A Critique of Secular Nationalism

The Insurrection of Little Selves: The Crisis of Secular Nationalism in India by Aditya Nigam
Review by: M. S. S. Pandian
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41, No. 51 (Dec. 23-29, 2006), pp. 5240-5241
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Ieviews

A Critique of
Nationalism
Secular
The Insurrection of Little Selves:
The Crisis of Secular Nationalism
in India
by AdityaNigam;
OxfordUniversityPress, Delhi, 2006;
pp 331, Rs 650.
M S S PANDIAN
Tn a political milieu where the main-

stream discourse is trapped within

the binary of secular vs communal, it is
no doubt a difficult task for anyone to
develop a critique of secular nationalism
and still be counted as radical. Aditya
Nigam provocatively takes up this
task in his book. The book not only offers
us a radical critique of secular nationalism
in India, but also urges us to move
beyond offering it as the only antidote to
communalism.
Nigam's well-argued thesis against
secular nationalism in India unfolds
within a larger critique of modernity and
its claims. Drawing on the works of Hannah
Arendt and Eric Fromm, he argues that
modernity not always produced the
individuated citizen-subject, but also the
"fearof freedom".This fear promptsthose
who are dislocated by modernity to seek
relocation in community or identification
with external figures of authority. Thus
"the modern subject that was expected
to simply ascend from the constitutive
attachments of community life into the
realm of citizenship, actually followed
a very different trajectoryand revealed in
the process, the complex nature of
'free will' and disengaged agency"
(p 3). Modernity, in its self-arrogating
certitude, refuses to acknowledge this
inevitable ambiguity of its career and the
co-presence of different temporalities.
Instead, it represents other voices as
survivals from the past without any
credible future. As Nigam rightly shows,

5240

thisclaimto universalismis the sourceof

modernity's violence. For him, "...to
acceptthe existenceof...differenttimes,
irreducibleto any othermoreprivileged
one, is to argue for a fundamentally
differentkindof contingenttotality,that
has no singularlogos thatgovernsall its
levels" (pp 20-21).
Againstthis broadtheoreticalcanvas,
Nigam develops his critique of Indian
secularnationalism.Treatingtheassertion
of a range of new identitiesin Indian
politics duringthe 1980s and the 1990s
(which he, following Michel Foucault,
calls "theinsurrectionof littleselves")as
a comment on the pre-existingsecular
"consensus"
thatcitizen-subject
is theonly
legitimateidentityin politics,he unravels
the underside of secular nationalism.
Accordingto him, thoughthe assertions
of new identitiesbeganduringthe 1970
(as evidentin theriseof KarpooriThakur
as the icon of the backwardcastes in
Bihar, the AnandpurSahib resolution
passed by ShiromaniAkali Dal in 1973,
Left Frontgovernment'smemorandum
of 1977 seeking higher share of power
to states, etc), the political changes
witnessed during the 1980s and the
1990s wereof criticalimportance.
Nigam
writes,"Isuggestthatthe 1980srepresent
one moment of ruptureand the 1990s
another. The first moment ruptured
the secular-nationalistdiscourse 'from
below', the second 'from above', representingnationstrikingback"(p 85).
The first momentis representedby the
mobilisationof backwardcastes, dalits,
women, etc, and the second momentby
the rise of Hindutva.As Nigam shows
convincingly,thisreturnof therepressed
is indeedthesourceof secularnationalism'
s
currentcrisis- a crisis thatdisclosesthe
limitsof secularismas a radicaldiscourse.
In short, the political churningsof the
1980s and the 1990s demonstratethat
the singularinsistenceon citizen-subject
by secularnationalismblocksthe arrival

of minorityidentities in the public sphere

while keeping majoritarian politics
at bay.
Proceeding further, Nigam tempers
this argument by showing that secular
nationalism, despite its claims to be
deracinated, is unwittingly Hindu and
upper caste in its orientation: "...there
is something in the abstractuniversalism
of secular modern politics and its understanding of Progress and History,
that, in its effort to erase markers of
difference, privileges the dominant/
majority culture as the norm. By delegitimising such difference anddisallowing articulations of 'different' voices,
modem secular universalisms reproduce
the common sense of the dominant/majority cultures as hegemonic" (p 73).
This quality of secular nationalism, which
is sedimented in the constant invocation
of categories such as efficiency, merit,
and productivity, comes in the way of
minority cultures identifying with it.
Drawing on instances of alternative
histories narrativised by dalits and Muslims, Nigam shows that secular
nationalism's conceptualisation of time as
a movement from community to citizensubject, does not accommodate their
interests. He argues, "...if the early
dalitbahujanassertions in the personalities
of Ambedkar, Periyar, Iyothee Thass,
and such others, resist the incorporation
into the nationalist narratives, so does
the present dalit movement resist the
bid to assimilate its voice into that of
secularism" (p 228).

Sites for Radical Politics

Sidestepping the rigidities and exclusions which are inherent in the secular
nationalist reasoning, Nigam argues for
the domain unrecognised by the modern
civil society, i e, the political society, as
the site of radical politics. As he notes,
"...in the secular stance, the state alone
is the agent of seculartransformationwhile
communities - if they ever come into the
picture - are locked in sectarian strife"
(p 167). In a significant and politically
important move, he recovers the grass
rootspolitical worker who abandons high
secularism but chooses to be part of the

Economicand PoliticalWeekly December23, 2006

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communityin order to transformit, as

the figure for alternativepolitics: "The
modernconstitutionalist
languageof civil
of convercannot
be
the
language
society
sation in politicalsociety. Here the key
figure,as I havesuggested,is thebilingual
whospeaksatoncethe
intellectual/activist
of
language community and the civil
society. In other words, the privileged
positionof the enlightenedintelligentsia
has to be abandoned"(p 325). His own
fieldworkamongtheLeftpoliticalworkers in West Bengal offers interestinginstances of how these bilingual activists
conduct their politics on ground transgressing the rigid boundariesbetween
communityand state, civil society and
politicalsociety.
Theoreticallyexpansiveandempirically
rich,the book does succeedin its task of
radicalcritique
developinga much-needed
of secularnationalismin India.The book
also covers substantialnew ground in
looking for alternativesfor the limits of
thealtersecularnationalism.Importantly,
nativepoliticalpossibilitiesthatit outlines
are worthy of serious considerationby
anyone who is committedto the everelusive ideals of equality and freedom
whichmodernityfailsto deliverdespiteits
promises.In furtheringthe accomplishments of this importantbook, I have a
plea and a suggestion. The plea follows
frommydifficultywiththebook'sdegree
of certitudeaboutthe alternativepolitics
it offers. I will argue here for a greater
degreeof ambivalence.This is so because
of little selves"
neitherthe "insurrection
nor the figure of the bilingual activist
needs to be necessarily the vehicle for
alternativeradicalismforalltimes.Itdoes
not take much time for eitherto nurture
dreamsof dominationandhegemony.In
other words, it is not so much "little
selves" in themselvesbut their shifting
careersin the lived worldof politics that
needsourconstantattention.My suggestion is aboutthe possibilityof alternative
as a necessary
modes of representations
part of radical politics. The crisis of
secular nationalismand the violence of
communalism
flow,asthebookablyshows,
fromthe single premiseof treatingidentitiesas singularandbounded.Giventhis,
I think, it is time to think how to
conceptualisea politics that consciously
basesitself on representations
of multiple
belongings.l, T
Email:mathiaspandian@gmail.com

The
KnowledgeDebate
Reopened
would impact ourlives in acapitalist world
is indeed astounding (GCMS, p 12). Not
only his prescience, but the power of his
metaphors is also striking:
A man, whilst he is dreaming,believes in
his dream;he is undeceived only when he
is awakened from his sleep. A man
labouringunderthe bane of civilisation is
ANANYA VAJPEYI
like a dreamingman. (...). But thereis no
end to the victims destroyedin the fire of
civilisation. Its deadlyeffect is thatpeople
come underits scorchingflames believing
it to be all good (HindSwaraj, pp 35, 43).
he largerprojectof whichthis review
is a partseeksto developa freshtheory
Gandhi's critique of "civilisation" has
Indiansoci- everything to do with the role of science
of knowledgeincontemporary
ety. A full or even partialtheoreticalar- - what Sahasrabudhey insists we call
ticulationof such a theory will not be "modem science" - in the present time.
attemptedhere.My pointof entryintothe That so much tragedy underlies scientific
discourseon knowledge,to theextentthat advances in modernity is a surprise only
it hasbeenarticulated
at all in Indiatoday, to those who, like Gandhi's sleeping man,
is SunilSahasrabudhey's
smallbutimpor- dream the dream of civilisation. In
tantrecentvolume,Gandhi'sChallengeto Sahasrabudhey's redaction of Gandhi,
ModernScience.The authorpositionshis modem science is not a moral science. This
workas perhapsthe firstsignificantcom- is because rationality,in the west, is falsely
mentaryon,aswell asfurtherdevelopment construed as being value-free.

Gandhi's Challenge to Modern

Science
by Sunil Sahasrabudhey;
The Other India Press, Goa, 2002;
pp 90, Rs 90.

of, Gandhi'sHind Swaraj(1909), in the

21stcentury.I HindSwarajis itselfahighly
retains
compressedbook;Sahasrabudhey
this'sutra'-likequalityinhiscommentarial
text.It's clearthatanelaborateexposition
of Gandhi's politics before and after
Hind Swarajmustbe readbackinto it in
orderto unpackits terseformulations.In
a similar fashion, an understandingof
the People's Science, the Alternative
Science,the Appropriate
Technology,the
Greenandthe Peace movementsin India
andelsewherein the worldfromthe late1970s to the mid-1990sis necessaryfor
a proper reading of Gandhi's Chalit is notpossible
lenge....2 Unfortunately
to undertakesuchexercisesin the limited
scope of this article.

Science is the victor. Its drawing room is

full of shields,medalsandcups. And while
it reigns,who can ask how they were won?
(...). Science - andoften even technology
- stands exonerated of all disasters and
antihuman consequences. These are
clubbed under the label of "misuse" of
scienceandtechnologyandtheentireblame
is shifted over to users, planners and
politicians. Is it not paradoxicalthat one
side in the balance sheet of science is
entirelyvacant?(...). If science is credited
with good consequences, it ought to be
blamedfor its badconsequences.It is here
precisely that the question of the relation
of science with morality arises. (...).
[Values] according to Gandhi must be
internalto science. It is not enough that
it is doneby moralmen andwomen, which
itself is a tallorder,butscience itself should
be moral.
II
For moral science, pure reason must give
Fromthe rich arrayof materialscomway to a concept of human reason. (...).
pactedwithinHindSwaraj,Sahasrabudhey [And] if pure reason is to be replacedby
human reason then scientific temper has
is mostconcernedwithGandhi'scritiques
of "civilisation"and of the "machine". to be replacedby humanisttemper(GCMS,
callsGandhi"aphilosopher pp 1, 27, 33).
Sahasrabudhey
of the future",and the Mahatma'svision
In a series of arguments about the onabout the way science and technology tology, the epistemology, the logic, andthe

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5241