality
left undefined
the status of the large Chinese
community.
On both political and diplomatic grounds the Colonial Office saw certain benefits in
correcting this anomaly. By the 1930s some local-born Chinese were already agitating
for more rights, partly provoked by the pro-Malay bias of the decentralization9
policy
inter-communal
and partly in response to heightened
competition wrought by the
economic depression.
Sir Samuel Wilson,
the Permanent Under-Secretary
of State for
the Colonies, who visited Malaya at the height of the decentralization
debate in 1932,
of the non-Malay
reported, for instance, that his discussions with the representatives
communities
"left me under no illusion as to the anxiety which they feel":
Those
there,
their
7The
who
call
1949)
been
and
adoption
figures
(London,
have
attention
are
born
inMalaya
to the fact that
have
from M.V.
and Appendices
contributed
or whose
themselves,
children
have
been
born
in the land of
interests
great
they have acquired
to its prosperous
in no small degree
develop
del Tufo, Malaya:

II and III in Victor
on the
Report
The Chinese
Purcell,
1947
Census
in Malaya
of
Population
(Kuala
Lumpur,
1967).
8Ibid.
the 1920s and 1930s British
officials
more
to devolve
9During
sought a policy of Decentralization
to the states and their rulers in the hope of encouraging
them to voluntarily
power
accept the rationale
for new treaties and further centralization.
For a study of the issue in the 1920s see Yeo Kim Wah,
The
Politics
of Decentralization
(Kuala
Lumpur,
1982).

218
Albert Lau
ment.
state
They
in a great
that
many
cases
those
concerned
have
never
seen
the
land of their origin and they claim that their children and their children's children
should
have
fair
treatment....10
legal jurisdiction over the local Chinese community, Britain would also have
little diplomatic control over the possibility of the Chinese government
actually inter
overseas
in
of
the
internal
affairs
her
nationals.
The
Chinese
law of
fering
nationality
1929 had made it clear that persons of the Chinese race, wherever born, were consi
dered technically as subjects of China. Although,
in theory, it was possible
for a
in practice, itwas an "almost impossible task" for him
Chinese to be "denationalized",
to do so because of legal obstacles placed before him by the Chinese government.11
inMalaya
Thus, as one British official put it, "[T]he Chinese Consular Representatives
will have a legal claim, if at any time the Chinese desire to exercise it, to jurisdiction in
Without
Malaya over Chinese natives in the Malay States."12 It was, therefore, "desirable that
... should not be
our claim to give protection to the FMS Chinese
successfully disputed
For
the
the
Government
of
China."13
Colonial
Office it was clear that the problem
by
of resolving the question of non-Malay status and rights could not be avoided or post
poned indefinitely. By the latter half of 1931 it began contemplating
seriously a solution
to this "horribly complicated
subject".14
in October
One solution which the Colonial Office considered
1931 was to make all
Chinese born in the Malay states British Protected Persons whose status would take
over their status as Chinese nationals while they were inMalaya.15 How
precedence
that legislation to that
ever, the Colonial Office was told by the High Commissioner
effect could not be successfully enacted since, under international
law, a person with
dual nationality could still affirm one nationality and renounce the other. Malaya-born
Chinese could still, therefore, renounce their Malayan nationality and claim Chinese
protection.16 The Foreign Office, when consulted, also agreed that itwould be "inadvis
international nationality precepts.17 There
able" to enact legislation that contravened
was also a second obstacle. The status of a British Protected Person could be conferred
only on a "subject" of the Malay ruler. But as it was unlikely that the Malay rulers
since "by religion and race the latter are alien
would accept Chinese as their subjects ?
?
in
the
of
the
Mohammedan
the status of British Protected
eyes
Malays"18
people
Person could not be conferred on deserving Chinese.19
Visit to Malaya
Sir Samuel Wilson,
10See Brigadier-General
1932, Cmd.
no. 2255/3. An applicant
7 Oct.
nMinute
1941, CO 323/1626
by Gent,
of his ancestors
to furnish details
of the birth-place
instance, was expected
in the street or village
in which
to Malaya,
the house number
China
including
was
of these
particulars
readily
service
testify that he had no military
could be prohibited
denationalization
military
825/19
and has not

service,
no. 55020.
12Minute
by Gent,
7 Oct.
13Minute
by Gent,
21 Jan.
14Minute by Clauson,
15Thomas to Clementi,
yet
8 Oct.
to Cunliffe-Lister,
17G.R. Warner
(FO) to R.V.
19Clementi
21 Jan.
by Gent,
to Cunfliffe-Lister,
also
secure
the latter were
at least two mercantile
born. None
guarantors
of Nationality,
to
Law
since, under article 12 of the Chinese
"who has attained military
from
for anyone
age, is not exempted
to MacDonald,
3 Aug.
served
in the Army".
See Thomas
1935, CO
liabilities
1941, CO 323/1626
1936, CO 323/1262
9 Aug.
16Clementi
18Minute
He must
ascertainable.
(Mar. 1933), p. 26.

for denationalization,
for
from
who had emigrated
4276
no.
no.
1930, CO 323/1080
1931, CO 323/1161
3 Mar.
Vernon,
1936, CO
15 Feb.
2255/3.
30330/3.
no.
no.
70328.
81495.
no.
1932, CO 323/1177
1 Jun. 1932, ibid.
323/1262
no.
1934,
ibid.
90297.
30330/3.

219
Union Citizenship
Malayan
to solve
two alternative methods
In late May 1935 the Foreign Office recommended
the Colonial Office's legal dilemma. An an initial measure, pressure could be applied on
the rulers to approve the necessary legislation making local-born Chinese their subjects.
The Colonial Office, however, demurred. True, the rulers could be "advised" under the
laws but what if they refused? "I
treaties20 to enact the new nationality
Anglo-Malay
a
we
not
wrote
be
H.R.
in
"that
should
fear,"
Cowell,
position to overrule their objec
one
as
matter
of
tions, since they might regard any such
'Malay religion and custom', in
to accept the advice of the Resi
respect of which they would be under no obligations
was
to unilaterally confer the
for the British government
dents."21 A second approach
status of British Protected Persons on the Chinese even if they were not considered
subjects of the rulers by means of an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction
Act. But, as the Colonial Office pointed out, an Order in Council could only be applied
to territories where Britain already possessed
legal jurisdiction.22 In the Malay states,
Britain possessed no such jurisdiction.
a modified
set of proposals which
In January 1936 the Colonial Office recommended
incorporated some aspects of the Foreign Office's plans. To solve the Malay side of the
problem it suggested that laws could be enacted in each of the Malay states describing
the categories of people who would be admitted as "subjects" of the rulers. These would
include those of Malay race and Mohammedan
presumably
religion but exclude the
to the rulers. To solve the Chinese side of the question,
Chinese as a concession
the
Colonial Office proposed asking the rulers, in turn, to give London a limited grant of
to make an Order in Council declaring
jurisdiction that would enable the government
those Chinese born and resident inMalaya as British Protected Persons. This could be
that, in order to resist Nanking's ability to inter
justified to the rulers by emphasizing
it was imperative to establish clearly London's
fere with the local Chinese,
"superior
authority" over the Chinese government and this could only be done by according them
the "indisputable
status" of British Protected Persons.23 With the concurrence of the
Sir Shenton
Foreign Office, the Colonial Office instructed the new High Commissioner,
inAugust 1936 to ascertain the views of the rulers on the possibility of enacting
Thomas,
the state nationality legislation and the formal grant of special jurisdiction to the British
government.24
in June 1939, Thomas reported that he anticipated difficulties as itwas "not

Replying
see
or she?
to
how anyone can prove that he ?
is of Malay race" and therefore
easy
a
to
entitled
become
"subject" of the Ruler. Thomas suggested that the question of state
nationality should be left for future review and that "a simple Federal Bill" be enacted
20The legal
treaties
Malay
Malay
tions
framework
for British
concluded
between
rule
in Peninsula
1874 and
a resident
or adviser
in all questions
upon"
treaties
Anglo-Malay
Treaties
and
Other
to each
other
than
to be
found
in the series
for British
British
those
and custom. A complete

set of the
affecting Malay
religion
in J. de V. Allen,
A.J.
Stockwell
and L.R. Wright,
A Collection
of
the States of Malaysia
1761-1963
in two
Affecting
(London,
1981)
can be found
Documents
volumes.
22Cowell
to Beckett,
to Beckwett,
23Minute
by Gent,
21Cowell
24Ormsby-Gore
20 Feb.
8 Jul.
21 Jan.
to Thomas,
of Anglo
of the
in each
protection
provided
and control over their external
rela
paramountcy
in the intei nal administrations
of the states by appointing
ruler. The advice of the British officer
"must be asked" and "acted
The
latter in turn accepted
kingdoms.
to interfere
and permitted
the British
either
was
Malaya
1930 which
1936, CO 323/1262
ibid.
no.
30330/3.
1935,
1936, ibid.
10 Aug.
1936, CO
323/1364
no.
2255/3.

220 Albert
Lau
instead to the effect that any person who was born within the FMS and whose father was
at the time of birth of Asiatic race but not a British subject would be entitled to receive
British protection. This Bill would be wide enough to apply also to the Malays who were
de facto subjects of the rulers.25
No action was taken on Thomas' despatch until August
1941, over two years later.
With the outbreak of the European war, the despatch, together with a number of other
nationality papers, were put away for review after the war. By then, the High Commis
sioner's despatch had waited for so long that itwas doubtful if itwas worth pursuing the
proposed
legislation until after the war. Turning to Thomas' perceived difficulties with
regard to the definition of "subjectship", Edward Gent, the head of the Eastern Depart
ment in the Colonial Office, thought that he had missed the point altogether. "We need
not be troubled by the suggested difficulties,"
he minuted,
"Our concern is with the
Chinese." Gent was also unhappy with the idea of enacting "a simple Federal Bill":
One
would
have
H.M.
representing
State concerned,
of
the Rulers
between
Unless
a surrender
such
thought
formal Agreement
we
can
it is impossible
would
jurisdiction
a definite
require
concerned and the High Commissioner

say that H.M.
clearly
to make
has
jurisdiction
in the Malay
headway.26
Thomas was instructed in October

1941 to explore the question of ceding jurisdiction
for the purpose at hand with the rulers of both the FMS and UMS. But before the High
Commissioner
could reply, Japan invaded Malaya
in December
1941.
II
The Japanese invasion of Malaya began shortly after midnight on 8 December
1941.
31
had
reached
Johore
the
southernmost
Bahru,
By
January 1942, Japanese troops
tip
of the Mainland,
and swept the allied defenders from the Malay Peninsula
into Singa
of the world, on 15 February 1942, Singapore
itself
pore. Then, to the astonishment
a
a
to
in
British
sudden
for
devas
and,
Britain,
presence
Malaya
capitulated, bringing
tating and humiliating end. Indeed, as Gent remarked, it seemed a "reasonable fore
cast" that Britain would now have to envisage a "new deal" for her dependencies
in
Southeast Asia.27
The "new deal" which the Colonial Office envisaged for Malaya was the Malayan
Union scheme which sought, through a series of new treaties with the rulers, to transfer
sovereignty to the Crown in order to bring about the objectives of a constitutional union
of the states in the Malay peninsula and common citizenship. Planning for the main
Union scheme started in July 1942 and by July 1943 the Colonial Office had endorsed
the plans for a Malayan Union and the need to wrest full jurisdiction from the Malay
rulers.28 Even while the form of the new Malayan policy was being considered in the lat
ter half of 1942, British planners had also been pondering over ways to resolve yet
25Thomas
26Minute
to MacDonald,
by Gent,
27Minute
23 Aug.
11 Apr.
28 Jun.
1941,
1939, CO
ibid.
1942, CO 825/35
Colonial
Office
by Gent,
"The
28See A.K.H.
Lau,
in British Policy
and
1942-3",
the Transfer
and A.J.
1988),
Stockwell
(London,
p.
323/1626
no.
2255/3.
no.
55104.
and
the Emergence
of
in Asia: Documentary
of Power
116.
the Malayan
Union
Perspectives,
ed. R.B.

Policy,
Smith
Malayan
Union
221
Citizenship
?
the question of political
another outstanding
issue from Malaya's
pre-war legacy
status and rights for Malaya's non-Malay communities.
to until the latter half of 1943, Colonial
From the outbreak of the war in Malaya
about
the solution to the problem. The pre
Office planners remained largely undecided
war "pro-Malay" policy remained very much in force during the early phases of con
on
stitutional planning for Malaya. As Gent argued in his preliminary memorandum
future policy in the Far East on 3 July 1942:
Our declared policy has also been to promote the well being and efficiency of the
Malay peoples and their educational fitness to fill the official Services in their own
territories.
The
continual
be
by
swamped
Indians.
Chinese
economic
of
the
legitimate
and
efficient
of
the
and
country
for
industries.
These
should
be
to a lesser
and
this reason
controlled
that
has been
numerous
has been
immigration
of the tin and rubber
capacity
people
fear of the Malays

Chinese
and
the more
policies
maintained
and
are
for
they would
extent
the
limited
to the
in the interests
their
paramount
advantage.29
No serious consideration of nationality questions therefore transpired in the Colonial

Office until early March 1943 when the question of granting British Protected Persons
status to Chinese domiciled
in the Malay states was raised again in the course of con
the Colonial Office had received a number of
stitutional planning. From March,
from former residents who had escaped from Malaya urging London to
memoranda
reconsider the question of political rights for the non-Malays. H.A.L.
for
Luckham,
that the pre-war practice of preserving only Malay
example, argued in his memorandum
was
and
indeed
since itworked against the develop
rights
privileges
counter-productive
so vital for the future political progress of Malaya.
ment of a Malayan
consciousness
Such a policy, he added, "seemed to say to the non-Malays,
'Malaya is not your country.
You may settle here for the time being, make money and pay us taxes; but when we do
without you, we will do without you.'"30
In April 1943, the Colonial Office had also received representations
for the creation
of some kind of "Malayan citizenship" from two Malays engaged in official propaganda
a
work in India. The first was a memorandum
submitted by Tengku Mahyiddeen,
member of the Kelantan royal family, who urged that a "Malayan citizenship" should
... will be
be created "whereby all races born and domiciled inMalaya
given the right
to renounce their previous nationality and acquire Malayan citizenship, and thus enjoy
the same political and other rights as the Malays". Mahyiddeen
further envisaged the
of
creation of a "Malayan Assembly",
elected
with both
consisting
representatives,
in
to
and non-Malays
number"
and
with
franchise
all
literate
Malay
"equal
given
men
women
and
above
of
for
the
five
first
citizens,
years
age,
years
Malayan
eighteen
after which only those who passed at least standard five in the Malay schools might be
recommendations
had the concurrence of another
given the franchise.31 Mahyiddeen's
M.
for
who
worked
the
Suffian
Hashim,
Malay,
Malay Unit in the all-India radio. In a
a senior retired MCS official working for the Malay
letter to Sir Richard Winstedt,
29Memo.
no.
by Gent
and MacDougall,
"Note
on Future
Policy
in the Far East",
3 Jul.
1942, CO
825/35
55104.
30See Memo,
by Luckham,
"Some
Causes
of
the Loss
of Malaya",
30 Mar.
1942, CO
55104/1/3.
31Memo.
by Mahyiddeen,
n.d.,
ibid.

825/35
no.
222
Albert
Lau
section of the BBC in London,

Suffian similarly called for a citizenship policy to be
enacted to "solve the Chinese problem". Drawing from his three months' experience
in
Ceylon, Suffian observed that Ceylon used also to have an Indian problem which had
been tackled quite effectively by having over and above British nationality something
not entirely satisfactory, Suffian
which might be called Ceylon citizenship. Although
was
"at
better
than
the
state of affairs which are allowed
that
this
least
confused
opined
to prevail inMalaya".32
The idea of a "Malayan citizenship" had also been advocated by the Association
of
a
In
to
in
of
memorandum
British Malaya,
the
Colo
consisting
ex-Malayans
England.
nial Office inMay, the Association
asserted that it was essential to face the fact that
"have acquired what is virtually a Malayan domicile and will expect
many non-Malays
to enjoy political rights and their fair share in the administration".
The anomaly of the
Protected Person, the Association
possessing or acquiring Malayan domicile
argued, should be abolished and all persons

for a period of not less than seven years and
to any foreign power should be entitled to British nation
British
who had renounced allegiance

ality and be given political rights.33
If the Colonial Office had been urged to implement a new nationality
from other ex-Malayans
also at the same time received representations
a
in
Britain's
traditional
shift
against
"pro-Malay" policy. Commenting
policy, it had
who warned
on Mahyid
feared it would end in the "eclipse of the Malays" as there

deen's proposals, Winstedt
were hardly enough educated Malays
to play a dominant role in a Malayan
assembly.
Nor was there, as yet, a competent Malay electorate.34 Fears of the Chinese, and of their
a
intentions to take power in Malaya,
had also been expressed by Roland Braddell,
a
and
friend
and
of
the
adviser
Sultan
of
lawyer
personal
legal
leading Singapore
Johore, who argued that unless the Malays were kept under British protection "they will
disappear". The Chinese, Braddell observed, were already thinking that the country
"will be theirs when the war is over".35 Others like Sir Theodore Adams,
the former
and
in Selangor from 1932 to 1936, had doubts about the willingness
British Resident
to
to
of
divest
themselves
of
their
and
the
Chinese
Chinese
nationality
identify
ability
themselves wholly with the Malays as partners in the new Malaya.36
The Colonial Office appreciated
the arguments of the "pro-Malay" lobby but main
tained that the principle that deserving non-Malays should not be denied political rights
inMalaya must be accepted. But so long as Britain possessed no clear jurisdiction in the
Malay states, the Colonial Office saw all such discussions as of purely academic interest.
Towards the end of July 1943, however, the situation changed significantly. By then, the
in connection with the planning for its main Malayan Union pol
Eastern Department,
had
endorsed the policy of wresting complete jurisdiction from the
icy,
provisionally
Sultans,37 paving the way for London, upon the completion of the new treaties, to then
legislate by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to confer the status of
in the Malay states.
British Protected Persons on deserving non-Malays domiciled
toWinstedt,
27 Feb. 1943, ibid. Winstedt
about
informed Gent
to Gent,
11 Apr.
See Winstedt
1943, ibid.
of British Malaya,
33Memo. by Association
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/7.
May
11 Apr.
34Memo. by Winstedt,
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
to Gent,
27 Nov.
35Braddell
1942, CO 865/14 no. M101/1.
32M. Suffian
Suffian's
Hashim
letter.
36Memo.
37See Lau,
by Adams,
p. 116.
9 Jun.
1943, CO
825/35
no.
55104/1/3.

the contents
of
Malayan
223
Union Citizenship
From June 1943, the Colonial Office had also moved

towards a more progressive
reason was the need for
to
affairs
in
The
immediate
with
Chinese
Malaya.
policy
regard
a directive on Chinese policy for the guidance of the military authorities during the
after the war. Given
the new Sino-British wartime
period of military
reoccupation
alliance relationship, British policy towards China and her overseas settlers would now
have to be put on a new forward-looking basis. Within the context of a general reapprai
the issue of the status and political rights of the
sal of Anglo-Chinese
relationship,
in Malaya
Chinese
could not therefore be avoided. Interest in nationality questions
rekindled.38
A working committee was accordingly convened on 17December
1943 to draw up the
An
examination
of
Protected
the
British
Persons
Order in Coun
proposals.
nationality
cil, however, revealed that it explicitly excluded persons who already possessed nation
ality under the laws of another state. As the Chinese possessed dual nationality
they
would almost certainly be excluded. Britain would therefore be in no position to declare
states as British Protected Persons. The most plausible
Chinese born in the Malay
recourse was to recommend the creation of an entirely new Malayan Union Citizenship
by a separate Order in Council.39 Early inMay 1944 a draft directive on citizenship was
drawn up by the Eastern Department.
With the approval of the main
subsequently
on
the
Cabinet
31
Union
Malayan
May 1944, a revised draft of the citizenship
policy by
directive was subsequently submitted to the Secretary of State on 16 June and approved
that two categories of persons would
by him three days later.40 It recommended
Union
those born in either the Union or
automatically
acquire Malayan
Citizenship:
on
at
and
who
the
date
which
Order in Council became opera
the
persons
Singapore;
tive had been ordinarily resident in either territories for ten years out of the preceding
fifteen years which would exclude the period of the Japanese occupation. A person
could also acquire citizenship on application after five years' ordinary residence
in
or Singapore.
either the Union
Successful applicants would be required to affirm
allegiance to the Malayan Union. British subjects would not lose their nationality upon
being granted Malayan Union Citizenship. And, apart from the consent of the Gover
nor, no person who was not aMalayan Union citizen would be admitted to public office
or membership
of the central and local councils.41 For the first time equality of citizen
for
the
non-Malays had been accepted as a cardinal principle in the new
ship rights
a major departure from the traditional
it represented
Malayan
policy. Conversely,
British policy which had always maintained
thatMalaya was primarily aMalay country.
Ill
sure, cracks in Britain's
"pro-Malay" policy were already evident in the
before the war with Japan. Amongst
reform-minded officials inWhitehall,
the
Sultanates were frequently perceived as an "anachronism"42 and the rulers themselves
to British advisory rule. That itwas a "mistake to
reprehended for their obstructiveness
To
be
decades
38Memo.
by Paskin,
39Minute
by Monson,
40Minute
41Minute
42"Note
7 Dec.
22 Dec.
1943, CO
825/35
no.
55104/1/6.
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/9.

1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/9.
19 Jun.
by Stanley,
5 May
1944, ibid.
by Paskin,
at the Colonial
of Conference
Office",
16 Mar.
1931, CO
717/76
no.
72483.

224
Albert Lau
bolster up the power of these petty Rulers" few of these officials doubted: "The future
of Malaya,"
argued Ellis, for instance, "lay in the hands of the Chinese and Indians."43
Gent himself had argued for a "fair field" to be presented
for all races alike.44 But
some
the
disillusionment
official
with
the
Sultans, British policy
among
despite
quarters
followed closely the traditional pro-Malay
line before the war. And given Britain's
to a policy of decentralization
declared commitment
in the Malay states, official conser
vatism prevailed.
The Japanese invasion, however,
and accen
radically altered pre-war perceptions
tuated the cracks already present. The rapid and sudden collapse of British power in
not only the structural vulnerability
Malaya was interpreted by some as demonstrating
of an administratively
fragmented constitutional polity but also the inherent weakness
of a population
for defence purposes. That a "pro
divided racially and politically
was
to
the
creation
of a "Malayan consciousness" was
Malay" policy
inimically opposed
of the Japanese
pointedly
impressed upon the Colonial Office by the object-lesson
to the Colonial Office cited
invasion. As Luckham had pointed out in his memorandum
in the defence of any country is that there
earlier: "One of the most vital necessities
should be a strong spirit of patriotism and loyalty to and confidence in the rulers of the
this was one of the major failings of the Malayan
country. The failure to develop
Governments."
The pro-Malay policy, he argued, "led to the assertion that non-Malays
had no rights in the country". What the Colonial Office must do, Luckham advised, was
to devise
a more
progressive policy that would strengthen "the will of the people of

for
the country and, if necessary, defend it". Luckham's memorandum
Malaya
a
made
good impression45 on the Colonial Office which discussed it some
apparently
time inApril 1943 for, two months later, Gent was arguing that "some indeed have not
hesitated to attribute to this [pro-Malay] policy our alleged failure in war time to secure
the full co-operation of the Chinese inMalaya".46 And by June 1944, the need for some
was recognized
in the proposals
for
association
amongst the various communities
a
common
sense
of
it:
of
As
Gent
"The
Union
put
development
Malayan
Citizenship.
citizenship inMalaya is important for political progress in general and as a basis for link
to work
in the country."47
ing the various communities
Further cracks in Britain's pro-Malay policy occurred probably as a result also of
campaign and
allegations of fifth column activities by the Malays during the Malayan
the
of
fifth
with
of
the
Sultans
collaboration
Malay
Japanese. Reports
reports
by
column activities became evident as British troops fought a rear-guard action inMalaya
down the Peninsula.48 Reports of the Sultans' obstructiveness
during the withdrawal
during the Malayan
campaign
and their alleged co-operation
after the
with the Japanese
at the Colonial
15 May
Office",
1931, CO 717/81 no. 82395.
no. 13467.
12 Dec.
1933, CO 717/101
by Gent,
to Martin,
"much food for thought".
See Gent
that it offered
remarked
45Gent, for instance,
1943, CO 865/14 no. M101/1.
43"Note
of Conference
"Minute
19 Apr.
to Paskin,
27 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
to Gater,
16 Jun. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/9.
no. 438/3.
inWO
in the Malayan
Activities
203/4036
48See "Fifth Column
n.d.,
1941-2",
Campaign,
were members
movement
Muda
which
had been
of the Kesatuan
collaborators
The Malay
Melayu
in Bangkok
and southern
the Japanese military
for Fujiwara Kikan,
agency based
intelligence
working
^Gent
47Gent
Thailand.
After
See Cheah
the Japanese
Boon
Occupation,
Resistance
Red Star Over Malaya:
Kheng,
1941-1946
1983), p. 20.
(Singapore,
and Social

Conflict
During
and
225
Union Citizenship
Malayan
fall of Singapore also dismayed the Colonial Office. Efforts to remove the Sultans out
to safer havens in Australia
and India were met by stiff resistance from the
of Malaya
rulers themselves who refused to be separated from their subjects.49 Early inApril 1942,
the Colonial Office had also received intercepted Domei reports from Singapore of the
to Japan and congratulating
nine Sultans declaring
their allegiance
the Japanese
on these reports,
commander on his "brilliant" victories over the British.50 Commenting
one Colonial Office official stiffly remarked: "These enemy reports should be put on
record. There is, of course, no proof that they are correct but, assuming the worst, they
have an obvious bearing on ... any reorganisation
of the political structure of Malaya
after reoccupation."51 The impression that the Malays were involved in fifth column
activities and that the Sultans were collaborating with the Japanese contributed to the
beginnings of British distrust of the Malays. Later when efforts were made to establish
it was to the Chinese that Force 136 personnel turned first
resistance groups inMalaya
?
and Malay groups were contacted only a year later. As Cheah commented:
"The
truth was that the British were generally suspicious of the Malays whom they believed
to be favourably disposed towards the Japanese."52
a shift in Britain's
If the war had precipitated
it had
"pro-Malay" orientation,
unleashed demands also for a more sympathetic reappraisal of British policy towards
the Chinese. Before the war, an undercurrent of "pro-Chinese"
sympathy had already
gained ground amongst some officials in the Colonial Office.53 Nevertheless,
suspicions
about the Malayan Chinese's political loyalty and susceptibility to subversion by either
the Kuomintang
(KMT)54 or the Malayan Communist
Party (MCP)55 precluded any
move
a firm political stake in the country. After
towards giving the Chinese
the
about
Japanese invasion, such pre-war suppositions were no longer valid. Reservations
to Malaya proved unwarranted when the Chinese rallied
their political commitment
stoutly behind the British authorities in the defence of Malaya. Both the MCP and the
and community leaders, joined hands
KMT, together with other Chinese organizations
in setting up the Overseas Chinese Mobilization
to recruit people for civil
Council
an
and
for
defence, propaganda
Dalforce,
independent
fighting unit attached to the
British
army's Third
Indian Corps.56
49Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya,

p. 20.
50See Domei
States
report "Sultans of Malay
52035.
congratulate
Yamashita",
Apr.
1942, CO
717/147
no.
51Minute by K.W.
15 Apr.
Blaxter,
1942, ibid.
p. 80.
no. 62010 Pt I.
53See Minute
25 Mar.
1929, CO 273/554
by Caine,
inMalaya
54KMT branches were established
after the formation
of the mother
Yat-sen
in 1912. At
because
of
inMalaya
party in China by Sun

the KMT was banned
from Malaya
in 1925
authorities,
by the British
See C.F. Yong
and R.B. McKenna,
"The Kuomintang
Movement
leanings".
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
1912-1925",
12, no. 1
(hereafter
JSEAS),
first tolerated
its "Bolshevik
and Singapore,
(1981): 118-32.
55Formed
in 1930, the MCP
1940 staged massive
strikes and
"The
Communist
Challenge
Journal
of the Malaysian
Branch
between
1936 and Mar.

1937 and again from Oct.
1939 to Sept.
Sept.
labour unrest to challenge
the Malayan
See Yeo Kim Wah,
government.
in the Malayan
Labour
1936-March
Scene,
1937",
September
64, no. 2 (1976): 36
of the Royal Asiatic
Society
(hereafter
JMBRAS),
79.
56Cheah,
Red
Star Over Malaya,
p.
19.

226
Moral
Albert Lau
sympathy for the Chinese was

of Chinese who had supported
further stirred when it became known that

the Malayan
authorities had also perished in
new
inflicted
their
accounts of
large-scale revenge purges
conquerors. Gruesome
by
Chinese massacres
and Japanese brutality, which reached the Colonial Office towards
the latter half of 1942 and early 1943, made grim reading for the staff of the Eastern
The knowledge
that Britain had somehow failed the Chinese, who had
Department.
been abandoned to bear the brunt of Japanese wrath, must have haunted the Colonial
Office ?
for accounts of Japanese "atrocity"57 were read by Whitehall
officials in
were
in
terse
silence.
Comments
minutes
and
few.
Words
would
indeed
have
eloquent
thousands
been superfluous amidst such descriptions of brutality.

A further contributory
factor to the reorientation
of British attitudes towards the
Chinese
stemmed also from their potential
value as an underpinning
bastion of
war.
British
of
for
rule
in
after
the
this
had
community support
Malaya
already
Aspects
in the short collaboration
been demonstrated
in the defence of Malaya. From May 1943,
a second step was taken to formalize even further the prospect of wartime military
to organize resis
co-operation when Force 136 personnel were infiltrated into Malaya
tance groups from amongst the Chinese,
and particularly
the communist Chinese.58
Properly led and armed these resistance forces, assessed the Colonial Office, would be
in a position to play "a very prominent part in helping us in any campaign to drive out
In these circumstances,
the Japanese".
it would therefore be "impossible", upon the
to
of
Malaya,
immediately "revive the pre-war embargoes" on either the
reoccupation
it reinforced
KMT or the MCP.59 Conversely,
the need for an enlightened
policy
in order to galvanize their support in the war.
towards the Chinese
Given British distrust of the Malays,
itmust have also occurred to the Colonial Office
that the Chinese would probably form the principal community that could be expected
to undergird British rule in Malaya
and afford, as Tan Cheng Lock, a prominent
of
in his memorandum
informed
the Eastern Department
Chinese community
leader,
most
"a
and
in
the
valuable
element
November
1943,
Malayan population, willing
loyal
and able to take a vital part in the defence of Malaya under British leadership should
an occasion arise in future". As Tan suggested, the Chinese were ready to assume such
a role "if properly and fairly treated" after the war. But to enable the Chinese to iden
Britain must, on her part,
tify themselves completely with the interests of Malaya,
"trust" the Chinese
and open to them the right to acquire "Malayan citizenship".
"That," argued Tan, "is the best and wisest course to adopt by way of solving the so
called Chinese problem inMalaya."60 Tan's arguments must have impressed the Colo
had also arrived at the
nial Office for, by the following month, the Eastern Department
same conclusion:
the need for a new Malayan
"citizenship".
the probable
influence of political, moral and military
So far, we have discussed
factors on the Colonial Office's
a further diplomatic
moreover,
tions. What
for political
thinking about its post-war Chinese policy. There was,

dimension which significantly affected British calcula
to the Colonial Office was not only the anticipated pressure
was worrying
recognition which
the Chinese
inMalaya
would
almost certainly exert in the
no. 50744/7.
16 Oct.
1942, CO 273/699
by Monson,
SOE in the Far East
p. 73. See also C. Cruickshank,
pp. 193-96.
1 Sept.
59Memo. by Monson,
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/6.
1 Nov.
??Memo, by Tan Cheng Lock,
1943, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/3A.
57Minute

(Oxford,
1983),
227
Union Citizenship
Malayan
post-war period, and which Whitehall would find almost impossible to resist, but also
the more ominous prospect of a "rampantly nationalist"61 KMT China looming behind,
in support of their political rights.
and collaborating with, the Malayan Chinese
That the Chinese deserved a better deal in Malaya
after the war few Whitehall
as
officials contested. But,
the Colonial Office also realized, a "pro-Chinese" policy
was
carried risks and
bound to put a strain on Britain's relations with the Malays. A
research department
in August
1942, for instance,
report by the Foreign Office's
warned against the unwisdom of turning Malaya "into a Malay
irredenta by bringing
about a Chinese
there". The younger educated Malays,
it noted, had
ascendency
East
already felt a strong sense of kinship with the "Indonesians" of the Netherlands
Indies (NEI) and "sooner or later in the future it is quite likely that an 'Indonesian'
nationality will emerge in the region which uses Malay as a lingua franca".62 The same
fears were echoed early in June 1943 by Sir Theodore Adams who warned that any
to
attempt to renege on the "principle" of Malay precedence would force the Malays
"either turn to pan-Islam or to any foreign power which will help them not to be
submerged by Chinese".63 The Colonial
reports. As Monson
argued:
The
Malay
ideals.
peninsula
Pan-Malayan
has
He
not
been
has
felt
Office,
however,
distinguished
to his
particular
loyalty
discounted
in the past
for
Ruler
such pessimistic
strong affection
or State
and
to
the
Japanese by preserving (apparently after an early flirtation with a United Malaya)

the State's
will
framework
have
kept
sense
that
of
regional
loyalty
alive.64
As for Adams' apprehensions,

Gent opined that he had taken "insufficient account of
the progressive elements among the Malays themselves and their own appreciation that
it is not possible to maintain
the old exclusiveness
and reactionary attitudes towards
Chinese
and Indian settlers". Carefully handled, Gent believed it should be possible to

"disastrous results" towards some conception of political rights for the
without
proceed
Chinese.65 In reality, the Colonial Office had little choice. Given its assumptions about
the post-war attitudes of China and the Malayan Chinese,
a reassertion of the tradi
tional
pro-Malay
ceptable
policy
political
would
have
as much
carried
if not
greater
and
more
unac
risks.
IV
1945 opened the way for the introduction of the

Japan's surrender on 15 August
Colonial Office's
long simmering plans for constitutional
change in Malaya. On 3
new
the
Labour66
new
Cabinet
endorsed
the
September
policy and also formally
61Minute
62Memo.
63Memo.
^Minute
11 Apr.
1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
by Gent,
G.F.
Hudson,
1942, ibid.
by
Aug.
9 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
by Adams,
24 Aug.
1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
by Monson,
27 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no.

65Minute by Gent,
66The Labour Party swept into power on 26 July
Hall became
the new Secretary
of State for
George
on 4 Oct.
1946 as Colonial
in a major
Secretary
(London,
1982),
p. 331. Hall
became
the First Lord
55104/1/3.
and Clement
the Colonies.
ministerial
Attlee
Arthur
reshuffle.
was
named
Prime Minister
Creech-Jones
See Kenneth
of the Admiralty.

succeeded
Harris,
and
Hall
Attlee
228
Albert
confirmed
Majesty's
October,
Britain's
Lau
Sir Harold MacMichael's

of His
appointment67 as Special Representative
to Malaya to negotiate
Government
the new treaties with the rulers. On 10
the Secretary of State, George Hall, announced
in the House of Commons
intention to introduce the new constitutional
changes in Malaya.68 On the
of 11 October MacMichael
disembarked at Port Swettenham. A week later, on
morning
18 October, he held his first discussion with the Malay rulers, beginning with the Sultan
he had successfully concluded his mission.69 With
of Johore. By 21 December,
the
on
in
the
Cabinet
10
1946
sanctioned
the
hand,
January
formally
signatures
proposals
which were subsequently published as aWhite Paper70 on 22 January to coincide with
the First Reading
of the Straits Settlements

(Repeal) Bill, the only piece of parliamen
new
to
effect
the
constitutional
arrangements.
tary legislation
inMalaya,
The immediate circumstances
however, were hardly auspicious for the
unveiling of a new political experiment. There were food shortages,71 politically-moti
vated strikes waged by the MCP,72 and heightened
racial tensions, resulting in serious
commuai clashes in Johore, Malacca, Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu,
and Perak
announcement
and
December
1945.73
in
between
The
September
parliament on 10
October of London's new scheme for Malaya and MacMichael's
subsequent mission
further exacerbated Malay
fears of Chinese
domination.
As
the British Military
1945 noted:
Administration74
(BMA) report for December
InKelantan racial feeling between Malays and Chinese flared up after the visit to the
Region of Sir Harold MacMichael. An orderly demonstration by Malays protesting
the proposed
against
violence
in which
creation
of
three Chinese
a Malayan
was
Union
by an outbreak
followed
of
and two Malays were killed and several more
injured.75
? which revealed for the

Paper
not
in secret with the rulers ?
The unveiling of the new policy in the January White

had discussed
first time the proposals MacMichael
won
new enemies.
few
friends
and
made
surprisingly
The citizenship provisions, which sought to benefit the Chinese,

evoked only little
from the politically-conscious
members
of the Chinese
enthusiasm
community. The
?
?
China-born
and
elements
remained
Chinese Right
pro-KMT
comprising mainly
Not
the
distinction
between
unenthusiastic.
comprehending
"nationality" and
generally
of
Chinese
assumed
that
the
the
latter
would automat
many
acceptance
"citizenship"
on 24 January:
Hwa
commented
As
the
their
Chinese
annul
nationality.
Chung
ically
we
want
to
If
the
have rights of
mother
is
the
second
country [of
"Malaya
Chinese]....
67MacMichael
sioner
was
of Palestine
the Governor
and Trans-Jordan
of Tanganyika
from
from 1938 to 1944.
1933
to 1937 before
10 Oct.
225-256.
H.C.,
1945, Cols.
Debates,
^Parliamentary
British Policy and Malay
Politics During
69See A.J. Stockwell,
for a documented
1948 (Kuala Lumpur,
1979), pp. 47-60
study
6724.
70See Cmd.
71See Paul H. Kratoska,
"The Post-1945
Food
Shortage
becoming
High
The Malayan
Union Experiment
of the MacMichael
mission.
in British
Malaya",
JSEAS
19, no.
Commis
1942
1 (1988):
27-47.
no. 51056.
for Jan. 1946, in CO 537/1572
72BMA Report
pp. 232-40.
on 3 Sept.
74Two days after the first British
landed in Penang
troops
From 5 Sept.
and
1945 to 1 Apr.
1946 Singapore
arrived
in Singapore.
administered
under
75BMA Report
the British
for Dec.
Administration.
Military
no.
in CO 537/1572
1945,
the main
forces
reoccupation
were
the Peninsula
separately
51056.

Malayan
229
Union Citizenship
in Malaya, we must either openly declare or quietly consent that we are

citizenship
our mother
from
country."76 Few were prepared to make such a definite
separated
break as the Malayan Security Service later observed:
...
it appears
Citizenship
to have
would
been
entail
generally
renunciation
that
acceptance
and
nationality
thought
of Chinese
of Malayan
Union
as
this was regarded
ridiculous by the Chinese.77

The Chinese Left, represented
by the MCP, on the other hand, saw "an ulterior
motive"
in the White Paper's citizenship provisions:
they were an "implicit decoy" to
nature of the White Paper. In themselves,
detract attention from the unrepresentative
the citizenship proposals were "without the counterpart of legitimate rights".78 Only the
Chinese Centre ?
represented by the moderate Chinese members of a newly formed
?
multi-racial
Democratic
Union
political party, the Malayan
(MDU)
generally
welcomed
the White Paper which it supported as a "progressive" document, although
making certain criticisms of detail.79
If Chinese reaction had been "completely apathetic",80 Malay response was bitterly
in particular, were a major object of Malay pro
resentful. The citizenship provisions,
test. The status of the rakyat, noted the influential Majlis, differed little from that "of
the Red Indians in North America
and the aborigines of Australia".81 By the second
week of February the Colonial Office found itself inundated with petitions, some from
revived pre-war associations whilst others came from many new Malay organizations
sprouted specifically to protest against the Malayan Union. Their arguments rehearsed
familiar themes about Malay fears of submergence by doubtful aliens who never failed
"to observe their national celebrations
and [the] hoisting [of] their national flags".82
own
of
in
their
defence
and
Partly
partly succumbing to pressures from their own
rights,
were
the
rulers
also
induced
subjects,
by the latter half of February to petition London
to defer the implementation
of the new constitution until an independent commission
had first visited the country and consulted local opinion. By early March, however,
over fundamental Malay
confronted
Office
by continual Colonial
intractability
the
demands, and at the same time emboldened
emergence of a new sense of unity
by
and assertiveness within the Malay community, Malay
reaction shifted perceptively
from polite protest to active resistance. On 1March, delegates at the first Pan-Malayan
resolved as "null and void" the MacMichael
treaties and called on
Malay Congress
to restore the status quo "with no change whatever
London
for the present".83 The
decision to establish a central organization,
the United Malays National Organization
76See "Malayan
Press
Comment
on
the White
Paper
on Malayan
Union",
in CO
n.d.,
537/1536
no.
50823/6/4.
30 Apr.
1946, p. 6.
on
78"The Malayan
Communist
Party's Statement
79See Cheah Boon Kheng,
"The Malayan
Democratic
77MSS/PIJ
the Malayan
Union,
on 21 Dec.
Union",
1945-1948"
was established
1945.
1974), p. 329. The MDU
Malaya,
no. 1375/1.
80Memo. by Guernsey,
19 Feb.
203/6203
1946, WO
no. 50823/6/4.
Press Comments
81See "Malayan
...", CO 537/1536
to Hall,
no.
82Perlis Malay Association
13 Feb.
1946, CO 537/1551
83BMA
to Hall,
5 Mar.
1946, CO
537/1548
no.
50823/34
Pt.
WO
203/6264
(M.A.
50823/34/3.
I.

no.
1249.
thesis, University
of
230
Albert Lau
to spearhead the anti-Malayan Union

struggle was also taken at the con
(UMNO),
the
gress.84 The rulers, on their part, agreed to engage legal counsel to challenge
of the new policy.85
constitutionality
While admitting a fairly "substantial" Malay revulsion against the White Paper, the
on its part, had also decided that there could
Colonial Office by late February-March,
from the fundamental policy already outlined. But to
be "no question" of withdrawing
the Colonial Office on 25 February forwarded two
deal with the Malay opposition,
The first, supported by Gent, urged the
alternative courses for urgent consideration.
of the new scheme despite strong Malay objections. Any
immediate implementation
the political rights already held out to the non
indication that London was withdrawing
arouse
a
would
"far more dangerous
from the
Gent
antagonism"
Malays,
argued,
to a lesser extent the Indians, who between
them outnumbered
the
as
was
to
all
alternative
with
other
Malays.
already planned,
proceed,
of the citizenship proposals for
aspects of the policy but deferring the implementation
six months pending further local consultations.86 This was based on the assumption that,
in almost all the popular reactions against theWhite Paper, itwas citizenship which was
of the Malays on the question of citizenship might
attacked. Some accommodation
therefore be expedient. The Colonial Secretary favoured the former course but, looking
ahead to the Commons debate on 8March, proposed that the second course might be
should strong parliamentary
opposition87 be encoun
adopted as a tactical compromise
informed the Colonial Office on 3March that there
tered. The BMA, in the meantime,
and
Chinese,
The
second
of the citizenship proposals provided

would be no adverse reaction to the postponement
In
it was made clear that no final decision would be taken pending local consultations.
a fresh appraisal two days later, the BMA reiterated that citizenship was the "chief bone
of contention" and repeated, by implication, its earlier entreaty that the Malayan Union
Citizenship Order in Council should be deferred:
of Government
Majority
dependent
successfully
upon
with
are Malays
and we are very
Police,
including
can only
new policy
We
implement
goodwill....
we have not at present
which
of Malays,
got....88
servants,
retention
co-operation
of
their
The arguments appeared "particularly cogent"89 to the Colonial Office: as the expected
it was "easier to make
"violence of Chinese and Indian reaction" seemed unfounded,
concessions on this point should the course of the debate make that advisable".90
Dato Onn bin Jaafar, on

by Johore aristocrat,
1946 itwas enthusiastically
supported
by some
a central organization
to spearhead
to establish
the anti
The Congress
decided
41 Malay
associations.
on 11 May
was formally
in Johore Bahru.
Union
inaugurated
struggle. UMNO
Malayan
no. 50823/34/1.
to Ibrahim,
9 Mar.
85Badlishah
1946, CO 537/1550
^The
24 Jan.
had been made

idea of a Pan-Malayan
Congress
on 1Mar.
convened
itwas eventually
1946. When
no. 50823 Pt I.
25 Feb.
86Minute by Bourdillon,
1946, CO 537/1528
to Lord Marchwood
for instance, had cabled his protests
87The ruler of Perak,
no. 50823/34/7.
The Old Malayans
to Elibank,
30 Jan. 1946, CO 537/1554
Aziz
bied L.D.
Gammans
in the House
88BMA
89Minute
^Minute
(Unionist
of Commons.
MP
for Hornsey),
who
was
also
an old Malayan
and Lord Elibank.

in London
hand,
no. 50823/34
Pt I.
5 Mar.
1946, CO 537/1548
6 Mar.
1946, ibid.
by Bourdillon,
no. 50823 Pt I.
6 Mar.
1946, CO 537/1528
by Lloyd,
to Hall,

had also
to exert
See
lob
pressure
231
Union Citizenship
Malayan
As it turned out, such a concession was necessary. Although

the Colonial Office had
some minor concessions
in a new White Paper91 on 4 March,
these were
announced
in parliament. A Creech-Jones,
the Parliamentary
insufficient to pacify the opposition
Under Secretary of State, consequently
agreed to defer the Malayan Union Citizenship
Order inCouncil pending local consultations. He reaffirmed, however, that there could
be no "whittling down" of the principle of common citizenship:
cannot
We
conceive
of any
forward
advance
unless
that principle
is acknowledged....
The House should be under no illusion that the British Government must push on
with this policy.92
On 18March the Straits Settlements
(Repeal) Bill was finally passed in parliament with
a further package of concessions93 to
out a division after Creech-Jones
announced
soothe the opposition.
The latest concessions
failed to assuage Malay feelings. When London ignored the
to
of
the
rulers
consider
their alternative proposal of a Federation94 and proceeded
pleas
to establish the Malayan Union on 1April 1946, Malay opposition hardened. UMNO
called for a campaign of non-recognition
of, and non-cooperation
with, the Malayan
Union government. Malay dignitaries consequently boycotted the installation of Gent95
as Governor
as the new Governor-General.96
and, later, that of Malcolm MacDonald
was no longer viable. Malay
4
had
Gent
concluded
that
the
Union
road
By
May
now
was
he
warned
the
Colonial
Office,
"widely stirred" and London risked
opposition,
of
and
likelihood
serious
and
facing "very
organised
widespread
non-cooperation
disorder on the part of the Malay people" which could play into the hands of the MCP
and the pro-Indonesian
radicals in their efforts to foment violence.97 Neither
the
Chinese nor the Indians, he reiterated, had displayed any preference
for either the
Malayan Union or Federation:
they were interested only in popular representation and
in the retention of their separate nationality along with their Malayan Union citizen
and urged the Colonial
ship.98 MacDonald
subsequently
upheld Gent's assessment
a
more
to
so
as
not
to
alienate
moderate Malay
Secretary
adopt
conciliatory approach
opinion:
as never
this is not a bad thing for it is

itself,
By
so as to prepare
conscious
them
politically
to play appropriate
self Governing
institutions.
But will be
part in developing
if this awakened
unfortunate
and interest
consciousness
extremely
political
gets rail
roaded
into extremist
and anti-British
channels.
If we can restore Malay
confidence
Malay
91
Malayan
(Mar.
Union
that Malays
and
before.
become
Singapore:
Summary
of Proposed
Constitutional
Arrangements,
Cmd.
6749
1946).
8 Mar.
H.C.,
1946, Col. 727.
1565.
1946, Col.
to Gater,
no. 50823/34/7.
27 Mar.
1946, CO 537/1554
^Parliamentary
93Ibid., 18 Mar.
94Newboult
95Gent's
to go
post
is roused
opinion
desirable
highly
selves
Stockwell,
96Given
General
Debates,
appointment
to Sir Arthur
as Governor
Richards
pp. 70-71.
the establishment
should
of both
be appointed
MacDonald
his appointment,
(1935-38) Minister
to Hall,
4 May
98Gent
to Hall,
11 May
the Eastern
of
Jamaica,
Gent
Department.
1938^13,
and
himself
of Nigeria,
expected
1934-47).
the
See
the Malayan
and Singapore
Union
it was felt that a Governor
the policies
of British
in Southeast
Prior
territories
Asia.
to coordinate
had
been
Colonial
(1935 and 1938-40),

Secretary
in Canada
High Commissioner
and UK
(1940-41)
no. 50823 Pt I.
1946, CO 537/1528
no. 50823 Pt II.
1946, CO 537/1529
of Health
97Gent
surprised
(Governor
Dominions
(1941-46).

Secretary
to
232
Albert Lau
as a result
in Britain
we
ment
the present
negotiations
this. Then Malay
nationalist
of
can prevent
secure
and
movement
in possession
of agree
is likely to be friendly
with the administration here and to cooperate with us in political affairs instead of
into
swept
being
Indonesian
currents.99
anti-European
By 5 July Hall reluctantly conceded that some "amended or new agreement"100 could be
the rulers on 20 July signalled Gent that they
considered. With this major concession,
were prepared to open constitutional
discussion but only on the basis that, upon the
a new constitution would then be
a
successful conclusion of
satisfactory arrangement,
to
treaties.101
executed
replace the MacMichael
from April to July 1946,

the main constitutional
struggle held centre-stage
Although
the citizenship question was not entirely ignored during the same period. On 18 April,
as a first step to the opening of consultation, Gent formally invited public comments on
the deferred citizenship proposals which had appeared in the March White Paper.102
Section 23 of the latter proposed that the following categories of persons be automa
tically conferred
(a)
(b)
citizenship:
or Singapore
the
the date when
before
Union
born
in the Malayan
person
Any
or
in the Malayan
comes
Union
resident
is ordinarily
into force, who
Order
on that date.
Singapore
in the Malayan
resident
of eighteen
years of age or over ordinarily
person
Any
comes
on the date when
has
or Singapore
into force, who
the Order
Union
resided in theMalayan Union or Singapore for a period of ten years during the
fifteen
or takes
or affirms
swears
the 15th of February,
1942, and who
years preceding
to
Government
to
and
the
be
faithful
the oath of allegiance
loyal
(i.e.
(c)
of the Malayan
Union).
born
in the Malayan
person
Any
comes
into force.
the Order
(d)
born
Any person
the Order
when
the
time
that
of
or was
Singapore
certificate
the Malayan
outside
comes
into
force,
birth and
person's
a Malayan
Union
of naturalization.
The
on or after
or Singapore
Union
Union
whose
on or after the date

and Singapore
at
Union
citizen
is a Malayan
father
either
citizen
minor
the date when
was
or
in the Malayan
Union
a
or
had
above
obtained
(b)
under
children
eighteen)
(viz.:
born
under
children
or persons in categories (a) and (b) will also be Malayan Union citizens.
For those acquiring citizenship by application,
that applicants must satisfy the Governor:
Section
24 of the White
Paper proposed
one
(a) that they have resided in theMalayan Union or Singapore for a period of
year immediately preceding the date of application and for a further period of
four years during the last eight years before application;
(b) that they are of good character and have an adequate knowledge of theMalay
or English
"MacDonald
l00Hall to Gent,
101Gent to Hall,
and
language;
to Hall,
5 Jul.
20 Jul.
21 Jun.
1946,
1946,
1946,
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
102Cmd. 6749.

Malayan
233
Union Citizenship
(c) that they intend, if the application is granted, to reside in theMalayan Union or
Singapore.
Applicants must also take the oath of allegiance before the certificate of naturalization
could be granted at the discretion of the Governor.
almost all the Malays refused to submit their views pending the settlement
Although
of the main constitutional
of the other communities
and
issue, the representatives
more
to
Gent's
invitation.
British
for
instance,
freely
responded
subjects,
organizations
expressed concern about their status and rights. Would dual nationality be allowed or
would
the acceptance of Malayan Union Citizenship

entail the renunciation of their
British nationality? What were the special rights conferred by citizenship and what were
the disabilities of non-citizenship?103 Doubts were also expressed by the MDU which
pointed to the anomaly of making persons "ordinarily resident" in Singapore Malayan
Union citizens, thus giving them political rights in the Union, and of requiring a Singa
pore citizen to affirm allegiance to the Union government which was in effect a separate
in its memorandum,
political entity.104 The MCP,
charged that all discussion on the
for citizenship were "meaningless" without the clear expression of "civic
qualifications
in the calculation
rights". Turning to the exclusion of the period of Japanese occupation
of the residential requirement
the MCP asserted that this had been proposed delibe
rately to sweep away the "meritorious" war record of the MPAJA105 fighters and to rob
them of citizenship rights. In its own counter-proposals,
the MCP called for citizenship
to be open to persons over eighteen years of age, with the residential qualification
reduced to five years (including the three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation),
the
abolition of the language requirement
for naturalization,
and the extension of "civic
in politics to all Malayan Union citizens.106
rights" of election and participation
Of the Malay organizations,
only the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP)107 submitted full
proposals. For persons qualifying for automatic citizenship under birth or residence the
MNP recommended
that a "sufficient knowledge" of the Malay and English languages
should be demanded. Revealing
its pro-Indonesian
sympathies the MNP also urged that
the birth qualifications
should not be restricted to the Malayan Union and Singapore
but extended to cover persons born in any part of the Malay Archipelago.108 The other
lead and boycotted Gent's invitation
however, followed UMNO's
Malay organizations,
to submit proposals, arguing that itwould be fruitless to debate about citizenship when
the main problem of British "annexation" had not been resolved.109
On 8May an ad hoc committee was appointed by Gent to "consider and make recom
on the qualifications
mendations"
for Malayan Union
citizenship. Chaired by Dr.
William Linehan, a senior Malayan Civil Service (MCS) officer, the committee included
103See "Interim
make
Report
recommendations
Union
Malayan
104Ibid.
of the Committee
to
Citizenship",
105Malayan People's
pation.
106"Joint Criticism
by His Excellency
the matter
of the
upon
1946, CSO 474/46.
appointed
the Government
2 Jul.
Anti-Japanese
and Proposals
Army
of
City
to consider
appropriate
arm of the MCP
the military
the Singapore
the Governor
qualifications
Committee
and
during
the Johore
of theMCP on the Rights of Citizenship", 1May 1946, BMA/HQ S Div 311/45.

107The MNP
was
108See "Summary
109Ibid.
founded
of Views"
by a group of Malay
in "Interim Report
radicals
in mid-Oct.
...", CSO
1945.
474/46.

the Japanese
State
and
to
occu
Committee
234
Albert Lau
the nine unofficial members of the Advisory Council which had been set up under
new constitution,
from the MCS and a nominee each from
three representatives
again were
Singapore government and the Eurasian associations.110 Unrepresented
the Advisory Council. Although
the MNP
Malays whose members had boycotted
it
invitation to nominate one person to the committee,
initially accepted Gent's
the
the
the
had
sub
lead in boycotting
the committee.111
sequently changed itsmind and followed UMNO's
on 16 May, followed by subsequent meetings
on 1, 2 and 28
commenced
Discussions
June.
The committee was satisfied with the birth criteria as a sufficient condition for citizen
to impose more
including Linehan,
ship and rejected the attempts by some members,
and unnecessary
since "even if every race is
stringent controls112 as discriminatory
by birth the Malays will never be swamped".113
granted Malayan Union Citizenship
was also generally expressed with regard to the residential and allegiance
Agreement
criteria in the White Paper's proposals although the committee made two additional
it advised that the period of residence (ten years out of fifteen)
recommendations:
of the Order in Council and not
should be calculated from the date of implementation
1942 but with the added stipulation
from 15 February
that, for persons who were
the period of the Japanese occupation could be
evacuated before the fall of Singapore,
it also
for citizenship;
the residential requirement
taken into account in calculating
?
the declaration of an intention to settle "per
sought the insertion of a new condition
in the country.
the committee
argued for
Turning to the subject of citizenship by naturalization,
more stringent conditions by raising the period of residence immediately before appli
cation from one to two years so that the total residential period in the Union would be
increased to six instead of five years during the last eight years before application. The
of intent to reside in the Malayan Union was also retained although
declaration
to emphasize
Some discussion trans
the resolve to settle "permanently".
augmented
pired regarding the advisability of the language requirement and only narrowly did the
committee vote in favour of it. So as not to impose "too many conditions" before applic
to drop the "good character" phrase as a
ants for naturalization,
it agreed, however,
manently"
concession.
further issues were considered: the admission of Singapore residents toMalayan

and the question of dual nationality. The committee voted unanim
Citizenship
abstaining) to recommend the exclusion of the
ously (with the Singapore representative
The argument which proved decisive was
Island from the scope of Union membership.
the time when Singapore
"We naturally welcome
succinctly summed up by A. Williams:
can come in, but until such time comes it seems to me that to give citizenship to people
Two
Union
n0The
Dr
Tan
9 unofficial
Cheng
Abdool
members
Leng, Dr
and M.L.R.
Cader,
and A. Williams
don-Hall,
nated as the representative
niThe MNP was forced
were Colonel
H.S. Lee, Dr Ong Chong Keng,
of the Advisory
Council
H.H.
S.B. Palmer,
Soo Kim Lan, Tan Eng Chye, W.G.C.
Blunn,
Gor
The MCS was represented
Jomaron, W.A.
by A.C.
Doraisamy
Aiyer.
(Miss)
E.C.S.
Adkins
of the Eurasian
was
the nominee
from Singapore
and CF.
Gomes
was
nomi
Associations.
resentment
to change
its mind
against Union.
by the tide of Malay
the Governor
of the Second Meeting
of the Committee
by His Excellency
appointed
112"Proceedings
for Malayan
of the qualifications
to consider
recommendations
and make
upon the matter
appropriate
1 and 2 Jun. 1946.
Union
Citizenship",
113Ibid.

Malayan
235
Union Citizenship
are not here and have no intention of coming here does not really make sense."114
The problem of dual nationality, however, continued to vex the committee and eluded
any satisfactory solution. Proceeding on the assumption that the citizenship proposals
?
a reasonable supposition given the
provided the framework for a "national status"
?
the committee
White Paper's stipulations of oaths and affirmations of allegiances
?
found itself unable to offer any recommendation
apart from recording its disapproval
?
as to whether a Malayan Union citizen ought to
of the principle of dual nationality
be required to renounce his other nationality or citizenship.
The committee's
report was submitted to the Colonial Office on 2 July. Most of its
were acceptable
to the Colonial
recommendations
Secretary although Hall himself
who
including "ordinary residence" for those born in the Union territories prior to
the introduction of the Order in Council to prevent local-born Chinese from "returning
after, say, forty years and claiming full citizenship rights".115 The Colonial Office did not
see any need to resolve the dual nationality
issue as "citizenship" was "something less
than nationality"
and should not be equated with the latter.116 Although
generally
favoured
pleased with the "very thorough and valuable document" which represented authorita
tive non-Malay opinion,
the Colonial Office noted that it took no account of Malay
as
the final recommendations,
framed after Malay
And
Gent
cautioned,
opinion.117
in
from
the
Linehan report.118
the
differ
substantially"
proposals
"may
participation,
VI
caution was soon vindicated. The initial Malay proposals submitted on 24 July
the conception of common citizenship.119 The following day the British and
on the establishment
of Anglo-Malay
Malay
parties reached agreement
Working
successor. The Colonial Secretary informed
to draft the Malayan Union's
Committee
two days later that the principle of common citizenship was "funda
the Governor
mental" and that he was not hopeful of any agreement unless the Malays retreated from
Gent's
rejected
their "extreme" position.120 From 6 August theWorking Committee met behind closed
doors for discussions which lasted until November
1946.121
on citizen
On 15 and 16August theWorking Committee
considered a memorandum
to
forwarded
its
members
that
confine
ship
Malay
sought
by
citizenship only to British
to
of
the
rulers.
But
the
and
accommodate
persons "who are
subjects
Malay
subjects
the Malays also introduced two other new categories: persons
truly Malaya minded"
,14Ibid.
to Gent,
2 Aug.
117Hall to Gent,
2 Aug.
no.
1946, CO 537/1530
1 Aug.
1946, ibid.
1946, ibid.
118Gent to Hall,
119Gent to Hall,
1946, CO 537/1542
1946, CO 537/1529
1946, ibid.
H5Hall
A.
14 Jun.
25 Jul.
120Hall to Gent,
27 Jul.
121
the government
Representing
and D.C. Watherston
Williams
(Johore)
and Dato
R.
Pt III.
50823/15
50823
Pt
I.
Pt II.
were:
W.D.
A.T. Newboult,
K.K. O'Connor,
W. Linehan,
Godsall,
was represented
as Secretary.
b. Jaafar
UMNO
by: Dato Onn
were:
The rulers' representatives
Abdul
b. Mohammed
Yasin
Rahman
(Johore).
b. Raja Mansur
Sheriff b. Osman
Dato Nik
(Perak), Haji Mohammed
(Kedah),
Raja Kamaralzaman
Ahmed
Kamil b. Mahmud
were also
meetings
Braddell
(for UMNO).
mittee's
no.
no.
50823
(Kelantan)
attended
and Dato
by H.R.
Hamzah
Hone
b. Abdullah
(for MacDonald),
In addition
the Com
(Selangor).
T.S. Adams
(for the rulers) and

236
Albert Lau
"domiciled" who applied for citizenship and fulfilled the conditions of good character,
command of the Malay or English
language and assurance of intention to settle; and
British Protected Persons ?
defined narrowly to include only the subjects of the rulers
and persons one of whose parents was a subject of the ruler ?
after a period of resi
dence to be agreed. The latter category was eventually dropped because of the per
ceived problems of restricting the definition of British Protected Persons to that of an
were generally
"internal status".122 The other categories, with slight modifications,
on
to
which
the
Committee
9
acceptable
September submitted a redraft of the
Working
for three categories of "Federal" citizens: (a) British
clauses providing
citizenship
and
subjects
subjects of the rulers born and "permanently resident" (i.e., completing a
of
in the "Federation";
fifteen
years' residence)
period
(b) any person applying for
as to his birth in the "Federation" and
citizenship who satisfied the High Commissioner
local residence for ten out of the fifteen years preceding his application,
his "good
character" and "adequate knowledge" of Malay or English; (c) any other applicant with
a longer residential period of fifteen out of twenty years, including the character and
all applicants would have to make a declaration
language requirements. Additionally,
of permanent
settlement and take the citizenship oath.123

readiness to discuss citizenship,
the Colonial
Although
encouraged by the Malays'
Office assessed that theWorking Committee's
proposals still fell "far short" of affirming
the principle of "common citizenship". The "subjects of the rulers" in category (a), for
instance, would presumably discriminate in favour of Indonesian immigrants who would
automatically be regarded by the rulers as their subjects, whereas Chinese immigrants,
however long resident inMalaya, would not be so considered. Chinese born in Penang
or Malacca would furthermore qualify under category (a) but not those born in the
Malay states. The Colonial Office believed that these proposals would be "impossible
to defend"
in parliament
and would almost certainly antagonize
the Chinese
and
encourage "racial bitterness". As they stood, the citizenship proposals were "unaccept
able".124
their position evaporated on

Any hope that the Malays would moderate
when the revised Malay citizenship proposals
submitted to the Working
retreated even further from the position agreed on 9 September. Automatic
would be granted only to the Malay subjects of the rulers. A British subject
need to have both his parents either born locally or resident there for at
26 October
Committee
citizenship
would now
least twenty
was even
For
born
the
criterion
all other persons
years.
locally (mainly Chinese),
must
not
be born locally and resident there for
bleaker: both parents
less than twenty
years. In short, the new proposals effectively excluded nearly all but the second gener
that the parental
and Indians from Federal citizenship. Warned
ation of Chinese
the Malay members
qualifications would be strongly opposed by the Straits Chinese,
it
reducing the residential terms to fifteen years and making
accepted a compromise
for the father to be born in the Federation.125 A further attempt to
only necessary
extend the same conditions equally to both the subject of the rulers and British subjects
294/A/46.
of CWC,
16 Aug.
1946, MU
of CWC,
9 Sept.
1946, ibid.
no.
124Hall to Gent,
24 Sept.
1946, CO 537/1530
131.
26 Oct.
l25Minutes of CWC,
1946, MU
122Minutes
123Minutes
50823
Pt
III.

Malayan
a menacing
elicited
237
Union Citizenship
riposte
from UMNO's
leader and representative,
Dato
Onn
bin
Jaafar:
There
was
it seemed
also make
talk about
to be
trouble
forgotten
trouble
if what
from
the Straits
Chinese
and
the vast majority

of the people
as
their
they regarded
legitimate
that
but
communities,
?
could
the Malays
not met.126
rights were
other
?
and
Onn warned that he was quite prepared to "risk the whole negotiations"
break off all discussions
if pressed further to broaden the citizenship categories.127
In an account which the Colonial Office described as "disturbing"128 Gent had warned
of the "noticeable
increase of nervous tension" among Malay political opinion in gen
eral. The Malay members of theWorking Committee,
he reported, had "come as far as
our
were "considerable Malay ele
dare
of
view".
there
towards
they
point
Already
ments gunning for them for having gone so far.... These will be only too happy if the
local proposals are rejected on any substantial point which will give the Malays gener
The leadership of
ally an opportunity of backing out and definitely non-cooperating."
Dato
the Malays would then "pass into the hands of the Indonesian forces of the MNP, sup
the
ported for so long as it suits them by the Malayan Communist
Party." Given
a
of
the situation, Gent urged
explosiveness
"quick settlement" with the Malays,
surmising that the Chinese and Indians were likely to accept the proposals "if they are
a
however, was reluctant to negotiate
accepted by HMG".129 The Colonial Office,
settlement with the Malays without sufficiently consulting the other communities.130
A further bid to break the deadlock on 15 November
yielded fruit: the Malay mem
a
a
also
for
bers, anxious
solution, agreed that British subject needed only to be born
to be conferred automatic Federal citizen
and permanently
resident in the Settlements
ship, thus narrowing the distinction between himself and the Malay subject of the ruler
to only the fifteen years residential qualification for the former; the Working Commit
tee, in turn, accepted their demands that any peninsular Malay born outside the states
would be granted citizenship automatically
if his father was a subject of the ruler and
on
Federal immigration policy, the High Commissioner must consult the confer
that,
ence
of
rulers.131
The
latest
citizenship
cabled
proposals,
the Governor,
represented
"a
substantial advance. We are convinced that it now is the best we can get".132
The Working Committee's
report, together with the draft Federation Agreement,
been
the
of government,
rulers and UMNO
having
Plenary Conference
accepted by
on 22 November. Were
leaders on 18 November, were taken to London by MacDonald
the Working
Committee's
for different categories
of "first generation"
proposals
with
the
British
citizenship compatible
government's
expressed objective of common
saw
to
The
Colonial
Office
little
need
citizenship?
quarrel with the additional residential
?
for
British
born
in
the
Settlements
devised to exclude transitory
qualification
subjects
?
elements
but found the strictures for British subjects born in the Malay states ?
?
"hard to justify".
requiring the father to be either born or resident for fifteen years
126Minutes of CWC,
29 Oct.
1946, ibid.
30 Oct.
127Minutes of CWC,
1946, ibid.
13 Nov.
1946, CO
5 Nov.
129Gent to Gater,
1946, ibid.
537/1530
no.
50823
to Gent,
8 Nov.
1946, ibid.
15 Nov.
131Minutes of CWC,
131.
1946, MU
132Gent to Creech-Jones,
16 Nov.
1946, CO 537/1543
no.
50823/15
Pt III.
130Creech-Jones
Pt II.

238
Albert Lau
For all others born in the Federation,

including most of the Chinese born in the Malay
the
that
birth and residence might be insufficient given
Colonial
Office
conceded
states,
even after prolonged periods of residence, reverting to
the history of many Chinese,
China.133 Pressed by Gent to promptly approve the proposals "without permitting any
'clever' points to be made either of a legal or political nature",134 the Colonial Office,
in endorsing the proposals, maintained
that "nothing in those clauses ... fundamentally
affects the situation as previously understood
the Cabinet
by us".135 On 5 December
endorsed the Federation proposals, with some minor amendments, which were referred
back to theWorking Committee
and subsequently approved by the Plenary Conference
on 20 December.
The publication of theWorking Committee's
report on Christmas Eve
?
on the same day?
set the stage
and the establishment of a Consultative Committee
for the next phase of the constitutional
discussions:
consultation with all Malayan
opinion and communities which had so far exerted no influence over the Anglo-Malay
constitutional
negotiations.
VII
Between
Committee136 (chaired by H.R.
January and March 1947, the Consultative
held a series of six public meetings137 during
the Director of Education)
Cheeseman,
letters and memoranda
which it considered some eighty-one
and oral representations
from interested associations and individuals on the Working Committee's
report. The
on 21 March,
Consultative
Committee's
report, which was submitted to the Governor
own proposals138 even on
from the Working Committee's
did not depart fundamentally
?
the controversial citizenship clauses, prompting the two dissenting Chinese members
?
to issue aminority recommendation
in favour
Colonel H.S. Lee and Leong Yew Koh
of more liberalized qualifications
that would confer automatic citizenship on (a) any
subject of the ruler born in his state; (b) any person who was either a British subject or
resident in either of the Settlements or
born in the Malay states who was permanently
states; and (c) any person whose father was, at the date of that
any of the Malay
person's birth, a Federal citizen.139 Gent, on his part, concurred with the majority view
that any broadening of the citizenship categories would risk the outright rejection of the
Consultative Committee's
report by the Malays. The retention of theWorking Commit
on the other hand, would grant citizenship only to those who
tee's recommendations,
22 Nov.
1946, ibid.
no. 50823 Pt IV.
22 Nov.
134Gent to Lloyd,
1946, CO 537/1531
no. 50823/15
22 Nov.
Pt III.
1946, CO 537/1543
of 4 members
of the Malayan
Union
Council
136The nucleus
consisted
of the Committee
Advisory
?
Palmer
M.L.R.
Colonel
H.S.
Lee
S.B.
Gent
(Indian),
(European),
Doraisamy
Aiyer
appointed
by
a member
in turn nominated
from their own community:
and C.F. Gomes
(Eurasian).
They
(Chinese)
from
A. Arbuthnot,
C.P.R. Menon,
G.E. Turner
Leong Yew Koh and Dr J.S. Goonting.
respectively,
the MCS was appointed
Secretary.
13 Feb.
20 Feb. (Malacca),
1Mar.
137These were held on 28 Jan. (Kuala Lumpur),
(Kuala
(Penang),
and 11 Mar.
5 Mar.
(Ipoh),
(Kuala Lumpur).
Lumpur),
138Of the
necessary
tance.
168 clauses
to recommend
five
schedules
amendments
it considered,
found
it
Committee
the Consultative
11 clauses and some of these on points of minor
impor
which
to only
Report
of the Consultative
Proposals
for Malaya:
a Summary
Made
of Representations
of Six Public Meetings,
1947).
by the Committee
(Kuala Lumpur,
139See Constitutional
Proceedings
Considered
and
Committee
and Letters

together with the

and Memoranda
Malayan
239
Union Citizenship
the inclina
could claim that their real home and loyalty were inMalaya. Furthermore,
to interfere inMalayan Chinese affairs, Gent
tion of the local Chinese Consul-General
argued, "provides a warning of the dangers that attend an indiscriminate extension of
Malayan
citizenship to Chinese".140
For the next stage of the discussions Gent had initially envisaged the possibility of a
and
joint conference,
involving members of both theWorking Committee
was
to
Committee's
but
forced
the
Consultative
discuss
Council,
report
because of Malay resistance to any association with the Advisory Council.
in
tative Committee's
report was consequently
only cursorily debated
on
Council which, as a formality, endorsed en bloc its recommendations
the Advisory
to back away
The Consul
the Advisory
10 April. At
it also resolved that the British government,

the Governor's
recommendation,
through
had
"fulfilled" its "pledge" of full and free consultation
the Consultative
Committee,
with all interested parties.141 By 10 April itwas apparent that Gent had decided against
any further representations
by the non-Malays.
nor Malay members
were
of the reconvened142 Working
the government
Neither
in examining the Consultative Committee's
Committee,
report, prepared to reopen the
was
on
considered
18 April. Apart from some minor143 amend
citizenship issue when it
report of the dissenting
they saw no need to take into account the minority
Chinese members.144 On 24 April the Plenary Conference
quickly approved the new
in the Working Commit
constitutional
terms, including the citizenship amendments,
tee's revised report145 for submission to the Colonial Office which, anxious for a solu
tion, also expressed satisfaction that the proposals had fulfilled the objective of "com
mon citizenship".146 The citizenship provisions
that were finally included in the Fede
of 1948 retreated significantly from the liberal terms issued
ration of Malaya Agreement
was restricted
to only the following
in 1946. Automatic
"Federal Citizenship"
ments
categories:147
(a)
any
ness
born
whether
subject,
the Ruler
of any State;
before,
on or after
the appointed
day,
of His
High
(b) any British subject born in either of the Settlements before, on or after the
(c)
now to be com
in the territories
is permanently
resident148
appointed
day who
in the Federation;
prised
on or after the appointed
born before,
in any of the
any British
subject
day,
now to be comprised
in the Federation,
territories
whose
father either
(i)
was
himself
born
in any of
the
territories
now
to be comprised
in the Fede
or
ration;
(ii) was or is, at the date of the birth of such British subjects, or thereafter
became
or becomes,
permanently
resident
in such
no. 52243
140Gent to Creech-Jones,
7 Apr.
1947, CO 537/2141
of the Advisory
Council
of the Malayan
Union,
141Proceedings
Pt
territories;
I.
10 Apr.
was reconvened
on 17 Apr.
142TheWorking
Committee
1947.
the period of residence
143For British
subjects born in the Settlement,
now to be comprised
in the Federation".
of the territories
1947, pp. B61-B72.

was
amended
144Minutes of CWC,
18 Apr.
294/A/46.
1947, MU
24 Apr.
of the Plenary Conference,
294/X/46.
1947, MU
145Proceedings
146Memo. by Creech-Jones,
28 Jun. 1947, FO 371/63517.
124.
147See The Federation
1948, Pt. XII Sect.
of Malaya
Agreement,
a
a
to
who
resident"
referred
continuous
person
completed
148"Permanently
period
dence.

to read
of
"in any
15 years
resi
240
Albert Lau
(d) any person born before, on or after the appointed day in any of the territories
now to be comprised in the Federation who habitually speaks theMalay lang
to Malay
and conforms
custom;149
on or after the
born before,
any other person
day in any of the terri
appointed
tories now to be comprised
in the Federation,
both of whose
born
parents were
or are, at the date of the birth of such per
in any of such territories
and were
or become,
became
in such territories;
resident
sons, or thereafter
permanently
uage
(e)
any
(f)
father
whose
person
is,
at
the
date
of
that
a Federal
birth,
person's
Citizen.150
who
Those
by application
citizenship
acquired
must
the the High
satisfy
Commis
sioner:151
(a) that either

(i) he was born in any of the territories now to be comprised in the Federation
and has been
in any one
resident
or more
of such
or
his application;152
years preceding
he has been
in any one or more
resident
of such
territories
for eight
out
of
the twelve
(ii)
territories
for fifteen
years
out of the twenty years immediately preceding his application;

and
(b) that he is of good character; and

(c) that he has an adequate knowledge of theMalay or English language; and
a Declaration
(d)
that he has made
(e)
the First Schedule to thisAgreement; and

that, if his application is approved, he iswilling to take the Citizenship Oath in
the form set out in the First Schedule to thisAgreement.
of Permanent
in the form
Settlement
set out
in
VIII
Until December
1946 the Colonial Office had encountered
little overt opposition
from the non-Malays as it engaged in confidential discussions with the Malays. The veil
of secrecy153 which had shrouded the Anglo-Malay
talks effectively precluded the par
of
also by official assurances that
the
Until
becalmed
then, partly
ticipation
non-Malays.
"all circles concerned" would be consulted before
final decisions were
reached,
to adopt a wait-and-see
Malayan opinion had been generally encouraged
posture pend
of the secret talks.154 But from mid-December
1946, sections of
ing the outcome
an
news
that
aroused
leaks155
accord to
Malayan opinion,
by
suggesting
Anglo-Malay
an
to
had
been
started
the
anti-Federation
Union
reached,
Malayan
replace
organize
to ensure that non-Muslim
added mainly
to citizenship.
150This was conceded
of the Working
by Malay members
151See Sect. 125 of The Federation
Agreement,
of Malaya
149This clause was
Malays
would
not be discriminated
in their
entitlement
152This was
agreed
years.
153The confidentiality
tee on 7 Aug.
1946.
as a compromise
of the proceedings
to Tan
154See Newboult
to the Consultative
was
insisted
Committee
on 26 Oct.
1946.
1948.
Committee's
by the Malay
recommendation
members
of 5 out of
of the Working
10
Commit
25 Jul. 1946, printed

in Tan Cheng
Problems
Lock,
Lock, Malayan
(Singapore,
1947), pp. 164-65.
were
of the Working
Committee's
leaked by the London
press
155Fairly accurate
proposals
on 7 Oct.
to issue an official
in early October,
statement
1946 dismissing
them as having
forcing Gent
no. 50823.
to Creech-Jones,
"no official
See Gent
8 Oct.
1946, CO 537/1530
authority".
from
a Chinese
Point
Cheng
of View
summaries

Malayan
241
Union Citizenship
to protest against the perceived fait accompli. Led by the Pan-Malayan

movement
?
later renamed the All Malaya Council of Joint
Council of Joint Action
(PMCJA)156
?
the movement
and
Pusat
the
Action
Tenaga Raayat
(PUTERA),158
(AMCJA)157
on
Consultative
called
the British
the government-sponsored
Committee,
boycotted
to draft a new constitution,
to appoint a Royal Commission
issued its own
government
to the Anglo
The People's Constitutional
Proposals for Malaya159 as an alternative
and staged strikes160 and demonstrations
in protest ?
all
Malay federal arrangements,
to no avail since its overtures were deliberately disregarded by the government which
not only had serious doubts about the movement's
programme,
popular strength,161
internal cohesion162 and left-wing ?
and possibly communist ?
inspiration163 but which
the practicability of fundamental changes so late in the day.
also questioned
Indeed, as we have seen, Gent had already decided by April 1947 that Federation was
irreversible.164 The Colonial Office had also crossed the Rubicon by July 1947.165 The
AMCJA-PUTERA's
People's Constitution, published only inOctober 1947,166 came too
late to deflect the government from its chosen course. The coalition's recommendation
of aMelayu161 citizenship ?
proposing that citizenship should connote nationality and
?
further confirmed British
offering automatic citizenship to all those born inMalaya
doubts about the movement's
political realism. The People's Constitution, observed the
Colonial Office's O.H. Morris, was "but an academic exercise" drafted by people
"either unaware of, or unwilling to face, the real difficulties of personal and racial
and of economic
animosities,
rivalries, which make Malayan
politics
so confused
and
on 14 Dec.
of Joint Action.
in Singapore
1946 as the Council
"Pan
initially established
was added to give it a more explicitly
focus. The organizations
in the
"Malayan"
represented
included
Indian Congress,
the MDU,
the Singapore Women's
the
MNP, Malayan
Federation,
the General
Labour Union,
Clerical
the Straits Chinese
British Association,
Union,
Singapore
Singa
of Commerce
and Singapore
Tamils Association.
pore Indian Chamber
?
to assuage
two of its later coalition
157The change
in name was made
the Associated
partners
?
Chinese
Chambers
of Commerce
which
felt that the term "Pan-Malayan"
domi
denoted
communist
156Itwas
Malayan"
Council
nation
to include only the non-Malays.

which
interpreted
"Malayan"
of radical Malay
to UMNO.
up of a number
groups opposed
159See The People's
Constitutional
Proposals
for Malaya
(Kuala Lumpur,
1947).
160Themost
successful was the country-wide
hartal on 20 Oct.
1947 which paralysed
and PUTERA
158This was made
towns in Malaya.
161
Unlike
UMNO,
PUTERA
coalition
representations
162Gent noted
163Although
nevertheless
the "driving
Oct.
had mobilized
all Malay
almost
the support of all non-Malay
the Consultative
Committee.
through
that the coalition
by their "inability
no. 52243/2/1.
was
which
did not have
to reconcile
was
the MCP
strongly
force" which
was
opinion
opinion,
under
some
its wings,
of whom
not only seriously weakened

by ideological
to Bourdillon,
interests". Gent
4 Oct.
their different
all the main
nearly
the AMCJA
directed
differences
1947, CO
their
but also
537/2148
not directly
in the AMCJA-PUTERA
its influence
coalition,
represented
Service which believed
that the MCP was
by the Malayan
Security
united
action" by all the other "subsidiary
forces". MSS/PIJ
30
"engineered
suspected
1947, p. 1.
164See fn. 141.
was
on 3 Jul. 1947. CAB

128/10 CM (47) 59.
by the Cabinet
at a mass rally at Farrer Park in
first presented
on 21 Sept.
Singapore
1947. On 4 Oct.
1947 Gent
were
that the AMCJA-PUTERA
a draft about"
still "pulling
reported
of their inability to agree on a final version. Gent
because
to Bourdillon,
4 Oct.
no.
1947, CO 537/2148
52243/2/1.
165The Federation
166The People's
,67The term was
scheme
Constitution
used
endorsed
was
at the insistence
of
the PUTERA
members.

242
Albert Lau
so intractable".168 A second British volte

the problem of settling a stable constitution
to
soothe the anti-Federation
opposition would almost certainly erode completely
face
in British sincerity and good intentions and might well force the
Malay confidence
"into channels of 'pan-Indonesian'
reasoned the Colonial Office,
(and anti
Malay,
as opposed
to peninsula progress
in friendship with Bri
development,
European)
tain".169 From July 1947 the Colonial Office,
looking to unfolding events in Indonesia,
had assessed that the situation inMalaya was potentially explosive. The failure to imple
and the onset of Dutch "police action" in the NEI on
ment the Linggadjati Agreement
20 July 1947170 had, on the one hand, unwittingly discredited "the methods of peaceful
political evolution" and, on the other, enhanced the "heady attractions of a revolutio
the Colo
leaders inUMNO,
nary struggle on the Indonesian model".171 The moderate
nial Office noted, were already under intense pressure to mobilize Malay
sympathy
themes.172 It was therefore important that the Malays should be
behind pan-Indonesian
in their commitment to the peaceful constitutional process, the "only satis
strengthened
course
open to Britain at the moment.173 Any impression that Britain was not
factory"
into
"playing straight with them" could "radically" change existing Malay quiescence
the Colo
more extreme modes of political dissent.174 If such an eventuality developed,
nial Office warned, "we might as well clear out of Malaya tomorrow".175 On 1 February
the Malayan Union
and effected a
of Malaya
1948 the Federation
finally displaced
revised, more restrictive, interpretation of the Colonial Office's original conception of
"common
citizenship".
as we have seen, was principally motivated

Planning for Malayan Union Citizenship,
The Second World War not only led to
the
Factor".
of
"Chinese
British
perception
by
a reorientation of Anglo-Malay
relations but had also precipitated a shift in British pol
the
that in Malaya
Office
The
Colonial
the
Chinese.
towards
anticipated
icy
war
to
not
from
was
arise
after
the
for
Britain
Malay
likely
primarily
problem
? was diffused and
?
nationalism which
disunited,
judging from pre-war perceptions
but from the claims of the Malayan Chinese to political rights in view of their numerical
?
a claim which the British
power and political organization
strength, economic
could not ignore given the wartime sacrifices of the Chinese and the prob
government
able emergence
of, and the political pressure exerted by, a strong KMT China as a
major regional power in post-war Southeast Asia. The Colonial Office consequently
devised, and secured Cabinet sanction, for a new policy that would anticipate, rather
?
a policy which corres
than be induced by, Chinese post-war demands for Malaya
and necessarily
so, detracted from the pre-war policy that favoured the
pondingly,
Malays.
These assumptions, however,

to British planning perceptions,
were overturned by post-war developments.

Contrary
a united Malay nationalism emerged after the war to
no. 52243/2/1.
13 Nov.
168Minute by Morris,
1947, CO 537/2148
no. 52243/2 Pt II.
18 Sept.
1947, CO 537/2146
in Indonesia
and Revolution
17?See G.M. Kahin, Nationalism
1952), pp. 196-212.
(Ithaca,
no. 52834.
171Note by Morris,
n.d., CO 537/2177
"Now is the time for the people
for example,
172On 27 Jul. 1947, Dato Onn b. Jaafar declared,
Ibid.
the Indonesians."
towards
to show their true feelings
Malaya
173Ibid.
ibid.
13 Nov.
1947,
18 Sept.
1947, CO
537/2146
no.
52243/2
Pt.
II

of
Malayan
Union Citizenship
243
challenge the logic of the British Malayan Union policy and its liberal interpretation of
common citizenship. The British were consequently
induced to enter into negotiations,
at first exclusively, with the Malays in order to ensure that Malay opinion, so far mod
in
and adopt the example of their brethren
erate, would not become anti-British
Indonesia who were in open and armed resistance against the Dutch. Bowing toMalay
that the original citizenship provisions had
pressure, Britain was forced to acknowledge
been too broadly drawn and compelled to whittle down these terms to accommodate
the citizenship proposals evoked
Malay demands. Contrary also to British perceptions,
to soothe Malay
only lukewarm interest from the Chinese, facilitating their withdrawal
also did not materialize
in China.
feelings. A united and strong KMT government
in a civil war with the Chinese communists. Con
Instead, the KMT was embroiled
fronted with the uncertain situation in China and the serious challenge mounted by the
in Malaya,
MCP
the British saw the importance of a local base of mass support to
?
a base they found in the Malays who were less sus
underpin their regime inMalaya
the citizenship categories to
ceptible to the ideological pull of communism. Broadening
embrace the "Chinese Factor" made little sense when the unresolved
issues of divided
fuelled by developments
in the international and
loyalties and ideological antagonism,
seemed once again ready to open up old wounds in the Malayan
regional environments,
body politic.


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Department of History, National University of Singapore

Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942-48

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20071081 .

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Vol. XX, No. 2

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional

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study of the rationale for, and the key stages

del Tufo, Malaya:

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and has not

the latter were

at least two mercantile

(Mar. 1933), p. 26.

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in June 1939, Thomas reported that he anticipated difficulties as itwas "not

and custom. A complete

This content downloaded from 103.26.196.190 on Mon, 14 Apr 2014 13:07:42 PM

concerned and the High Commissioner

Thomas was instructed in October

This content downloaded from 103.26.196.190 on Mon, 14 Apr 2014 13:07:42 PM

fear of the Malays

No serious consideration of nationality questions therefore transpired in the Colonial

in the Far East",

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section of the BBC in London,

argued, should be abolished and all persons

who had renounced allegiance

feared it would end in the "eclipse of the Malays" as there

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From June 1943, the Colonial Office had also moved

1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/9.

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progressive policy that would strengthen "the will of the people of

and their alleged co-operation

with the Japanese

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49Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya,

party in China by Sun

1936 and Mar.

Star Over Malaya,

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sympathy for the Chinese was

further stirred when it became known that

been superfluous amidst such descriptions of brutality.

thinking about its post-war Chinese policy. There was,

almost certainly exert in the

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Japanese by preserving (apparently after an early flirtation with a United Malaya)

As for Adams' apprehensions,

and Indian settlers". Carefully handled, Gent believed it should be possible to

1945 opened the way for the introduction of the

27 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no.

the First Lord

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Sir Harold MacMichael's

of the Straits Settlements

and two Malays were killed and several more

? which revealed for the

The unveiling of the new policy in the January White

The citizenship provisions, which sought to benefit the Chinese,

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in Malaya, we must either openly declare or quietly consent that we are