Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, petitioner, v. Zenaida Magud-Logmao, respondent, G.R. No.

175540, April 7, 2014

Bautista, Ramon Isagani III, S.
Damages; Negligence
FACTS: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 31, 2006, adjudging petitioner liable for damages, and the Resolution
dated November 22, 2006, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, be reversed
and set aside.
Plaintiff-appelle Zeniada Magud-Logmao is the mother of deceased Arnelito Logmao. Defendantappellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney Institute (NKI).
On March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in
Quezon City after falling from the overpass near the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The
patients data sheet erroneously identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue,
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Cabrera, the surgical resident onduty at the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao]. Later on
Lugmoso developed generalized seizures and his condition progressively deteriorated and was
intubated and ambu-bagging support was provided; admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
and mechanical ventilator support became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and
available ventilator at EAMC.
Arrangements were made and Angelito was transferred to NKI. At the NKI, the name Angelito
[Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer B.
Misa, NKIs Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media
assistance. Dr. Enrique T. Ona (now DOH Sec.), Chairman of the Department of Surgery,
observed that the severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso manifested symptoms of brain death
and requested the Laboratory Section to conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross-matching
examination, so that should Lugmoso expire despite the necessary medical care and
management and he would be found to be a suitable organ donor and his family would consent
to organ donation, the organs thus donated could be detached and transplanted promptly to
any compatible beneficiary.
Several radio and television stations were contacted and requested for air time for the purpose
of locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, who was confined at
NKI for severe head injury after allegedly falling from the Cubao overpass. Police Station No. 5,
Eastern Police District, whose area of jurisdiction includes Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, was
contacted and was even later followed-up for assistance in locating the relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso.
Angelito was later pronounced brain dead. Dr. Ona was informed that the EEG recording
exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that Lugmoso was brain dead. Upon learning that
Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had
blood and tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer Misa whether
the relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that the necessary consent for organ donation
could be obtained.

As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time being of
the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano,
Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of Lugmoso
for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete-Liquete to
secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the Medico-Legal
Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the incident which
lead to the brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum, stating to make certain that your Department has
exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient
such as appeal through the radios and television as well as through police and other government
agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case. If all
the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 349
as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the Department of
Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said deceased
patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said
organs to live and survive.
On the afternoon of March 3, 1988, a medical team, composed of Dr. Enrique Ona, as principal
surgeon, then transplanted a kidney and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other
kidney of Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan.
Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television about a successful double
organ transplantation and that the donor was an eighteen (18) year old boy whose name
sounded like Arnelito Logmao and that the body was at La Funeraria Oro, Aida informed plaintiff
of the news report. Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other children went to
La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket.
On April 29, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. On January 17, 2000, the court
rendered judgment finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for damages to plaintiff and dismissing
the complaint against the other defendants for lack of legal basis.
The CA affirmed the finding of the lower court but deleted and reduced the amount of damages.
ISSUE/S: Whether respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in
granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's
son who had been declared brain dead.
PRINCIPLE: To be entitled to damages, negligence must be proven.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
2006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner Doctor is not negligent. Petitioner gave authorization for the removal of some of the
internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the letter of the
law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 856, i.e., giving his
subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next of kin of
respondent's son. Announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance of
police authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. There can be no

cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach
the relatives of the deceased.
It is not petitioners fault if respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death
because the notices did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased. The lower courts
found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who
recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The NKI could not have
obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by the lower courts,
the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Finding petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs
of the deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional
pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to
petitioner.

Antipolo Ining (Deceased), survived by Manuel Villanueva, Teodora Villanueva-Francisco, Camilo

Francisco, Adolfo Francisco, Lucimo Francisco, Jr., Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, Herminigildo
Francisco, Ramon TResvalles, Roberto Tajonera, Natividad Ining-Ibea (Deceased), survived by Edilberto
Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz, Eugenio Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz,
Dolores Ining-RImon (Deceased) survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon
Cordero, and Pedro Ining (Deceased) survived by Elisa Tan Ining (Wife) and Pedro Ining Jr., petitioners, v.
Leonardo R. Vega, substituted by Lourdes Vega, Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena VegaRestituto and Lenard Vega, respondents, G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
Bautista, Ramon Isagani III, S.
Succession; Prescription; Co-ownership
FACTS: Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a parcel of land (subject property) in
Kalibo, Aklan covered by an Original Certificate of Title. Leon and Rafaela died without issue.
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan-Ining, who are now both
deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and
children, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea
(Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. In turn turn
they are survived by, herein petitioners, Gregorias grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias
heirs).
Acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving
heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a civil case for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs, alleging that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregorias heirs refused to heed his demands.
Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have also deprived him of the fruits of the property.
Gregorias heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.),
husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; They claim have become the
sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was
aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive
possession of the property with a just title.
The trial court concluded that the subject property remained part of Leons estate at the time of
his death in 1962. Leons siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in
equal shares. But it also held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leons death in 1962 or up
to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only
in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription.
On Appeal to the CA, the court declared that prescription began to run not from Leons death in
1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which

amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code.1 The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.s sole possession
of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
Aggrieved, petitioners now comes with this petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Leonardos right as a co-owner for partition has prescribed.
Whether or not Leonardo has a right in the in the subject property.
PRINCIPLE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and
cannot become a co-owner of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.
HELD: Petition is DENIED.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited
the property in equal shares. In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein
became entitled to the property upon the sisters passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and
respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in
common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such
a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute
another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980,
when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration
exclusively in his name and informed the latter of his 1943 purchase of the property. These
apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos
1

[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,

share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims. Considering
these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in
1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the coownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the
filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within
the period prescribed under Article 1141.
While it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is
not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter
Teodora. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.2
In point of law, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot
validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason,
prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.
Leons ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death the property passed on to his heirs by
operation of law. Since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation or the existing coownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.