MARIA GLENNA

December 09, 2011

SIS 610-002

FAILURE OF NONVIOLENCE IN LIBYA

Introduction
During spring 2011 waves of revolutionary demonstrations and protest occurred
in the Arab World in what is now called the Arab Spring. The uprisings in the Arab world
were motivated by a number of factors such as discontent with dictatorship, extreme
poverty, unemployment, human rights violations, government corruption and a call for
changing the regimes. As of December 2011, the uprisings have succeeded in
overthrowing three heads of state: President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, President
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. Still, there are major
ongoing struggles and protests, particularly in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.
Most of the resistance struggles during the Arab Spring started as popular
nonviolent protests. However, some of the struggles have turned violent. For example,
in Egypt and Tunisia the resistance movements succeeded in toppling their head of
state through nonviolent techniques, while the majority of the uprising in Libya became
violent shortly after its start. The different approaches that the resistance struggles in
the Arab world have taken on to achieve their goals raise important questions regarding
the successes and failures of nonviolence in the Arab spring.
The traditional realist perspective signifies that peace through force is the most
effective intervention in overthrowing suppressing regimes. However, a recent study
shows that nonviolent resistance statistically is more effective than violent struggles 1.
Moreover, the study affirms that if a regime shift was caused by a nonviolent campaign
1

According to Chenoweth major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time,
compared with 26 percent for violent resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008).

the emerging state is more likely to develop democracy and less prone to relapse into
civil war than if the former regime was overthrown by violent means2. Consequently
there should generally be strong incentives for the civil society to use nonviolent means
to achieve its goals.
Libya is a country where the nonviolent campaign failed to bring change, while
the violent response brought down the regime. Therefore Libya is an excellent case
study in examining the shortcomings of a nonviolent campaign in a country where
change was possible. This paper therefore aims to examine why nonviolence failed in
Libya. The main findings presented in the paper are that nonviolence failed to overthrow
the regime in Libya because the civil society did not mobilize enough participants in its
nonviolent activities. Moreover, a nonviolent campaign would have had limited chances
of success because of the regimes uncompromising position and lack of dependency on
the Libyan people.
Despite the fact that nonviolence has been used as a tool to bring about social
change for decades, there is still limited research on why nonviolence fails and how to
conduct an effective nonviolent intervention. By studying the reasons for the successes
and failure of nonviolence, we can understand how peace can be achieved through
nonviolence. Furthermore, we can examine which factors are needed to be present in
order to have an effective and successful nonviolent intervention and how to facilitate a
nonviolent intervention, rather than a violent one.
A nonviolent campaign can fail for many reasons and its failure may simply be

Chenoweth (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 213-215

connected with local conditions rather than with general principles. By studying the
failure of nonviolence in Libya, we can learn more about the local conditions in Libya
and how they affected the outcome of the nonviolent activities.
Background on the nonviolent campaign in Libya
From February 15th news agencies reported about the first nonviolent protests
in Libya similar to those in other parts of the Arab world3. The protests were demanding
that Muammar Qaddafi, the official ruler in Libya would step down. According to the
reports, there were a few days of spontaneous and uncoordinated protest in different
cities in Libya, but the mass response was violent activities by riotous mobs that
overwhelmed and killed a few members of Qaddafis security forces4.
Qaddafi answered by repressing the civilians and killing unarmed protesters.
Within days, the rebellion turned violent and comprised almost exclusively of armed
military defectors that turned their guns on Qaddafi5. In this environment, most
unarmed civilians would be likely to just stay safe at home to avoid being caught in
crossfire. Foreign journalists were denied entry to Libya and those who entered risked
being arrested6. Therefore only a limited number of records of events are available and
information about events is hard to verify7. News agencies did report about military
defections and spontaneous protests, but not as a part of an organized campaign. All in
all, there is no support that there ever was an organized nonviolent resistance in Libya.

3
4
5
6
7

See (Sapienza, 2011) and ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011)
("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011)
(Ditz, 2011)
(Halliday, 2011)
(Halliday, 2011)

Theoretical framework
The theory of nonviolence was introduced to a global audience by Mohandas K.
Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who used nonviolence in their civil resistance
work because they saw it as a morally superior form of resistance, but also an effective
method to end injustice8. Strategic nonviolence differs from the morally based approach
in that it looks at the effectiveness of nonviolence as a means to achieve its goals. To
examine why nonviolence in Libya failed, this paper will look at nonviolence through the
lens of strategic nonviolence. Seminal work has been developed by a long line of
scholars, most notably Gene Sharp, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler,
Ackerman and Jack DuVall, Stephen Zunes and Kurt Schock.
Sharp defines nonviolence as [a] general technique of conducting protest,
resistance and intervention without physical violence9. This action can be conducted as
an act for omission, acts of commission or a combination of both10. He presents a
number of activities11 and groups them in three main classes: Nonviolent protests and
persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention12.
There are several ways of measuring the effectiveness of nonviolence and the
different scholars focus on various factors to explain the success of nonviolent
campaigns. This paper will draw from different theories to provide explanations for why
nonviolence in Libya was unsuccessful.
In Why Civil Resistance Works Erika Chenoweth and Maria Stephan approach
8

(Cortright, 2010)
(Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 547
10
(Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 41
11
(Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page chapter 4
12
(Sharp & Paulson, 2005) page 41
9

the question of strategic nonviolence in a systematic manner and present the results of
a study of 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns which all had the goal to overthrow
their regimes13. They tested a number of factors effect on the success rate, particularly
size, security force defections, international sanctions and violent regime repression of
nonviolent campaigns. Based on their findings, Chenoweth & Stephan offer possible
explanations to why nonviolent campaigns statistically have been more successful than
violent ones and reasons for the successes and failures of both types of campaigns14.
Chenoweth & Stephan found that the size of the campaign was the most
significant factor for success, and that as the number of participants increased, the
probability of success for the campaign would also increase15. The highest number of
participants during peak events in the campaign is used to measure the size. However,
Chenoweth & Stephan found that great numbers were insufficient to guarantee
success16 and that the quality of participation may be as important as the quantity 17
in order to create sufficient leverage over the regime. According to their study the
campaigns that were able to cause defections in the security forces would also have a
significantly higher probability of success18.
Kurt Schock has a more methodological approach in Unarmed Insurrections
where he attempts to explain the dynamics of a nonviolent struggle and identifies
challenges for nonviolent campaigns. In his opinion a campaign must meet two basic
13

According to Chenoweth major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time,
compared with 26 percent for violent resistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008).
14
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 10.
15
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 39
16
(Chenoweth, 2011b) page 39
17
(Chenoweth, 2011b) page 39
18
(Chenoweth, 2011b) page 48

conditions to bring change: withstand repression and undermine regime power19. He

notes that campaigns that challenge nondemocratic regimes should expect and prepare
for repression by building their organizational structure and channels for communication
accordingly to survive the repression20. Moreover, by disrupting the regimes
dependence on third parties the campaign can gain leverage and challenge the regime.
Similarly, Ackerman has identified three qualities that a nonviolent campaign
should seek to develop in order to be successful: unity, planning and nonviolent
discipline21. He argues that a united nonviolent campaign will have a stronger impact
because it stands together in ends and means, the organization is unified and they are
able to mobilize supporters from different parts of the society. Moreover, planning is
essential for the campaign to train members and implement nonviolent policies while
nonviolent discipline facilitate conversion by third parties and even members of the
regime22.
Chenoweth & Stephan present the first systematic and extensive study of civil
society campaigns and examine probability for success based on their statistical data.
Hence, their framework will provide a solid basis for studying reasons for the success
and failure of a nonviolent campaign and examination of quantitative and qualitative
factors will therefore be the starting point in this analysis of why nonviolence failed in
Libya. Drawing from the methods of the mentioned scholars this paper will also discuss
these factors: loyalty, tactical diversity and innovation, discipline, planning and training.
19
20
21
22

(Schock, 2005) page 49

(Schock, 2005) page 49-52
(Ackerman, 2006)
(Ackerman, 2006)

Some critics of nonviolence have raised the issue whether nonviolence works
against ruthless tyrants23 and rentier states24. Therefore these concerns will also be
discussed in this paper.
Quantity of participants
As demonstrated by Chenoweth & Stephan the numbers of participants are the
most significant factor for the success of a nonviolent struggle25. Chenoweth & Stephan
illustrate how the probability of success increases proportionally with the number of
participants during the peak events of the nonviolent activity. If the numbers for
participation in the nonviolent campaign in Libya were low, it would also have an equally
low probability of success.
The reports from news agencies and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) indicate that the nonviolent struggle had few participants. AlJazeera reported that the first major protests started on February 15th in Benghazi, the
second biggest city in Libya26 and that hundreds gathered outside the police station.
According to Libyan bloggers the numbers of protesters gathered in the demonstration
in Benghazi were around 200 people27. Human Rights Watch (HRW) uses similar
numbers and affirms that hundreds of peaceful protesters took to the streets on
February 17th in Baida, Benghazi, Zenten, Derna and Adjabiya28.
The most distinct numbers are from Benghazi. There are no public numbers for
23

(Summy, 1993)
(Zunes, 2011b)
25
Chenoweth attributes the decline in mobilization to the failure of the nonviolent campaign in Burma
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2008).
26
("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011)
27
(Hussaini, 2011)
28
Human Rights Watch ("Security Forces Fire on 'Day of Anger' Demonstrations," 2011)
24

inhabitants in Benghazi, but the population is estimated to 1,087.000 people (2010

estimates)29. If the numbers for the protesters are even remotely correct, not even 1%
of the population in Benghazi participated in the protests. These numbers therefore
indicate that the numbers of protesters were very low and moreover, that the
mobilization failed.
The strong emphasis on numbers of participants during the peak activity has its
limitations. As mentioned, international news agencies were not allowed into Libya
during the beginning of the uprising, and there are few reported numbers of protesters
that are verifiable. Moreover, concerns have been raised regarding the numbers used by
Western media30. Consequently, these numbers have limited relevance.
However, there are other numbers that can indicate a lack of mobilization of the
civil society. Despite his suppressing regime, Qaddafi still had a major basis of
supporters as illustrated by the demonstrations and rallies in his favor in Tripoli. BBC
broadcasts a movie clip from one of these demonstrations claiming that tens of
thousands participated31. Considering the fact that the population in Tripoli is estimated
to 1,191,047 people32 the numbers of participation in Tripoli are also small, but they can
still illustrate a lack of mobilization for a nonviolent uprising. Based on Chenoweth &
Stephans findings about the importance of numbers for a campaigns success, the
failure to mobilize a larger part of the Libyan population is likely to have been an
important factor in the failure of nonviolent uprising in Libya.
29

("Census numbers Benghazi," 2010)

International Crisis Group ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011) page 4
31
("Libya crisis: Thousands at Tripoli pro-Gaddafi rally ", 2011). See also ("Tripoli: a stronghold by day, a
battleground at night," 2011).
32
("Census numbers Tripoli," 2000)
30

Chenoweth & Stephan put a lot of significance in the number of participants, but
do not directly address why movements are unable to mobilize more participants.
However, they explain lacking numbers with a campaigns qualitative properties and
regime type.
Quality of Campaign
Loyalty Shifts
Even campaigns that have started with few supporters in the first place have
been able to mobilize and therefore have more leverage against the regime. The reason
is how nonviolent campaigns tend to attract support from third parties including
bystanders, supporter bases of the regime and even the regime itself33. Moreover,
empirical evidence shows that repression has a tendency to backfire and cause loyalty
shifts in the supporter base of the regime34.
As seen above the nonviolent movement in Libya was quite small and did not
develop. The chances for loyalty shifts were therefore equally limited. Considering the
lack of numbers of participants, it would be nearly impossible to determine if such
loyalty shifts happened and moreover, if they were produced by nonviolent activities.
However, there are indications that the repression did cause loyalty shifts in the
form of security force defections. As mentioned Chenoweth & Stephan found that if
defections in security forces much more probable that will succeed. Also, the probability
of security forces defections is influenced by the number of participants. According to
Chenoweth & Stephan the probability for producing security defections was about 60 %
33
34

(Cortright, 2010) page 136

(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 46

for the largest nonviolent campaigns. Moreover, the campaigns of this size were more
50 % more likely to produce defections than the smallest nonviolent campaign 35.
Chenoweths studies shows that the chance for security forces defections increases
proportionally with the number of participants.
Already in February news agencies reported about massive defections36.
Accordingly, senior regime figures, Libyan diplomats and key military commanders
resigned then, and further defections were reported later37. A statement in May from Ali
al-Essawi, the former Libyan ambassador to India, is particularly interesting in relation
to the reasons for the defections. He claimed that Qaddafi was using foreign
mercenaries to repress the uprising in Libya and maintained that the troops [could] not
see foreigners killing Libyans so they moved beside the people38. It can not be
established if it was the nonviolent activity that caused Even though Al-Essawis
statements do not contain any references to the nonviolent activity they illustrate the
sympathy effect that nonviolence can have on third parties.
However, in general the security forces have not hesitated to strike down on
protesters. There are numerous reports of security forces cracking down on protesters
from news agencies and international NGOs39. It is not clear how many mercenaries
were employed or how big part of the forces they constituted. However, the notion that
35

(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 48.

(Black, 2011)
37
("'Scores defect' from Gaddafi's army," 2011)
38
(Foy, 2011)
39
See ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011; "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate
all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," 2011), ("The battle
for Libya - Killings, disappearances and torture," 2011) and ("Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya," 2011)
36

10

Qaddafi used foreign mercenaries can indicate why the nonviolent movement did not
have sufficient leverage over the security forces. Foreign mercenaries would not have
the same qualms of killing people based on a common national identity.
Tactical Diversity and Innovation
Another factor that illustrates the quality of the nonviolent activity is tactical
diversity and innovation. In order for a nonviolent campaign to be successful and
effective, it must be able to survive repression from the regime. Kurt Schock40 argues
that the use of diverse tactics and methods makes it easier for the campaign to
withstand repression in that it becomes a less tangible target and therefore harder to
attack. According to Schock nonviolent campaigns should utilize different forms of
nonviolent methods and actions for example methods of concentration such as
demonstrations and sit-ins and methods of dispersion for example walk slows, stayaways, strikes or boycotts41. If the movement is met by repression the need to shift to
methods that makes the campaign a harder target become even more important.
Except from reports about some house occupations42, it seems that nonviolent
dissidents have mainly used methods of concentration, more specific rallies and protests.
Following Schocks arguments, it became easy for the regime to crack down on the
protesters because it could easily see in which form the attack was coming from. As
pointed about by Stephen Zunes the dissidents could have utilized strikes, sit-ins, stayaways and boycotts that could have increased the pressure on the regime43.
40
41
42
43

(Schock, 2005) page 51-52

A more extensive list of nonviolent actions can be found in (Sharp & Paulson, 2005)
International Crisis Group ("Making Sense of Libya," 2011) page 3
(Zunes, 2011a)

11

A nonviolent campaigns lack of diversity is most likely connected with the

number of people that are involved in the nonviolent activities. Chenoweth & Stephan
suggest that a large number of people are more likely to produce more diverse and
creative ideas than as small group. The low number of participants in nonviolent activity
in Libya can therefore explain why the group did not use more diverse forms of
nonviolent activities.
Planning and Training
According to Ackerman planning and training is essential for a successful
nonviolent campaign44. By assessing the vulnerabilities of the regime and form
strategies, the campaign can respond to the regime in a way that is most effective45.
Furthermore, training in nonviolence enables the campaign to educate the dissidents in
nonviolent strategies and tools, implement nonviolent policies and promote the
campaigns commitment to stay nonviolent46.
The uprising in Libya seems to have started spontaneously, and the nonviolent
activity only lasted for some days. This is illustrated by the early protests that were held
in the middle of February in 2011. There were already scheduled for a protest on
February 17th which coincided with the anniversary of anti-Qaddafi demonstrations 5
years earlier47. However, already on January 15-16th the protests started in Benghazi
and diverged from another established initiative48. Another source claims that the
protests started as a result of the arrest of dissident Fathi Terbil in Benghazi and spread
44
45
46
47
48

(Ackerman, 2006)
(Ackerman, 2006)
(Ackerman, 2006)
(Mahmoud, 2011)
(Sapienza, 2011) and (Hussaini, 2011)

12

because of repression from the police49. This lack of coordination and organizing
indicates lack of strategies and plans. The short time it took before the uprising turned
violent also implies that the protesters were not educated in nonviolence.
The mentioned factors all indicate that the nonviolent protests started
spontaneously which again could explain the lack of diversity in the early protests.
Nonviolent Discipline
Even if a nonviolent campaign have managed to mobilize many supporters, have
used a diverse approach that has been successful in producing defections and trained
and planned for nonviolent activities, the campaign needs to stick to the nonviolent
approach despite being met with repression50. If the movement instead turns violent,
they risk losing the benefits of a nonviolent approach, such as the ability to mobilize and
attract support from third parties and opponent. By abandoning the nonviolent strategy,
the conflict may be more polarized, the regime and its supporters will see the struggle
as a zero-sum game and will have incentives to fight even harder51.
As mentioned the protests in Libya started out as nonviolent and it was during
this period the protesters made most progress52. For example, most of the defections
and resignations from high-ranking officials happened and the protesters managed to
get control over large parts of the country53.
However, the uprising turned violent shortly after the first protests started54.

49
50
51
52
53
54

(Ayhan, 2011)
(Ackerman, 2006)
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) page 44
(Zunes, 2011a)
(Zunes, 2011a)
(Zunes, 2011a)

13

News agencies reported within a few days that the protests were getting increasingly
violent, and after some weeks there were open war between the rebels and the
regime55. By turning to violence, the uprising in Libya became polarized and the uprising
developed a fight between the security forces and the rebels. The lack of discipline can
also explain why the civil society was not able to mobilize and attract support for their
nonviolent activities in the first place.
The indication of lack of training and planning would offer one explanation as to
why the civil society failed to stick to nonviolent methods. Firstly, if the protesters were
not educated in the power of nonviolence, they may not have consciously opted to use
only nonviolent methods from the start. Secondly, if such a decision was made, training
and planning could provide support mechanisms for the protesters and thus contribute
to stay nonviolent.
Another reason for the change in approach can also be a consequence of
previous experiences with the regime and distrust in the effectiveness of nonviolence
against Qaddafi when faced with the hard repression that followed the uprising.
Regime Type
Several critics argue that there can still be situations where nonviolence cannot
succeed even if the nonviolent campaign fulfills all the above mentioned criteria. The
concerns that are relevant for the Libyan situation are when rallying against a ruthless
opponent and in the case of a rentier state.
The critics of nonviolence argue that this form of resistance cannot triumph over

55

(Chenoweth, 2011a), (Little, 2011) and ("Battle for Libya: Key moments ", 2011)

14

a regime that is determined to destroy dissidents with massive violence despite the
humanitarian consequences56. Qaddafis response to the uprisings in Libya shows that
he had the necessary apparatus to crack down excessively on the protesters and was
willing to use it. Earlier human rights violations also show how the civil society had
limited leverage over the regime to prevent abuse of the population. For example,
Human Rights Watch reported in 1996 that about 1200 prisoners in the Abu Salim
prison in Tripoli had been executed following an incident of revolt in the prison57.
Relatives of the victims of the massacre and international NGOs have called for an
investigation since then. The Libyan government has been reluctant to inspect the issue,
but reported to the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (UNHCHR) in January 2011
that an investigation was being carried out58. Nevertheless, the massacre and the lack
of investigation despite domestic and international demands illustrate the civil societys
limited political influence over the regime.
In The Efficacy of Nonviolence59 Ralph Summy counters some of the criticism
against the use of nonviolence in the face of a ruthless opponent. He observes that
there have been victories even in worst cast scenarios and argues that the question is
not how ruthless the opponent is, but rather if the ruler is dependent on an external
actor based on interest or morality. If so, the nonviolent movement can use the rulers
dependency to its advantage to get leverage over the ruler.

56

See for example (Greenfield, 2008)

("Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison," 2003)
58
("Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international
human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," 2011; Review, 2011)
59
(Summy, 1993)
57

15

However, Libya is considered a rentier state60 that derives a substantial

portion of its national revenues from sale of natural resources to other states. Therefore,
Qaddafi was not dependent on the cooperation of its people to work, produce goods
and pay taxes and it would be harder for the civil society to gain leverage through noncooperation. Zunes argue that the use of more diverse tactics, including boycott and
strikes that effectively would have slowed down the oil industry and increased the
economic pressure on the regime61. However, even if the civil society mobilized for
massive noncooperation activities, Qaddafi could hire foreign workers and mercenaries
and operate on income from the oil. Because of the regime and its independence on the
Libyan people, the civil society had limited possibilities to change the situation in the
first place.
Conclusion
As acknowledged by Chenoweth & Stephan, a campaign does not succeed only
because it is nonviolent62. The question of why nonviolence failed in Libya has many
answers and factors that all must be considered, but two of them are particularly
significant. Based on Chenoweth & Stephans framework, the number of participants
was the most significant factor in the failure of the nonviolent campaign in Libya.
Compared to the population in the cities where protesters operated, the number of
protesters was minuscule. Looking at this factor isolated, the nonviolent activity
therefore had very little potential to bring change.
However, because of lack of information, the used numbers can not be
60
61
62

(Zunes, 2011b)
(Zunes, 2011b)
(Chenoweth, 2011b)

16

sufficiently verified and the estimated number of participants could therefore change as
more information is available. This is unfortunate as the number of protesters plays
such a significant role in Chenoweths framework and influence the examination of the
other factors. Future studies of this topic should therefore include more research on the
exact number of participants in the demonstrations and include other methods to
measure the size of the nonviolent activity.
The lack of numbers can further be seen in the study of the other factors. For
example, a large campaign would potentially use more diverse methods, conduct
training and planning of their activities and would therefore be able to mobilize more
people. Moreover, it is possible that the movement would have been able to mobilize
more participants if they were disciplined and stuck to the nonviolent strategy. The
increased mobilization would again have made success more probable.
Secondly, because of the regimes lack of qualms for use of massive violence
and its economic independency on the Libyan people, the civil resistance would have
had difficulties with succeeding with its campaign even if they fulfilled all the conditions
that the different nonviolent authors list as necessary for success. The limited
opportunity to succeed with nonviolent means may also be one of the reasons why the
civil society was not able to mobilize in the first place.
The influence of culture has not been discussed in this paper simply because
there is not enough available information on this topic. However, cultural behaviors and
local conflict resolution mechanisms may be a more important factor for the failure of
nonviolence in Libya and other countries than anticipated. Future studies about the

17

effectiveness of nonviolence should therefore take culture into consideration.

18

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