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? 1999Journalof PeaceResearch
vol.36, no. 5, 1999, pp. 571-591
SagePublications(London,Thousand
Oaks,CAand New Delhi)
[0022-3433 (199909) 365; 571-591; 009492]
TISHKOV
This article summarizes research on ethnic conflict in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Various
appealing but unsatisfactorytypologies have been proposed, focusing on the subjectsof the conflict
(actors, goals, motivations); on the environmentof the conflict (territory, language, socio-economy,
environment and resources;or on characteristics
of the conflict (scale, length, form of fighting, losses,
aftermath).Most conflict typologies reflect better the thinking and political agenda of the typologists
than the actual social panorama. Conflict theories and data presentationscontain strong prescriptive
elements and may even generate new conflict. For the conflicts in the Former Soviet Union, existing
typologies fail to grasp severalmajor factors, such as the strategiesand behavior of individuals, social
and political disorder, power and status aspirations, elite manipulations, and outside interventions.
This article discusses data on human and materiallosses in nine violent conflicts: Karabakh,Fergana,
Osh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria,Tajik, Abkhazia, Ingush-Ossetian, and Chechen. In conclusion, a
plea is made for writing 'between' theory and data, without sacrificingsensitive and self-reflectivenarration in order to produce new insights and new knowledge.
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Valery Tishkov
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sions, and as falling into two major categories - conflicts of ideological doctrines,
and conflicts of political institutions (Payin,
1996; Payin & Popov, 1990; Popov, 1997).
Another extreme is expressedin the 'clashof
civilizations'paradigm,which sees an ethnic
conflict as the incompatible encounter
between the 'pre-modern'(e.g. Ingush) and
'modern' (e.g. Ossets) peoples (Skakunov,
1996). Russian 'conflictologists' have contributed theoretical/typological constructions, but very few have presented case
analyses (e.g. Ivanov & Smolaynsky, 1994;
Kremenyuk,1994; Zdravomyslov,1997).
What, then, is an ethnic conflict?
Yamskov (1997: 206) has defined it as
'dynamically changing sociopolitical situation caused by rejection of existing status
Definitions and Typologies
quoon a partof significantnumberof people
What is 'ethnic conflict'? Most attempts at representing one or several local ethnic
theories of ethnic conflict (Carment & groups'.This rejectioncan take the form of:
James, 1997) simply sidestep the problem of *
ethnicallyselectiveexodus from a region;
definition. In Russia, the term 'ethnic con- *
emerging national or cultural political
flict' came into use late, because the word
organizationsdemandinga change in the
'conflict' was usually replaced by the
situation in the interests of a certain
euphemism 'contradictions'. In fact the
ethnic group;
Soviet Union was a place of relative ethnic *
protest actions against violations of
peace despite the state'scontradictorypolicy
group interestsby other groups or by the
of repression and pandering towards nonstate.
Russian nationalities (Bromley, 1977;
Drobizheva, 1981; Karklins, 1986; Kozlov, Yamskov (1997: 206-207) sees ethnic con1988; Suny, 1993; Tishkov, 1997a). The flict as an organized political process when
first ethnically-tinged civic clashes under 'national movements (or parties) struggling
Gorbachev (the Sumgait and Fergana for the "national interests" of the people
pogroms againstArmeniansand Turks)were acquirea certaininfluence and try to change
dismissed by experts as 'incidents', 'events', cultural/linguistic, socio-economic, or poletc. Until the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and itical statuses'(Table I).
Such typologiesarenot simple to apply to
the Chechen War eruptedon the territoryof
Russia itself, the term 'ethnic conflict' was concrete research purposes. It is certainly
seen as an inadequateand humiliating term impossible to place any known conflict in
to describepeople who do not normallyhate the Former Soviet Union into a single cell.
and fight each other. Ethnic entities, it was Even the Karabakhconflict studied in detail
held, are deliberatelydriven into conflict by by Yamskov (1991), contains all the
in-group agitatorsor by outside conspiracies. elements of the typology.
Another scheme for the analysis of soConflicts were viewed as carrying political,
territorial, criminal, or economic dimen- called ethno-territorial conflicts has been
centuries- researcherspreferto focus on evidence of historic fights and cultural differences. The same may be said of Kazansince
the 17th century and Grozny in 1960-80
with their peacefulmulti-ethnicities.Experts
find it easier to parrot the YeltsinMaskhadov political absurdityof the '300year war between Russia and Chechnya'
which ended with the signing of a treaty in
May 1997. Very few pay any attention to
historicaldocuments that disprovethis myth
(see, for example, Kusheva, 1997).
None of this is meant to question the
need for theory and data, as I hope to
illustrate, using an area from my own
research.
Valery Tishkov
Short-term(self-destroying)
Nonviolent
Violent
Nonviolent
Violent
Pogroms,terror,
disorders,
guerrilla
Emigration
Deportation,
genocide
suggested by Strelezkii(1997), who has collected data on conflicts in the USSR since
1991. By definition, ethno-territorialconflicts involve disputes, claims, and open conflicts over territorial issues, which include
state (administrative)sovereigntyover territories, borders, and rights of groups to live
on territoriesand to control them. The territorialization of ethnicity is one of the
Soviet legacieswhich laid the foundation for
ethno-nationalism. Indeed, the USSR was
the only state in the world besides
Yugoslavia whose internal structure was
built on ethnic principles. All major nonRussiangroups had their 'own' autonomous
territories.
Strelezkii rightly points out that practically all territorialissues in intergroup and
interstate levels on the territory of the
Former Soviet Union acquire an 'ethnic'
form because even newly emerged states
preach an exclusivist ideology - 'Latviafor
the Latvians'or 'Georgiafor the Georgians'.
However, Strelezkii'sown vision of ethnicity
is not radically different from those who
built the USSR and those who constructed
the 'Soviet theory' of ethnos (see Skalnik,
1988; Slezkine, 1994; Tishkov, 1997a:
1-23). This methodological position is
made clear in Strelezkii's classification of
subjectsof ethno-territorialclaims:
*
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hidden political agenda behind this ethnonationalist rhetoric, in the assumption that
in the post-Cold War world nations have
emergedwhich have not fully accomplished
the process of nation-building, i.e. 'quasisovereign states'(Carment & James, 1997:
205).
Western academics and policymakers
have easily absorbedan ambivalentlanguage
for the FSU area - a language they would
never use for describing the same realities
elsewhere. A speech construct of'national
minorities' (in other similarcontexts, it may
be 'linguistic', 'ethnic', etc.) has come into
Realpolitik, including the institution of the
OSCE High Commissioner for National
Minorities. Terms like 'nations without
states', 'non-represented nations', 'nonstatus nations' have emerged as labels for
ethnic communities in countries where
'remaking'is in the cards, especiallyif their
state and administrative borders are contested and not congruentwith ethnic or cultural borders.
Strelezkii (1997: 237-244) identifies
the following types of ethno-territorialconflict:
* conflicts over disputed territories with
demands that interstate or internal
administrativebordersbe changed;
* disputes about the administrativestatus
of a territory expressed in ethnically
defined claims for independent states
and for new autonomies, or for their
abolition;
* conflicts over the status of existing
national formations;
* conflicts over claims for the federalization of existing unitarypolities;
* exclusion of population and cleansing of
territories;
Valery Tishkov
ethno-territorial
autonomies
in
the
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1989
Nagorno-Karabakh
Fergana pogroms
Osh conflict
South Ossetia
Transdniestria
TajikistanAbkhazianIngush-Ossetian
Chechen War
0.1
0.1
-
Total
n.d., not data.
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997 Total
0.4
0.5
7.0
2.0
1.5
8.0
0.2
0.9
0.2
4.0
0.6
n.d.
0.5
0.3
-
25.0
6.0
24.0
0.1
0.3
1.1
0.8
23.5
12.0
1.0
35.0
0.2
0.8
1.1
7.1
25.6
6.0
0.5
97.9
0.6
-
0.5
0.8
20.0
3.8
0.8
-
32.9
14.0
23.7
Valery Tishkov
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ETHNIC
CONFLICTS
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43,000-45,000
people were killed,
including 18,000-20,000 Russian military
personnel (Interfax, 9 March 1995).
According to Chechen leader Yandarbiev,
there were about 100,000 killed and 45,000
wounded (Izvestia, 12 October 1996). This
defies belief, since the usual ratio between
wounded and killed in military operations
(3-5 wounded for each casualty) would
yield a casualty figure of around
10,000-15,000. Nevertheless, the Moscow
opposition used the same figures: Grigorii
Yavlinskii spoke of 100,000 casualties,
Dmitrii Rogozin about 150,000 (Nevavisimayagazeta, 5 October 1996). The most
exaggerated statements came from the
former Secretary of the Security Council,
General Alexander Lebed. He had played a
crucial role in ending the war in the fall of
1996 and was interested in ensuring a most
dramatic presentation of this achievement.
Lebed spoke of 80,000 killed and 240,000
wounded (Izvestia, 5 September 1996).
Chechen propagandists simply added
another 20,000 to the casualty figure. This
dubious information immediately became
widely cited.
Becauseof the chaos and poor accounting
even among federal regulars,precise figures
can never be establishedwith any accuracy.
The estimatesprovidedby Mukomel (1997:
305) are probably the best: Some 35,000
people were killed, including 4,300 federal
troops, about 3,000 Chechen combatants,
and between 25,000 and 30,000 civilians,
up to 60% of whom could be ethnic
Russiansliving in Grozny. This is still a high
figure,combining data from militarysources
and data collected by the leading Russian
human rights organization 'Memorial' on
civilian casualties in Grozny. The Russian
Ministry of InternalAffairsestimatesoverall
losses in the Chechen War at about 18,500
people.
Even when there is agrementon the data,
they can be subjected to differing interpret-
1996.
Valery Tishkov
ETHNIC
CONFLICTS
their
situation,
presenting
it
as
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refugees in Afghanistan have now returned
home; refugeesto the CIS countries remain
refugees (30,000 in Uzbekistan, 20,000 in
Russia, 20,000 in Turkmenistan, 15,000 in
Kirgizia).There are about 10,000 Chechen
refugees in Kazakhstanand Kirgizia, and a
small number of Armeniansfrom Azerbaijan
who fled to Turkmenistan.
The Russian Federation has become a
hub of population movements. Despite political instability and economic crisis, Russia
has been receivinglargenumbersof migrants
of all kinds - labor migrants, refugees,
asylum-seekers,repatriates,illegal migrants,
and others. The Russian Federal Migration
Service registered 1,224,764 refulgeesas of
January 1997; according to my estimates
there are another 1.5 million non-registered
forced migrants from other post-Soviet
states (mainly Tajikistan, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan) and involuntarily relocated
persons, mainly as a result of the
Ingush-Ossetian conflict and the Chechen
War. Most of these migrants do not go
through the bureaucraticprocedureof registration, with scant prospectsof receivingany
sizeable material compensation and proper
civic status. Many carriersof former Soviet
passports arriving in Russia are satisfied if
they can find a job and a place to live.
Sometimes they are refusedrefugeestatus or
they are afraid to announce themselves and
to apply for assistance.In summer 1992, the
number of registered South Ossetian
refugees from Georgia to North Ossetia
started to increase dramaticallybecause of
the impending procedureof issuing Russian
privatization checks. Soon after, with
rumorsof an expected resettlementprogram
to South Ossetia, numbers began to fall
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