.Beyond the 'Outer Crescent': the Mackinder century in New Zealand geopolitics.

(Halford Mackinder)
The Geographical Journal; 12/1/2004; Mayell, Peter

Search for more information on HighBeam Research for geopolitics.

This paper proposes that, although Mackinder never mentions New Zealand in his influential 1904 paper
and despite the absence of a formal Kiwi geopolitical tradition, 'The geographical pivot of history' provides
a useful framework with which to approach New Zealand geopolitics. The argument uses two
Mackinderian ideas to suggest three phases in New Zealand's security relationships during the Mackinder
century. First, New Zealand's commitment to Mackinder's 'pivot area' notion of 'imperial defence' and
'collective security' characterized its dependent security phase. Between 1973 and 1990/91 there was a
transitional security phase towards Mackinder's second 'global interconnectedness' idea. Third, this shift led
to a current interdependent security phase which is characterized by the recognition that New Zealand's
security relationships, despite its geographic isolation, are mutually dependent on political, economic, and
military events around the world. The impact of 11 September 2001 and the consequent 'war on terror' are
also considered. The paper concludes by suggesting that New Zealand's post-conflict reconstruction efforts
in Afghanistan and Iraq point to the continuing relevance of Mackinder's 'The geographical pivot of history'
to New Zealand geopolitics.
KEY WORDS: Mackinder, 'The geographical pivot of history', New Zealand geopolitics
I once went to a coastal city in California to receive an award from a
local peace foundation in recognition of New Zealand's efforts towards
disarmament ... The award itself was a handsome creation. Etched on
thick glass was a map of the world, its centre the Pacific Ocean. Only
one detail was missing. In the space to the east of Australia where
New Zealand should have been, the map showed nothing but ocean. It's
hard to make an impact when your country falls off the end of the
world.
Former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange 1990, 98
The paradox of New Zealand geopolitics
The reader familiar with Mackinder's influential 1904 article 'The geographical pivot of history' will note
the geopolitical paradox of a born and bred Kiwi contributing a New Zealand reflection to this centenary
issues. This paradox arises for three reasons. First, Mackinder never mentions New Zealand, and although
its two main islands--in contrast to Lange's disarmament award--do appear on 'The natural seats of power'
map, its position relative to Mackinder's 'Outer Crescent' is ambiguous at best. Mackinder's list of 'Outer
Crescent' states does not include New Zealand, which is a long way from the listed core states of 'Britain,
South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan' (1904, 436). Second, New Zealand is also
omitted from Mackinder's list of 'New Europes' that 'were created in the vacant lands discovered in the
midst of the waters' (1904, 433), yet at the time New Zealand was the quintessential British colony. Third,
the geopolitics sub-discipline of political geography that Mackinder's paper is commonly held to have
founded, even if 'retroactively' (O Tuathail 1996, 23), has never been strong in New Zealand universities.
Consequently, this Kiwi reflection does not represent an established New Zealand 'geopolitical tradition'
(Dodds and Atkinson 2000). Indeed, little academic work has been undertaken on New Zealand geopolitics.
The articles by Dalby (1993) and Johnston (1997) are exceptions. Both are limited, however, by their
necessary brevity and consequent narrowing to particular periods. In Dalby's case the focus is the epitome
of recent New Zealand geopolitics; the nuclear-free policy of the mid-1980s. Johnston's approach is
broader, beginning in 1945, but it still leans towards the nuclear-free drama. Moreover, that neither of these
authors are New Zealanders illustrates the absence of 'home-grown' geopolitic(ian)s. Instead, Kiwi
academics documenting New Zealand 'geopolitics' reside in international relations (e.g. Kennaway and
Henderson 1991), history (e.g. McGibbon 1991), and sociology (e.g. Clements 1988). Political geographer

Harris has written some articles on New Zealand 'geopolitics', for example his short 1991 paper, but this
discussion is also limited by a nuclear-free focus, the global upheavals of the time, and because 'geopolitics'
is mentioned only twice.
This situation is also paradoxical because New Zealand is a worthwhile place to engage in 'formal
geopolitics'. New Zealand's millennium-long occupation by the indigenous Maori people, colonial
settlement, dominance, and subsequent transition to a post-colonial society gives it a familiar but unique
life story. New Zealand's isolation and smallness, but size and wealth relative to its South Pacific
neighbours, places it in the curious position of being global periphery but regional core. New Zealand's
neo-liberal economic reforms that began in 1984 were amongst the earliest and harshest undertaken
anywhere in the world, offering early insights into the 'geo-economics' of what is now known as
'globalization'. The list could go on, but the point is made: the absence of a formal New Zealand
geopolitical tradition is an anomaly deserving redress.
The Mackinder century in New Zealand geopolitics
From beyond the 'Outer Crescent' (but not quite 'off the end of the world'!) I use the occasion of
Mackinder's centenary to initiate an overdue discussion of New Zealand geopolitics. Despite the above
paradoxes 'The geographical pivot of history' provides a useful conceptual framework with which to
approach this understudied subject. Two of Mackinder's 1904 ideas have characterized three periods in the
geopolitics of New Zealand's security relationships. By 'security relationships' I mean New Zealand's
defence policies and its interactions with other states regarding local, regional, and global military security
issues. The domestic and foreign dimensions are taken together because, as this paper will illustrate, they
are inextricably linked. Moreover, these security relationships are the focus because this aspect of New
Zealand foreign policy is the most appropriate for an opening geopolitical analysis, especially from a
Mackinderian perspective. Mackinder's two ideas employed here are his initial notion of 'imperial defence',
which later evolved into the concept of 'collective security', and his 'global interconnectedness' hypothesis.
Mackinder's most famous idea was that the 'pivot area' provided its occupying state a natural advantage in
the European 'balance of power' struggle. This geographical edge threatened the dominance of the British
empire. Mackinder sought to maintain Britain's position by preventing the rise of competing powers,
especially those located in this favourable 'pivot area'. Thus Mackinder argued that the 'pivot area' power
had to be countered by non-'pivot area' states to protect the British empire. Mackinder makes this 'imperial
defence' argument as follows:
The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state,
resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia,
would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleetbuilding, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This
might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia. The threat
of such an event should, therefore, throw France into alliance with
the oversea(s) powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea
would become so many bridge heads where the outside navies would
support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and
prevent them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets.
Mackinder 1904, 436
Mackinder (1919 1943) later updated this analysis by proposing that the occupying power of a redefined
Eurasian 'heartland', by then the Soviet Union, was geographically predisposed to world domination. After
World War Two, Mackinder's 'heartland theory' was reflected in the new 'collective security' strategies of
the Western alliance, now led by the US, during the Cold War. By 'collective security' I mean the formal
political and military agreements between Western states designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe
and the global spread of communism.
Mackinder's less famous idea was that the end of geographical exploration meant the world was now a
single connected entity within which events in any part of the globe could reverberate around and impact

on other parts of the world. This 'closing of political space' idea was common within the wider geopolitical
conversation across Europe and the Atlantic at the time Mackinder wrote. Mackinder's point, however, has
usually been downplayed in recent literature in favour of the 'pivot area' idea, but it is worth recalling here.
In Mackinder's words:
From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall
again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less
that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social
forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of
unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the
far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and
economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.
Mackinder 1904, 422
In the current era of accelerating global interactions it is remarkable that Mackinder, already credited with
establishing geopolitics, should have also predicted a world so much like today's. However, it is the second
sentence of this passage that is the most significant, because it connects 'global interconnectedness' to the
need for 'collective security' against 'explosions of social forces'. There is no further 'far side of the globe'
and no more 'weak element' in the 'political and economic organism of the world' than New Zealand. It
seems, therefore, an ideal place to explore the contemporary insightfulness of 'The geographical pivot of
history'.
Consequently, Mackinder's two ideas are used to propose three phases in the geopolitics of New Zealand's
security relationships. First, New Zealand's unconditional commitment to the 'imperial defence' of Britain
and, after 1945, to US-led 'collective security' during the Cold War characterized its dependent security
phase of the first two-thirds of the Mackinder century. From 1973 a growing dissatisfaction with this
dependency and a simultaneous recognition that New Zealand's security, despite its geographic isolation, is
mutually dependent on political, economic and military events in other parts of the world characterized the
second transitional security phase. Since 1990/91 this shift has seen Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness'
idea characterize the current interdependent security phase. This paper outlines these three periods by
noting the major geopolitical events affecting New Zealand's security relationships during the Mackinder
century.
This Kiwi reflection differs from the recent literature on Mackinder and from the minimal literature on New
Zealand geopolitics. In contrast to O Tuathail (1992, 102), who sought to 'out Mackinder in his place' by
placing his texts 'back in the place and time in which they were generated', I pull Mackinder beyond the
'Outer Crescent' by demonstrating his relevance to New Zealand geopolitics. Whereas Mayhew (2000)
placed Mackinder's 'new' political geography within the established geographical tradition, I illuminate the
possibility of using Mackinder to begin a formal New Zealand geopolitics. I redress the common
downplaying of Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness' idea by giving this equal standing with his more
prominent 'pivot-area' idea. Moreover, while acknowledging the importance of Dalby's (1993) critical
geopolitics of nuclear-free New Zealand, I identify other aspects worth investigating. Although Johnston
(1997) puts the transformation of New Zealand's security relationships in the context of its post-World War
Two alignment with the US, I trace New Zealand geopolitics back another half-century to its British
colonial origins. As Harris (1991) considers the consequences of New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation on
its post-Cold War security relationships, I conclude by raising the impacts of 11 September 2001 and the
'war on terrorism'.
Finally, because Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness' appears set to characterize New Zealand's security
relationships into the foreseeable future, 'The geographical pivot of history' is itself mounted on a centenary
pivot, allowing a look back over the first Mackinder century and then, swivelling 180 degrees, offering an
insight into the beginning of the second Mackinder century. This discussion therefore echoes the comments
of Leo Amery after Mackinder's address:
It is always enormously interesting if we can occasionally get away
from the details of everyday politics and try to see things as a

whole, and this is what Mr Mackinder's most stimulating lecture has

done for us tonight. He has given us the whole of history and the
whole of ordinary politics under one big comprehensive idea.
Amery 1904, 439
In this initial discussion of New Zealand geopolitics the 'one big comprehensive idea' is that, although
Mackinder never mentions New Zealand, his two ideas have characterized three phases in its security
relationships during the Mackinder century.
Dependent security
My paternal grandfather, Ben Mayell, was a Private in the 15th North Auckland Regiment and was
wounded at Bapaume, France on 24 August 1918. Two years earlier, his brother, Charles Mayell, a Private
in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, was killed in action during the New Zealand Division's attack on Flers,
during the Battle of the Somme, on 15 September 1916. There is a monument commemorating this attack at
the Caterpillar Valley War Cemetery near Longueval, as well as a long list of New Zealand soldiers 'whose
graves are known only to God'. This list includes the name of 'Mayell, CJ'. His combat death in a foreign
field is a typical story in New Zealand society and represents the wartime sacrifices of previous Kiwi
generations. These sacrifices are enshrined in the national memorial day: not the British 'Remembrance
Day' anniversary of the armistice celebrated every 11 November, but 'ANZAC Day', commemorated every
25 April. This date is the anniversary of the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps landing at Gallipoli,
Turkey in 1915 in an 'ill-fated campaign' (McGibbon 1991, 256) that cost 2700 New Zealand lives and
4800 injuries, in addition to 8000 Australian dead and 18 000 wounded (McGibbon 2003).
My great uncle's name on a war memorial half-a-world-away in Europe, the Gallipoli campaign, and
ANZAC Day symbolize New Zealand's early commitment to 'imperial defence' that characterized its first
dependent security phase of the Mackinder century. New Zealand's security relationships were based on
two geopolitical assumptions. First, New Zealand assumed that its security interests were synonymous with
those of Britain. This assumption led New Zealand to loyally fulfil, beginning with its participation in the
Boer War in South Africa, Mackinder's (1904, 436) expectation of the supporting role of British colonies in
countering the 'pivot area': 'May not this in the end prove to be the strategical function of India in the
British Imperial system?'. As an advocate of imperial unity, Mackinder would surely have been impressed
with the colony's contribution to British 'imperial defence'. Second, New Zealand assumed that Britain was
as committed to New Zealand's security as it was to 'imperial defence'. This assumption led New Zealand to
believe that by participating in Britain's wars it would prove itself to be worthy of defence by Britain if and
when it was threatened. Britain, in other words, was New Zealand's military security guarantor.
Thus, a generation after Gallipoli, New Zealand was again alongside Britain at the outbreak of World War
Two. Once more New Zealand forces rushed to defend Britain and its interests, eventually serving in
Europe, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This colonial loyalty was epitomized when
Japan entered the war: the majority of New Zealand forces remained in northern hemisphere theatres rather
than being recalled to counter this more imminent threat (Henderson 1984). This contrasted with the
Australian policy which prioritized the Pacific war. Instead, New Zealand's security was synonymous with
and dependent upon Britain's.
These two assumptions, however, also embodied the subservient character of New Zealand's commitment
to 'imperial defence' (McGibbon 1991). New Zealand's dependent security arose because it depended on
Britain for guidance, if not instruction, on security issues. Indeed, New Zealand's commitment to 'imperial
defence' was enshrined in Prime Minister Sydney Holland's 1956 geopolitical position: 'New Zealand goes
and stands where the Mother country goes and stands'. This modus operandi was used to justify New
Zealand's political support of the unpopular British, French, and Israeli military intervention, which not
even the US condoned, during the Suez crisis. This support was another example of New Zealand assuming
it had to follow Britain; an assumption still evident a generation later when Prime Minister Robert Muldoon
echoed Holland when commenting, on the despatch of a navy frigate to assist Britain in the Falklands war,
that 'We are a free and independent nation but in time of trouble we stand with our mother country' (both
quoted in Johnston 1997, 51).

After World War Two, however, it slowly became apparent that both of these assumptions were
problematic. The process of decolonization in the 1960s raised the contradiction between New Zealand's
political support for the principle of self-determination and its military participation in British operations
against 'insurrections' in Borneo, Malaya, and Indonesia. This tension opened the possibility that New
Zealand and Britain did not always have synonymous security interests. Moreover, Britain's surrender to
the Japanese at Singapore had demonstrated that New Zealand could no longer rely on Britain as its
security guarantor, prompting the 1944 negotiation of the Canberra Pact with Australia. This initial search
for a new security relationship continued when New Zealand was a founding member of the United Nations
and demonstrated its commitment through its participation in the Korean War. The rising communist 'threat'
demanded a new Cold War security guarantor, however, so the ad hoc (Pacific) wartime alliance between
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was formalized in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty.
This agreement was part of the 'collective security' update, based on the re-defined (Soviet) 'heartland' of
world domination, of Mackinder's initial 'pivot area' notion of 'imperial defence'. The ANZUS Treaty was
the last link in the NATO-CENTO-SEATO chain 'containing' the Soviet Union and established military
cooperation, enabled the exchange of intelligence information, and included the ultimate 'collective
security' clause: a military attack on one partner would be regarded by the other two partners as a military
attack on all three (Burnett 1988). This provision installed the US as New Zealand's new security guarantor
and continued its dependent security.
This 'new' dependency meant New Zealand, virtually by default, politically and militarily supported the US
intervention in Vietnam and despatched its first troops there in 1965. The Vietnam action, however, became
as unpopular in New Zealand as it did in the US. By the late 1960s opposition groups began questioning
both New Zealand's involvement and the intervention itself. These dissenters included faith-based groups,
women's organizations, environmentalists, peaceniks, and socialists. Also included were rank-and-file
members and members of parliament of the leftist Labour Party, one of New Zealand's two major
mainstream political parties, then in opposition to the rightist National Party government. The questioning
of New Zealand's involvement was a result of the absence of any obvious New Zealand interest in
defending South Vietnam. For the first time the synonymity assumption was openly challenged (Henderson
1984) and this critique inevitably exposed the dependent character of New Zealand's security relationships.
The raison d'etre of these dissenting groups vanished when the Vietnam intervention was scaled down from
the early 1970s. This public questioning, however, was already strong enough to withstand this
evaporation. Focus shifted to the broader Cold War problematic of nuclear weapons and deterrence as
represented by French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. This popular demand to reconsider New
Zealand's security relationships marked the end of its dependent security phase.
Transitional security
In 1973 three major events began a transitional security phase away from Mackinder's 'imperial
defence'/'collective security' and towards 'global interconnectedness'. First, Britain's accession to the
European Economic Community exposed the reliance, and thus vulnerability, of New Zealand's vital
agricultural export industries. Similarly, the first oil crisis highlighted New Zealand's dependence on
imported Middle Eastern oil and its potential jeopardy by a close alignment with the US. Finally, New
Zealand's small nuclear-free movement moved into mainstream politics through two interrelated events.
First, New Zealand succeeded with its legal appeal to the World Court for an injunction against France's
atmospheric nuclear testing because of detrimental environmental and health effects over the South Pacific
(Clements 1988). Second, Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk despatched HMNZS Otago to Mururoa
Atoll to protest at a French atmospheric nuclear test conducted in defiance of the World Court ban.
The momentum of 1973, however, immediately stalled. In 1974 Kirk, a staunch advocate of a reorientation
of New Zealand's foreign policy and of a nuclear-free New Zealand, died in office. The following year the
Labour government lost the election, beginning a decade of National Party rule. The new Prime Minister,
Robert Muldoon, was committed to a close alignment with the US and reinvigorated New Zealand's
commitment to 'collective security'. ANZUS became the cornerstone of New Zealand's security

relationships, as represented by the increase in US Navy nuclear-ship visits. Moreover, Muldoon's

domineering personality expelled the nuclear-free movement from the corridors of power.
This reinvigoration, however, was opposed by an increasingly popular 'grassroots "nuclear-free zone"
movement' (Dalby 1993, 438) that gathered significant momentum as households, businesses, schools,
churches, streets, neighbourhoods and local councils declared themselves nuclear-free. The National
government's arguments in defence of nuclear-ship visits, ANZUS, and Cold War 'collective security' only
emboldened the nuclear-free movement. Increasing protests at ongoing underground French nuclear testing
at Mururoa and nuclear-ship visits highlighted the growing divergence between public sentiment and
government policy. The Labour Party opposition, having always been on the fringes of the nuclear-free
movement, became the focus of mainstream attempts to re-shape government policy. The first serious
assault came in early 1984, when Labour proposed legislation that would ban nuclear weapons and nuclear
power from New Zealand. When two of National's own members of parliament voted for the bill--it was
only defeated because two independent members voted against it--Muldoon called a snap election.
Labour's nuclear-free policy assisted in its election victory on 14 July. New Zealand's transitional security
at the government level resumed. There would be no going back this time. The incoming government, led
by the new Prime Minister David Lange, began implementing the nuclear-free policy. A diplomatic crisis
within ANZUS, particularly between Washington and Wellington, immediately erupted. US Secretary of
State George Schultz was the first of many Western representatives to visit Wellington to admonish the
government for its misguided legislation and to warn the New Zealand public of its naivete. According to
the Cold Warriors, New Zealand was reneging on its agreement with its ANZUS partners and Western
allies. The accusation followed that New Zealand was getting a 'free-ride' by living under the Western
nuclear umbrella but not bearing its share of the burden (Graham 1987). Whatever the good intentions and
democratic merits of the nuclear-free policy, the Soviet threat demanded that New Zealand tolerate nuclear
testing and accept nuclear-ship visits. New Zealand, regardless of its smallness, isolation, and unique
geopolitical perspective, would not be allowed to get away with this nuclear-free nonsense, lest 'the Kiwi
disease' (Dalby 1993) spread to other states and the whole Western alliance was infected. In other words,
the rules of Mackinderian 'collective security' had to be fully adhered to by all.
The popular nuclear-free movement and the government's nuclear-free policy were of course juxtaposed
against this Cold War geopolitical reasoning. The great Soviet threat that so worried the Western alliance
was essentially imperceptible in New Zealand (Kennaway 1991). After Vietnam, against all predictions, the
dominoes had not fallen. There were no signs of a Moscow takeover 'down under'. The closest Soviet
military base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam was nearer to Paris than Wellington. There was no discernible
domestic 'threat' as Kiwi 'communism' barely existed in any organized form. In the absence of a clear and
present Soviet danger, therefore, the New Zealand nuclear-free movement perceived the nuclear arms race
between the superpowers and the dangerous (il)logic of nuclear deterrence as detracting from, not
contributing to, global, regional, and New Zealand security. That the Cold War came to New Zealand and
the South Pacific only via its allies, through French nuclear testing and US nuclear-ship visits, was an
untenable 'anti-geopolitics' (Dalby 1993, 445) paradox: these activities were the source of rather than the
answer to threats to national and regional security. Nuclear testing and nuclear-ship visits were in fact the
intolerable costs of New Zealand's commitment to an unwanted nuclear umbrella (Johnston 1997). The
Lange government, reflecting the views of the electorate, was determined to break this (in)security
dependency.
The ANZUS crisis transformed New Zealand's security relationships away from Mackinderian 'collective
security' and towards his second 'global interconnectedness' idea. For while the nuclear-free policy rejected
nuclear weapons and deterrence it maintained, even reinvigorated, New Zealand's commitment to
conventional 'collective security' by recognizing that it was not separate from the rest of the world. This
'global interconnectedness' was precisely the reasoning behind banning nuclear weapons. As Lange
explained:
If we watched the northern hemisphere destroy itself, it would be in
the certainty that there is no escape for us. The nuclear winter would
not spare the South Pacific. We would be condemned by decisions in

which we had no part, and by calculations in which we had no

influence.
Lange quoted in Kennaway 1991, 73-4
New Zealand's transitional security was consolidated between 1985 and 1990 by three major events. First,
France's bombing of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, which was about to lead a peace flotilla to
Mururoa, in Auckland harbour on 10 July 1985 entrenched the perception that New Zealand's 'allies'
actually posed the greatest threats to its security. Second, in 1987 the Labour government passed the
nuclear-free legislation and consolidated its own position by winning that year's election. Third, after
defeating the Labour government in the 1990 election the National opposition kept its campaign promise
not to repeal the nuclear-free legislation, making nuclear-free New Zealand a bi-partisan policy. Moreover,
during this time ANZUS became a dead-letter when the US and Australia ended military cooperation,
intelligence exchanges, and the collective security provision with New Zealand. Wellington and
Washington settled into a new security relationship as the US officially downgraded New Zealand's status
from 'ally' to 'friend'.
Interdependent security
This consolidation was followed from 1990/91 by New Zealand's current interdependent security phase,
which is characterized by Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness' idea. The start of the 1990s is crucial for
three reasons. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union meant that New Zealand's nuclear-free status was
no longer the major irritant to the US that it had been just a few years beforehand. The irony was that, after
Western alliance arguments during the ANZUS crisis that nuclear controls were impossible, curbing nuclear
proliferation amongst the newly independent former Soviet republics became a major priority. Second, the
passing of the Cold War caused a decrease in US and Western alliance adherence to Mackinderian
'collective security' and a simultaneous increase in the importance of Mackinder's 'global
interconnectedness'. There was widespread recognition that, despite the euphoria of the Cold War's demise,
the new era held other dangers that had impacts throughout a closed worldwide political system. Nuclear
proliferation was merely at the top of a new list of global security issues that the UN, free of its superpower
veto paralysis, would now be able to deal with and thus fulfil its original promise of global governance.
Third, Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait provided the UN with an early opportunity to prove it could fulfil
this new hope by using its Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms to restore international peace and security.
The US-led multinational coalition that subsequently evicted Iraq from Kuwait appeared to live up to this
new expectation.
The Gulf War was an opportunity for New Zealand to demonstrate its new interdependent security focused
on the rule of international law, the necessity of multilateral action, and the UN monopoly on the legitimate
use of force (Hoadley 1992). The new National government thus perceived Iraq's invasion as a breach of
the prohibition on the use of force and as a significant threat to international peace and security. The status
quo ante could only be restored by a UN-mandated enforcement action. Consequently, New Zealand
renewed its commitment to the original interdependent--as opposed to British or US--notions of 'collective
security' enshrined in the UN Charter and supported UN efforts to reverse Iraq's invasion. When those
diplomatic attempts failed, New Zealand demonstrated its new commitment to a New York (rather than
London or Washington) notion of 'collective security' and contributed military engineers, air transport, and
medical teams to Operation Desert Storm (Macintyre 1991).
Given New Zealand's previous enthusiasm for foreign wars it is notable that its Gulf War contribution did
not include combat troops. This noncombat role represented the beginning of a new emphasis on peaceful,
constructive, and integrated roles for its small military. After the breakdown of ANZUS and the end of the
Cold War, New Zealand reorganized its forces for peacekeeping, surveillance, disaster relief and postconflict reconstruction roles. A National government White Paper advocated a new 'internationalist
approach ... [requiring] a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New
Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are
involved' (quoted in Henderson 1991, 93). This new interdependence was again demonstrated by New
Zealand's renewed commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, including contributions to the troubled
missions in Bosnia and Somalia. Regional commitments were prioritized, however, with New Zealand

extensively involved in the Bougainville peace process, the transitional trauma of East Timor, ethnic
violence and a coup d'etat in Fiji. These operations illustrate how Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness'
characterizes New Zealand's current interdependent security phase.
I wish to conclude by considering the impact of 11 September 2001 and the 'war on terror' on New
Zealand's security relationships. It is difficult to imagine a more profound example to illustrate Mackinder's
'global interconnectedness' idea. Certainly 11 September 2001 was a dramatic 'explosion of social forces'
and the 'war on terror' has involved the shattering of 'weak elements in the political and economic organism
of the world', namely Afghanistan and Iraq. The Labour-led coalition government of Prime Minister Helen
Clark responded, as most of the world did, by expressing its shock, disbelief, and sympathy with the US.
This political solidarity translated into military support with the deployment of New Zealand's small but
elite Special Air Service (SAS) to Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban were perceived
as a clear threat to international peace and security and thus New Zealand endorsed the United States' UNmandated attack on Afghanistan.
While the Afghanistan war and New Zealand's limited contribution was generally supported, the moves
toward war on Iraq from August 2002 were widely unpopular. In keeping with New Zealand's
interdependent security the Clark government maintained that any military action could only be taken with
UN Security Council approval. New Zealand did not support the unilateral use of force by the US and
Britain. Although New Zealand acknowledged the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime it was
unconvinced by White House and Downing Street claims over Iraq's imminent weapons of mass
destruction threat and therefore the justification for war. Moreover, New Zealand was concerned by the
ambiguity of a pre-emptive war under international law and wished to avoid establishing a legal precedent.
Thus, New Zealand supported more diplomatic efforts and continued UN weapons inspections, which it
backed up with a small personnel contribution. When these efforts were sidelined by the Bush and Blair
governments and the war began on 21 March 2003, New Zealand refused to provide any military units,
combatant or non-combatant. Clark then went a controversial step further by suggesting that the Iraq war
would not have happened had Al Gore been US President. The comment prompted an outcry from the US
Embassy and eventually from the State Department. Clark, eager not to end up on the wrong side of Bush's
bipolar 'you're either with us or with the terrorists' policy, was forced to apologize.
New Zealand's political and military non-support of the Iraq war, however, has been put to one side as the
geopolitics of interdependent security has continued to guide its security relationships. The importance of
Mackinder's 'global interconnectedness' is demonstrated in New Zealand's contribution of non-combat
military units to the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This participation is
despite the small size of New Zealand's armed forces and their recent extensive operation in East Timor.
The involvement demonstrates, as the first Gulf War did, how far New Zealand's approach to violence and
war has come during the Mackinder century; from its initial enthusiasm to be a combat participant to
qualifying its support to UN-mandated actions only and focusing on conflict management and/or postconflict reconstruction roles. Thus, the Afghanistan and Iraq deployment also indicates the likelihood that
'global interconnectedness' will continue to characterize New Zealand's interdependent security into the
second Mackinder century.
Conclusion
Given these three proposed phases of its security relationships, the opening paradox of New Zealand
geopolitics is a geographical anomaly. Although Mackinder never mentions New Zealand in 'The
geographical pivot of history', his two ideas of 'imperial defence'/'collective security' and 'global
interconnectedness' are useful for conceptualizing New Zealand's dependent, transitional, and
interdependent security. A commitment towards Mackin-derian 'collective security' characterized New
Zealand's dependent security relationships with firstly Britain and then the US. In a transitional period New
Zealand's security relationships were transformed from this dependency towards Mackinder's 'global
interconnectedness'. Finally, this second idea has characterized New Zealand's post-Cold War security
relationships for the last 15 years of the Mackinder century. Since 11 September 2001, Mackinderian
'global interconnectedness' has characterized New Zealand's navigation through the 'war on terror'.

Moreover, New Zealand's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that this idea looks set to
continue to characterize New Zealand's security relationships into the immediate future.
Thus, from beyond the Outer Crescent, this Kiwi reflection on the Mackinder century was not so
paradoxical after all, and begins an overdue discussion of New Zealand geopolitics. Mackinder may have
left New Zealand out of 'The geographical pivot of history', but it has not, unlike from Lange's disarmament
award, 'fallen off the end of the world'. Indeed, from the above discussion it appears that Mackinder, even a
century on, provides a useful conceptual framework to approach the geopolitics of New Zealand's security
relationships. Perhaps it is not, therefore, so remarkable after all, as O Tuathail claims, 'that a British
geographer writing over 80 [now 100] years ago in a world which is radically different from the present
should appear to exercise such influence and inspire such reverence' (1992, 101-2).
Acknowledgements
I must begin by thanking Neil Smith for pointing out the potential significance of Mackinder's 'global
interconnectedness' idea in a renewed study of 'The geographical pivot of history'. I also thank Klaus Dodds
and James Sidaway for suggesting I convert a draft doctoral thesis chapter into this paper for the Mackinder
centenary project. I am grateful to James Sidaway, Eric Pawson, Peter Perry and especially the two
anonymous referees for comments on an early draft. I am indebted to Eric Pawson and Martin Holland for
their continued support that makes papers like this possible.
This paper was accepted for publication in May 2004
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PETER MAYELL
Department of Geography and National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury,
Christchurch, New Zealand
E-mail: p.mayell@geog.canterbury.ac.nz

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