1. RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC.

, Petitioner, versus ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF

LINGAYEN DAGUPAN, Respondent.
Facts:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.
The Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property
Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data
Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley.
Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of Lot 736.
The trial court rendered a decision stating, among others, that Lot 736 is not covered by
any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley hence, it
is public in nature. Since it is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. The
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their
ownership of Lot 736.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. It held that property of public dominion is
intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by
private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible
of private ownership.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot in dispute is a property of public dominion.
Held:
YES. Lot 736 is a part of the public domain and is owned by the state.
Ratio:
With regard to the documents submitted as evidence by the Municipality of Binmaley, said
submitted documents merely reveal that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In
fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San
Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the
Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved. The cadastral survey was based on the Lot
Data Computation of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.
As to the respondents contention, respondent had never acquired Lot 736 through open,
continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession because records show that Lot 736 is used as a
pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot
736. Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground. In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in
general.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot
736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot
736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state.
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of the public

domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.

2. ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, Petitioners, versus SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules), The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.
Petitioners argue that the law amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not IPRA violates the Regalian doctrine.
Held:
NO. The Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain does
not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.

Ratio:

Generally, under the concept of Regalian doctrine, private title to land must be traced to some
grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government,
and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in
the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue
forth from nowhere.
In its broad sense, Regalian doctrine refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by
virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in
which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by
the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while
the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the
King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all
lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. Regalian doctrine was
therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.
The Regalian doctrine, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cario vs. Insular Government, the United States
Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following
pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to

have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have
been part of the public domain. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution is irrelevant to the
application of the Cario doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Consequently,
ancestral lands and ancestral domains shall be treated as private property.
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership
of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the Regalian doctrine.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

Facts:
An application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located at Botolan, Zambales was
filed by respondent-applicant Celestina Nuguiat. Respondent-applicant alleges that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise
acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the monuments of title and
tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute, as a forest land belonging to public domain, may be
appropriated as private property.
Held:
NO. The parcels of land in dispute are public forest lands.
Ratio:
Forest lands, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they
may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation. In other words, declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their
conversion into alienable and disposable lands, need an express and positive act from the Government.
In this case, respondent-applicant never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for a proof. Aside from tax
receipts, she submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court held,
however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest
have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little
moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.

4. MATEO CARIO, Petitioner-Appellant, versus THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, RespondentAppellee.

Facts:
Plaintiff Mateo Cario, an Igorot, applied for registration of an ancestral land. Plaintiff contends
that for more than fifty (50) years before the treaty of Paris, he and his ancestors had held the land as
owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle,
and that his father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for
pasture in his turn. Furthermore, he alleges that they all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots,
and he had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom.
No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894,
and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing
seems to have come of it. Hence, he filed a petition alleging ownership of the land but he was only
granted a possessory title.
Initially, his application for registration was granted. An appeal was taken to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of the province of Benguet, on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on
behalf of the United States, those governments having taken possession of the property for public and
military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application for registration. The decision was affirmed by the
Philippine Supreme Court. Hence, a petition was brought to the US Supreme Court by writ of error.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff Cario is the lawful owner of the land in dispute.
Held:
YES. Plaintiff Cario owns the land in dispute thus, he should be granted what he seeks and
should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
Ratio:
The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription, as mentioned in the Royal
Cedula of 1754 which states:
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
In cases like this one, the presumption would and should be against the government. As far back
as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it was never
public land. It would not be proper to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes
if it really meant to use the rights acquired by them for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. They didnt intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers. Principle of prescription was admitted:
that if they werent able to produce title deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid
title by prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a document of title
or else lose his land, it does not show that it meant to apply to all but only those who wrongfully occupied
royal lands. It does not appear that the land of Cario was considered as Royal land nor was it
considered to have been wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would
be attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were indications that

registration was expected but it didnt mean that ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof was not to confer title to them, but to establish it.

5. ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO
ASEDILLO, respondents.
Facts:
A decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan in a land registration
case. Consequently, an Original Certificate of Title covering a parcel of land located in Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal was issued in favor of the spouses.
Afterwards, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina,
Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
accordingly.
Later on, Nofuentes sold the property to Ching Leng. By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, a Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued in his favor and the Transfer Certificate of Title of the Nofuentes
was deemed cancelled.
Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. Petitioner Alfredo Ching,
his legitimate son, filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for administration of the estate of
deceased Ching Leng. Consequently, after presentation of evidence, petitioner Alfredo Ching was
appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate. The said property was among those included in the
inventory submitted to the court.
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced by private
respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of Ching Lengs
Transfer Certificate of Title in his favor based on possession. An amended complaint was filed by private
respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng, alleging " that on account of the fact that
the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is
still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication.
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order. The
summons and the complaint were published.
The trial court ruled in favor of Asedilo. The title over the property in the name of Ching Leng was
cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo who subsequently
sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc.
Petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovementioned decision. He filed a verified petition to set
it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased
Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service of summons by publication.
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in
rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and
settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in
rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who on the face of the
complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam,
and if so, would a dead man and/or his estate be bound by service of summons and decision by
publication.

Held:
YES. An action for reconveyance real property is not an action in rem; it is an action in persona,
so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or
given an opportunity to be heard. The judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
Ratio:
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status
of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a
parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products,Inc., the decision of the lower court
insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil
Code). The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's
estate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or
administrator in his representative capacity.
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires "notice to all parties in
interest." Since Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he could
not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
The proceedings for cancellation of title could not have been held.

6. DINAH C. CASTILLO, Petitioner, versus ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A.

MISTAS,MARIETTA L. LINATOC, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Dinah Castillo is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married
to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor,
petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla
(Perla), co-owned Lot 13713 situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas,
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order dated
issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings,
including Lot to residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office
of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification stating that Lot 13713 was in the name of co-owners
Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration itself. Lastly, the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certification[9] attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel,
Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the
issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale
of the same. Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
Petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in
Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City. Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration indicating that
she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square
meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot
13713, she was shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration was cancelled.
Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Francisco Catigbac,
Petitioner filed a complaint questioning the cancellation of her Tax Declaration. She alleges that
the cancellation of such Tax Declaration is in violation of Section 109 of Presidential Decree 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Act.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of the Tax Declaration of petitioner is in violation of Section 109 of
Presidential Decree 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Act.
Held:
NO. Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced.
Ratio:
Section 109 of P.D. 1529 provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration.

The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration was not because of the issuance of a new
owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of Catigbac, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which
encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by the Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of Catigbac.
A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All
persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Therefore, upon the
presentation of petitioner of her Transfer Certificate of Title, the Office of the City Assessor must
recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said
property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly,
any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not
supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City
Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same property.
As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title, evidenced only
by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of
title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs
certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner
herself.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot
be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of
the same. Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment
debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title.

7. RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, versus THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF

PARAAQUE CITY, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc., a corporation, amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by
Securities and Exchange Commission. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the
amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were under
the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because
the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the
subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the
custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and
alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.
Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay City.
However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the lands
involved are situated in Paraaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground
of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the
properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the ExParte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City;
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could
not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated.
Held:
YES. Petitioner correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated.
Ratio:
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the
titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated, pursuant
to Rule 4, Section 1 (1) of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states:

Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, under the mistaken
impression that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Paraaque. Later, petitioner learned that
a Register of Deeds for Paraaque City had taken over the record and custody of titles
therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its petition. This, to our mind, was
justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner likewise corrected its allegation on the location of
the lands involved.
Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay
City. However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the
lands involved are situated in Paraaque City. The trial court should have considered these annexes, as
these do form an integral part of the pleading.
At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for this was still a
matter of right on its part as provided for by Rule 10, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
states:
Amendments as a matter of right. --- A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any
time within ten (10) days after it is served.

8. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented
by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
versus COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D.
BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
This case involves a claim of a huge parcel of land covering lands in the provinces Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan, and in cities including Quezon City. It involves two (2) cases, which prior to being decided by the
SC were consolidated.
The first case was a complaint for recovery of possession and damages by Engracio San Pedro,
as heir-judicial administrator of plaintiff intestate, against respondents Ocampo, Buhain, and Dela Cruz. In
the complaint, it was alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject estate by employing fraud,
bad faith and misrepresentation. The lower court dismissed the complaint saying that the respondents are
already the registered owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the alleged
Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the
coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
On the other hand, the second case is a petition for letters of administration over the intestate
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro Y Esteban. The complaint was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively. Judge
Echeverri appointed San Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor
upon posting a bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming
that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republics opposition to the petition for letter
of administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon. The Judge declared Titulo de
Propriedad as null and void and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro.
Issue:
Whether or not the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered
by the said title from the inventory of the estate.
Held:
YES. The Titulo is null and void. The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can be
derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition
for letter of administration closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.
Ratio:
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree 892, the system of registration under Spanish
Mortgage Law was abolished, and all holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered
under Land Registration Act within six (6) months from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.
Since the Titulo was not registered under Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the
registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the
conclusive presumption of validity. In other words, Titulo is null and void because it has been defeated by
the title of the respondents under the Torrens system.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of
private ownership in special proceedings case. In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. In the case at bar,
there was no certificate of title shown.

9. CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, versus N.M.
SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila. Between the
adjoining lots, there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall. Said wall is located on the lot
of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot.
The court decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later on, the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. The court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Several months later, the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the
error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court
however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency
of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant. .
Issue:
WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it.
Held:
NO. According to Torrens system, the plaintiffs are the owners of the wall and the land occupied
by it.
Ratio:
For the issue involved, Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, which provides for the
registration of titles under the Torrens system, affords no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving
the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should
be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons. However, it can be
construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail. Once a party registers the land in good faith, no third
parties may claim interest on the same land.
The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had.
The registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties. It is a notice to the world and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
Adopting the rule which is more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the
Torrens system, the Court ruled that in case in which land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. The presumption is
that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption is

irrebutable. It cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would
lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

10. ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners, versus HERMINIGILDO TAYAG and
JUAN HERNANDEZ, respondents
Facts:
Petitioners Antonio Talusan and Celia Talusan filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter
alia, that they bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title, from its former
owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondent Juan D. Hernandez, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to
the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public
auction to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of
the sum of P4, 039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon.
Respondent Hernandez sold the above-described property to respondent Tayag for P4, 400.00
without any notice to the former owner thereof, or to petitioners, and without compliance with the
provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale. A final bill of sale was later issued in
favor of Tayag.
Petitioners allege that the assessed value alone of the said property is P37, 310.00 and the fair
market value of the same is more than P300, 000.00 and both respondents knew these. They contend
that the bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience; thus, the sale for
the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null and void ab initio.
Moreover, petitioners claim that they have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since
they bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse
and in the concept of owners, while respondent Tayag has never been in possession of the said property.
Petitioners through intermediaries, offered to pay to the respondents the sum of P4,400 plus all
interests and expenses which they might have incurred, but said offer was rejected without any just or
lawful cause.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements. They allege that ther
auction sale of the subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of
the notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale or public
auction of the subject property and (c) equitable considerations
On the other hand, respondent Tayag argues that petitioners have no cause of action against
him, he being a buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified
to participate. Furthermore, he contends that the public auction sale complied with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 464 hence; the same is lawful and valid.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, acting as a Land Registration Court (LRC), ruled on the
validity of the auction sale of the subject parcel of land. Petitioners allege that the RTC has no jurisdiction
to resolve the issue and instituted a separate action to annul the auction sale.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the RTC bars the filing of a separate action to annul the auction sale;
and
(2) Whether the auction sale of the subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.

Held/Ratio:
(1) YES. Petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from ruling
on the validity of the auction sale.
Presidential Decree (PD) 1529 intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases, therefore, the Court declared that this
Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land
registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases,
as well as those involving substantial issues.
Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from ruling
on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only on applications
for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title.
Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the
land registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction.
(2) NO. The auction sale was valid, because several requisites regarding notice and publication were
satisfied.
For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the
taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant
proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through
an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the registered
owners.
In the absence of registration, the registered owner whose name appears on the
certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale should be
sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the
auction sale may not be invoked successfully.

11. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land situated in
Silang, Cavite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite-Tagaytay, He claimed that he purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved
as such under FAO 4-1656.
The RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of
Malabanan.
The CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any
period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. It further noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on
March 15, 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession.
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA. His heirs appealed the decision before
the appellate court.
On appeal, petitioners rely on the ruling in Republic v. Naguit, which opines that with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree. Hence, with respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. On the other hand, The Republic remains
insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
as of 12 June 1945.
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land
into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
The Republic notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of
properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not any possession, prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable,
may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.

(2) Whether or not petitioners open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property,
thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
Held/Ratio:
(1) NO. For Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
as of 12 June 1945.
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession,
the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
(2) NO. A parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable cannot be deemed private land
hence; it is not susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code.
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as

property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL

CENTER, petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE
JESUS, respondents.
Facts:
Eugenio de Jesus applied with the Bureau of Lands for sale patent a portion of what was then Lot
522 of Davao Cadastre. Then, Bureau of Lands accepted sealed bids, one Dr. Jose Ebro submitted a bid
of P100.50 per hectare which was the highest bid. Thus the said auction was annulled for the sale
applicant, Eugenio, failed to participate because of non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
Another bidding was held, Eugenio was the lone bidder where he equaled the bid of Dr. Ebro, then made
a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare. Hence, Director of
Lands issued to Eugenio an order of award on Nov. 23, 1934.
However, on Aug. 28, 1936, Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio in conformity with Proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon withdrawing the said land from sale
because it covered the land, Lot 1176-B-2 which was needed and reserved from military campsite
th
th
purposes. Thus, when Eugenio paid P660.45 covering the 8 and 10 installment for 20.6400 hectares
excluding the military campsite the Director of Lands Jose Dans ordered the issuance of the patent of the
said land situated in Barrio Poblacion, Davao.
On Aug. 11, 1956, President Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No.85 and issued Proclamation
No. 328 which declared the Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition for resettlement of squatters in Piapi Beach,
Davao thus it was also revoked by him on Oct. 9, 1956. Afterwards, President Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 350, reserving the same land for medical center site purposes hence, Mindanao
Medical Center (MMC) claimed for simple title to the land. Respondent, Alejandro de Jesus, son and
successor-in-interest of Eugenio, opposed the registration of the MMC on the ground that his father
acquired vested right on the subject land by virtue of Order of Award issued to him by Director of Lands.
Thus, after due hearing, Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment in favor of the MMC.
Hence, Alejandro appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and it ruled in affirmation to him.
Then, petitioner MMC elevated the matter to the SC through certiorari on the ground that pursuant to
Proclamation No. 350 which legally effected the land grant to MMC, Bureau of Medical Services, and
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration
Act such land grant is constitutive of a fee simple title or absolute title in favor of MMC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner MMC has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of
an executive proclamation in 1956, reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Held:
YES. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the
Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.
Ratio:
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole
lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive
of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of
the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that
"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines

are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
registered lands."
It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical
Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable
appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the
entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized
competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain
for a specific public use or service.
Revised Administrative Code, Section 64 empowers the President to reserve from sale of other
disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the private domain of the
Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The land reserved "shall
be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law."
Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasipublic uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit.

13. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, versus PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
The Philippine Government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and
II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of
fifty (50) percent of the total reclaimed land.
Subsequently, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the
Public Estates Authority (PEA). PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On
the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
When President Corazon C. Aquino assumed office, she issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands.. Afterwards,
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands.
In an amended JVA, PEA, in addition, sought the transfer to AMARI of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. It also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay transferred to AMARI.
Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed a case against the transfer of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA for being null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of reclaimed lands and submerged areas to AMARI is valid.
Held:
NO. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands and submerged areas to be transferred to AMARI will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Ratio:
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may only lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. But, PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void

for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, with respect to submerged areas, said submerged areas, like the waters (sea or
bay) above them, are part of the States inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of
public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to
foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it
violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are
still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Hence, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical

School), petitioner, versus NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
Facts:
Respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol,
Misamis Oriental. He filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of
Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same. Meanwhile, the Provincial
Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a lot as a school site. This reserved lot
unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970.
Subsequently, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the
portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School
(hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the
school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldols refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed a complaint for accion
possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the schools favor
and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for
thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint.
Petitioner Republic claimed that the CA erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the
evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession
of the land in dispute for thirty-two years. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has a better right to possess the lot.
Held:
NO. Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
Ratio:
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public
land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
must either be from June 12, 1945 or earlier. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the
portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that
possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquire an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with
the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to
segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the
school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO

B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M.
GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents filed an application for registration of title over five (5) parcels of land located in
Laguna. They stated that they are the sole heirs of Melendez spouses and that their parents had been in
possession of the property since 1949.
After the death of their parents, they respectively partitioned the lot and subdivided it into five (5)
lots. Since then, they have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a
public and peaceful manner.
Meanwhile, petitioner Republic opposes on the grounds that they are not in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Moreover, it alleges that tax declaration and tax receipts
shown as evidence by the respondents, do not constitute bona fide right over the land, and ownership
based on Spanish title can no longer be availed, and that the said land is part of the public domain.
Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The trial court found that the respondents have
sufficiently established their familys actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject
property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the possession of their predecessors-ininterest in 1940, and that such possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that
the land in question is alienable and disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it
confirmed the title of the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna,
Calamba Branch, to cause the registration of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon
payment of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes final
and executory.
Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents application for registration should be granted.
Held:
NO. Respondents have miserably failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945 as
required by Property Registration Decree.
Ratio:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years of possession by
the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and Mauricio. The
two were aged 62 and 60, respectively, when they testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in
1935 and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted for a period of fifty-seven years at the
time they testified, the same must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that Carmencita
was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp,
before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify
thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse
possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents.
In any case, respondents bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessorsin-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita) or since 1949 (as testified to by Mauricio and

declared in respondents application for registration) are hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
their claim. They cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual
evidence of possession. Even granting that the possession by the respondents parents commenced in
1940, still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, had control
over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural purposes. Moreover,
only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by
the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their
name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes.
While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land upon the death
of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes
thereon. The Court even find unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the
land. They did not present any tenant.
The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes by the
respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990, 1991, 1992,
1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, the Court cannot trust the assertion of the respondents that
they immediately took possession of the property in the concept of an owner after the death of their
parents.
While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the
fact of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.

Angeles University Foundation

School of Law

Case Digests
(Land Titles and Deeds)

Yeen, Katrina Anne L.

Juris Doctor 2

October 7, 2014