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•
Nietzsche's Etbical Vision:
of Friedrich Nietzsche
Fredrick Appel
Department ofPolitical Science
McGill University, Montreal
June, 1995
•
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• Abstract
This dissertation argues that a pervasive ethical vision underlies the work of
Friedrich NietzsChe (1844-1900): a concem for the possibility of human flourishing
in the modern world. Notwithstanding NietzsChe's celebrated daim to he "beyond
good and evil", and against the standard interpretation of bis "pelSpCCtivism", it is
argued that Nietzsche makes qualitative, normative distinctions between higher,
admirable modes ofhuman existence and lower, contemptible ones, and that he
wishes through bis writings to foster the former and discourage the latter.
Furthermore, it is argued that Nietzsche believes human excellence to he the
property of a small minority of "higher" human heings, and that he identifies the
project ofencouraging human excellence with a political imperative ofcultivating
this gifted élite. The dissertation also argues that Nietzsche's piCtu1'e of the fully
flourishing human life suffers from a number ofinconsistencies that may he traeed
back to bis vaciUation between two incompatible moral discourses: an Aristotelian
discourse emphasising the importance of certain "external goods" (e.g. friendship,
recognition, community) in a fully flourishing life, and a rival, Stoic-influenced
discourse stressing the virtuous individual's total sclf-sufficiency. An examination
is made ofNietzsehe's stance towards the following key concepts and questions:
truth, morality, virtue, instinct and "bodily" knowledge, nature, creativity,
rationality, discipline and self-masteIy, freedom, solitude and sociability,
friendship, community, pity, breeding and heredity, women and gender relations,
and domination.
Résumé
Cette thèse veut démontrer que l'oeuvre de Friedrich Nietzsehe (1844-1900) est
soutenue par une vision éthique, c'est-à-dire par un souci de l'q,anouisseme1J.t de
l'homme dans la modernité. La thèse, allant à rencontre de l'interprétation
orthodoxe du <<perspectivisme» nietzsehœn, suggère que Nietzsche, malgré sa
c61~ prétension à vouloir se situer <<par-delà du bien et du ma1», a tout de
même fait des distinctions qualitatives et normatives. n a établi des diff6rences
entre. d'une part, les modes de vie humaine sup&ieurs et admirables et. d'autre
part, les modes inf6rieurs et m6prisables. La thèse suggère par ailleurs qu'à travers
ses écrits Nietzsche a cherché à encourager les premiers et condalT!Ql:l' les seconds.
na cru que l'excellence humaine ~t le propre d'une petite minorité d'hommes
sup6rieurs et son but, qui fut essentiellement d'encourager cette excellenc:e de
l'homme, alla de paire avec un projet politique. Cette thèse suggère aussi que la
conception nietzselW:nne de la vie bumaine la plus noble ne va pas sans quelques
contradictions et que ces contradictions trouvent leurs origines dans la lutte, etiez
N"1etzsehe, entre deux discoUIS moraux incompatibles. D'une part, il est influencé
par un discours aristotélicien mettant l'accent sur 1'impo1tance de certains <<biens
extœes» (par exemple, l'amiti6, la l'CCOIIDllissance, la communauté) dans la vie la
plus riche. D'autre part, il est aussi maIqUé par un discours inspir6 du stoïcisme
promouvant l'~ de l'autosuffisance totale de l'homme vertueux. La position de
Nietzsche sur les questions et les concepts suivants sera 6tudïœ: la v6ité, la
moralité, la vertu, l'instinct et le savoir <<corporel»,la nature, la c:r6Iti.vité, la
raison, la discipline et la 1DlI1~lahDerlé, la solitude et la sociabilité,
•
l'amiti6, la comm1mauté,la piti6, l'6:lueation, la proc:r&tion et l ~ les
femmes et les lapports homme-femme et la domination.
• Acknowledgements
1wish to thank my supervisor, Charles Taylor, for bis support and assistance in the
preparation of this dissertation and throughout the years of my graduate studies.
Innumerable thanks must also go to my wife, Marilyn Besner, without whose
unflagging support and patience this worlc would not have been possible. The birth
of our daughter Lottie coincided with the start of my disse$tion research, and it
gives me great pleasure to think that 1shal1 always associate this work with ber
infant yea.-s.
Many thanks are owed to the following individuals who took the time to read and
comment on earlier versions of this manuscript, in whole or part Peter Berkowitz,
Randy Coonolly, Martha Nussbaum, James Tully, Brian WaIker, and Robert
Welshon. Ruth Abbey bas been especially generous with her time and attention.
My exchanges with Brian Leiter have also proved invaluable. 1 also wish to
acknowledge Caroline Guindon for her kind offer ofhelp during the preparation of
this manuscript.
1am indebted too to James Booth, Mark Brawley, Alain-G. Gagnon, Elisabeth
Gidengil, and Hudson MeadweIl of the Department of Politica1 Science at McGill
for their encouragement and support during my years ofassociation with the
Department. A similar debt ofgratitude is owed to FIederick Krantz of the LJ.0eral
Arts College, ConCOIdia University. For funding during my doctoral studies 1am
grateful to the Doctoral Fellowship programme of the Social Sciences and
Humanities ReseaICh Council ofcaDlma
Material from chapter three will appear in a slightly different form as an essay
entitled "Nietzsche's Natural Hierarchy· in the Falll996 issue ofIntemtltûmaI
Stwfies in Phüosophy. 1 amgrateful to the editors ofthis journal for giving me
permission to use this material hem.
•
• AC
BGE
The Antichrist
BT Birth ofTragedy
"Attempt" "Attempt at a Self-Criticism"
EH &ceHolTW
"BGE" "Beyond Good and Evil"
"BT" "The Birth ofTragedy"
"Books" "Why 1Write such Good Books"
"Oever" "Why 1am 50 Oever"
"Destiny" "Why 1am a Destiny"
"GM" "On the Genealogy of MoraIs"
"UM" "Untimely Meditations"
"zn "Thus Spoke Zarathustra"
• "FS"
"G"
"HC"
"The Funeral Song"
"The Greeting"
"The Home-Coming"
• "HO"
"LS"
"DA"
"OAW"
"OBI"
"OBV"
"The Boney Offering"
"The Last Supper"
"Of the Apostates"
"Of the Afterworldsmen"
"On Blissful Islands"
"Of the Bestowing VirDle"
"OC" "Of the Compassionate"
"OCV" "Of the Chairs ofVlItUe"
"OOB" "Of the Despisers of the Body"
"OFM" "Of the Flies of the Market-PIace"
"OFP" "Of the Famous Philosophers"
"QGL" "Of the GIeat Longing"
"OHM:" "Of the Higber Man"
"OIB" "Of Involuntary Bliss"
"OIP" "Of Immanilate Perception"
"OJP" "Of Joys and Passions"
"OLe" "Of the Land of Culture"
"OMC' "OfMarriage and Children"
"OW" "OfManly Prudence"
"ON!" "Of the New Idol"
"ONL" "Of Old and New Law-Tables"
"OP" "Of the Priests"
"OPC" "Of the Pale Qjmin al "
"OPO" "Of the Preacbers ofDeath"
"OR" "Of Redemption"
"ORW" "Of Reading and WIiting"
"OS" "Of Science"
"OSG" "Of the Spirit of Gravity"
"OSM" "Of the Sublime Man"
"OSa" "OfSe1f-Qven:oming"
"CT' "Of the Tarantulas"
"QTG" "Of the Thousand and One Goals"
"OI'M" "Of the TIee on the Mountainside"
"OV" "Of the V1ItUOus"
"OYR" "Of the VlSion and the Riddle"
"OWC" "Of the Way of the Creator"
"OWW" "OfWar and Warrior.;"
"SOS" "The Second Oance Song"
"SB" "The StiIlest Bour"
oSSo "The Seven SeaIs"
"TET" "Of the 1bIec ET,i1c'!biDgs"
"YB" "The Voluntary Beggar"
"TM" "Of the 1bIec Metamorphoses"
"VMS" "Of the VIItUe that Makes SmaII"
"W" "The Wandere.r"
•
• Introduction
Table of Contents
ChapterI
NietzsebP..an Truth and Objectivity 23
ChaPterii
Ni~hean Morality and Moral Philosophy 58
ChaPterm
Nietzsehean Vutue: 84
Instinct, Nature, and Artifice
CbpterIV
The CoIIUption and Rescue of the Nietzsehean Master-Type 112
ChaPterV
Reconstituting the Master (1): 141
Se1f-Discovery and Self-Mastery
ChapterVI
Reconstituting the Master (2): 176
The Flight into and Beyond Solitude
ChaPterVII
Reconstituting the Master (3): 210
Jasagen and the Hope for Friendship and Community
Chaptervm
Nietzsehe's Will to Politics 250
ChaPterIX
Caste and Gender Relations in the Nietzsehean Utopia 294
CbapterX
Noblesse Oblige and Domination 335
Bibliography 392
•
• Niet7sche's Ethical Vision
Introduction
1 Evidence of the French origins ofthis new orthodoxy is found in many recent
North American works. See, for example Tracy B. Strong: "Not surprisingly it bas
been the French who have developed the best understllDding ofNietzsche, e.g.,
Deleuze, Klossowski, Granier. Nietzsche would have been pleased." (Strong
1988: 350) Similarly, in the pteface ofa work Iefe:aed to recently as "perbaps the
best of the many recent studies ofNietzsche's ideas" (JoU 1993: 20), Alexander
Nebamas cxpresseshis indebtedness to French literary theoly (Nehamas 1985:
viii). Michel Foucault's WIitings are often seen as an invaluable key for unIocking
Nietzsche's secrets. See, for example, Mark Waaen: "Of aIl Nietzsche's
intclp1eters, Foucault bas come the closest to capturing the movement and spirit of
genealogy•••" (Waaen 1988: 272) Although WJ1liam CoonoUy, in bis recent book,
carefully distinguishes between Foucault and Nietzsche early on ('1'owe my most
salient debts to Nietzsche and Foucault. Not to Nietzsche alone or Foucault alone,
but to each as a complement and col1'eCtive to the other." Connony 1991: 10), once
he embarks upon bis argument the two tbinkets are often seen as engaged in a
common project, and are refen'ed to tandem (e.g.1bid., 10, 12).
2 To emphasise any sort ofcontinUÏty between N'~ and an identifiable
1
• My task must appear in an even more dubious light upon an initial perusal of the
relevant texts, in whicll Nietzsche makes unmistakable and repeated reference to the
novelity of bis project and to his position "above" or "beyond" such concepts as
truth, morality, politics, etc. The fodder for the new orthodox line of interpretation,
which portrays Nietzsche as a radical sceptic and debunker of aIl "truth", is c1early
present. 1 intend to argue, however, that Nietzsehe's iconoclastic rhetoric of
mpture bas often blinded interpreters to an important fact: that the often negative,
debunking thrust of bis wide-ranging commentaries is rooted in an essentiaIly
positive project of moral and political import tbat bears some family resemblance to
moral and political projects of Nietzsehe's philosophical forebearers.3 This project,
moreover, relies on certain authoritative interpretations of reallty in general and of
the human condition in particular, which in mm presuppose an adherence to a
notion of truth that is quile consistent with the normative, truth-seeking orientation
of much of the Western philosophical tradition.
To be more precise: the point de départ for Nietzsche's intellectual enterprise,
in Jrrj view, is an eminently ethical concem for the conditions ofhuman
flourishing. Nietzsche believes not ooly that wc can (and must) make qualitative
distinctions between higber, admirable modes ofhnman existence and lower,
contemptible ones, but also that these distinctions compel us to ensure that higher
forms ofhuman life are fostered (and loweriorms discouraged) as much as
possible. When Nietzsche speaks of "us" (as in "we free-spirits". "we seekers of
Eric Blondel echoes these sentiments, deeming il "almost a truism to say that wc
must preserve ~ irreducible originality ofbis revolt.••" (Blondel 1991: 4) Sec also
Tracy B. Strong(I988: 144 .
3 Ruth Abbey notes that Nietzsehe's willingness to acknowledge bis indebtedness
to philosophical forebears dl'c1ines marJœi!ly in bis 1ate works, wheze he is much
more likely to assert bis absolute intellectual independtnce (Abbey 1994: 26-7).
Carl Pletsch traces Nietzsehe's strident insistenœ on bis own uniquenes5 to bis
2
• knowledge", ete.), however, he bas a very select group in mind - himself and a few
like-minded kindrcd spirits - and wishes to concem bimself with and address this
group alone. Only the few, he believes, cao and will understand bis central point:
!bat a concem for human flourishing and for the dignity of the human species
properly translates inti) a concem for the wcl1-being of a small minoIÏty of human
beings. Nietzsche, in other words, propounds a thesis !bat he believes to be a fact
of human existence, something !bat would be self-evident to any "healthy" human
being: !bat no more !han a small minority of the human species bas the potential to
strive for the pinnacle ofexcellence ofwhich the species as a whole is capable.
Only the few have the innate capacities ta be exemplars of the species and lead fully
flourishing, vinuous lives.
Kecping this view of an inescapable Rtmgordnung ofhigher and lower types of
human being in mind is essential ifwe are ta place Nietzsehe's often ironie and
derisive treatment oftenns like "morality", "vinue", "truth", and "the good" in its
proper context. Nietzsche believes!bat these and other nonnatÎ.ve tenns have been
effectively hijaclced and polluted by a lowly, contempt1llle fonn ofvaluation - a
"slave morality" -!bat bas been in cultural and political ascendance in Europe since
the cultural "slave revoit" of antiquity. TIagically, he believes, slave morality bas
captured the hearts and minds even of those few individuals with nobler
dispositions (himself excepted), thase capable.of striving for something much
higher!han the "pitiable comfort" pmsued by the majorlty. For centmi'=S, this
persecuted minorlty bas been tangh( from aadle ta grave ta bemoan and repudiaIe
its own impulses and ta em1mlce a base set ofvalues al variance with its deepest
inclinations. It is Nletzsche's goal ta wean these superior human beings away from
the false consciousness eogendered by a plebeian society andmake the;n sec what
•
!bey already know in their bancs: the contcmptl1l1e, servile lIlItUI:e of lIIlIinstR:am,
3
• modem society and its moral valuations, and the splendour and dignity of the
highest human being who follows bis deepest inclinations.
In embarking upon this mission of moral-spiritual awakening, Nietzsche is
undeIstandably reluctant to use the language of the enemy. His frequent,
provocative seif-descriptions as an "immoralist" and 50 on represent, in my view,
an attempt to demaxcate bis position from that of slave morality and not, as is oftcn
believed, an attempt to transcend ethical valuation altogelher. (As wc sha1l sec later,
for every derisive tteatment of "morality" in Nietzsehe's writings there is a
straightforward, unapologetic invocation of a "higher" or a "master" morality that
Nietzsche develops as bis own.)4
The same is true, 1believe, for bis tteatment of many other valuative terms.
One of the reasons why Nietzsche is 50 difficuit to intelpret is bis often maddening
tendency to tIeat a given term both pejoratively and positively, depending on the
context. We shall soon sec how Nietzsche persistently distinguishes between
superlor and inferior manifestations of the same concept or phenomena; between,
for examp\e, authentic and bogus conceptions oftrutb. higher and lower forms of
friendship, great and petty forms ofpolitics, admirable and contemptible types of
shame, hea1thy and unhealthy women. ete. It is my view. in sum. that in derisively
placing terms like "truth". "justice". and the like in inverted commas, Nietzsche
calls attention to the fact that tbese terms have all-too-often been conscripted into the
service ofa whole package ofbeliefs and values that are both morally poisonous
and just plain wrong. He does this, moreover. in the name ofa higher. more
authentic notion of truth and justice.
4
• Is this ethical vision tied to a socio-political imperative? As we sha1l examiD': in
more favourable "breeding" environment for the superior human beings of the
future.
•
major intr:r!ocutors. As a geDmI1 me!h<ldological prlnciple, 1agree with Abbey's
contention tbat Oit is possible ta sIot a WJitcr into a tradition on the basis of sbaœd
concems.identified from the ootside and [that] this l"CCJUÏœS no a~ on their
part tbat Ile or she is sbaring!hem and continuing adebate " (Abbey 1994: 29)
=- S
• the agent is depicted as higbly vulnerable and in need of resources that are not
wholly in his control or ofhis making. On the other band, however. Nietzsche is
also powerfully drawn towards a Stoic ideal of individual self-sufficiency. the
notion that a fully flourishing life of virtue need not contain those "extemal goods"
(like friendship. community. rame and honour. wealth, ete.) that depend on forces
need suggests vulnerability and would work against the self-sufficiency ideal). and
(b) in bis depiction of social Ie1ations in his imagined, idea1 political arder. in which
bis repeated insistence tha1 every superior human being is self-sufficient, i.e. a law
unto himself. pIOdl!(:es to a highly unstable. scarcely workable framework for a .
social and political arder. To anticipate one of my conclusions: while an important
part ofNietzsehe's moral philosophy calls for a social and political dimension,
•
lII1l3gOnism towaIds the IOle ofcontingency in buman affaiIs pIays a 1aIge IOle in
6
• should resist Fortlma's efforts ta exert influence over their lives and should attempt
ta replace ber with their all-powerfu1 will. 1 will argue that the whole political
project of "breeding" is posited in this context, as li combat not just against the
"degenerate" values of slave morality, but also against those forces that hold sway
over the herd: the forces of contingency and luck. The highest hnman beings,
believes Nietzsche, should control the conditions of their existence and their
reproduction, rnther than continue ta submit ta the conditions of li servile milieu
over which they have no controL FUIthermore, 1 argue that Nietzsehe's "breeding"
fantasies form only one front of li two-front assault on Fortll1UL 1 identify bis
second assault with bis celebrated notion of the Eternal Retum of the SaIne, which 1
read as li thought experiment through which the superior human being imaginatively
defeats Fortlma by joyously willing retrospectively evetything that bas ever
happened ta him (and, by extension, evetything that bas ever happened, perioti).
N1etz:schean Naturalism
more complex, and indeed ultimately contradietoIy, bc'A:ansc ofbis tendency ta slide
between two very different and incompatible uses of"natuIe" that coexist uneasily
with one another.
Nietzsche attempts from time-to-time to ground bis own ethica1 framewoJ:k,
along with all normative Dameworlcs, in an amoral (or, perbaps more accurately,
7
• reference to an allegedly more basic, substratum of "fact". bas been predominant in
European moral and political philosophy since the seventeenth century. and. as we
shaIl sec in the course ofan examination of the notion of the will to power,
Nietzsche is strongly influcnced by this prototypically modern dîscourse.
As we shaIl sec. however. Nietzsehe's modern naturalism forms only one side
strive for ever-higher levels ofhuman pe<fedion. Thus Nietzsche cau celebrate the
"artificiality" of the highest hnman being - Le. bis ability ta create an artifice of
meaning and value out ofnothinglcss or chaos - while at the same lime BIgUing for
the "natura1ncss" of this very achievement.
Problems arise whcn wc tty ta reconcile these rival discourses. and the whole
coherence oUfJetzsche's project suffers as a consequence. As 1will argue
throughout this study. there is something inescapably incoheœnt in N'Jetzsehe's
attel'lpt ta have it bath ways. On the one band. in a "naturalistic" temper he wants
ta ground all moral schemata in a ptoper understanding of a prc-moral state of
•
affaiIs (which he 50metÏmes claims ta have been the first in the modem world ta
8
• individual). On the othcr band, he undcrmines bis own naturalistic foundationalism
by insisting. in effect, that there is no pre-moral. neutral sphere of fact upon which
we could base our valuations. He insists. in other words. that our very perceptions
of reality and ail of c.JI" judgements (even scïentific ones) axe imbued with a more
basic normative-ethica1 stance tow:mls the world that we eithcr self-consciously
choose (like the admirable highest type of man, who chooses to follow the ethica1
orientation suggested by bis deepest, visceral self) or, like the "hcrd", unreflectively
inherit. Unlike those who insist that Nietzsche somehow overcame all residual
foundationalism in bis mature thought, 1remain convinced that this is a tension that
N"1elZSche never resolved.
AlI of this bas implications for Nietzsche's portrait of bis superior human
beings and their relationship to the "mediocre" majority ofhumankind. Whereas
his developmental ethics and bis stress on moral pedagogy suggest that the highest
human being is bath vulnerable and falh"ble, and needs to he helped along in
progxessing from an inadequate to a more adequate understanding ofhimself and
the world, in bis naturalistic temper Nietzsche seems to suggest the opposite: that
the highest man's "instincts" or deepest inclinatiQns are iaeproacbable from the
start. As we shall sec. Niettsehe tends to invoke this latter position whenever he
wisbes to reject any sort ofextemal,legal fetter on the creative will of the highest
man. Nietzsche wants to mgue that the highest man's deeply intemalised sense of
propriety and self-discipline (which we shall examine al senne length) will ensure
that only good things come as a result ofhis untrammelled, aeative self-asscrtion.
However, once we take note of (a) the unmitigated contempt in which Nietzsehe's
higbest men hold the majority of the population, and (b) tbeirblithe dismissal of the
,
idea that the majority possesses "rlghts" or IeCOlIl'Se ofany sort, we will find lellSOIl
•
to he sceptical ofNietzsche's xeassurances (along with those ofhis many academic
champiQDS).
9
• To anticipate anotber.of my conclusions: although, as 1 suggested above.
Nietzsche hegins bis enterprise with an avowedly moral-ethical view in minci, and
makes use of the ineplo.chable conceptual and normative tools of an Aristotclian
developmental ethic, 1 will axgue that bis contempt for the majority of humankind
and bis nalUl'a1istic effort ta legitimate an unconscionable ranking of human beings
lead him out of moral discourse altogetber. Nietzsche ends up lllgIIing for the
construction ofa hierarchical political order chara::terised by the untrammelled
aesthetic self-expxession of a se1f-absoIbed élite that bas no compassion (or even
much thought at all) for the majority of their fellow human beings.6 (Thus 1 part
company with se1f-styled "left-Nietzschean" authOlS who claim to unearth a
"progxessive" political and moral orientation from Nietzsche's writings.)7
The Nietzsche that emerges from this study is deeply problematic, bath from the
•
Nietzsche is pollxayec). Ua Kanfmann, as a distinguished (albeit sceplical) member
of the Canon or as its Jl""Wltimate cxitic and destroyer, there is a clear convexgence
in the secondaxy liteI'atuœ around the view ofNietzsehe as an admirable.
emancipatoly tbinker. This view, 1 suggesl, needs ta he JeeXamincd.
la
• An Out1ine of the Cbapters
tha1 the conception of ttuth he criticises and xejects is one tha1 he associates with a
whole package ofdubious metaphysical assnmptions about the nature of reality and
the human condition. It is this notion ofcapital "T" ttuth, 1 argue, tha1 Nietzsche
criticises in the name ofa ttuer, more accurate pictute of the natw:e ofreality.
Moreover, in an interpretation of Nietzsebe's celebrated "perspectivism", 1 suggest
tha1 he aims at teeonciling the notion ofobjective ttuth with the ubiquity of
identified with the bigbest moral and spiritual potentials ofhnmankind as a who1e.
Cbapter m also explores the moral psycbological account that undcrgiIds
N'1etzscbe's pœsumption of an inescapable Rangordnung ofhnman beings. We
shal1 examine his crucial account ofbodily "knowledge". i.e. of the cognitive and
normative stalUS wbicb he (m Jine with a tradition ofmoral tbought traceable back to
11
• Nietzsche believes that an objective assessment of the quality of our affective
instincts is crucial 10 determining our moral-spiritual "rank." vis-à-vis other human
beings. (Such an assessment, for Nietzsche, is objective only to the extent that it is
made by li superior sort ofhuman being who is in possession of an undistorted
initially hea1thy, e1evated instincts are routine1y forced 10 suppress and repudiate
these deepest parts of their selves by li pernicious form of socia1isation that bas been
li highcr. Dobler form of moral valuation in and through the sort of rationality that
• be1ieves, must do the bard wod: itse\f. Tbe road 10 the superlor human being's
12
• "rec:overy" from false COnsciOUSDess must go through a fonn of self-healing. We
shall examine how the highest man's self-overcoming is descn1led in terms of an
ever-more profound exploration of the "knowledge" of bis own body; i.e. ofbis
own deepest inclinations and orientations.
In the context of Chapter Vs discussion of Nietzsche's conception of self-
discipline, 1argue further that this call to embrace one's "instincts" is in no way
analogons to a h"bertine call to abandon aIl manner ofrational self-mastery. On the
contraxy, unlike the ascetic priest, who urges bis followers to suppress and
extiIpaIe their primaI urges, Nietzsche wishes bis superior human beings to both
embrace their dangerous, "Dïonysian" side and to harmonise this dimension with
the highest man's rational, controlling element the "Apollonian" dimension. (As
we shall see in Chapter X. however, N"1ClZsche also approves of the idea of "letting
loose~ ~t crucial jllllCttIreS, a concession that bas serious implications for those
whom he designates as the "herd".)
Chapter VI takes up Nietzsche's "debunking" stance towards mainstream
noble type ofhuman being who reacquaints himselfwith bis own visceral instincts
will develop a fine di<criminating sense, and will criticise and repudiate much of
what he sees. Negation alone, however, wbile a precondition for self-overcoming,
is by no means a snfficient condition. After exarnining Nietzsche's dadc portrait of
the nihilist. ie. of the pathological negating type, 1shall begin an account of
Nietzsche's conception ofan affirmative stance towards reality. Bcqnse he feaIs
that the higbest human being may lose bis capacity for Jasagen in the face of the
overwhe1ming ugIiness and mediocrity ofherd society. Nietzsche urges bis select,
superior readershipto breaIc with the mainstream and move into solitude. Alone,
•
thefreespiritmustembarkuponamoral-spirituaIjoumey,thec1imaxofwhichis
described in ClapIer VII as Nietzsche's proposed thought experiment known as the
13
• Etemal Retum of the Samc. In my view. Niettsehe is convinced that the definitive
OVeICOming of ressentiment and revenge is contingent upon successful passage
through this fonnidable mind game, which he represcnts (rather fancifully. 1 will
suggest) as the highest man's triumph over Forruna. As 1sec it, the Etemal Retum
tums out ta be a conceptual conjuring trick that obscures, rather than e!iminatof our
vulnerability to contingency.
Chapter Vil also examines Nietzsehe's views on the importance of friendship.
narrow conception ofaesthetic activity.) His motives, 1suggest, are bath persona!
and political, as he is concemed bath with finding meaningful buman contact and
•
with the future of the human specïes. Only if the higher sort of men wrest the
"breeding" of the next generatîon out of the bands ofChance (and those of the
14
• resentful majority) will human excellence be preserved in an age of increasing
mediocrity. 1argue for the existence of a continuum in Nietzsehe's complex
treatment of breeding, ranging from the strictly metaphorical use of procreative
language. to the easily recognisable use of "breeding" in terms of upbringing and
non-tutelary education. to finally the frank reference to a polities ofeugenies. 1
argue furthermore that NielZSChe's ambivalence with respect to the question of
heredity are traceable back to the aforementioned tension in bis thought between the
"fatalistic" view of human capabilities found in bis "scientific" naturalism and his
more supple developmental ethies.
Chapter IX moves to an examination of Nietzsehe's imagined aristocratic
politica1 order of the future, focussing firstly on the relations between the highest
human beings. and secondly on bis depiction of idealised gender relations and
relations between masters and slaves. With respect to gender relations. 1argue
against recent attempts to unearth a proto-feminist stance in Nietzsehe's writings
and claim that bis portrait of the highest type of human being is unreservedly male.
although 1acknowledge bis effusive praise for the "healthy" type of higher woman
who would serve as an ideal consort of the highest type (and as an idea1 mother to
bis children). In contrast to the standard, new orthodox insistence on Nietzsehe's
transcendence ofall manner of "essentialism". 1propose that he unapologetically
puts forth an essentialist view of the ideal. healthy woman, and criticises her
"unhealthy" counterpart for the latter's failure to live up the· sublime standards of
the Obermensch's consort.
With respect to bis depiction of relations between the bighest and lowest Imman
beings. 1note that Nietzsehe's occasional insistence on the bighest man's self-
sufficiency is rendered problematic in light of bis view of the highest man's need
for those to tread upon and over. 1examine a wonisome portrait of ostensibly
• lower order human beings at the mercy ofa supposedly magnanimous upper crus!,
IS
• whose innate sense ofself-control and good taste (Nietzsche assures us) guarantcc
that they would never lord it over their inferiors. 1express doubts about !bis
M('~'lodological Considerations
Cogent arguments can be made both for the presence ofunderlying continuity
and for significant change in the course ofNietzsehe's relatively briefbut very
prolific intellectual career. The case for a more serious examination ofthe shifts
from period to period bas recently been made by Ruth AbbeY, who suggests that
commentators have too often imposed an artificial uniformity on Nietzsehe's
writings in their aeation ofa "single, static Nietzsche" (AbbeY 1994: 283). In the
course ofa c=ful study of the so-called "middle period" texts (from the 1879
Human, AH Too HID1U1n to thefirstfourbooks of The Gay Science of 1882),
AbbeY argues persuasively, for exarnple, for N'JlltZSChe's shift in ernphasis from
Germano- to Eurocentrism from the early to the middle period (Ibid., 13), and
suggesls that bis rich, nuanced treatment ofmorality of the middle period gives way
•
to a tendency in the mature period to caricabJ~ "slave" morality (Ibid., 16)•
16
• Alexander Nebamas, for bis part, suggests !bat otber crucial devclopments
occur in the transition from middle 10 late periods, and 1agn:e particularly with bis
contention !bat although Nietzsehe's middle works contain many passages on
power, bis crucial conception of the will 10 power becomes central only in the late
writings. (Nebamas 1985: 75, Because some of the clements of NiClZSChe's
thought !bat 1 wish 10 explore in depth are most fully treated or developed in bis late
or mab.IrC period (including the will to power, bis political vision, bis conception of
master-slave relations, and bis treatment of questions of "breeding"), 1have decided
10 focus on these later works. Accordingly, the vast majority of my references will le
taken from the following: Thus Spoke Zara1hustra (1883-5); Beyond Good and
Evû (1886); the fifth book of The Gay Science (1886-7); NiClZSChe's prefaces to the
second editions of most of bis pre-Zarathustra works, including the Untimely
Meditations, HumanAU Too HU1NJ1I.,Daybreak, and the Gay Science (1886-7);
On the Genealogy of Morals (1887); the four works of 1888 (The Case o/Wagner,
Twilight of the ldols, The Antî-Christ, and Ecce Homo) and selections from the
NachJJJss, writings from the period 1883-8 unpl.lblisbed in Nietzsehe's lifetime and
subsequently edited and pub1ished in bis col1ected works and in English lraIts1ation
under the title The W"ül 10 Power.
Altbough 1 accept in principle the importance ofperiodisation, and agœe that
Nietzsche neitber held one positionall of bis adult life nor said cxactly the same
thing in all of bis books, 1remain convinced, nevertheless. that the case for certain
timdamental continuities is CC'mpelling. Many commentatms have argued, in my
view conv:incingly, thatcertain basic concems pervade N1ClZSChe's wOIk as a
whole. Berkowitz, for examp1e, asserts that Nietzsehe's writings "are marJœo!f by
an exceptional unity ofintention and exccution." (Berkowitz 1995: 262'/ 1hope 10
17
• bring out this diachronie unity by supplementing my mature period citatioDS with
selective references to early and middle period pieces, especially with respect to the
following tbemes: Nietzsehe's "Aristotelian" conception ofhuman nature stressing
the creative- "artificial" potential of the human species, bis recourse to truth, bis
stress on the virtues of intellectual honesty, integrity, and courage, and bis
endorsement ofsocio-political hierarchy.
however, pansing on each occasion ta comment on the place of the cited passage in
the DlIlTlltive progression of the WOIk as a whole, Berkowitz's critic::ism seems ta
speak directly ta studies like my own. Ifhis claim is that one should cite
Zarat1uIstra only if one's avowed aim is ta study this text alone, then it seems ta
me ta be excessive and umeasonable. Berkowitz, however. may be making a much
more œasonable and 1egitimate point: he may simply be cal1ing upon us ta respect
• of the narrative integrity of the text. This pointseems most compelling when one
looks al specifie passages in Zarat1uIstra where the Ieader's understanding is
18
• indeed contingent upon a knowledge of the sw:rounding namttive context. When
provClbs and teachings come !rom the mouths of one of the dubious "bigher men"
characters of Part IV, for example, one ought ta be exceedingly cautious; though
Ù1Cy mimic some of Zarathustra's lIIlIltims and gestures, their general portrayal in
the namttive as pathetic, servile creatures should discourage any effort ta identify
their words with NielZSChe's position on anything. "1 need pure, smootll mirrors
for my teaching;" decIares Zarathustra ta these so-called bigher men. "Upon your
surface even my own reflection is distorted." (Z IV G) In cases like this, 1 agree
with Berkowitz that ta deny the importance of the namttive context wou1d be folly.
1maintain, however, that regard1ess ofhow one intelprets the namttive as a
whole (llIId there are numeroUS, conflicting intelpretations), there are aIso many
passages in ThlIS Spoke Zara1JuIStra that cao be understood and appreciated on
their own, written as peads ofwisdom readily accessible and meaningful without
continuaI reference ta the immediate narrative context. On one important level, this
text may be seen as emnlating a genre ofclassiC'l1 Greek and Roman (and, Iater,
Renaissance) literanne that had a profound impact on N"1CtZSChe through bis
classicist and philological background: the genre of"wisdom literanne", produced
by fathers for their sons or by hnmanist scbolars for the Mifieation ofprinces and
aimed at an expIoration of the attinufes that should be taken towards various spheres
oflife (e.g. fami1y, friends, comrnnnity, po1ities, waretc.), monumentous life-
changes (ascension ta adu1thood, marriage, acx:eding ta public office, old age,
death). and varlous types of people. The pedagogic inœnt of the 7..artzthustra text, 1
would BIgUe, mirrors this genre quite clearly. thus barkening back ta many o~
excmpIars of the genre: LaRocbefoucauld's maxims. Ciccro's Ietters ta bis son in
bis On DIlties. Hesiod's Worb and Days. and so on. One cao. 1 think, quote
•
freely (aIbeit CllIe1ùI1y) !rom any section ofthese texlS in a themariç SlUdy aimed at
exploring tbeir author's attitudes towards the abow-mentioned spheœs oflife
19
• without doing violence to thesc tcxts as a whole. The same may be said, 1would
argue, for Nietzsche's T1uIs Spoke Zarathustra.
9 As ~ sball note in Chaptets V and Je. Nietzsche. in both Zarathustra and other
• tcxts, uses the mel8Jd!ors ofascent and desccDt to describc the ptoc:ess of moral and
spiritual progression. Just what he means by this twin movement is discussed in
these cbaptcts.
20
• Henccforth Zarathustra gradually redirects bis attention from the majority plebeian
clement 10 a more rarified, minority audience, reflecting the author's (mature) view
that such teachings ought 10 be düected at those few with the capacity to undeIstand
Any writer focnssing on Nietzsche's mature period must decide on the levcl of
importance 10 accord Nietzsehe's so-called Nachltzss , the thousands of pages of
unpub1ished notes written during the mature period, most ofwhich weIe collated
and edited by Elisabeth Fôrster-Nietzsehe eL al and published under the title Der
Wùle ZJIT Macht.
Two opposing (and extteme) positions bave emerged in the debate over the
Nachltzss: either it is lauded as an essential component ofNietzsehe's work,
,representïng the culmination ofbis philosophy or bis philosophy's "true" core (e.g.
Heidegger 1991), or it is dismi5S'"d as "pseudo-canonical" and rife with many ideas
that Nietzsche eventnally disgmded (e.g. Magnus eL al 1993).
1sec no reason 10 taIœ a stand at either extteme. While it secms 10 me an
unwise scho1arly practice 10 accotd the same weight 10 an author's posthumoUS,
unpublished matc:rial as 10 bis or ber published works, 1 do not sec any valid reason
why we should deny their significance altogether.l0 It secms clear that the
10 1 concurwith Ricbani Scbacht in this matter: "One !DaY always question the
commitmeDt of Il writerto things he writes but does Dot pllbJjsh; but this is a worry
ofwhich toomuch can he made. And it is doubly desirable Dot 10 mate 100 much
ofit in the case of _. N;etzsche, whose productive life endcd abruptly and qujte
•
early. with majorprojecls undcrway and in the offing. mateôaJ forwhich he was
am 1J!!lJ]atinB in the nolebooks from bis 1ateryears. One cannotknow what use he
migbt have made oftbis mateôal; but this. in my opinion. is DO reason 10 ignore il."
(Scbacbt 1983: xiI)
21
• cross-rcferences ta The Will to Power. However. 1 will avoid excessive reliance on
the materialleft unpublished by Nietzsche, under the working assumption that my
• 22
• The Received VIew
Cbapter 1: Nktœ:hean Tmtb and Objedivity
The new orthodoxy proclaims that one of the most important things Nietzsche
are with the "dogmatic, univeISalist tradition" ofWestem thought from Plata to
Kant (Nebamas 1985: 223), a tradition typically posited as a "unified system"
(Allison 1985: xxi), tIUth-claims are said to evoke a vision ofsome transcendent,
etema1 realmofBeing-orcapital "R" Reality -which serves as the ultimate
standani-beaIer ofTruth in the cbanging, human wood of appearances. NielZSche
is routinely said to equate the concept of truth with this Platonic-Cbristian clnalism.
and is invoked in support of the view that ail truth-claims or claims to knowledge
lleCeSS8ri1y presume some sort ofprivileged access to and grasp ofan unchanging,
peâeà realm. As MarleWarren suggests in what he believes to he a Nietzschean
spirit, one shou1d he suspicions of ail truth-claims in light of the tendency of
metBphysical theories to view tIUth as a "neutral discoveIY", as "somc:thing that
exists apart from retlexive practices, and that .,. can he ciisc:ov=d and politically
applied.••" (Warren 1988: 236)
In presnming that Nietzsche's gR:8t importance stems from bis supposed
aiticism ofand bœak: with the concept oftruth, the new orthodoxy. as Peter
Bedrowitz observes, "drastically shifts the actuaI center ofgravity of [Nietzsche's]
books," thereby obscuring bis con<:em with ethical and political questions and
. .
making him over "into a theorist prlm8TIly conœmed with questions ofhow we
know rather than ofhow we should live." (BeI:kowitz 1995: 3)1 In the new
• concemed above ail else with questions about the possl"bility ofknow1edge. He
dcclares that "[t}he basic moving fon::e bebind N"ldZ9"'he's philosophical en=prise
is the problem ofmeœùng •••" (1991: 32) 1 disagree with Bedrowitz's view that
23
• orthodox frameworlc, Nietzsehe's debunking of the notion of a higher realm of
Truth or Being is said to demonstrate clearly "that there are no prior conect starting
points for questioning; hence, there can be no foundation for historica1 truth.•
(Strong 1988: 39) There can be, in other words, no truly objective truth-claim,
since ·objectivity", understood as privileged access to or contact with a flawless,
neutral standard, is simply impossible. AIl that rernains are limited, partial
perspectives or interpretations, and to deny this by making pretentious claims to
objective truth is dogmatic. Alexander Nebamas goes to great length ta convince us
that Nietzsche's real bête noire is dogmatism understood in this sense: any belief
while masking its true status as a partial, inteIested interpretation (Nebamas 1985:
125-6). Revulsion in the face of dogmatism, claims Nebamas, is ~ main pillar of
Nietzsche's aitique of Socrates and Plato: Nietzsche "attributes to them the view
that their view is not simply a view but an accurare desaiption of the real world
which foIces its own acceptance and makes an unconditional claim on everyone's
assent.• (Ibid., 32; cf. 4).
enticing type ofthinking that is conscious of ils oWn particularlty and partiality. In
describing this sltemative, new orthodox theorists usually invokc the celebraIcd
concept of "perspectivism", said to imply that "no particular point of view is
privileged in the sense that it affords those who occupy it a betler pietme of the
world as it really is than all otIIcIs." (Nebamas 1985: 49) Broce Detwiler's account
Blondel e9:apes the pœvailing, œductionist ttend (Berkowitz 1995: 1:15). WlI1ml
appears al first g1ance to resist tbis reductionism, dccIariDg that "Nît'tzcche's
approach to truth is DOt firndamentally epïsternologicaL" (WlI1ml 1988: 94) Upon
fmtber œading, however, it SOOD becomes clear that he resists linking N"Jetzscbe
widl "epistemology" only bccanse he associates this teml with the assmnprions of
•
mctaphysica1 duslism (JbùI). SinceWlI1ml 8.«lDDtS that Nietzsebe's primaxy
conc:em is to dcbmk metapbysical dnalist conceplions ofknowlcdge (and how they
Idale to agency: Ibid., 26), wc can safely say that he falls in line after all with the
new ortbodoxy's stress on language and meaning.
24
• admirably fleshes out the new orthodox view: Nietzsche's perspectivism, he
daims,
Wben Nehamas claims that Nietzsche presents "an interpretation that demands to be
believed even as it says that it is only an interpretation" (1985: 40, emphasis added),
the ward "only" is injected. to evoke the image of a levd epistemic playing field
than another." (1988: IS; sec also 93) For Nehamas. Nietzsche's image of a
• modest perspective that serves only as an a,dl..ntic miaor of one's OWD views,
without S'JC'C'l mbing ta the (mberently dogmatic, alltho, i,man) temptation of.
2S
• generalisal:ion: "Nietzsche's opposition to dogmatism," explains Nehamas. "does
not consist in the paradoxical idea that it is wrong to think that one's beliefs are
true, but only in the view that one's beliefs are not, and need not be. true for
plurality, but presents itse1f as the unique and absolute truth of the text)_." (Blondel
1991: 146)2
Awareness of the partiality and biased nature ofone's own thought is,
however, oniy one oftwo anti-dogmatic strategies said to be involœd by N"1elZsche;
the other, it is widely clairrwl. al1egedly involves a deliheraœ cultivalion of
ambiguity. Nietzsche, it is c1airrwl, sides. dogmatism by mating it impossible
for his wrltings to be decipbeœd in a clear, UDeqUivocal manner. In this spirit Jean
Granier axgues that N"1WSCbe insists "on the j"'possibility of a definjtjve
intel'pret3tion that would exhanst the richness ofreality_" (GraDier 1985: 197)
•
values. LiIœ Nebamas and BIODde1, Karman claims thatN"votzscœ sees the ptiestly
table ofvaloes as jnc!eœnt and dangerous primanly becm'SC it "preteikis _ to sec
the world as it is; it claims, that is, to deDy the paspective that is part of the vital
condition of an that 1ives." (Kofman 1988: 190)
26
• Blondel coneurs, characterising N'Jetzsehe's writings as a "wonderfu1 disorder"
(1991: 5), an "enigmatic ambiguity" (Ibid.. 6), and suggesting that they are open ta
an "infinite possible inteqnetative plurality." (Ibid., 145) In Blonde1's eyes,
N'1CtZSCbe's project appears ta involve an active seeking out and embrace of
incoben:nce:
not only does Nietzsche not seem ta care IDIlch about
not giving a strictly univocal definition of the value
of the concepts implied in bis text '" but he does not
even tty to link them up in a coherently
demonstrative fashion, which cau simply seem ta
lead ta incompab.llle propositions. (Ibid.. 14)
Connolly, in a similar vein, bestows on Nietzsche a "protean" status (1991: 185),
wbich he then invokes - conveniently - ta give himself as interpreter absolute
licence ta "shift the center of gravity ofNietzsebean discourse" any way he sees
fit.3
For the new orthodoxy, reality is "rich" because it is an ambiguous, chaotic
flllX, and the most admirable type of writing - Nietzsche's type - is one that both
miIrors and joyously celebrates this indetmninate staIe. In ADison's slœtch of the
sort of universe tbat N'1ClZSChe supposedly identifies with and œvels in,
3 "Tbe point _ is DOt ta offer the ttue account ofthe true Niettsche biding behind
a series Ofmasks. but to construet a post-Niemcheanism one is wiIIing to endorse
and enact." (CoanoDy 1991: 197) Since ConnoUy (al tilDes) self~ously
distaooes bis tbongbt from N'1CtZscbe in this sense, bis detailed account of "post-
NiefDtheanism" will DOt be of diIect COIIœ.[n to this study. Connolly's approach
to Nïe'zscbe. howevet'. is more lIIDbiguous tban he lets on. On the one band, when
he insists cm the absoluœ liceDce of the ilmpreœr, he seems to suggest tbat no one
intapœtaticmofNietz~heis "Iight". Beappc:atstoinvokethis position when
crlticisiDg tbosc who sec Nietzsche as a tIwUist of domination; such a reading, he
conccr:1es, is possible, but~, becallse etherreadings are aIso poss1llle (Ibid.,
185). On the ether hand,he also seems to SUggest tbat bis own intetprel3tion of
•
Niefzso he capcwes whatNietzscheis cmaboutbettertban othe:ts (e.g. Ibid., 187).
This Jatœr aspect of ConnoUy's wœk - the aspect tbat c1aims to provi.dc an lICCUl'lIte
assessDlent ofNietzsche's thought - will he nitically examined in this study,
particulady in Cbapten V and X.
• cbaracter of the metaphorical economy. It is this
infinitely "open" aspect of transformation that
liberates the whole field of signification from its
traditional finitude. (Allison, 1985: xvii)
Blondel claims !bat Nietzsche's celebration of this openness, and of the limitless
interpretive freedom it allows, is the root ofhis Jasagen, or affirmative stance
towards life (Blondel 1991: 29).4
Blondel charitably concedes the existence ofclements in Nietzsehe's texts -
"explieatory discursive passages" -!bat might lead the UDtutOred mind to think that
Nietzsche does in fact take a clear stand on certain issues ("Only fanaticism would
contest the fact!bat there is first and foremost a discourse in N"1CIZSChe..." 1991: 24;
also Ibid., 76; 248), but he insists !bat nit is not on this discourse !bat Nietzsehe's
enterprise bases itself..•" (Ibid., 24) For Blondel, Nietzsche's main claim to
originality and pertinence is found in "those elements in him which resist discursive
synthesis," (Ibid.,7) i.e. the ineffable, non-discursive moments of "resistance" to
meaning in the text itself (Ibid., 89). Nietzsche's resistance, for Blondel. is
tantamount ID a Iefusal ID identify bimselfwhole-heartedly with one particular
vicwpoint or meaning, for this wouId involve closing himselfofffrom the
wonderful chaos !bat is life.s In a painfully contorted passage (which, ID be fair,
may be the IeSUl.t of a poor trans1aIion), Blondel proposes that
there are many discursive sequences in Nietzschc's
texts, but ... al the same lime Nietzsche œcants or
unsa15 them [s'en didït]- and ... he can only lI1WlY
what he 1uu saül. Nietzsche does not say 7IOt1ùng;
but he:~ longer sa15 something. 'Ibis is what
meaning is. in Nietzsche (Ibid., 76; emphasis in
original)
Ecboing a tbeme pœvalent in postmodetnist 1itetature, Blondel suggests !bat
N"1etzsehe uses traditionallanguage because he bas DO choice: it is aIl-pervasive. It
28
• is only through the use of ÏIODy, he daims, and in particuIar through the use of
those tell-tale signs of ïrony, the inverted COIDlIl3S, that Nietzsche succeeds in
"unsaying" what he says. in keeping a safe distance from the traditional,
metapbysicallanguage that he bas no choice but to invoke. "[B]ec:allse new words
aIe lacking, he uses the old ones in inverted commas, wbic:h is a silent way of
c:arving out a gulfbetween bim se1 f and metapbysics on bis own ground." (Blondel
1991: 141; also 30)6 For Blondel, in other words, the main thing that differentiates
Niel2Sc:he's discouIse from dogmatic: metapbysics is the presence ofinverted
commas, wbic:h allegedly serve as indie:atOIS of the autbor's awazeness of the
essentially artific:ial, invented, and llIbitraIy natw:e of bis discourse.. Blondel goes
50 far as to claim tbat "[i]t is, in fact, the whole of language that, ac:c:ording to
Nietzse:be, bas to he placed within inverted commas ••" (150)7
The attractiveness'of the new orthodox acc:ount lies in its bighlighting ofcertain
undeniab'y important elements ofNietzsc:be's thought. Refusing to heed "the siJ:en
6 The empbasis on irony as both a prefeacd stylistic: device and outlook on life bas
long bcen pervasive in posl1J»iem literatuze. Connolly, for exampte, asserts tbat
pt'SlllïOdemism involves the c:ultivation ofan iIonic: stance towani the self, even as
one affi , ms the selfin its i~ (1991: 47). See also the intlucntial wodc of
Richard Rorty (c:spcc:ially Rorty 1989). Blondel's great stress on iJ:ony in
Nietz.. Ile leads bim to dismiss the œ1evanc:e of pateDtly non-iJ:onic: elements in the
texts. In a revelatmy,)'Ct scan:ely discernable sc:holarly IDlIIIOC11ver, Blondel places
a sic! interpolation immediate1y after bis citation of one ofNietzsc:he's many
refeœDceS to the posslDi1ity of disting'Ûsbing betvteen truth and eaor (1991: 295).
Blondel's teJKlentious use of the sic, whichis usually ~ fora1erlingthe
readerto ïnsllPœS inc:oJrcct speDing. poor grarnmar, ~ logic:, and the lilœ, is
indicative of a dismismve c1ose-rnin..W ress towards the possibility tbat many of
Nietzsc:he's evoc:ations of truth are non-iIonic: and eamest (sec the disCJlssion
below).
7 The absunüty ofthis propositiOD is nothllld to sec. Jfthe whole oflanguage is
to he placed within inverted commas, does this Dot denude inverted commas oftheir
•
essential function, which is to dislinguish SOUle WOlds from. others? Wheœas
Blondel's c1aim rendcIS the ïnverted comma meaningless, Nietzsc:be (as wc shall
: sec) bestows upon tbem a very specifie meaning and fimction. (1 am indebœd to
discussions with Ruth ADbey on this point.)
29
• sangs of old metaphysical bird catchers" (BGE 230), Nietzsche docs indeed refuse
the conceit oflinking bis view of things to same timeless, unearthly standard akin
apart from and preceding humanity, there is only "becoming", the ever-cl1anging
activity and reactivity of this world (the only world) !bat "docs not aim at ajinal
state, docs not flow into 'Being'." (WP 70S) If there is such a thing as "being",
Nietzsche suggests, it is we who create it out of the flux of becoming, by taking
charge of the contingency and chaos of the world by shaping it into a meaningful
arder: "To impose upon becoming the character ofbeing -!bat is the supreme will
to power." (WP 617) Nietzsche draws our attention to the immense scope of the
human power to create meaning and insists !bat we cannat understand our moral-
ethical fIameworks apart from this creative dimension (e.g. BGE 21; TI FGE S).
Indeed. as we will sec in gtearer detail in cbapter m. Nietzsche sees the &Ct of
carving out a stable, ordered realm ofmeaning part of the essence ofwhat it means
ta be human in the highest sense. AlI knowledge is dowDstteam of the creative aet:
"supposïng everything is becoming. !ben knowledge is possible only on the basis
ofbeliefin being." (WP 518)
Knowledge, then, cannot involve privileged access to a higher realm ofTruth.
Proponents of the new orthodoxy bave rightly observed that given Nietzsche's
denial ofmetaphysical dnalism, he cannat subsaibe ta the version of the
coaespondenœ tbeoly ofttuth that relies on it.s Nielz.. he denounces the Kantian
•
8 Ricbani Scbacbt malœs the point weIl: "it ctmI/Otbe the case that the 'truth' of
any such propositions _ is a JIIlItter of tbeir stt>nding in a coaespondcnc:e-relaon
ta a Iea1ity that bas an inttinsic stIuctIIral arlicnlatjon and ordr1 jng, since tbere is no
such reality for plopositions ta r.:oœspond ta_. When Nietzsche asserts that 'there
30
• thing-in-itself [Ding-an-sich] and derides the aspiration to attain unconditioncd
access to it as "the fable ofknowlcdge" (WP 555). Nietzsche does DOt claim that
bis views are "absolutely" correct, as this would imply a (nonexistent) standard of
universal, unchanging Reason (e.g. GS 374). As Schacht suggests, bis
repudiation ofcapital "T" Truth "might only he a candid admiss\on of the
impossibility of achieving a kind of knowlcdge that would he absolute, final,
rigorously demonstrable, and completely adequate to reality." (Schacht 1983: 2(0)
This does seem to point towards an enticïng type ofepistemic humility, a fOIm of
attributed to Nietzsche was this aitique of metaphysical dnalism, the sole distortion
ofwhîch it would he guilty would he a wild exaggeratïon of Nietzsche's originality,
along with an unfair caricature ofthe whole ofpxe-Nietzsehean Westem thought.l0
is no truth,' bis point is that no propositions are or cao be tIUe in this sense."
(Schacht 1983: 61-2)
9 In BGE 22, N"lCtzsehe concludes a short discnssion ofbis view of the world as
will to power with the following famous momie "Granted this 100 is only
interpmation - and you will be eager enough to I3ise this objection? - weIl, so
much the better. -" We shouId note that this applllent hnmility is balanced in this
same section by a clear assertion ofbis view's superior access to reality; he derides
the "bad arts of ÙltElptelalion" practiced by physicists and countetposes agairst
their inferlor efforts bis own "opposite intention and art of intelptelation" that Ie3ds
sotœthing quite difI.'erent "out ofthe ;same 1IDtID'e œul with regard 10 the ;same
p1lmtJrMna [DUS tkr gleichm Natur und im H"mbück au!die gleichm
Encheinungen] (my emphasis)_" Sec also BGE 36. Brian Leiter (1992: 280-1)
•
outside the appearances, is both futile and desttuctive: futile, becanse such a
vantage point is unavailable, as such, to bnman inquiry; dcstIUctive, because the
glOlY of the promised goallDlllœs the humanly posst.Dle worlc look boring and
cheap." (NlIssbanm , 1986: 258) Aristotle, like Nietzsche, argued for a vigorous
31
• As we have noted above, however, the new orthodox view attributes to Nietzsche
much maIe than this: bis thought is routinely associated with a repudiation of ail
tnIth-claims as such, a rejection of the notion ofa reality outside ofour multifarious
interpretive schemata, and a celebration ofambiguity and chaos. Let us eyamine
how far new orthodox accounts have strayed from their purported. source of
inspiration.
When Nietzsche claims ta investigate the value oftroth, be mcans ta wean us away
DOt from the ideas of tnJth and reality::!S such, but rather from metaphysical,
transcendental portraits ofthem (tnJth "as being, as God", ete.). The significancc
• tbJ: ••
anopooentrie
than otheIs.
Vlew while JDqsting
• •• that c:ertaiIl....unopoa:lIl
• _.....
32
1" Are.. ' - -
iC VlewS .';: • uo;ug
• presuppose the existence of a Iealm of (non-dogmatic) truth outside the inverted
commas.
Nietzsche insists !bat authentic philosopbers (lilœ himselt) "use big words
sparingly; it is said !bat they dislike the very word 'truth': it sounds too
grandiloquent." (GM m.S) His own taste, he informs us elsewbere, ois for more
modest expressions..." (D Pref. 4) Nietzsehe's frequent usage ofinverted commas
around words like "morality", "truth", "virtue", "justice", etc. serves ta distance bis
discomse from what he perceives as the pompous locutions of many of bis
contemporaries, locutions he asso:ia'es with the "slave morality" !bat he feels bas
tainted many of the key concepts !bat he wants to use (and, as we shal1 sec, cannot
do without).ll In EH "Oever" 10, Nietzsche groups together the concepts "'God',
'sour, 'virtue', 'sin', 'the Beyond', 'truth', 'eterna1life'" as a package,
denouncing tbem as mere "imaginings, more strictly speaking lies from the bad
instincts of the sicle." He argues !bat previous philosopbers and moralists, along
with all pu1'VCYors of ·COmmolHCDSC· heœtofore, have all but sueceeded in
monopolising the word ·truth· for this mendacious package, thus making bis own
project of mzl truth-tclling all the more diffimlt "When mendaciousness at any
priee appropriates the word 'truth' for its pel:spective, what is actually veracious
must be discovered bearing the worst names " (EH "Destiny" 5)12 AlI
world "in a false and mendacious rfalsch und lilgnerisch] way, in accordance with
the wishes of our reverence.... (GS 346), and thus have actnally banished the truth
• 12 "Wenn die Verlogeoheit umjedeD. Preis das Wort «WahIhei1» filr ihre Optik
in Auspruch nirmnt, sa muS dereigentljch WahdJaftige untel" den scJjIjmmsteJ]
Namen wiederznfinden sein."
33
• "on principle" (EH Forward 3). By contrast, he promises. the "comïng
philosophers" will he "new friends of 'truth'" (BGE 43). the inverted commas
serving heœ as a telling reminder of Nietzsche's view that this tcrm bas most often
heen used to desClihe "truth for everyman". fallacious beliefs that have nothing
more to he said for them than unthjnking custom and the adherence of the vast
majority.
solve "the probIem of value" [das Problem vom Werte zu liisen]. to detcrmine "the
arder of rank among values" [Rangoninung der Werte]" (GM LI7), he seems
cIearly to he striving for a true, undogmatic account of the wodd.13 In bis Iate,
retrospective assessment of bis Thus Spoke Zaratlrustra, Nietzsche declares that the
work was "bom out of the innermost abundance oftruth [DUS dem inMrsten
Reichtum der Wahrheit]_." (EH Forward 4) "ZlIrathustra," he declares, ois more
truthful [wa1IrlztgDger] than any other thinJcer. His teacbing ._ uphoIds
truthfuIness as the supreme virtue [die Wahrhaftigkeit also obente Tugend]•••"
(EH "Destiny" 3) Until Zarathustra, "one does not know what height, what depth
is; one knows even Iess what truth is." (EH "Z" 6) In the samc work he
characterises bimselfas "the fiIst honut spirit [der ente rechtsc1uzjJiIe Geist] in
13 As Leitcr pots il, the point ofN'Jet7SChe's varions attaeks on particuIar, popuIar
• beliefsabootthewodd"isnottbatnoheliefisepistemica1Iywarranted(orthatthcœ
is DO uuth). but ratbertbataparticular (admittedly huge) c/Qss of fmmliar beliefs or
supposed 'ttuths' are in fact faIse." (Leiter, 1994: 340)
34
• the bistory of the spirit, the spirit in whom ttuth comes to judgement on the false-
and apart from the guise of bis cbaracter of ZarathustraIS - puts foIWaId bis
existence. Niet2SChe sees bis doctrine, whicb he desaibes as bis "teacbing about
life and about the nature of ail living crealUIeS [mein WOTt vom Leben sagen und
von der Art aIles Lebendigen]" (Z fi OSO), as part of bis claim to originality and
therefore there bas hitberto been ooly supposition, not knowledge [bisher nur
gewl.l1urt, nü:ht gewuftt wonim], conceming good and evi1!" (Z m ONL 9)16
In atte'lIl"Ïngto outline bis perspective on reality, i.e. what he sees as the ttue
nature of exist=ce, NieIzscbe sttives for precision and clarlty ofexptession. Far
14 For some ofbis other eamest appeals to trutb, see: D 91, 164,456,556; GS 2,
319,335; BGE zn, 229; AC 36. See also BGE 230, wheIe Nietzsche insists tbat
the taskofthe "scelœrafœr know1edge" mustbe theIeCOgDition of"the etemal
basic text [ewigen Gnmdte.xt] of homo 1IlIIUrrl". In this passage Nietzsche asserts
tbat prlorclaims te "knowledge" have bcen supedicial pœcisely because they bave
ignored this "etemaI basic text" of man. As Leiter coaec:tly notes, "[t]bat this text is
etemal andbasic imp!ies _ tbat readings wbicb do Dot treat man lIlItIIralistica1ly
misread the text - they 'falsify' il. And it is pœcisely such misreadi.ngs of, 'tcxts'
tbat Nietzsche the 'good pbilologist' aims te coacc:t" (Leiœr 1992: 279) 1 will
bave moœ te say about Nietzsche's "1IlItul'alism" below, and in Cbapters fi and m.
15 See the Introduction for my undcœtandiDg ofNiet2SCbe's relatiODShip to
Zaratbustra.
16 We,sba11 examine N1etzscbe's c:loctrine of will te power in greater detail in
~ n. In Chap«rr ml will argue tbat there is amcI!!rlng, umesolved tellsion
• in NielzSche's thought between bis effort te ground bis prefeaed normative stance
in anatunl1istic (andostenSJoly mora1ly-neutra1) viewof"1ife" on the oue band and
bis occasional insistmN' on the i o 'J'ŒSI1lility of such an ~ on the other.
35
• from ce1ebrating ambiguity and indetcnDinancy, NielZSChc sees their cultivation as a
character flaw. Zarathustra, for example, declares in bis discussiQn with the "Old
Pope" of Part IV that ambiguity and indistinctness aIe to be counted against the
Judaeo-Christian God:
1 love everything that is clear-eyed and honest of
speech [was heU blic1ct und redlich redet]. But he...
was ambiguous [er war vieldeutig]J He was aI50
indistinct [zmdeutlich]. How angry he was with us,
this snorter of wrath, because we mistook bis
meaning! But why did he not speak more clearly
[wanon sprach er nicht reinlù::her]?/ And if Out catS
were to blame, why did he give us catS that were
unable to hear him pxoperly? Ifthere was dirt in out
catS, very weIl! who put it there? (Z IV RS)
Here the Deity is reproached not for being audaciously concemed with meaning,
but rather for bis caginess about bis own meaning, a trait Nietzsche associates with
the less-than-straightforwatd "prlestly nature" in general (Ibid).17 Nietzsche's
contempt for pretentious, deliberately opaque language is further demonstrated in
zarathustra's berating of the Wagner figure, the Sorcerex. "'You. however. must
deceive: 1 know you 50 far. You must aIways be ambiguous, with two. three,
four. five meanings [Du mujJt immer zwei- tIrei- vier- fi1nfdeutig sein]!" (Z IV S 2)
complains, "one does not want to be clear about oneself" (EH "cw" 3). one would
prefer b1ithely to asS!!lne that logical and moral 0}1.\CSÏl&'s cao be easily reconciled:
the German nation _. continues to nourlsh itself with
opposites [sich von Gegensllt1.en zu nllhren] and
knows how to gulp down 'faith' as weIl as
scientificality [W"1SSe1IS~]. 'Oujstian love'
as well as anti-Semitism, will to power (to the
'Reich') as wellas the lwmgile des humbles. without
having any trouble digesting tbem (EH "CW" 1)
36
• Rather thao celebrating the indetcrminancy of meaning, as authOIS like Blondel and
Granier would bave il, Nietzsebe's superior human being wishes above all eIse "to
New orthodox commentary bas tcnded bath to dismiss the importance of these
serious references 10 truth and clarity and to obscure the specialised nature of
Nietzsehe's attaek on the rarified, metaphysical notion ofTruth, due to the
commitnlent of many self-proclaiIT!I"P "Nietzsehean" thinkers 10 identify a
. specifically Nietzsehean attaek on truth and logical coherence as a whole. In effect,
authOIS like Nebamas establish a rlgid eitherlor scenerlo and attempt to persuade us
that wc bave only two options: eitber to make truth-cla.ims (and thereby succumb to
dogmatism), or 10 reject the notion oftruth altogether. When the problem is framed
in these temlS. wc seem 10 have little choice but 10 place ouxselves (and, ofcourse,
Nietzsche) on the side ofidiosyncraJic. subjectivist self-expression and ambiguity.
Who, L'œr aIl, wants 10 be labled a dogmatist?
Tbc whole deb8le, howcver, bas bcen skewed by the terms of this rathcr
J'JII':lapbysical cfnaJjsm are in fact the only standaRIs, and, with authOIs like Bloom,
• agree tbat iftbese standaros are rejected tbere can he no standmIs atall As
Nussbanm suggests, it is only to one who bas pinned everything to the hope of
37
• absolute Troth in the metaphysical dualist sense tbat ilS collapse seems ta entai! "the
collapse of all evaluation" (Nussbaum 1992: 213; sec also Taylor 1987).18 In other
words, while the new orthodoxy and the defenders of metaphysical dnalism are
ostens1bly mortal enemics, a closer look exposes them as two sidcs of the same
coin.l 9
What the new orthodoxy's partisans fail ta consider seriously, and wha1 they
seem unable ta perceive in Nietzsche, is an account of objective standards of truth
tbat owcs nothing to the assumptiODS of metaphysical dnalism 1shal1 argue below
tbat Nietzsche believcs it is possible to make a truth-claim in the strong sense (i.e. a
claim tbat something is true notjust for oneself, but true iiberhoupt, as such)
• very wide sence as the art ofrnding wdl- ofbeing able 10 œad ol!a fact without
falsifying it by intetptetatïon [TatMchm ablesen l:iJnnen, 0'- sie durch
Interpretation ZIlfillschm]-" (AC 52)
38
• auned in no particuJar direction, in which the active and inteIpreting forees. tbrough
which aIone seeing bccomes seeing something. are supposed to be lacking..." (GM
ID.12; cf. WP 481) The sort of "objectivity" positing "absolute know1edge," aimed
al "c:Ii m inat[ing] the will aItogether•••. suspend[ing] each and every affect," strikes
him as a lw1icrous a~ to "CIJStTQIe the intellect." (GM ID.12) Unlike
Nietzsche's ideaI of a truc knowledge-seeker. whose every action and desire for
enlightenm~t is driven (as we shal1 sec) by a deeply-felt, franldy personal. and
unhidden normative perspective, the so-caIled scientists and scholars who pmsue
scientist seem .mable to acknowledge that any scienti1ic investigation, like any
39
• practical pursuit, always involves a commitment ta "an ideal of value, a value-
it is truly and authentically bis own. In a nutsbcll, Nietzsche believes that he bas
developed a stance which, baving incorporated bis OWD observations, assessmenlS,
and criticisms of other.limited (or one-sicled) points of view. passesses a higher
level of adcquacy than its rivais. "Before knowledge [ein ErkDmen] is possible,"
Nietzsebc mnarJes, one must come ta sec the strengtbs and weaknesvs and, most
• 23 As Leiter nœs. the tr:ncfconry to conf/lite these two issues - the question of
positivism's talability and that of the tenability oftruth and knowledge about reality
- is a chata le' istic gestuI:e of the IICW orthodoxy (Lciœ:r 1994: 355).
40
• importantly. the limitations of each and every "one-sided view [einseitige Ansicht)
of the thing or event" in question (GS 333). Taking this first step tawards
knowledge requires a "1IIlttUre frecdom of spirit" which "pemlils access ta many
and contradietory modes of thought..•" (HAH 1 Pref. 4). which in tum is the
precondition for true (as opposcd ta bogus, positivist) objectivity:
[T)hc more affects wc aIlow to speak about onc
thing. thc more eyes. different cyes. wc can use 10
observe one thing, thc more complete [vol1standiger)
will our "concept" [BegrijJ) of this thing. our
"objectivity". [«Objektivitllt») be.24 (GMmI2)
Nietzsche aetually descn1les this ability ta "reverse perspedivcs" [perspektiven
41
• dismic;<;ing the pmported1y "natural", etemal morality of good and evil as merely
conventional, ie. as "only inœrvening shadows and damp afflictions and passing
clouds [nur Zwischen-Schatten undfeuchte TriibsaJe und Zieh- Wolken]." (Z m
BS)
As noted above, Nietzsche's conception ofobjectivity inCOIpOl'ateS the ncecssity
of peISPeClive, the fact that "[t]here is only a petspec:tive seeking, only a peISPCClive
'knowing·..." (GM IILI2). Through the attainrneut of objective knowledge. one
leams that "alllife is based on appearance, art, deception, point of view, the
necessity of perspective and eaor." (BT "Attempt" Sf1" It is in this, and omy this
sense that Nietzsche speaks glowingly of the "rich ambiguity" [vie1deutigen
Charakters] of existence (GS 373; cf. WP 134,481). Far from implying, as the
• m
28 1will argue in Cbapler that N'Jetzsebe's avemon to the self-rigbœous
soIemnity of the conventional morality ofbisday was 1argely bebind bis reluetanœ
to use conventional virtue-terms -lilœ "virtue·, ·morality", etc. - in support ofbis
42
• incorporate a number of different perspectives, represents Dot simply a different,
but a bener fonn of access to reality.
Nietzsche, as the new oIthodoxy never fails to point out, refuses to make any
claim of absolute infalh"bility on behalfof bis own perspective. Given the
impossibility of the universa1 standpoint ofBeing and the infinite nomber of
possl"ble perspcctival viewpoints, it, toc, is partial and limited. His crucial claim,
bowever, is that bis OWD perspective is Dot as limited (and nowbere near as
distorted) as its rivais. The apparent eqlJ3njmïty of Nietzsehe's perspectivism does
Dot tberefoIe entail an indiscriminate relativism that would see bis own perspective
as no better nor worse than aIl the others.29 Nietzsche imagines bis position to be a
dual one, in whicb bis perspective triumphs over others on the same, level playing-
field of worldly contestation while, simultaneously, flying higb above this same
playing-field in its ability to adopt a biId's eye view of the te1I'ain and of aIl the
players (itself included). From the serene, magnanimous viewpoint of bis self-
styled "meca"-level, whicb he claims to bave attained after baving "climbed above
bimseJf" and bebeld "the ground ofthings and their background [aller Dinge
Gnmtl schtnm und Hinlergrundj" (Z m W), Nietzsche claims to see bis own
perspective al combat with, and victorlous over, othee perspectives. In this context
Nietzsche associates the lI!tainme:nt of the objective viewpoint with a feeling of
joyful eqnanimity:_ "[the great artist] arrives al the ,ùtimate pinnacle of bis greatness
only wben he comes to see bimselfand bis art beneath bim - wben he knows bow
to lIJugh al bimselfo" (GM m.3)
prefea'ed noaDlltive stance.. 1 will also aIgUe that althougb he occasionally resists
these tenDs, and sometïDl"S subjects them to ridicule, in the end he cannot belp but
use them bimself in a wholly UIIÏroDic DIllIIDer.
29 As noted above. DCW orthodox tbeoriSIS like Nebamas deny that their
•
intequ'ellltiOll of perspecti vism is tantamollDt 10 an abandonme:nt of aIl ID8IIDer of
ptincipled discrimination, but the typically subjectivist understandiDg of
Nietzsehean perspeclÏvism maIœs it diflicult 10 see how the charge ofrelativism cao
he deflected.
43
• ln a move that saikes us as counterintuitivc, because of our typical association
of "objectivity" with absence ofbias or "disinterestedness", Nietzsche insists upon
both the ubiquity of pe!spective (bias) and the possibility ofobjective truth. A
proposition may he objectively truc, claims Nietzsche, not becanse someone from a
God-lïke, universal view could, in principle, confirm that this is so, or because it is
himself and no other? Nehamas would answer in the affirmative, for, as we noted
above, he sees Nietzsche's work as wholly self-referential and idiosyncratic.
Throughout the course ofthis work 1 will he arguing the contrary, that Nietzsche
presupposes or imagines truth and knowledge to he the property (or al least
potentially the property) ofa smal1, select group with a sensibility and character
similar to bis own, with whom he feels in spiritual solidatity and (so he believes)
with whom he shares a certain "rank".
• ('11 FGE 2), determining the natuIe ofour relations with others, how wc react to
incoming stimuli, how and why wc seek to lJIllIerstand the wood around us, and
44
• what we think most important in Iife. Although, as we shal1 explore in Chapter VI,
Nietzsche calls for an individnalistic break with one's home community in the Dame
of self-development, he also asks, impatiently. "what do individuals matter to
nature!" in response to theories ofontological individualism of the Kantian or
utilitarian variety (BGE 188).30 What matters most, and that to which the
imperatives of nature are addressed, is not the individual, but "peoples. races. ages.
classes. and above ail ... the entire animal 'man'••.. mankind." (Ibid.)31
NielZSclte does not diminish the conceptual (and, as we shal1 see, moral)
importance of the individual, but stresses that "the individual [der Einzelne] himself
is still the 1atest creation..." (Z 1OTG). insisting that to ttuly know someone is to
determine the rank in which the person be1ongs.
The conception ofrank denotes a hierarchy. and this is exactly what Nietzsche
between man and man" (BGE 228; also 263). Sttong is wrong to suggest that for
30 See also WP 886: "A class [Stand]. a rank [Rang]. a race [Volks-Ra.rse]. an
environment [UmgœlDlg]. an accident [ZIifall] - anything is more likdy to be
~ in a worlc or aet than is a 'pc%son' reine <<Person»]." .
31 "_dies scbeint mir der moralische I:mpelativ der Natur zu sein, we1cher freilich
weder <<Icategorlsch» ist, _ noch an den Einz-Jnen sich wendel (was liegt ibr
• am Einzelnen1). wob1 aber an VlS1Iœr. R.assen, ZeitaJlr:r. Stinde. var A11etn aber an
das ganze T'Jel' <<Menscb». an den Menscben" Just what Nietzsche means by
"the imperatives of nature" will be investigated in 0JapterIlL
4S
• ooly the sanctioning ofa 1I01UTO! ortier, a naturallaw of the first rank [die Sanktion
einer NatuT-Ordrumg, Natur-Gesetzlichkeit ersten Ranges) over whieh no
arbitrary caprice, no 'modem idea' bas any power.· (AC 57) The natural arder also
ordains that the rep=talives of·a higher, brighter IulIDanity· are .very small in
number (for everything outstanding is by its nature rare)•••• (WP 993),32 while
those who represent degeneration and decadence will be many:
Among men, as among every other species, there is a
surplus of t'ailures [Miftratenen), of the siek
[Kranken), the degenerate [Entartenden), the fragile
[Gebrechlichen), of those who are bound to suffer
[LeitIenden); the successfuI cases are, among men
too, always the exception. (BGE 62)33
NielZSChe believes that ooly the Bite members of the ascending line ofhumanity
have the innate capacity ta aspire to the sort ofobjectivity described above as a
precondition for the attainDlP.nt of truth. Since, as wc have seen, Nietzsehe's
conception ofobjectivity is tied to the ubiquity ofperspective, truth and knowledge
appear in bis view ta be tied ta the positiO:l of the minority, ascending line of the
huma" species. Only they cao tum ·from a motbid perspedive [Knmken-Optik)
tawards 1reaIl1rierconcepts and values jgesi1nduen Begriffen und Werten).••• (EH
"W'lSC· 1), ie. taward the healthy perspective. To think the contrary, ta suppose
that truth cao be made aeœssib1e ta everyone (given the pl0per circumstances, a
32 Sec also WP 420: ·it is inevitable, it is petbaps also desirable, that the
philosopher should be a rare plant._" In WP 317. Nietzsche attempt;s ta describe
the "aristomltie magic" of virtue, claiming that "preacbets of virtue" have
mi",mde. stJod its "cbarm of rareness, inimitableness, exceptiona'ness and
UDaverageness [die Tugendpmligu_.1IdImm der Tugend ihren Reir. des Seltenen,
des Unnochahmlichen, des AJIstuJhmsweise und untbArchschnittl- ihren
<<aristokratischen 2'4ubu» ]••."
33 It is important to note that Nietzscbe's many disparaging references ta the
majority as "the herd," "the people," ~. are not Ineant as designatiODS of a specifie
sociological categoIy like Maa's proletariat. While Nielzscbe is c1early œferring ta
•
a majority of the popu1ace, lie does DOt tbeœby exempt those in politically and
economically advanlageous cimzmstanres of"berdish" status. As wc sha11 sec in
Chapter VIn, NielZSChe recogDises herd-like qnalities among many members of
actna!ly existing European aristoaacies.
46
• strong system of mass education, ete.), is, in Nietzsche's eyes, ta commit the error
ofgeneralisation [generalisiren] "where generalisation is impermissible" (BGE
198). TlUth can oever he the property of that unhealthy, dcdining fraction of
One bas ta set rid of the bad taste ofwanting ta he in agreement with many." (BOE
43)34 When ZaIathustra declazes before the so-called "higher men": "1 am a law
oo1y for iny kind, 1 am no law for all" (Z IV LS), he does not mean, as Nebamas
and others would have il, that bis "laws" are strictly idiosyncratic and say nothing at
aIl about the wood as such. On the contrary, as 1 argued above, Nietzsche makes
succinctly pots il, ois itself a means ofbecoming master of something " (WP 643)
NussbaJ!!D rlghtly points out that Nietzsche believes "all our cognitive activity,
including logical œasoning, including the abstracting and genemlizing tendencies.
are ••• ways in which wc tty ta master the wood and ta make ourselves secu:re in
iL" (Nussbaum 1991: 95) When N"JetzSclIe makcs Z8rathustm say that bis "will ta
power" waJks with the feet of the enligblened man's will ta lIUth (Z II 080), he
•
34 "...Es muS ihnen wïderden Stolz gehn, auch wider den Gescbmack, wenn ilue
Wahdleit garnoch cine Wahdleit filr Jedennann sein soU: was bisher dergeheime
Wunsch und Hintersinn aller dogmatischeD Bemebongen war••• Man muS den
sch1echten Gescbmack von sich abtun, mit Vielen übcreinstimmen zu wollen."
47
• means to suggcst that cognitive activity is, first and foremost, a tool of the
ascendant or healthy man's efforts at exerting mastely over the world: "In knowing
and understanding [Erkennen], tao," insists Zarathustra, "1 fecl only my will's
delight in begetting and becoming [meines Wlllens Zeuge-1IlId Werde-Lust)•••" (Z
TI OBI) Those human capacities which we invoke in the search for truth and
knowledge, sensation [Sinn] and cognition [Geist), are but the "instruments and
toys" [Werk-1IlId Spie1zeuge] enlisted towards this end (Z 1ODB). A fine
snmmation of Nietzsche's position is found in the following NachùJss fragment:
"the measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the
suggestion that Nietzsche associarcd the highest form of truth with the pragmatic
aims of certain, select individuals. Schacht, for example, assumes that Nietzsche
between that which œndcrs a lower order ofIife easier (the so-caJled "truths" of the
• 3S "_das MaS des Erkennenwolieus hlIngt ab von dcmMaS des Wacbsens des
Willens zur Macht der Art: cine Art ergreift 50 viel Reali1llt, um Ilber sie Herr zu
werden, um sie in Dieust zu nehmen."
48
• herd, referrcd 00 as "life-preserving en:ors" -lebenerhaltenden Irrtümer - in GS
110) and that which is authentically true: "A bellef, however necessary it may be
for the preservation of a species, bas nothing 00 do with truth..." (WP 487)36 The
majority, according 00 Nietzsche, tend 00 avoid inconvenient truths that would be
"harmful and dangerous" 00 them "00 the highest degree" (BGE 39), for 00 fully
embrace them would entait wholesale changes in their lives that they unwilling and
unable to countenance.
However, with respect 00 Nietzsehe's views of himself and thase he considers
like bimself- the highest order of hllmankind - Schacht's distinction breaks down,
for Nietzsche sees the (undistorted) dispositions and viewpoints of a truly
aristocratie, life-affirming class of higher men to be wholly in line with truth in
Schacht's second, cognitive sense.37 To argue that Nietzsche a1ways holds truth to
be separable in principle from the affirmation ofa particular life-fonn is 00 fall inOO
the eaor ofassnming that he believes truth 00 be S(lDlC':tbing neutra1, above and
beyond ail particular life-forms and tables of values. But as we have just seen,
Nietzsche posits an objective truth that is also embodied in one human life-forrn (in
the sense that only the mernbers of this life-forrn can pen:eive and live by it).38
the higbest sort of bllman being as 00 warrant bis playing with il, twisting it as he
• "strong" minority are said 00 possess the right sort of CODStitutive intcrests and
DCeds lhat aIlow them to know (and embrace) the "teaible truth." (Leiter 1994: 346-
7) For Nietzsehe's understanding of wby this truth is "teaible", see below.
49
• sees fit with "mendacious innocence" in the manner of Socrates' "noble lie" [edlen
liigen] (Z IV S).39 The highest sort is someone for whom "the lie is sanctified and
the will 10 deception bas a good conscience" (GM Ill.25) precisely becallse he is in
sucb confident possession of it. In the bands of the highest sort, lying may even he
compatible withjusti= "[t]o him who wants to he just from the very heart," claims
Zarathustra, "even a lie becomes philanthropy [Menschen-Freundlichkeit]." (Z 1
OAB) By contrast, thase not in possession of the truth - the vast majority - can
only he slaves to wbat they believe to he true; i.e. they fee\ obliged to
indiscriminately "speak the truth" regardless of the worth oftheir utterance or the
consequences. As Zarathustra suggests, "inability to lie is far from being love of
truth [Ohnmacht ZJ,lT liige ist lange noch nicht liebe ZJ,lT Wahrheit] ..• He who
cannot lie does not know wbat truth is." (Z IV OHM 9)40
&cause "the service of truth is the bardest service" (AC 50), Nietzsche
constantly reiterates, it remains the purview ofa minority. "To he lIUthful [Wahr
sein]- few carl do it!" (Z m ONL 7) The lIUth !bat Nietzsche feels impe11ed to tell is
so diflicult to swa\low becanse it is harsh and unappealing: "the lIUth speaks out of
me. - But my truth is dreadfu1 [redet aus mir die WahrheiL - Aber meine Wahrheit
;s.furchlbar]•••" (EH "Destïny" 1) Elsewhere he describes the 1IUths !bat must he
told as "plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral" (GM 1:1; sec also GM
L16, 17; BGE 202, 228; EH "GM"), and declares !bat the value of a human life is
measuIed by "how much truth can a spirit bear, how much 1IUth can a spirit
39 The use of the masculine pronoun is, bcre and elsewhere, de\iberate. In
Chapter IX1 will argue against œcent feminist readingc: ofNi~ !bat he does
indcM seC (certain types of) men as the higbest cxcmplars of the hnman species,
although he acconis to (certain types of) women a noteworthy honourable mention.
40 Sec also GM m19: "Our educated people oftoday, our 'good people,' do not
tell lies - !bat is truc; but tbat is 1IOt to their aedit! A xeallie. a genuine, resolute,
'honest'lie (on whose value one shonld consult Plato) wouId he something far tao
•
seveIe and patent for them..." Kanfmann's insistenœ tbat "Nietzscbe bad the
greatest scom for [the noble lie]_" (1974: 326), while revelatory ofKanfmann's
efforts al putting a respectable Enligbtenment face on N1CtZSCbe, is DOt home out by
the texmal evidence.
50
• tiare•.." [Wieviel Wahrheit ertrllgt. wieviel wagt ein Geist?) (EH Forward 3) What
is so difficult about these harsh truths, and why, in NielZSChe's view, are so few
Nietzsche argues that the vast majority - the "good" people [die Gwen), as he
sometimes refers to them - could not embrace the truth of the nonexistence ofany
Gad, aftcr-life or higher plane ofexistence, for their belief in these nonentities
undergirds their lives and he1ps them make sense of their worldly suffering. "Good
men never tell the truth," he daims, for the condition of their existence
[ExistenzbedinglU/gen) ois the lie -: expressed differently, the desire not ta see al
"noble lies" of the few; whereas the falsehoods of the virtuous are landed as a sort
ofplayfulness undcrgirded by an absolute master of the tIUtb, those of the many are
looked down upoD as the scarcely willful, patbetic responses of servile types who
have Dot the sttength ofcharacter ta look an intriDsically fearl'ul reality in the eye.
In other words, the weak, cowardly majority lie out of necessity; they must falsify
reality.
41 "[IJhrer innedichsten Feigheit var der Realjtllt, die auch die Feigheit var der
Wahrheit ist._" Compare Wmren's suspiciously reassuring suggestion that
Nielzsche decms an inlapteta!Ϝ adequate ta the extent that it "empowers" ils
holder and proponent: "an iutetptetation must he kgitimDle in œrms ofhistorical
expcrience, the 'testimony of the senses' It must _ become an clement of
practice, and produce effects pemlitting a self-inteq»:eta!Ïon of agency - a 'feeling of
•
power.'" (Wmren: 98) Nietzsche would deem this subjectivist reading, which
comp1etely ignores Nietzsche's great stress on RDngordnuug. obscencly
indiscriminate. Far froID wanting ta "empower" everyone, Nietzsche identifies as
true and noble the interpretations and actions of oo1y a select few.
51
• As we have seen, Nietzsche rejects the notion that the universe is (a) meaningful
apart from human agency and (b) organised aceording to categories of ethical
notion of a transcenr.lent Deity who bestows meaning holds any water for
Nietzsche, who traces all eategories of meaning back to the aeative imagination of
human agents.42 He claims that the popu1ar, cowardly reluctanee to embrace the
human origin of meaning and ethics aceounts (at least in part)43 for the origin of
slave morality and its difference from any self-zespecting noble morality.
Nietzsche suggests that being forced to come to terms with the "artificiality" of
all fonDS of morality in a forthright, honest manner would lead a 1=, servile sort
of man "to nallsea and suicide." (GS 107) Confronting the nonexistence of extemal
sources and the absence ofany other-worldly xedemption after mortality, believes
Nietzsche, would utterly crush him. Life, for such a disillusioneci, weary soul,
would "he felt to he undesirable, valueless in itseif"; it would he "crusbed beneath
the weight ofcontempt..•" (BT "Attempt" 5) Such a man, who finds bis life of
deprivation and suffering difficult to hear and is destitutc of the internaI IeSOlJl'ceS
neeessmy for a l110Ie affiImative, optimistic stance. tends to push aside the truth (as
Nietzsche sees it) and craves rather a mythical, external SOUlCe of validation of bis
existence.
•
43 As we shall see in Chaptcr V, NielzSCbe also traces the origins ofbeliefin God
or tl'llDsceodenta1, other-worldly forces to the inability of the servile persona1ity type
to find a SOUlCe of diIectiOD from within. Slave morality, in other words, is seen as
stcmming from both moral cowardice lIIId a lack of self-sufficiency.
S2
• Hence the origin, amongst the needy, un-self-sufficient majority, of
transeendental, religious worldviews and ascetic practices which "siam shut" the
door to "ail suicidai nibilism" by providing a supposedly extema11y-grounded
inlelpret3.tion for human existence and suffering and the hope ofredemption (GM
m.28).44 "It was suffering and impotence [Unvermagen]," claims Zarathustra,
44 NussballID traces the drive 10 find an extra-hllIDan status for our mora1 values
back 10 Plato and the pre-Socratics. 'Ibis etrort "providcd a justification for the
hardness and lnvio1ability that people wished 10 associl!lJ': with the decpest ethical
œquirements. The view implied, among ether things, that tbese IequiremenlS could
never be set aside or annu11ed by hmnan action. It also means that our most
fimdamenta1 ethical re1aIionship is DOt 10 UDStlIble entities such as persans and city,
but 10 somethingfirmerthanany ofus-" (Nussbamn 1986:401) Ironica1ly,
Nietzsche is guilty of the same 1'CCOUl'SIC 10 extemaJly-grounded intapletation that he
(and NussballID) aiticise, when he claims that bis ethic ofexpansion and
•
domination is rooted in the "fact.. that life itself is Will 10 Power. Mme will be said
on this point in Chapters II and IlL
45 Sec also WP S86c:: "it is the instinct oflife-weariness. and not that oflife,
which bas created the 'other wor1d.... Sec also 11 RIP 6.
53
• insists Nietzsche, "to the same degree as an ideal world bas beenjabricaled.....46
(EH Forward 2)
character and disposition (see Chapter ID). it should come as no surprise that bis
criticism of this supposed web offabrication is insepaIable from bis disparaging
assessment of those who allow themselves to be caught in il. Just as some
1'hiloso1'hers need their 1'hiloso1'hy as "a 1'[01'" or "a sedative" (OS Pref. 2). so do
servile people in general need to flee the truth about reality and take refuge in the
comforting lie:
easily-IerQC'<Iied decision to embIace a set of false theorles. Were the latter the case,
the weak and unhealthy cou1d presnmab\y become stronger and bealtbier by being
weaned from the false belief systems and encouraged to embIace views more in line
with the tlUe state of things. For Nietzsche, however, this is simply inconceivable.
The vulgar majority·s embIace offa1sehood and illusion is seen as a symptom ofa
much more dcep1y-rooted state of affairs - the mean state of'their souls, the base
quality oftheir desiIes - and as sucb cannot he brolœD. Any efforts.at cbanging
their pattems ofbeliefor desiIe are doomed to failllIe, as NJetzscbe·s Zarathustra
46 "Man had die Realjtllt in dem Grade um ihre:n Wert, ihre:n Sinn, ihIe
Wahrbafligkeitgedncbt, aIs maneineidea1 Welterlog_." Cf. WP461: "[M]an
•
seeks a principle tbrough which he cao despise men - he invents a wodd so as to be
able to slander and bespatter this wodcL" See also EH "Destiny" 8: "The concept
'the Beyond', 'Ieal wodd' invented so as to deprl.ve ofvalue the only wood whicb
exists - so as to leave over no goal, no reason, DO task for our earth1y œality!"
54
• lcams in the Prologue 10 T1uJS Spoke ZDrathustra, where his vision of the
Obermensch is ridiculed and his dark portrait of the "last man" enthusiastically
embraced.
Nietzsche holds out a great deal more hope for the cultivation of nobility in
those already posscssing sound, healthy instincts. This is not 10 say that he
believes those posscssing a lofty SetlS1"ility are thereby safely innoculated from
grave error in the moral sphere, and predestined, regardless of the manner of their
upbringing and life experiences, to lead wholly praiseworthy lives. Indeed, as wc .
shall sec in Chapter IV. Nietzsche believes the majority ofhis (essentially healthy)
cohorts to be tragically caught up in the false consciousness of worldviews and
beliefs that go against the grain of their basic characters. Ifthis false consciousness
were 10 be transcentjed, howcver. N"1ClZSChe believes that an essentially noble
In this chapter 1argued that Nietzsche is very serious about the concept of truth
despite his treneban~ critique of"Truth" (as the concept is used in metaphysical
dna}igt perspectives). 1suggested thatNietzsehe. when atlcllqdiag 10 provide his
own, ttue 8CCOUI1t ofvarious states of affaiJ:s, prlzes clarity and precision, rather
55
• !han ambiguity and indeterminacy. Furthermore. and perhaps most
superior view of the phenomena in question. FmaUy. 1attemptcd to argue that the
particular point of view that is most likely. in Nietzsehe's eyC"S, to acccde to the
status of objective truth is that of a superior type human heing. i.e. a point of view
held by a memher ofthe minority that Nietzsche considers to represent (at least
potentiaUy) aU that is admirable and exemplary in the human species.
The suggestion that Nietzsche considers truth to he the "property" of an
exceptionally gifted minority does not mean, however. that he sees aU memhers of
that minority at any given time as possessors of a true, undistortcd account of
themselves and the wodd around them. On the contrary. as we notcd in the
Introduction and as we shaU see in greater detail in Chapters IV- vm. Nietzsche
finds those of noble sensibility in the modem wodd (himseJfexceptcd) under the
insidious. powerful influen~ ofa slave morality that prevents them from
recognising the truth that is potentially within tbeir grasp. A large part of bis task
involves attempting to Cree these confuscd souls from this false consciousness.
BefOte moving on, however.1O an investigation ofNietzsehe's understanding
•
overthrow of "morality"? That the author of Beyond Good andEvil is operating
onder a moral-normative imperative ofsome sort bas thus far been simply assertcd
56
• and assumed; it bas yet ta be argued. 1bis argument, which involves an
assessment of Niet2Sche's complex twlttnent of the concept of morality, forInS the
subject of the next cbapter.
• 57
• Chamer Di Nietzschean Moralitv and Moral PbilOSQphy
Beca"se Nehamas associates terms like "morn1ity" and "ethics" with rigid sets
ofprescriptive rules and maxims which in tum point towards a (non-exÏStent)
pristine realm ofTruth, he refuses to countenance the possibility that Nietzsche
makes claims of a moral-ethica1 nature. Nietzsche, insists Nehamas, refrains from
consisting perhaps ofa description of the right kind oflife or ofa set of principles
for becoming the sort ofperson he admires," he forewarns, "is bound to fail."
(Ibid.) Nehamas belittles the significance of Nietzsche's use of the expressions like
implying that their appear.mces in the texts are too infrequent to be taken seriously
(Ibid., 254). He prefers to use a more neutral, less "moral"-sounding phrase of his
• 58
• own design - "noble mode of valuation" - whieh he repeatC'4ly invokes when
alluding ta NielZSChe's conception of nobility (e.g. Ibid.. 111; 126; 206).
As we noted in OJapter 1, Nehamas believes that Nietzsehe embraces
subjectivism in order ta escape from dogmatism; NielZSChe's "lIUths" are said ta be
"true" only in the (very limited) sense that they are presented authentically and
honest1y as bis own. without reference to anyone else or ta any sense ofobjectivitj·.
When Nebamas asserts that Nietzsehe presents "a view as true, by which one cao
live, without also presenting it as a view that is true necessarily. by whieh all must
live..." (Ibid.• 36). he appears ta assume that Nietzsehe's writings are meant to be
exclusively self-referential and idiosyncratic.! We cao see how weil this
subjectivism fits with Nehamas's account ofNietzsehe's alleged amoralism. For
Nebama s • Nietzsche presents himself ta the reader as a "specifie and idiosyncratie"
(Ibid., 233) literary character whose way of Iife and table of values are uniquely
bis, incapable ofbeing imitated (Ibid.. 4).2 This character. ratherthan beingput
forward as an exemplar, is "bath someone we cao admire and someone we need not
want to be." (Ibid., 39) When faœd with Nietzsehe's substantive (and, 1 will argue
be1ow, general) ethical cIaims about what it means ta lead a flourishing human life,
Nebamas cao onIy ignore or be1ittle these as "vague and banal" rules ofthumb
(Ibid., 226) oflittle consequence wben compared ta Nietzsehe's admirable,
idiosyncratie self-exemplification.
According ta this "amoral" strain of the Dew orthodoxy, as exemplified by
Nehamas. Nietzsche tums ta the celebrared technique ofgenealogy primarily ta
1 Detwiler shares Nehamas' view that the aitique ofmetaphysical dmjtism implies
a reducliOD of ethical discourse ta subjectivist self«pxessi.m: "As a result of the
col)apse of the transcendent inta the puxely physiological and psycbological, man
DOW comes c10sest ta the 'tntth' wben he expresses himself most authentically."
(DetwiIer 1990: ISS) -
•
2 A Iather ironie convergence ofviews occurs between Nehamas and Allan Bloom.
Although Bloom is inteJ:estcd in denouncing rather than ce1ebrating Nietzsehe's
alleged subjectivism (see Bloom 1987), bath he and Neinlmas embIace the view
that Nietzsehe's outlook is subjectivist.
S9
• debunk ail moral schemata. Nietzsche is said to conduet his genealogical
investigations from a morally-neutral vantage poilit that treats ail ethical frameworks
- including whatever ethical positions he may have toyed with from time-to-time -
as supezSlXuetural. At base, it is cJaimed, Nietzsche envisions an amoral, chaotic
void, out of which emerges an incommensurable and irreducible plurality of
moralities, each ofwhich claiming (dogmatically, and hence illegitimately) to
represent ultimate, absolute, universal Meaning or Truth. Genealogy is descn1led
as a limited, inhereDtly negative enterprise designed to prepaœ the terrain for an
overthrow of ail ethical frameworlcs through the unmasking of thdr intt:rested,
oppIeSSive origins (see, for example, Strong 1988: 13; 91). Nietzsehe's
genealogy, limited as it is to exposing "the errors and prejudices macic in the past",
is focused not on proposing a new, "better" morality, but rather on annihilating
morality altogether (Ibid., 39; see 99).
According to authors like Nebamas, the claim that Nietzsche is dealing primarily
in ethics must be dismissed as preposterous in light ofNietzsehe's self-dec1ared
"amoral" debllIlking of ail morality. This claim appears more plausible, however,
if, in an exercise similar to the one used in the previous chapter with respect to
• ought 1to live?" (Williams 1985) Williams argues that we cm use the couceptuaI,
nonnative resources of the ethica1 universe (50 defined) in arder to criticise those
60
• internaI sub-systcms of "moraIity" !bat may he based upon questionable
metaphysical premises.
Alas. Nietzsche does not always follow Williams' useful semantic distinction.
often employing the tcrm "moraIity" confusingly in both a pejorative sense and in a
positive, non-ironic manner to denote bis own position. Whereas bis invocation of
morality in a pejorative sense is well-known, Nietzsehe's xepeated description of
bis own position as a morality of some sort is often overlooked. Among the many
examples of the latter usage is the following comment from bis 1886 pxeface to
DaybreaJc "in this book faith in morality is withdrawn - but why? Out of
moraIity! [Aus Moralitiit.'] Or what else should we call !bat which informs it - and
us?" (D PIef. 4) lJl a similar spirit, the following famous passage from Beyond
Good and Evil clearly iDdicates the possibility of more than one morality. with
Nietzsche taking the side of the "higher" against the "lower". dominant variety:
Morality [Moral) is in Europe today herd-animal
morality [Herdentier-Moral] - that is to say. as we
understand the thing. ooly one kind of human
morality beside which, before which, after which
many other. above all higher. moralities [Mhere
MM~]~~~~oo~tobe~~~$œ
202; emphasis in the original. Cf. BGE 260)
The same idea is found in theNach1ass ("Morality itself. in the form ofhonesty [ais
Redlichkeit]. compels us to deny monllity." WP 404).3 and reappears in aquati-
religious f~ in 71UIS Spoke Zarathustra: "I love him who cbastises bis God
because he loves bis God [lch liebe den, wekher seinen Gott zi1chtigt, wei! er
3 Sec also WP 268: "Two types of morality (7)pen der Moral] must not he
coDfused: the morality with which the hcalthy instinct [der gesund geblïebene
lnstinkr] cicfeDds itself llg8ingt incipicnt decadence [déœdmce]- and anothcr
morality reine andere Moral] with which this very decadence de6nes :mdjustifies
itselfand leads downwards." Anothcr revelatoty fragment is found in WP 317:
"One should defend virtue agaînstthepreachers ofvirtue [die Tugendgegendie
Tugendprediguvertheidigen]: they ~ its wOISt enemies." Later in this fragment
• Nietzsche refers to his bIand ofvirtue as in the style of the Rc:nai«ance "moraline-
free virtue." For Nietzscbe, as we shal1 sec, authc:ntic virtue is neither preached nor
"propagandïsed." (Ibid.)
61
• seinen Gott liebt]..... (Z Prologue 4) ln Ecce Homo Nietzsche makes a number of
persona! refetences to "his" morality; e.g. "A couple more signposts from my
morality [meiner Mo.al]" (EH "Qever" 1); "I would like to impart one more clause
of my moral code against vice [aus meinem Moral-Koda gegen das Lasru]" (EH
"Books" 5).
on mapping "a pol1Iait of mo.-es [moeurs] ... onto the hnman condition in general."
(Blondel 248: 336) Nietzsche clearly uses the term "moralist" in this French sense
when he asks, "Is a moralist not the opposite ofa Puritan? '!bat is to say, as a
tbjnker who regards morality as 50rnething questionable, as worthy ofquestion-
marks, in short as a problem? Is moraIizing Dot - immoral?" (BGE 228)4
Similarly in WP 981, Nietzsche declares that his goal is "not to preach moralityS to
them in any form..•; but to create conditions that nquire strongermen who for
their part need, and consequently will have, a morality (more clearly: a physical-
spiritual discipline) thIJt 1rIIJkes them strong! "6 Those who,like Blondel and
Nehamas. reduce the entire realm ofethics to the sort of moral preaching that
Nietzsche dcrldcs understandably conclude that Nielzsche ",",aios steadfastly
4 Cf. HAH II.2.19: "B«:allSC they disscct monility, moralists must DOW he
content to he upbraidcd as immora1ists. But he who wants to diSllect bas to kill; yet
only for the sake of better knowIedge, better judgement, better living; Dot 50 that all
the wodd sha11 start dissectïDg. UDhappily. however. people ••• confuse [the
mœalist] with the preacher of morals. The oIder moralists dissccted too little and
pœached tao much.••" (Emphasis added.) The suggestion that dissCction of
morality (m the pejorative sense) leads to "betterliving" suggests ID me that
N"1ClZSche conceives the diSS"'ding ent.crprise as an ethical-lIOI1D3tive endeavour (sec
be1ow).
5 Cf. GS 292: "To those who preat:h moraIs. - 1 do Dot wish to promote any
morality•••" .
6 1 will explGIC what Nietzsche means by "creating conditions" in Chapter VIn.
where 1 argue that N"1CtZSchc's main normative and political concem is to encourage
th=: plOper cultivation - or "breeding" - ofthe superior type ofhuman being.
62
• outside ethics. Afrr:r aIl, <Wcs not Nietzsche cJaim tbat wc make ourselves
"ridieulous" [1licherlich] wbcn wc tum to an individUlÙ and say, '''You ought to be
thus and thus' [<<sound so solltestdll sein/»]..."? (TI MAN 6) It seems to me,
tbeir lead in this regard) criticised the moral conventions of tbeir day from a clcarly
deve10ped ethical vision of human flourishing, a vision tbat explicitly excludes the
tiresome sanctimony of moral preacbing. (Abbey 1994)7
"morality" shouid be seen in the same Iight as bis treatment of truth; not as b1anket
rejection of ail ethical thinking and practice as such. but as part ofa broadly-based
attaek on a slave personality-type that, in Nietzsehe's view, bas unjustly
appropriated the virtue œans that by rîghts only should he used by those like
himself. When Zarathustta cries out, "Oh, you befouiers of Doble names [ihr
lJesc1tmulur edkrNomen]!" (Z n OIP). he is in effect bemoaning the debasement
of precious, inhezentJ.y-valuable vinue tenns by a plc:beian majority that
UDhesitatingly invokes them in the most distastefuIly self-rigbrmus and strident
manner.8 The word "vinue," Z8rathustra 1ater remarks, sounds "ill ... in their
• 8 Sec WP 870: "the bcst things bave becD. slandeled [verliistert] beèa'lse the weak
orthe immoderale swine have cast a bad ligbt on them - and the bcst men[die besten
Menschen] have rcmained biddcn - 2Dd bave ob misunderstood themselves."
63
• mouths." for "when they say: '1 am just' [ich hin gerechtl. it always soumis like: '1
am revenged!' [ich hin geriicht]" (Z n OV).9
Nietzsche bas a particularly sharp eye for the moral hypocrisy. the excessive
sanctimoniousness of those who have hijacked the normative vocabulary of virtue
but who remain, in bis eyes, mere pretenders to virtue. He pointedly criticises and
ridicules the "gloomy mien" of these pretenders. who ostentatiously display "the
beaving bosom" (TI MA 19). and in whom excessive moral seriousness [Ernst]
becomes "imprïnted on faces and gestures..." (GM Ill.2S) 50 eager to grasp at the
mantle of "virtue", these people "are disguised without wanting to admit il." (GS
365)
9 1bis passage seems to suggest that there is an altcmatc, more legitimatc usage of
the term "justice" that is more respectful of its true naIUre. 1mgue in 01apter IV
• that NidZSCbe &IV" 'Pts to invoke justice in this, more legitimatc sense.
10 "_ übertIIncbter WurmfraS, 1v:mlIntclt dm'ch starke Wortc, dm'ch Ansh!lnge-
Tugenden, dmch gl!lnv:nde falsche Wedœ."
64
• you filI your mouths with noble words," notes Z3rathustra in an earlier passage.
"[A]rc we supposed ta believe that your hearts are overflowing. you habitua1liars?"
(Z n OIP) The true test of virtue, for Nietzsche, is wbether a virtuous disposition
becomes manifest away from the crowd: "Do you possess courage, 0 my
brothers? Are you stout-bearted? Not courage in the presence of witnesses, but
hermits' and eagles' courage, which not even a god observes any morc?" (Z IV
OHM 4)11
Underneath the pomposjty and studied self-importance of the vain, Nietzsche
finds a profound self-loathing, as demonstratcd by their inabiliiy to find evidence of
wisdom, holiness. viItue" (GS 359) - IepIeseDt futile attempts to caver up their
deficiencies "in moralistic veIbal tinsel and valences." (BOE 23) These
observations fonn the bacltground to Nietzsche's often ironie or contemptuous
1J'e8tment ofthose he refers ta as "the viItoous" [Tug~] (e.g. Z n ov) or
"the good" (e.g. Z 1 OTM). Often misread as uepudiation of the idca ofvirtue and
momlity altogetber, Ibis coutempt or mockety is quite delibenltcIy put in the seMee
of autht:ntù: VÙ'llIe, allOWÏll6 Nietzsche to aeate a critical space between bjmselfand
• Il "N"1Cht Mut vorZeugen. sondem Eînsiedler- und Adler-Mut, dem auch hein
Gatt mehr zusieht."
6S
• an inlrinsically valuable moral vocabu1aIy that bas, aIas, been misuscd and abuscd
by the "befoulers of noble names."
1be sanctimonious befoulers bave tainted certain key virtue-tenns with specifie,
undesirable connotations. Nietzsche puIS forth "moderation" as an example of one
of the most hefouled of noble names A1though Nietzsche, as we sha1I examine in
Chapter V, follows Aristotle in wishing 10 steer a moderate course between the
exttemes of asceticism and laisser aller, bis embrace of this AristoteIian ideal is
souled man, would "excite spleen" 100 much, while possessing no honour al all
would make one sleep badly; the solution, concIudes the "wise man," is 10 seek out
• 12 "N"lCht cure SOnde - cure GenIlgsamkeit scIueit gen HimmeJ, euer Geiz selbst in
curerSÜDde schIeit gen Himmel!"
66
• a "moderate" (i.e. mediocre) fonn of honour: "a good name" in the cyes of the
majority.J 3
Following the jaundiced view of the majority of bllmankind associated with the
French moralist tradition of La Rochefoucauld tbrough to Benjamin Constant,
Nietzsche considers this risle-averse type of "vïrtue" a symptom of an inadequacy or
deficiency that slave morality altempts to repackage (perverseIy) as a praiseworthy
qua1ity: "[i)n truth, 1 have often Jaughed at the weaklings [Schwiichlinge) who
think themselves good because their c\aws are billOt!" (Z n OSM) In a reve1atory
fragment from the Nachlass, Nietzsche lands La Rochefoucauld for suspecting
"that 'virtue' was a pretty word rein schiines Wort) among those who could no
longer take any pleasure in vice.••" (WP 870; cf. WP 355)14 For Nietzsche, this
lowering of the horizon oflmman achievement and potential is truly a "vïrtue that
makes sma1l" [die verkleinemde Tugend) (Z m VMS 1): "_.their best is 50 very
small! lbeir worst is 50 very sma1l!" (Z m ONL 2) It is a "vïrtue" that "makes
modest and tame," turniug "the wolf into a dog and man bimself into man's best
domestic animal." (Z m VMS 2)
A closely-reJated orientation associatrd with the "1DOl'lI1i1y" package that
N"1ClZSChe wishes to repudiate is that caJcnlaring prudence or clevemess [Klugheit)
which he often treats as a cowardly hedging ofhets among those who are tao weak
to confront their enemies directly. "They are often kind to you," suggests
zarathustra to bis imaginaty noble interlocutor, "but that bas always been the
prudence of the cowardly [die Klugheit der Feigen). Yes. the cowardly are
prudent'" (ZIOFM) "Fuodarnentally," he observes latcr, "thcywantone thing
•
Rochefoucauld, Mtaimes CCCVID: "On a fait une vertu de la modération, pour
borner l'ambition des grands hommes ct pour consoler les gens m6:1iocres de leur
peu de fortune ct de Ieurpeu de nâire." On the iDfluence of La Rochefoucauld on
Niettsebe, sec Abbey (1994).
67
• mast of all: that nobody shal1 do them harm. So they steal a march on everyone and
do goOO to everyoneJ This, however. is cowardù:e [Feigheit]: although it be cal1ed
·virtue.... (Z mVMS 2) These are the ones, 1believe. to whom Zarathustra is
referring when he mentions those "who sit in their swamp and speak thus from the
rushes: 'Virtue - that means to sit quietly in the swampJ We bite nobody and avoid
him who wants to bite: and in everything we hold the opinion that is given us"" (Z
II OV) Moreover, as we shal1 see in Chapter IV. Nietzsche also reserves the tenn
Klugheit for the "ingenious". albeit unhealthy.life-calumniating inventiveness of
the ascetic priests, the ideologues of slave morality.15
Although Nietzsche believes that virtue terms ought to belong in the bands of
the select few. he suggests that the aforementioned regrettable plebeian
contaminations should make those interested in authentic virtue suspicious of them.
To allow oneself10 use a vocabulary claimed by the herd is to risk being mistaken
for a berd-animal Zarathustra notes bis disciples' desire to cal1 their virtue "by a
Dame and caress it," but cautions that in succumbing 10 this temptation they now
"have its name in common with the people and have come of the people and the
herd.••" (Z 1 OJP) The berd-animal. i.e. the nominally "goOO" people [den Guten].
he observes elsewhere, oflen call the "noble man" [Edler] good "in arder to make
away with him [beiseite bringen]." (Z 1 OTM) Renee the neeci to hold the language
• compt'Iisate for their inability to judge weil in particular contexts by living their lives
on automatic pilot, 50 to speak: they are "lilœ household clocks wound op; they
repeat their tick-toek and want people to cal1 tïck-tock - virtue." (Z II OV)
68
• of virtue at arms-Iength. 10 ridicule and parody them when necessa'Y. Declaring
!bat "like aD creators, 1 have grown weary of the old lOngues," (Z n CM)
Zarathustra daims !bat bis mockery aims at blowing away aD "mouldered words"
ofgoodness which forbids the mouth 50lemn words and thc formulas ofvirtue."
(BGE 216) Hence bis empassioned appeal- through Zarathustra - to bis irnagined
kindred spirits to "let [their] virtue be too exalted for the farnmarity of names." (Z 1
OJP)17
16 "Ifl must be compasSÎonate [mitleidig]," Zarathustra inSÎsts, "1 still do Dot waat
10 be ca11ed compassionate." (Z n OC)
17 Nietzsche also proposes another argument for being W3'Y ofvirtue terms. Even
ifwe assume !bat they have DOt been iIIevocably tainted by the herd, pœcocious use
ofthem may, he suggests, seriously damage onc's virtue: "Even the grand words,
the grand attitudes must be guaIded against! AlI ofthem xepresent a danger !bat the
instinct will 'understand itse1f' too carly..." (EH "C1ever" 9) PIecocious self-
consciousness, in other words, might easily lead 10 the vain self-regaId 50
characleristic of the servile personaL~ !bat would destroy the bealltiful,
unconscious innocence ofthose whose sou! is 50 "overfull" !bat they "forget"
themselves (Z Prologue 4). CompaIe .Aris:otle's inSÎstellce in the N'u:omochean
Ethics !bat the study of moral and politica1 philosophy should be limited 10 older
men, on the a.~nnptiOD !bat those with little life experlence and an as yet unsettled
c:haracter should first develop and be aDowed 10 hone ~tiaIlycorrect instincts
and habits before CUJbarlcing upon highly inte11ectual exercises. (109531-9; also
1146b34-35, Sec also RheIoric 1395a2-5). Nietzsehe's waming against
pœcocious self-conscionsness and bis trenehant critiquc of the 1mbea1thy form of
self-consciousness chaIacterlstic ofslave morality (Chapter III) do Dot mean, of
course, that he remains suspicious of a1llDllDDCl' conscious awareness and rational
69
• should be weapons and ringing symbols that life must overcome itself again and
again!" (Z II OT) He suggests that this project, alas, bas hardly begun. In contrast
ta the "habitua1liars" who free1y and easily spout the standard, noble-5Ounding
words, Z3raIhustra describes bis own, tentative vocabulary as "poor, despised,
halting" (Z II OIP). His first, awkward efforts al naming an alternative, noble
morality, he admits, may result in foolish-5Ounding prattle: "My happincss is
foolish and it will speak foolish things [Tiiricht ist mein Glück und Tiirichtes wird
es reden): it is still too young - 50 be patient with itl" (Z II CM)18 Nietzsche is
power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion." (GM 11.2) Out
ofthis self-consciousncss emerges a ncw sense ofvirtue:
The self-rejoicing of such bodies and 50uls calls
itself: 'Virtue'J Such self-rejoicing protects itself
with its doctrines of good and bad [Gut und
Schlecht) as with sacred graves; with the names it
gives its happincss it banishes from itself all that is
contemplible [alles VeriichtIiche). (Z m TET 2)19
Not all adherents of the new orthodoxy follow commentators like Nehamas,
Blondel and Strong in seeing Nietzsche as fundamentally an "amoral" thinker•
Another iniluentiaÏ strain in the Iiterature, which is most likely ta bepresent in
authors who position themselves al the left, "progressive" end of the political
70
• spectrum,20 sccs a n,;.'V, franldy ·ethical scnsibility" (Connolly 1993: 372)
emerging out of the spirit ofNie!Zsc~'s thought. Authors like Connolly and
Bonnie Honig. while in general agreement with the broad themes and direction of
the new orthodox ~tofNietzsche, sec in genealogical negativism "an
alternative ethü: that seeks ta be more generous and creative - more responsive ta
the impulses, yeamings, and resentments that marlc the jmman condition in
modemity.· (Honig 1993a: 8; emphasis added) Honig differentiates Nietzsehe's
ethical stance from modemist moralities, or "moral virtue', which she associates
with inherently authoritarian attempts to facilitate identïty fozmatioD, consensus-
building, and collective decision-making at the cast ofstifling creative dissent.
Mainstream polities and society. aided and abetted by modemist moral and political
philosophies, are said to be driven by a 'need for closure and meaning" (Ibid.,41)
that entai! unjust, violent suppressions of "the Other', Le. the 'dissonant impulses"
20 Just what this entails. in the Jale 199Os, is unclear. ta say the least. Generally
speaking, however. the "progressivism' of the theorists discussed below appealS ta
be associaWI with a sympathetic treattnent of the situation of the politically
undeIrepIesented, economically IIIlIIgÎnaliwl groups, or otherwise disadvantaged
(e.g. people of colour. women, aboriginal peoples, those with homosexual
• ~ces, ete.)•
1 Sec also Marle Wam:n's contention that mctaphysical theorles oftruth are
"inherently manipulative and Jatently authoritarian... (1988: 236)
71
• Recovering this "Other" involves highlighting and revelling in paradox and
ambiguity, for these destabilising, disrupting devices are seen as our only hope in
the battle to loosen the hold that "monotonic standlirds ofidentity" have over our
lives. (Connolly 1991: 60) Similarly, Honig claims that Nietzsche offers Otherness
"a legitimate avenue ofexpression instead ofsilencing it by branding it abnormal.
unnaturaI. or irresponsible. He valorizes it and its resistance to formation into
responsible subjectivity..." (Honigl993a 65) Honig does insist that there is a
positive thrust to this negative-sounding enterprise ofconstant disruption:
Here we find a h"berationist ethic that sees the only hope for freedom and democracy
in the never-ending, piayful give-anei-take between belief, interpretation, and action
on the ('ne band and the ironie and subversive overtuming ofthese on the other.
22 Honig is on solid ground when she claims that certain paraIlels can he drawn
hetween Nietzsehe's ethical stance and Machiavelli's notion of virtù. 1will draw
attention to certain similarilies between Machiavellian and Nietzse:heN1 ethics in
Chapters VU and vm. However. 1intend to mgue below (and in Chapter X, when
1take up the question ofNietzsehe's stance toward domination) that ber account of
Nietzsehean ethics (Le. N"Jetuche's ethics, and .Ilot post-modemist imaginative
•
interpretations ofbis ethics) is off the mark in its snJdied ignorance of Nietzsche's
emphasis on socio-political hieran:hy and of bis blithe dismissal of the idea that the
majority ofbnmanlcind possesses certain, inalienable rights to respect and humane
treatment.
72
• "[E]xperimental detachment from the dominant terms of debate," states Connolly,
ois an element in tlle eultivation of freedom and care..." (Ibid., 14)
1 hope it will saon become elear, however, that in light of Nietzsehe's view
(discussed below) of the most desirable outcome ofethical contestation, this attempt
without evaluating", for "only through evaluation is there value [Durch das
SchliJzen erst gibt es Wel1]•••"(Ibid.) In this same, important section of Thus
Spoke 7Arathustra, Nietzsche notes that an evaluating "table of values" [T1ife1 der
Güter] that bangs o\~ every people that ois the voicc ofilS will ta power" (Ibid.),
resuIting in an irreducible plurality oftables ofvalue, or wills ta power, in the
human-etbical univetSe.
Much that seemed good ta one people seemed shame
and disgrace ta another... [M]uch tbat was ca1led
evil in one place was in another decked with purple
honoursJ One neighbour never understood another:
bis soul was always amam at bis neighbour's
madness and wick.."dness. (Ibid.)
Although everyone agrees tllat SOJ;IIdhiiig ~""WD as "virtue" is desirable, clashes
me inevitable becanse "almost everyone 1iIm;y be1ieves he is paIticipating in virtue;
and ••• asserlS he is an expert on 'good' and 'evil'." (Z n OV) Nietzsche not only
• 73
• acknowledges the existence of !bis moral conflict, but also argues for its
importance:
And do you tell me, friends. that there is no dispute
over laSte and laSting? But all life is dispute over
taste and tasting! [alles Leben ist Streit um
Geschmack und Schmecken] •.. [W]oe to allliving
creatures that want to live without dispute over
weight and scales and weigher! (Z il OSM)
That Nietzsche sees dispute between rival tables of value as necessaty does not
mean, as authors like Connolly and Honig suggest, that he celebrates the prospect
of never-ending contestation and opposes, in principle, the prospect of a vietoty of
one.side or another.23 1wish to argue that while there is a nascent political vision
implicit in Nietzsehe's worlc, it is not the pluralistic, tolerant vision championed by
many ofhis contemporary admirers in the Academy.24 With respect to the clash
between moralities or tables of value, and hence between different social castes,
most of Nietzsehe's intetpreters have displaycd. as Berkowitz bas suggested, an
exquisite innocence about the moral and political implications of Nietzsche's higbest
aspirations. (Berkowitz 1995: 5-10) In Nietzsche's view. ooly those caught up in
that "democratic idiosyncracy which opposes evetything that deuninates and wants
10 dominate" (GM n.12) would fail 10 recognise that which is perceived as self-
evident by truly self-awme bearers of master morality: the importance of
domination and exploitation in a universe where ooc's self-aggrandisement and
self-pafectability are always attained st the expense ofothers.
It is "life itself'. N'1CtzSche famousIy claims, that shows this truth 10 us (or.
more accurately. ta those amongst us with the courage and sensitivity ta grasp !bis
• co:1leSt, but only ofa rarjfied. highly circnmscnDed sort, condl1(:ted amongst a very
few in an imagined areœ ofa new aristo zatic politics. A detailed discnssion of
Nietzsehe's political vision will be conducted in Chapter vm.
74
• truth). "llie itself," insists Nietzsche, in a manner recalling the char2cters of
Thrasymachus and Callicles ofPJato's Republu: and Gorgias. ois essentiaJ1y
slave morality. we can sec that "[e]very animal - thetefore la bête philosophique.
too26 - instinctively strives for an optimum offavorable conditions under which it
can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling ofpower..." (GM III.7)
In c1aimin g that primordial human egoism is deeply consistent with the self-
aggrandising "motivations" allegedly found in all other natural creatures, Nietzsche
seems to be 7"")Iching for a realm of non-noanative "facto - in this case the
inescapable fact of primordial egoism in the natUta1 world - in order ta back bis
view ofour deepest motivations.27
Leaving aside for now questions about the viability ofgrounding the position of
prlm<m:lial egoism naturalistically. we can sec why Nietzsche believes that our
25 In DOting the filial relation of these views with those expIeSSed py Socrates' two
infamous interlocutoIs. 1 wish ta underline that although this attempt to ground a
meta-dhic: in "life" or "118tUIe" is cbaracteristic oflIlIICh (although certainly Dot all)
modem moral and political philosophy. it does have roots in certain intuitions and
beliefs common in the ancient world (If notin any reputable ancient school of
philosophy).
26 Nietzsche's treatment of the bllman being as an anima! (aIbeit a "philosophical
7S
• moral values "natuIal1y" are an important vehicle for our primordial drive to sclf-
aggrandisement "thus in the history of morality a will te power finds expression,
through which ... the slaves and oppressed ••• attempt te make those value
judgments prevail that are favorable to them.••" (WP 4(0) Nietzsche does not
always use the expression "will to power" when discussing bis view of the roct of
ail moral values in primaI egoism; in WP 345, for example, he declares quite
simply that "[e]veryone desires that no doctrine or valuation of things should come
into favor but that through which he himsclf prospers." The message, however,
remains the saIne: even the praise and (alleged) practice of self1essness is said to
exemplify this rule: "the neighbor praises selflessness because it brings him
advantages." (GS 21; sec also WP 246)28 Every form of will to power, even the
most ostensibly sclf-eifacing, officia1ly apolitica1 or philanthropie, desires te rule at
others' expense, regardless of whether this desire is expressed openIy or secret1y.29
Nietzsche's view tends to strike us as counter-intuitive, given our usual notion
of the moral-ethica1 viewpoint as, by definition, disinterested, or "se1fIess". For the
author of Beyond Good and Evil. however, this typica1 view is an illusion, a lie
manufactured and propagated by cennuies ofessentia1ly weak, unhealthy
individuals who have latched onto it as tbeir ooly means of(covert) sclf-
28 Leiter ca1ls this basic N"1el:ZScht'Jm idea - that (a) normative-evaluative systems
serve the prudential interests of paIticuIar types of persoDS, and (b) that these
systems are typica1ly promoted by persons whose interests they advance-
N"1ClZSChe's "Prudence Thesis." (Leiter 1995: 8) Sec Nietzsehe's characterisation
ofslave morality in GML13 as "theprodcnce of the lowest arder" [diese Klugheit
niedrigstm Ranges] and WP 134's description of "[slave] moral valualion as a
history of lies and the art ofslander in the service of the will to power•••"
29 Note, however, that a1though N"1CtZSche considers "selflessness" to be a cavert
form ofsclf-ïnterest in the bands of the majotity, he deems it not simply deceitful,
but also dowmight nnhealthy, espccia1ly when evoked by thase potentially
exceJlent, but woefuIly confused individuals (like the ascetic priestly type) whose
flollTishing is predieated upon open. honest self-assertion. "To choose what is
harmfu1 to onesdj: he atgUCS, "to he attraeted by 'disin1ciested' motives, almost
• constitutes the formula for dictJtlence." ('Il EUM 35) 1 will explore this idca-
Nietzsche's portrait of the potential greatness and aetua1 decadcnce of the priest1y
type - in Chapter IV.
76
• aggrandisemcnt. "Wbete 1found a living creature," concludes Zarathustta, "th= 1
found will ta power; and even in the will of the servant 1found the will to he master
[noch im Wlllen des Dienendenfand ich dm WUlen, Herr ZIl sein]." (Z n OSO)
which live. grow, beget and perish", it is still possible - and indeed Decessary for
the pw:poses ofexposition - ta "alte!'JIpt ta display the moœ 1iequent and IeClIlring
77
• categories of master and slave moralities should thus he consttued as idea1 types in
the Weberian sense.31 Speaking very generally, Nietzsche characterises those
normalive views as "servile" and a party to "slave morality" when, in bis
judgement, they tend to favour the lowest, most contemptible men at the expense of
the highest. "Master morality", by extension, is meant to r.:fer to that disparate
78
• sec, he blames for a graduaI moral decline of the human species beginning with the
Nierzsehe disIikes the "moderation" that calls for talerance and compromise in the
face of moral confIict:
[W]e dislike these mediators and mixers... these
ha1f-and-ha1fers, who have leamed neither to bless
nor ta curse from the heart [diesen Halb- und
Halben, welche weder segnen lemten, noch von
Gnmd GUS fluchen] ••• For 1 would rather have noise
and thunder and storm-curses than this cautious,
uncertain feIine repose; and among men, too, 1 hate
most of aIl soft-waIkers [Leisetreter] and ha1f-and-
halfers and unc(:tain, hesitating [zweifelnde,
ziigemde] passing cI..Iuds. (Z m BS)
Like Machiavelli, who incur.ted the undying enmity of generations of readers by
insisting that in times of acute political crisis, one bas ta choose between Christian
and republican vittue (Berlin 1982: 25-79), Nierzsehe is convinced that intellectuaI
and moraI integrity [Rechtschajfenheit] demand that one must choose sides in the
batt1e he hopes will come betweelI these incompatible visions of society.
Nietzsche chooses the side ofthose higher Imman beings who alone possess the
capacity ta ascend ta an objective viCW1-'OilOt and ttue knowledge ~ who
potenrially ~t, at the same time, the embodiment ofan objectivP..!Y superior
form ofhuman flourishing. TheIe is only one set ofttue standards of"bappiness,
beauty. [and) benevolencc". and one of the great "privileges" ofNietzsche's
notion ofwhich, for Nietzsche. is "a self-contradiction: [for) what can he common
• bas ever but little value [was gemein sein kann, kat immer 1IUTwenig Wert]." (BOE
79
• 43) As Leiter bas observed, NietzsChe identifies the preservation and cultivation of
bis "highest men" with the affirmation of "life" itself (Leiter 1995: 23).34
Nietzsche makes it clear !bat he will be content with nothing less !han the
complete vietory of bis set of"master" values, for the stakes are tao high to
contempIate the altemative:
Truly the power of this praÏSing and blaming is a
monster rein Ungetiim ist die Macht dieses Lobem
und Tadelns]. Tell me, who will subdue it for me
[wer bezwingt es mir], my brothers? Tell me, who
will fasten fetters upon the thousand necks of this
beast? [wer wirft diesem Tier die FesseZ über die
tausend Nacken?]1 Hitherto there have been a
thousand goals, for there have been a thousand
peoples. Ooly fetters are still lacking for these
thousand necks, the one goal is stilliacking [es fehlt
das «eine» Ziel]J Yet tell me, my brothers: if a
goal for humanity is still lacking, is there not still
lacking - humanity itself? (Z 1OTG)
The awesome power of determining moral value, in other words, ought not to be
treated lightly and left in many different bands. Humanity, claims NietzsChe, will
not attain its full flowering until the multiplicity ofWeltanschauungen are brought to
becl by "one goal"; l'. ruiing, noble set of values in the service of the full flourishing
of the superiortype ofhuman being.
A great admirer ofThucydides thtoughout bis intellectuaI ca=, Nietzsehe
agree!I wholeheartedly with the following millenia~ld sentiments recotded by the
great Greek historian'
"It bas a1ways been a rule that the weak. should he
subject ta the strong" (1.76). In the words of one of
Thucydides' Athenian generaIs: Our opinion of the
gods and our knowledge of men lead us ta conclude
that it is a generai and necessary law of nature ta ruIe
• 359) As Leiter observes. "the things N'1ClZSChe identifies as 'valuable' for life are
thase he takes ta he necessary for the flourishing o{ the highest types of life (or
human excellence)_." (Leiter 1995: 24)
80
• whatever one cano This is not a law that we made
ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it
was made. We found it a1Ieady in existence, and we
shallleave it to exist for ever among those who come
after us. (V.I05)3S
Unlike Thucydides, however, Nietzsche does not think the vietory of the best
and strongest ta be a foregone conclusion, for unlike the noble aetors of
Thucydides' historical draIna, NielZSche's irnagined nobles of the modem era are in
the unlikely position of underdogs. They are suffering from a false consciousness
that trains them to despise their noble, "gut" instincts. to feel guilty about
possessing them, and ta value ideals that they inwardly, viscerally, rejcct:
democracy, h"beralism, equality, feminism. Christian piety, etc. As wc shall sec in
more detail in Chapter IV, Nietzsche's great worry is that unless these nobles
5Omehow free themselves from this false consciousness, aIl traces of nobility will
vanish from modemity altogether, thus eliminating the future possibility for
grealDess and coI'demning the human species ta a perpetuaUy low-Ievel, "pitiably
comfortable" existence. Hence the need for Nietzsche's attempted rescue operation:
as moral philosopher and pedagogue concemed with the future of the species, he
must "raise the co:lSCÏousness" ofn8scent noble-types and incite them to take action
species.36
3S Nietzsche expresses great admiration for Thucydides in HAH L92 & IL2.144,
D 168, and, in bis mature period, in TIWOA2.
36 Wanen does have a point in arguing thatNïetzsche wishes dcvelop a model of
politics that "moves towani reali'eing potentials for agency" (1988: 47), but in bis
unfortunatc decision ta fall in line with the new orthodoxy's tendency ta atlnDute a
leftist, political "spirit" ta its alleged fonnding father, he wrongly assumes that
Nietzsche's main philosophical concem is with agency as such; i.e. the agency of
aIl human beings. Wanen's insistence on imposing egalitarian ideals on Nietzsche
obscures the important hieran:hical dimension of this latter's thought. Nietzsche
does Dot think:, as Wanen suggests, that the main problem with Cbristi8nity was its
inhibition ofaction; on the contraIy, he DOtes constantly that Cbristianity
• encourages a great deal of activism, but (m bis vicw) of the wrong kind. (Sec, for
exampJ~ Nietzsebe's coOOemn8tion ofLuther's break with Rome in AC 61.)
Nietzsche's point is that the action 50 encouraged is destructive of aIl that is noble
81
• In this chapter 1bave subjected Nietzsche's treatment of the concept of morality
to critical analysis, and bave noted bis often confusing tendC:lCY to invoke the
concept both negatively and positively. In a negative sense, Nietzsche daims to
mount a root-and-branch critique of morality from either an "amoral" or "immoral"
standpoint, and it is this debunking strategy - the substance of which will be
examined in Chapters m and IV - which bas captured most of the attention of
Nietzsche commentators. 1bave suggested, however, that a careful examination of
bis writings reveals that the whole debunking project is powered by a deeply-felt
ethical imperative, an imperative that appears in NielZSChe's concern for the needs
and desires of the superior type of human being. The ethical nature of this
imperative is sometimes obscured both by NielZSChe's reluctance to employ many
standard virtue-terms that he believes ta bave been irrevocably tainted through
"grounded" in a view of the cosmos (as will ta power) that is "scientific", i.e.
neutral from a moral standpoinl.
We have seen, furthermore, that Nietzsehe's preferred ethical framework is
neither egalitarian nor compatlole with a democratic political culture, as some
commentators would have us believe. On the contrary, Nietzsche's polemic against
mainstream, "slave" morality is driven by bis conviction that this hegemonic set of
values, becanse it is demonsttably infeàor to the set ofvalues proper ta the highest
type and actnally inimical ta that type's proper development, ought ta be
subordinated ta the latter.
A more detailed examination ofNietzsehe's lICCOiIIIt of"master" and "slave"
moralities and of the clash between them is dearly wammted. Before wc can move
• and lofty. The problem, then, is not agency as such, but rather the type of agency -
what, and who drives il.
82
• ta such an examjnation, however, we must take a closer look at Nietzsehc's view of
the respective moral psychologies of bis ideal-typical master and slave types. As
we shaIl sec, Nietzsche makes it clear that one cannot fully grasp a moral outlook,
or "table of values", without attempting ta understand the type of person who
embodies il. In the course of our investigation of Nietzschean moral psychology, 1
shaIl argue that Nietzsehe follows an important stream of ancient moral philosophy
• 83
• CbaRter mi NiWgbean Yirtuei Instinct. Nature. and Artifice
[Instinkt] or drives [Triebe] rooted in our bodies, whether we are aware of this or
not and notwithstanding our most vigorous (albeit mistaken) efforts at transeending
our bodiIy selves through the sheer fOIœ of our intellect.
Nietzsche combats the belief- which he associa~ with the Platonic and
Christian traditions - that the only way to exuIt the human species is to help it
subdue its bodily, animalistic instincts. "We philosophers," he declares, "are not
free 10 divide body from souI as the people do..." (GS PIer. 3), since our entire
being is corporeal: "the awakened, the enlightened man [der ErwQJ;h1e, der
W"zssende] says: 1 am body entiIely [Leib bin ich ganz und gar], and nothing
beside; and souI is only a word for something in the body." (Z 1 ODB)2 Moreover,
as unwilling as he is 10 attribute an independent existence 10 the souI [Seele],
Nietzsche is no more prepared 10 make concessions to the "spirit" [Geist]: "'Since 1
have known the body better,' mentions Zarathustra 10 one of bis disciples, 'the
spirit bas been only figuratively spirit to me·•.•" (Z fi OP)3 N'1ClZSChe notes that the
insistence on a mind-body split bas often been accompanied by a contemptuous
1 "Der Mensch seIber aber ~t dem Erkennenden: das Tier, das rote Baclcen bat."
2 See also Z 1 OAW: "this most honest being [dies redIù:hste Sein], the Ego - it
speaks of the body, and it insists upon the body [es MU noch den Leib]" AI!d WP
• 229: That man "bas a nervous system (but no 'souI') is still the secret of the best
infonned." .
3 "'Seit ich den Leib besser kenne ••. ist mir der Geist nur nach g1eichsam Geist.·"
84
• repudiation of our bodily selves in the context of misguided ascetic programmes of
"self-improvement" designed to bring our errant bodies in line with our (alleged1y)
troe selves:
Once the sou!looked contemptuously upon the body:
and then this contempt was the supreme good - the
soul wanted the body lean, monstrous, famished
[mager. griijJlich und verhungert]. So the soul
thought to escape from the body and from the earth
[ihm und der Erde zu entschlüpfen]. Oh, this sou!
was itself lean, monstrous, and famished: and crueity
[Grausamkeit] was the delight of this sou!! (Z
Prologue 3)
As is weIl known, Nietzsche dismisses all traditional arguments for the
blinde Werkzeug] of another drive", (D 109) and maintains this view into bis
mature period. Reason is not an independent faculty, he notes in the Nachlass, but
rather "a system of relations between various passions and desires..." (WP 387) •
When philosophical reason attempts to detach itse1ffrom its root in the body,
the resu1t can only he a "misunderstanding of the body" (GS Pref. 4) that
Nietzsche bas Z8rathustra Iefer to as the "raving of the reason." [Raserei der
Ve17lll1!lt] (Z 1OAW) As Z8rathustra suggests, any attelDpt to Iepudiate one's
bodily affects in the name ofreason can only resu1t, paradoxically, in a deformation
ofone's rational capabilities: "one shou!d hold fast to one's hem; for if one lets it
go, how saon one loses one's head, too!" (Z II OC) Hence the need for an
approach to practical reasoning that takes its "physiological" basis into account
"every table of values, every 'thou shalt' ••• xequires tirst a physiological
investigation and interpIetation..." (GM LI?) In a crucial, carly passage in Thus
•
Spoke ZDrathustra, Nietzsche maltes an important conceptua1 distinction between
"the Self" [das Selbst] as CIeative body and "the Ego" [das Ich] as conscious
8S
• thought and feeling. The latter, though proud of its imaginative leapings and prone
to vainglorious celebration of its allegedly ir,dependent power, is in fact the
former's handmaid: "Your Self laughs at your Ego and its proud leapings. 'What
are these leapings and flights ofthought to me?' it says to itse1f. 'A by-way to my
goal. 1 am the Ego's leading-string and 1 prompt its conceptions...• (Z 1ODB)4
Further on in this same section, the Ego is described as a "littie intelligence" [kleine
Vemunft] that is, in fact, "an instrument of your body, a littie instrument and toy of
your great intelligence rein kleines Werk- und Spielzeug deiner gro.f3en Vemunft]."
Nietzsehe's description of the body as a "great intelligence" and his reference
later in the same work to "the supple, persuasive body" [überredende Leib] (Z m
TET 2) reveal a complex view of the bodily affects, a view suggested in an earlier,
anecdotai account of an anonymous, eighteenth-century Frenchman, who laid his
band on Fontenelle's heart and said, "'what you have there, dear sir, is another
brain.'" (GS 3) In breaking with the Platonic tradition, which dismisses the affects
as unthinking and bestial in nature, Nietzsche repudiates the reason-passion
dichotomy altogether by insisting that emotion and practical reason are not mutually
exclusive after ail. Our self-conscious efforts at cognition are indeed in the grip of
instinctive feelings and drives,S but these actually embody certain claims 10
knowledge: "ofall forros ofintelligence discovered hitherto, 'instinct' is the most
intelligent." (BGE 218) There is always a cognitive clement in our passions, or, as
Zarathustra puts il, "some reason in madness" (Z ! ORW);6 and every passion
4 "'Ich bin das Glingelband des Ichs und der Einblliser seiner Begriffe.'"
Elsewhere in book 1ofThus Spou ZoratJzustra. the claim is made that the Ego, in
its most honest forro, "speaks of the body, ••• insists upon the body [es will noch
den Leib]." (Z 1OAW)
5 "1 love him who is ofa free spirit and a free heart: thus his head is ooly the
bowels ofhis heart [sa ist sein Kopf1UlT das Eingeweide seines Herz.ens ] " (Z
• Prologue 4)
6 For this passage 1am using Kallfmann's, rather than Hollingdaie's, translation,
as it seems 10 me a better rendition of "Es ist aber immer auch etwas Vemunft im
86
• What is more, Nietzsche insists (or so 1would argue) that the rationality
embodied in our bodily instincts bas a CTUcial moral significanee. a moral-ethical as
weil as a cognitive status: "our most sacred convictions. the unchanging elements
in our supreme values," he claims. "are judgements of our muscles." (WP 314)
The new orthodoxy routinely interprets this to mean that our ethical judgement
stems ultimately from a substratum of (pre- or amoral) instinct. Proponents of the
new orthodoxy, in other words, suppose that Nietzsche helieves moral valuations
to he wholly contingent consttucts layered atop an amoral flux of physical
sensation. At first glanee. this reading of moral judgement as arbitraly
epiphenomenon may seem reasonable in light of Nietzsehe's recurring description
of the body (and himself) as "amoraL" If, however, we recall the discussion of the
last chapter and take into account (a) Nietzsehe's polemical tendency te label the
conventional moral schemata of bis day as "morality", and (b) that he also invokes
this same term in a more positive sense, as reflective of bis own position. the new
and parce! of the puppennaster te such a degree that any distinction between the
Wahnsinn" Sec also Z IV OHM 9: "Freedom from fever is far from heing
knowledge! 1do not believe in frozen spirits [Freiheit von Fieber ist lange noch
nicht Erkenntnis! A1Isgekiilteten Geistem glaube ù:h nicht]."
7 1 disagree with Kallfinann's insistenœ that "Nietzsche considers j)oth the man
who sets on impulse and the man who delibezatcly counteracts bis impulses inferior
to the man who acts rationally on instinct... (Kallfinann' 1974: 233) Sucb a
formulation does not quite capture the attempt of the author of Zaralhustra te
dispense with reason-passion dnalism altegether. Nietzsche finds bis idealised
nobleman admirable precisely because he sets on bis ("intelligent") impulses. As
we sha1l see below. what matters for the aristocratic-minded Nietzsche is always the
87
• two, and sense of extemal control of the former by the later, fades away. The
"supple, persuasive body" to which Zarathustra alludes is imbibed from the s!art
with an innate sense of right and wrong, nobility and baseness. Our "gut" feelings,
to which Nietzsche attributes the status of knowledge, seem to compel us to
perform (or avoid) certain actions and to make certain judgements on the basis of
this innate sense.
The attribution of both cognitive and moral-ethical properties ta our passions
bas a long history in the Western tradition of moral philosophy. In Williams' recent
borderline between the intellectual and the passional, partaking ofbOth natures: it
cao be described as cither desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire." (Ibid.)8
• 8 Annas notes tha1 this Aristotelian xefusal ta see desire as wholly separate from
reason was maintained by m.ost post-Aristote1ian, Hellenistic mora1 philosophy
(Annas 1993: 35).
88
• Nietzsche's repeated references to bodily knowledge seem to suggest that there
are definite echoes of this ancient philosophical tradition in bis writings. TIlis 1:: !lot
to say, however, that Nietzsche is simply an unreeonslIUcted Aristotelian, a modem
represenœtive of the vinue ethies tradition. A recurring theme of this work is that
Nietzsche continually (and confusingly) moves back.-and-forth between the
conceptual framework of ancient vinue ethies and a distinctively modem,
naturalistic account of human psychological make-up.
In the carly-modern naturaIist account of the human psyche, found
paradigmalically in the writings of Hobbes and Locke, hum:m beings are described
as sentient creatures with pre-given, unchangeable sets of instincts that can be
managed, ttained, suppressed, or sublimated through the scientifically-guided
efforts of external parties.9 The imperative driving these authors and the tradition .
of thought and practice that grew out of thcir writing is the pereeived need to come
to an accurate, scientific undcrstanding of this essentially unchanging human nature
in order to ensure public order. The 11I!man "subject" had to be disciplined, and the
job of the modern science of man, in this naturalistic view, was to tender the public
authority's efforts al such discipline more effective.
Nietzsche, ofcourse, talœs great exception to modern society's attempt 10
"discipline" exceptional human beings, and wishes 10 h"berate superior bnman
beings from what he sees as the false consciousness engendered by this sort of
discipline which, in bis view, operatcs in the service ofa servile, contemptible set
of values. However, insofar as Nietzsche occasionally empbasises the
unchangeable nature ofour instincts, the influence of this modern, naturalistic
account ofhllman psychology seems never far from the surface. "[1']0 the
discerning man," declares Z3rathustra, "all instincts are holy" [dem Erkennenden
heùigen sich a1le Triebe] (Z 1 OBV 2), giving voice 10 just how unerring and
89
• permanent Nietzsche imagines the deeply intemalised, virtuous sensibility of bis
(idea1ised) superior human heing. 10 Nietzsche often suggests that the superior man
is perpetually equipped with an instinctive, confident decisiveness in actions taken
and judgements made, a decisiveness which he traces back to a "fundamentai
certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to itself, something which may not
he sought or found and perhaps may not he lost either." (BGE 287) Elsewhere he
speaks ofa "complete automatism of instinct" as "the precondition for any kind of
mastely, any kind of perfection in the art ofliving" (AC 57), and notes in the
Nachlass that "the suong man ." is led [in the main] by a faultless and severe
instinct into doing nothing that disagrees with him, just as he cats nothing he does
not enjoy." (WP 906)11 Those personifying the "higher type" [die Mhere Natur],
who are "noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificial" [Ed1e, Groflmütige,
Aufopfemde], oUght to "follow [their] own senses to the end" [eignen Sinne ••• zu
Enlie denken], for they are al their hest when "their reason pauses" and they
succumb to their instincts. (GS 3; zn OBI)
In attempting to give an account of what he sees as this "faultlessness",
confidence, and gracefulness,12 Nietzsche often resorts 10 the metaphor of the
dancer, claiming that "my virtue is a dancing virtue [eines Tiin:l.ers Tugendj••." (Z
mss 6) "Everything good is instinct - and consequently easy, necesS3J:y, free.
Effort is an objection ••• üght feet are the fust atlributc ofdivinity." (TI FGE 2)
This apparent effortlessness stems from the virtuoso's innate ability to maintain
contact with bis unerring bodily instincts: men of virtue, zarathustta daims, are
10 As wc shall sec in Chapter VIn, this rlgid conception of the instincts is related
10 a Lamarckian beIief in the great ÏIIlpOrtlIIlœ ofheredity.
Il It aIso possible 10 inteIptet this talk of "automarism ofinstinct" in a non-
naturalistic way that is more in line with the discourse of virtue ethics. Nietzsche
may he refening in these passages 10 the agent's achievement ofeffort1ess virtue
after a long process ofmoral-spiritual dcveIopment. Wc shall explore this
90
• "fine dancers" who "do not forget their legs" when they lift themselves Iùgher. (Z
IV OHM 19) These instincts are sometimes described in terms of a visceral.
internai rhythm that rebels against any clumsy attempt at imposing the foreign
"beat" of an opposing set of moral valuations: "ask my foot if it likes their melodies
ofpraise and enticement! Truly, ta such a measure and tick-tock beat it likes neither
ta dance nor ta stand still." (Z m VMS 2) Only the dancing man of virtue bas the
"light fcet" required ta "overcome gravity," i.e. ta main the type of objectivity
descn1led in Chapter 1: "[olne bas ta be very light ta drive one's will to knowledge
into such a distance and, as it were, beyond one's time, to ereate for oneself eyes to
survey millennia..." (GS 380)
• do seantjustice 10 bis thought _. were one 10 forget that he began with the
assumption that all men were essentially anima!s._" (Ibid., 176) But here, tao, he
missteps. In bis eagemess 10 place Nietzsche's thought in as positive a light as
91
• Pan of what it mcans to be a hea!thy. self-aware member of the highest order of
humanity is the ability to identify and distinguish beIWeen :hese IWO types of
instincts. and the IWO types of people who represent them; the ability. in other
words. to perceive the Rangordnung in the human world, to know one's (lofty)
place in relation to this hierarchy. and to have an innate sense for one's own and
one's inferiors. Nietzsche never fails to underline the importance of this literallyad
hominem endeavour. an ability to discriminate between types of character that
always takes precedence over any independent assessment of action as sucb: "an
action is perfect1y devoid of value: it an depends on who performs il." (WP 292)14
The value ofan action, sentiment, or thought cao be assessed only with reference to
the value of the aetor - i.e. the value ofthat person's charaeter and instincts. We
must always make, he repeatedly insists. a backward inference "from the deed to
the doer. from the ideal to those who need il." (GS 370; ct: WP 675)15 This is true
even for the assessment of ideas and theories: when we assess the value of a
particular philosophy. claims Nietzsche, we are realiy evaluating the charaeter of
• admirable in higher human beings, while blame-worthy in the vulgar. quite simply
b«:lIllse he believes that superior lmman beings have li more refined, praiseworthy
conception ofwhat is truly pleasurable.
92
• Particular philosophies are most profitably looked at "as hints or symptoms of the
body, of its success or faîlure..." (GS PIef. 2)
ln contrast to bis aforementioncd descriptions of the unerring taste and
apparently effortless grace of that minority of gifted individuals Nietz5"..he deems
truly virtuous, he claims that those belonging to the majority cao hope ooly (at best)
to constantly strain after virtue, to make self-conscious anempts at emulaling noble
grace that will always appear inauthentic to the discriminating eye. There are certain
noble traits that simply cannot be sought out: "enjoyment and innocence [Gem!P
und UnschuId]," claims Zarathustra, "are the most modest things: neither want to
be looked for. One should have them..." (Z m ONL 5) Unaided by those healthy,
bodily instincts and elevated passions identified by Nietzsche as the sine qua non of
virtue, all heartfelt effort goes for nought, and may even be taken as evidence ofan
inner deficiency: "all perfect acts are unconscious and no longer subject to will;
consciousness is the expression of an imperfect and often morbid state in a person."
(WP 289) Nietzsche expresses this same point in a revealing, autobiographical
happiness [auch im G1iick schweres Getier], there are those who are clumsy-footcd
from birth. They exert themselves strangely,like an elephant ttying ta stand on its
• head." (Z IV OHM 19) Those who xepresent the "poor, sick type, [the] mob type"
93
• of human being [arme kranke Art, eine Piibel-Artl. remarks Zarathustra, have
"heavy fee!... [Tlhey do not know how to dance. How could the earth be light to
such men!" (Z IV OHM 16)
The insistent suggestion that all fine action and judgement is rooted in an
unerring. unchanging core of visceral instinct of the fortunate few (and that
authentic vinue is forever foreign to the majority with base instincts) leads to the
seemingly counter-intuitive suggestion that vinuous action is compelled, or
determined almost in advance, rather than chosen.1 6 "A well-constituted human
being, a 'happy' one," he insis\S, "must perform certain actions and instinctively
shrinks from other actions." (TI FGE 2; emphasis in original) Nietzsche refers to
artists (or rather bis ideaHsarion of them). for example, as the mest "involuntary"
and "unconscious" ofhuman beings. (GM IL 17; cf. BGE 213).l7 His "fatalistic"
line seerns to he further reinforced by bis well-known cIaim that the great
conceptual weight we tend te place upon our "intentions" (Absicht) is a mere
"prejudice". that conscious intention is, essenrially. superficiaI. (BGE 32)
Nietzsche's critique of"free will", however, is Dot driven sole1y by this
natucalistic line, as powerful as it may he in bis writings. His indebtedness to
ancient moral philosophy pulls him in another direction, one that is more congenial
to free agency. 1 will call this direction Aristotelian, because it involves a sort of
t/evelopmenral ethic favOU1'ed by Aristotle; the idea that it is possible for an agent
16 In TI MAN 6, Nietzsche fiirt yet again with determinism by declaring that the
"individual (der einzebze] is, in bis future and in bis past, a piece of rate (ein Stiidc
Fatum von vome um:l von hinten]•••"
17 Referring te bis own démarche, Nietzsche simply asserts, without expIanation,
that bis own unconscious, determinM behaviour bas been, in fact, a manifestation
• of the higbest sort of fieedom: "everything is in the bighest degree involuntary but
takes place as in a tempest ofa feeling offreedom. ofabsoluteness, of power, of
divinity••." (EH "zn 3)
94
• with i.'litially wund moral equipment (healthy instincts) to move from less adequate
to more adequate beliefs about what really matters in life. and consequently from a
less to a more virtuous life. While this ethic rejects the sort of naturalistic
àetenninism sometimes favoured by Nietzsche, it also provides Nietzsche with the
conceptual reso= to criticise as one-dimensional and superficial a particularly
contentious aceount of action and "free will" that Nietzsche associates with "slave
morality".
When in bis naturalistic humour, Nietzsche belittles and dismisses the
importance of conscious intention and deliberation. At other, more Aristotelian
moments, however, conscious deliberation is not belittled, but rather made a junior
partner to the profoundly internalised, "instinctive" type of ethical knowledge
mentioned above. Like Aristotle, he believes that we need not trace our actions
back to an identifiable process of conscious deliberation in order to deem ourselves
fully responsible moral agents. The "deliberation" that we engage in before the
performance of free actions need not be explicit; it can be deeply internalised to the
point where it can seem instinctive.18 It is from this perspective, rather than the
perspective of naturallstic determinism, that Nietzsche can reject the voluntaristic
notion of"free will", which he identifies with Christian and secular, post-ehristian
attaeks on the role ofpre-conscious bodily knowledge in practicaljudgemenL
Ardent defenders of "slave morality", claims Nietzsche, use the notion of free will
as a club with which to beat down healthy, superior men. When sueb men malte
the mistaken of acceding to this insidious notion, they come to mistrust their own
instinctive, bodily knowledge and are duped into thinking that they could have
•
Annas notes that the Aristotelian account ofmoral cboice (an account that is shared,
in my view, by Nietzsche) is nnacceptable to moral philosophers influenced by
Kant, who refuses to situate moral decision-making within any account of the
empirical, dispositional self (Ibid., 52).
95
• chosen (through the strength of their "will") another path.I 9 It is no accident.
observes NietzsChe, that "free will" has always becn associated with "sin"" ''The
concept 'sin' invented together with the instrument of torture which goes with it.
the concept of 'free will', sa as ta confuse the instincts, sa as ta make mistrust of
the instincts inta second nature!" (EH "Destiny" 8)
NietzsChe is suggesting, in other words, that those who insist that "an effects
[are] conditioned by something that causes effects, by a 'subject'" (GM 113) are
really self-interested ideologues ofa slave morality attempting ta convince the
strong that they could "freely choose" not ta manifest their strength against others.
These ardent defenders of plebeian interests "maintain no helief more ardently than
the helief that the srrong man isfree ta he weak and the bird of prey ta he a
lamb..." (Ibid.) For Nietzsche, in contradistinction, the "1" that expresses who we
are is not a disembodied, voluntaristic command center issuing orders ta a body that
is mean only ta ohey; it is rather a vehicle oheying the (intelligent) body's deepest
inclinations and proclivities.2O
His critique offree will, ta recap, need not stem from the naturalistic-
deterministic line he sometimes espouses. Indeed, 1 would suggest that the
influence of Aristotelian moral pbilosophy weighs more heavily on him becanse of
bis need for its developmental ethic, ie. the optimistic suggestion that, given the
right moral "equipment", it is poSSIble for us ta change our ways and move from
inadequate ta adequate states of moral consciousness. Nietzsche is drawn ta this
developmental ethic because of bis view - ta he discussed more closeIy in Chapters
IV through VIn - that inherently superior human heings, though initially deluded
•
19 As we shall sec in the next chapter, Nietzsche associates this path with that
moral and cultural dec1ine and decay•
20 Bernard Williams conduets a briefbut interesting discussion on Nietzsehe's
critique of"free will" in WIlliams 1994: 237-250.
96
• about their true interests. cC/uld be "nudged" toward a more accurate assessment of
their own potentialities and place in the world.
Let us now begin to exanüne this developmental ethic in sorne detail. At the
center of this ethic is a treatment of "nature" quite different from that found in the
modem tradition ofscientific naturalism. 1would argue that an understanding of
the use of nature in this sense is crucial to grasping Nietzsche's distinction between
noble and ignoble.
when Nietzsche pointedly insists that man, "the great experimenter with himself,
discontented and insatiable, wrestling with animaIs, nature, and gods for ultimate
21 The rest of this chapter appears in a slightly different form in Appel 1996
(forthcoming).
22 Nietzsche takes issue with what he sees as the levelling tendency ofDarwinism
that places the human animal on par with other species. Compared with this
denigration ofhumankind's inherent dignity, he suggests, the pre-modem vaunting
•
of man is infinitely preferable: "Alas, the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of
man, in bis irreplaceability in the great chain ofbeing, is a thing of the past - he bas
become an animal, literal1y and without reservation or qualification, he who was,
according to bis old faith, almost Gad ('child of God,' 'Gad-man)." (GM m.2S)
97
• dominion," has ... dared more, done more new things, braved more and
challenged fate more than ail the other animals put together..." In the eyes of man
the great self-experimenter, the mere ape is but "a laughing-stock or a painful
embarrassment" (Z Prologue 3)
Transcending the rest of nature means moving beyond the lowly goal of self-
preservation towards the struggle for "self-overcoming," a trait Nietzsche associates
at severa! points in Zarathustra not just with healthy, noble human beings, but with
all "ascending" life-forms. In an apparent slap against Darwinist thought,
Nietzsche denounces the idea !bat there is a "will to existence" [Willen zum Dasein]
(Z II OSO) or "will to health" (GS 120).23 "AlI creatures hitherto have created
something beyond themselves" (Z Prologue 3), Zarathustra insists, for "the living
creature values many things higher!han life itself [Vzeles ist dem Lebenden hiiher
geschiitzt. ais Leben selber]..." (Z II OSO) This is especially the case in the human
world, where higher members of the human species are said to have the potential
for "overcoming" the level ofexistence of the vast majority of men in contemporary
societies. whom Nietzsche sees as falling far short of the mark anainable by the
human species at its highest.
"Living - is !bat not pteeisely wanting to be other !han this Nature?" (BGE 9)
In creating their own meaniDg and ortler, the virtuous, as "genuine artists oflife,"
(BGE 32) inject a form of willed artifice in their lives Dot pre-given by nature. As
Nussbaum rightly points out, life, for Nietzsche,
is made worth living, made joyful and made human.
only by art - that is to say, in the largest sense, by the
human being's power to create an order in the midst
of disorder, to make up a meaning where nature
herself does not supply one. In the aeative aetivity
•
"health" that he disparates to he different in kind, Iefening specifical1y to the
tendency of the "many-too-many' to consider their own self-preservation and safety
as paramount. Nietzsehe's notion of moral-psychologiccal health will become
clearer in the Dext chapter. :
98
• (associated by Nietzsche not only with the arts
narrowly understood. but also with love. religion.
ethics. science - all being seen as fonns of creative
story-making). we fmd the source of what is in truth
wonderful andjoyful in life. (Nussbaum 1991: 99)
The highest fonn of this willed, creative artifice. the specifically human
endeavour that makes our species greal, is our evaluative, c1iscrinùnating ethical
capacity: "evaluation is creation [Sclu'itzen ist Schaffen] .•• Valuating is itselfthe
value and jewel of all valued things." (Z 1 OTG) Ethical valuation is par.icularly
noble, for Nietzsche. when it has no illusions about itself and self-eonsciously
refrains from seeking out meaning in external sources. Conducted by agents who
acknowledge its "artificiality" and who rejoice Î!l their own creation of meaning.
ethical valuation represents the highest fonn ofcreative artifice. "[I]f we cao learn
to value that activity, and find our own meaning in il, rather than looking for an
extemal meaning in god or in nature, we cao then love ourselves. and love life."
(Nussbaum op.ciL)
We should understand Nietzsehe's critique of Romanticism and Naturalism in
light of this stress on the "artificiality" of virtue. Nietzsehe's profound objection to
Romanticism, ie. to the view that one could "return to nature" (and thus to virtue)
by sloughing off the artifice ofculture and civilisation and recovering a pristine.
"natural" self, bas been well-explored. In part IV of Thus Spou Zarathustra,
Nietzsche burlesques the romantic nostalgia for the noble savage by making one of
bis foolish, so-ealled "higher men" (one of the two kings) declare:
The fact that the lowly peasant is thoroughly "natural" is no reason to show him the
• respect due to the highest orders ofhumanity. Nietzsche despises the intellectual
99
• and artislic fasbion of bis lime - associated bath with Romanlicism and nineteenth-
century "Naturalism" - that insists on the inherent worth of everything "natural". In
one's social dealings one should foUow the example of a man of taste like the poet
Emerson, who "inslinclively feeds on pure ambrosia and leaves alone the
indigestible in things." (TI EUM, 13) Emerson represents the SOIt of "barn
psychologist" Nietzsche describes in TI EUM 7, who "instinctively guards against
seeing for the sake of seeing; the same applies to the barn painter. He never works
'from nature' - he leaves it to bis instinct, bis camera obscura, to sift and strain
'nature'." Nietzsche believes that the fasbionable, Romantic idealisation of "rustic"
manners and the indiscriminate curiosity of Naturalists for everything "natural"
embody modem assaults against the true nobility and decency he sees himself as
championing: "[t]oday we consider it a matter ofdecency reine Sache der
Schicklichkeit] not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything,
or to understand and 'know' everything." (GS Pref. 4)
Nietzsche also parts company with the view of Nature (with a capital "N") as an
aIl-powerful entity with its own logos and its own good, separate from natural
things and human beings and directing them in light of its own, master plan. He
cbides Romantic poets who, canied away by tbeir own "tender emotions" [ziirtüche
Regnungen] and rural reveries, claim 10 be in tune with Nature's "voice". (Z nOS)
purpose; as "a total process" or system, Nietzsche contends, it "does not exist at
ail." (WP 711) Elsewhere Nietzsche wams us against thinking of the world as a
•
imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral
judgements apply to it... Let us beware of saying
that there are laws in nature. There are only
100
• necessities: there is nobody who commands. nobody
who obeys. nobody who trespasses. (GS 109)24
"Life." remarks Nietzsche in an oft-quoted passage. "is something essentially
amoral." (ET "Attempt" 5) We must take this critique of universal teleology into
account when assessing Nietzsche's efforts at "demoting" morality. at locating it "in
the phenomenal world ... among the 'deceptions'. as illusion. delusion. error.
interpretation. artifice. art [ais Schein, Wahn, Irrtum, Ausdeutung,
Zurechtrruzchung, Kunst]." (Ibid.) Scholars within the new orthodox consensus
routinely take passages like these as evidence for Nietzsche's supposed view of
ethical valuation as epiphenomenal and hence excluded from his account of what
makes human beings sublime. 1 would argue. however. that Nietzsche's
"demotion" of ethics is not meant as a denigration of il. His refusai to give ethical
valuation a supra-human status. i.e. his insistance that it is firmly anchored in the
human domain. is in fact his way of honouring it in the highest degree. Seeing
morality as artifice is not to belittle il; artifice. in Nietzsehe's view. is what makes
the highest sort of human being great.
Vu:tue as Natural
24 Sec also GS 301. 357 and BGE 21, 22. Granier quite rightly points out that
Nietzsche does not wish us "to fall back into metaphysical illusion by turning the
hypothesis of 'nature' into an abstraction that would surreptitiously lead back to an
in~lligiblesubstratum ofbeing in itself." (Granier 1985: 137)
25 Significantly. the new orthodoxy also assumes that Nietzsehe·s criticism of
capital "N" Nature is tantamount, in eff'ect, to a rejection of the whole legacy of
ancient moral philosophy, since it is wide1y assumed that the appeal to nature in
•
ancient moral philosophy is just of this sort; an appeal to a cosmic teleology with
the concomitant cIaim that our lives have a point only as part of a larger. ethically-
infused cosmic scheme. This all-too-eommon view of ancient moral philosophY
bas recently come under strong criticism in a number ofscholarly reassessments of
101
• plain of inaction. a darlc midnight of a world that permits no categories or action."
(1988: 141) Warren's insistence on placing the terms "nature". "natural". and
"unnatural" in inverted commas reinforce this same view that Nietzsche sees nature
as meaningless. groundless chaos. and that he could only look upon alternative
perspectives with irony (Warren 1988: 30. 32. 98. 150.265).26
A close reading of the teXts, however. reveals that Nietzsche treats the concept
of nature with the utmost serlousness. Notwithstanding bis virulent criticisms of
what he sees as the indiscriminate vulgarity of late nineteenth-century "Naturalism"
in the arts and letters. Nietzsche does not hesitate to define bis own perspective on
virtue as a form of naturalism. Nietzsche explicitly identifies bis understanding of
naturalism in ethics with "aIl healthy morality '" dominated by an instinct of life"
(11 MAN 4).27 While Nietzsche's new philosopher must criticise and denounce the
many erroneous ways in which nature bas been invoked to justify oppressive,
dogmatic moralities. religious traditions. political movements, etc.• he insists this
critique he mounted ftom the standpoint of "that eternal basic text" that is homo
natura. The new philosopher's task is
the tradition. It is aIgUed that the appeal to na!Ure in, for example, Aristotle and the
Stoics is an appeal to a normative conception ofspecifically human nature, rather
than nature in the cosmic sense. (See Nussbaum 1985: 102-3; Annas 1993: 136-
139; Irwin 1985: 416-417) Those few attempts in the ancient, pre-Christian world
to find an overa1I moral puxpose in the cosmos itself, and to propose cosmic nature
as a tirst principle for ethical conduet - for example, Plato (Phoedo 97b-98b and
1Aws 886a) and later Stoics like Marcus Aurelius and Epietetus - were heterodox
exceptions and not very influential in the ancient wodd (Annas 1993, 159-165).
We shall discuss the normative role of (anthropommphic) nature in Aristotle's
moral philosophy, and its similarity to Nietzsehe's trealmc:nt of nature, be1ow.
26 See also Nehamas (1985: 173), anè Blondel (1991: 205) for similar. dismissive
treatments of nature.
27 References to Nietzsehe's own "naturalism" are also present in the Nachlass.
In WP 283, he suggests that only unhea1thy ideologies stemming from the pleheian
slave revoIt in mora1s declare that "naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose nature."
•
In WP 462, he desaibes as one ofbis "fundamental innovations" the replacing of
"'moral values'" with "purely naturalistic values. Naturalisation of morality."
Ben:, as in many other contexts, Nietzsche associates the term "morality"
specifically with slave morality (sec the discussion in Olapter m.
102
• to translate man back into nature; to rnaster the many
vain and fanciful interpretations and secondary
meanings which have hitherto scribbled and daubed
over that etemal basic text homo natura; to confront
man henceforth with man in the way in which.
hardened by the discipline of science, man today
confronts the rest of nature, with daunting Oedipus
eyes. (BGE 230)
We have already explored one way in which Nietzsche considers his project to
be in line with "naturalism". 1am referring to his aforementioned attempt to ground
bis view of primordial human t;,l!oism in something more fundamentai than any
particuiar table of values (even bis own): the imperative of the will to power, which
purportedly gives a causal explanation of the behaviour of ail sentient beings.
There is, however. another important way in which Nietzsche treats the concept of
nature. a way that does not purport to serve as an independent validation of his
moral view. but instead emerges out ofhis moral view and remains inextricably tied
up with il. It is an understanding of human nature, as opposed to cosmic nature.
This view is aIlued to in the above excerpt from BGE 230. where the "eternal. basic
103
• upbringing. In this flfSt sense, as Williams notes. hardly anything in human beings
is "natural," including the use oflanguage (Williams 1985: 47). "Mere" nature, in
this sense. simply provides US with certain potentials and capacities; it is up to US to
develop the "natural equipment" with which we may initially have been endowed
into a fully virtuous disposition.28 In the second part of the above passage.
however. Aristotle suggests that this. first sense of nature (as "mere" nature) is ooly
ha1f the story. Nature can also be seen in another sense - as an ethical standard
(Annas 1993: 142-147). He argues that the formation ofethical dispositions is a
natural process in human beings. where "natural" now refers te the cultivation of
certain essential human atttibutes. In ber g10ss on Aristotle's famous c1aim that the
human being is a "political animal". Nussbaum fonnulates the inSight with
28 Cf. N'u:omac1reœl Ethics 1337al: "the deficiencies of nature aIe what art and
education seek to fill up." .
29 The tlbennensch.. it must be noted, is not conceived as some litcral OYeiCOming
of the human species. W8i1'eD. rightly observes that "[a]lthough Nietzsche c1aims
many times in Zorathustra that 'man is something that must be OYeiCOIDe,' he
never suggests that postmodem man - bis 0be171ll!1lSch - wouId CO<1SÏSt ofanything
that does not in sorne way exist in present man. 'only a buffoon things: <<:Man can
• also be jumped over».' [Z mONL 4]" (W8i1'eD. 1988: 160) 1 would argue that
Nietzsche porttays the tJbennnrsch as the quinessential hmnan specimen; a master-
type befitting modemity.
104
• tIüs second sense provides us with our ethical goals !hat should dictate. in tom, our
value judgements and political decisions.3O
Nietzsche does not believe !bat we cao find out what is natural in tIüs
developmental sense - and hence what our ethical goals should he - sirnply by
examining what most people do or believe. In Nietzsehean ethics, as in Aristotelian
and Stoic ethies, nature is used in a way !bat often leads the moral philosopher to
call for a radical break with conventional ways oflife and beliefs: "the natura!life is
the life we would idea1ly live, and the fact !bat we do not live !hat way merely
shows !bat we have been cormpted." (Annas 1993: 273) As we sha11 sec below
and in the n~ chapter, Nietzsche sees moral corruption as roe not just within the
majority of the population, but also - tragically - amongst those few with innateIy
noble dispositions. He treats the 1atter as an oppressed minority imbued with the
faIse consciousness of slave mora1ity. and consequently without a proper
•
modern naturaIism and ancient deve10pmental ethics. Whexeas the 1atter.
Aristotelian strain cao easily countenance the possl"bility of moral change within the
lifetime ofa superior human being - i.e. moving from a state of false consciousness
te a stance more in line with bis innare potentials - the former. natura1istic strain (as
lOS
• important part of Nietzsehean reflections throughout bis intellectua1 career.
Detwiler bas pereeptively observed this in noting that Nietzsehe develops a
conception of the natural that Ois not l'eressarily distinct from the conventional."
(Detwiler 1990: SO) As carly as "Homer's Contest," (1872) Nietzsche stakes out
the Aristotelian position whieh he never complete1y abandons:
we bave already seen) leads N"1CIZSChe ta sec moral personality as essentially statie
and pregiven.
32 Wenn man von Humanitlit redet, 50 liegt die Vorstellung zugrunde, es mi)ge
das sein, was den Menschen von der Natur abscheidet und auszeichnet. Aber eine
50lche Abscheidung gibt es in Wnk1ichkcit nïcht: die «natflrlichen»
EigeDschaftcn und die eigentlich <<rnenscblich» genannten sind ùotrennbar
verwachsen. Der Mensch in seinen hiSchsten und edelsten Krliften ist gaœ Natur
und trligt ihren unheïmIichen Doppelcharakter an sich." Kanfmann's ttansIation cao
be found in bis Portabk N"letzsehe (1982: 32). Cf. the following comment, from
the 1874 essay "Schopenhauer as Edueator": "[T]he fundamc:ntal idea of
<:Ultzw[Ku1tur], insofar as it sets for each one ofus but one task [IS] to promote the
• production ofthe philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and
thereby to woTt al the perfecting of1llJtUTe [an der Vollendung der Natur zu
arbeiten]." UM.III.S.
106
• knows how far from the feeling of letting himself go
his 'natura!' condition is... (BGE 188)33
This passage refers back to the CIÏticism he makes a few paragraphs earlier of
anarchists who presume - mistakeo1y, in his view - that genuine freedom can oo1y
be defined negatively, by the absence ofalllaw and other artificial constraint. In a
What of men and women unable to attain hnmanity's "highest and noblest
capacities"? How do those representing, in Nietzsehe's eyes, the vast majority fit
into this account of the dual character ofhuman beings? Ifbeing hnman in the
fullest sense means striving for greatness. those with neither the capacity nor the
desire for such striving "deprive existence of its great character" [dem Dasein
seinen groften Charakter nehmen) (EH "Destiny" 4), thereby distancing themselves
from human nature in its fullest flourishing. Unable and unwilling 10 strive for the
pinnacle of refined, creative artifice that is natural for the human species, Nietzsche
claims they resemble the rest of the animal wood more than his exemplars of
humanity.
In his early encounter with the crowd, before realising the futility of his
proselytising efforts among them. zarathustra asks if, rather than striving for
overcoming the human-all-too-human, they would prefer 10 "retum 10 the animaIs"
[lieber noch ZJQIl TIeTe zurückgehn) (Z Prologue 3). Later on, zarathustra
• 33 Once again, Nletzsclle resorts 10 the Ibetorical device of the inverted comma 10
distance his prefeaed trea!TTleDt of nature from that ofa despised group - in this
case,. Romantics and self-defined naturalists.
107
• interprets their longing for the "last man" as an affumative answer to bis question,
and henceforth turiIS bis back on them and redirects bis message to thase few with
cars to hear him. Henceforth the majority ofbumankind is disrnissed for its
incapacity to ttanscend the rest of nature, and is described repeatedly - and
revealingly - with animal imageIy. The many move together as a "herd", or
"swann", succumbing to the temptations of amerely (ie. not-fully-human) animal-
like existence focused on the firlfillment of immediate, basic needs. (Z Pref. 3; GS
majority, "you would devote yourselves less to the moment." (Z 1 OPD) Instead,
the people Nietzsche deems "superfluous" clamber about "like nimble apes." (Z 1
(Z 1 OPe; cf. Z Prologue 3) Tuming away !rom the noblest part ofhuman life, the
majority pursues what Nietzsche refers to as "the happiness of serfs" [Glück der
Knechte] (Z n OfF), for he believes that the herd is truly enslaved ta the base idea1s
of mere physical health and comfort. Becausc of their repudiation of all noble
aspirations oftransœndence, they become like the cows portrayed by the
ridiculous. sermonising "voluntary beggar" ofZ IV VB, who "'have devised
rnmination [das Wrederkiiuen] and lying in the sun. And they abstain !rom all
heavy thoughts that int1ate the heart [aIler schweren Gedonken, welche das BeTZ
bUihn].'"
Zarathustta contrasts Ibis U1II/QtUral happiness of serfs with the attitude of the
master-type towards life: "wc love life, not becausc wc are used ta living but
bec8usc wc are used to loving." (Z 1ORW) Oearly, mere existence and the
•
satisfaction ofbasic needs are not sufficient. In a transparent nad ta ancient Roman
aristocratie mores, Nietzsche outlines the case for choosing the time and
108
• circumstances of one's own death, arguing !bat it is more noble to take leave of
one's life when one is at the height of one's powers ("One must stop pennitting
oneself to be eaten when one tastes best") than ta cling pathetically to life. (Z 1
OVD) ln contrast to a mob [Piibel] that "wants to live gratis," thase of noble sou!
[die Art edler Seelenl - in whose company Nietzsche includes, ofcourse, himself-
Nietzsche believes !bat it is profoundly unnatural to tum one's back on the most
distinctive'and complex capacities of the human species and succumb to a life
focused entirely on self-preservation and comfon.34 Hence the unnaturalness of
slave morality, the term he invokes to describe the mode of ethicai valuation
predominant in Western civilisation since the dawn ofJudaism and the carly days of
its Christian offspring. When Nietzsche refers to bis "attentat on two millennia of
anti-nature and the violation of man" (EH "BT" 4), he is speaking of this slave or
herd morality, which, he assures US, bas been found in "virtually every morality
that bas hitherto been taught,:teverenced, and preached." (Tl MAN 4) lt is notthe
epistemic errors of slave morality that horrify and offend him, not its lack "of
discipline, of decency, ofcourage in spiritual affaiIs ..• - it is the lack of nature, it is
the uttedy ghastiy fact that Q1ltÏ-1IIJtlUe itself bas received the highest honours as
•
self-doubts and anxieties about the possibility for success ofhis enterprise. AIl
ambitious striving after virtue, the dwarf mockingly seems to say, must come
crashing down in the end. 1 will say more about Nietzsehe's CODCerI1 about the
temptations to moral back-sliding faced by natural nobles in Chapter VI.
109
• This chapter began with an exam;nation of the cognitive and moral-ethical
significaoce that Nietzsche sees in our bodily "instincts". Like Aristotle and post-
Aristotelian moral philosophctS of the Hellenistic period, Nietzsche argues that
dettrmining the quality of our passions - something that involves determining what
anraets and repels us viscerally - is key to revealing the state of our moral-spiritual
development. While he believes the affects U> be present in both those at higher and
lower states ofdevelopment, he suggests that wc cao determine the truc status of
particular individuals by assessing the quality of their instincts. To make an
accurate assessment, of course. requires possession ofIoftier, more refined
instincts; reeall our discussion in Cbapter 1 of Nietzsehe's conviction that truth itself
is accessible only to the select, superior few.
1 argued that Nietzsche's treatment of this bodily "knowledge", while clearly
indebted to Aristotelian and Hellenistic moral philosophy, is also greatly influenced
by a modem form of naturalism that leads him to sugge5t, at times, that
fundamental moral-spiritual self-ïmprovement is, at some deep level, impossJ."ble.
In Nietzsche's naturalistic moments, he argues l3ther fatalistically that aulhentic
virtue is "unconscious", that one either "bas it" or one does not. This fatl1ism
suffer from distorted and confused beliefs about themselves, and yet (neverthe1ess)
somehow ta tum themselves around (so to speak) and embrace a truer, nobler
"table ofvalues" more ret1ective of their noble sensibilities. In arder U> argue in this
manner, Nietzsche moves away from modern, scientific naturalism in arder U>
embrace the sort ofdevelopmental ethic found in Aristotle and the He11enistic moral
•
philosophers. N'1ClZSChe's complex. evocation ofa normative conception of nature,
1sugge5t, cao only he undctSU>od in the contex.t of such an ethic.
no
• Having established (at least provisionally) Nietzsche's status as a moral
philosopher. and having given an inttoductory (admittedly only formaI) account of
bis distinction between higher and lower human beings, we are now in a better
• 111
• Chapter IV; The Corroption & Rescue of the Nietzschean J\:Laster-Type
morality is distinguished from its noble rival by its essentially reactive nature (GM
ll.ll). Whereas true nobility bas always been self-regarding, taking itselfas good
and praiseworthy and (almost as an afterthought) dismissing what cannot attain its
level as bad [schlecht] and undesirable, slave morality bas been preoccupied with
the business of regarding the other from start 10 finish, forever defining itself in
reference to an a1ready-existent noble standard ofexcellence.
In bis harangue against the "despisers of the body", Zarathustra elaims to
expose the unacknowledged but passionate, SH'thing envy that characterises the
multitude and explains many of their attitudes and actions: "no longer are you able
to aeate beyond yourselvesJ And therefore you are now angry with life and with
the earth. An unconscious envy [Ein IUIgewujJter Neid] lies in the sidelong glace of
• 112
• your contempt [eurer Verachtung]." (Z 1ODB)! As Zarathustra counsels his
young disciple in Z 1OTM. "[yJou still fcel YOl1lSelf noble. and the others. too [edel
fühlen dich auch die andem noch]. who dislike you and cast evil glances at you,
still fcel you are noble. Leam that everyone finds the noble man an obstruction."
super~or men evir.ce a "silent pride" that "offends their taste." (Ibid.) The one thing
the people cannot abide, that which sets their teeth on edge. is the noble character's
calm, palite rejection of the universality of their aIleged ..virtues." As Zarathustra
noles ofhis own commerce with the plebeian element, "I go among the people and
keep my eyes open: they do not forgive me !hat 1 am not envious [neidisch] of their
virtuesJ They peck al me becanse 1 tell !hem: For sma\l people sma\l virtues are
necessary..... (ZmVMS 2)
The envy and resentment of the many are intensified by an aceurare sense of the
superior man's contempt towards them: "Even when you are gentle towards them,
they still feel you despise !hem; and they return your kindness with secret
unkindness." (lOFM) Despite bis magnanjmous show ofpalite gentleness, the
free, independent spirit's lofty reserve and dicdain are ail-tao evident - and
infuriating - to the crowd: "You approached them and yet went on past !hem: that
they will never forgive you.•. And he who flies is hated most ofaIl." (Z 1 OWC)
1 Sec also Z n OT, where Zarathustra noles the "repressed envy" [verira1tener
Neidj of the "tarantu\as." .Simi\arly, in TI MA 19 Nietzsche mentions the envious
•
nature ofthose sanctimonious individuals who (as wc saw in 0Japter II) try bard to
act the part of virtue without being al ail convincing in the eyes of those offine
character: they display "the beaving bosom, yet al the same time look with envy on
the advantages enjoyed by those who live for the day•••"
113
• In what appears to be a transparent allusion to Nietzsehe's own experience amongst
scholarly types, Zarathustra remarks that "when 1 lived among them [the scholars] 1
lived above them. They grew angry with me for thatJ They did not want to know
that someone was walking over their heads..." (Z II OS) In bis last work,
Nietzsche returns in an autobiographical cantext to the idea that the ressentiment
directed at the free spirit is fueled by the accurate popular perception of bis contempt
for the majority: "He whom 1despise divines that 1 despise him [Wen ich erachte,
der erriit, daj3 er von mir verachJet wird): through my mere existence 1enrage
everything that bas bad bloOO in its veïns..." (EH "Oever" 10)
Ressentiment quicldy leads to revenge. "Before YOD," claims Zarathustra
before one of bis youthful, noble interlocutors, "they fcel themselves small, and
their baseness [ihre Niedrigkeil] glimmer; and glows against you in hidden
vengeance [unsichJbarer Rache]." (Z 1 OFM) Bitterly resentful ofthe "advantages
enjoyed by those who live for the day" (TI MA 19), the plebeian forces, througb
the twistedly creative efforts of their priest1y leaders (sec bclow), succeed in
"mak[ing] others su1fer" (Z II OP) by reciefining, indeed demonising all that is truly
noble and healthy as "evil" [bèise], and recasting all that does not possess.inberent
nobility (ie. themselves) as "goOO" (GM L4). This program of revenge, Nietzsche
argues, cloaks itse1fin the sanetimonious language of "pn nisbment"2 and
"justice."3 "To hunt him [the free spirit] from bis biding place - the people a1ways
called that 'baving a sense of right' [<<Sinnfiir dtzs Rechte»]: tbey bave a1ways
set their sbaIpest-toothed dogs upon bim." (Z II OFP)4
2 "'pnnisbment' is what revenge calls itself: it feigns a good conscience for itse1f
with a lie [mit einem Lilgenwort heuchelt sie sich ein gutes Gewirsen]." (Z II OR)
3 Pol'traying the envious and vengeful. as "tarantulas," Zaratbustra attempts to goad
tbem into dropping the pretense ofjustice. thus revealing their vengeful motives: "I
~ pull al your web that your rage may lwe you from your cave oflies and your
revenge may bound forward from behind your word ~ustice.·" (Z II OT)
114
• In the name of "justice". for example, the thirst for revenge manifests itself in
the democratic call for equality. Nietzsche associates doctrines of equality of ail
human beings - both Judaeo-Christian and later.liberal-democratic secularised
versiotts - with (a) the ever-present, timeless plebeian frustration at the prospect of
striving for but never attaining true equality with the naturally gifted, and (b) a
similarly timeless, tyrannical desire on the part of the majority to impose sorne fonn
ofpolitically- and/or religiously- sanctioned equality nonetheless. In an invective
launched al the "preachers of equality", Zarathustra claims that "from you the
tyrant-madness ofimpotence" [der Tyrannen-Wahnsinn der Ohn.macht] cries for
'equality': thus your most secret tyrant-appetite disguises itself in words of vinue
[eure Heimlichsten Tyrannen-Gelüste vermummen sich also in Tugend-Wol1e]."
(Z II OT) The preachers ofequality practice revenge "against ail who are not as
[they] are," i.e. "against evetythiDg that has power••." (Ibid.) Nietzsehe's portrait
of the resentful majority's target becomes cleater in the following fragment:
rr:Jhe concept of the 'equal value [Gleichwerthigkeit]
of men before God' is extraordinarily harmful; one
forbade actiotts and attitudes that were in themselves
among the prerogatives of the sttongly COttstituted
[Starkgerathenen] - as if they were in themselves
unworthy of men. One erected the proteetive
the concomitant thiM for revenge are quite simply the understandable reactiotts ofa
disempowered class subject ta the stresses of socio-politica1 oppn:ssion: "for
Nietzsche resst!llliment is not a natura1 psychological attribute but a psychological
effect of the social condition ofslavery." (Wmen 1988: 66) Ressentiment is said
ta arise in reaction ta "the loss of the relatiouship betwee.n goals and aetiOtts
necess3l)' to a sense ofagency." (Ibid..27) (In Wmen's view. the same is true
about Nietzsehe's twltment of "<feQIdence": "Decadcnce dcsaibes adisorganized
capacity for agency." {Ibid.. ISO}) Given the logic ofthis account, once the plebs
are taken out of their oppressed politica1 condition and given back their "agency."
ressentiment would presumably vanish altagether. This, however. cornes nowhere
near N'lClZSChe's position. For Nietzsche. ressentiment and J:eVeDge stem not from
socio-politica1 c:iIcumstances, but rather from petty. base cbaracters who. regardless
of their place in the socio-political hierarchy and their "capacity for agency". are
bound ta deride ail that is great and noble. The strong hierarchica1 element of
Nietzsehe's position is also ignored by Connolly. who. in line with bis
115
• measures of the weakest [die Schutzmittel der
Schwachsten] (those who were weakest also when
confronting themselves) as a norm of value [Werth-
Norm]. (WP 871)
wretehed.s
N"ielZSChe traces this progressive degeneration and decadence of the majority
plebeian element back 10 the dawn of Judaeo-Cbristian monotheism, and suggests
that it bas accelerated with the advent of modem libera1-democracy. The natural,
hea1thy instinct ofdeference to one's betters, he daims, bas been graduaIly replaced
by those typical, distasteful marlcs of the modem, democratic-minded plebeian type:
"untoward intemperance", "narrow enviousness". and "a dumsy obstinate self-
assertiveness." (BGE 264) Democratie ideology bas become 50 much a part of
mainstream "common sense," suggests Zarathustta, that l~ herd's initial, implicit
knowledge of Rangordnung and its OWD, inferior place in it bas been lost "The
mob [Pobel) .•• does not know what is great or small, what is straight and honest it
is innocently crooked [unschu/dig krumm]•.•" (Z IV OHM 8)6 "[H]e who makes
5 The para1lel with Aristotle's view of the master "completing" the natura1 slave is
tmmjstak'eable. Nietzsehe's poItrait ofidea1 master-slave relations is taken up in
further detail in Chapter IX. .
6 Nietzsche sees bis own people as particularly damaged in this regard. "In the
• end the Gem1ans bave no idea whalever how common [gemein] they are; but that is
the superlative ofcommonness [der Gemeinheit] - they are not even ashamed of
being mere Germans.•." (EH "CW" 4)
116
• the lame man walk," he intones, "does him the grea1est harm: for no sooner can he
walk than bis vices [seine Laster] run away with him..." (Z n OR)?
These ill-effects of slave morality on the slave, however. pale in comparison
with what Nietzsche identifies as its catastrophic effect on those whom he identifies
as the exemplars of human greatness, the minority of free spirits.
instincts.
A sure indication mat their hearts and minds have 1>=1 captured is the
insinuation of"bad conscience" into their psyche, a state of mind associated with
the very genesis of rational self-consciousoess in the Platonic and Judaeo-Christian
moral systems: "Hitherto ail knowledge [WlSSen] bas grown up besùk the bad
conscience [bôsen Gewissen]!" (Z m Om."7; emphasis in the original)8 Rooted in
7 1 agree with Warren's claim that Nietzsche "registcrs occasional symparhy for the
working classes" (Warren 1988: 224). but would argue that bis sympathy. far from
being an expression ofsolidarity (as Warren would have it). stems from bis reading
ofbow egalitarjan ideas and political movements have perverted their original1y
docile, untroubled psyches.
8 1must disagree with Warren's assertion that Nietzsche considered bad
conscience ta he "Western man's most primaI psychology". that "bad conscience is
the psychological moment of the first society." (Warren 1988: 21-22) In
•
Nietzscbe's account, bad conscience is aIways associated with a slave morality that
eDlCIges in revoIt against a pre-existent master cilies. Far from being "most
primaI: bad conscience is seen as alater. artificial (and, in Nietzscbe's view.
unjust) imposition on an innocent, noble sensibility. This Nietzschean assumption
117
• a faIse set of beliefs that prevents a joyful and spontaneous embrace of lofty, fine
instincts, bad conscience is described a state of psychic self-torture, an inward-
tuming form ofcruel torment manifesting itselfonly after open, honest, and healthy
expressions of the body's intelligence - including, as we shal1 see later, "cruelty" -
are suppressed (e.g. GM ll.22). Bad conscience, Nietzsche argues, bas the power
determïned to resist (while unable to fully escape) this bodiIy knowledge, the noble
sufferer of plebeian faIse consciousness seeks out "new •.. subterreanean
gratifications" (GM n.l6), developing a secretive, guilt-ridden personality that
attempts 10 reconcile public adherence to servile mores with a covert enjoyment of
now shameful (albeit still pleasurable) inclinations.
Regrettably, the perverted noble character comes 10 share in the hypocrisy
Zarathustra ascribes 10 the envious and spiritually unhealthy majority: "And now
your spirit is ashamed that it must do the will ofyour entrails and follows by-ways
and lying-ways 10 avoid its own shame .. (Z n OIP) Indeed, the unfortunate noble
may even he infected with plebeian ressentiment and vengefulness. Unable 10
allow bis own instincts free Ieign, the repressed noble may resent those very few,
fortunate ones ofequally lofty potential who,like Nietzsche himself, have
somehow escaped indoctrination, and may nurse a desire 10 punish.them for having
is centnl1 10 bis mgument that bad conscience is a non~tial and thus excisable
part of the contemporaIy. noble psyche.
Ils
• stings of conscience teaeh one to sting [Gewissensbisse erziehn zum Beij3en]." (Z
HOC)
Most tragic, for Nietzsche, but also most fascinating, is the strange
phenomenon of the noble-type who undergoes a wholehearted conversion to slave
morality and becomes, because of bis natural1y forceful personality, creativity, and
innate sense of responsibility, one of its leading proponents; a "shepherd" to the
servile flock. He has lost, suggests Nietzsche, the noble, discriminating sense of
Rangordmmg that normally proteets finer sensibilities by keeping them apart from
the common orders. Seduced by doctrines of human equality, the natural noble
type comes to think the multitude worthy of bis consideration; indeed, of bis
guidance and leadership. Sadly, this superior type imitates what Nietzsche
ignoring bis inDa te , discriminating sense by refusing to disdain anyone: not even
"cold frogs and hot toads." The camel-lïke creature, argues Zarathustra, "debases
itse1f" [sich erniedrigll1l] by "making friends with the deaf", by loving "those who
despîse us", ie. those of the noble order (Ibn). Much later in this work,
Nietzsche retums again to the image of the camel, making Zarathustra bestow bis
finaljudgement on the sort ofbigher man who stoopS to lead the many:
[H]e bears too many foreign things on bis shoulders.
Like the camel, he kneels down and lets bimself be
wellladenJ Especially the strong, weight-bearing
man [der starke. tragsame Mensch] in whom dwell
respect and awe [E1uftm:ht]: he bas laden too many
foreïgn heavy woIds and values upon himself - now
life seems to bim a desert! (Z m OSG 2)
Anotberpowerful metaphoric image used to descn"be the spoliation of these
•
misguided noble characteIs is that ofparasitism. Those oflofty character who
l'SSlU"C camel-lïke leadersbip roIes in mainsIream, "herd" society have their life-
119
• energy draincd away by ..the most offensive bcast of a man 1ever found," the
parasite [Sclunarotzer] (Z ID OSG 2). Parasitical men. unable to love but wanting
to live by anothcr's love (Z ID OSG 2). unable to create but profiting from the
creations of othcrs.\O spcnd their lives "cxtraet[ing] warmth from light-givcrs" (Z il
NS). In Z IV G. one of Zarathustra's nominal (but far from authentic) "bigher
men". the "king on the right," inadvertently acknowlcdgcs the majority dcsirc to
fceci parasitica1ly off Zarathustra: "The gloomy man. too. and the ill-œnstituted
[der MifJratene]. refresh thcmsclves at your tree. 0 Zarathustra; at your glanœ evcn
the rcstless man grows secure and heals bis heart."
This shamcless exploitation of the very best is not idcntificd as a willcd
majority incIudcs most of the educated middle and upper classes as welL
Nietzsche secs the furtive rcscntment of the 1IIl\Ï0rity and their exploitation of the
very best as quite compatible, and often combined with, their often obsequious
flattery of the gifted minority. "They buzz around you even with their praise,"
• 10 Z8rathustta denounccs those who "steal for themseIvcs the works ofinvcntors
and the treasures of the wise.•• [calling] their theft culture [Bildung)..... (Z 1 ONI)
120
• IOFM) As one of bis lessons leamed among the herd. Zarathustra notes that "he
who praises appeazs to be giving back, in truth however he wants to be given
more!" (Z ID VMS 2) Nietzsche bas Zarathustra counsel bis fellow-travellers to
follow bis example and be exceedingiy cautious in the face of such flatteIy,t t and
argues repeatedly elsewhere that true honour rests not oniy in being al odds with the
majority, but in being shunned and mocked by it (e.g. Z II OFP; BGE 30, 43, 220;
AC 46).
Nietzsche, it must be noted, demonstrates a grudging respect for the twisted
form ofcreativity of these deiuded - but "ingenious" [Geistreich] (GM L7) - noble
souls. He recognises their inherent nobility, identifying bimself as their kin (e.g.
GM IL24). Moreover, he concedes that their self-lascerating, disciplined
asceticism is more admirable thad the hedonistic orientation of the vast majority,
who are drawn to lives of "pitiable comfor!." Zarathustra's respectful treatment of
the solitaIy Hermit in Z Prologue 2, whose life evinces a certain form ofdisciplined
self-overcoming, may be taken as an illustration. Moreover, in the GeneakJgy of
Morals Nietzsche cannot help but show a certain, grudging admiration for the
inventive ability of the original, ascetic priest1y caste, wbicb developed somcthing
"50 new, profound, unbeard of, enigmatic, contradietory.••" as to constitute a
"sublime" spectacle wortby of "divine spectators." (GM IL16) He insists,
however, that aithough the noble-type bas presented an "interesting" spectacle, he
nevertheless represents "the most tem"ble sickness that bas ever raged in man.••"
(GMIL22)12
Il "And sbould they even praise me: how could 1 rest on tbeir praise? Their praise
is a baIbed giIdle to me: it scratches me even wben 1 take it off." (Z ID VMS 2)
12 See also WP 228, wbere the ascetic priest is descnDed as "the best" [Hikhsten]
of an essentially sick population. Authors lilce Warren, ever-determined to present
Nietzsche as a political ptogressive in sympatby with the downtrodden, folegO the
•
ba1anced view in focusing on Nietzsebe's acknowledgemcnt of the creativity of the
slave revoit (Waœn 1988: 26-7) while ignoring bis diagnosis of this creativity as
twisted and degenerate. While Scbacht is not in the samc eategory as Warren, 1
disagIee with bis suggestion that the ascetic priest1y leader represents, for
121
• Man, Nietzsche argues, is "the sicldiest of anjmals" (AC 14) beca nse out of all
the species in the animal world, ooly ours produces individual members who can
actually tum against their healthy species drives and attempt to build lives contrary
10 UlCm. The noble type involved in misguided plebeian projects is a case in point,
228) Life is soon seen as barren by such a man, claims Nietzsche, because he is in
the grip of an unnatura1 idea "without flesh and desires" (WP 228). The noble
tumed priest, he concludes, bas succumbed to "the morbid softening and
moralization through which the anima! 'man' finally leams to he ashamed of all bis
instincts." (GM ll.7)13
In contributing 10 his own "softening," the deluded noble type services a
tendency identified by Nietzsche as the gravest attack upon the ideal of greatness in
the human species: species degeneration. "Tell me, my brothers," Nietzsche's
alter~o rbetorlcally asks bis disciples, "what do we account bad [Schlechtes] and
the worst of all [Schlechte.stes]? Ys it not degeneration [Entartung]?" (Z 1OBV 1)
The slave morality cbampioned by the ascetic priest of noble origin, argues
Nietzsche, promotes a set of moroid instincts that crowd out ~ own, natural,
hea1thy ones, and threaten 10 do the same in the human species as a whole. "[M]en
of gIeat creativity, the Iea1ly gIeat men according 10 my UDdemanding," he daims.
122
• "will be sought in vain today" becanse "nothing stands more malignantly in the way
of their rise and evolution 000 than what in Europe today is called simply 'morality'"
(WP 957)014 As Leiter bas noted, Nietzsche identifies the threat posed by slave
morality in terms of its ability to lead "potentially excellent individuals ta value what
is in fact not conducive to their flourishing and devalue what is in fact essential to
it" (Leiter 1995: 34-5)15
As we noted in Cbapters I-In, Nietzsche identifies the potentiality of the fine,
noble sort of man with the potential greatness of the human species as a wholeo
Hence bis view that the destruction of the finest sort would be tantamount to the
degradation of the species as a whole. Nietzsche fcars that such a species-wide
degeneration - "the physiological ruination of mankind" (EH "D" 2) - is spreading
like a disease throughout the body politic of modem societies, and that slave moral
values are the SOUICC of the potentially-lethal infection. Nietzsche evokes this
degeneration in terms of a downward movement ofdemocratic levelling,leading ta
a state of "no herdsman and one herd" (Z Prologue 5) where even the pervcrted
creativity of the ascetic priest would no longer be possible. At the terminus of such
a development, after the ability ta discriminate between higher and lower bas been
eradieated, all ideas and idea1s would be saupulously p1aced on an equal footingo
Men. And ifyou want ta speak there, very weil, do sol But the mob blink and
say: 'We are all equaL" 'You Higher Men' - thus the mob blink. - 'there are no
Higher Men, we are all equal, man is but man, before God - wc are all equal!'" (Z
14 Here, once again, Nietzsche uses the broad term "moralïty" ta mcan "slave
morality." Sec Cbapter II for my discnssiQll ofhis various usages of "morality."
15 The claim that s1ave morality imperi1s the cultivalion ofhuman excellence is by
• no means limited ta the Nach/ass. Sec D 163; BGE 62, 212; GM Preface 6; GM
I1L14; BT "Attempt" 6; AC 5,24. For other Nach/ass passages evincing the same
sentiment, sec WP 274, 345, 400,870,879,897.
123
• IV OHM 1)16 Pcrfect toleration of the diversity ofviews, remarks zarathustra, is a
characteristic of this scropulously democratic society: "[e]verything among them
speaks•••" (Z m HC) While everyone scrambles to he heard. however. the views
of the elevated are treated with no more respect !han thase of the lowly ("everything
is unheard"). for "no one knows any longer how to understand." (Ibid.)17 Such a
tolerant society represents a criticalloss of practical knowledge: that disceming
knowledge of tasteful judgement Nietzsche associates with the select few. 18 "All-
contentedness that knows how to taste everything: that is not the best taste!"
declares zarathustra.
1 honour the obstinate. fastidious tongues [die
widerspenstigen wahlerischen Zungen] and
stomachs that have leamed to say 'r and 'Yes' and
'No') But to chew and digest everything - that is to
have a really swinish nature reine rechte Schweine-
Art]! .•• (Z m OSG 2)
Although it might come as a SU1Prise to those accustomed to associating
Nietzsche's name with the destruction of all moral categories, Nietzsche clearly
invokes a central concept of moral and political philosophy - justice - in criticising a
society "where injustice [Ungerechtigkeit] is always at its greatest: where life bas
•
wbereas Plata speaks of the emeLgew:e ofadizzying variety ofindividuals in
democcatic society, Nietzsche fOIeCllStS ever-rising 1evels ofconformity. See, in
this context, zarathustta's portrait of the last man in 17uIs Spoke Zarat1uIstra.
Prologue. 1am indebted to discussions with Ruth Abbey on this point.
124
• developed at its smallest, narrowest, neediest, ... calling into question the higher,
greater, richer..." (HAH 1Pref. 6) Just as Aristotle argues in the Polmes m.9 that
it would be unjïlSt to treat the better sort of man like everyone else, 19 Nietzsche
insists that "what is right for one cannat by any means therefore be right for
another... The demand for one morality for ail is detrimental to precisely the higher
man." (BOE 228; cf. BOE 82) The noble soul fully in tune with his instincts, he
continues, understands that "justice itself" supports bis belief that deferential
tteatment and privilege are bis due. (BOE 265)20 "For men are not equal," intones
zarathustta, "thus speaks justice. And what 1 desire, they may not desire!" (Z n
OS) "[J)ustice speaks thus to me," he reiterates in zn OT, "'Men are not
equal·..."21 With reference to those "good" people who insist upon one law for ail,
zarathustra exclaims, "how could they be - just [gerecht] towards me!" (Z m
HC)22
19 "[I]t is thought that justice is equality; and so it is, but not for ail persans, only
for those that are equal•.• We make bad mistakes if we neglect this 'for whom'
when we are deciding what isjust." Politics,l280alO-l3
20 Leiter petceptiveiy notes that "while Nietzsche might not dispute the general
moral imperative that 'like cases should he treated alike' he clearly rejects the idea
that we are, in fact, aH like cases." (Leiter 1995: 15) Indeed, 1 shal1 argue in
Chapter VU that Nietzsche remains a firm believer in equality: aristocratic (rather
than democratic) equality.
21 "Denn so redet mir die Gerechtigkeit <<die Menschen sind Dicht gleich.»"
22 Sec WP 361, where Nietzsche speaks ofwanting not to destroy the "anemic
Christian ideal (together with what is closely related 10 it)", but rather 10 "put an end
to its tyranny.••" Slave morality in all its forms, he believes, unjustly tyrtJ1l1lises
over the 10flier minority. primarily through its stubbom insistence that it "and
nothing besicles" is "morality itse1f." (BOE 202). 1therefore disagree with
DetwileI's insistence that N"JetzSChe's defence of elitism bas nothing 10 do with
arguments for "a more equitable or more just social order_" (Detwiler 1990: 102)
1 must also voice qualified disagrec aient with Wanen's contention that "Nietzsche
did not oppose equality on principle but rather becanse he viewed its modem form
as an ideology devoid ofcontent. AlI 100 often, in Nietzsche's view. the idea1 of
equality expressed a mutual envy of, and a revenge against, individual
personalities." (Wanen 1988: 72) Wanen is right to point out Nietzsche's
insisteDce that ideologies ofequality are based in envy and lust for revenge, but he
•
is off the marlc in snggesting that Nietzsche's critique is not based "on principle"
and that he found snch ideologies "devoid ofcontent." Nietzsche believed that he
understood their content all-too well, and opposed them in principle. on the basis of
this content, which he thought contraty 10 the cultivation ofexcellence and virtue.
125
• Nietzsche thus sees an injustice ta the superior few. and hence a grave danger to
the moral and spiritual potentiality of hnmankind, in modem, mainstream society's
emphasis 011 "equal rights". "Injustice never lies in unequal rights. it lies in the
claim ta 'equaf rights..." (AC S7) It is simply not right for the naturally strong to
serve as physicians ta the weak and sicle: "the higher must not be made an
instrument [Werkzeug] of the lower; the 'pathos of distance' must to all etemity
keep scparate tasks separate." (GM m.14)23 Modern social:md political
A Modem Nobillty?
From the perspective of the new orthodoxy, the idea that the author of Beyond
Goodand Evil countenances the possibility ofam:onstituted mastercaste in the
modem era must seem preposterous. The new orthodoxy converges around the
126
• Nietzsche's long-vanished "blond beast" cannot possibly serve as a model for any
new, modem ideal ofhuman flourishing.
The tone was set by Kaufmann in bis influential, post-war tome that
rehabilitated Nietzsche in the Anglo-Saxon academic community. "In spite of the
polemical tone" of Nietzsche's writings, insists Kaufmann,
it does not follow from Nierzsche's 'vivisection' of
slave-moraIity that he identifies his own position with
that ofthe masters. Nietzsche's own ethic is beyond
bath master and slave morality. He would like us to
confonn to neither and become autonomous.
(Kaufmann 1974: 297, emphasis in original; cf. 302)
Martha Nussbaum, in a recent essay, echoes this very position, remarking rather
complacently that ..this is something Kaufmann's book should have laid to rest once
and for all..... (Nussbaum 1994: 166). Nussbaum suggests that the masters evoked
by Nietzsche - especially in GM 1.11 - "lack not only the discipline that is a
necessary prerequisite of Nietzsehean virtue, but also the inner se1f-awareness and
se1f-critical reflectiveness that is a central mark of the virtuous. and even of the
'interesting·... (Ibid.) Similarly, Schacht believes that although Nietzsche may have
felt"a certain admiration" for and stood "somewhat in awe" of the pre-modem
"barbarian", he adV0cate5 the supercesslon of bath the blond beast and the
mediocxe. insipid man of modemity (Schacht 1983: 412) "Nietzsche," Schacht
insists. "looks ta a different [configuration ofdispositions and circnmstances], and
to the emergence ofhuman beings in whom bath 'herd animal' and 'beast of prey'
have been overcome." (Ibid., 413; cf. 279)
Notwithstanding their conspicuous break with Kanfma nn over the question of
Nietzsehe's originality, proponents of the new orthodoxy in Nietzsche studies have
enthusiastically taken up Kanfmann's position on this matter, with only minor
variations. In Strong's influential account, for example, Nietzsehe's discussion of
• master morality mnains bound up with bis treatment of the pre-rationaI. heroic
127
• culture of Homeric Greece. (Strong 1988: 148; 237) Noting that Nietzsche
identifies the development of "intelliger.::e and calculation" with the rise and
eventtlal triumph of slave morality, Strong argues that a retum to master morality,
for Nietzsche, would entai! a Dow-impossible reversion to a pre-rational state; hence
"the triumph ofslave morality bas become well-nigh total." (Ibid., 275; cf. 39; 238;
244-5; 258; 271) In assimilating Nietzsche's discussions of instinct with the men
of this by-gone cm, Strong presumes that Nietzsche effects a complete separation of
rationality and instinct. Thus Nietzsche is said ta believe that "men do not have
'instincts' to live by any more." (Ibid., 258; empbasis in original) In a slight
variation on the Kanfrnann reading, Strong claims that instead ofstaking out a
position beyond both master and slave morality, Nietzsche identifies himself whole-
heartedly with the latter: Nietzsche"does not take himselfseriously: as the product
ofover (WO thousand years of western culture. he still cao accept that he and aIl he
bas represented is coming to an end." (Ibid., 65)
Nc:bamas, ta bis credit, acknowledges the possibility ofan alternati",e reading of
Nietzsehe's treatment of masters and slaves. even if, in the end, he aligns himself
with the convcotional view. He perceptively notes that one ofNietzsche's central
concems is ta outline an idea1 character type, "a struetuIe that cao be embodied in a
large number of particular characters."25 (Nc:bamas 1985: 38) 'Ibis undetstanding,
at the very least, leaves open the possibility ofboth pre-modern and modem
manifestations of the same, broadly-dcfined idea1 type. Indeed, Nc:bamas ponders
whether the ancient and mediaeval baIbarlan nobles described in On the GeneoJogy
ofMorals are not "one manifestation, under specifie bistorical cÏIcnmstmecs, ofa
general personality type which Nietzsche outlines and ofwhich they are an
2S In BOE 260, for example, Nietzsche talks of certain traits regularly =rring
•
together and bound up with one another". and in GM Lll, in an importallt
discussion of the noble-type, notes that !lis portrait "._goes as weil for the Roman,
Arabian, Gennan, Japanese nobility as for the Homeric heroes and the
Scandinavian vikings", i.e. a plurality of different noble-typeS ofvmying cras.
128
• example." (Ibid., 206) Moreover, al variance with the common view, Nehamas
concedes that Nietzsche beIieves "the attitudes associated with the noble mode of
valuation [to be] still present within our c=t schemes of thought and action"
(Ibid., Ill; empbasis added). Although Nietzsche, as Nehatnas points out, may
assumes that Niettsebe finds slave morality ta be the only ethical orientation
possible in modemity. In light of Nietzsche's unmistakable critique ofslave
modity. concludes Nebamas, Nietzsche's discourse is beyond notjust "good and
evil". but beyond all ethies.27
We need not follow Nehamas along this path. 'The alternative route he
perceptively but all-too-briefly sketches. however. wammts further exploration.
26 "To he beyond good and evil is not simply ta discaId these temIS of valuation
and the system ta which they be1ong._ It is not even necessa'Y ta abandon all the
QUalities that this system commends." (N'ehamas 1985: 206)
129
• By my lights, this promising route sees Nietzsche evoking the possibility of "a new
nobility" [neuen Adels] (Z m ONL 11),28 a small collection ofself-conscious,
modem individuals of refined sensibility who trace their genealogy (in a non-literaI
sense) baclc ta ancient limes and yet who ünprove upon the pre-reflective master
ethos of their "forebears" through a heightened sense of self-awareness and.a
robust, critical intellect in harmony with their unerring, lofty instincts. This
reconfigured master ethas, hopes Nietzsche, will provide them with the conceptual
and moral resources for escaping the false COnscioUSDess of ascetie, plebeian
worldviews. Nietzsche. 1argue, does not conceive of this transfiguration in terms
ofan absolute break with all past traditions of moral and political thought and
practice. He is convinced that it is possible ta look ta the past for inspiration
without attempting ta mimic it in a servile manner by engaging in a reasoned,
selective appropriation ofan older sensibility through its adaptation ta contemporary
circumstances. He bas embarked, in other words, upon a Renaissance-Iike project
of imitatio of a virtue first artÎcn1atffl in ancient times.29
towards mediocrity, and in describing bis position as "a critique of modemity' (EH
130
• "BGE" 2).30 Nietzsche seems at fust glance to favour the emergence of a
"postmodem" noble sensibility whieh. to many. suggests a wholly unprecedented
state of affairs, owing nothing to past (modem or pre-modem) intellectual and
news of the 'Empile' ••.• their market business of'today' •••" (GM m.S) As
Z8rathustra suggests, there is much wisdom to be mined among the ancients which
is far from incompatible with the innovative formulntions ofa contemporary.
revitalised nobility: "0 my sou!. 1 have your soil ail wisdom to drink. ail new
wines and also ail immemorially ancient sttong wines ofwisdom [unvonlenklich
a1ten starken Weïne der Weisheit]." (Z m OGL) As carly as bis Untimely
• 30 In this same passage (EH "BGE" 2) Nietzsche also desaibes bis preferred
"noble [vomehmen]. _. affirmative Uasagenden] type" ofman assomeone who is
"as little modem as possible."
131
• Medirarions, Nietzsche urges those like him to take the exarnjnation of ancient
societies ("classical studies") seriously, "for the benefit of a rime to come," as part
of a broader stnlggle against the dominant, servile ethes of the modem age.31 (UM
2, Foreward)
•
which he (leemed 10 be a precoodition for, but DO gwuantee of, complete virtue:
"(E]ach. ofus seems 10 possess bis type of characterto some extent by natuIe, since
we are just, brave, prone to tc,,\"'ZlIIlCC, or have anotber featw:e, immediately from
birtb. However, we still searcJi for some other condition as full goodness.••
132
• ancient noble warrior caste - Nietzsehe's infamous "blond beasts" - as an example,
he atttibutes their eventual prostration before a rising plebeian sensibility to its
wealcncss in this area.
The fatal flaw of ancient, primaI nobles, where they were st their "weakest and
most fallible" (GM n.16), was their lack of rational se1f-consciousncss and critical
thinking skills.34 Possessing no cognitive resources other than those provided by
their admirable "unconscious drives," primaI nobles proved unable to withstand the
challenge posed by the completely unprecedented development outlined above: the
emergence ofa plebeian intellectu al , spiritual, and normative movement. Upon
their initial encounter with this movement, ill-equipped nobles with "small intellects
and spacious sauls" [Kleine Geister und umflinglidle Seelen] (Z II OP) suddenly
felt obliged to play, awkwardly, by its new, unfamiliar rules of reasoned
articulation and conceptualisation: they were fon:ed to exercise the weakest part of
themselves, "reducing" themselves "to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-onlinating
cause and effect.••" (GM n.16) Moreover, in doing 50 they were obliged to buy
into the distorted conceptual and moral package ofplebeian metaphysics, complete
with its earth- and body-calnmniatÏQn and attendant "bad conscience", since slave
morality, in Nietzsehe's view, was for the longest time the only vehicle for critical
se1f-consciousness. "Hitherto," explains Zarathustra, "all knowledge [WlSSen] bas
grown up beside the bad conscience [bOsen Gewissen]!" (Z mONL 7)
[T]b.ese natural states belong to childIen and to beasts as well [as to adults], but
without undelstanding they are evidently harmfuL. [l]f somcone acquires
undelstanding, he improves in bis actions; and the state he DOW bas, though still
similar [to the natural one], will he virtue to the full exteDt." (lVlCOInlJC1Ieon Ethù:s,
1144bS-14) Sec also 1337al: "the deticiences of lIlItUle are what art and edneation
seek to fill up." At 1178a17-20, Atistotle explains that in the fully viItuous man
what lie calls the "viItue ofcharacter", or natural viItue, and "intelligence"
CP/rrone$is) are "yoked together". Sec the discussion in AImas 1993: 74.
• 34 In GM L6, Nietzselle suggests that "all the concepts of ancient man were Iatber
at first inCredibly uncouth, coarse, extemaI. DlI11'OW, straigbtforward. and altogether
IDISY"Ù'OlictJl in meaning to a degree that wc can scarcely conceive."
133
• Nietzsche is quite clear that the origina1, pre-reflective version of nobility is no
longer an option for us. At one point Nietzsche suggests that we ought to he
grateful for the introduction ofcritica1 consciousness into Westem society, even if a
despised table of values was responsible for its introduction: "[h]uman bistory," he
concedes, "would he altogether tao stupid a thing without the spirit that the
impotent have introduced into iL.." (GM 17) Once introduced, se1f-consciousness
and the practicc of philosophy changed the complexion ofhuman society and the
human personality completely, to the point where modernity is inconceivable
of antiquity, for the efforts of "priests and moralists ... ta take mankind back,force
it back, to an earlier stal'.daId ofvirtue" (Tl EUM 43), bas been will explored in the
secondary literature.37 "A reversion, a turning back. in any sense and ta any
134
• degree," as Nietzsche insists, "is quite impossible. "(Ibid.) "[W)e do not permit
ourselves," he declares, "any bridge-of-lies to ancient ideals" (D Pref. 4), any futile
anempt to recreate a pristine, ancient aristocratie society and the "blond beast" who
inhabited il. Nietzsche does not permit himself this soIt of nostalgia not merely
becallse ofits futility, but also (and perhaps more importantly) because of its
ignominy: to pine for a long-lost antiquity and to attempt its reconstitution, in bis
view, would entail a fortn of servile obedience to and confortnity with received
tradition that would he antithetical to a truly noble morality. Servile obedience is
not part of Nietzsehe's idea ofnobility, which bas much more ta do with bold,
creative change in the light ofchanging circumstanccs.38 This is why, as he so
famously proclaims, "[w]e must overcome [überwinden] even the Greeks." (GS
340)
perpetual struggle between slave and master moralities. For Nietzsche, the context
of this struggle bas altered considetably; the pre-modem set ofoptions - priestly,
self-conscious "craftiness" on the one hand and unref1ective, noble naïveté on the
other - no longer hold a monopoly over us. Since we modems as a whole cannot
escape rationality. the important question, for Nietzsche, becomes: what soIt of
rationality does the superior. noble sensibility choose ta embody? Will bis modem
rational, self-consciousness aim al serving life, or al denigrating it? Will he, in
other words, IeIIIlÙIl trapped in the clever web of false theories and beliefs
inaugurated by servile priestly sects two mjJJenia ago. or will he forge a newform
ofTationality more in lœeping with bis noble SCDSl'bilities? Nietzsche would have
approved of the title, although not the content, ofone ofA1asdair Maclntyre's
135
• Nietzsche concedes that the very origins and development of rational self-
awarencss were the ploperty of the priest and bis ascctic ideal, and that up until bis
time, rationality bas always been in the service ofpriest1y, ascctic deca d ence.39
Whence the attraction and great power ofslave morality: "faute de mieux - becanse
hitherto it bas been the ooly ideal, becanse it had no competitors... What was
lacking above aIl was a counJer-ïdeal - untiI the adveru ofZarathustra."4O ~,
"GM"; emphasis in original) Nietzsche insists, however, that although rationality
bas long served as a life-denying force, it need DOt forever serve in this manner,
and may indeed he enlistcxi ta combat that force in the name ofa life-affirming,
reconstituted noble stance.41 Indeed, he identifies himself as the originator ofa
"counter-ideal," an unprecedented mixture of noble sensibility and critical self-
consciousncss.
Whereas the original rationality of the ascctic priest served the interests of sJave
•
people on whom pbilosophy bas deeply leftits mark." (1986: 393) Just as Aristot1e
needed ta use philosopby ta combat what Ile saw as the distortions ofPlatonie
pbilosophy, sc must Nietzsche's aristocratie sensibility look ta rationality ta combat
a rationality in the service ofignominy.
136
• aIl unnaturaI inclinations (U1I1UZtürlichen Hange) with bad conscience.42 (GM
ll.24) Nietzsche imagines that in the modem, self-aware noble type, the intellect or
spirit [Geist) is bis body's "hera\d, companion, and echo of its battles and
vietories." (Z 1 OBV 1) In Nietzsche's conception ofa worldly rationality in the
service of life (ie. at the disposai of a reconstituted nobility), spirit and body are
one: the spirit "elevates and rises up" the body, wbich in tum "enrapmres the spirit
with its joy [mit seiner WOIl7le entzückt er den Geist), that it may become creator
and evaluator..." (Ibid.) An individual having the good fortune to possess bath a
fine sensibility and this woridly rationality would possess, unlike bis pre-modem,
pre-rational counterpaIt, the "maximum of the art and power of adaptation" needed
to counler (what Nietzsche sees as) the clevemess and trickery ofPlatonic-Christian
aqrument.
This, 1 would argue, is where Nietzsche sees bis originality. He is not tuming
bis back entirely on the master mora\ity fust found in antiquity: "1 tao speak of a
'Ietum ta natuIe'. although it is not rea\ly a going-back but a going-up [nicht ein
nature and naturalness..." (TI EUM 48) He is not, that is to say. giving up on the
idea1 ofa mora\ity that is "nalUrai" in the developmentai, Aristotelian sense
discussed earlier. that serves the (hea1thy) body and its instincts and aIlows the
individuai to strive for the greatness that is the ptoperty of the human species at its
most sublime. On the contraty. he is convinced, that retuming ta a more nalUrai
table of values in this sense involves not tuming one's back on Ie8SOn, but
developing a worldly rationality capable ofservicing a newer. stronger. master
~ty.
137
• Nietzsche refcrs to bis conceptual innovation, a synthesis of heightened self-
consciousness and healthy, pre-rational instincts, as a "transposition of the
dionysian inta a philosophical pathos" (EH "BT" 3). "Before me," he insists, othis
transposition..• did not exist tragic wisdom was lacking - 1have sought in vain for
signs of it even among the great Greeks of philosophy, those of the twO centuries
before Socrates..." (Ibid. Empbasis in original) Tragic wisdom involves
attaining, through genealogical analyses. the sort of rational "objectivity" discussed
in Cbapter I, a view characterised bath by healthy, embodied instinct ("natura1
virtue" in Aristotle's sense43) and a rational, historically-sensitive undcrstanding of
the origins, development, and true value of respective, competing tables of values.
Nietzsche predicts the future appearance in Europe ofa type of man embodying this
unprecedented tragic wisdom. a man "~ôIOnger and richer than bas perlJaps ever
happened before ••• thanks to the treme...<tdous multiplicity of practice, art and
mask." (BGE 242)
cowardice of the inferior, servile type of human being, this chapter highlighted bis
assessment ofwhat he sees as the other, complimentary motivating drive behind
slave morality: the majority's gmdging acknowledgement ofthe inherent
superiority of the minority ofsuperior human beings, an acknowlecigement which,
in bis view, is always accompanied by jealousy, bitter resentment, and the thirst for
revenge.
•
revoIt in morals", which Nietzsche as.cociates (at times) with the vietory of Socratic
138
• dialectic in Athens, but more often with Christianity's attainment of cultural
hegemony in Europe during the latc Roman Empire. The new moral climate
engendered by this successfu1 revoIt, to the extent that it is embraced by the finest
as weIl as the lowest, plebeian clement, places the former in the torturous position
of feeling compelled to fcel badly about their own, innate dispositions. Those of
noble, refined sensibility, becanse they have intellectually assented to a set of
valuations al variance with their deepe:st selves, come to fcel guilty about their own,
essentially healthy inclinations and desires, and adopt the unhealthy, secretive habit
of hiding them or indulging in !hem on the sly. The false consciousness of this
tortured noble type reaches, in Nietzsehe's eyes, an almost staggering level in the
character type of the ascetic priest, that originator and guardian of slave morality
who places bis creative talents al the service of a moral project that aims, ultimately,
al the nullification of all futuIe manifestations ofindividuality and creativity.
Outraged by what he sees as the injustice petpetrated by the many on the few,
by the tyrannical overtbrow of the naturaI Rongordrumg, Nietzsche sets himself the
task ofwinning hack the hearts and minds ofthose of noble sensibility. As 1
argued above, however, he advocates not for a retum ta the original "blond beast"
ofpre-Christian antiquity, but rather for the embrace ofa wholly modern, critical
master morality that he sees himself as bringing inta being. 'Ibrough bis criticaJ..
genealogical studies, Nietzsche be1ieves that he is the fiIst ta practice a very modem
fonn of rationality in the service of (rather!han subversive of) an admiIably noble
sensibility. As we shall sec in the next chapter, this project is direeted al a highly
selective audience, a sma1l, disparate collection of"kindred spirits" who are going
through the same psychological turmoil, suffering, and metamorphoses as himself.
This reading may seem deeply problematic in light of Nietzsehe's view of the
• possibly sec a moral-pedagogical intent in bis writings, given bis view that the
139
• highest type of human being should never "follow" anyone eIse? Chapter V will
wrestle with this issue. in the course of an investigation of Nietzsehe's view of the
and creativity.
• 140
• Chanter V; Reconstituting the Master (1); Self-Discovery and SeJf-Mastery
moral thought and practice in its pemicious attempt to universalise its own moral
categories. thereby rendering superior sorts of human beings Iiahle to judgement
and condemnation under its own (limited, plebeian) standards. The noble sort of
human being caII. combat this oppressive, leveI!ing effort only by "discover[ing]
himself' and declaring. Iike zarathustra, "'[t]bis is my good and evil·..." Only thus
cao he "silence thereby the mole and dwarf who says: 'Good for an. evil for aIl:"
(Z m OSG 2) Far from constituting a repudiation of moral language altogether.
moral philosophies that are quick to equate the mediocre with the "UniversaI".
Nietzsche believes that moral philosophies in the service of slave moraIity. i.e. most
moral philosophies heretofore, have always discounted the great importance of the
personal. 1
Thar Nietzsche places great stress on the personal in bis writings is
• 1 He bas these philosophies in mind, 1be!ieve, when he notes in the Nachloss that
"words dilute and brutalize; words depersona\ize; words make the uncommon
common." (WP 810)
141
• your own virtue," insislS Zarathustra, "you have it in common with no one." (Z 1
OJP) The stress on finding a unique. singularly persona! path to nobility leads to a
seeming rejection of al1 impersona! qualifietS: "not good taste, not bad taste. but rrry
taste," declares Zarathustra in an attaek on the aforementioned universalising and
ofhea1th and hidden islands oflife" that are "still unexhausted and undiscovered"
(Z 1OBV 2), and in response to those who ask him for "the way" to spiritual
growth, he replies, "'[t]bis - is now my way: where is yours?' ••• For the way -
does not exist!" (Z m OSG 2) "If you want to rise high," Zarathu5tra proposes to
those with noble pretensiODS, "use your own legs! Do not let yourselves be carried
up, do not sit on the backs and heads ofstrangel's!" (Z IV OHM 10) The insistence
on the solitaly nature of persona! development is further empbasi sed in Nietzsehe's
1886 Preface to Daybreak. in which he wams bis readership,
142
• the same solitude! For he who proceeds on bis own
path in this fashion encounters no one: that is
inherent in 'proceeding on one's own path·... (0
Pref.2)
Nietzsche':, emphasis on singularity in self-development is further reinforced by
a crucial characteristic of the Nietzsehean noble spirit noted in the previous chapter:
the highest sort of man in touch with bis truest instincts is said to abhor the idea of
servile obedience. In a manner reminiscent of Aristotie's megaJopsuchos,
Nietzsehe's great man, who truly loves himself and bis virtue, feels compelled to
rebel viscerally against moral systems that equate moral action with obedience to
sometbing outside of the self. zaratbustta declares that ooly those who have
removed themselves from "aIl obeying, knee-bending, and obsequiousness [alles
Gehorchen, Kniebeugen und Herr-Sagen]..... (Z m OGL), who ·renounce aIl
submission," [alle Ergebung von sich abtun] are bis equals (Z m VMS 3). This
sort of "glorious selfisbness" derides servile behaviour of ail kinds, whether it be
servility ·before gods and divine kicks, or before ... the silly opinions of men.....
(Z m TEl' 2) Hence the necessity of an idiosyncratic démtuche in the
mOi'a1lspiritual sphere.
Given this stress on the persona!, it would seem to follow that Nietzsche rejects
out of band the idea that bis work could serve as an example (moral or otberwise)
for others. However, a close reading ofNietzsche's OWD comments about bis
work reveals that for the author of Thus Spoke Zaralhustra, a focus on persona!
experience and a lively interest in the sort ofothers are not oecessarily mutually
exclusive. Wben zaratbustta observes that ·he who is of my sort will also
encounter experïeDces of my sort.•.• 2 (Z m OA 1), he appears 10 be speaking not
just ofhimse1f, but ofa broadly-defined cbaracter type [meiner Art] ofwhich he is
but an exemplar. As sucb, bis démarche and experiences may be ofsorne use to
• 2 "Wer meiner Art ist, dem werden auch die Erlebnisse meiner Art über den Weg
laufen..••
143
• other representatives of t1ùs same type. Farther a!ong in his odyssey, zarathustra
c1early and deliberately represents himseIf and bis own experience as a beacon for
"shipwrecked" others, i.e. for those presently in grave difficulty:
With rope-ladders 1 learned to climb ... up high
masts: to sit upon high masts of knowledge seemed
to me no small happiness - 1 to flicker like Iittle
flames upon high masts: a Iittle light, to be sure, but
yet a great comfort to castaway sailors and the
shipwrecked! (Z m OSG 2)
Nietzsche does appear, therefore, ta be interested in setting an example, in
"show[ing) them the rainbow and the stairway to the Supennan..... (Z Prologue 9)3
and sees no contradiction between writing in an intensely persona! manner and
expressing a keen interest in the motal-spirit:1al development ofothers. Following
Montaigne, he believes that exacting seIf-examination and introspection leads the
most perspicacious ofsouls to a greater understanding of the human condition, and
mus to a form of knowledge that may be transmitted ta like-minded others.4 "ShalI
my experience .,. have been my persona! experience a!one?" asks Nietzsche
riletorically in an 1886 preface ta an early work. (HAH fi Pref. 6) The negative
answer!hat he immediately gives ta bis own question is reveIatol)': "Today 1
would like to believe the reverse; again and again 1feeI sure !hat my trave! books
were not written soleIy for myseIf, as sometimes seems to be the case..." (Ibid.)
Nietzsche goes on to "commend" bis books "ta the hearts and ears" ofthose simiIar
to himseIf, ie. those still struggling with and suffering from the "burden" oftheir
pas!, the "most imperiIed, most spiritual, most courageous men who have to be the
;1 As we shalI discuss in further detail beIow, the Zarathustra ofBooks fi-IV bas
definitive!y rejected bis earlier efforts - most c1early found in the Prologue - at
talking sense to the "herd" in the marketp1ace. Zarathustra's preferrcd audience
then sbifts, from the many to the very few. His pedagogical intent, however,
remains constant. He still wishes ta show the way to the 0be171U!TlSch, but only to
a select, high-minded minority.
4 The celebrated author of 7he Essays wrote that "[e]very man bears the whole
•
Form ofthe human condition" [l'humaine condition] (1993: Ill.2, 908) and
observed that bis long study of himseIfserved to train him "to judge passably weIl
of others..." (Ibid., m.13, 1221)
144
• conscience of the modem soul and as sucb have to possess its knowledge '" whose
comfort it is to know the way to a new health... a health of tomorrow and the day
after..." (Ibid.) In sharing bis account of bis own trials and tribulations. Nietzsche
hopes to give aid and comfort to those ofsimilar make-up going through similar
upheavals, who are now passing through a difficult periodS but who may gain
solace in the knowledge of a future "redemption". Perhaps, muses Nietzsche in
another section of this 1886 preface, "1 sha1l do something to speed [the] coming"
of worthy. noble friends and companions "if 1descn1le in advance under what
vicissitudes. upon what paths. 1see them coming?-" (HAH 1 Pref. 2) In il late
work, Nietzsche once again stresses the pedagogical value - indeed healing powers
- of bis own experiences: "he who is related to me through loftiness of will [Hohe
des Wollens] experiences when he reads me real extasies ofleaming.... (EH
"Books" 3).6
The pedagogical relationship wbicb he describes and seeks to foster. far from
encouraging domination and submission, is of a type that respects the independent
spirit of the pupil conceived ofas an equai or near-equai: a master-in-training, as it
were. As noted in the previous chapter, the sort of lmitatio to wbicb NIetzsche
points involves active, creative appropriation rather than servile mimiay.
Paradoxically, Nietzsche urges bis select audience to follow bis example by not
5 As, according to Nietzsche, they must. We shall explore Nietzsche's view of the
neeessity of suffering in the next chapter.
6 Thal NIetzsche cleady bas a specifie audience in mind and is interested in
illiciting a specifie responsc is illustrated in bis IepClIted admonishments to bis
readership to "get it nght"; "My friends," pleads Zarathustra, "1 do not want to be
confused with others or taken for what 1am not [ich wiU nicht vemiischt llIId
verwechselt wenlen]." (Z II O'I) In bis last wœk, Nietzsche n:m arks that thougq
bis "habit, even more the prlde of [bis] instincts IeVOlts" against the idea of
exp1aining bimself, he feels he bas a duty to do so, in order to "prevent people from
making miscbiefwitb me.... [es soUe verlzilten, tkJjJ man UnJug mit mir treibt] (EH
Forward 1, "Dcstiny" 1) "Do not, above aIl," he insists, "confolllld me with w1uJt 1
145
• following anyone or anything but their own inc1inations and instincts: "1 need
living companions who follow me bxanse !bey want to follow themselves..... (Z
Prologue 9) This paradox of "follow me, command!" is succinctly encapsulated in
the following injunction: "Lead, as 1 do [gleich mir]. the flown-away virtue back ta
earth..." (Z 1 OBV 2)7
Despite zarathustra's warm recollection of bis first disciples as "a lively flock
rein lebendiger Schwann]. full oflove, full offolly. full of adolescent adoration
[unblirtige Verehrung]" (Z m OA Il). he stemly wams those who are of "[bis]
sort" not to "grapple [their] heart" ta uncritical, hero-worshipping "believers": "he
who knows fickle-cowardly human natul'e [wer diefliidrlig1eige Menschenart
kennt] should not believe in these springs and many-coloured meadows!" (Z m OA
1)8 If. as Nietzsche imagines. the tIUe destiny of the natuta1 noble invo1ves
commanding. rather than obsequious obeying, leaming how ta command [befeiùen]
must require "unleam[ing] how ta obey [das GeJwrche verlemen]." (Z n SH)9 Let
the patient's "best healing-aid he to sec with bis own eyes" (Z 1 OBV 2). and let
himlook ta bis teaeher as an inspiration, ratherthan aauteh.10 Formedy.
7 Cf. GS 2SS: "I do Dot want ta have people imitate my exarnp\e; 1 wish that
everybody would fashiOD bis OWD exarnple, as 1 do."
8 The "king OD the nght" in Z IV G porttays the sort ofhero-worshiPPing disciple
Zaralhustra re1ùses ta Ile saddled witb. This servile. dependent character type is
made al one point to lament ~fbctically: '"Does Z8I:athustIa SIill.live? There is DO
longer any point in living. it 15 an one, cverything is in vain: except wc live with
Zarathustra!'"
9 Note, however. Zaralhustra's injunction al Z n 050 that the highest man ought
ta practice obedience "even in commanding." [es gehorcht lIIId befiehlt und
befehknd noch GeJwrsam ilbt] Have wc cangllt Nietzsche (or. al lcast,
Z81:athustIa) in a contradiction? 1 think DOt. The <>bedience ~ in this
passage refers ta the tightly disciplined sense of deœnan of the man ofvirtue that,
as wc shall sec beJowe, is self-imposed and self-policed. N'1CtZSChe's man of virtue
oheys bis OWD dietates which, although generated tbrough aets ofwill, are Dot seen
as c:aprlcious, becanse they are said 10 retlect an inner core of solid, unwaverïng.
and noble instincts and sensibilities. By contrast, the sort ofobedience criticised in
zn SB and elsewhere refers ta the cIefeIence towan1s an outside somœ (Gad,
• Nature, public opinion, ete.) for which Nietzsche bas only conternpt.
10 "1 am a tailing besidc the stream: he who cao grasp me, let him grasp me! 1am
DOt, however. your cruteh." (Z 1 OPe)
146
• Nietzsche explains, master-typeS in the grip ofa self-abnegating false
consciousness saw virtue as an extemal. superior slave-driver. crying plaintively,
"'What 1 am not. that, that to me is Gad and virtuel'" (Z TI OV) Under bis
influence, he hopes they will come ta recognise a profound uuth that emerges from
"the bottom of [their] souls". vil.• that "your virtue is your Self and not something
allen. a skin. a covering..." (Ibid.)
The allusion in the above passage to a uuth already present in the sou! suggests
another reason why Nietzsehe's imagined master-in-training cannat he a passive,
obedient receptaele for the moral insight ofan inherently superior teaeher. In
describing bis pedagogical role, zarathustra xefers to himself as a "drawer. trainer.
and taskmast.er"11 rein Zieher. Züchter lI1Il1 Zuchtmeister] who cao ooly demand of
bis charges: "become what you are." [Wenie, der du bist] (Z IV HO)12 This
invocation, IeÏterated in the famous subtitle ofEH ("How one becomes what one
isi. suggest8 that the most important task is accomplished by the "pupil" himself.
"mtimately." Nietzsche elaboratcs further on in EH, "no one cao exttact from
things. books inclutled, more than he already knows. What one bas no access ta
through experience one bas no ear for._" (EH "Books" 1) MoralIspiritllll1
development, then, is a highly personaljoumey allowing one ta experience
(ped1aps for the fust lime) the jnnate, instinctive knowledge that defines who or
what one ttuly is. It is also a joumey of h"beration, for in tbis pocess of
(re)discoveIy one Ieams ta free onese1f from all manuer of "foœign~ lICCOllterIDent
collected through early. misguided, and noxious indOClrination. The"free spirit"
147
• ffreier Geist] is one who bas cast off that which is nonessential, thus "seiz[ing]
possession of itself [von sich selber wieder Besitz ergriffen hal]." (EH "HAB" 1)
The repossession of the selfinvolves a recovery of contact with the COIpOre&
knowledge of instinct and drive that, as we have seen, Nietzsche deems so crucial.
Zarathustra expends much effort berating bis intcrlocutors for heing out of touch
with this knowledge, urging them ta think more deeply about their troe selves and
ta embrace more authentic positions in line with their profoundest inclinations. Let
us briefly examine bis response ta the portentaUS, self-important sermonising of the
"volunwy beggar" of Part IV:
'You do violence to yourself, mountain sermonizer,
when you use such stern words. Neither your
mouth nor your eyes were made for such sternness
[HaTte]J 'Nor your stomach cither, as 1 think: that
opposes ail such raging and hating and over-frothing
[Oberschaumen]. Your stomach wants gentler
things: you are no butcherJ 'On the contrary, you
seem to me a man of plants and roots. Perl1aps you
grind com. But you are certainly disinclined to
flesby pleasures rJleischlichen Freuden] and love
honey.' (Z IV VB)
For bath zatatbustra and bis creator, the truth ofone's soul spealcs from the
corporeal self; i.e. the "gut". zatatbustra is suggesting tbat the voluntary beggat's
bard words ring false becallse they do not seem ta emerge from a careful, attentive
listening ta the self.!3 The result is a somewhat ridiculous spectacle of empty
bluster, an inauthetie, unedifying, "over-frothing" perfOIDWlce. zatatbustra
proposes an altemative ta bis "brothets": tbat they "[l]ïsten _. ta the voice of the
hea1thy body [die Stimme des gesundm Leibes]: this is apurer voice and amore
bonest one [Red1icher redet und reiner der gesuru:k Leib]." (Z 1OAW) Such a
• acquiesce, their bearts mntate, tbey obey from the heart: but he who obeys does not
liskn 10 himself [sie ergeben sich, ihr Ben sprichl nach, ihr Grund gehoreht: wer
aber gehorcht, der 1WI't sich selber nicht]'" (Z mONL 7; emphasis in original.)
148
• proposa!, dirccted at those ofe1evated sensibilities, is meant "to give men back the
courage to their natural drives." (WP 124)
The process of rediscovering innate, bodily knowledge is often descnbed by
the light ooly by plunging its 1'OOts "into the depths - into evil" (Z 1OlM). and of
the mountain rising from the sea: "The highest must arise to its height from the
deepest [Aus don Trefsten ml4fJ dos HOchste zu seiner Hohe kommen]." (Z m W)
149
• the eanh its meaning, a human meaning [einen
Menschen-Sinn]! (Z 1OBV 2)15
Zarathustra's frequent injunctions against the tempting, imaginative flight from
earthly reality inta "cloudland" [Reich der Wolken] (Z n OP) and bis
characterisations of those who succumb ta the temptation as "world-calumniators"
and "world-slanderers" [Welt-Ver1eumder] (Z m ONL 15, m SS 2) call to mind
Francis Bacon's spirited, idcological defense ofearthly empiricist method against
the enttenchcd Aristotelian science of bis age.16
While Nietzsche's recurring emphasis on creativity and originality bas been
wel1-noted and much comment.ed upon. its ctucial connection ta this rbetoric of
rediscovcty bas mrely been given the recognition it deserves. Against the backdrop
of the new orthodoxy's commitment ta a pietuIe ofNiettsehe as a philosopher of
complete originality, there is an undcrstandab'y sttong IeSistance ta the idea that
Nietzsehean creativity is related in any way ta se1f-disc'Jvcty. To bis aedi.t,
N'chamas serves as a (partial) exception when he rernarks that "making and finding,
creating and discovering, imposing laws and being coostrained by them are
ISO
• assumption that self-creation and discovcry of the self must be mutually
exclusive.J7
Far from identifying human =live activity with "purposeless play", as sorne
would have it, Nietzsche insists that at its highest, =livity is something attuded to
a profound truth about the self and the world, a truth that bas always been deep
within the noble self and that needs to be drawn oul The "new psychologists" of
tomorrow, suggests Nietzsche, are condemned to inventing the new - and, who
knows? perhaps toftnding il" (BGE 12) The rather mysterious relation ofcreation
and dis;:ovcry is evoked in the following exchange between zarathustra and the
young man in Z 1 OTM: "'How," asks the young man of bis mentor, ois it possible
you can uncover my soul [meine Seele entdecktest]TI zarathustra smiled and said:
There are many souls one will never uncover [entdecken], unless one invents
[e1findet]them fiIst.'" No =livity, it seems, without discovery.
is no neo-Platonist, for whom the truth and beauty of the Cosmos would become
apparent through agradually deve10ping awareness and embrace ofa preexistent,
unchanging Reality. In the Platonic view, agency is relevant only in the struggle to
see the True Order of things and one's place in il Once that Truth bas been seen,
one presnmably bas found eudaimonia and a blissful state of pesee. For Nietzsche,
however. it is idle and slavish to speak of truths apart from creative agency. of truth
revealed to us by a wholly externa1 fon::e. The "creating, willing, evaluating Ego".
17 Leiter perceptively notes that Nehamas defends bis final position through a
highly selective manner ofquOlation (Leiter 1992: 286). Nebamas c;ites the
following passage. from GS 335. where Nietzsche insists that people who "want to
become those they are" are pœcisely "hl!Jnan beings who are new. unique,
incompa1'llble, who give themselves laws, who create themselves." The section
continues, bowever. thusly: "To that end [of creating omselves] we must become
the best bm= and discoverers ofevcrything that is lawful and necessary in the
wodd: we must become physicists in onier to be able to be cnaIOrs in this
151
• he insists, is "a first motion", a "self-prope1ling wheel" (Z 1 OWC), i.e. "the
measure and value of aIl things." (Z 1 OAW) Zarathustra hopes that bis "brothers"
with forever "fut anew" the value of aIl things (Z 1 OBV 2), that the ultïmate
exemplar of modem nobility, theObermensch, will "create a goal for mankind and
gives the earth ils meaning and its future..." (Z ID ONL 2) In so doing, the highest
sort of man fulfills bis true natuIe in the Aristotelian sense discussed in Cbapter DL
Oearly, any discoveries made by such a superb being will he accomplished in and
through creative making, and any truths so discovered cannot he said to exist above
and heyond this making. These truths are, however, "objective" in the Nietzsehean
sense discussed in Chapter 1, i.e. the property ofa.noble, discerning sensibility that
possesses a monopoly on truth and virtue.
• accomplish in this chaos is b develop "style", i.e. a talent for living in relative
152
• harmony with these powcrful and confiieting tendencies without disowning any of
them (Ibid., 7, 187,216).18
In advocating !bis supposed1y Nietzsehean "multiple self', proponeilts of the
new orthodoxy seem to propose a new type of postmodemist, egalitarian meta-
ethic. Connolly, for example, claims that the Obermensch should be understood as
"a set ofdispositions that may compete for presence in any self." (Connolly 1991:
186-7) Part of what it Im'-3DS 10 be to possess these admirable, Obermenschlich
qualities, for Connolly, is the ability to disrupt the repressive, deadening hold of
stable forms ofidentity through "compensatory strategies" like genealogical
discourse (Ibid., 13). Connolly denounces the will to impose order on chaotic
impulses and desires as "a reclpe for the repression of difference" and an example
of slave morality (Ibid., 178-9), suggestiag that the set ofadmirable qualites
associated with Nietzsehe's Obennensch should be seen (as is a11egedly seen by
Nietzsche "10 a significant degree") as "a voice in the selfcontending with other
voices, including those of ressentiment." (Ibid., 186-7)19
Taking a slightly different taek, but relying on what 1consider 10 be a sim;Jarly
fanciful metaphorical reading, Honig "democratizes" and "raè!;ca!j'D"$" the
Obermensck. tuming !bis construet into a reptesentative of all those aspects of the
18 At. one point Nehamas comes close 10 Nietzsehe's position when he describes
N"tetzsebean style as "conJrol1ed multiplicity and resolved conflict" (1985: 7.
emphasis added). The general thrust ofNehamas' position, however, appears 10
resist the constancy that such control and stability would entail: "The self,
according 10 Nietzsebe, is not a constant, stable entity." (Ibid.) Blondel makes a
sim;!ar assessDlent of the Nietzschean body as a plurality of forces, a "political
organization based on relations between forces that are unstable and DOt univocally
regulated by conscious causallogic.•••" (Blondel 1991: 232) Detv61er concurs:
"theIe are apt 10 he multiple pelspectives vying for supremacy within a single breast .
because the self, according 10 N"Ietzsehe, is wtrinsically a multiplicity and DOt a
unity. In most cases what we call the selfis little more than a battleground of
competing drives..." (Detwiler 1990: 21)
1~ At. other points Connolly appears 10 suggest thateven the admirable,
•
0ber:nmsch1ich qualities of the Nietzschean (multiple) selfare inconsistent with
each other. The "mature 1ITIelZSChe". he states, is said 10 have come 10 the "tragïc·
conclusion "that the esse, .I;al clements ofnobiliIy (let alone the overmau) cannot be
combined in the same self al the same time." (Connolly 1992: 70S)
153
• "multiple self' that refuse to be Sqlleeu4 into oppressive, unitary identities. (Hooig
1993a: 8-9) The Obermensch, claims Hooig. is simply the name Nietzsche
bestows on "the othemess within the self that resists the discipline of moral
claims that other passages endorse it. In support of ber interpretation, Hooig cites
Nietzsche's famous remarks in the early piece "Homer's Contest" that endorse the
notion ofperpetua1 contest, or "agan". (Ibid., 229) Nietzsebe's valorisation of
struggle, conc1udes Hooig, entaiIs a rejection of the notion ofself-masteIy: "he
does not experience the veogefulness that comes with that quest." (Ibid., 63)
It is my view that this portrait of the multiple self strays far from Nietzsche's
emphasis on the self-discipline and self-mastety cbaracrcristic of bea1tby, bigbest
buman being. Wbile Nietzsche's praise ofDionysian freuzy and chaos bas been
well noted, many commentators bave neglected bis aucial emphasis on the
Apollooian counterpart to Dionysus. He advocates not an endIess pezpetuaâon of
struggle within the bigbcst individual, but Iatber the fustering ofa disciplined
inclination to submit 0nese1f, in the end, to one particu1ar orientation. 1am
154
• suggesting, in other words, !bat bis idea is not to celebrate a chaotie, internaI
struggle, but to encourage the absolutc victory ofone, admirable orientation in the
self and its mastcry over other, baser traits.
Honig is quitc right, of course, to note Nietzsehe's criticism of the type of self-
discipline propounded by the slavisb "moralists", who counsel extirpation of (rather
!han mastery over) the Dionysian chaos within the self. She and other proponents
of the new orthodoxy err, however, in assuming !bat all ethical projects ofself-
mastcry involve this sort ofself-vivisection. Zarathustra suggests!bat "[e]very soul
is a world of its own.••" (Z mC 2), giving expression to Nietzsehe's vision of
disciplined unity incoIporates complexity and plurality. His point is !bat striving
for a unity ofcharactcr need not entail the excision of aIl interesting, creative
expLessions ofindividuality and the emergence of a Marcusean "one-dirnensional
man".
'Ibis is not to say !bat NIetzSChe believes self-mastcry - the a!tllinment. of a
readily aclcnowledges the fact !bat internaI struggle is part and parcel of the process
ofmoral-spiritual development "Behold how each of your virtues ••• wants your
entù:e spirit, that your spirit may he ils herald, it wants your entire sttength in anger,
hatc. and love." (Z 1 OJP) Inevitably, in the COUIse of such development, there axe
intema1 struggles and upheavals. 'The bighest men, however, will find the sttength
to impose Apollonian omer on their impulses; !bey will becorne "willers of a single
will" (Z 1OBV 1). In aself-IefeteDtial comment lare in his intcllectua1 cmer,
Nietzscbe infonns us that he eventnally came to understand that the many struggles
and metamorphoses of his past which see"'C'd pointless al the tirne had a raison
d'2tre: the development ofhis well-ronnded., unified cbaractcr. "It is my sagacity to
have been many dJ!ngs and in many places so as to he able to become one persan-
• 155
• 50 as to be able ta attain one thing.
3; emphasis in origina1)21
For a time 1 had to be a scholar.-" (EH "UM"
21 As wc sball see in Chaplcr vu, N"JC1ZSCbe 1inks this important insight with the
S'u=cessful peri"ormance of the thought experiment known as the "Etemal Retum of
• theSame."
22 More will be said about NielzSCbe's views on irony in the next chapter. when
wc sball explore bis treatment of nibiliSID
156
Il3tUIe bas set itselfin the case of man? is it not the real problemregarding man?"
(GM lU) This capacity for the creation of "a long chain of will," for "desir[ing]
••. the continuance of something desired once" (Ibn), could hardly become
manifest without a certain faIsightedness and disciplined regularity of character.
Although the professional dancer malœs ber craft seem like an effortless project
of uncontrolled, spontaneous inspiration, bebind this surface appearance lie years
of bard work and training that make possible ber apparent effOrtlessness in
performance. Similarly, Nietzsche outlines a deve10pmental account of virtue in
whicb the apparently effortless certituœ and graceful ease of the virtuous
disposition is usuaIly:l3 seen as an acbievement that is unthinkable without a great
dea1 of training, self-discipline, and the "self-<lvercoming" involved in the constant,
vigilant assessment of and control over one's actions and reactions.
Nietzsche considcrs self-discipline an absolute necessity, given the high stakes
involved in the game ofmoral valuation. As we noted in OJapter TI, Nietzsche
considcrs the naroing of good and evil ta he a "terrible power" that sbould not he
taken lightly.24 Although, in bis "fatalistic" mode, he occasionally suggest5 that the
superior blUD8 n being cao do no wrollg. he also (and, 1wculd argue, more usually)
indieates that this power could tum monstrous even in the bands ofthose with the
nalUra1 stuff ofnobility. Not everything that emerges from the deptbs of sncb men
is refined and noble: "Even in the best there is something ta excite disgust [An dem
• 24 "Truly the power ofthis praising and b1aming is a monster. TeR me. who will
subdue it for me [wer bez.wingt es mir]. my brothets? TeR me. who will fasten
fetteB upon the thousand necks ofthis beast1" (Z 1 OTG)
157
• &sten ist noch e/Was vun Ekeln]; and even the best is something that must he
overcome!" (Z ID ONL 14) Although Nietzsche believes that a refined sensibility
pervades the chatactet of the free-spirited man of vïrtue, the ubiquitous presence of
loathsome clements necessitalCS the cultivation of "a noble shell":
And much that is intrinsic in man is Iike the oyster,
that is loathsome and s1ippery and bard to grasp [ekel
und schlüpfrig und schwer erfajJlich] -/ so that a
noble sbell with noble embellishments must inteteede
for iL But one bas to leam this art as weil: to have a
shell and a fair appearance and a prudent blindness
[~chale haben und schOnen ScheÙl und kIuge
Blindheit]! (Z ID OSG Z)
Envcloping oneself in a noble she1l alIows one to maintain a dcliherate, studied
ignorance - or blindness - bath towards one's least admirable sentiments and
d;:sires and"towards the ugJiness and vulgarity in the world at 1arge.2S
Characteristically, Nietzsche imagines the capacity to construct such a shell as
ar'.sing from a "dominant instinct": the "dominating spirituality" ofNlelZSChe's new
pbilosopbers, he suggests, "had fi.rst to put a check on an unrestrained and initable
pride or a wanton sensuaIity"; petbaps at fi.rst it
had a bard job ••• maintain[mg] its will ta the 'desert'
against a love of luxury and refinement or an
excessive liberality of heart and band. But it did il,
preeisely becanse it was the dominating instinct
whose demands prevailed against those of aIl the
othr.r ïnstinets.•• (GM mlS)
The passage just quoted, evoking a portrait ofa nobility wrestling with and
finally subduing excessive hubris,.sensuality,love ofluxury, ete., suggest5 that
Nietzsche's stress on the nobleman's "automarism ofinstinct", when seen in light
• itself, the formation ofever higher, nuer, more remote, tenser, more
comprehensive states "The existence and maintenance ofa recognised hierarchy
in society, in other words, is a precondition for self-oVClCOming (sec Chapter IX).
158
• ofhis developmental ethic, in no way entails a blind, indiscriminatc indulgence of
all sentiment or dcsire. On:he contrary, he insists that any sort of moral valuation
"teaehes hatred of laisser aller, of too grcat freedom..." (BGE 188) "Blind
indulgence of an affect," he observes in the Nachlass, "1Otally rcgardlcss of
whcthcr it he a gcncrous and compassionate or a hostile affect, is the cause of the
grcatcst evils." (WP 928) Nietzsche evokes the image of the taut bowstring in
dcscribing a praiscworthy, disciplincd virtuc, and fcars the day when laisser aller
triumphs ovcr the characteristic "tension" of nobility: "1be timc is coming whcn
man will no more shoot the arrow ofhis longing out ovcr mankind, and the strong
ofhis bow will have forgottcn how to twang! [nicht mehr••• die Sehne seines
Bogens ver1emt 1ult, ZJl schwirrenl]" (Z Prologue S) While it is true, in other
words, that Nietzsehcan virtue involves a hcalthy dose ofself-love (in constrast to
the ostenslole self-abncgation encouraged by slave morality), Nietzsehean self-love
is by no means a defence of mcrc self-indulgence.26 Nietzsche, aftcr all, urges that
above.
In light of the Nietzsehc's insistencc upon the cognitive and moral significance
of the cœporcal passions (Chapter m), howevcr, bis distastc for "1etting it all bang
•
pcnt-up encrgies should he cxpended from time-to-timc; spccifically, in proximity
of the lower 0Idcrs. who could very wel1 suifer the unintended consequences of the
dionysian discharge. We shall explore bath ofthescpoints furthcrin Cbapterx. in
the context of li :liscussion ofNietzsehe's portrait of master-slave relations.
159
• out" cannot entail an ascetic renonciation of pleasure and desire altogether. Wben
N"JelZSChe speaks of the noble self as "a tremendous multiplicity which is
nonetheless the opposite ofcbaos"27 (EH "Oever" 9), he is suggesting that the
immense richness of sensation and the intensity of passion cbaracterising bis
imagined noble must be preserved. albeit in a tigbtly bound and disciplined manner.
By insisting that the body is "a multiplicity with one sense [eine Vze1heit mit
«einem» Sinne], a war and a peace. a berd and a berdsman" (Z 1 ODB),
Nietzsche furtber deve10ps the view introduced in The Birth oITragedy that the
human being - as weil as society and culture as a whole - requiIes both the protean
substrata of Dionysian energy and the shaping, form-giving order of Apollonian
discipline.28
Nietzsche. therefore. comes out in favour of a fonn ofdr.cipline that involves
scrutinising and disciplining the sentiments. rather tban suppzessing tbem.
"Greatness ofcharactcr does not coosist in not possessing tbese affects - on the
contrary, one passesses tbem 10 the higbest degree - but in baving tbem onder
controL" (WP 928)29 Kanfmann bas rigbt1y noted that unlike the ancicnt Stoics
and the Christian ascetics aiticised in On tire Genetzlogy ofMoraIs, Nic:tzscbe does
not sec the way 10 discip1iMi virtue through an extirpation of the passions: "1hz
good man isfor Nim.,sche the passionate man who is the mtJSter oIhis passions."
<Kanfmaun 1974: 280, ernpbasis in mgiual) Much like Arlstotle. Nietzsche
wisbes 10 steel a middle course between the barmfiJl ex1It:me~ of ascetic
.
renunciation and hedonistic laisseralIer. Nietzsche's bigbest man.like Arïstotle's.
ongbt 10 be a stranger neither 10 bardship and suffering nar 10 physical p1easuIe:
1:1 "_eine ungebeureVtelhcit. die trotzdem das GegenstlIck des Chaos ist."
28 N"u:tzsche contrasts bis OWD conception of cliscipline with the "great self-
control" [die groJJe SelbstbeIrerrscg] evinccd by the servile type ofman wbose
"discipline" aI10ws him 1Odissimn1ate andape thegesturesofthetmlyvirluous.
• ~GEI4)
Sec also wP 966: "wberc the plant 'man' shows himself strongest one finds
insfuIets that confliet powerfully (e.g.. in SbalœspeaIe), but are controlled."
160
• "he who belongs to me," declares zanuhuslra, "must Ile ••• merry in war and
feasting, no moumful man, no d.reamy fellow, ready for what is hardest as for a
feast..." (Z IV LS)30 In order, however, for our merry-making affects ta service
"our best interests", they must be subjceted "ta a protraeted tyranny": ooly then will
they "love us as good servants." (WP 384)
The reference to the affects as servants and ta the body as bath herd and
herdsman indieate that command and obedience remain fundamental components of
Nietzsche's moral psychology,3\ which is more indebted ta ancient notions than he
is often willing ta admit. "[W]berever 1 found living creatures," remarlcs
zanuhustra, "there too 1 heard the language ofobedience [Gdwrsame]. " (Z n
OSO) The type ofobedience characteristic of a paIticular individua.l. however,
depends upon the persan's character: "And this is the second thing: he who cannot
161
• obedient subjects, looking upon them with considerable disdain for tbeir inability ta
sec virIue in any sense otber than obedience ta an omniscient, omnipotent Deity.
He associates the great monotheistic religions with an undue, wlgar emphasis on
reward and pnnisbment st the bands of a divine "paymaster" (Z n OV), and sees an
truly virtuous dispositions as steering clcar of these base motives: "in an decent
actions, are wc not deliberately indifferent ta the prospect of what !DaY happen ta
us? To avoid an action that might have barmful consequences for us - that would
mean a ban on decent actions in generaI." (WP 92S)34 Ourehoice. as N'lCttsche
sees it, is not between obedience ta Gad (in anticipation of reward or in fcar of
pnnisb~t) and the empty chaos of laisser aller. Wc can have oràer and
discipline and meaning and logic from within ourselves.3S
those able ta issue self-commanm but who fall short when itcomes ta obeying
tbem. 'Ibis thiId eaIegO[y eaDs ta mind Arlstotle's notion of akrasia, or moral
weaJmess: "many a one ctln command bimselfbut be very remiss in obeying what
he commands [manchu ktmn sich befehlen, aber dafeh1t 7IOCh viel, dafl eT' sicJ;
auehgehon:he]l" (ZmONL4) By contrast, the "unconditionaIcommander"
[unbedingt lkjehlenden] (BGE 199) bas nO such difficulty; he "commands
sollll'tbing in bimselfwbich obeys or which he believes obeys." (BOE 19)
34 "'You want 10 be paid as wcn. you virtuous! Do you want IeW81d for virtue
and beaven for earth and etcmity foryourtoday?/ And are you now angry with me
becausc 1 teach that tbcre is DO reward-giver BOr paymaster [es gibt lceinen Lo1lll
und 7ahlmeistu]? And truly. 1 do DOt even teaeh that virtue is its own rewardJ
AJas. this is my sorrow: rewmd and pmisbment have bcen lyingly introduced inta
the foundation ofthiDgs [in den Grund der Dinge hot mon Lohn U1!d Strafe
hineingelogen] - and DOW even into the foundation ofyour souls. you virtuous!'"
(Z noV) Later ou in this section. Zarathustra dcclaœs ta the i m agilll'4 noble:
"You love yourvirlue as the mother ber child; but when was it heaJ:d of a mother
wanting ta be paid for ber loveT
3S Nussbanm 81'lÏcnJaœs the Nielzscbean position well: "Centuries ofCbristian
fnc:bing bave left us with 50 little self-respect for our bodies and tbcir desires that
162
• We have notcd sincc Chapter 1, Nietzsche tends ta stress issues of character as a
mcans ofcounteracting what he secs as the unjust universa1isation of the categories
of slave morality. Nietzsebc. wc will recall, argues that plebcian majorities sincc
the dawn of the "slave revoIt" in marals have attemptcd ta generalisc "whcrc
36 Thal thcle is beauty and virtuc in the wodd, Nielzscbc bas no doubt. The
163
• Nietzsche accuses the partisan of slave morality not only of this sort of wrong-
headed projection ofdepravity onto the universe. but also of a fondamental
dishonesty and hypocrisy in denying the very existence of the base instincts that
campel to make such a projection.38 Nietzsche speaks. for example, of religicns
faith as "a cloak, a pretext. a screen, behind wbich the instincts played their game -
a shrewd blirulness reine kIuge Blindheit] to the dominance of certain instincts.••
One bas always spoken of faith, one bas always acted from instinct." (AC 39)
Metaphysical dualist positions, in other words, are not what they seem:
notwithstanding (and perbaps becanse of) their holders' sincere aspirations for
otherworldly status, they indieate a very worldly (indeed, sickly) condition and set
of interests.
The ftaudulent nature of their claims to speak for "otberworldly", transcendent
values is, for Nietzsche. obvions. Oose obserTh:ion of them reveals that
"[a]lthough their spirit [Geist] "bas been persna tfed to contempt of the earth1y, •.•
[their] entrails [Eingeweide] have not"; these "entrails", Z3rathustra hastens to add,
their osteI1Slole repudiation of the body. "believe most firmly in the body.•} But it
is a sickly thing to them; and they would dearly like to get out of their skins." (Z 1
37 "Und mancher. der das Hobe an den Menschen nicht sehen kaon, nennt es
'I\lgend, daB cr ibr Niedriges aJ17,lm ahe sieht also hei8t cr seinen bl:Isen Blick
'I\lgend." Sec also BGE 'ZlS: "He who does not want to sec what is elevated in a
man looks all the more kcen1y for what is low and foreground in bim - and thereby
~ves bimself away."
8 Speaking on bebalf of a noble table of values, N'1CtZSche goes oUt ofhis 'way to
empbasise how much he prizes honesty and integrîty. As Z3rathustra dcclares, "I
count nothing more valuable and rare today tban honesty" [Redlichkeit] (Z IV OHM
8). In D l'ret: 4, N'JClZSChe speaks ofhis hope that a small number of "men <>r
conscience" [Menschen des Gewissens]. who possess a natural honesty and
integrity [Rechtschajfenhei]. will refrain from re1lUning ta that wbich is "outlived
• and decayed" once they have leamed of the truc arder ofthings. (D l'ret: 4). Sec
also WP 404: "Morality itself. in the form ofhonesty [ais Redlichkeit]. compels us
to deny morality."
164
• OAW) Further on in the text, Zarathustra openly accuses the "worId-weary" of
hypocrisy on this score:
Ironical1y. these embodied beings. who despise their own bodies and wish to
transeend their corporeal selves, gain an almast sensual pleasure out of their
transcendental flights of fantasy. thereby exposing (at least to sensitive observees
1ike Nietzsche) the lie al the core of all metapbysical dualist ftameworks: "to what
do they owe the convulsion and joy of their transport?" asks Zarathustra. The
answer he provides ta bis own question is eategorical: "To their bodies and to this
earth." (Z ! OAW)
Nietzsche's point is not simply that servile practitioners ofasceticism are wrong
to think that they cao escape the hegemonic sensations of bis body. His critique of
asceticism runs deeper. suggesting in an ad hominem manner that this confused,
dishonest doctrine attracts many people who are in fact steeped in a sensna1jty of the
mast lascivious, revolting varlety. Stripped of their etherea1 pretensions, many
ascetics reveal a low-brow set ofdesires rivaling that of the most shameless of
hedonists: "just look al these men: their eye reveals it - they know ofnothing better
on earth than to lie with a womanJ There is filth at the bottom of their sauls•••" (Z
IOC) Sïnce the ascetic's ostens1"le anti-sensualism prevents him from openly
embracing bis own lasciviousness, bis sexual feelings must be "sublimatl'Ai":
denied physical sensuality. bis lust finds more "spiritual" abjects. "[N]ow your
• 39 "LOstem fand ich euch immer nach nach &de, vediebt nach in die eiguc Erd-
MOdigkeit._ im Auge - schwim:mt da nicht ein WlSl1a:hen unvergessner Erden-
Lust7"
165
• otherworldly pretensions, "wants to be called 'contemplation'
[<<BeschauIichkeit» l!" (Z II OIP)40
rrJhe biteh Sensuality [die Hündin Sinnlichkeitl,"
observes Zarathustra elsewhere, "glares enviously
out of all they dol This restless beast follows them
even into the heights of their virtue and the depths of
their cold spiritl And how nicely the bitch
Sensuality knows how to beg for a piece of spirit,
when a piece of flesh is denied ber. (Z 1OC)
Further along in this work, Zarathustra revealingly refers to sucb men as "dainty,
actions, and ail the more so when the abject ofhis pity is one noblcrthan bimse1f:
"When the great man aies out, straightway the little man cames nmning; his tangue
166
• is hanging from bis mouth with lasciviousness. He, however, calls it bis 'pity'."
(Zmc2)43
Nietzsehe's view !bat ascetic discourse evinces a debased, vulgar form of desire
is further demonstrated in the following confession of a nameless character in Z n
OIP, denounced by Zarathustra as one of the "sentimental hypocrites"
[empfindsamen Heuchler) or "Iustful men" [Lüstemen):
43 Nussbanm draws a provocative paralIel between Nietzsche and the Roman Stoic
Seneca in this context (1994: 165). This linkage between pity and base sensl1 alïty
forms one of two Nietzsehean arguments against the sentimeot ofpity. The second
argument, to be explored in Chapter vu, implies !bat pity is an insulting fatm of
condesœnsion towald the pitied. and hence inappropriatc as a sentimeot among
ûiends (as equals).
44 Annas peIteptively discusses Aristotle's view !bat the pleasure experienced by
the virtuous individual in, forexample, peâatming brave actions"could [not) tempt
the cowa:nl,just as the brave person is Dot tempted by the pleasures of nmning
away and avoiding danger. Similarly. the pIeasure of acting temperatcly is available
• only to t h e : Dot to the greedy and uncontrolled person; and the pleasures
of pigging
you value." (
Dot tempt the tempctate. What you find pIeasant clepends on what
1993: 369)
167
• revelatcIy not of ÎI.dIer strength, but of a weakness stemming from the sort of
baseness that the ascetic shares. ironically, with the hedonist. Ascetic self-denial
and hedonist indulgence, for Niettsehe, are merely two sides of the same coin. The
ascetic and the bedonist share the saIne, base desires and instincts - indeed, me
sarDe, basic personality type - differing ooly in that the fonner chooses ta repudiate
them, while the latter indulges them. The"pteachers of death," claims zarathustra,
have ooly two choices before them: "lusts or self-mortification." (Z 1 OPD) "1 call
wretched [Unsclig]," he declares furtheron, "aIl who bave ooly one chcice: ta
become an evil beast [bèisc TlCrc] or an evil tamer ofbeasts [bèisc TlCrbiindigcr]."
(Z m OSG 2) Regardless ofwhich role is chosen, the chaste angcl or the
sbarneJess lecher, the attitude tawards ~he beast" - what it is, bow it bebaves. ete. -
is thesame.
As our earlier discussion ofNietzsehean self-discipline suggests, Niettsebe's
idea of virtuous conduct involves not the "uD1earning of aIl violent desiring [heftige
Begehren]," as zarathustra bears "the people" counsel eacL. another in wbispers (Z
m ONL 16), but ratber a careful cultivation ofDionysian clements under the
guiciance of ApolloDian discipline. To assume, as "aIl preacbeJs ofmoraIs as well
as aIl theologil!DS" do, that "aIl bappiness begins ooly after the annibiliarion of
passion", is ludicrous (GS 326). Unable ta gain mastcry over their lower-order
desires, being possessed by them rather than possessing them, ascetics respond ta
this inner slavmy by "s1anderlng" desire altagetber in ca1ling for its eradication.4S
The servility ofthis stance is œiteœted in Z mONL 16. wbere ZlIra!bustra deems
the anti-seosnalism of the ascetiçs a "sermon urging slavmy" [cine Predigt ZUT
KnechJschtift]. N"Ul!'zSCbe's gloss on the ascetic idea bebind the Gospel of Mark
• 4S "Euch fehlt die UDSChuld in der Begierde: und nun ver.1enrndet ibr chum das
Begebren!" zn OIP.
168
• ("And if thy band offend thec, cut it off; •.• And if thine eye offend thec. pluck it
out." 9:43-47). sums up bis position admiIably: to follow sucb edicts would result
not only the 1055 of an organ but the emascuiation of
a man's character - And the same applies to the
moralist's madness that demands, instead of the
restraining of the passions. their extirpation [die
Exstirpation der Leidenschaften]. Its conclusion is
always: only the castrated man [der entmannte
Mensch] is a good man. Instead of taking into
service [in Dienst zu nehmen] the great sources of
strength [Kraftquellen]. those impetuous torrents of
the sou! that are so often dangerous and
overwhelming. and economizing them [<: u
èikonomisiren]. this most shortsighted and pemicious
mode of thought, the moral mode of thought, wants
to make them dry up [versiegen machen]. (WP
383)46
169
• It is e:dS'j enough ta say that the supcrior hum:m bcing shouJd rcdiscovcr bis
Dionysian instincts and cxert Apollonian control ovcr thcm. It is quite anothcr
thing, Nietzsche concedes, for this ta aetually come about. "Man is àifficult to
discover," notes Zarathustra, "most of all ta himsclf•.•" (Z m OSG 2) Natural
nobles still living amongst the hcrd and in the grip ofits servile table of values may
not cven pcrceive the nccd for cmbarking on such ajoumcy of sclf-discovcry, or
may somchow bclieve that thcy have a1ready undcrtalœn it and have rcachcd a
satisfactory terminus. Thcir "spirit" [Geist], as Zarathustta puts it, oftcn "tells lies
about the sou!: [Seele] (Ibid.) and not simply bccansc it bas made a series ofcasily
corrcctable miscalculations. The spirit of the 10fty sort who suffcrs from falsc
consciousncss bas bcen misguidcd ta such a profound cxtent that cxroncous bclicfs
have aetually hampcred the body's ability ta cxpcricnce its authcntic, hcalthy
instincts. Whcn Nietzsche suggcsts that the dccp intemalisation ofothcr-worldly
idcals bas made "mankind itself [die Mensch.'leit selbst] ••• falsc down ta its dccpcst
instincts [lDItersten Instinkte] - te the point ofworshipping the itwerse values
[umgekeluten Werte] ta thosc which alone could guarantee it prospcrity_.", he
docs not pœsumc that the instincts of the fincst have bcen lcft UnlOlk'hed (EH
Forward 2).48 Thcre is still much "illusion" and "blundcring" in our bodies,
concludcs Zarathustra: nit bas thcle becoClC body and willJ _. Alas, much
ignorance and cxror bas become body in us!n49 (Z 1OBV 2)
170
• Nietzsche is weIl aware that the great power of our well-established.
conventional moral systems bas liUle to do with overt coercion. "[M]orality," he
notes in one of bis 1886 Prefaces,
does not merely have at its ccmmand every kind of
means of frightening off critical bands and torture-
instruments: its ser-...ci>y reposes far more in a certain
art of enchanttneut [Kunst der Bezauberung] it bas at
its disposaI- it knows how to 'inspire'. With this art
it succeeds, often with no more !han a single glance.
in paralysing the critical will against itself, so that,
like the scotpion, it drives its sting into its own
body. (D Pref. 3)50
Most of us have been "bewitched" by the dominant slave morality to such an extent
that herd sensibility bas become our "good conscience," which deems any proud
expression ofindependent, assertive individuality beyond the pale: "as long as the
good conscience [gute Gewissen] is calIed herd, only the bad conscience [schlechte
Gewissen] says: L" (Z 1 OTG) The "heavy words and values" of the herd,
observes zarathustta, have been imposed upon us alI our lives, beginning "almost
in the cradle." (Z m OSG 2) Indeed, it is a "madncss" that bas been omnipresent
for millennia: "the madncss of millennia too breaks out in us. It is dangerous to be
an heir." (Z Il OR)
Without someone ofcharismatic presence and insight 10 jar them out oftheir
dogmatic slumber and seIf-abasement, superb Imman beings may squander their
fine instincts and enslave themsel~-es forever 10 a base morality (as, indeed, the
ascetic priests have; sec Chapter IV). N"Ietzsehc,like AristotIe, believes that
superior men without disciplined intellects in harmony witli their bodiIy knowledge
are at sea, so 10 speak, bereft of a compass sophistieated enough 10 help them
navigate sucoessfully through the fog. 1beir innate instincts do serve as a crude
sort ofcompass, and with it they may find the right way unaided. As we noted in
ln
• the previous chapter. however. NietzsChe tends to subscribe 10 a more pessimistic
scenerio. The natural noble typ: with underdeveloped rational facu1ties - or with
highly developed, yet misguided philosophicalleanings - is highly suscepn1l1e to
indocttination in ail manner of mendacious. self-abnegating dogma, and, like the
"blond beast" ofantiquity. is more likely 10 succumb 10 some form or another of
self-abnegating slave morality. In line with the Aristotelian tradition of moral
philosophy. Nietzsche insists !bat highly talented, sensitive men must be aided in
their attempts at dïscovering the right targets at which 10 shoot. zarathustra wants
thase under bis influence "to desire !bis path !bat men have followed blindly [diesen
Weg woUen, den blint/lings der Mensch gegangen]. and 10 call it good and no more
to creep aside from il, like the sick and dying!" (Z 1OAW) Nietzsehe, in other
words, believes !bat essentially virtuous men have a predilection for the right target,
but often "creep aside from it" becanse of a bad upbringing. education, or in general
a corrupt socio-political milieu. With the proper influences and disciplined training.
bowever. the full potential of their virtue may blossom.
We creep aside from the paths ta virtue becallse ofour embrace of false beliefs
and desires !bat have estranged us from our essentially hea1thy.life-affirming
instincts. In order 10 discover our truc selves, wc must be weaned away from these
wrong or foolisb beliefs and desires and encouraged 10 embrace a new set more in
line with our deepest inclinations.St Like Aristotlc and the moral philosopbers of
the Hellenistic cm, Zaralbustra states !bat the "tare" he provides is aimed at
51 "Unlike appetitcs such as tbirst and hungcr, [the emotions] have an important
cognitive element: !bey embody ways ofinterpreting the world. The feelings !bat
go with the cxperience ofemotion are hooked up with and lest upon beIiefs or
judgements !bat are their basis or ground, in such a way !bat the emotion as a whole
cao appropàately he evaluated as truc and false, and also as rational or ïrrationat.
• IlCCClIding ta ourevaluation of the grounding belief. Sïnce the belief is the ground
of the feeling, the feeling, and therefore the emotion as a wholc, cao he modified by
a modification ofbeliet:" (NussNmm 1987: 140)
172
• "awaken[ing] new desires" [neue Begierden weckte ich] and "stretehing" and
"unburdening" of the heart (Z IV Al).
Nietzsehe's goal is to illicit the profoundest of personal changes in bis select
readership. It is not enough, he implies. simply to assent intellectually to bis
doctrines. Zarathustra evinces great scepticism towards those whose facile, rapid
conversion to bis ideas and overheated repelÏtion of !hem suggest (to him) the
absence of a deeper embrace of them: "For thus you speak: 'We are complete
realists, and without belief or superstition': thus you thump your chests - alas. even
without having chests!" (Z II OLe) Looking inward, Zarathustra suggests at one
point that perhaps even he bas yet to intemalise bis own doctrines to a satisfactory
degree: in Z II sa "something voiceless" says to him, "0 Zarathustra, your fruits
are ripe but you are not ripe for your fruits!'" Zarathustra tinds the doctrine of the
Etemal Return of the Same, for =pie, fnndamenœlly sound. but when the
doctrine is first introduced he acknowledges may not yet he able to fully embnce it
and all it would entaiLS2 For new beliefs and desires to he full~ awakened.
Nietzsche concludes, they must not he consented. to in a facile manner; rather. they
ought to have emerged !rom within us, !rom othis most honest being" [dies
redJkhsre Sein], the "Ego", which "speaks of the body, and it insists upon the body
[es will noch den Leib], even wben it fables and fabricates and flutters with broken
wings." (Z 1OAW)
Nietzsehe's writing and its pedagogical intent are not mutuaIly exclusive. 'Ibrough
bis deeply personal accounts of bis own joys and sufferings, bis frustrations !Illd
173
epiphanies (bath in the fl1'St persan and through bis alter~o, Zarathustra),
Nietzsche hopes te toueh a chard within the bearts of the select readersbip for
whom he writes and !bat he seeks te eultivate. The next cbapter will explore further
Nietzsehe's conception of the rarified, selective nature of bis ideal audience. As we
sball sec, far from aspiring te the status of a "best-seller" author, Nietzsche talces
bis marginality te be a badge of honour; ooly the very few, he believes, will ever
secondary literature.
Furthermore. 1argued !bat Nietzsebe's call te bis select Ieadership te embrace
its "deepest" inclinations can in no way be understood as part ofa h'bertine
philosophy or a form of morallaxity. Although, as we sbaU sœ in Cbapter X,
Nietzsehe's fatalistic side sometimes leads him in this diœctiOIl, on the whole he
sees the moral-psycbological malœ-up of the superlor human being as cbaraàerisl'd
•
by a rigorous, uncompromising form of self-discipline. The bigbest man's
embrace ofbis multifarious, intense. tbreateDingly cbaotic passions must, in
174
• Nietzsehe's view, he accompanicd by a rational fonn of self-surveillance and tight
control over the raging impulses (he introduces, however, a number of worri50me
exceptions to this IUle; wc shall discuss this in Chapter X). As we shall see later
(Chapter VIll), Nietzsche expects that the highest man's self-control will he
directed tawards the anainment ofone, overriding goal: reversing the ever-
on the road ta "recoVC[}'" (which, Nietzsche emphasi ses , must he a fonn ofself-
healing). The difficulty of this project seems ail the greatcr, and its attraetiveness
even more dubious, when, as wc shall sec in the next chapter. wc come ta
undeIstand that the pxucess ofmoral-spiritual development cao be begun ooly by
subjecting oneself ta widespread societa1 reprobation. ridicule, and intense personal
• suffering.
175
• Chapter YI: Reconstitutine the Master (2); The FlIebt jnto and Beyond
Sclitude
The higheSt type of man in bis fully developed state is a lover of virtue ("you
love your vi..rtue as the mother ber child..." zn ov) and, as a consequence, a
self-lover: "Your virtue is your dearest self [Es ist euer liebstes Selbst, eure
Tugend]." (Ibid.) As "a self-propelling wbeel, a first motion, a sacred Yes" (Z 1
3M)1 who finds meaning and strength from within, Nietzsehe's healthy man of
virtue taIces delight in bimself and bis OWD activity. The "image and epitome" of
bis "supple and persuasive body", claims zarathustra, is the figurative "self-
rejoicing soul" [selbst-lustige Seele] (Z m TET 2) in close consort with the
body. As zarathustra remarks of bis "dancer", "the self-rejoicing of such bodies
and souls calls itself: 'Vntue'." (Ibn)
As a natural extension ofbis virtuous self-love, the highest type cvinces a
profound love of ail the earth. Zsr:-.ihustra speaks ofan "eartbly virtuc" [Eine
irdische Tugend] that is in no way a "sign-post to superearths and paradises " (Z
IOJP) Men ofvirtue, he empbasises, strive for "the'kingdom ofearth" [das
Enlenreich] ratherthan the~mofheaven [Himmelreich]. (ZIV AF2) In
• 1 "_.cio Ncubeginncn, cio Spiel, cio aus sich rcllendcs Rad, cinc CISte
Bewegung. cin Heiliges Ja-sagen."
176
• The love of the earth does not imply, however, an indiscriminate embrace of
but also that the ugly shou1d he avoided: "1 honor the obsfimlte, fastidious
[widerspenstigen wilh1erischen] lOngues and stomachs that have Ieamed lo say
T and oYes' and 'No'." (Z m OSG 2)3 The higbest man's spontaneous,
uncompromising honesty manifests itself in negati.on. as weil as affiImation.
As wc noted in our earIier cxaminarion ofNielZSChe's critique of Jlineteenth-
CCDnny literaIy "Naturalism" {Chapœ:r 111), he beIieves that onIy the wlgar sort
• Caution. eveD. hostility towards new books is rather part of my instinct than
'tolerancc', 'largeur da coeur' and other fonns of 'neighbour love.'" (EH
"0ever"3)
ln
• evince an jnsatiable curiosity for everything and anything: "to chew and digest
everything - that is to have a really swinish natuIe [eine rechte Schweine-
Art]!••." (Ibid.)'+ "He who wants to understand all things among mer.,"
observes zarathustra elsewhere, "bas to touch all things. But my bands are too
clean for that." (Z m HC) In line once again with the tradition of moral
philoscphy sttetching back to Greek antiquity. Nietzsche proposes a willfiù
ignorance of wlgarity as a means of maintaining one's virtue. zarathustra sets
an example for others of bis kind by deciding to "[dwell] with stopped cars
among people with a strange language." (Z II OR) He clearly believes it
essential for "the language of their bartering and their baggling for power ... [to]
remain strange to [him]." (Ibid.)S Nietzsche speaks favourably Dot only of such
willful ignorance, but also ofwillfiù forgetting ofone's past en~unters with it
"Blessed are the forgetful," he declares (BGE 217). for forgetfulness represents
"a force, a form of robust hea1th" (GM ILl) in thase of "strong. full Dl\lDIes."
In this context the example of Mirabeau, who had "no memory for insults and
vile actions done [to] him," is cited (GM LlO).6 The desiIed goal appears to be
a state in which one bas "IejUVCl1llted [one's] cycs" and fœed oneself "from
4 Or perhaps a "donkeyish" nature, for zarathustra suggests that the ass "spums
DO one, Dot beggars Dor kings." (Z IV A 2)
S Sec also Z m ONL 21: "[Y]ou must pass many things by. especially I!'''st
you pass by many of the rabble.••" Bernard Williams, in bis recent discussion
of the virtIIe ethics tradition. bas commented on the importance of willed
ignorance and mainstream moral philoscphy's tendcncy ta overlook it "An
effective way for actions ta he 1Uled out is that they never come into thought at
aIl, and this is often the best way. One dacs DOt feel easy with the man who in
the course of a discnssion ofhow ta deal with political or bnsin"(SS rlvals ~-:.
'Of course, wc could have themkilled, but wc should lay that aside rl.ght from
the begiMiDg.' It should never have come into bis bands ta be laid aside. It is
cbaracteristic ofmorality [Le. modem moral philosophy; FA] that it tends ta
overlook the possibility that some c:oncems are best embodied in this way. in
deliberati.ve silence." (Williams 1985: 185) ,
6 Cf. Aristotle, whose magnanimous man [megalopsuchos] ois DOt proDe ta '"
178
• disgust" [Ekel] by "[flying] to the hcight wherc thc rabble no longer sit.... (Z n
OR), wherc thc pettincss of the majority cao no longer bc foremost in ooc's
mind.
Once again, the élite, minority status of Nietzsehc's imagincd audience,
those "most select" [Auserwiihltesten] who cao truly grasp bis ideas (EH
Forward 4), comes to the fore. zarathustra, likc Christ, is saie! to be a "fisher of
men", but with this aucial differcnce: in rcjccting Cbristianity's uni-...::tsalising
message, zarathustra wishes to bc much more discriminating in bis choice of
fishing hale and of catch. Unlike thosc who "sit all day with fishing-rods bcsidc
swamps and for that rcason think thcmsclves deep," who fish "wherc thcrc arc
no fish." (Z m OA 2), zarathustra, the "most wickcd of all fishcrs of men,"
sccks "thc faircst [schlinsten] human fish.. (Z IV HO) Earlier in thc tcxt,
7 For an ear1y example ofthis view, sec BAH, WS 131, whcre, aftcr stating bis
• view on what it means to improve OIIC'S literaIy style, declarcs, "[ilf you do not
straightaway agrce with this it will be impossible to convince yon ofit." (HAH
ll.2.131)
179
.
It is bere, in the contcxt of bis blankct rejcction of the possibility of moral
self-improvement on the part of the majority, that Nietzsche's afoIe1IlCDtioned
fataIistic reading of the "instincts" predomin ates over the more elastic view of
instincts found in bis developmental ethical model Appaxently, those without
the "natural equipment" of the naturally virtuous cao ooly = t , envy, and fear
virtue, and condemn ils manifestations as evil. It would he sheer folly, and a
simple wastc of rime, claims Nietzsche, te attempt te teaeh !hem te understand
and embrace it, as Zarathustta found out the bard way in the Prologue of 1hus
Spoke Zarathustra. "Zarathustra bas not come to say te aU these liars and fools:
'Wbat do YOu know ofvirtue? What couldyou know ofvirtue?'" (Z II OV) By
Parts II and m of this work, Nietzsche's alter-ego bas concluded that when one
is dOVln in the valley, one would he well-advised te "pass by" [Vorübergehn]
the many, for among !hem "aU speech is in vaïn.••" [da ist alles Reden umsonst]
chance, and accident." (WP 334)8 Once a plebeian (or noble) spirit,
180
The flISt thing in which l 'test the reins' cf a
person is whether he has in him a feeling of
distance [ein Gefiihl fir Distanz im Leibe].
whether he sees everywhc!'C rank, degree. order
between man and man, whether he distinguishes:,
one is thereby a gentleman [gentühomme]; in any
other event one belongs irretrievably to the widc-
hearted. alas! so good-hearted concept of the
canaille. (EH "CW" 4)
Along with acknowledging the fact of hierarchy and feeling himselfsuperior.
the superior human being at the height of bis powers ought to feeJ contempt for
and repulsed by bis inferiors. An interlocuter worthy of bis company. claims
Nietzsche, should be contemphlous of those Jacking the critical faculties to
question the "rich ambiguity of existence," those who do not or cannot tremble
"with the craving and the rapb1re of such questioning..•" (GS 2) The importance
ofcontempt as a sign of virble is pervasjve in 11lus Spoke Zarathustra. Another
ofZarathustra's names for the "Iast man" is "the most contempllole man"
[Veràchtüchsten] (Z Prologue 5), and it is presumed throughout the text that any
9 As W'C noted in Chapter IV, the objects of the higbest man's cop.tempt will he
all-too aware ofbis dici!ain' "Even when you are gentIe" towards the small-
minded, mediocre souls in the rnarlretp1ace, observes Zarathustra, "they still feel
you despise them.••" (Z 1OFM)
10 'Ibis notion of the salutary etfects ofdisgust and contempt, in tenns of their
reinforcemeut offeelings of RDngordnung and self-love, appears to belie
•
Nietzsche's insistenee in GM llO that master morality, unIiIœ its servile rival, is
complete1y seIf-sufficient in its refusa] to define itseIf relative to the Othcr. We
shall examine Nietzsche's view of the importance of the slave to the master more
c10sely in Chapters IX and X.
181
The grcat ncgation represenœd by contempt is part of the essentially affinDative,
"great, loving contempt [das grofte, das liebende Verachten] wbich loves most
wbcle it despises [verachtet] most" (Z m OGL), and claims "ta love the grcat
despisers, forthey are the great venerators [groflen Verehrendm] .•." (Z
Prologue 4; Z IV OHM 3) At the highest level ofbnman existence, the contempt
for much ofbnmankind is said ta he inseparable from the love ofcreation and
the desire to creation. "The lover wanlS ta create, becanse he despises! What
does he know oflove who bas DOt had to despise precisely what he loved?" (Z 1
OWC)
The noble with unfettered, healthy instincts can look to bis own body and ilS
senses as allies in the fight ta maintain the neeessal)' distance from and contempt
tawaId the herd. Blondel right1y observes that whereas the Platonic tradition
di1'ferentiates the noble from the base by way of the stomach. zarathustra is
made ta "describe the stomach momIly" (B1onde11991: 226) by Iefening ta bis
182
• [Krieger-Kostl, and "conquerers' food" [Eroberer-Kostl (z IV A 1). The
natural noble is said to possess a discriminating, selective palate and stomach:
"he is led by a faultless and severe instinct into doing nothing that disagrees with
some ill-constituted souI" [die Eingeweùfe einer mifiratenen Seele] (GM L12),
which he elsewhere describes as the "smell ofdissolution and decomposition
[der Geruch _. der Aufliisung. der Verwesung]." (TI EUM 20) Zarathustra
claims that such degenerate, "superf1uous" individuals [die Obeiflüssigen]
• goods as mattering a great deal. His highest man, for example, simply refuses
to "swallow" inferior types offriendship and commnnity, and seeks out higher
types that agree with him. More on this in the next chapter.
183
• there is usually a stink [da pflegt es zu stinken]. One should not go into
churches if one wants to breathe pure air." (BGE 30)
The visceral desire to maintain a distance from the mob is often described a.~
a question of hygiene. Nietzsche claims 10 possess "the instinct for c1eanliness"
(EH "WlSC" 8) and ofien describes contact with morally inferior types of people
the text "[w]hen 1 went to men for the fust lime," he reca1ls, "1 committed the
folly ofhermits [die Einsiedler-Torheit], the gxeat Colly: 1set myselfin the
market-placeJ And when 1 spoke to everyone, 1spoke 10 no one [ais ich zu
allen redete. redete ich zu keinem]." (Z IV OHM 1) Zarathustra, 1 would
suggest, is referring not only 10 bis earnest efforts in the Prologue to reform the
masses by speaking 10 them of the Obennensck. but also of bis own derogatory
comments directed 10wards them early on in the text: in part 1, Zarathustra is still
coneemed with "sayrmg] a word to the despïsers of the body." (Z 1ODB)
However. as Thus Spoke Zara1hlIstra moves towaId its end, and indeed as
Nietzsehe's own writing career draws 10 a close. even this sort ofvituperalÏve
184
• "Destiny" 1) Once in flIl11 possession of the sense of one's lofty position in a
natura! socio-political hierarchy, any other stance now seems preposterous:
"How could I. with this feeling of distance [Ge.fiiJùe der Distanz], even want the
'modem men' [<<Modemen» II know - to read me!" (EH "Books" 1)
Zarathustra's growing distaste for the idea of intervening in or ruling over
"herd society" is illustrated in several of bis comments in Part I and il on the
nature and origin of mainstream, European politics. He shows bis disgust with
have," he continues, "as ifbappiness sat upon the throne! Often filth [Sch1amm]
sits upon the throne - and often the throne upon filth, too." (lbid.) Disdaining al!
manner of activity that smacks of mercantilism, ZarathUStra ostensibly "turn[s]
[bis] back upon the rulers [den HerrscJrenden)" after discovering what they
associate with political ruIe: "bartering and baggling for power - with the rabble
[Gesindel]!" (Z il OR)12
Show me that you aIe not one of the 1ustfu1 or ambitious!" (Z 1 OWC) The
nature ofNietzsehe's critique emerges more clearly in the course ofbis 1aler
encounter with the "frothing fool" ofZ ID OPB. who lurks 1>Y the gales of the
gIell1 city and caricatures Z3rathUStra's teaehings in bis overwrougbt, pseudo-
• 12 1 shall argue in Chapter VIn, however. that Nietzsche's contempt for the
poUties ofherd society by no meaDS entails a xepudiation ofpoUties as such.
185
• discovers that the true, albeit unconscious motivation driving this petformance is
a contemptible, unrequitted desire for the flattery and praise of the many:
What, then, was it that started you grunting7 l'hat
nobody badflaltered you enough: therefore you
sat down beside this filth, 50 that you might have
cause for much grunting - 1 so that you might
have cause for much revenge! For all your
frothing, you vain fool, is revenge; 1have divined
you weil! (Z m OPB)
The fool's great disappointment at not being recognised and valued by the many,
leading to bis subsequent ressentiment and vengeful rhetoric, reveals a
misguided dependency on the opinion ofthose who, in Nietzsehe's view, ought
to he despised. This pseudo-prophet is deemed a foolWanse he does not sec
the fooIishness in seeking recognition from the herd)3 Zarathustra declares the
pursuit ofsuch recognition is essentially wrong-headed; the adulation of the
many is worthless, because their standards ofgreatness are worthless: "1 have
never believed the people when the}' la1ked about great men..." (Z il OR)14
A herd society based upon life.caIumniaring values can only honour those
who exude and defend these same values. By extension, herd society can only
shun and persecute those evincing hea1thy, noble, life-affin:ning values. Hence
the possession of pariah status amongst the herd, being shunned and mocked by
it, ought 10 he a badge ofhonour for the tru1y noble spirit: "he who is hated by
the people as a wolf is by the dogs," claims Zarathustra. ois the Cree spirit, the
enemy offetters..." (Z il OFP) Nietzsche argues, for examp\e, that all those
• people and the glmy revolve around the aetor_" (Z 1 OFM) Cf. Z il OGE:
'The wood revolves, not around the inventors of new noises, but around the
inventors of new values [die Erftnder von neuen Wertenl; it revolves inaudibly."
186
• attaeked by the "fust Christians" of the New Testament are "thereby signaIized.
•
ïmportance.ofvirtuous deeds themselves. and their long-term impact; like the
ligbt ofa distant, Dow-extÏDet star, the Dobility ofone's good cIeeds will continue
to travel, "eveu when its task is done. Though it be forgotten and dead, its beam
ofligbt still lives and trave1s." (Z n ov)
187
• "for a laugh" (Z IV HO). Zarathustra, who clearly secs a pedagogical raIe for
himself vis-à-vis a select group, bas time neither for the masses nor for their
shunned, would-be prophet: "This great city, and not ooly this fool, disgusts
me. In bath there is nothing to make better, nothing to make worse." (Z m
OPB) As he notes elsewhere, "beauty is unattainable to all violent wills." (Z n
OSM) The calmness required for beauty and virtue cao ooly be required,
believes Nietzsche, away from those who cao ooly drive one to distraction.
For those lofty types obliged to live amongst the herd, Nietzsche counsels a
studied, inscrutable aloofness to go along with lofty contempt. One of the marks
of nobility in contemporary European society, suggests Nietzsche, is the fact of
"always [being] disguised" [immer verkleidet]; "the higher the type, the more a
man requiIes an incognito." ('NP 943)16 The imperative ofself-defense dictates
this taetic: it would be dangerous to bear one's soul in the midst of the vulgar,
16 "je hôherer Art, um. 50 mehr bedarf der Mensch des incognito." In
Nietzsche's ideal society, by contrast, the highest human being is able to evince
undisguised contempt for the herd animal (Nietzsche, as 1 sball argue in
Cbapter X, associates openness and hoDCSty with "health", and counsels
~ ooly for those still obliged te live in berd society.)
188
• Since those with "woebegone souls" could not "endure [bis] bappincss",
zaratbustra reveals "ooly ice and winter on [bis] peaks." (Ibid.) He aIso
suggests, bowever, that bis outward, inscrutable austerity conceals a \Varmth
and lovingncss that, as we sball sec in the next cbapter, is being saveà for a
more select group ofcompanions: "not that my mountain aIso winds aIl the
girdles of sunlight around it!! They bear ooly the wbistling of my winter 51orms:
and oot that 1aIso fare over warm seas,like passionate, beavy, bot south
winds." (Ibid.)
In the passages cited above that advocate deception and inscrutability,
Nietzsche appears to follow a Stoic line of thougbt, suggesting that a stable,
virtuous cbaracter may be forged and maintained even within a vice-ridden
ambient culture. "[A]lthoUgb there are swamps and tbick affliction on earth,"
suggests Zarathustra optimisticaIly, "he who bas Iight feet runs even across mud
and dances as upon swept ice." (Z IV OHM 17) The pitfaIls ofslave moraIity
may be skipped over, as it were, by the dancing ·virtuoso with nimble feet.
Elsewhere, however, and (I would argue) more pervasively, Nietzsche
c1ear1y suggests that life amongst the herd is not a viable option for a noble type
of person interested in preserving bis virtue and contïnuing bis persona!
démarche of moral-spiritual development. This more AristoteIian view, the
view that one's environment and the company one keeps plays a detemlinant raie
189
• suffering of lower human beings affects him in a visceral way. As he takes
leave of the pathetic "ugliest man". for example, he feels "chilled and alone: for
he had absorbed much coldness and loneliness. to such an extent that even bis
Iimbs had grown colder." (Z IV VB) His confrontation with that
Schopenhauerian figure, the gioomy prophet, bas the same effect: Zarathustra
claims that he bas become "wet with [the gioomy prophet's] affliction and
drenched like a dog•.•" (Z IV CD) His self-prescribed cure for this contagious
Schopenhanerian pessimi sm is to "shake myself and run away from you [the
prophet]. so that 1 may become dry again.••" (Ibid.)
Delaying too long before making the alI-important break with the community
oforigin may have a deleterious effect on the nascent noble's vïrtue. In another
autobiographical aside, Zarathustra notes that while in close quarters with the
many-too-many. bis instinctive desire to remain aloof forced him to live "with
truths held back" [Mit veha1lenen Wahrheiten]. (Z mHO Obligee! to live
among them "disguised" [Verkleidet]. Zarathustra adroits that.he was alI-too-
ready to "misunderstand myselfso that 1might endure them [<midz» zu
verkennen, dojJ ich sie ertriige]." (Ibid.) It seems that self-understanding. for
Nietzsche, can develop only when one bas parted company with those from
• remain in close proximity to the large city: "Why did you live so long in the
190
• swamp that you had to become a frog and taOO yourself?/ ... Why did you not
go into the forest? Or plough the earth? Is the sea Dot full ofgreen islands?" (Z
m OPB) By remaining near the city, the fool bas been contaminated by it His
message, a1though infIuenced by Zarathustra's OWD rhetoric, is tainted by its
misdirection. Zarathustra cites as evidence of the fool's error the fact that the
masses aetuaIly ridicule him (as they ridiculed Zarathustra in the Prologue) and
look ta bis diatribes as a source ofamusement, rather than inspiration (Ibid.).
Nietzsehe's message seems ta be that those with an essentially healthy stance
towards life ought to surround themselves only with good things and good
company, in order to preserve their optimism: "Set good little perfect things
around you, you Higher Men! Things whose golden ripeness heaIs the heart
Perfect things teaeh hope [Vollkommenes lehrt hoffenJ." (Z IV OHM 15) For
Nietzsche, who seeks, like bis a1ter-ego, to "luxe" [wegzulocken] individuaIs
away from the herd (Z Prologue 9), one can only begin ta move in this direction
by first breaking cleaniy with one's primary, herd-like commnnity, including
one's biological family and fotmerly close friends.
Only when the master type begins ta bIeak with bis faIse consclousness and
adopt a critical distance from bath bis commUDÏty ofbirth and bis previous set of
values and loyalties is he on the road ta se1f-overcoming. Critique, or, as
Nietzsche often terms it, the "destruction" ofolder, faIse values and beliefs, is
essential for the cuItivation of the creative, affirmative self.18 His literary a1ter-
•
criticisms of rival. mendacious tables ofvalues, is aIso purveyor ofobjective
tnlth. The "cruel No" [dos grausame NeinJ, claims Z8rathustra, foIms part of
the seed from which truth is raised (Z m ONL 7).
191
• ego constantly insists on the intimate relation between creation and destruction:
"And he who bas to be a creator [Schlipfer] in good and evil," advises
Zarathustra, "truly, bas fust to be a destroyer [Vemichter] and break values
[Werte zerbrechen]." (Z n OSO; aIso Z 1 OTG) "[O]nly wCere there are graves
are there resurrectïons. n (Z n FS) Zarathustta argues that although the
destructive, "lionn part of the souI is itselfincapable ofcreation, the lion's
merciless, "Sacred No" [Heüiges Nein] provides the freedom for the
development of a new, creative space [Freiheit sich schaffen zu neuem Schaffen]
(Z 1 3M). A similar view is found in GM n.24, where Nietzsche deems it a
and, Hat the same lime, a sickness that can destroy the man who bas it.•." (HAB
1 Pre!. 3) The stage may tum "pathological", however, if it encourages a most
pemicious "genetalization" [die ungeheure VeralIgemeinenmg]: the idea that all
• tables ofvalue are emply and false simply bec8n sc one previously cherished set -
192
• a plebeian set, bound up with belief in God and a higher realm of Being - bas
been exposed as empty and false (WP 13)0 19 To remain stuck within whaI
critical stance towards ail thaI he previously held clear, the naïve, uncriticallove
of former titues is transformed into such bitter disappointment as to engender the
opposite extreme: an indiscriminate hatred and repudiation of ail values. Having
overthrown God and rejected the existence of another, higher realm ofBeing
which heretofore gave meaning and value to this earth, the still-immamre critie
now heaps scom on any effort aI finding meaning in the world. "Now thaI the
shabby origin ofthese values [die mesquine Herkunft dieser Werthel is
becoming elear," Nietzsche explains in the Nachlass, "the unive= seems to
have lost value, seems 'meaningless' [<<sinnlos>>l..." (WP 7)'1JJ The idea
thaI there is no meaning becomes, in a sense, a new religion for the youthful
nihilist; having "tom himself away" from the older metaphysical traditions, he
fetishises bis own tranmatie break with bis former commnnity and table of
values, feeling compelled "10 tum bis unbelief into a new belief, a purpose, a
martyIdom." (GS 346) The young iconoclast does not Yel possess
• Geji1hl do Werthlosigkeitl was reac:berl with the realiZlltion thaI the overaIl
character ofexistence may not he interpreted by means of the concept of 'aim,'
the concept of 'unity' 0.0 50 the worId looks va1uelesso"
193
• the strength to reverse values [die Werthe
umzuwenden] and to deify becvming and the
apparent world as the ooly world, and to call them
good [dos Werdende die scheinbare WeIt ais die
«Einzige» zu vergottlichen. gutzuheiften].
(VIP 585a)2\
In the absence of this ability to Jasagen, the youth of noble instincts may
lose bis faith in humanity, in the great potential of its best exemplarso In its
absence, a "great disgust al man" [Der groj3e OberdrufJ am Menschen] creeps
into bis throat to choke him, as it aImost chokes Zarathustra himself (Z m C
2)022 Like the Wagnerian "sorcerer" figure who appears near the end of
Zarathustra's saga. "disgust [der Ekel] 0.0 clings to [bis] mouth"; he now
"reap[s] ilisgust as [bis] single trutho" (Z IV S 2) Contempt for humanity
translates inta self-loathing, as Zarathustra prophesises to bis disciples early on:
one day solitude will make you weary, one day
your pride will bend and your courage break..J
One day you will no longer see what is exalted in
you; and what is base in you, you will s::e all too
closely [Einst wint du dein Hohes nicht mehr
sehn und dein Niedriges allzunahe]••• (Z 1 OWC)
With neither a clear sense of bis higher possibilities nor indeed any hope for
the future, the wayward, self-hating youth finds salace in perpelnating that
initial, iconoclastie pleasure experienced as a result of breaking ftee from the
21 As Scbacht right1y notes, Nietzsche believes that most people have "bccome
addicted ta [the idea of Gad] as a means ofxendering tlIeir lives endurable...
bebind this tendency [Nietzsche] discerns a fJmdamentallack of Se1f-confiden~
and of the sttength ta accept and affirm life in this wodd..." (Schaebt 1983: 126)
Altbougb the youtbful nibilist bas rejected bis former belief in Gad, he bas not
yet overcome this lack ofself-confidence.
22 In Z n OR Zarathustraconfesses that at one point disgust tboroughly
consnmed bim: ""Not my bate but my disgust [N'rcht mein HajJ. sontlem mein
194
• exuberance" (HAH 1 Pref. 4) th:J.t comes with it - is sustained by maintaining the
same ironie, debunking attitude towards everything and everyone. Early in Part
1of TItus Spoke Zaratlutstra, Nietzsche evokes the metamorphosis of the
•
you can, for you will!' [alles ist Freiheit: du
kannst, denn du willst] (Z m ONL 9)
195
In this passage the "freedom" of perpetuaI, untramme11ed scepticism is portrayed
bis own, deepest instincts; instincts which are aimed at creative, optimistic
•
irnpediment, ie. negative fIeedom in Jsaiah Berlin's sense (Berlin 1969), is
desîrable only forthose in whom noble instincts are dominant, for ooly these
individuals will use their h"berty to good ends. As wc shall sec in Cbapter VIn,
this view bas great implications for N"1ClZSChe's politics.
1%
Thus Nietzsche joins with a vast and disparate group of past moral and political
philosophers, including Aristotle, Machiavelli. Locke and Rousseau. who
identify liberty with the "positive freedom" (in Isaiah BerIin's sense) involved in
perfecting our nature in the performance of virtuous deeds.24
Nietzsche identifies a num1ler ofequally undesirable paths that nihilistic
negative freedom could take. For exampJe, the nihilist could grow weary at the
struggle between rival tables of values, dec1aring it al1 a matter of indifference
and sliding into a weary reIativism. Zarathustta indicates that this is the path of
"weak men" [schwacher Menschen] who ask: "'Why have we ever taken any
way? It is a matter ofindifferencel" It sounds pleasant to their cars when it is
preached: 'Nothing is worth whilel You shall Dot wilIl·.... (Z m ONL 16)
SchOpenhauerian teaching appears to he the target here. Further on in Part m.
Zarathustta !ables this perpelUal1y sighing. "AIl is vain" perspective a "sham-
wisdom" [4fier-Weisheit]. worthy of "slaves [Knechte] and old men and weary
men..." (Z m TET 2)25
Another Iikcly consequence of the nihilistic deifieation of negative freedom is
the embrace ofhedonism and the laisser allerphilosophy that, as wc noted in
the previous cbapter. Nietzsche 50 detests The man with the spark. of nobility
197
indulging in "briefpleasures" and "[having] hardly an aim beyond the day." (Z 1
OTM) Likc the Shadow characterofZ IV S. sucha man basembraced the view
and beliefin thegood" ralle Schom und aller Glaube an die Gute1I] (ZIV S).
He bas succumbed 10 the base sensualism of the herd even as he tries to appear
above it by cultivating an ironie demeanour: he "snatch[es] at sweets••••
eling[mg] to [bis] sttaw oflife and mock[ing] that [he is] still clinging to a
sttaw." (Z 1 OPD)26
Altematïvely. the nihilistie persanality may fall prey as easily to dogmatie
ideologies of vaIYing sorts as it does 10 empty irony and weary relativism. After
patiently listening 10 the Shadow's praise of negative ii:eedom in Z IV S.
Zarathustra warns him that he is likely 10 sueeumb to any "narrow belief. a bard,
stem illusion rein enger Glaube einflingt, ein harter. strenger Wahn]! For
henceforth everything that is narrow and firm will entice and tempt yon." The
nihil.ist. ill at ease with himselfand the worId, may find as much comfort in the
"prison" ofdogmatie beliefas the criminal finds in being finally c:aptw:ed: "Have
yon ever seen how captured criminals sleep? They sleep peacefully, they enjoy
theirnew security." (Ibn)
Wbatever face the young persan chooses 10 adopt - irony, extreme
scepticlsm, or c!clgnwism - Nietzsche a1ways tteats bis njbi1ism as the samc
phenomcnon, a "stteteh of desert, exhaustion, disbelief. icing up in the midst of
198
• youth, this interlude of old age at the wrong time..." (GS Pref. 1) If, however,
the young person's instincts are fundamentally sound, and if he finds the proper
guidance !bat spurs him to listen lO bis deepest inclinations, he may find the
inner strength lo overcome bis bittemess and engage œ. the neX!, crucial
"he who had lo create always had bis prophetic dreams and star-auguries - and
he believed in belief!" (Z n OLe) In line with the child metaphor, Nietzsche
199
• subtler [raffinierter] than one bas ever been
before. (GS Prei. 4)
NielZSChe's Jasagen ultimately involves the emergence of a more hopeful
attiblde 10watds the fumre, as illustrated in bis description of the escape from
dead-end nihilism in terms of "a reawakened faith in a tomorrow and the day
after tomorrow, of a sudden sense and anticipation of a future, of impending
adventures, of seas that are open again, of goals that are permitted again,
believed "'~." (GS Pref 1) 1would argue, however, that Nietzsche strongly
suggests that this reawakening cannot occur in the bosom ofherd society. For
the affirmative stance to be attained, the soul must be cJeansed; and this, for
Nietzsche, means an abandonment of the mainstream altogether in the course of
building an entirely new life.
Living amongst bis inferiors, the noble sort who discovers the hDetating
effect ofcritique could begin 10 despise the bad company surrounding him with a
passion that might overwhelm bis essentially aftjnnative, optimistic state.
N"1elZsche, as wc bave just seen, takes this threat seriously, and suggests that the
best way to protect the highest man's essential, but fragile, optimism is 10 bave
•
avoid such a debilitating waste of energy is for the higbest man 10 effect a
200
• "radical retreat into solitude as a sclf-defense against a contempt for men that had
become pathologiClllly clairvoyant..." (GS Pref. 1)
In a number ofautobiogrnphical passages, Nietzsche c\aims that bis own
decision to escape bis society of origin and scek out solitude was made
suddenly, alter a fldsh of insight. He speaks of a "reveIation, in the sense that
something suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and subtlety, [became] visible,
audible, something that sbalces and overtums one to the depths..." (EH "Z" 3)
This cpiphany was both complete1y out of bis control and powerliilly h"berating:
•
29 zarathustra nOIeS that acommon, fustmletion to the cxposÏtion of the "hani
truths" of modem, henl society is resistaucc, and even hostility towards the
pedagogue: "Truly, 1 have taken a hundred maxims and yourvil'tues' cIearest
playthings away from yoD; and yoo scold me DOW, as children scold." (Z n ov)
201
• 10 he. "The voice of the herd will still ring within you," wams Zarathustra.
"[II]nd when you say: 'We have no longer the same conscience, you and r, it
will he Il lament and Il grief." (Z 1OWC) Zarathustra here seems 10 he
descn"bing the inner tonnent ofone of bis disciples, the young man of Z 101M
who, upon bis break with the values of bis commllnity oforigin, still finds the
conscience of bis former community ringing in bis ears as he suffers through its
ostracism ofhim: "No one speaks 10 me," he laments, "the frost of my solitude
makes me tremble." His wish 10 "cise into the heights" bas made him Il pariah
amongst bis former comrades ("When 1 ascend 1 oftenjump over steps, and no
step forgives me that"), and the IeSU1ting misery makes him doubt the wisdom of
Nietzsche notes that someone in the position of this young man might very
weIl consider IelIeatÎIlg from the critical stance by seeking once again the warmth
of the herd community. "In the yellow sand and bumed by the sun," this
be1eaguered, noble soul may "blïnk tbirstily at the islands fi1led with springs
where living aeatures rest beneath shady trees." (Z n OFP) Wbile finding this
temptation understandable, Nietzsche bas only contempt for the backslidel:s who
would actnally snccumb 10 the sùen song of their commnnities of origin. who
would grow "welIIy", snccnmb 10 the "common, comfortable" [mllde, gemein,
bequem], and actuaUy slander "their morning boldDess." (Z m OA 1) Whereas
they once "Iifted their legs like Il dancer", recaIls ZanIthuslra, with an eye 10 such
backslidel:s (real or imagined), now they "creep 10 the Cross." (Ibid.) In the
30 "He who proœeds on bis own path," notes N'Jetzscbe in D Pref. 2, becomes
aIl-too-awme ofbis alienation from bis fonner friends: "bis path is his aIone - as
•
is, of COUISe, the bittemess and occasional ill-humour he feeIs at this 'bis alone':
among wbich is inc1uded, for instance, the knowledge that even bis friends me
unable 10 divine wbeI:e he is or wbither he is going, that they will SOOJCtimes ask
tbc:mse1ves: 'wbat? is he going at aIl? does he still bave - Il pathT"
202
• end. they tum out not 10 bave been the stuff of true nobility aCter aIl, for they
lack tbat which only the few, fine exemp1ars of humanity bave in their hearts: "a
By contrast, the tnIe noble does not allow bis thirst for companionship and
bis fear and anguish in its absence 10 persuade him "10 become Iike these
comfortable creatures [Behaglichen): for whete there are oases there are aIso
idols [Gèitzenbilder)." (Z n OFP) Raving intimate knowledge of the fear and
pain of social disapprobation, he Iefuses 10 let these emotions dominate him:
203
• discovery). One should not, he stresses, abandon this suffering prematurely and
seek relief in the "pitiable comfort" of herd existence. '"The way to yourse1f,"
claims Zarathustta, is also "the way of your afflication." (Z 1OWC) Throughout
Nietzsehe's account ofzarathustra's odyssey. suffering consistently appears as
a reliable indicator of the authenticity of one's efforts at self-improvement:
"C>enuine [Wahrluiftig] - that is what 1 call him who goes into god-forsaken
deserts and bas broken bis venerating heart [sein verehrendes Herz]." (Z fi
OFP) In the midst of Zarathustra's chastisement of the so-called "higher men"•
we leam that one of the clearest signs of their moral-spiritual impoverishment is
their not having "suffered enough" (Z IV OHM 6). A mea~ of the depth of
our examination of life, Zarathustra suggests earlier. is the depth ofour
suffering.33
Suffering [Leid]. then, is an essential part of the packageofauthentic self-
overcoming and a precondition ofcreativity. There is "much bitter dying" (Z fi
OBI) in the life of the creative individual; ie. one must he prepared to
countenance mpeated zeenminations - and even l'ejection - of one's most
cberished beliefs and closest relationships in order to reemerge as a "child new-
bom".34 One who aspires to this new-bom status "must also he willing to he
33 "[A]s cleeply as man looks into life, 50 cleeply does he look also into
suffering [$0 tief der Mensch in dos Leben sWa. so tiefsieht er auch in dos
Leiden]." (Z m OVR 1) The suggestion that suffering is a precondition for the
cultivation ofbnman excellence is also made powerfuIly in BGE 225: "The
discipline ofsuffering. ofgreat suffering - do you DOt know that it is this
discipline alone which bas created every elevation of mankind bitbcrto? Sec also
WP 910: "To those human beings who are of any concem to me 1 wish
suffering. desolation, siclmess. ill-treatrnent, indignities._ 1wish them the only
thing that can prove today whcther one is worthy anytbing or DOt - that one
endures." One of the ttu1y coutemptible features of an slave DlOIlI1ity. for
Nietzsche. is its desire to abolish an manner ofsuffering, its aspiration for what
he refeI:s to dcdsive1y as an "English bappiness". ie. a life cIwacterised 501ely
by the pmsuit of "comfort and fashion" (BGE 228).
•
3'J "One pays deady for being immortal: one bas to die several tilDes while
alive." (EH "Z" S) Leiter rightly observes tbat N"JetzsChe sees suffering as a
pœrequisile ofany great bnman achievement (Leiter 1995: 31). His account of
the itapoltanœ Nietzsche atttibutes to suffering is flawed. however. in one
204
• the mother and endure the mother's pain." (Ibid.) The metaphor of maternaI
labour pain reappears once again in the Preface to the Gay Science. when
Nietzsche insists that "we have to give birth to our thoughts out ofour pain.••
Only great pain is the ultimaIe hôerator of the spirit." (GS Pref. 3)35
Nietzsche sees one of bis most important but difficult tasks as encouraging
bis fellow travellers to embrace this 10neIiness and suffering by breaking with
their primary communities. "One forgets what one bas leamed about men,"
wams zarathustra, "when one lives among men... [W]hat can far-seeing. far-
seeking eyes do there!" (Z m HC) Nietzsebe's position appears to he: no
psychological distance from the herd without physical separation from it. In the
absence of this physical and psychological distance, one cannat adopt the
superior bird's eye view of the wood desaibed in Chapter 1, the objecû've view
ofhow things truly aIe. Even the comforting camaraderie of the youthful,
ideaHstic worshippers smrounding zarathustra is no substitute for the insights
derived from a period ofenforced solitude. As Z3rathustra mentions to bis
loving disciples in Z 1OBV 3. "[y]ou had not yet sought yomselves when you
found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all belief is of so little account."
Although these youthful, nasœnt noble types took an important stcp in negaring
their a:)11 In"mities of orlgin. they betrayed their continued attachment to servile.
• Unlike noble suffering, seen as the by-product of the all-consumiog desiIe for
self-improvetDCllt, p1ebeian suffering is traced back to the slave type's dim
awareness ofbis own inadequacies and wretchedness.
205
• worship. with Zarathustra as its godhead. Uoless the abject of their veneration
gently pusbes them away onto solitaly paths. they may tum into the pathetic. 50-
called "bighermen" burlesqued in Part IV. who bang on Zarathustra's every
ward while never really understanding what he says. Like the "king on the
right". the}' will find meaning and value only in the persan of their Master:
"'There is no longer any point in living, it is a11 one, everything is in vain: except
and the self-satisfacti'>D thatcomes with the be1iefthatone bas fina11y attained
one's ethical œlos. Committed ta the idea ofperpetual self-improvement, he
makes bis literaIy aeatÎon impLess upon bis disciples that "mak[mg] peace [IS
• only] a mcans ta new wars." (Z 1OWW) B1issful peace of mind must give way
206
• ta the terrible. war-like, psychic agony of soliwde !bat is the precondition of
moraI and spiritual independence and further growth. At the end of this same
section, Zarathustra compares the tempting, facile bappiness !bat pursues him ta
a woman who aims to dominait: ber man and suppress bis independence
altogether (Ibid.).36 One must develop a "hatred ofIove" ofthis sort (HAH 1
Pref.3). ZaratilUStIa bas this sort of"desire for love" [das Behehren noch
liebe] in mind when he decIares: "To desire -!bat now means to me: to have lost
myself [Begehren - das heijJt mir schon: mich verloren haben].•." (Z m OIB)
For Nietzsche. this is type of "love" is in filet pseudo-love; through Zarathustra,
he argues !bat one does not yet know love's troe meaning if one bas not drunk
fIom the cup ofbittemess: "There is a bittemess [Bittemis] in the cup ofeven
the best love: thus it arouses longing for the Superman [Sehnsucht zwn
that he is a bridge and not a goal; what cao be loved in man is that he is agoing-
across and a down-going rein t1beI'gUIIg und ein Untergang ist]." (Z Prologue
4; andZIV OHM 3)
207
• We began this chapter with an examination of Nietzsehe's stress on negation
- i.e. bis critical debunking of inferior tables of values and the ideas and practices
reIated to them - as a precondition for moral-spiritual se1f-improvement. A
Nietzschean affitmation of "life", 1 argued, should not be equated with an
indiscriminate embrace of all manner of human existence; on the contrary, the
highest man must leam to shun and repudiate as well as to affirm. In particular,
superior human beings should abandon their futile, wrong-headed efforts at
reforming mainstream society and its slavish-minded people (who, in
Nietzsche's fatalistic view, are beyond hope), and instead, under the guidance of
their visceral, sensitive "psychological antennae", exert hea1thy, se1f-defensive
strategies aimed at sheltering themse1ves from all manner of contemptuous,
"herd" influt'.nce.
society, will overwhelm the me spirited rebel complete1y, thereby stifling bis
essentially affumative, Jasagen-ing disposition. Nietzsche explores in this
context the dangers of the nihilistic personality, !bat pathology of untramrneled
negation barn of youthful, bitter disillusionment at the shattering of naIve,
complacent belief. It is this concem for the well-beïng of the me spirit !bat
compe1s Nietzsche te encourage in bis select readers notjust a noble aloofness
from the herd. but a sttonger, visceral feeling ofcontempt and a desire te flee at
allcosts. ~
208
•
move. Nietzsche insists !bat such persona! suffering is in fact a precondition for
further moral-spiritual growth. Those who embrace it, and suffer the mockery
and/or rejection of lower order people, show admirable courage and
determination. Nietzsche aiso empresses upon us the unavoidability of this type
of suffering. in light of how deeply interna lised slave moral categories are in the
hearts of nascent noble types and of how difficult it would he to effect such a
drastic change in value stances.
The suffering is also. Nietzsche hopes, temporary. As wc shall sec in the
next chapter. Nietzsche argues that the future-oriented optimism of those who
overcome the temptations ofnihilism by f1eeing mainstream, heId society cao he
sustained in the long run only by arrempting tu reconnect with humanity. After a
necessaI)'. cJeansing period of solitude, the free spirit must seek out and find
suitable companions in orderto continue bis moral-spiritualjoumey.
Nietzsche also believes, however. that wc cao enter into a friendship of this
higher sort ooly after wc have traVCISCd a difficult, solitaI)' period in which wc
succeed in adoptiDg an affirmative stance with respect to our own past and to the
pastingeneral. This "Iedemptïoo" ofthepast [Die VergangenzuerlOsen] (Zn
OR; z m ONL 3). suggests Nietzsche, cornes through an inward, psychological
"stretching" !bat is said to result from CC1ndnctiDg a thought experiment known as
the Etemal Return of the Same. h is to Nietzsche's account of the Etemal
•
Retum, and to bis view of the sort offriendship po8S1ole in its aftermath, that we
DOW tom.
209
• Chapter vu; Reconstituting the Master (3); Jasagen and the "Que for
Friendship and Communjty
They are an expression ofa great sagacity, even the supIeIIlC sagacity•••" (EH
"Oever" 9) As wc noted in the last chapter, Nietzsche believes that one must pass
tbrough periods of great persona! upheaval and anguish, suffer ridicule and
ostraeism, and talœ many "wrong" tums in arder ta attain the lofty moral and
spiritual outlook of the highest man. Were this superior individual·given the
hypothelical chance ta live bis life over again, Nietzsche believes that ifhe ttuly
210
• loves himself (and he must, if he is to qualify as a "highest man"), he would
assent unhesitatingiy 10 the whole process again. 'Was that hfe?" remaries the
highest sort of man. 'WeU then!" he courageously decides: "Once more!" (Z m
OVRl)
The Etemal Retum doctrine, moreover. involves imaginatively embracing the
prospect ofa hypothetical, never-ending repetition aIl of existence, and not simply
the retum ofincidents related directly to one's own life. "My formula for
greatness in a human bcing," declares Nietzsche towards the end of bis career. "is
amorloti: that one wants nothing to be other than it ÎS... Not merely to endure that
which happens of neeessïty. stilliess to dissemble it - an ideaJism is untruthfulness
in the face of necessity - but to love it... "(EH "Oever" 10)
Given the discriminating soul's keen awareness of the Rongordnung between
nobility and wlgarity and bis utter contempt for the latter, it is easy to appreciate
how such an individual, al first giance, would view the prospect ofsuch an
UDconditional embrace with horror. 'Ibis thought experiment, after an, entails
imaging the etemaI recurrence Dot just of an that is beautiful, but ofugliness as
weil; even of the contemptably wlgar, slave-like man: ""l'he man ofwhom you
aIe weary, the little man, recurs etemally'," 2'.arathustra repeats incredulously to
himself. " •.. etemaI recuaence even for the smallest! that was my disgust al an
existence [das war mein OberdrujJ an allem Dasein]!" (Z mC 2)2 Nietzsche's
harsh thought experiment is one that envisages affiImation "even ofsuffering
211
• invoked once again in Z mom, when Zarathustra concedes he has yet to
summon the strength ofcharacter and "arrogance" [Obermute] required to
"summon [it] up." (Ibid.)
Nietzsche wants to convince us, however, that heing an unconditional
affinner of all ofexistence need not entai! abandonment of our visceral disdain for
vulgarity and baseness. He clearly wishes the higher sort of man to retain bis
•
then, that an jmaginative, loving embracc of all that bas 00CUlTed is in faet
212
• compatible with the maintenance of a heightened, discriminating sense. How is it
possible ta reconcile the two?
Cearly the reconciliation is not easy; as we have just seen, Nietzsche calls it a
"psychological problem". He believes that this unconditional, yet discriminating
embrace cm be attained only by a mature individual, who bas developed a sttength
of character that appears only lifter the turbulence of youth bas subsided. It is only
Mat the midday ofour life," he informs us, "that we understand what preparations,
bypaths, experiments, temptations, disguises the problem had need ofbefore it
was al10wed ta rise up before U5.••" (HAH 1 Pref. 7) Successful conduct of this
thought experiment, therefore, presupposes the overcoming of the dangers of
youthful nihilism The highest man is ready ta embrace it only when he is able te
keep beauty and virtue in the forefront of bis mind at all times. In other words,
213
• The EternaI Return and the Triumph over FoTtuna
upon the highest mountains," observes Zarathustra, "laughs at aIl tragedies, real or
imaginary [lacht aber alIe Trauer-Spiele lI1I/l Trauer-Emste]." (Z 1ORW)
NIetzsche be1ieves bis thought experimen~ ta be 50 empowerlng as ta banish the
in GM) ofthe self-snfficiency of the highest type ofhlJ1D8n being in dceming the
Datura1 slave type "necessary" (m this iDstrumental sense) ta the deve10pment of
the bighest type. .
4 "yes, something invuInerable, UDbw:iable is within me rein
Unvuwundbares,
Unbegrabbares ist an mir], something that reuds rocks: it is called my W"11l.
Silently it steps and unchangîng through the yearsJ It sball go i15 course upon my
feet, my old Will; hlud ofheart and invu1Dc:rable is i15 tenFJ Iam invu1Dc:rable
only in my hee1s. You live there and are always the same. most patient one! You
• will always bIeak out of aIl graves!" (Z nPS) Just as IeVCa1ing is Zarathustra's
charaaerlsarionofthestrongwill as "thisdispellerofneed" [diese Wendealler
Not]. (Z 1 OBV 1)
214
• very notion of accidentaI 0CCIIlleIlCC (31 least with respect ta the superior man):
Zarathustra serves notice !bat "[t]he time bas passed when accidents [Zlifd1le]
could befall me; and what couid still come ta me !bat was not already my own?" (Z
mW)S
forces beyond their conlIOl, whether these forces aIe seen as stemming from God
or as completely independent, capricious phenomena. Unable ta creatively rethink
the pasto "he who is of the mob" [Pobel) uncritically submits ta its authority. AIl
!bat is past, for this sort of man, simply is "handed over" [Also ist alles
Ve1'8angene preisgegeben]. (Z m ONL Il) Unable ta will the past, he "is only
'willed', he is the sport of every wave" (Z m ONL 16), a fact !bat fills him with
regIet and recrlminarion.6 Bitterly IeSCI1tful of the cards !bat "fate" bas dealt bim,
he cannot Iep1icate the courage of the higbest man and face unblinkingIy the
prospect of living bis life over again in exactly the same way.
and rancor, not ta mention revenge (Chapter IV). Z8r!Uhustra observes how the
weak, servile will tums ill-tempered. "gnasbing its teeth" in its awaxeness ofits
own impotence (Z m ONL 3), and "tak[mg] revenge for its inability to go
• ta!œ clwge of and fully embrace tbeirpast, tbey remain filled with œgret: "Many a
burden, many a memory weigbs down your shoulders; many an evil dwarf
crouches in your comers." (Z IV G)
215
• backwards" (Z n OR) by making others suffer for its own impotence. "[T]bis
alone," explains Zarathustra, ois revenge itse1f: the wiIJ's antipathy towards time
and time's 'It was'." (Ibid.)
Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Retum is therefore a test to see if the
prospective noble cao triumph over such rancor. and ultimately over what
Nietzsche identifies as "the world's oldest nobility": "Lord Chance" [«Von
Ohngeflihr» - das ist der iilteste Adel der Welt]. (Z m BS) Although he
216
• new orthodoxy would have it). but rather ta subdue ber entirely. as illustrated in
this graphie depiction ofcomplete and utter submission:
1am zarathustra the GodIess: 1 cook every chance
Ueden Zufall] in my pot. And only when it is quite
cooked do 1 welcome it as my foodJ And truly.
many a chance came imperiously ta me: but my will
spoke ta it even more imperiously [mancher Zufall
kom herrish Vl mir: aber herrischer noch sprach
Vl ibm mein Wille]. then it went down imploringly
on its 1aIees -/ Imploring she1ter and love with me,
and urging in wheedling tones: 'Just see. 0
zarathustra, how a friend comes ta he a friend!' (Z
mVMS3)
Unlike the ancient Romans. who deified Chance as the goddess FortullO..
Nietzsche refuses ta see contingency as a powerful, independent force in the lives
of the finest human beings. The only god he wisbes the highest I:IlIIl ta worship is
bis own self. the self-creating Obermenseh, before whom there cao he no rivaIs.9
9 "Better no god, bettcr ta produce destiny on one's own account [üeber aJI/eigne
Faust Schù:1csal machen]. bettcrta he a fool, bettcrta he GodoneseIf [üeber
selber Gott sein]!'" (Z IV RS) Elsewbere, zarathustta w:ges liko-minded souls ta
consïdcrthemseIves tbeir own "fate": "And if you will not he fates [Schicksale]. if
you will DOt he inexorable [Unetbittliche]: how cao yoo - CODquerwith me?" (Z m
ONL29) .
10 In one scene in 7'hus Spoke Ztm1Ihustra, Life appeIIIS in a female persona,
descn"bing hersc1f as "changeable and 'mtaJDC'd and in evuything a woman, and no
virtuous one." (Z n DS) Z8rathustralater makes it clear wha1 is the best way ta
dea1 with such a mocking, wild woman: "To the Ihythm of my whip you shall
shrlek and trot! Did 1 forget my whip? - 1 did notl" [Nach don Takt meiner
• Peitsche $OUst tbl mir tom:en und schrein! lch vergafJ doch die Peitsche nicht? -
Nein!) (Z mSDS 1) An extended disMlssi'Jl1 ofNietzsebe's stance tawards
women must he defemd ùntiI C1apter IX.
217
• dcpend only on human effort, things that human beings can always control, no
matter what happens in the world around them." (Nussbaum 1992: 263)
(Ibid.). The Stoics Iatcr radicalised this thought, insisting that the good man ought
even the most admirable ofmcn. What separates the virtuous ODes from the
majority. in theirview. is the ability of the fonnerto en:ct effective "d.ykes". of
either a strietly interna!, psychological natme or of a political nature, 10 stem
218
• spiritually and morally impoverisbed, the same, he insists, cannot be said for the
finest, who have succ:essfully pelfonned the psychological conjuring aet of the
Etemal Rctum. Once one bas successfully "willed backwards" and thereby
masteIed all of lime and destiny, there is no longer any need for compensatory
strategies; in the lives of the finest, Fortune plays no further role.
Given this insistence on associating the conquest offortuna with the highest
form ofethical development, it would seem I3ther incongroous to suggest that
NielZSChe aIso argues - in diamelric opposition to the Stoics - for the importance of
"externa1 goods" like friendship and community in the lives ofhis highest men.
As 1 shall argue beIow, however, this is just what N"1etZSChe does, thereby
sacrificing a great deal of theoretical consistency. For these views are indeed
incompatible; how could one hold that the higbest man's virtue is invulnerable to
contingency while, al the saDIe time, insist that the inherently uncertain, contingent
goods offriendship and commllDity are necessary preconditions for virtue's
cultivation?
1 intend to explore this tension, and take up NieIZSChe's views on friendship,
prevailing orthodoxy.
219
• towards any and every fonu ofhuman community. The consensus on tbis point
extends over a very broad field, encompassing commentators who disagree
ecboes tbis view. declaring tbat "for the most part, [Nietzsche] remains an
advocate of the individua1 against the 'berd' tendencies ofsociety." (Warren 1988:
12 Furtber on in tbis text, bowever. Scbacllt comctly observes tbat with lespect
•
10 Nietzsebe's concepJion ofmaster moraliJ;y "we are confronted with a
fllnc! amc:nta1Jy sociol mode of valuation, ldlecting the cba1acter of one sort of
group and bound up with its relation ta anotlJer." (ScbaclIt 1983: 409) If tbe1e is
indeed an impoI1aDt social dimc:nsion 10 master mora1ity. in what sense can we say
220
• MacIntyIe, whose spirited antagonism towards postmodemism is well-known,
that the harmonious inner state ofNietzsche's ptototypical master is "exila social"
in nature?
13 Lciter also shares in this consensus Altbough he effective1y aiticisCs many
aspects of the new orthodoxy (Leiter 1992, 1994), he maintaïns tendentiously that
•
Nietzsche shouId DOt be seen as endOIsing any vadent of"mastecmorality",
becmlSe such an endorsement would a11egedly "require an embedding in particular
cornIDImal ~ and traditions foreign to the Nietzsche who a$Ïgns higher
value to 5OIJbK1e and individual creation." (Leiter 1993: 263)
221
of these orders, the "subservient, unauthoritalive and un-self-sufficïent species of
man" [nicht herrschenden, nicht autoritativen und auch nicht selbst-genugsœnen
Art Mensch] who possesses "the instinct for bis own kind" (BGE 206), is pictured
vividly by zarathustra as a "lover of bis neighbour" Dot out of authentic virtue, but
out of neœssity. This "dependent" [abhangigen] (Ibid.) type cannot bear the
thought ofexistence without the warmth generated by rubbing himself against
others (Z Prologue 5). As we notcd in Chapter II, Nietzsche believes that the
"good works" of this dependent type of man are performed with an eye for
"honour and recognition" becanse of bis desire for "that constant affirmation of bis
value and bis utility" so desperately needed to Ieinforce bis own shaky sense of
self-worth (BGE 206). His vanity, in other woIds. conceals a profound self-
loathing that prevents the dependent man !rom finding self-valuation in the absence
ofconstant, comforting recognition of others like bimself. Thus, zarathustra
observes, he cau hardIy "endure to he alone with [bimself]..•" (Z 1ONL) "You
tlee 10 your neighbour away from yourselves," zarathustra points out 10 those of
Nietzsche recommends solitude only for those few who have the moral
strel1gth 10 endure the pain ofsocial ostracism and the loneliness that comes with
it. Without the sound and healthy self-love of the master type. "those who have
tumed out badly" [MfPratenen] cau only experience solitude as a prison (Ibid.),
or, as he notes elsewhere. as "poison" [Einsamkeit wird G!fi]. (GS 359) Hence
the futility of the attempts br woebegone souls 10 escape !rom tbemselves and their
own base desiIes in10 a life ofascetic self-knial, eitber in a monaste1y or the
desert "many should he dissnaded !rom solitudcJ Has there ever been anything
filthier on earth than the saints of the desert'l" (Z IV OHM 13)14
222
• The lone wolf thesis appeatS in even better light when one xecalls NielZSChe's
only in this state will he "grow me11ow" [mürbe werden]o (Z n Sil) Further on
Nietzsche personifies solitude [Einsamkeit] as a woman who appeatS before
zarathustra, contrasting herself with 10ne1iness [Verlassenheit] and reminding him
ofhow much better she is for him than bis previous, 10ne1y life among the masses:
'0 zarathustra, 1 know all: and that you were
loneüer among the crowd, you solitary, tran you
ever were with me!l Loneliness is one thing,
solitude another: you have Ieamed that - now! And
that among men you will always be wild and
strange [wild lI1Id fremdJ:J 00' But here you are at
your own hearth and home; here you cao utter
everything and pour out eveI}' reason, nothing is
here asbamed of hidden, hardened feelingsJ •••
'Here you may speak to all things straight and tIue
[AzqTecht lI1Id mifrichtig dœftt du hier zu allen
Dingen reden]: and truly, it sounds as praise to their
ears, that someone should speak with all things -
honestly! (Z mRC)IS
This is not, however, the whole &tory. In assuming that passages lilœ these
reflect a repudiation of aIl forms ofcomm1mity, ptoponents of the Ione wolfthesis
oftcn fan to nOle }f1etzsehe·s selective tmgetting of the so-<:a1led Iower orders and
thdrneed for community. For Nietzsche, criticising and breaking with the
"pitiable comforts" ofhenl-like community !DaY be a neœss ory precondition for
full human flollJisbing, but it is not. bY itself: a sufficient one. Beyond the
•
OMO)
IS Cf. EH "Clever" 10, where Nietzsche iDsists that finding solitude bard to bear
is a sign ofbad character: "To suffer from solitude is lilœwise an objection [to the
man and bis woric] - 1have always suffered only from the ·multitude·•.•"
223
• temporary. albeit necessaxy need to break with aIl forms of community, there
emerges in the more fully rounded noble sort a aucial element of Nietzsehean
Jasagen: the attempt to cultivate full human f10urishing in the context of a new
type ofcommunity.
that encircles and embraces the now-isolated, ostraeised seeker oftruth (cf. BAH 1
Pref. 3). zarathustra does not wish 10 end up like the hermit he meets in the
Prologue. WhiIe he does seem 10 feel a sort ofkinship with this ascetic loner
("thus they parted from one another_laughing as two boys laugh" Z Prologue 2).
bis 1ater comments clearly suggest that the f1ight in10 solitude, however laudable as
a self-protective measure against the berd, may tum in10 a wholescale, lJIIhea1thy
------
• repudiation oflife itself: "And many a one who~neaaway from life, tumed
224
• away ooly from the rabble [vom Gesindel]: he did not wish 10 share the weIl and
the flame and the fruit with the rabble." (Z II OR)
my kind and my race [meiner Art und Ablaoift)•••" (Ibid.) Only if a patticular tree
passes the test may it move out ofsolitude and enjoy the privüege ofreuniting with
Z8ratb:Jstra, ofbeing bis "companion [Geftihrte] and a fellow-creator and fellow-
rejoicer [Mitsduz.ffender und Miifeiemder].•• - sncb a one as insctibes my will
upon my tablets: for the grearer petfection of aIl tbings.••n (IbûL)
As N'1etzSChe confesses in one ofbis 1886 prefaces· "Wbat 1 again and again
othis morbid isolation" [dieser 1crankhoften Veninsamung] on the icy peaks nis
• still a loug road ta tbat tmmendous overfIowiag certainty and bealth _., ta tbat
225
• mature freedom of spirit..." (HAH 1Pref. 4) Zarathustra refers to this type of
wonder if, in this passage. Nietzsche is not contradieting bis own, repeated
emphasis on the ïndependenœ and self-snfficiency of the creative type. Does this
seaxch for like-rnjnded comradcs not suggest a certain neediness, a dependency
wholly uncharactcrlstic of self-sufliciency? Nietzsche, however, wants to have it
bath ways: individual self-snfficiency and seme form ofC(\rnwmal existence. At
• m TET 2). This SC"m'ingly paIadoxical notion ofa self-sufliciency requiring the
226
• presence of others is further hinted at in passages likc the following: "What dawns
on philosopbers Iast of all lis that] they must no longer accept concepts as a gift,
nor merely purify and polish them, but fust make and create them, present !hem
and make !hem convincing." (WP 409) Here the emphasis is not only on
innovative, individual concepmaHsing. but also on the importance ofa dialogical
community. the presence of a group ofhigh-minded, receptive, and contentious
interlocutars whom one cao aspire ta convince.
These interlocutars must also be friends. In what follows we will explore
•
16 "Arlstotle is claiming that wc cao in fad: extend self-love in certain respects,
cao come ta re1aIe ta a friend in some of the ways wc re1aIe ta ourselves. Westart,
as a matterofpsycho1ogical fact, with self-concem; but ft cao, also as a matter of
psychological flet. come ta extend ta others the relevant aspects ofthat concem,
• Nietzsche, as we noted above, approaches Aristotle in bis condescension
towaxds the commiserating "friendship" that =bles mere animalistic huddling
for warmth. He, too, makes a hierarchical distinction between this lower order
5Olidarity, which he sees as pervasive in modem democratic societies, and the
50lidarity ofkindred, noble spirits bound together in equality and virtue. "Are you
a slave?" asks Zarathustra of bis disciples. "If so, you cannot be a friencl. Are
you a tyrant? If 50, you cannot have friends." (Z 1OF) The character defects of
the slave and despot, DOt the least of which aIe their bitter ressentiment and deep
feelings of regret about the past, prevent them from becoming tIlle friends in the
highest sense; they simply do Dot possess what Zarathustra claims the virtuous
man loves most about bis friend: "the undjmmed eye and the glance ofeternity
&cause tIlle friends aIe equally endowed with fine instincts, they œcognise
themselves in the ref1ection ofeach other's nndimmed eye: a friend's face, claims
zarathustra, ois your own face, in a rough and iJ:npelfect mïrror." (Z 1OF) In light
of the difficulty we experience in seeing our own lives clearly and without bias, it
is particularly useful to study ourselves second-band, as it were. embodied in
another good life. As NUssOOIJTn notes in the context of ber discussion of
Aristotle's view offriendship, an cxamination ofgoodness as embodied in our
closest friends "enbances our uncierstanding of our own charactcr and aspirations,
improving self-criticism and shaJ:peningjndgment" (Nussbanm 1986: 364)t7
Blinded as wc aIe by ourpartiality, wc may in fact end up being a greaœrscnuœ
and 50 come 10 care about their good for their own sakes... (ADDas 1993: 254)
ADDas argues fuItberthat Arlstotlc was the only major moral pbilosopber in the
ancient wodd to explain the virtuous person's conc:em for otbers in œrms ofself-
love. In berview,latertbinkers (e.g. theStoics) weremore likdy 10œservethe
notion of self-love for common, se1fish Iegard (Ibid., 262; 288).
• 17 Aristotle puts forwanl bis notion of the bigbest sort of ftiendsbip as a vehicle
for self-discovely in the N"u:mnac1Jean Ethics, 1169b28-1170a4. Sec the
di."C'lssion in ADDas 1993: 251-257.
228
• ofinsight for our friends than for ourselves. As ZarathustIa puts il, "[m]any a one
cannot deliver himself from bis own chaiDs and yet he is bis friend's deliverer." (Z
lOF)
The friend is 50metimes said to he important in another sense as weIl. Like the
sun and every star in the heavens, NIetZsChe suggests that the highest man's
happiness and virtue is dependent upon bis shining on - ie. giving to - others. At
the very beginning of bis adventures, and again near the end of Part IV,
ZarathUStIa gives voice to bis feelings ofkinship with the sun wben he calls out
this message to it: "Great star! What would your happiness [dein Glück] he, if
you had not those for whom you shine!" (Z Prologue 1; Z IV S)18 Just as
ZarathUStIa and bis animaIs bless the sun for its "supedIuity" r()beTjùJJJJ and draw
sttength from il, 50 do lofty men draw sustenance from each others' overflow.
ZarathustIa identifies with the sun from the start; both he and the sun are
18 "'Du groBes Gestim! Was wâre dein Gllk:k, wenn du nicht die bllttest.
welchen du IClJc1rt='" The image of the superabundant sun, giving off
"inexhanstible rlches", appeats again in Z IIfONL 3•
.19 Aftcr the Prologue, of courSe, Zaratbustra cames to sec bis earlier generosity
toWards the hem in the JI'IlU'!œtplaœ as misguicIed. xeaJising that Dot just anyone
shou1d he the œcipients ofbis bene1icent overflow. The idea of the necessity of
229
• giver owe thanks to the IeCCiver for IeCCiving? Is giving not a neeessity [Ist
Schenken nkht eine Notdwft]?" (Z mOGL)
The idea that giving to others is essential for the full expression of virtue is
evoked in other metaphors taken from the natural world. Zarathustra confesses
that he feels as compe11ed to shan: with others as the stream that tlows into the sea:
"My impatient love overtlows rJlieftt aber] in torrents down towards morning and
evening. My soul streams into the va1leys out of silent mountains and storms of
grief... How should a stream not find its way to the sea at last!" (Z il CM)
Further on in this same section, he speaks of needing to release a storm cloud-1i1œ
"tension" [die Spannung meiner Wolke], and in Part IV notes rather threateningly
that bis wisdom "bas long collected itself1i1œ a cloud, it is growing stiller and
darker. Thus does every wisdom that sha1l one day give birth to lightnings." (Z
IV OHM 7)'J!J As wc sha1l sec below, Nietzsehe's vision of the "sbaring" needed
between lofty companions is not all sweetDcss and light; there is an important
clement of conflict in a friendship ternpered by aggICSSive "hardncss" towards the
other.
Nietzsche mentions otber ways in wbich the absence offriendship may prove
deleterious to one's moral-spiritual developmenL Too long a period of self-
ilTlp"'S"'d isolation. for example, may render the naso:nt noble so "needy: so
starved for bllman contact that he may ignme the waming from bis discriminaIing
taste and fal1 back into the mediocre companionship from which he C9:aped in the
fiIst pIace. "The solitary," observes zarathustra, "extends bis band tao quickly ta
20 Using yet anotber. but much less aggœssive, metaphor from n3tme, N'JCtzSc1Ic
compares the necd for the higbest man ta give ta others with the mothets necd ta
succor ber cbild: "0 my soul, now you stand superabundant and beavy (ilberreich
und schwerl. a vine with swelling uddeEs and closo-aowed golden-brown wine-
gœpes: 1 opptesscd and weigbted down by your bappiness, eJqleCtant from
abnndanœ (wœtDui 'IIOr 'Obetjlussel- 0 my sou1, 1 understand the smile ofyour
• melancl1oly: your supeœbundancc itself DOW stretebes out longing bands!! Your
ftlDness looks out overIaging scas and searcbes and waits; the longing of over-
fullness gazes out of the smiling beaven ofyour eyes!" (Z m OGL)
230
• anyone he meets." (Z 1OWC) This message is reitcrated in Z m w. when
Zarathustra dcclares that the greatest danger for the solita:ry man is "[l]ove ... love
of any thing if only it is aIive!" Still farther along in the text, Zarathustra refers to
tbis lapse of the instinct for Rtmgordrumg as "the foUy of hermits" [die Einsiedler-
21 For another ofNietzsebe·s C;QIilIi IClU3ries on the moroseness that comes with
•
excessive isolation, sce bis portrait of the unhealthy. withdrawn [Zunïckgezognen]
·slIbljny:man· inZn OSM. ·[O]n1y ifheturns awayfrombjmseIt" suggests
Zarathustra, ·will he jump over bis own sbadow_ He bas sat ail tao long in the
shadows••••
231
• exist are words and music Dot rainbows and seeming bridges between things
etcmal1y separated?" (Z me 2)
Nietzsche does Dot believe, however, that life among one's frieDds is one of
constant bavardage. Paradoxically, just as one needs to flee from the herd in
oroer to overcome 10Deliness, SO ODe requires the company of kindred spirits to
attaïn a healthy, peaceful silence. This insigbt comes to Zarathustra after mODths
and years of self-împosed isolation: "1 have belonged to solitude too long: thus 1
have forgotten how to be silent."2Z (Z II CM) Farther alODg in Zarathustra's
quest, he reiterates this insigbt in the following, ostensibly puzzling passage: "It is
my favourite wickedness and art, that my silence bas leamed DOt to bettay itselfby
silence."23 (Z m OMO) The IIIlItUIe Zarathustra bas leamed, in other words, Dot
to disturb the healthy, exemp1lll.y silence attaïned amoDgst worthy companions by
retteating unwisely into yet another fon:ed silence ofsolitude. The fiIst retreat was
Decessaty, for reasons discussed earlier (Chapters IV-VI); a second would be
inadvisable.
Pezhaps our difficulty in coDceiving ofNietzsche as a theorist offriendship
and commUDÏty stems from our resistance to bis uncompromisingly austete
understanding ofthcse DOlions. One tends to think offriends and comm'mity in
terms ofwarmth, tagethem-ss, the comfort of shaIed rneanings, and the shariDg
ofjoy as well as SOlIOW. While thcse ideas are DOt wholly absent from
Nietzsche's account oflu!JD an solidarity. what stands out, and what he intcods ta
emphasise above aIl, is a barsh, adversarial view that must seem nnpahltable ta
many.24 This is particnJady the case with Iespect ta bis rejection of an forms of
pity, ta which wc DOW tum.
22 "Zu lange gehôrte ich der Einsamkeit so vedernte ich das Schweigen."
23 "Meine liebste Bosheit Jmd Kunst ist es, da8 mcin Schweigcn 1ernte, sich nicht
232
• "Bard" Friendship and the Critique ofPity
own (Nussbaum 1990: 52). Were the contrary were the case, and the damage or
loss was commonly felt to have bee.n the fault of the sufferer. the more likely
reaction ta the suffering would be one ofblame, rather than pity. Nussbaum
argues further !bat pity and its correJ.ate emotions - fear, joy. grief, anger, envy -
aIl have sometbing in common: the ascription of a high value to certain, vulnerable
"extemal goods."
•
aucial reIaD.onship between emotion and evalualive belle(, and (especia1Iy in the
case of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics) sought "therapeutica11y" ta alter
233
• emotional patterns indirectly. through philosophical arguments.aimcd 31 debunking
wc1l-entrenched beliefs about the value ofextemal goods (see also Annas, 1993:
246-248).
Nietzsehe's stance is most profitably seen in light of these psychologic:ù
insights of ancient moral philosophy. Successful passage through the thought
experiment ofEtemal Retum entails, for Nietzsche, a rejection of a whole eategory
ofbeliefs that make pity a conceivable and even laudable response to human
suffering. Most general1y. the mature noble type comes to Iepudiate the belief that
vulnerability to fortune is an endemic part of the human condition (31 least as it is
experienced by the highest form ofhuman life). As we noted above, Etemal
Retum xepresents a complete conquest offortune, an intoxieating sense of total
control over one's entire destiny that cao be experienced ooly by the highest
exemplars ofhumanity. Having convînced himself of the omnipotence of bis
own, aeating will, Nietzse1Je's highest man would naturally resist the suggestion
that bad things cao happen to good people (like himself) through DO fault of their
own.
The logic ofthis position suggests that superior human beings must be adverse
to showing pity to kindœd spù:its who are experiencing a period of aisis and
intense sufferlng. Being tteated as an object ofpity would imply vulneœbility to
b3d luck, whicb, for any self-respecting fiee spirit, would be taken as a
concJescending affront to bis dignity. an injuIy to bis pride (cf. zn OC). "To
offer pity." as Nietzscbe remaries in a middle-.period text, "is as good as to offer
contempt." (D 135) The real danger ofpity. he suggests, lies in ilS effect on
n8scent nobles who have yet to break comp1etely fiee of slave morality. The aI1uIe
ofpity. in ilS comforting. tranqnilising indulgence oflnun8n weakness. migbt be
very strong indced for those weary of the sttuggIe and sorely telllpt.cd to backsljde
• from the diffiOJIt, painful qucst for higber moral and spiritual cIcvelopmcnt
234
• (Chapter Vl). Nietzsche considers pity especially iDsidious bccallse its ostensibly
benign, nurlllring face masks a noxious leveling effect, whereby the noble type is
gently but assuredly discouraged from continuing bis upward trek, and (what is
worse) even rewarded for abandoning il. Pity is thus seen as part of the leveling
agenda of hegemonic Christian and post-ehristian slave morality:15 Hence
Nietzsche's insistence that there is no room in the sublime friendship of natural
nobles for the lax sort of "nurlllring" that indulges and excuses moral-spiritual
weakness.26
In colllrast 10 the servile friendship ofindulgence and commiseration,
Nietzsebe counsels "hardness" as a SUIe sign of love between bigher friends.27
The bardness with whicb we treat our loved ODeS, he argues, is first and foremost
23S
• friends who are, as Nietzsche suggests, a mirror-image ofourselves? Dec1aring
that "[w]e do not wish to be spaIed by ..• those whom we love from the very
heart" (Z 1 OWW), Zarathustra proposes that the highest sort of love is that which
splU'S our friends 10 3Chieve their highest potential In serving as "an arrow and a
longing for the Supenna.n" for our friends (Z lOF), we ought 10 conceal our
feelings of pity for them "under a bard shell" rather than indulge in them (Ibid.),
for "all great love ... oven:omes even forgiveness and pity." (Z n OC) Zarathustra
suggests, for example, that wben we wish to give sustenance 10 our suffering
friends, we ought to provide not an oasis of easy respite, but rather "a resting-
-
place Iike a bard bed, acamp-bed: thus you will serve him best." (Ibid.) A "bard"
stance towards our friends, in other words, is in their best interests. however
diflicult it may be 10 mainrain in practice.
The difliculty in being bard with one's friend is similar 10 the difliculty
• 29 Zarathustra suggests that only wben life becomes "harder and harder" will
"man grow 10 the height where the lightning cao strike and shatter him..." (Z IV
OHM 6)
236
• We can best steel ourselves to being bard on our friends, and resisting the
heart's tendency to melt at the sight of their suffering. if we remind ourselves of
the probal)le consequeuces of the alternative route: "the bands of pity can under
"bard" in refusing to sec it slip a'Mrj without a fight (Z m W). In treating our dear
friends barshly, our gentle, loving side strives to cultiVate in them similar qualities
of harshness so t'ecessary for moral-spiritual épanouissement: "in arder to grow
big, a tree wants to strike bard roots into bard rocks!" (Z mVMS 3)
The cballenging, "hardeIIing" sort of friendsbip jmagined by Nietzsche thus
appears less COIISCDSWÙ !han adversaria1, an uneasy relationship in wbich the
distinction between friend and foe is bluned. Nietzsche is no "c:omrmmitarian"
dreamer of a conflict-free society of equaIs, in wbich stIife is e1jminatee! or reduced
to a minimum through a peacefiJl convergence around commonly-sbamf
•
prototypic:al ·communitarlan,· Arlstotle, tban it is ofNietzsehe Aristotle's clear-
eyed COUDlCnance ofpe.!pelUa1 social and political conflict in even the JOOSt stable
of r6gimes bas recently been bighlighted in an admirable study by Bemani Yack
(1993).
237
• bester Feind)." (Z 1 OWW) "In your friend," he counsels farthcr along, "you
should possess your best enemy. Your heart should feel closest to him when you
oppose him." (Z 1OF) In the final section of Part 1, as he parts from bis disciples
into another long period of therapeutic, self-impow! isolation, zarathustta
suggests that heartfelt intimacy is in no ~ incompatlble with feelings of halred:
the "man oflcnowledge" [Der Mensch der Erkenntnis] "must be able not only to
love bis enemies but also to hale bis friends." (Z 1OBV 3)31 Becanse it is in our
nature as bigber human beings to be "warlike,"32 we must love the friendlenemy
31 "[N]icht nur seine Feinde lieben, sondern auch seine Freunde hassen klSnnen."
Hate, but DOt despise; as we have a1Ieady seen and shal1 explcxe in further detail in
Chapter X. Niettsehe insists that the most sublime man must œserve contempt
(Venu:hten) for bis inferiors. Halxed, by contrast, expresses in Nietzsehe's view a
grodging admiration for one who is equal in statuIe. Sec GM LlO: "How much
reveœnce [E1ujiadJt] bas a noble man for bis eneTDies! - and such Jeverenœ is a
bridge to love... For he desiJes bis enemy for bimself. as bis mark ofdistinction
[ais seine Auszeichnung]._"
32 Following Nietzsche's self-understandïng as a bigber sort ofhuman being: "I
am by nature wm:IiIœ [lch bill meiner Art JIlJCh 1aiegerisch]." (EH"'W'ISe" 7)
33 Niettsehe UDhesitatingly involœs the teml "asceticism" in describing bis OWD
position. Sec, for e,Tample, GM m.27: "Unconditional honest atheism (and ils is
the 0n1y air we bJeathe, we mme spiritual DICD of this age!) is therefcxe 1IOt the
"rd il' <sis of [the ascetic] ideal, as it appeaIS to he; it is rather only one of the 1atest
phases ofits evolution..." Cf. BGE 61: "asceticism and pnritanism are virtually
238
• highcr. more noble potentiality. Hence Zarathustra's claim that our virtue bas nits
origin and beginning" in the contempt for the easy Iife, "the soft bed and what is
pleasant [dos Angenehme]" (Z 1OBV 1). "the land wherc butter and honey-
flow!" (Z m W) Nietzsche counsels "a moderate poverty; and dcems the
endurance of poverty ta be one of the characteristics of nobility (WP 943). because
he feels.1ike many motalists in the Western philosophical tradition before him.
that the temptations of a Iife of "pitiable comfort" axe diminished when one is
•
Nietzsebe tteats the tl:lm "viItue" pej~y. associating it with slave moraIity
and the self-conscious. artificial, thealIical attempt ta fIaunt OQC's merits in the
public sphere.. A.uthentic virtue, in this COD!P.Xt, œfuses the name, appearing as a
more natuIa1, visëeraI compulsion. Sec Cllapter TI.
239
• readily indulge in it do 50 out out ofan inner, spiritual poverty, a nced ta boIster
their shaky sense of self-worth through ostentatious displays of their compassion
as they profess "disinterested" motives (cf. Chapter V). In 50 doing, they actually
increase the amount ofsuffering i:l. the worlel. theIeby contradicting their avowed
intentions. As Zarathustra puts il. "what in the wodd bas caused more suffering
than the follies of the compassionate?" (lbïd.)35
Hele Ni~ is directly in line with the virtue etbics tradition and its
•
1233b23-28, and Nussbsmm's discussion in 1980: 399. See aIso Williams' very
useful discussiOn of ancient Greek notions of shame in Williams 1993, As
always. Nietzsche's position is complicatc04 by bis propeosity for distinguishing
betweea admirable and disIeputable versions of the same concept. feeling., or
240
• the presence of pathctic individuals 1ike the so-called "bigher men" of part IV of
comfortable beds" (Z IV OHM 6), the embaIIassed blush and the averted eye,
rather than the eager expression ofinterested curiosity, are considered appropriate
The likeIihood of aetually meeting and living with friends of the sort described
above seems al limes 50 remoœ and improbable that Nietzsche is moved on
occasion to great despair, invoking language clearly suggesting that the life of the
free spirit, for all bis efforts al finding meaningful contact with lilœ-minded others,
are completely seIf-contained soun:es oflight "1 live in my own light, 1drink
back into myself the flames that break from me..." (Z il NS) Cleative beings, in
.'
Zaratbustra decIares ta bis disc::iples, "You must become a child and without
sharnc •." (Z il SB), and when he appeals ta warrior types like bimself Dot ta he
asharnc:il oftheir batred (Z 1OWW), he is attacking this second, c:onfoanist sttain
ofsharnc.
241
• values: "Many suns circle in empty space: 10 aIl that is dark they speak with their
light - to me they are silent." (Ibid.)
Here Zarathustra speaks not ooly of inaccessibility. but also of mutual
hostility. of the "enmity oflight [die Feindschaft des Lichts] 10wards what gives
light... Unjust towards the light-giver in its inmost heart, cold towards suns
[UnbiUig gegen Leuchtendes im tiefsten Herzen. kalt gegen Sonnen]- thus travels
every sun." (Ibid.) The sun-like producers of light and meaning may indeed find
human contact, but of a strictly noxious kind; they seem to connect ooly with "aIl
that is dark," i.e. inferior types who. unable to produce light for themse1ves,
parasitically feed off of their light: "Oh, it is ooly you, obscure, dark ones, who
extraet warmth from light-givers! Oh, ooly you drink milk and comfOIt from the
among those "most alike" in tbis complexity. "the sma1Jest gap is the most djflicult
the Same, which rejecls in principle any nolion of misfortun€ beyond our control,
•
sttength. Henee bis occasional (and not always convincing) clenials that the
242
• absence of durable companiollShip in bis life bas bad any negative impact: he
claims. for cxample, that bis Jack of "adequale company" [vueit:herukr
Gesellschaft] "exists today as it bas aiways existed without pIeventing me from
being brave and cheerful [heiter und tapfer]." (EH "Oever" 2) The
disingenuousness of this statement is exposed further on in Ecce Homo, when
Nietzsche momentarily forgets bis supposedly "cheerful" demeanour and oft-stated
conr.:mpt for recognition in comp1aining about bis colIl?lete Jack ofdefenders on
the German intellectual scene: "'l'en years: and no one in Germany bas made it a
question ofconscience to defend my Dame againt the absuId silence under which it
bas Iain buried.••" (EH "CW" 4) It is difficult 10 detect invulnerability and cheer in
a plaintive cris de coeur like the following: "where may 1 look with any kind of
hope for my kind of philosopher himself, at the least for my need [meinem
BediirftùJIj of new philosophers?" (WP 464)
Having difficulty in finding meaningful collDeCtions with real people in the real
world, Nietzsche demonstrates bis psychic need for comradeship by creating
idealjsffl friends in bis imagination. Zlltathustra counsels bis disciples 10 follow
this route, dœming it pteferable 10 "create your friend and bis ovedlowing heart
out ofyourselves" [euren Freund und sein iiberwalkndes Hen schaffen) rather
than "endure _. any kind ofneïghbour•••" (Z 1OLN) Zarathustra's rnJ!sings
example, imagery from Hesïod's Worb and Days is evoked 10 pottlay bis
sought-after "chi1dren's land, the undiscoven:d land in the furthest sca..."38 Later
this vision n:emerges as one of "the distant futme, which no dIeam bas yet seen,
in10 warmer Souths !han artists bave ever dreamed of, theœ whele gods, dancing,
• 38 In Hesiod's Worb andDays. the fourth age of Man sees a "divine race of
Heroes". "juster and nobler". fashioned by Zeus, living a life apart from other
men, at the ends of the Earth.
243
• are ashamed ofall clothes..." (Ill ONL 2) In a preface from 1887. Nietzsche
unhesitatinglyadmits ta the fanciful origins of "companions" such as these:
Thus when 1 needed to 1 once aIso invented for
myself the 'free spirits' ta whom this melancholy-
vallant book •.• is dedieated: 'free spirits' of this
kind do not exist, did not exist - but ... 1 had need
of them al that timc if 1 was ta keep in good spirits
while surrounded by ills (sickness. solitude.
unfamiliar places. acedia. inactivity): as brave
companions and familiars with whom one can laugh
and chatter when one feels like laughing and
chattering. and whom one can send to the Devil
when they hecome tedious - as compensation for the
friends 1 lacked. (HAH 1 Pret: 2)
The imaginative creation offictitious friends is undeniably one of Nietzsche's
• N'Ietzscbe's literaIy creation. "The earth." dccIares zarathustra, "still remains ûee
for great souls. Many places - the odour oftranquil seas blowing about them - are
244
• stil1 empty for solitaries and solitaxy couples [Einsame und Zweisame]." (Z 1ONI)
With the proper guidance and nurturing of these initially margina1 individuals. nit
will Dot be long before new peoples [neue Volker] shall arise and new springs rush
Art] may take a generalion or IDOle ta ("Jme ta fruition: Z3rathustta suggests ta bis
friends that although tbey migbt Dot be able ta create the Obermensch, "you could
uansform yoursel.ves Ï:1ta foœfatbexs and ancestors [Viitem und Vorfahren] of the
Superman: let this be your finest creating!" (Z II OBI)41
39 1bat Nietzsche identifies the "mw material" of the noble cultmal arder of the
futme with the maIginaliSC'd of COIIlempOIaIy, mainstleam society is illustratcd
elsewhcre in 7'htIs SpoJ:e Zomthustra: "Yoo solitaties oftoday, yoo who bave
seceded from society [ihr.AILrsc:heidmde], yoo shall one day be a:people rein
Volk sein]: from you, who bave chosen out yoursel.vcs, shall a chosen people rein
ausuwi1hlIes Volk] spring - and from this chosen people, the SupemJan." (Z 1
OBV2)
40 "[T]o leam ta love onesclfis no commandment for today or for tomorrow.
Ratber is this art the finest, subt1est, nltimatr:, and most patient of ail [von al1en
245
• Nietzsche is greatly concerne<!, however. that bis painstaking fishing
expedition, bis "slow search for those related ta [him]" [der langsame Umbück
nach Verwandten] (EH "BGE" 1). may ultimately be undermined by the
overwhelm. those with high potential (who. in virtue ofliving in modem European
civilisation, are aiready suffering the perverse effects of false consciousness). If
measures are not taken to shield these individuals from the general cultural decline,
the emergence of a new. modem nobility - and thus a set ofworthy companioos
for Nierzsche - will tragically be aborted. The time ta set in defence ofthis futuIe
nobility. believes Nietzsche, is now; whereas the soil of hnmanity may still be
"rich enough" for the cultivatiOIl of a master ethos, "one day" saon it will become
too "poor and weak." for such a task (Z Prologue 5). This "one day," if 3ll0wed ta
happen, will be that of the complete triumph of the "last man," the pathetic excuse
• rein echIu SolIn und vollkommener EThe]: but tha1 is far ahead. You yourselves
are DOt those ta whommy heritage [Erbgut] and name belong." (Z IV G)
42 "Die Frohe Botsehaft" is the Ge! QIan, Lutheran expression for the Gospels.
• unprecedented, "prescribable patbs of culture" [vorzuschreibende Wege der
Kultur] (EH '"IT' 2).
1 argued above tbat Nietzsche posits the notion ofEtemal Retum of the SaIne
as a sort of thought experiment tbat represents, in effect, a watershed in the
superior human being's self-overcoming. An unconditional embrace of the
"results" of this experiment - which would involve acccding ta a hypothetical,
infinite repetition of all ofone's past experiences, including the most unpleasant
and painful ones - is put forward as a precondition for the superior individual's
future moral-spiritual development. We noted tbat saying "yeso ta life in this
sense nccd Dot entai! abandoning NielZsche's insist.ence on the need ta discriminate
between admirable and contemptJ."ble modes ofhuman existence On the contrnzy.
heartfdt adheœnce ta the results of this thought experiment simply entails
acknowlcilging the instrumental necessity of the ugliness in the wood - including
the ugliness of the lowly. contemptz"ble lunnan being - ta the process of the highest
man's self-overcoming.
By acx:eding in principle and with enthnsia sm ta this fictive repetition, the
highest man tbereby emancipates himselfimaginatively from the tyranny of
Chance. In saying "yes" ta ail of existence. he bas stlcceeded, in othe!' words, in
œtroactively "chosing" ail tbat bas been and is, in bringing ail past events under
the hegemony ofhis omnipotent will Unlikc the mediocre masses, who remain
the impoœnt, passive viClims of arbitœy misfortune and thus remain full ofregxet
and resentmeDt, the higbest man of the post-Etemal Retum perlod ensures tbat the
e:ategoIy of"misfornme" cau never again be applied ta him. Sïnce he bas
•
conviDced himselfthrough this imaginative conjUIing aet that henœf01th nothing is
out ofhis control, he becomes (at least in Nietzsehe's view) inwJnerable. The
247
• good Iife is thus portrayed as solely dependent on human effort, owing nothing to
factors outside of our agency (these factors are, for the highest human being.
nonexistent). Nietzsche theIeby links up with (and markedly radicalises) a
powerful strain ofancient and Renaissance moral philosophy, which gives pride
of place 10 the notion of the virtuous man's invulnerability.
Nietzsche's stress on invulnerability and se1f-sufficiency sits uneasily,
however, with bis view of the importance of friendship to the Iife of bis imagined
highest men. Notwithstanding the commonly-held view that Nietzsche propounds
a type of radical individualism (the free spirit as "Ione wolf'), 1hold thatbis
undeniable praise ofsolitude and flight from the herd commnnity is mitigated by
bis insistence that solitude should only be a temporaI)' phase, a period of se1f-
cleansing that prepares the "purified" superior being for new, higher sorts of
human solidarity. We bave èyamined, moœover, Nietzsehe's view that (bis
conception of) friendship is positiveiy essential for the full flourishing of the
highest human being. In effect, he believes that meaningful exchange with others
ofsimilar stature and mind is essential for the emergence ofindividual creativity.
For such "exchange" to bave this effect, it must, however, depart from our
common-seuse ideas that friendship involves commiseration in the face of the
others suffering. Amongst superior types of men, friendship is "baId", and
sometimes even adversarial. To pity one's friend is, in Nietzsehe's eyes, 10 insult
him. The act ofpity involves, for him, the implicit beliefthat the persan who is
pitied bas come upon bis suffering through misfortune; and as we bave seen,
Nietzsche is convinced that superior hmnan beings, at 1east at the peak of their
deve1opment, are impervious 10 Fortune. The point of such lofty friendship is not
10 commiserate, thereby bowing before Fortune's power, but rather 10 he1p the
•
. other strive for bis highest potential, and overthrow Fortune's hold on bis Iife.
248
• This sort of friendship might therefore sooner entail a swift kick in the posterior
rather than more comforting gestures.
this sort in bis lifetime. Indeed, 1believe that bis writings show a strong
commitment not to passively waiting about for the appearance ofsuch friends, but
rather to an aetivism aimed at making a veritable community offriends happen.
This is the key to understanding the essentially political nature of bis project.
Nietzsche wants Europe's scattered master types to come together into new forms
ofcommunity that would serve as propitious "breeding grounds" for the next
generation ofexemplaty human beings that would lead Europe into a cultural
renaissance. 1bat this vision, which involves some very frank allusions to
eugenic experimentation, is eminently political in nature bas been tien:ely contested
in the seconda1y literature. Our next chapter is devoted to an exarnination of a
• 249
• Chanter ym: Njetroçbe's Will to Po)ltics
250
• Often this supposee! failure is attributed ta an uncompromising hostility towards
This apolitical view seems at first gIance ta be bome out by Nietzsehe's many
deprecatoty remaries about the politics ofhis day and his related self-desctiption as
a thinker who is "abovc" politics (e.g. BT Preface; AC Preface). As is well
1 1 should add, however, that Berkowitz dues not thereby conclude that Nietzsche
bas nothing ta contribute ta political philosophy. He rightly notes that "[b]y
starting from an analysis ofwhat bnrnan beings desire and what is desiIable for a
human being, Nietzsche moves within the domain of moral and political
philosophy." (Berkowitz 1995: 2)
2 This sort of gross 0VCJ:StaICDIent and hypetbole are charadcristic of this
ostenst1>ly "postmodern" commentary, in which violent, rni1itaristic metaphors are
routineJy invoked as aJhetmical devices aimed at associaring all opposition ta the
author's positbn with the daIk imagery offascistic oppression. Se1f-declared
postmodemist conttibotors ta this cIebate over the political status ofNietzscbe's
thought are all-too ready ta take these questionable tlights of rltetorlc. At one point
in Connolly's ~ book, for enmpl.e, he places the innocuous academics who
criticise him in the same camp as virulent racists: bath types of people, he insists,
rely on identities "that must de1ine what deviates from them as intrinsically evil (or
one ofits modem surrogates) in order ta establish their own self-certainty••."
(1991: 14-15) In Connolly'seyes, apparently, allassertioDS ofopinion different
•
from his own are ïnherently dangeruus, oppressive, and potentially violent. The
ovel"'stetiJhetorlc is unfortuDate, as itserves todebase the coinage ofthe language
used ta describe violation and annexatïoD, which should be œserved for acts of real
violence and coen:ion.
251
• known, Nietzsche derides the "long-drawn-<lut comedy of [Europe's] petty states
and the divided will of ils dynasties and democracies" (BGE 251), and throughout
bis cmeer casts scomful glances at modem nationalism,3 imperialist pretensions,4
and the "new idol" of the herd, that "coldest of all cold monsters," the bureaucratic
state (Z ION!). It is easy to take these aiticisms of"petty politics" [kleinen Poütik]
political projects. The toDe, once again, is set by the ever-influential Kanfmann,
who claims that Nietzsche
W2S not primarlly a moral philosopher at all... He
was concemed with the artist, the philosopher. and
those who achieve self-perfection... Particular
actions seemed much less important to Nietzsche
than the state ofbeing of the whole man - and those
who achieve self-perfection and affirm their own
being and all etemity. backward and foreward, have
no thought of the IIlOI1'OW. (Kanfmann 1974: 322)
•
one ofbis many other stabs at the Bismarckian Reich, Nietzsche declares that
"[t]here is no more vicions misundeIstanding than to believe that the Germans'
great success in arms could demonstIatc anything in favour of this eulture..." (EH
"UM" 1)
252
• Thus. he conc1udcs, the author of zaratlwstra "does not write to endorse a cour"e
of actiOI:"; bis "primaly concem is not with particular actions." (Ibid.. 248. 325)
Kanfmann's narrow understanding of Nietzsehe's aestheticism is reproduced in
nwnerous studies of more recent vintage. For Nehamas. Nietzsche's "aesthetic
attitude toward life" implies a strictly individual project ofself-realisation. a
"tum[ing] to oneself in arder to make one's life valuable without c1ai ming that one's
particular method for accompIishing this end should. or even could. be followed by
others." (Nehamas 1985: 136-7)5 Honig echoes this view ofNietzsehe as navel-
gazing self-actmiliser. insisting that the Nietzschean tJbermensch "exercises bis will
to power primarily (even solely) 01: hirnself and not on others_. [TJbe matter with
which the Nietzschean artist woIks is the raw matter ofself." (1993a: 231)
For Nietzsche, however. there is no contradiction between the aesthetic on the
one band and the ethical or the political on the other. Even when speaking of "art"
in the conventional.limited sense. as a ciJ:cumsaibed dom.'lÏIl or endeavour (as in
les beaux arts). Nietzsche insists that "art" is in no way isolated from broader
questions of power and ethicaljudgement. He claims that when one looks al art
"u.:.der the lens ofEfe." (BT "Attempt" 2) one sees thatitis farfrom that
"disinterested" realm posited in the aesthetic theories of Kant and Schopenhauer.
existence: "'what does ail art do? does it not praise? glorify? choose? prefer'l" (TI
EUM 24) In taking a stand about the best sort ofbl!JDan life, art moves us not into
a disengaged contemplation of the Beautiful, as in the Kantian aesthelic tradition.
but zather towards discriminaring, practïcaljudgements about hUlIllll1 flourlsbing. It
253
• is this sort ofjudgement, as a manifestation of will to power,6 that Nietzsche deems
beautifuI. and that he sees as constituting the beauty in art: "When power [die
Macht] grows gracious and descends into the visible: 1calI such descending beauty
[Schiinheit]." (Z n OSM)7 Zarathustra elsewbere reinforces this linkage between
artistic activity (narrowly conceivecl) and power and domination when he points to
the existence of a basic. underlying "battle and inequality and war for power and
predominance" among alI things. "even in beauty." (Z fi OT)s
For Nietzsche, however. the intimate relationship between aesthetics, ethics,
and will to power runs even deeper. Not only does he see the ci1'l:umscribed realm
of "art" as a practical-normalive endeavour. he often posits the aesthetic realm as a
whole in a much broader sense, inc1uding within its boundarles any form ofbold,
original creativity. Nietzsche repeatedly invl'kes the notion of the "artist" to
describe any admirably action~ented, productive life that transcends the
boundaries of art, nan:owly conceived. Artists [Künstler]. liS he notes in the
Nachlass. are a "productive" fproduktiv] species-type "to the extent that they
aetnally alter and transform [veriinde~ und W1!fonnen]..." (WP 585a)9 The
problem with most artists. however. is that their creative prowess "comes 10 an end
•
distingnisbing, ordering, reviewing, planning, artistically creative [kilrutlerisch],
self-detennining power of the spiIit." PhiJosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greelcs;
19. Cf. the Ieference in GM n.18 10 "those artists of violence lIIid ~
[GewaIt-Künstlem und Organisatoren] who build states [Staaten haut]•••"
254
• where art eDlls and Iife begins••. " (GS 299) The highest sort of men, by contrast,
adopts the creative stance towards their entire eAistence; in Nietzsche's striking
phrase, "we want to he the poets of our Iife [die Dichter unseres Lebens] - fiIst of
The = t studies that skirt around the issue of Nietzsehe's politics tend to
argue - wrongly, in my view - that the Lutheran minister's son is simply
uninterested in action. Strong, for examplc, asserts that Nietzsche does not concem
bjmseJf with "actual behavior" (1988: 13; 91), and Nebamas similarly insists that
that Nietzsche's primaIy concem is "not with the specific content ofparticular
assume that this entails a completely neutta1 stance with respect to the content or
results ofactions. 11 In one of his comments on artists. NIetzsche illustrates his
concem for the latter by suggesting that
•
order of ranlc here, to employ an old religious formll!a in a new and deeper sense:
some fundamental certainty [Gnmdgewisshdt] which a noble sou!. Pl sse sses in
regard to itself•••" Of COUISe, given Nietzsche's repeated stress on questions of
peJSOIIlI1 cbaracter and disposition, the quality of our motivations are treated as
255
• one does best ta separate an l!.Itist from bis work, not
taking him as seriously as bis worle. He is, afu'.r all,
ollly the precondition of bis work, the womb, the
soil, sometimes the dUDg and manure on which, out
of wbich, it grows - and therefore in most cases
something one must forget if one is to enjoy the
work itself. (GM IIL4)
The artist, in other words, is valuable only as a vebicle for a determinate,
Gedanke] is one thing, the deed [der Tat] is anot.'ler, and anotl1er yet is the image of
the deed [lias BiLl der Tat]. The whee1 ofcausality does not roll between them."
(Z 1 OPe) Simply thin!cjng about oneself in a certain way cannat lead ta the
ctucia1ly impollant. The groJJ politi/c he envisions must come !rom men of great
character, with magnanimolJS motivations. 'Ibis necd not imply. however, a Jack of
interest in wbat they do. .
•
12 Nietzsche's position is simUar ta Aristotle's, who, as NussbanID rightly notes,
sees the "namral fiJJfi11mcnt and flonrishing" of virtuous character in activity
[energda]." (Nussbm!JD 1986: 324) In this context, Nietzsche sides with Aristotle
against the Stoics, who he1d - counterintuitively - that the good and praiseworthy
256
• Since Nietzsche believes that we are what we do. bis afor:ementioned
Rangordnung of bigher and lower order human beings is inrimately Iinked with a
paraIIel ranking of dceds. For Nietzsche, praiseworthy individuals are those who
perform praiseworthy actions. while the mediocre and contemptible engage in
activity of a coaespondingly base nature. His interest in cultivating a bigher sort of
human being. therefoIe, is aIso an interest in laying the foundations for the
performance of gIeat dceds. That Nietzsche takes the idea of gIeat deeds very
seriously is illustrated by Zarathustra's vituperative response to the "subtle
fabrieators and aetors" lfeinm Falschmiinz.er und Schauspieler) whose scurrilously
bogus cIaim to virtue "awaken mistrust of gIeat things" [grojJe Dinge] (Z IV OHM
8). When those who are smaIl of spirit have the gal! to attempt to "will gIeat
. things". their impertinence threaIens to cali the very idea of gœatness in things and
in action into question.
What characterlses a great deed? Nietzsche tends to concentrate on certain
fonnal properties of fine action, stressing above aU the importance ofits ambition
and long-term scope. The doer of great deeds possesses a "protraeted and
press your band upon millennia as upon wax/ bliss to write upon the will of
mi1lennia as upon mctaI- harder than metal, nobler than metaJ ." (Z mONL 29}13
This far-sighted, ambitious c:reator is above aU a built.ler. Zarathustta c1aims that
•
previous creations. regardless of1bcirintrinsic value, is be1ied by bis own refeœnce
to such a mnmstic mindsct as "madness": "madness preached. 'Everything passes
away. tbeIefore everytbing cIcsenes to pass away!''' (Z n OR) Recall my
discnssion in Qapter VI.ofNietzsehc's undcrstanding and critique ofnibilism
2S7
• those who follow Christ's examp]c and movc mountains with their spirit are
proverbial small-fiy compared to the "enlightcned man" [der Erlcennende] who
"Ieam[s] to build with mountains" [mit Bergen soU der Erkennende bauen lemen]
(ZllOFP).
Nietzsehe's model for the farsighted doer or builder is the architcet,14 and
following Aristotlc and Machiavelli, he equates the ar..hiteetural vocation al its
summit with the woIk of the master Icgis1ator. Honig, unlike many other recent
commentators, bas rightly noted Nietzsehc's "deep reverence for institutions (of
particular kinds) as well as [bis] abiding interest in the way they function to produce
and maintain a variety offorms oflife and exce1lence.•." (Honig, 1993a: 69) In
Nietzsehc's vicw, the task of the greatest ofarchiteets, the building of "a society in
thc old sense ofthat word" (GS 356), is not unlike tbat ofa constitutional
"founding father" who aims al "[etema1ising] a grand orgacisation of society reine
grojJe Organisation der GeseUschaft zu <<.verewigen»], lM $upreme Condition
for the prosperity oflife." (AC 58)15
Nietzsehc's admiring evocation of a conception of society "in the old sense" is a
reference ID ancient Rome and the constitutional (or "architectural." in a NiClZSCbean
sense) genius of the Roman people. "[N)obody stronger and nobler [than the
Romans] bas yet existed on earth" (GM L16) in large part becansc they had the
unprecedented (and, as ofyet, UDSIIIpllSSCd) courage and audacity ID enact plans for
social and politica1 engineering that were millenial in scope, plans which 1ed ID the
establishment ofinst!tutions 50 sturdy as to survive "the acciden~ of persoIIS," ie.
14 "The most JlOwerful men bave a1ways inspi!ed the arcbiteds; the arcbitect bas
a1ways been. iDf1uenced by power. Prlde, vietoly over weight and gravity, the will
ID power, seek to Iender themse1ves visiblc in a building; architeetw:e is a kind of
Ibctoric ofpower reine Art Mac1rt-Buedsam1ceit], DOW persuasive, even cajoling in
form, DOW b1untly imperious." (TI EUM 11)
258
• the foibles of corrupt emperors. (AC 58) Commentators with a blindspot for the
political dimension in Nietzscbe's writings bave teDded to pass ovec his admiration
for the political achievements ofancient Rome,16 the most impressive of which, in
his eyes, was the development of a "most grandious form of organization [die
grojJartigste Organisations-Form] ••• in comparison with which everything before
and everything since is patchworlc, bungllilg. dilettantism." (IbiQ..) The Romans
owed their great achievement to "a protracted temole will ofits own [einen langen,
.furchtbaren eignen Wùlen] which could set its objectives thousands of years
Nietzsche points to and condemns the political quietism preached !Ti Paul (m. e.g.•
Romans 13:1-3). claiming tbat it is logically downstIeam of this other-woddly
neglect ofimportant political JIIlItIers: "tbere is nOlbing :"1ore faIse or deceitful in the
wodd." declaresZ8rathustra, than tosay. "'Lethim whowatltsto&laughterandkill
and hamIss and swindle the people: do Dot raise a finger against it! 1bus they will
•
champioo[KlToc:ellence ofmester mœality. l'bis passage should also give pause
•to those, like Kanfmann , who altempt to argue tbat Nietzscbe's view of the Jews is
unambiguously positive. A full discnssioo ofthis matter is. however. beyond the
scope ofthe present study.
259
• yet leam ta renounce the world.'" (Z m ONL 15)17 Once il gains a popular
following. argues Nietzsche, Christianity proves destructive of the political and
social order by
Nietzsche argues that a precondition for any attempt by a "new ruling caste for
Europe"19 l.O inst!tutea "thousand-yearempiIe" of the type envisioned by
Zaralhustra [das Zarathustra-Reich von tausend Jahrm] (Z IV HO) is the
260
• oveztbrow of this antipolitical Christian mindset and the recapturing of the same
type of (eminently political) will that gripped the pre-Ouistian Romans. a will
profoundest depths and become[s] instinct." (GM n.2; cf. BGE 203, 212) Indeed,
Nietzsehe's natural noble-type "instinctively seeks heavy respons1bilities" (WP
944) in viItue of bis social station.21 In bis last, leb:ospective woxk, Nietzsche
20 "••• den Wtllen zur Tradition. zur Antoritllt, zur Vexantwortlicblœit auf
Jahxhundcrte binans, zur SoUdariliit von Geschlec:hter-Ketten vorwlixts und
xOckwllrts in injinitum. Ist dieser Wille da, 50 grilndet sich etwas wie das imperium
Romanum.••" Cf. EH "Clever" 10, wbexe Nietzsche speaks of the need to bear"a
respoDSlbility for the coming nn11ennia [mit einer Verantwortlichkeit fi1r a1le
Jahrtausende 1IIICh mir]_" The emphasis on futurc.oxiented respoDSlbility belies
Kanfmann's aforementioned idca that for Nietzscœ, "those who achieve self-
ped"cction._ have no thougbt OfthelDOllOW." (1974: 322) More will he saidon
N'JClzSChe's conception of the bigbestman's lcsponsibility be1ow.
21 Willj,xns notes that nit bas been in evexy society a xecognizable ethical thought,
and remains 50 in 0UlS, tbat one cao he UlIder a [moral] xequirement ._ simply
becanse of who one is and of onets social situation." (W"illiarns 1985, 7) He argues
that ancient moral pbi10s0phy was better able to account for this fact of our ethical
lives than cootempomty Ksntian ethics: "In the thougbt ofKsnt and ofthose
261
• describes bis zarathustra charactcr as "a spirit bcaring the hcavicst ofdcstinics [das
Schwerste von Schicksal], a fatality of a task rein Verhiingnis von AIifgabe]••." (EH
"Z" 6)
In the carly stages of moral dcvclopmcnl, one might fecI oncsclf in possession
ofa grcat dcstiny, an "organising idca," without quitc knowing what it is for (EH
"Oevcr" 9). Long bcfore one bas caught sight of one's grcat task,
[t]hc secret force and ncccssity of this task will rule
among and in the individual faccts of bis dcstiny like
an unconscious pregnancy... Our vocation
commands and disposes of us [Unsre Bestimmung
ve1fi1gt über UlIS] cvcn when wc do not ye: know it;
it is the future that regulatcs our today. (HAB 1 Pref.
7)
Conscious awarencss of what this rcsponsibility entails dcvclops iatcr, coming with
an undcrstanding ofwhy our dcvclopmcnt had to havc takcn the paths it took: nit is
ooly now, at the midday of our life, that wc undcrstand what preparations, bypaths,
experimcnts, tcmptations, disguiscs the problem had need ofbefore it was alIowed
to rise up before us•••" (HAB 1 Pref. 7) Just what is this grcat responsibility?
It refers, as zarathustra puts il, ta a "new virtuc" [neue Tugend] or a "ruling
•
those with wbom we do not belong, forevery activity. however respectable. if it
distracts us !rom our chief undertaking, cvcn indeed for every virtue that wouId Iike
ta shie1d us !rom the sevcrlty ofour OWD most personal rcspoDS1Dility." (BAH n
Pret4)
262
• emerged in the long run something for the sake of
which it is worthwhile to live on earth, for example
virtue, art, music, dance, rcason, spirituality -
somcthing transfiguring, refincd, mad and divine.
(BGE 188)
Nictzsehe's new philosophcrs obey dcmands ofthcir "suprcme lord" who is
"conccmcd with one thing aJone, and assembles and saves up evcrything - time,
cncrgy,love, and intercst - oo1y for that one thing." (GM DI.8) In the preface to
this same work, Nietzsche insists that "our ycas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow
out of us with the nccessity with which a ttee bears fruit - rcIatcd and cach with an
affinity to cach, and evidence oÏ one will, one hcalth, one soil, one sun." (GM
Prcf.2)
This rcsponsibility, 1 would argue, cntails a conccm not simply with the moral
23 RecaIl my lIIgUIDCIIts that Nietzsche secs the highcst sort ofbnman being as
having averitable monopoly on truth (~1) and as the prlvileged vcssel of the
blUnan species' fuIlest moral and spiritual potentiaJ (Cbapter III).
263
• bis new philosopher as the search for "a new greatness of man reine mue GriJjJe
212)25 The ascending fOIm of human life. repteSeDted in Thus Spoke Zaralhustra
as the tJbel71lDlSch, is. as Zarathustra declaIes in the Prologue, ·the meaning of the
earth" [der SÙUI der Erde] (Z Prologue 3). the telos in the naIne of which ail other
one clay the Superman may live [welcher erk.ennen will, damil einst der
tJbermensch lebe].· (Z Prologue 4)26 AlI manner of social organisation - indeed,
human society itself- is to bejustitied ·only as a foundation and scaffolding [nur
aIs Unterbau und Gerüst] upon which a select species ofbeing reine ausgesuchte
Art Wesen] is able to raise itselfto its highertask [hiiherenAiifgabe] and in general
ultimate artistic projeet. He sees himself, along with bis imaginM new
philosophers, as ·artist-tyrants· [KibJstler-7yrœIIIen] (WP 960) sculpting a
magnum opus - a new type ofhuman being and society - with humanity itself.
rather!han stone or clay. serving as the raw material.27 To zarathustra, as
25 See also WP 973: "One cao conceive philosophers as those who make the most
extJ:ewe efforts to test bow far man could elevate himself [zu erproben, wie weit
sù:h der Mensch erheben kônne]_.·
26 As we noted in CJaptcts 1 and II, large categories 1ike "life., "Iialurc", and
"species" take pt'CC"'4ence in Nietzsche's thought over individual cases. Highly
gifted individuals, as zarathustra argues, me most impottantly seen as life's chosen
vehicle through which it "raise[s] itselfon high with piJlm and steps.• (Z n OT)
27 Cf. WP 960, where Nietzsche speaks of the "higher kind of man" reine hiihere
Art Menschen] "work[mg] as artists upon 'man' himself [am <<Menschen»
• selbst aIs Ki1nstIer zu gestalten]." Similarly, in WP 962 Nietzsche notes that ·in
bis intercourse with men [the higbest sort of man] is always intcnt on making
SOD)!"Jbing out of them." One might suppose that a COIlttlIlY view is put forth in EH
264
• Niet7sche confinns in bis iate autobiographical work, "man is formlessness,
material, an ugly stone which requires the sculptor [der Mensch ist iJun eine
Un/oml, ein Staff, ein hlJjJlicher Stein, der des Bildners bedarfJ." (EH OZ" 8)
Indeed, Zarathustra confesses that bis "ardent, creative will" drives him "again and
again ••• to mankjnd... [T]hus it drives the hammer to the stene." (Z II OBI)
Noting that the men of today a."C but "fragments of the future" [Bruchstiickm der
Zukwift], i.e. only the precursors of the more sublime, yet-to-be-fully-defined type
of man ofa reconstituted, noble society,28 Zarathustra decJares that it is bis "an and
aim _. to compose into one and bring together what is fragmen~ and riddle and
Forward 2, where N1etZSCbc declares that "[t]he Iast thing lwould promise would
be ta 'improve' mankind [die Menschheitzu «veri1essem»]". In this passage,
however, he refers iroDically ta the so-calIed "improvements" wrought in Europe
aIong ('bristjan (and, later, senJ1ar liberal-democratic) Iines, and pledges xesolutely
ta bIeak with this path of "ïmprovement" (which, as wc saw in Chapter IV,
Nietzsche claims ta have been infact a type of debasement). .
28 Sec aIso Nietzsehe's description ofbis new philosophers as "hera1ds and
forerunners" (Vorousgestandten] in BGE 203.
29 "_das ist ail mein Dichten und Tracbten, daB ich in Eins dichte und
znsammentrage, was BrnchsUIck ist und Ritsel und gnwser ZUfalL" This new
•
political 0Ider would notably improve the now-hapbazard conditions under which
D8scent noble types come into the wodd and are brought up. Further aIong in this
cbapœr 1 will discuss the importantrole ofN1etZSCbc's imagined aristomltic polity
aS acountervailing fon:e to the "dreadful c1lllDCC" evoked by Zarathustra in Z II OR.
265
• "more valuable" [hOherwertigeren) type ofhuman being, one that is "more worthy
of life" [lebenswürdigeren] (AC 3).
Nietzsche urges bis sympathetic, select readership (those purported superior
types for whom he writes) to abandon their misguided concems for the fate of the
vast majority and work - counterintuitively - towards "the greater petfc..."tion of aIl
things [zu aller Dinge vollerer Vol1endung)" (Z m Om) through a selfish
preoccupation with themselves and their own moral and spiritual development. In
an extremely important section towards the end of Thus Spoke Zara1lUlstra,
Nietzsehe's alter~go poses a rhetoricai question aimed at aIl of bis imaged higher
human beings:
even in your vanity!" (Z n OSM)31 "For the sake of bis children," c1aims
Zarathustra ofhimse1f, "must Zarathustra pe1fect bimself [sich selbst lIOlIenden]."
(ZmOIB)
266
• JU3t how literally should we take co=ts like these?
The secondary literature usually dismjsses with naIY a second thought the idea
!bat Nietzsche takes seriously the concept of breeding in a literaI, eugenical sense.
The ever-infIuential Kat/wa nn , for example, insists !bat "Nietzsche looked ta art,
religion, and philosophy - and not to race - ta elevate man above the beasts, and
some men above the mass of mankind." (Kaufmann 1974: 285) In Connolly's
view, the idea !bat Nietzsche aimd at breeding a coherent personality type is
obviated by the supposedly "tragïc" conclusions of the "mature Nietzsche": "thar. the
essential elements of nobility (let aIone the overman) cannot he combined ln the
same self at the same time." (1992: 705) In genera1, the new orthodoxy's
commillDent ta the emancipatoty thesis - the pieture ofNietzsebe as a wholly
admirable thinker aiming at li'beration - seems ta subvert any serious e:ramjnation of
bis tRmllDent ofbreeding.
œar, grow or cultivate, a ward normally used in connection with animaIs or plants"
(Ibid.. 274), and obse:ves !bat he "intended bis œaching and philosophy ta reshape
_and consciously remold the vety stuff of bumanit:y." (Ibid.. 16) Yet despite these
• .sensible urgings ta take Nietzsche's language seriously, in the end Strong refrains
from practicing what he pteaebes As wc have a1Ieady noted, aIthough he insists
267
• that Nietzsche bas in mind a "transformation of the whole persan" (Ibid., 287) as
well as a "new transfigured world" (Ibid., 290), Strong sbies away from examining
the fonn and content of that transfiguration, claiming that 'it would he "50 complex
as to defy ..• all attempts" at description. (Ibid., 292) This is a most convenient
c\aim, for a sericus aLtempt at description would, 1 believe, create great difficulties
for Strong's very sympathetic reading of Nietzsche as a benign figure of liberation.
In the face of a hegemonic consensus that seems 50 se\f-evident its proponents,
but rather one-sidedly incomplete to me, 1 have drawn inspiration from Strong's
"face-value" principle:
1 have ttied ... to take Nietzsche seriously and at the
same lime to make sense of all bis claims. Most
previous interpreterS have ••• managed to blind
themselves to what they did not want or need to
sec... 1 was helped in my endeavor by an almost
accidenta! èecision, to take at face value thase claims
in Nietzsche wbich appear the most histrionic and
exasperating. Among these are bis demands for
'master races' and 'breeding,' bis assertions that he
'breaks the world in two,' and sa forlh. (Ibid., viii)
evocation of terms such as "fertility" and "inferti\ity", "begetting" and bearing", and
the like.33 Nietzsche clearly associates the creative per.;onality with notions of
32 In the next chapter wc shall sec that the tendency ta adopt striet1y metaphorical
readings ofNietzsebe's IeI1!arks on pregnancy and the like is also pervasive
an.'Ongst those attetDfIting ta unearth a proto-feminist orientation in Nietzsehe's
WIitings. 1 shall argue that Ibis attempt falls short of success.
• 33 Such metapho.tical usages have a long history in moral and political philosophy•
AristotIe, for example, claimed in the Nico1lll1dzean Ethics that lnunan beings
brought forth their actions "like children." (1113b18)
268
• von Mensch] (GS 369), or "the motherly human type" [die mütter1iche Art Mensch]
(GS 376).34 As carly as Daybreak, N"1ClzSChe declares that the aearive type is no
more in conscious control of the ideas or deeds gestating within him than the
mother of her offspring's rare of growth or time ofhirth.3S He even equaleS the
"birthing" process of ideas and deeds with that of infants, when he exhotts us t.o
"give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with an
we have ofblood, heart, fire, pIeasure. passion, agony, conscience, fate, and
catastrophe..." (GS PIef. 3)36 In GM m.S, Nietzsche informs us that this form of
"fruitfulness" [Fruchtbarkeit] - the fruitfulness of the new philosopher - is to be
found not in the sphere ofbiological reproduction, but rather in bis work [Werk],
which is to its aeator as the child is to its mother.37 "One is pregnant only with
one's OWD child," declares zarathustra, as he urges bis imagined companions to
eschew the servile idea that one ought to act "seIflessly", for the sake only of
something other than oneself. (Z IV OHM Il)
1maintain, however. that Nietzsehe's Ibetoric ofprocreation is most profitab1y
seen on a continuum, from the metaphoric to the literaI, with a great many
ambiguous passages in between that lend themselves to readings in either direction.
While there is no clear line that dcDWCates the litera1 from the metaphorlc. this
•
either begets or bears. [dnem Wesm, welches entwederuugt odergebierl}_"
Cf. zn OBI: "In knowing and undetslanding. too. 1 feel only my will's de1ight in
begetting and becoming (Auch imErkennenjüh1e ichnur meines Wdlens Zeuge-
und Werde-Lust]••."
269
• should not Ile used as a pretext for denying altogetber the presence of the former.
cspecially i:J. a text as rife with imagety extcnding from one end of the continuum to
the other as Thus Spoke Zarathustra. When ZlIrathustra declares, for example, that
"one loves from the very heart only one's child and one's wode" [sein Kind und
Werk] (Z ID Om). why should we assume that the Kind in this passage is only a
Many of the passages that seem ta xesist placement at eitber exlleme ofthe
continuum, that seem, in otber words. to he used neither wholly metaphorically nor
with eugenics immediatt:ly in mind, aIe most profitably Ie3d as evocatioDS of
"breeding" in the sense ofeducation [Eniehung] and/or upbringing.38 As Detwiler
rightly notes. Nietzsche's ftequent coupling of the Gennan temlS Zuchl
("discipline") andZiü:htung ("breeding") suggests that in bis view. breeding
involves (but need DOt he limited ta) the cultivation of othets who aIe not
necessarily one's own children through ptopct moral edllcatiOn.39 When
Zarathustra shaIes with us bis hope for the aealion of "companiODS [Gefli/u1m]
and children [Kinder] of bis hope,• (Ibid.), he expœsses a desiIe ta become a
•
tends ta ptefertbc temlZilchtung ta Bildung, which he routinely associares with the
pœdominant educational pbilosophy a Cm bis view) comp1acellt, servile liberal-
d<mIocmtic society. For seme cu n q.1es ofN"1elZSclle's disrnissive usage of
Bildung, sec GS 86; zn OLC; CW 6; 11WGL S.
270
mentor ta a group of youthful. nascent noble types which, as a "new nobility"
[neum Adel], will hopefully "become begetters and cultivators and sowers of the
future [Zeuger und Ziichter werden und Slimiïnner der Zukunft]••." (Z m ONL 12)
In this and other passages, bis concem for the charactcr development ofkindred
spirits (and potential friends) is causally reIated to bis political conccms for the
live; if the cultivation of noble, fine character in a select few is not properly
encouragecl through Ziichtung, a noble society aimed at the pUISUÏt of greatness will
be ÎIIIpOSSlllle. l'hose concemed with the emergence of such a society (as weIl as
founded on a fear and loatbing of "the most valuable type" of man [hOhel'We1'tigere
7)lpus] have had as theirtwin aims bis annihilation and the systemaric breMing of
bis contemptlllle replacement, "the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick
40 Nietzsehe's concem for the state of Europe and bis vision ofpolitico-culturaJ.
IeVitaJisalion are not, of comse, "selfJess" in the sense ofbeing diVQrced!rom bis
own intensive search for suitable companions (Chapter VlI). TheIe is no
separation. in otherwords, betwcen the "pemmal" Nietzsche and the "polilical"
Nietzsche, For all ofbis attacks on the ethical stance ofmoderr.1t:minism,
Nierzsche wou1d agJee with the fammar feminist insistence that the persona! is
IiticaL
iY
•
The peiception of aœciprocal relationship betwcen individual character and the
state of a society's moeurs bas, of COUIse, a long pedagree in the history of moral
and political thought, and is eIsewbe1e found in the nineteenth centmy in the
writings of de Tocqueville. Sec Tocqueville 1991: Il5.
271
• animal man [dos Haustier. dos Herdentier, dos 1cr'ank Tler Mensch] - the
Cbristian.." (AC 3) In modem herd society, Nietzsche complains,
[a]11 questions of politics, the ordering of society,
education [Alle Fragen der Politik. der
Gesellschajts-Ordnung. der Ertiehung] have been
falsified [geflilscht] down to their foundations
because the most injurious men have been taken for
great men - becanse contempt bas been taught for the
'little' things, which is to say for the fundamental
affairs of life [die Grundangelegenheiten] ... (EH
"Cever" 10)
"One day or other: Nietzsche informs us, this hodge-podge k:nown in modem
Europe as BiIdung will have ta be swept aside ta make room for badly-needed
"institutions [lnstitutionen] ._ in which people live and teach as 1understand living
and teaching.••" {EH "Books" 1)
Who are the ones ta have aœcss ta these institutions? We have aIIeady
examined Nietzsehe'$ fatalistic beliefthat bis type of pedagogy would be wasted
upon those without the ir.11e:I:ently noble predisposition that arises from a healthy set
ofdrives or instincts. "There are books," he BIgUeS. ftwhich possess an opposite
value for sou! and health depending on whetber the lower soul, the lower vitality,
or the higher and more powerful avails itselfofthem._ft (BGE 30) Fme books and
ed,'Cation. while landable and indeed essential for an individual with refined
• instincls, "become poison for those who have tumed out badly [MfPratenen]••• ft
272
• (GS 359) It bears repeating that Nietzsche beIieves that the pedagogue should
aspire only to awalcen the sense of virtue in those who already have visceral
possession ofit: "[u]ltimately. no one cao extraet from things. books included,
more than he already lœows." (EH "Books" 1)42
Nietzsehe's fatalism in tbis context - the brutally harsh notion that a minority
simply bas the capacity for virtue, while the majority does not - is further reinfon::ed
by bis flirtaIion with a nineteenth-<:entU1y nalUI'alistic view of the all-determining
power of beredity. He seems on this course wben, for example, he suggests that
one's (literai) genea10gy essentially presctibes one's potentialities. In mging bis
readers to "[f)ollow in the footsteps ofyour fathers' virtue [Gdtt in den Fuj3tapfen,
wo schon eurer VlJ1er Tugend ging]," Zarathustra exhorts bis interlocutors to attend
to their own genealogies in tbis sense, in order to prevent them from overreaching
This passage strongly suggests that N"lClZSCbe takes the idea of the heritability of
character traits very seriously. Other remarks, Iike the following fragment from the
NachkJss. furt~' illustnltcs the strong influence of the bellef in heritability of
character throug'.l "blood":
Theœ is only nobility ofbirth [Geburtsadel]. only
nobility ofblood [Gebliltwdel]. (I am not speaking
bere of the little woni 'von' or of the Almanach de
Gotha: paœntbesis for asses.) When one speaks of
'aristocrats of the spirit,' [<<Aristokraten des
Geistes»] reasons are usually not lacking for
concealing something; as is well known, it is a
favo:ite term among ambitious [ehrgeizigen] Jews.
273
• For spirit alone does not make noble [Geist allein
niimlich adelt nicht]; rather. there must he something
to ennoble the spirit. - What then is required? Blood
[Des Geblüts]. ('NP 942)43
In scoffing at the expression "aristocracy of the spirit," Nietzsche aims to expose as
wishful thinking the Enlightenment notion shared by parvenus of plebeian origin -
like the German Jew - that ascension to a "true" aristocracy is open to any educated
individual. regardless ofbirth. It appears that he retains a traditional aristocratie
prejudice against those of rural or peasant birth in particular. casting aspersions on
the idea that refined sensibilities couid he nurtured in such an environment.44
With respect to Nietzsehe's view ofhis owngenealogy. this·fatalistie stance
remains influential. Becanse. as we have seen, he remains committed to the view
that he himself is. summa summarum,4S essentially "healthy" and a member of the
origins are hybrid, "from the highest and the lowest rung of the ladder of life, at
once dicadent and beginning•••" (EH "WISC" 1) He concedes not only that he bas
• to bis mother and sistcr as CQ1IIJÜ/e (see below), was suppressed by Nietzsehe·s
sistcr Elisabeth in the post!uunous edition ofhis works that she supervised. The
suppressed version is used in Hollingdale's translation.
274
• bcen "infected" by a slave morality that pervades the culture of modemity, but also
that he bas inberited some of the "decadeDce" ofhis parents. His father, although
"lovable" [liebenswilrtig], was also "delieate" [zan] and "morbid" (EH "WISe"
1),47 while his mother and sister are derided as thoroughly cœzaille, possessing
noble type might pass through a pedod of mouming and teSeDtment for the
impoverisbment ofhis upbringing ("Wbat child bas not had reason to weep over its
paIeIIt5?" Z 1OMC), Niettsebe definitively rejects the pessimistic notion that a less-
tban-adequate upbringing repIeseDts an unmitigatecl disaster, destroying forever the
developmental possibilities of the individual with essentially bea1thy instincts
Although he flirts with such a bleak, deterministic view from time-tc-time
(especially in his comments on the "berd's" lack of moral-developmental potential),
he nonetheless derldes it (with:espect to bimse1fand others like him) as
•
47 On Nietzsehe's view of the hemiitlUy influence ofhis father, see EH "WISe" 5:
"1 am merely my father once more and as it were the continuation ofhis life..." Cf•
zn OT: "What the father lœpt silent the son speaks out; and 1 of'.en found the son
the father's revealed secœt...
275
• lustful or of the fanatical or of the vindietive," yet uneler proper guidanœ still find
the resources within oneselfte tum all of one's pass:ons into virtues, and all of
one's "devils [into] angels." (Z 1 OJP)
Nietzsche gives us a clear idea of how he came to reconcile himself with the
"decadent" nature ofhis petsenal background in the course of bis own moral-
spiritual transformation. The key, he explains, is that center-piece of bis
developmental ethics, the thought experiment known as the Etemal Retum of the
Same. Let us recall our earlier eyamination ofNietzsehe's view that a crucial
signpost of mature moral development and noble self-love is the heart-felt,
unconditional embraœ of aIl elements ofone's past, becallse of their respective
contributions to the formation of oneself, including one's virtues. In assessing bis
own "priestly" heritage via bis father, for example, Nietzsche comes to understand
that the ascetic project ofservice te Gad and truth, while fundamentally misguided,
wish for bis blood to he honow:ed in theiIs (Z n OP). Nietzsche, in SUIn, believes
bimselfto he the "heir" [Eben] ofthis heroism, the "executor of [the] innennost
will" [Vollstrecker ihres innenten WI1lens] of the priestly conscience (D PIef. 4).
Having acknowledged - and even, via this thought experiment, affi J]T1C"4 - a
tainted ancestty, one who possesses a "higher nature" is thcn in a position te
transcend a vulgar, immediate parentage and embrace a loftier, fanciful (Le. willed)
276
• farther back, and with them much had to be
assembled, saved and hoarded. (EH "W"1Se" 3)
It is in this context that we should undcrstand Nietzsehe's claims to be "related" to
such political figures as Alexander the Great, Julius Caeser, Emperor Friedrich II,
and 10 philosophers and men of letters 1ike Plato, Pascal, Spinoza, and Goethe.
Having made bis peace with bis past, the noble type can then will a new ancest1y
for himself in which "kinship" is found with other, higber typeS.49
277
• Commentators oftcn ignore the fact that Nietzsche speaks very higbly ofchild
bearing and rearing. One of bis most significaot compJaints against the ascetic
"preachers of death" is their unhealthy, negative attitude towards procreation; these
asceties, observes Zarathustra, renounce the begetting ofchildren becanse of their
view that "Just is sin", that "giving birth is laborous", and that "one gives birth ooly
to unhappy children." (Z 1 OPD)S1 In light of Nietzsehe's well-known comment in
GM nL8 about the "fruitfulness" of philosophers manifesting itself in something
other than children, we might be disinclined to interpret literally Zarathustra's desire
for "heirs and children" (e.g. Z II OIP; Z mom). But when one considers bis
repeated suggestion that the "garden of IDlIIIiage" cao assist one in propagating
oneself "not ooly forward but upward" (Z 1 OMC; Z m ONL 24),52 and that
IDlIIIiage cao best be described as "tlIe will of two to create the one who is more
than those who created it" (Z 1OMC), it seems plausible that Nietzsche
51 See also EH "Books" 5: "1 would like to impart one more clause of my moral
code against vice [aus meinem Moral-Kodex gegen das Laster]: with the word
vice 1 combat every sort ofanti-nature, or, if one likes beautiful words, ,dea1ism
The clause reads: The preachi!lg of chastity is a public incitement to anti-nature.
Every expression ofcontempt for the sexuallife, every befouling ofit through the
concept 'impure', is the crime against life - is the intrinsic sin against the holy spirit
of life.'"
52 ."Nicht nur fort sollst du dich pOan:zen, sondern hinauf!" Z 1oMc
53 Detwiler notes tbat Niettsebe's favourable views on the institution of IDlIIIiage
makes him a much 1ess radical thinker than Plato in this regard (Delwiler 1990:
Ill). Even Kanfmann concedes tbat while Nietzsche condemns the type of
IDlIIIiage (ta the "dressed-up lie", Z 1 OMC) that spoils a man's COmp:!11Y and
subverts bis moral-spiritual potential, "he does not, for that reason, depreciate
• marriage altogether... [M]aniage can be creative and 'boly': namely, when two
single ones •.. come together ta aid each other in this supleme effort, mutually
intensifying the 'longing for the overman,' eager that their children should not ooly
278
• Ever-conscious of Rangordnung, Nietzsche is hardly enthusiastie about aIl
manncr of ~ and reproduction. When Zarathustra asks rbetorically, "are you
a man who ought to dcsire a child? [bist du ein Mensch, der ein Kind sich
wiJnschen tIœf'!J" (Z 1OMC), the implication seems to be that only certain types of
parents and motiYalioDS forparenthood are praiseworthy. Nietzsche does DOt sec
the birth ofehildIen as sometbing to be celebrated if, for example, the parental
dcsire to reproduce is driven by "the animal and necessity" [dos Trer und die
embarlcing upon such a project "You should build beyond yomself. But first you
must be built yourself [em 7TUljJt du mir selber gebaul sein], square-built in body
and sou!." (Ibid.)
Nietzsche's attention to the questicn of who should rigbtfully "bIeed" the Den
generation ofbigher human beings is ofcourse in line with other, nineœentb-
century aristocratie Ieflections on the impoItance ofmaniage and propagation as a
means of reproducing a healthy ruling c1a"'''' It is important to note, however, how
Nietzsche deparls from standard nineœenth-century aristocratie peœeplÏons ofwhat
constitutes good bIeeding. His afoIeIDCDtiOned, CODtemptuous leference to the
"Almanach de Gotha" (WP 942), a Well-knOWD "who's who" ofEuropean royal
familles, and bis equally dcrisive treattneIJt of the Geananic princely title von,
illtisttate how far IeIDOVCd he is from the sentiments of the European aristOCl'at of
bis lime. When Zarathustra enjoins bis intcrlocutors to "[l]et wheIe you are going,
• repIeSeDt another generation but SUIp3SS them, [thcn] their marriage is a truc
mmiage..." (ICallfmann 1974: 311)
279
• not where you come froIn, hencefortb he your honour..." (Z m ONL 12), he is
urging us not to fetisbise genea10gy along the lines of theA1manach de Gotha.54
Unlike most of bis aristocratie-minded contemporaries, Nietzsche does not seem 10
caxe for the bl00d ofany of the existent European. aristocracies. Individuals of
refined instincts, allows Nietzsche, may need to bave the rigbt sort of blood
eoursing tbrougb their veins, but he leaves undefined just what type of bl00d tbat
may he. It is tbis refusai to atttibute innate1y refined sensibilities to any of the
recognised and privileged races, classes, or nations of bis day tbat wc must
understand bis claim 10 bave taken the concept of "gentlemen" more "radically"
[mdikaler genommen] tban it bas ever been taken (EH "BGE" 2). Nietzsche
eategorically refuses to identify the bl00d of specifie races or national groups as
particu1arly beneficient (althougb, as mentioned earlier, he retains a ratber general,
albeit recognisably traditional, aristocratie contempt for the origins of those whom
he refers 10 as canoiJle).ss Indeed, bis ideal ruling caste is multi-racial in cbaracter;
54 "0 my brothers. your nobility sball not gaze backwaId, but outward [nicht
zuriick soU euerAdel schauen, sondem 1Iiruzus]!" Z mONL 12
55 Sarah Kofman suggests tbat N'Ietzsche's insistence on the absence of"had
blood" [sch1echtes Blut] in bis veins (EH "Wl5e" 3) reveals aristocr8tic. ratber tban
racist preoccupations: "hy the exptession 'bad blood' he means the plebeian type.
wbich he calls (m French, as he does the term SQ1Ig pur) la canoiJle, 'the rabble';
and by the exptession 'good' and pure blood, he means the nobility." Kofman
1994: 36.
56 Detwiler rigbtJy notes tbat wbile Nietzsche rejects the connotation ofpure
• bloodedness in the modem racist sense. he still invokes terms like "hlood" and
"race" wben speaking ofa stronger, superior species ofhuman being (Detwiler
1990: 111). ~
280
• the crudest of peasants. and most likely is sc. given the state of degeneration inlo
281
• providing such a propitious, nurturing environment for the emergence of ever-finer
nobility, the parents "rcdeem [erUisen] all that is past" and even "make amends" to
their children for thei! own, imperfect geneaology (Z mONL 12).57
Some might question whether these IWo forms of "redemption" reallyare
complimentaty. Given our understanding of the Eternal Return, one might well
wonder why someone prepared to accede in principle to a an eternal reliving of all
existent socio-political and family arrangements would countenance the "collective
experiments in discipline and breeding" mentioned in BGE 203. Does not
Nietzsehe's understanding of the Eternal Return preclude any commitment to
political aetivism? A number ofinfluential commentators think 50, most notab1y
Kanfmann:
contradietory aspects of bis thought. Thal N''ClZSChe sees the IWo as mutually
reinforcing is suggested in the following fragment from 1887: "In place of
ST "You sha1llove your chi1t1rm:s land: Let this love he your new nobility - the
undiscovered land in the furthest sea! 1bid your sails seek it and seek W You
• sha1l make amends to your children for being the children ofyour fathers: thus you
sha1l redeema11 that is past! [An euren Kindem soUt ihr gut lIUlChen, dojJ ihr eurer
Vc'iter Kinder seid: Alles Vergang~ soUt ihr so erUisen]" (Z mONL 12)
- 282
• 'metaphysics' and religion, the theory of etemal recWTCllce (this as a means of
bre.:ding [Züchnmg] and selection [Auswahl])." ('NP 462)58 Etemal Retum leads
to breeding in the sense that successful passage through its uncompromisingly
harsh strietures contributes to the development of a mature, refined moral agent
woIthy ofparticipation in the political project NielZSChe prizes more than any other:
the raÏSing of the &uman species through selective breeding.
!ben: is, moreover, anoilier sense in which Nietzsche sees Etemal Retum and
breeding as leading to the same result: bath are depicted as attempts to neutralise the
power of Fortuna over the lives of the highest human heings. Whereas the Etemal
Retum thought experiment looks backwards, as it were, redeeming all past
misfortune by imaginatively transforming it into the produet of the great man's will.
the project ofcontrolled breeding involves an analogons, practical effort al bringing
the future wholly within the purview of the will of the gIeatest. Nietzsche, in oilier
words, launches a two-front assault on Fortuna, via past-oriented imaginative
means (the Etemal Retum) and a future-oriented call for political-practical means
(eugenies, institution-building). Vietory on the fiIst front, in Nietzsche's view,
must precede vietory on the second, for political action aimed al producïog a higher
type ofhuman being can succeed ooly ifthose thus eogaged have tbemselves
evolved into morally mature human beings with .mimpeacbable judgemeot and
standards.
là us pursue further this idea that controlled brfflIiog, for N'lCtzsche, is the
best way ofproducing a higher form ofhuman life and ofeliminating the iofluence
of pure chance and contingency in hnmao affaiIs. As noted eadier,.N'u:tzsehe
believes that the appemaace ofhigher human heings bas always been ir.regular and
iofrequeot; he descnëes them as as "brieflittle pieces of good luck _ that here and
• 58 ftAn Stelle von Metaphysik und Religion die ewige WJedericunftslehre (diese aIs
Mittel dcrZüchtung und Auswahl)"
283
• there come flashing up." (BGE 224) and as "lucky bits" [Glücks.fàlle] in contrast to
the "nonnal sick1iness" of the majority of men in the modern age (GM IIL14).
S9 "••• je hlSher gemtet der Typus cines Menschen ist, der durch ibn dargeste1lt
wird, um 50 mehr steight nach die Unwahrscheinlichkeit, da6 cr gerlit_." Cf. Z IV
OHM IS: "'Ihe higher its type, the less often does a thing sllcceed [Je hOher von
Art, je seltmergeriit ein Ding]." Sec also WP 684: "Among men, tao, the bigher
types, the lucky strokes ofevolution [die Gli1cksftll1e der Entwick1ung], perish most
~ as fortunes change."
• 60 Sec also Z 1OFM, wheœ Z8rathustIa observes that the profoundest of men
suffer "tao profoundly even from small wounds.••" [Aber du Tzefer, du leidest zu
tiefauch an kIeinen Wunden]
284
• Gesetz des Unsinns] in the total economy of mankind" (BGE 62).61 After noting
that "the ruination [das Zugrundegehen] of higher human beings ... is the role,"
Nietzsche describes how "dreadful" [schrecklich] it is "to have such a role always
before one's eyes." (BGE 269) Speakïng in the third person of the "manifold
tonnent [vielfache Marter] of the psychologist who bas discovered this ruination,"
(Ibid.) Nietzsche is cleady sharing bis own tonnent and frustration with the reader
in the face of "this etemal 'too 1ate!'" (Ibid.), i.e. in the face of Chance's obstinate
refusaI to "permit" the appearance ofhigher human beings at moments that would
be most conducive to their flourishing (BGE 274).
Contra Darwin, Nietzsche proclaims somberly that "man as a species is not
progressing [der Mensch aIs Gattung steUt keinen Fortschritt]." (WP 684; also TI
EUM 14) On the contraIy, he proposes, the species is rapidly degenerating, not
simply becanse of the penury ofhigher human beings and the precariousness of
their existence (which bas always been the case), but also beca'lse of the
increasingly desperate lack of space fortheirpropercultivation in light of the ever-
encroaching, universa!ising tendencies of slave morality. "He who bas the desires
of an elevated, fastidious sou!," Nietzsche opines, "will be in great danger at aIl
times: but today the danger he is in bas become exIIaOIùinaIy." (BGE 282)
Nietzsche offers two reason why. in the modem wodd especiaJJy. "the wealœr
dorninate the stronger again and again...": in the first pIace. "they are the great
majority...". and secondly, "they are also cleverer [kliiger]." (11 EUM 14)
Nietzsche considers the majority status of the lower ordeIs ofluJJDanity to be
guaranteed by the fact that. un1ike the fragile, vulnerable higher sort, the lower
0Iders are quite hardy in a teproduetive sense, and need no help in propagating
• expxession as "nemendous fortuitousness," which does not quite capture the horror
that Nietzsehe feeIs when contemplating thetragedy of this routine subVCISÎon of
potential greatness.
285
• themselves: the "Ultimate Man [der letxJe Mensch] lives longest," observes
Zarathustra. "His race [Geschlecht] is as inexterminable [unaustilgbar] as the
flea." (Z Prologue 5)62 As for the superior "clevemess" of the majority, Nietzsche
makes two interrelated points. FlI'St1y, as we saw in Cbapter IV, Nietzsche deeros
the herd majority's priestly leadership adept at stamping out all noble non-
conformity by turning youthful noble types against themselves and their own
instincts from the start. "Our best is still young," wams Zarathustra, "this excites
old palates. Our flesh is tender, our skin is only a lamb-skin: - how should wc not
excifC old idol-priests!" (Z m ONL 6) Secondly, Nietzsche associates slave
morality with a cowardly, calculating prudence or clevemess [Klugheit] that enables
the servile-minded ta place their own self-preservation and "pitiable comfort" above
all other considerations (sec Chapter Il). In Zarathustra's memorable portrait of the
letzte Mensch. for example, the last man councils bis fellows to "go about warily."
(Z Prologue 5) The many-too-many would never consider putting themselves at
risk in the name ofany higher ideal; this is an important IelISOn why they breed so
successful1y. "Wbat distinguishes the common type," Nietzsche observes, "is that
it never loses sight ofits advantage [VOTteil)•••" (GS 3)63
The noble-minded, by contrast, routinely court danger in countless ways, and
are often "glad ta go over the bridge" (Z Prologue 4) inta oblivion as aresult of
some risky, but outstanding, deed. They have neither the time nor the enezgy for
self-defensive "prudence," as their ICSOurces must he cbannelled in their entiIety
62 Sec also BGE 268. where N1CIZSCbe suggests that "mon: on:IinaIy human
beings" are much IDOle likely ta find snitable mates and reproduce than "the mon:
select, subtle, raIe and harder ta understand," who may VClj' well pass their entire
lives without finding a companion who could understand them. The
autobiographical allusion is nnmistakable.
63 Earlier in this passage Nietzsche suggests that "[c]ommonnatures consider all
• noble, magnanill!tJUS feelings inexpedient and therefote fust ofall inaech"ble." [Den
gemeinen NatuTm erscheinen alle edlen, grofJmiitigen Geftih1e ais unzweekmIijJig
111II1 desha1b zuaIlererst ais ung1aubwürdig•••]
286
• into creative aetivity. Their resulting "helplessness" [Hiljlosigkeit] in the fuce of
"everything small," Nietzsche elaborates, is
conditioned by the ttemendous expenditure of all
defensive energies [ungeheuren Verschwendung
aller J)efer.siv-Kriifte] presupposed by every creative
deed, every deed that comes from the most persona!,
innermost, deepest part of one's being. The minor
defensive capabilities are thereby as it were
suspended; they no longer receive any energy. (EH
"Z" 5)
you," Zarathustta says ta the ïnsect-like common types SUltoUDding him, "since 1
64 See also Z n OMP, wheIe Zarathustra deems it bis "fust manly prudence"
[Menscben-Klugheit] ta let himselfbe deceived [betügen] "50 as not ta be on guard
[tuif der But Dl sein] against deceivers."
must modems in the face ofthis holocaust (BGE 203). Hnmankind, he firmly
believes, can and ougbt 10 take up arms against the degradation of the species, and
enact counter-measures that work 10wards the species' petfcction.67 In order to do
SO, Nietzsche COllntenances a break with the pattern of allowing Chance and the
66 As Nussbanm bas recently pointed out, the idea that noble character is
incompatible with constant suspicion goes back 10 anciCllt Greek tragedy. moral
philosophy, and historical writing: "Euripides, Aristotle, and Thueydides CODeur in
the view that openness is an essenti.al condition of good character and that a
mistrustful SuspiciOIlS'""SS, which can come 10 an agent througb no moral failing,
but only througb experlenœ of the bad tbings in life, can he a poisop. that corrodes
all of the excellences, tuming them 10 forms ofvindictive defensiveness."
(Nussbaum 1986: 418)
67 Cf. JCanfmano' "Nature bas pIIIpOses (Zwecke). but it is not zweckmiJssig: it
does not proceed wisely 10 realize its purposes; its means are inadequate. wastefuI.
and inefficient. Hence man must help nature and work at bis own perfection."
(Kanfmaoo 1974: 174) Altbougb Nietzsche would not agree with Kanfmaoo's
• attribution of agency 10 "Nature" with a capital "N" (see Chapter m>, he does call
for intervention in a "natural" process that appeiUS 10 be 1eading the human species
to utter degradation.
288
• practÏtioncrs oÏ slave morality to subvert the reproduction of bigher human beings.
Nietzsche insists that although the status quo bas miraculously (or, perbaps more
appropriately, "accidently") aIlowed for the appearance ofone such as he - someone
who managed to =pc the leveling tendencies of mainstream society with bis
nobility intact - mattcrs will never improve for the bigher type in general unIess a
concerted interVention is made into the reaIm of politics.
Nietzsche speaks in this context of the need to cali upon "[t]remendous counter-
forces [ungeheure Gegenkriifte] •.• to cross this nanu'll1, aIl tao natural progressus
in simile [progress towards uniformity]" (BGE 268) The sort of counterVailing
political action envisioned by Nietzsche is aimed at ensuring that "this type of
'accident''', i.e. the appearance of strong, noble men, is "willed consciously." (WP
979)68 It involves the establishment of planned and controlled measures of
cultivation ofnascent noble types, as a means ofsheltering them from bath the
vagaries of Chance69 and the vindictiveness of the base. Thal Nietzsche sees bis
twin enemies as Fortuna and the proponents of slave morality is demonstrated
clearly in EH "D" 2, when he speaks of bis "task" [Azifgabe] as the preparation for
mankjnd's "step[ping] out from the domination ofchance and the priesthood [aus
• fragment andIiddle and dreadful chance [das ist all mein Dichten und TrachJm,
dofl ich in Eins dichte und zusœnmentrage, was BrudJstiick ist und Riitsel und
grauser Zufallj." (Z II OR)
289
• der Herrschaft des Zufalls und der Priester heraustritt).•." He understands this
"stepping out" in tenns of a rectification of injustice, which is the great
responsibility of the "new philosophers," whose motto ("royal calling") Nie1Zsche
takes from Chatlemagne's Anglo-Saxon advisor, the theologian Alcuin: prava
290
• improvement tums out to involve a firm commitment to the ultimate artistic projcet:
that of attending to the condition - and the possibilities of successful reproduction -
of these gifted exemplars.
In this context we began our discussion of the use of the concept of ''breeding''
291
• modest lineage to somehow he bom with (or develop early on) noble instincts, and
transcend the limitations and disadvantages of bis immediate milieu through the
strength of bis will.
Notwithstanding the thrust of Nierzsche's definitive rejection ofbiological
determinism, 1 continued to axgue for the existence of the literaI end of the
continuum. i.e. for Niettsehe's abiding interest in the procreation and rearing of
children. While finding little worthwhile in most mar.riages and familles (given bis
jaundiced view of the characters of most spouses and parents, including those
found in conventionally "aristocratic" circles), Niettsehe deems it ofover.riding
importance to ensure the most propitious conditions for bath the physical
reproduction of the highest human beings and the nurture of their offspring.
Indeed, 1 axgued that Niettsehe's foray in the area of eugenics represents the second
of a two-front assault on the fon:es of bis capricious nemesis: Fortuna. The first
assault, represented by the thought experiment known as Etemal Return,
"[T]he goal for mankind that Nietzsche affirms and the cultural vision it
entails," DOtes Detwiler. "are of political significance because this goal._ may he
compatible only with a certain kind ofpolitical order." (Detwi1er 1990: 12-13) But
•
what does this imagined political arder look 1ike? When Nietzsche claims to know
"away out of [the] blind alley" that is modem, "herd" society (EH "cw- 2), what
292
• sort of alternative society does he have in mind? Where is political power held, and
how the friendship of bis free-spirited human heings would manifest itself. and will
also explore the crucial question of their relationship with the vast majority. We
shall also examine bis view of the place of women and of the gender relations that
• 293
• CbllDter IXi Cam and Gender Relations in the Nietzschean Utopia
Nietzsehe's portrait of bis ideal community is admittedly sketchy, and the seant
attention he gives to many issues of capital importance (such as how the new order
is to he brought about, where it should he located, how its economic and social
institutions should he organised. ete.) might lead one to conclude, with Williams,
that Nietzsche in fact bas "no coherent set ofopinions" about how polities ought to
Chapter 1). As far as Plato's polities are concemed, however, Nietzsche heartily
1 Sec bis admjring comments about "Plato's pe1fect state" [Der volIkommne Staal
• Platos] in an carly essay, "The Greek State". Sec Der griechische Staal, KGA
m(2): 258-271. Cf. bis discussion ofPlato in the essay "Schopenhauer as
Edueator" in UM.m.8.
294
• of Nietzsche's own envisioned political order can he described in terms of a series
ofconcentric ciI'C1es, with an inner ciI'C1e composee! of a minority ruling clique of
bigher human beings. SUITOunded by a much larger ciI'C1e representing a majority
population that is both under the tutelage of the minority and instrumental for its
continued flourishing. 2
Within the inner ciI'C1e, divcrsity rooted in commonality is the rule. As
Zarathustra explains, "many noblemen [Edlen] are needed. and noblemen of many
kinds.for nobility [Adel] to e.xist!" (Z m ONL Il) Further on in this same section
he makes the same point in the form of a parable, declaring that "'[P]recisely this is
godIiness, that there are gods but no God!'" (Ibid.) Although Nietzsche assumes
that noble persons have many traits in common (wbich aUows him to speak of
nobility in genera1, as an Ideal type; see Chapter m. he also believes that there are
many different ways and spheres in wbich nobility can manifest itself.3 The
members of the select commnnity are aU oflofty sta1UIe not becallse they move in
lock-step (from a Nietzschean perspective, such uniformity would he a sign of
slavishness), but rather becanse each bas it in him to find bis own path to nobility.
Neither a "social contract" nor any other legalistic device serves as the cement
that binds these friends and antagonists together. Zarathustra decries as "soft-
hearted" the view that that society is a conlract (Z mONL 25); such an insistence
upon "oaths instead ofloolcs and bands", he believes, implies a "timid
mistrustfulness" [das scheue Mi,6tnzuen] and is theIefore "base" [gering] (Z m
TET 2). In contrast to the "cowardly souls" who prudently bide behind legalistic
guarantees ofpersonal safety, Nietzsche's imagined nobles (likc the nobles of
2 We sball see be10w that Nietzsche also posits an "inner, inner circIe" ,Le. a
bieran:hy within the ruling caste.
•
3 1 disagrec with Wmen's contention that Nietzscbe's explicit politics denies the
role ofcultuIe "as a medium ofindividuation._" (Wmen 1988: 74) For Nietzsche•
the role ofcultuIe and politics is to cultivate, rather than stifle, noble individuality
amongst those (fe) with lofty dispositions and bea1thy instincts.
295
• antiquity) constrain themselves through "custam, respect. usage, gratitude, and
even more by mutuaI suspicion and jeaIousy..." along with "consideration, seIf-
control, deIieat.:y, loyalty, pride, and friendship..." (GM L11) Warren accurately
notes tha1 Nietzsche foresees the preservation of social order not through "equai
rights" in the form ofJega! guarantees, but through "the prese:ace of a eulturaIly
sustained mutuaI respect for others." (Warren 1988: 72) In a social context of
relative equaIity, a smaIl group of noble types may consider it "good manners"
[guten Sitten] to refrain "from mutuaI injury, mutuaI violence, mutuaI exploillltion,
to equate one's own will with tha1 ofanother..." (BGE 259) In sum, rather than
proposing the state as an externaI guarantor of rights, Nietzsche posits "a self-
policing eommunity of individuaIs•••" (Ibid., 74) in which informai displays of
(sometimes grudging) respect for those ofequai stature take the place of (what are
for Nietzsche) petty-minded, cowardiy rules and regulations.4
Some Nietzsche commentators, eager ta put the best po5S1ole face on
Nietzsche's poiitical views, have fastened upon tbis portrayai of aristocratie
equaIity and mutuaI respect ta argue tha1 Nietzsche was favourably disposed (al
least al certain points in bis career) towards some form ofpopular democracy.
and 1ater writings." (Detwiler 1990: 14) Warren similarly claims tha1 severa!
4 Sec in tbis context tbis carly depiction of crime and pnnisbment in an ideaI
political orcier. in which the transgxessor, instead ofbeing sentenced by an
impersona11egal code, "caIls bimself to account and publicly dietates bis own
pllDisl!JDent, in the proud feeling tha1 he is thus honourlng the law which he bimself
bas made, that by pllnishing himselfhe is exeR:ising bis power, the power of the
296
• based on a mutual recognition." (Warren 1988: 71) While conceding that it "may
seem odd" 10 impute an egalitarian strain to Nietzsche. Warren insists that Nietzsche
does not oppose "political cultures that inc1ude equal rights." (Ibid.. 72)
Warren is, in one sense, quite right: Nietzsche does make conceptual room for
the notion ofpolitical equality. However. in failing to place bis picture of equality
within the larger context of a hierarchical, aristocratic society• Warren and Detwiler
have mjssec! the ClUCial point. Nietzsche is interested in encouraging relations of
•
equality between bis highest h'JIIIan beings, and not between thcse noble types and
the rest of the population. With respect to relations between the noble ciIcle and the
see) are routinely proposeci as perfectly compatl"le with the principle ofjustice.S
As we noted in Chapter IV, Nietzsche staunchly opposes "equal rights" when this
phrase is taken as an injunction 10 treat aIl- the fine as weil as the vulgar - in the
same manner.6
The wary respect that characterises relations between the friends and rivals of
Nietzsehe's inner circle is c10sely related 10 each individual's zeaIous assertion and
defence of bis own self-sufficiency, i.e. bis freedom from dependency upon others
(Chapter Vll). Unlike late eighteenth-centUly theorists ofcolDlllCl:CÏa1 society like
Montesquieu. Kant, Adam Smith. and Benjamin Constant, who argued that the
emeIging varieties ofmutuaI dependence in a modem. commercialised wodd would
• of a democrat.
6 "For men are not equal, thus speaks justice. And what 1desire. they may nut
desire!" (Z II OS)
297
• have a benign effect upon the human condition, Nietzsche stubbomly maintains the
aristocratie view that ail occupations dependent upon the will of others are. by
definition, servile. As Zarathustra declares, "1 also call wretehed those who always
have to wail - they offend my taste: ail tax-collectors and shopkeepers and kings
and other keepers of lands and shops." (Z m OSG 2) Even a head of modem
nation-state. in bis eyes. is not wholly self-sufficient, for no matter how fum bis
grasp of the helm of state. he, too. must "wait" upon the will ,?f many others.
Nietzsche cannot abide this fact of modem politicallife: "Truly. 1 tao have learned
10 wail, 1have learned it !rom the very heart, but only to wait for myself." (Ibid.)
Exactly what this is supposed to entail is unclear. How is a noble type
supposed to attain a state of perfect self-sufficiency. in ligbt of the importance
Nietzsche attributes 10 friendship. which (arguahly) implies a certain mutual
dependency? We have a1ready notcd this tension between an uncompromising.
Stoie-inspired desiIe for self-sufficiency and bis competing desite 10 develop and
sustain satisfying telationships with kindred spirits ofsimilarly lofty dispositions.
When zarathustra insists that "1 live in my own ligbt, 1 drink back. into myselfthe
fJames that break from rœ.I 1 do not know the joy of the receiver; and 1bave often
dteamed that stealing must be more blessed than receiving" (Z II NS). he seems 10
himself10 ac1alowledge the corol1aIy: that one must learn 10 receive as well as 10
give.
The dccision 10 teceive who1e-heal1edly the offerings ofa friend is denounced
as an unconditional surrender. a "going over" 10 one's frlend [übervareten] that is
• 7 "Does not the giver owe thaDks 10 the teceiver for teceiving? Is giving not a
nece ssity [lst Sc1umken l'licht eine Notdu1ft]?" (Z m OGL) Recall the diccnssion in
Cbapter VII.
298
• base and servile (Z lOF). As an altematVe, Zarathustra counsels a more cautiaus,
guarded approach to one's friends, a "going near" 10 them [herantreten] rather than
cirele and reconci1e their undeniable need for supportive, lofty human contact with a
harsh, uncompromising autarehic ideal is left unc\ear. Nietzsche's failure to
explore these issues more deeply suggests (to me, at anJ rate) that the very
coherence (not to mention realism) of Nietzsehe's inner circle of friendslrivals is
very much in doubt.
• individual egoism in Kant (".msocïal sociability") and Smith (the "invisible band")•
sec Abbey 1994: 7. Foran interesting discussion of this eighteenth-centUIy
discourse, sec Hh'schmann lm.
299
• Fierce competition must he the rule in Nietzsebe's ideal society, for in bis view
every individual who evince the ttaits of a "master" seeks openly and
unapologetically to rule over others. "[T]he best [dos Beste] shall rule,"
Zarathustra procla.ms, "the best wants ta rule [will auch herrschen]! And where it
is taught different1y, there - the 1:lest is lacking." (Z ID ONL 21) One of the reasons
NIetZSChe 50 despises slave morality is that it cultivates an ethos in which desire for
rule is ostensibly discouraged and disparaged. In the society of the "last man," as
Zarathustra famously utters, no one wishes ta rule any more, for ruling (and even
observes that 1ust for rule is also present in societies undergirded by servile morality
(notwithstanding protestations ta the contraly), he argues that in these societies it is
manifested covert1y, masking itselfdishonestly and hypocritically in the rhetoric of
Hypocrisy, believes Nietzsche, is the ODIy outeome of a social ethos that denies the
fact that the will ta power drives evetythiDg: "They lie in wait for one another, they
wheedle things out ofone another - the call that 'good neighbourliness' [gute
Nadrbarschaft]." (Z ID ONL 21)
"lust"; "Lust for power: but who sha1l call it lust, whCn the height longs ta stoop
• down afterpower [doch wer hiejJe es SucIrt, wenn dos Hohe hinab nach Macht
300
• gelüstet]! Troly, there is no sickness and lust in such a longing and descent!" (Z
TET 2) The open clash of competing wills to power in the aristocratie inner circle
is, for Nietzsche, a noble thing of beauty.
m
Wbile the inner circle bas no set hierarchy au départ, Nietzsche appears to
countenance the emetgence of a meritocratie hierarchy out of the "experimentation"
involved in having a group ofexceptional human beings compete for supremacy.
Un1ike commentators like Honig and Connolly, who find in Nietzsche a utopian
idea1 ofperpetual, chaotie contestation (e.g. Honig 1993a: 229), Ibelieve!bat
Nietzsche envisions a telos ta bis battle of giants: the emergence of a victor who is
strongest, wisest, and most virtuous. As Zarathustra puts it, "[h]uman society
seeks ... the commander [Befehlenden]!" (Ibid.)9 Around the commander, he
In a strikingly Platonie spirit, Nietzsche sees emerging out of these lofty battles
for supremacy a new, inner hierarchy, with a "predominantly spiritual type" [die
vorwiegend Geistigen] reigning ovec a "predominantly mnSC'l1ar and tempem1ental
"second in rank" and expected ta Idieve the former, ie. "the most venerable
[eluwiùdigste] kind ofhuman being," of "everything coane in the work of ruling
301
• [alles Grobe in der Arbeit des Herrschaft]." (AC 57) It is surely no accident that
this emergent hieran:hy recalls the divisions within Plato's "guardians" in the
dIy" hy the parasitical majority (e.g. Z m ONL 19). The imperative of maintaining
a form of apartheid between master- and slave-types, a prime motive for the higher
sort's flight into solitude (Chapter VI), is retained in the recanstituted political order
of Nietzsche's imagination. Nietzsche insists that a "master race" [eine Herren-
Rasse] at its highest Ievel ofdevelopment cannot remain preoccupied with the
mnndan~ task of nùing ovec inferiors. "Not merely a master race whose sole task
is to rule [regieren]," emphasises N'1ClZSChe in a fragment from the Nach1ass, "but
a race with ils own sphere of life [eine Rasse mit eigenerLebenssphlire]•••" (WP
898; emphasis added) One should sec bis favourable comments about the Indian
"Law ofManu", which countenanees a rigidly-maintained hierarchical caste system,
in this lighllO The attitude ofN'lClZsche's "spiritual" type of master towaIds the
10 Cf. TI TIM 3, in which Nietzsche lands the separation ofIndian society into
fOlU' "races": a priestly. a warrior, a uading and fanning "race", and finally a menia!
race. Further on, he remaries: "One draws a breath of reliefwhen coming out of
the Christian 5Ïck-house and dungeon atmospbeœinto this bealthier, higher, wider
worId. How paltIy the 'New Testament' is compared with Manu, Iiow ill it
smeIlsl" (Ibid.) When discnssing the strlngent restrictions on the "Untoucbables"
of the Indian caste system, N'1ClZSChe suggest5 that "[P]erbaps there is nothing
which outtages 0lU' feelings more than these p:oteetive measures ofIndian
morality." (Ibid.) Kanfmann argues thattbeseWOJdsimply acritical stance
towaIds this "morality of breeding" [Die Moral der Zilc1rtlmg) (TI TIM 5) as a
302
• plebeian e1ement, moreover, can be seen in zarathustta's approach to beggars.
zarathustra, we will reca11, finds the very sight of beggars offensive, and yeams for
their banisbme1lt (or e1imination).l1
contael with the majority "mediocre type" [die Mittelmiij3igen] than with the highest
individua1s, who cannot be expected to sully their bands by dealing with the
majority plebeian e1ement (AC 57). This division of labour between different types
ofpolitica1 rule - i.e, between those in the inner circ1e with the task of ruling over
the majority and those responsible for ruling only over themse1ves and their peers -
recalls the hierarchica1 distinctions of Aristotelian politica1 philosophy. AristotJe, it
will be recalled, associates the highest form of rule with a participatory, republican
politics conducted between free, self-goveming men, conttasting it favourably with
despotic rule over slaves or slave-like persons. who, for whatever reason (mnate
deficiencies, economic deprivation, ete.), cannot govem themse1ves. 12 Similarly,
Nietzsche deems the kind of rule nover select disciples or brothers" [ausgesuchte
Jünder oder Ordensbrüder] to be best and "most refined," (feinste] whereas the
direction of the larger commnnity of unequals is said to require a cruder form of
rule, "the necessary dirt of a11 politics [dem notwendigen Schmutz alles Politik-
Machens]." (BGE 61)13
belïeves, is respons1Dle for "murderous epidemics" that endanger the lives of a11; TI
TIM3).
11 "Beggars._ shou1d be entirely abolished! Truly, it is annoying to give to them
and annoying not to give to them." (Z n OC) .
12 "AlI the different kinds ofrule are not, as some affirm. the samè as each other.
For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over
subjects who are by nature slaves." The Politics, L7, 1255b16-17. Cf. 1253820-
24; 116Oa1O-b32; 1295b18-22; 1324b31-35.
13 In this context NielZSclte once again refers to the Jndian caste system, singling
out the Brahmins as an admirah1y discip1ined religious œder that "have themselves
• the power ofnominatjng their kings for the people, while keeping and feeling
tbemselves aside and outside as men ofhigher and more than kingly tasks." (BGE
61)
303
• It is worth emphasising that this imagined type of rule over and between high-
minded equals is indeed eminently political. Just as Aristotle criticises many of bis
contemporaries in the Politics for wrongly assuming that the inferior, del;potie type
of rule constitl1tes politics as such, wc should take to task those commentators who
assume that Nieœsche's condescension towards the rule of masters over slaves is
tantamount to a repudiation ofpolitics. Detwiler makes this dubious assumption
when he declares that the "new philosopher" at the pinnacle ofNieœsche's new
aristocratie order ois not a politicalleader, but ..• uses politicalleaders as bis tools
as he sets the will ofmillennia on new ttaeks." (Detwiler 1990: 144) In passages
like these Detwiler adheres to an ex.cessively restrictive conception of politics, in
whieh the "political" refers narrowly and exclusively to the master's rule over
inferiors. Given such a restrictive Ieading, it is understandable why he deems
Nit:tzsche's position to he "antipolitical".l4 If, however, wc adopt the broader,
more inclusive view of the political used in this study, that sees politics as
incorporating aspirations for the cultural and moral betterment of the hnma n
species, Nietzehe's writings can he placed firmly in the "political" camp.ls My
14 Detwiler is not entiIely consistent in bis use of the term "political". At one
point, when he claims that Nieœsche "advocatcs akind ofpolitics ••• that is wholly
suboldinate to what is conducive to or expressive of the levels of cultural
attainrnent..." (Detwiler 1990: 66), he appe81s to conntenance a broader, more
inclusive conception.
15 Admittedly, Detwilets D8m1W conception of the political bas a long and
distinguished bistoIy. As far back as the French religious wars of the sixteenth
centUIy, those idcntified as the Politùples argued in favour of a purely smilar.
œSttictive concept of the state, dcDoJmcing as "antipolitical" those who argued for
the retention of oider, theoclatic modeIs, according to which politics must subserve
higber ends. Tbe Politùples, it will he recalled, insiS'M that tbeir naaow notion of
politics was the only way to save France from self-destnJction through unceasing
civil sttife betweeD religious factions. Their viewpoint bas proved tIernendously
attractive in the modem wortel, and today finds perbaps its most articulate
ex:pIession in the woJX ofJohn Rawls, whose notion of an "ovedapping
consensus" remains dependent upon a vision ofpolitical dtbaIe that rules all (or
• most) questions of the good Jife out-of-bouncls. Sec Rawls 1993: 133-211•
Wbether this view ofpolitical contcstalion is desirable, and even coherent, remains
a matter ofcontroversy and cannot he dise1Jssed here.
304
• argument, in a nutshell, is that Nietzsche denounœs "petty politics" in the name of
vast majority. As we discussed in Chapter IV, Nietzsche believes that since the
dawn ofslave morality the majority bas always nUISed a bitter resentment towal'ds
the few, noble spirits whom it knew i.nstinctiveiy to he superior. The rancor is saiei
to be due, we will recall, to the majority's intuitive recognition of the asymmetry of
obligation between themselves and this lofty minority; the majority feels itselfin
greater debt to the creative few than vice-versa. This coostitutes a significant
danger for the few, for, as zarathustra remaries, "[g]reat obligations do not makc a
man grateful. they makc him resentful [GrojJe Verbindlichkeitm mm:hen nù:ht
Unlike the rule within the inner ciIcle, which is envisioned as operating
accoIding to informaI, ad hoc ammgements, rule over the greater society should he
aggressive" men against the mob's "xeactive feelings." (GM Kil) As it was in the
days of the aristoaatic societies ofantiquity, 50 it should he in the future: a
Jasagen-ing, ruling élite should use·"the institution oflaw" [die Aufrichtung des
«Gesetz»] "to impose measure and bounds upon the excesses orthe reactive
30S
• practiced and maintained," he dcc1ares, "one sees a stronger power seeking a means
of putting an end to the senseless raging of ressenJimenl among the weaker powers
that stand under it..." (Ibid.) The just polilical order is one in which the vast
majority je: regulated by stringent legal codes administered and intetpreted by a well-
cullivated minority (or at least the lower, "auxili3l)''' lier of the minority élite),
which itself is exempt from such restrictions.
In Chapter IV we lOOk note of Nietzsche's view that the just society must he
•
expressions will to power, iftbey are to advance the species, must hecome other-
directed. The"emancipated individual [Freigewomne]," he insists, in the course of
306
• bis moral-spiritual development, becomes aware of how bis "mastery over Iùmself
[Herrschaft über sich] also necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances
[Umstiinde]. over nature [Natur]. and over all more short-willed and unreliable
essence, he deems the presence of the weak and inferior to be essential to the
freedom of the strong. master type. "That which is termed 'freedom of the will'
[Freiheit des Wùlens]." he explains, "is essentially the affect of superiority in
relation to him who must obey [der Oberlegen.'reits-Affekt in Hinsicht aufden, der
gehorchen 17lI4ll: 'I am free, he must obey' [«ich binfrei, er muj3 gehorchen»]
- this consciousness adheres to every will..." (BOE 19) Although he insists that
on when he asks, "must there not exist that which is danced upon., danced across?
• 16 "A man who wills - commands something in himself which oheys or which he
believes oheys." (BOE 19) Recall our discussion ofNietzsehe>m self-mastery and
discipline (Chapter V) in this context.
• Must there not be moles and heavy dwarfs - for the sake of the nimble ...7" (Z m
ONL2)17
sovereign species that stands upon" it and that "ean raise itselfto its task oniy by
doing this."18 (WP 898)
17 It is in this light,I be1ieve, that we should read WP 7(IJ. "We must think of the
masses as unsentimentally as ",oc think of nature: they preserve the specics "
18 "[S]ie liegt im Dienste einer h6heren, souverllnen Art, we1che auf ihr steht und
• eISt auf ihr sich zu ihrer Aufgabe ~ kann." TheNachIoss contains many
otber passages which clearly indicaœ that the plOper function of the average (Le.
"slavish") individual in a m:onstituted aristocracy of the future is 10 serve as a tool
308
• Lower order human beings, al best, ought to he treatcd as "intelligent machines"
(AC S7) that "exist for service and general utility and ... may exist ooly for that
pmpose." (BGE 61)19 Evincing a traditional aristocratic di.wain for "menial"
occupations, Nietzsche appears ta 1imit their vocation to manuallabour and other
lowly "matcrialistic" pursuits.20 "The crafts, trade, agriculture, science, the greater
part of art, in a word the entire compass of professional activity [Berufstiitigkeit),"
for the higher sort. In WP 901, Nietzsche informs us that the "main consideration"
is "not to see the task of the higher species in leading the lower (as, e.g., Comte
does), but the lower as a base upon which bigher species perfurms its own tasks -
upon which alone it can stand." Cf. WP 960, where higher men are urged to
"employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple ÏDstl1lment [ais ihres
gejügigsten und beweglichsten Werk4eugs] for getting hold of the destinies of the
earth.••" In WP 962, Nietzsche notes that the man "whom oature bas constructed
and invented in the grand style" wants "no 'sympathetic' heart, but servants, tools
[Diener, Werkleuge]•••"
19 Nietzsche is indeed a "perfectionist" in John Rawls' sense, in that he directs us
ta ammge institutions 50 as ta maximise the achievements ofbnman excellence,
bestowing a sbameful or slavish Iife upon the many in oroer ta foster high levels of
achievement in the few (see Rawls 1971: 25, 325). Rawls may he wrong in
identifying bath Plata and Aristotle as pe.rfectionists in the same sense. For bath
Plata and Aristot1e, the aim of the law is Dot "ta mate some one group in the city
outstandingly happy but ta conlrlve ta spread happiness through the city, bringing
the citizens into baImony with each other by persuasion and compulsion." Republic
51ge-52Oa. Practically speaking, however, a society organised along the lines of
Plato's Republic would no doubt he pe.tfectionist in Rawls' sense, regardIess of the
intentions of its rulers.
20 In ber survey ofancient moral philosophy, AI1nas notes that whereas Plata and
AristotIe followed aristocœlic seDS1bilities here, the Stoics did DOt, and refused ta
see an agent's occupation as an obstacle ta bis becoming virtuous (Annas 1993:
72). Nietzsche clear1y follows Plata and AIistot1e, rather than the Staics, in this
context.
21 Cf. WP 943, where Nietzsche observes that being noble cmies with it the
nnsbakable conviction that "although a craft in any sense does Dot dishonour, it
certainly takes away nobility [ein Handwerk injedem Sinne zwar nicht schilndet,
aber sicherlich entodelt]." Nussbanm bas recent1y criticised Nietzsche for allegedly
•
denying the importance of the practical dimensions oflife in bis wrltings; ie. the
fact that even a "new philosopher" or"fœe spirit" must, for c,'tampte, procure food
and eso "le menia! labour in oroer ta think weil (Nussbanm 1994: 158). By my
lights, however, Nietzsche is very aware ofthese materia! concems, and dea1s with
309
• Nietzsche's Happy Slave
virtues" [Heerdentugenden] (ViP 901). The most "admirable" slave seems in bis
eyes to be one who is fully aware of bis limits and refuses to oveneach himse1f.
"00 not will beyond your powers [WoUt nichts über euer Vemùigen]," Zarathustta
310
• lord's spirit and virtue [so wiichsest du selber mit
seinem Geiste und seiner Tugend]!' (Z il OFP)
It is Nietzsehe's hope that the modem Europe of the future will produce a large
number of "weak-willed and highly employable" servile typeS who know
themselves in this sense, who "need a master, a commander, as they need their
daily bread..." (BGE 242) The naturaI slave in a properly ordered society will find
an inttinsic satisfaction in the fulfillment of bis (limited) basic capacities: "To be a
public utility, a cog, a function," he claims, is a "natural vocation" or a "kind of
happiness of which the great majority are alone capable.. which ~ intelligent
machines of them. For the mediocre., it is bappiness to he mediocre..." (AC S7)
This type of "virtue," as Nietzsche never tires ofemphasising, is and must
remain that of the slave caste alone. While acknowledging that servile "virtues" of
uncritical obedience and deference may be benign and even desirable when
embodied in truly servile types,22 Nietzsche takes up arms against the alleged
tendency of slave morality ta universalise these charaeter traits as virtues tout court,
22 "Beyond good and evil- but we demand that herd morality shoÛld he he1d
sacred unconditionally [die unbet1ingte Heiligholtung der Heerden-Moral]." (WP
132) Cf. GS 381. where Nietzsche notes that "being an immoralist. one bas ta take
steps against corrupting innocents._" Schacht explains Nietzsebe's position
admiIably: "N"1elZSChe would by no means have everyone abandon the 'herd
morality_ On the contraIy, he considers it ta he entirely fitting, and hardly capable
• ofbeing improved upon _ where all those who do not have it in them ta he more
than the 'herd type' oflnunan being are concemed. Wbat he abjects ta is Iather its
inculcation in the potential exceptions ta the buman rule.-" (Scbacbt 1983: 4SS)
311
• are misplaced amidst the herd. It would he inappropriatc. for example, for a slave
ta seek the sort of freedom appropriate for nobles,23 for he is not "such a man as
ought ta escape a yoke.••" (Z 1 owq "There are many," remarks Zarathustra,
"who threw off their final worth when they threw off their bandage [seine
Dienstbarkeit wegwœf]."(Ibid.) N"1ClZSChe is convinced that efforts on the part of
servile types ta ape noble virtucs and lifestyles only end in disaster and great
suffering for the latter:
That which is available only to the strongcst and
most fruitful natures [stiirksten und fruchtbarsten
Naturen] and makcs their existence possible -
leisure, adventure, disbelief, even dissipation -
would, if it were available to mediocre natures,
necessarily destroy them - and actnally does. This is
where industriousncss, rule, moderation, firm
'conviction' have their place [die Arbeitsamkeit, die
Regel, die MèIjJigkeit, die fest «Oberzeugung»
am Platzl - in short, the 'herd virtucs'
[Heerdentugenden]••• (WP 901)
Hence it is in the slave's best interests ta be ban'ed, for example, from the type of
education that, in Nietzsehe's view, becomes "poison" in the bands ofthose "who
have tumed out badly." (OS 359)
Wbat is the place ofwomen in Nietzsehe's ideal commllDÏty? One looks in vain
for guidance from much of the secondaIy litera!uIe, whichJeDlains caught between
two extremes: on the one band, a denunciation of Nietzsche's al1eged misogyny,
and on the other a strained effort at uneartbing a proto-feminist vision beneath bis
writiDgs on womeu. and the "etr:rnal feminine"•
312
• References to Nietzsche's allegedly 0ve1t misogyny - which is assumed to he
synonymous with bis anti-feminism24 - are now routine: "Nietzsche.." claims
Detwiler. "appears to have been an unabashed misogynist..•" (Detwiler 1990: 15),
while Wam:n refers to "Nietzsche's well-known misogyny." (Wam:n 1988: xiv)
For some feminist theorists, this alleged misogyny is reason enough for
discounting bis thought outright. Penny Weise, for example.. responds to
Zarathustra's infamous reminder ("Are you visiting women? Do not forget your
whip!" Z 1 OYW) with the dismissive reply. "Thus spake misogyny." (Weise 1993:
137) Other. more charitable commentators, while implicitly or explictly accepting
Nietzsche's status as a misogynist, attempt to hive offand marginaIise bis remaries
on women, claiming that they have Iittle n:levance to bis philosophy as a whole.
The paradigm case here is Kanfmann, who dismisses Nietzsche's comments about
313
• understandable, if human, all-too-human need for revenge against Lou Salomé."
(Ibid.,4)
While conceding Nietzsche's contempt for the idea ofgender equality, many
commentators move on to extoll those allegedly proto-feminist e1ements ofhis
thought which the}' claim undercut his overt anti-ferninisrn Amongst so-called
postmodemist theorists, NielZsche is often said to celebrate a chaotic "female"
dimension oflife as inherently superior to the allegedly dogmalic and oppressive
"male" domain of metaphysics. According to Blondel, for example, Nietzsche
holdsthat
life is a woman, aIl appearance and make-up, a mask
devoid of underlying reality or base, the innocence of
becomiDg, a disconcerting game: this pure appearing
is reified by the c1umsy and unwholesome outlook of
the theoretical ma.n. a voyeur who perverts the
innocence ofbecoming by assuming it bas a Grund,
a background, and several seductive ulterior motives.
In addition, Nietzsche views this woman-life as an
illogicality, a contradiction, the negation of a
concocted essence.•• (Blonde11991: 28)
One might weIl wonder, however, how we should understand Nietzsche's notion
of the "Eternal feminine" [dos Weib an sich] (BGE 231) in lightofthis account; is
this not an example of the sort ofahistorlcal "essence" that Nietzschean proto-
feminist., post-modemist thought supposedly decries?
No, cIaim a number ofcommentators, who argue that Nietzsche lUldercuts aIl
manner ofessentialism, especially with respect ta women. Peter J. Burgmd, for
example, sees in Nietzsche's Withering criticism of nineteenth-century feminist
attempts "to enligbten men about 'woman as such' [dos Weib an sich]" (BGE 232)
an illustration ofhis combat against the "essentializing tendency" peT se. (BurgaId
1994: 9) Bmgani refuses to countenance the very real possibi1ity that BGE 232
contains a criticism not of the "essentializing tendency" as such, but rather ofone
314
• pages that follow that Nietzsche, far !rom claimjng that there is no such thing as li
womanly essence or nature, argues instead that the nineteenth-centurY feminist
understanding of that nature is both wrong-headed and dangerous. In the previous
section (BGE 231) and elsewhere.2S Nietzsche purports to outline bis own
(ostensIbly more accurate) understanding of das Weib an sich.2f>
Some Nietzsche scholaxs claim to find li subversive undermining ofessentialist
views ofwomen even in li passage Iike BGE 231. We recall that in this passage
Nietzsche. while announcing bis intention to "utter li few truths about 'woman as
such'", appears to qualify bis statement by placing the phrase das Weib an sich in
inverted commas and by insisting further on that "these are only - rny trurhs [meine
WahrheitenJ." Clark sees these qualifications as evidence that Nietzsche does not
take the notion of das Weib an sich seriously, that he presents it as li mere social
construction "that individual women need not exemplify." (Clark 1994: T'jD In the
fiIst place, insists Clark, the self-conscious use of the phrase Weib an sich is meant
to xecall the critique ofKant's Ding an sich in BGE 16; Nietzsche shows as much
2S Burgani studiously ignores BGE 239, in which NIetzsche claims that modem
feminists commit li gEe8t error - li "stupidity" - when they alft:mpl: to talk men out of
the idea "that thcre is something etemally,no:ess" i1y feminine [Ewig-1IIId
Notwendig-WeiblichesJ_." Similarly, in EH "Books" 5, Nietzsche suggests that
"perbaps 1 am the fiIst psychologist of the elCrDa1-womanly [des Ewig-
WeiblichenJ_." Unlike many commentators, who claim to pen:eïve irony
eveI:}'Where in Nietzsche's writings, 1 am able to detect neither ironie cJetachment
nor any sort ofself-unden:utting in these passar-s-
26 Burgani comes close to conceding this point when he deems Nietzsehe's own
essentialising gestuIe both an "irony" and "aDIDcfamenlllJ paradox" (Burgard 1994:
10). h seems to me that he finds Nietzsehe's substantive positions on woman's
nature and on natlJXe itse1f (sec QIapœr III) surprising and paradoxical only "ecanse
he lIssn mes that Nietzsche holds a belief in "Illdical pelspectivism" tbat ought to IUle
out such positions (Ibid.. 9). As 1 argued in Chapter 1, however, Nietzsche is oot a
"radical perspectivist" in Burgani's (or Nc:hamas') sense, since he sees bimselfas
putting forward accounts of reality that are both "perspectival" ond objective1y truc.
TI A simiJar llIgUmeDt is presented by Kofman in Kofman 1988: 198. Sec also
Janet Lungstrum's reveaIing (and typical) refeœnce to "N"letzsche's self-denigrating
• announcement that bis comments on woman are 'rny truths' only_" (LungstnJm
1994: 141. Myemphasis.) 1 shall argue below thatN1etzsebe's qlllllificatjQD is not
meant to he self-denigrating lit alL
315
• contempt for the former notion as he does of the Ianer (Ibid.) In the second place,
CIarlt suggests that "the waming that these are 'only my truths' may he Nietzsehe's
way of dicclaiming the beliefthat bis misogynistie comments are truc." (Ibid., 5)
She concludes that Nietzsehe's views are presented "on the level of sentiment, not
be/ief',ZP. and that he succeeds - heroically - in maintaining an ironie distance from
them. (Ibid., 4)29
What should wc make ofCIarlt's c1aim that Nietzsehe's treatment of theWeib an
sich echoes bis derisive treatment of the Ding an sich? It is certainly true that
Nietzsehe's use ofinverted commas around the former indicates a desire ta distance
bimseIf!rom a particular use of this expression. As wc noted in Chapters 1 and II,
inverted commas often function in Nietzsehe's writings as a device aIIowing the
author to maintain a critical (often ironie) distance from certain aII-too-eommon
ways ofusing a given term or phrase. However, as 1argued in the context of my
discussions of Nietzsche treatment oftruth, virtue, morality, and related concepts,
this distancing, ironie device signifies ironie detacbment only!rom mainstteam
usage, and not (as many Nietzsche scho\ars argue) !rom the concepts themselves.
•
about women, out ofhis commitment ta truth." (Ib;d.. 10) She suggests tbat this
admirable O'.e.. oming of self-intei:ested l'eSC umeo t is sometbing that feminists
ought ta strive ta c:ml1bte (Ib;d.. 4). In this picture, Nic:tzschc: Iec:merges as a
model for feminists afœr an. bis anti-feminism notwithstanding.
316
• use the same language for different (in bis view, contemptible) ends. Hence the
distancing device of the inverted commas.JO
CIark bases ber argument on the questionable assumption that objective trulh, for
xepresenting an ironie retreat from bis own understanding of the "eternal feminine,"
Nietzsche's emphasis on the intensely persona! DlltUIe of bis views constitutes an
avowal of their objective truth, a truth disc:ov=d througb the most scrupulous and
intensive self-exploration.
But what ofNietzsche's IepClIted insistence on the "artî6ciality" (i.e. the
human-constructed status) ofall moral scbc:ma!ll? Dacs this view not imply that
notions of gender roIes and Ie1ations are construeted, and that attempts te legitimise
one's own conception ofgendcrIe1ations by refeaing te some "essential" S!llDdaxd
of"DlltUIe" are untcnable? Not nec:css Bdly; as far as 1 can tell. Nietzseœ deems bis
30 It is instructive te contrast BGE 231 with the passages from BGE 239 and EH
"Books" 5 cited in note 24. In neïther ofthese passages is the notion ofthe etemal-
317
• historicist account of how women (and men) become who they are peri'ectly
compatible with bis gender essentialism. Yes, he seems 10 suggest, the concept of
"woman" is malleable, and in fact changes through time; their views of themselves
and our view oftbem cao change and bas changed throughout histoJy. In xecent
worthy of the same rights and privileges of European men. But this, he insists, is
WI'Ong, and (as wc shall sec below) indicative of widespread cultural degeneration.
Feminism, this contingent historical development arising as a post-ehristian
offspring of slave morality, is contraIy to women's essential nature, wheleas
Nietzsehe's own (CODStructed) master morality said to he superior in large part
because it bas an accurate grasp of the essence of woman. In sum, Nietzsche (m
my view) attempts to combine a social constructivist view with a deeper gender
essentialism.31
Wi1Jjams bas xecently obsetved that "[t]be double idea that thel'e should he a
shaIp and unchanging distnDution of roles and that females and males were
designed 10 fill those roIes bas managed 10 find a remarkable range ofpolitical
philosophies xeady to accommodate it._" (Wi1Jjams 1993: 123) Nietzsche. 1would
argue, bas a fiImly entrenebed position within this "J'CID&kable range." Anti-
"cSsentialist" readings notwitbstanding, Nietzsche taIœs the idca ofthe "etemal
fcminioc" very seriously, believing thel'e to he an ahistorlcal, acultural essence of
womauhood that women in partïcuIartimes and places cither succccd in cmbodying
or fail 10 live up to.
In the pages that follow 1will attempt to explore bis unde:rstanding of this
essence. As wc shall sec, N'1CIZSChc falls into linc with much of tIllditional moral
and political philosophy in lauding the virtuc supposed1y intJ:insic 10 the woman
• m.
31 Cf. Cbapter whcrc 1 mgued for the logical COIIlpatibility bctwcen
NiclZsCbc's normative use of the concept oflllltUœ (à la Arlstotle) and bis view of
the "a11ific:ialit" of an moral sclJemara
318
• who serves as worthy consort ta thc higher sort of man and as mother ta his
children. Also in linc with this tradition, Nietzsche maintains that the ultimate form
of human excellence is a!tl!inablc ooly by IDCI:. That such a position could hardly
be chaIacterised as fcminist goes without saying. Just as contestable, by my lights,
is its routinc characterisation as misogynist. Whilc very few enlightened peoplc in
contcmporary Western societies would agree with NiClZSChc's views on women, to
dismiss them as hateful, childish ranting seems tao easy.
It would be wrong, moreover, ta tIy ta marginalise these views from thc teSt of
Nictzsehc's philosophy. NiClZSChc's ManY xemarks on women oUght to he taken
seriously as an inttinsic part ofhis moral and political vision - a vision in which
conceptions of marriage and breeding are given pride ofplace - and any CU1'SOIY
dismissal of them can ooly serve ta impoverish our understanding of that vision.32
Nictzsche's vituperativc language is IeSeIVCd not for the femalc sex as a whole,
as Clark. (1994: 4) and otheIs have rightly suggested, but ralher for a partïcular type
ofwoman. an "unbealthy" woman al the bottom end ofN"lCtzSChe's Rangordnung
of femininity whom he compares unfavourably to his ideal.33 She is considcIed
unbealthy becallse ofher shllnnjng of customaxy femalc defeIence ta men and her
dccision to seek gender equality, particularly in the traditionally malc-dominated
public sphere. Nietzsche aetually traces feminist dcmands for gender equality back
ta physiological pat!lQlogy: "[t]he stmgglc for equa1 rïghts fg1eiche Rechte] is even
a symptom of siclrness [ein Symptom von Knmkheitl: every physician [Arzt] lcnows
. that." (EH "Books" S) MOle specifical1y, the feminist woman is alleged ta be
• tawaxds womcn and his social and political vision (1994: 323)•
33 Kofman points to Nietzsche's distinction between different types ofwomcn and
ta his valorisation of the "afIirmalivc" type ofwoman in Kofman 1988: 193.
319
• physiologically deficient in the area where healthy women demonstrale (for
NJCIZSChe) their greatcst use and importance: biological reproduction. FeminislS are
"abortive women [die vmmg1ilcktm Weiblein], the 'emancipateli' who lack the
Nietzsche's sterile, resentful woman not only shares same disposition as the
plebeian sort, she appears to represent to an even greater degIee the worst aspects
of the plebeian characler: "A littlc woman chasing aftcr herrevenge would over-run
faIe itself. - The woman is unspeakably more wicked [bOser] than the man, also
. clcverer [klüger] •••" (Ibid.)3S
• ta bave this positive sense of "wickedness" in mind, and uses the tmn in the more
conventiona1l (Le. pejorative) sense. Once again wc sec tbat consistent:}' in the use
oftmns is oot to be found in Nietzsche.
320
• Ironically, argues Nietzsche, although the fcminist remains convinced that she
is worlcing for the troe inteI'eSts of the female sex, sbe in fact ensures a contnuy
result. A "real woman" rein wohlgeratenes Weib] in touch with ber "most
womanly instincts" [weiblichsten Instinkte] (BGE 239) undexstands this: "The
more a woman is a woman [Dos We;b. je mehr Weib es istl the more she defends
bexselftooth and nail against rights [Rechte] in general••." (EH "Books" 5) It
.
would be in the best interests ofwomen to submit to the natura! order of unequal
gender relations, for women would thereby retain the advantages of their abilities in
one crucial area where, as we shall see in further detai1 below, Nietzsche believes
they exercise a significant modicum ofpower: the area ofpersonal relations.
"[T]be state of nature [der Nat/UVlStll1Idj, the eternal war between the sexes puts
ber in a superior position by far••." (Ibid.) In this private realm of gender relations,
men of bonour provide a "tribute ofrespect" [Achtungszoll) to their consorts,
something that modern, degenerate women have perversely come to see as "almost
"grammar school education. trousers and the political rights ofvoting catt1e"
[Stimmvieh-Rechte],36 women aClnally abandon their great natura1 advantages in
exchange for the opportunity to compete with men in a man's game, thereby
"lower['mg] the general rank ofwoman [dos allgemeine RDng-N'weDIl des Weibes
<.herunter»bringen]••." (EH "Books" S) "Sïnce the French Revolution." insists
Nietzsche elsewhere, "the influence [der EinfùIJ!J ofwoman in Europe bas grown
less in the same pxoportion as ber rights and claims have grown greater-" (BGE
239)
• 36 Cf. BGE 239, where he speaks disparagingly of the "[reduction of) woman to
the level of'general edncation', if DOt to that of newspaper reading and playing al
politics."
321
• Nietzsche aIso suggcsts, rather inconsistently, that the unhealthy woman aspires
not mcze1y to cqual rights, but to the exercise of domination over men in bath the
public spbere and in the area of more ttaditional women's aetivîty, the spbere of
domestic relations with men. Zarathustra mises the specter of the ambitions female
who, as a "dressed-up lie [geput<:te Lage]," conceals ber domineering streak behind
a veil ofsubmissiveness during courtship, ooly to unIeash it upon her
unsuspecting, gulh"ble groom after marriage (Z 1 OMC). Having sought after and
believing bimselfto have found na handmaiden with the virtues ofan ange!" reine
Magd mit den Tugenden e~ Engels], the naive husband suddeoly finds bimseJf
undcr ber thumb: "he became the handmaiden of a womann [wurde er die Magd
e~ Weibes] (Ibid.).
It should be noted that Nietzsche believes the 1mbealthy woman's success in
dominating ber man in this manner is contingent upon bis own basic servi1ity (Le.
.mmanJjness). "[I]fone tests your virility," ZarathustIa decIares mockingly to the
majority ofbis male contemporaties, "one finds ooly steri1ity!n (Z n Ou:::p7 Like
Arlstotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and other figures in the civic bnmanist ttadition
before bim, N"le'ZsCœ sees this fcmale domination over men in hoth the public and
pàvale spheres as an .mm;stakahle sign of widespread cultural degradation and
'57 "Und WCIII1 man auch Nierenprilfer ist wer glaubt woh1 noch, da8 ihr Nieren
habt." In EH "HAH" 5, N"letZSChe suggests that he bimsdiwas "infectcd" with
"'icfc:a1jsm'. 'beantiful fœlings' and otber womanisbness [WeiblichKeiten]" before
beginning bis long, painful moral and spirilUal joumey.
38 Cœveacly, Nietzsche a1so adopIs the classical civic bnmanist association of
public viltue with tigbt male control. over WOIDCD: the ancient Greeks "fromHomer
to the IF of Perlcles", he be1ieves, undei::>1OOd "how œcessary [notwendig]" it was
to become "mœe sttict with women" [stmJger gegen dos Weib] "with the increase
322
• an ominous waming that "[w]hat is womanish [Weibsarr], what stems from
sIavishness [Knechtsart] ••. now wants to become master of mankind's entire
destiny••." (Z rv OHM 3)
In a corrupt, servile society. where men's will to power is weak or channelled
seize the opportunity to step outside the domestic sphere and assert themselves
publicly. "[Woman] rules when she succeeds in overcoming the sttong [es
hemcht, wenn es gelingt, die Starken Vl überwiiltigen]." opines Nietzsche in a
women make themselves manly. For only he who is sufficient1y a man will-
redeem the woman in woman." (Z ID VMS 2)40
Nietzsche suggests not only that feminist women tllkc advantage of the
nnmanliness ofheM men, but also tha1 they (along with the "soft" culture tha1
• 40 "Des Mannes ist hierwenig: daium vennllmjJichen sich ihre Weiber. Dena nur
wer Mannes genug ist, wini im Weibe das Weib - erlOsen." 0n1y a "man's man,"
it seems, cao put a woman back in ber place. More on this be1ow.
323
• insured their flourishing) serve ID "sedllce" men - even men with initially noble
instincts - inID an nMaOlraI femininity. Such women, for Nietzsche. suggest a sort
of easy. complacent sensuality; the "lustful woman" [briinstigen Weibes] is a
temptation ID slide off the road of self-overcoming inID petty self-indulgence.41
Even metaphorically. women of'ten appear in NielZSChe's writing as temptations to
he avoided by high-minded men intent on self-transeendence: IDward the end ofZ
41 "Is it Dot betterto faI1 into the bands of amurderertban into the dreams ofa
lustful woman?" (Z 1 OC)
42 For anothermctaphorlc trcatment of the cIeleù'rious influence of womcn, sce
HAHII Prcf. 3, whele N"Ie'ZSChe wams that Romantic music "unnerves, softcns,
feminiœs [erwich4 verweibIichtl, its 'etemal womanly' draws us - downwards!"
43 "f.T}o demand that evezything sbould becomc 'good man', herd animal, bIne-
• eyed, beaevo1ent, 'beautiful soul', _ wou1d mean to deprlve existence of its greal
c:haracter, wouIdmean to castrate mankjnd [die Menschheit kastrierenl and 10
miuce it to a paltly Cbinadom." (EH "Destiny" 4)
324
• Mother and Consort: Nietzsehe's Ideal Woman
perceptions, desires, [and] fcars" bas no guarantee of success (BGE 268). 1bese
"more select, subtle, rare and harder to understand" men. a1as, succumb more often
than not to "over-hasty attachments to which senses and heart prompt them." (Ibid.)
"[E]ven the most astute man," observes Z8rathustra ruefully, "buys his wife while
she is still wrapped," ie. without ascertaining whether she is ttuIy worthy to he his
consort (Z 1OMC). The implication appears to he that there are rare women who,
w1len "unwrapped," prove themselves to he valuable "acquisitions."
This view ofwomen's potenlial as valuable companions to the Obermensch is
fmtherreinfœced by Z8rathustra's observation that women are "not yet capable of
friendship" [dos Weib (ist) noch nicht der Frelllltlschaftflihig] (Z lOF). The
qualifier "Dot yet" seems to suggest that under a proper regime of cultiva!ion and
training, women might sorne day fmesake their UIIhealthy qualities and become
capable of sorne form offrlendship (Ibn).
1say "SODle form" offrlendsbip, hecanse it.is Dot at an clear that Nietzsche
believes even the best and bea1thiest ofwomen to he capable ofaspiring to the
• highest form offrlendship, a form (as wc saw in 0Japter VIl) rooœd in arlstocratic
equa1ity, creativity, and virtue. 1 wouId 8IgUe the contr:l11}', that Nielzsche beIieves
325
• cven the most idcal female consort to be barred from this bighest of human
re1ationships becanse of ber inherent "shallowncss", her inability to attain the
snmmit ofexcellence that is the provenance ber partDer, the creative man.44 The
"man who bas depth in bis spirit as well as in bis desires," N"lCtzsehe informs US,
".•• must conceive of woman as a possession, as property with lock and key, as
SC'mething predestined for service and attaining ber fidfi1ment in service..." (BGE
238)45 In this context Nietzsehe's idcal of male-fema1e friendships resembles that
of Aristotle, who posited a bierarchy of philci in the polis, with the friendship
between Cree males deemed the most perfec:t and that between each Cree male and the
wives and children in their respective households an inferior - although admitted1y a
hardly insignificant - variety.46
Nietzsche does concede that hea1thy women may have an innate knowledge of
"creation" in their capacity as mothers, and (thl"ough Z3IathustIa) urges male
creative types to take heed of their birthing Cxperlence: "You creators, you Higher
Men! Whoever bas to give birth is sicle; but wboever bas given birth is uncleanJ
AsIe the women [die Weiber]: one does not give birth for pleasure." (Z JY OHM 12)
Great1y respectful of WOIDCD'S natura1 ptOClealÏve capacity, he be1ieves that
• two males. each of whom bas a wife and childm1 (who. on account of alleged
incquaHties, ClIDDot he philoi with him in the higbe$t sense); and each clearly lives
with, in the litcra1 sense, these lower-order philci." (Nussbanm 1986: 358)
326
• woman's virtue, her 'highest hopc' in Zarathustra's parlance, consists in bcaring
the next Obermenschlich generation: ''May 1bear the Superman [den
Obermenschen gebiiren]!" shc is made to declare (Z 1 OYW).47 Her 'first and last
profession' [ersten umi letzten Benife]. reiterates Nietzsche. 'is to bear strong
children.· (BGE 239)48
Although Nietzsche honours the fema1e vocation of proaeation and even
invokes the metaphor of pregnancy repeatedly in bis discussions ofcreation, the
creator nevertheless is invariably portrayed as male. In the following passage, for
example, zarathustra describes himself as 'pregnant with lightnings which affirm
Yes [schwanger von Blitzen, die ja! sagen]! laugh Yes!·••• [B]lessed is he who is
thus pregnant [selig aber ist der also Schwangere]!' (Z mss 1) With the crucial
exception of their role as mothers, therefore, women are Dot seen as creators.
Indeed, Nietzsche believes that women cannot attain the sublime, child-lïke
innocence requiIed for the life-affinning act ofcreation. Whereas 'woman
understands children better than aman,' zarathustra claims that 'man is more
childlilœ [kinderlicher] than womBn.•• A child is concealed in the tlUe man [lm
echten Manne ist ein Kind verstec1ct]._• (Z 1OYW) And as we recall from our
discussion in Otapter VI. zarathustra states that only those who can become
47 Eadier in this section, zarathustra includes the following as one ofbis homilies:
"Everythïng about woman is aridd1e, and eveI)'thing about woman bas one
solution: it is ca11ed pregnancyJ For the woman, the man is a means [ein Mittel):
the end [der Zweck] is always the child.' (Z 1OYW) Cf. EH "Books" S: •As my
answer been heard to the question how one cures - 'redeems' - a woman? One
makes a child for ber. The woman bas need ofchildren, the man is always only the
me8ns' thus spote Z8rathustra.••"
48 The great impoItanœ Nimsche attributes to the female role in propagation is
further cIcmonstœted in bis criticism ofChristianity's "abysmal vulgmty"
[uneTg1'iind1icM Gemeinheit] with xespect to "p.llx:realion [die 7nlgrmg] _
women, [and] marriage." (AC S6) AppaIcntly Nietzsche believes that the œudency
ofChristianity's ascetic strain to "sJander" the body involves a sJandennd
vl1ifieation of typicaIly fema1e bodily functions as we1L By contrast, he conœuds,
the Tndian Law of Manu treats these JD8tterS "seriously, withrevetCDCC [E1u;1iudzt].
• with love and trust." The "old greybeaIds and saints" who composed the laws of
Indian caste society, he believes, "have a way ofbeing pollie [amg] to women
wbich bas perbaps never been surpassed." (IbitL)
3Zl
• cbiIdren once again can embody "a new beginning. a sport. a self-propelling wheel,
a first motion, a sacred Yes." (Z 13M)
In SUIn, while Nietzsche believes that bealthy women may aspire to the summit
ofspecifically female virtues - to which he seems to atlxibute more inhexent value
than the aforementioned "hexd virtues" - he dismisses the possibility of their
[sehnsiJchtige alte lI1Id jll1lge Weibchen! (Z IV AI). Thus he concludes: "I am not
Wbat are the specifically fema1e virtues to which essentially healthy women
aspire? As we noted above, Nietzsche believes that women attain their true
fulfilment in "service" to men (BGE 238). In continuity with the ethos of the
waaior societies ofantiquity. he identifies two complementaxy roles in this regard:
that ofreaeatiooal plaything of the virtuous male on the one band, and ofnurturing
mother to his cbiIdren on the ether.SII Z3rathustxa succinctly encapsn1ates this view
of women's double duty in his oftband remark about fema1e bIeasts: "there are
many things 50 weIl devised that they are like women's bxeasts: al the SarDe lime
useful and pleasant [niltZlich mgleich und angenehm]." (Z mONL 17) Anether of
Z3rathustra's remarJcs relatjng more direct1y to the division of labour between the
sexes makes the SarDe point "'Ibis is how 1 would have man and woman: the one
49 1 wou1d add once again that in josist.ing on women's inability to"attain the
highest type ofvirlue, Nictz9;he does oot intend to place all women on the saxne,
Ievel field. As Karman notes, NieIzscbe believes an "affinnative woman" to he
"c1oser to an affirmative man tban a dcgeDerate woman." (Kafman 1988: 193)
50 1 disagree with Kelly Olivex's contention that "N'1CtZsclIe reduces woman and
the feminine to the malMnal" as too one sided (Oliver 1994: 60). Olivex's Frendjao
• ~ to trace DOt 0D1y Nietzsàle's position on WOInel1, but also his entire
philosophy back to his fear ofhis "castrating" mother (Ibid., 62) also seems over-
stated. A similar reading can he found in Luce IIigaray. 1990.
328
• fit for war [kriegstiichtig], the other fit for bearing children [gebèirtti1chtig], but
both fit for dancing [tanVüchtig] with head and hecls." (Z m ONL 23)5\
The attitude of Nietzsche's highest man towards the woman who wou!d be bis
bis female source of divertissement: "danger and play... [H)e wants woman. as
means oftesting bis mettle even in leisure, he seeks out in bis woman (or women)
not a meek, submissive sbrinking violet of a lesser man's fantasies, but rather a
"strangely wild" (BGE 239) creatwe, a "dangerous, aeeping, sublerranean little
beast ofprey" who will not be subdued easily and who, for this reason,
Nietzsehe's waaior male takes great pleaswe in attempting to subdue (EH "Books"
5).
Even as he speaks ofwomen as p1operty, NielZSChe does not appear at aIl
convinced that bis hig1test man will ever completcly subdue such a "wild" c:reanue..
• 51 Sec also Z 1OYW: "Man should he trained forwar and woman for the
recreaticin of the warrior [Erholung des Kriegen]: aIl else is folly (Torheit]."
329
• He suggests chat such a woman, whose "nazure, which is more 'natural' than chat
of the man" would inspire "respect" and "fcar" [Furcht] in any man, is
characterised by a fundamental "inedncability and inner savagery" [Unerziehbarkeit
und innerliche Wùdheit] (BGE 239). We will recaII !rom our earlier discussion
(Chapter In) chat for Nietzsche, education [Eniehung] and breeding [Züchtung]
he1p the higbest sort of man break away !rom the natural world and attain the
summit of human excellence, which involves the erection of an artifice of great
deeds. Apparently the "nature" of the finest women is more "natural" than chat of
men's because, unliIœ the finest of men, their "ineducability" prevents them !rom
breaking with nature in this manner. It is this natural savagery, however, that
makes the ideaIly heaIthy woman, if not creative, then eenaiDly fonnidable, and
thus a worthy consort.
Perhaps, Nietzsche concedes, the most ferocious ofthem will never be
completely brought to hce1; in this context Ile speaks approvingly ofwomen
throughout bistmy who have exCICised power "behind the scenes", as it were, "the
wodd's most powerlu1 and influential women (most =ntly the mother of
Napoleon), [who] owed their power and ascendancy over men pœcisely to the
forceoftheirwill.••" (Ibid.)
Neverthe1ess, N'1ClZsc Ile foUows Macbiavelli in insisting that al some deep Ieve1,
these women crave to be dominatrd by worthy maIes.
HoweverwiDfully dangerous they may he, as heaIthy women they tind deep
tiJ!fiI1ment in their stants as pIaythings, in beiDg an ÏIIStIUlDemll1 support for the
willing of their male paciDCrS. As zarathustra puts it ""The man's happiness
[Glilck] is: 1 wilL Tbe woman's happiness is: He wilL" (Z 1 OYW) Fme women
are tbus attrlICœd oo1y to the strong and bold type ofman wbose will bas resistrd
•
the empsculatjng efforts ofcenturies of servile moral teaehing. zarathustra suggCsts
this mctaphorica11y in c1aiming that the "woman" wisdom "never loves anyone but a
330
• warrïor." (Z 1ORW) More literally, he asks elsewhere "whom does woman hale
most?" and revcalingly answers: "Thus spoke the iron to the magnet: '1 hale you
most, ~ause you attraet me. but are not strang enough to draw me towards you.'"
(Z 1 OYW) Healthy women, in other words. have no respect for men who have
neither the strength nor the courage ta make them their OWO. "In the long lUIl,"
Nietzsche concludes. "the little women [die Weiblein) '" play the deuee with
selfless, with merely objective men [sie 1IUlChen sich den Teufel was aus
selbstlosen, aus bloj3 objektiven Mèinnem)••." (EH "Books" 5)
with a look at the salient features of the inner "community" of Cree spiritcd
friendslenemies. 1place invertcd commas around this term because the depiction is
that of a remarkab'y unstable and tenuous type ofcoexistence, one that may very
well he UDworkable at any time and in any place. Given Nietzsebe's view that each
Cree spirit should he aUowed the broadest possible range ofcreative self-expIessïoD,
he insists that the only sort ofrestraint imaginable in this rarified comm1mity comes
from within each individuaL "Good breeding" and a concomitant respect for one's
neighbours are Idied upon ta ensme individual commilmCDt ta somc semblance of
collective oIder; the restraining features of the rule oflaw are rejectcd from the start
as unacœptab'le limitations on the lifc..affinning will ta power of the higbest human
beings.
Thal which tums this dispaIaIe collection of fiercely-independent Cree spirits
• common bond by challenging each other ta strive ever harder for perfection. Just
331
• wba1 sort ofcompetitions Nietzsche bas is minci, however, is left unclear, spart
from the fact that they arc to be unapologetically nakcd (rather than hidden) power
strugglcs; wba1 does scem clear is bis view of the zero-sum nature of these
"museu1ar" WlIIrior type and a more "spiritual" caste. While the latter provides the
political arder as a whole with its directive force, it is portrayed as decidedly self-
absoIbed, interested in the competitive dynamie within its own sphere. The former,
martial group, by contrast, is charged with the less sublime, but nevertheless crucial
task of ruling over the plebeian majority, wbo enter into Nietzsc1le's political vision
"
opportuDity the feminist idcals ofwbat he seems as the "nnhealthy" woman, wbose
motivations and psycbo1ogy scem stn"kingiy similarto tbose of the "hetd" male.
I..ike the plebeian sort in general, the 'mhealtby woman is said 10 be driven by a
frustration at ber own "infertility" and by a scarœ1y-acknowledged resentmcnt at
bealthy. fertilefe:ma1e types. Nietzsche takes issue in paIticularwith the feminist
aspùation 10 gender equality in the public spb=e which, for N'letzsehe, as for the
• 332
• seeing women's participation in public life as an umnistakable sign of widespread
societal decadence, decay, and "effemïnacy".
These women are unhealthy in virtue of their inability and unwillingness to
comorm to Nietzsehe's conception of natural, healthy fc:mininity. 1 thus part
company with those commentatoxs who claim to detect a radical anti-essenrialism in
Nietzsche's treatment ofwomen. Although he readily aclmowledges historical
variances throughout the centuries in popular conceptions of womanbood, it seems
to me that he sees certain conceptions as better!han othets, and indeed pots forward
bis own conception of the "etema1 fc:minine" as the most adequate account, i.e. as
decidedly and "natm:ally" inferlor to bis bighest men (although not inferlor to aIl
men; they appear in a mach mote favourable Iight!han the plebeian-spirited male).
•
Tbeir true nature, in bis view, does Dot aliow for the sort ofproductive, artificial
creativity that lx: associates with the nature ofthe bighest man.
333
• Having explored the generaI outIine of social Ie1ations in Nie!ZSChe's ;magined
society of the future, 1 wish to tum in the final chapter to the question of
dom.ination. Whereas many have argued that Nietzsehe's whole stance represents a
repudiation of o(l!l!jnation of all fonns, 1intend to m-gue that he ieaves the door
open for the most objectionable forms ofoppression, and this notwithstanding bis
emphasis oc the highest man's ostensible self-control and seIf-masteIy•
.
"
• 334
• Chauter Xi Noblesse Oblige and Domination
expression never appears in Nietzsehe's work (Blondel 1991: 30). It aIso aIlows a
theorist Iike AIIison ta speak blithely ofNietzsehe's "metaphorical 'notion' of Will
ta Power", as if this notion was never seriously invoked with respect ta soclo-
political relationships (AIIison 1985: xv). The sort of nobility posited by Nietzsche,
in this view, encourages individualistic self-expzession and social and cultural
beterogeneity, while virulently opposing ail forms ofexploitation and oppression
(e.g. White 1990: 135-6). Any potentially troublesome passage in N'lCtzsche's
writings that may suggest the contrary is disrnissed either as strictly metaphorical or
as an embarrassing "rhetorical excess," ta be passed over in silence.1
•
filtering them out as so much unforlunate static, if one is 10 he able 10 gel down 10
matters ofphilosophical moment... (Scbacht 1983: xv) As 1 will argue below, tbese
rbetorical excesses are mnch more integraI 10 N'1dZSChe's ~ that Scbacht
would have us believe. Mucb is Iost, in my view, by this type offiltering strategy.
335
• Otber plOpOn.::nts of the new ortbodoxy aclcnowledge - albeit Icluetantly -
Nietzsche as a "commendable" artistic tbinker whom "we can admire" (Ibid, 39).
Regrettably, Nebamas maIœs no real effort ta reconcile the "objectionahle,
obnoxioUS, and even dangerous" aspects ofNietzsche's thought with bis overall
portrait of the author of Beyond Good and Evil as a benign prophet of self-
reaJisarion and emancipation.
Connolly does make such an effort, aIbeit an llIlS8%isfac:oI one. Readily
conceding that one could read Nietzsche as a theorist ofdomination, Connolly
insis1s that "other po5Sl"bilities ._ can he distil1ed" from the texts ofa thinker as
"prorean" as N"Jetzschc (Connolly 1991: 185).4 His claim, in sum, is that the
vestigial eIements ofNietzsebe's thought most amc:nable ta the "masteEy reading"
can and ought ta bejettïsooed in the late-modcm age, leaving late-modem "left-
• IXoponent of the new orthoc1oxy like White. who talœs Nehamas ta task for bis
betcrodox Jeanings (White 1990: 115-121).
4 Sec Chaptcr I. footnote 3.
336
Nietzseheans" like bimseJf with the cote of an essentially emancipatory
philosopby.S
Even as he insists tendentiously upon bir. Gia! tic with Nietzscbean thougbt,
Connolly acknowledges (to bis credit) the very real distance between bis
IeCODStrUCtion of the Nictzsebean Overman and Nietzsche's original concept
Bonnie Honig, by contrast, makes a stronger - but ratber dubious - attempt to link
ber imaginative reading of the Obemumsch to Nietzsche. In ber bands, Nietzsebe's
Obemumsch undergoes bath a "metapborization" and "democratization" !bat, sbe
claims nonetbeless, is "suggested by Nietzsebe's own texts." (Honig 1993a: 229,
65).6 Rexead metapborically and democratically, Honig's Obemumsch.like
5 Connolly aIgUCS !bat although Nietzsche may originally bave posited the
Obermensch as a "set ofdistinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or
type: Ibis pietuIe "no longermakes muchsense. ifiteverdid" (Connolly 1991:
186) fortworeasons. In the fitst place, "the late-modem possibility ofbnman self-
extinction" tbrough nncleu bolocaust bas sbaken us out of the age-old, complacent
beliefof an assured futme for bnmankind. Wbereas (in Connolly's view) the pre-
nuclear Nietzsche blitbely dismissed the "preservation" of man in the name of
hnman "0VClC0JDing," wc Nietzscbeans of the post-nuclear era axe obliged to draw
these two projects closely together. Secondly, whcreas Nietzsche was able to
imagine an Obermenschlich caste retIeating into the margins of sociallife, in
complete isolation !rom the contaminating influence of the majority, "Ibis picture of
a maIginal space ••• no longer refers to any discemiblc place in the late-modem
tÎme._ Exactly what late-modem life renders inescapable is the intensive
entangleulent ofeveryone with everyone eIse..." (Ibid., 188) In ligbt of these two
"t"'Cbal changes, Connolly concludes !bat "late-modem" Nictzsebeanism requùes
!bat wc conceive of the concept of the Obennensch as a set ofadmiIablc "spiritual
qualitics" availablc to or present in everyone (Ibid., 186-7). Wbile an assessmen~
ofConnolly's reconfigured Obennensch is beyond the scope ofIbis study, 1 wisb
to point out the flaws in bis reading ofNietzscbe's orlginal position. His claim, for
example, !bat Nietzsche popcses a Iigid dichotÔmy between "preservation" and
"ovezœming" is doubtful at best Truc, Nietzsc:be does DOt wisb to "p1eservc"
bnmankind if preselYing entaiIs a defeuse of the life of the comp1acœt, pitiable "1ast
man". Wc bave seen, bowever. !bat Nietzsche does wisb to "pœserve". and indeed
cu1tivate an élite with the poœntial for seIf-overcoming. As N"1etzscbe argues in a
fragment !rom 1884. altbougb "raxer. subtler. and less avemge men" axe "enraged"
by the seIf-perservation tendencies of "the profoundly average c:œatuœ. the specics
man [dos tiefe Durchschnittswes der Gattungsmensc1J)." tbey tbemselves axe
prepared ID declare: "'wc axe nobler [Edlerm)1 Our preservation [/DlSUU
Erhaitung) is D10te important !ban !bat ofthose catt1c1" (WP 873)
337
• Connolly's. becomes "a part of the self. of all selves.••" that represenls the
"resistant and umnasterable" dimension within all ofus (Ibid. 65). This dimension
- presnmably some sort of innate psychological predisposition - is saià ta fight
tenaciously against all oppressive efforts at molding the inherently "multiple self"
along the confor.nist lines of "respollS1ole subjectivity." (Ibid..74) The ineffable
parts of ourselves represented by the Obermensch are, for Honig, the focal point of
Nietzsehe's "polities of resistance", a polities that "seeks out the rifts and fissures
of foundational identities and constitutions" (Honig 1993a 13) and "'1'Ouses enmity
taward every arder' by interrogating every formation of subjectivity••." (Ibid., 74)
But what if, as 1 have argued throughout, Nietzsche posils the Obermensch as a
coherent and intrinsically social and political being? If this is the case, then the
Obermensch qua aetua1 human ag:nt, far from being tmthinkable, becomes the
abject ofan ambitious political project, and Honig's claim ta have found support
within Nietzscbe's writings for a sttictly metaphorica1, psychological reading
foundcrs. Although Honig and Connolly are quite right ta note the important
psychological dimension in N"lCtzsche'S master-slave categories, they mistakenly
psychologise and interiorise these categories in a Ieduclive fashion, stripping them
of tbeir crucial social and political implications. The result is a wholly metaphoric
reading orthe Obermensch and slave that spirits away tbeircrucial ~on ta
Nietzsche's views of natural Rangordnung amongst human beings.7 Throughout
mastery. and power exen:ised by great men, are Sllid by Honig 10 be "ill at case"
with Nietzsebe's broadet. ptogressive commitments (1993b: 533). The one who is
ttuly ill at case, however. is Honig. who feels obliged 10 bend Nietzsebe's
tteB111lt:nt of the Obermensch out of:œcognition in ordcr1o produœ ~ acceptable fit
with ber brand of"lefl:-Nietzsebc:anism " H~ œndentious claim 10 find support for
11er inreqaetatiOll in Nietzsebe's writings is furtber undermined when sbe admits
that the n:al SClIIlœ of 11er creative "radicalization" of the Obumensch is Foucault,
via Connol1y: "Connolly finds authorization for reading the overman as part of the
self in Foucault, who 'sbifts the cen~ of gravity ofN1CIZSChean discourse from
heroes and classical tragic figures 10 everyday misfits' (Connony 1991: 187)."
• (1993a: 229)
7 Once again 1would emphasise thatmy primary intention is not 10 critically assess
the merits oftbese readings, but ~ 10 call into question their ostenS101y
338
this study 1have argued that the psychological charactcristics of Nietzsehe's master-
and slave types are, in bis view, indelibly wedded te readi1y-identifiable types of
human being who possess differing degrees ofintrinsic ment according to a
Rongordrumg that is (again, in bis view) only pen:eived and understood by those
"cultural-aesthetic fascism " (Ibid., 66; also 213; 221) Nietzsche, notes Wan:en,
"could be charged with advocating a cultura1ly totalitarian model ofsociety - one not
sc different from the one that emerges from a literai reading ofPlato's Republic."
(Ibid., 68-9) In line with the new orthodoxy, however, he then moves quickly to
ïso1ate these "troubling" elements from the rest ofNietzsche's philosophy: "theIe
are xeally two Nietzsches," Wan:en infolUlS us, "a 'gentle' Nietzsche and a 'bloody'
one." (Ibid.,211) Deeming these two Nietzsehes te be "identifiably separate,"
Wan:en associates the fonner with a fo1'W8Id-lookïng, emancipatory
"postmodernism", and the latter with a IelrOgrade. œsidnal "modemism".
Nietzsehe's texts. he explains, are "transitionaL••,looking beth backward and
forward, implieated in problems of the past. and ambiguously su~ve of new
ones." (Ibid.,2) While the main body ofhis philosophy, is squarely (and
admirably) postmodem, N'Ietzschc's political views are evideuœ. of bis inability "te
extricate bimsclffrom the language of the modcmist debate _"(Ibid., 113) Bence
339
• Nietzsehe's "modernist" politics of domination, continues Warren, should be
no cause for concem for self-styled contemporary left-Nietzscbeans like bimself.
The "gentle" Nietzsehe's philosophical positions, it seems, have nothing
whatsoever to do with the political judgements and conclusions of bis "bloody".
modernist doppelglinger (Ibid., xi). Indeed, Warren insists that the opposite is the
case: not only are the "bloody Nietzsche's" assumptions about social and political
life "bath insupportable and extraneous to bis postmodem concerns" (Ibid.), they
aetually "violate [the "gentle" Nietzsche'sl own critique of metaphysics" (Ibid.,
208). Nietzsehe's assertion that political exploitation is justified becanse life is will
i.e. bis "thinking about how capacities of agency are possible.ft (Ibid., 3)
Nietzsche is especially coJlceml"Ai, he claims, with "the lIlltUle ofsubjectivity,
especially how subjective capacities Idated to historically sitnatr:il practices,
relations of power, culture, and language.ft (Ibid., 2) The crucial distinction that
Nielzsche maIœs between intelpœtive stanœs is not between truc and false
interpretations (Warren S1Jbsaibes to the view ofNehamas - discussed in CJapter 1
- that claims to ttuth or falsehood involve reeomse to dogmatism), butrather
•
8 This is also Honig's message: "wc cao buiId on the politicizing impulses of
N"1elzsche's m:oveàes of respOllsible subjectivity withOut endorsing bis vision of
'great' politics as such (there is, in any case, no necessary connection between the
two).ft (Honig: 1993a74)
340
• not..•" (Ibid., 63-64) Ni~ is concemed with the conditions of agency as
sucb, i.e. with developing "a postmodem theory of agency"9 that carries with it an
implicit political vision of "a pluralistic society in which egalitarianism underwrites
individuality, and in which politics is an mena allowing agency to he developed and
manifestec:l." (Ibid., 157) Elsewhere, Wanen insists that a ttuly Nietzsehean
political vision "would include the values ofindividuation, communal
intersubjectivity, egalitarianism, and pluralism." (Ibid., 247)
Seen in this light, the "gentle" Ni~'s Will ta Power appeaIS as a
•
Nietzsehe's beliefin the ncccssity of socio-political domination œsts DOt upon
somctbing 50 CODtingent and corrigible as a set of mistllken ;,ssumptions about
modem institutions, but Illlber on a decp1y "essentialist" view that Rangordnung is
part of the Junnan condition, and indecd part of the condition of ail living bcinv
341
• Nietzschean worldview without complctcly eviscerating its Nietzsehea n pedigree.
How could such a view still call itsclfNietzsehean? As we have seen time and
again, Nietzsche celebrates the potential "agency" ofonly a select few, deriding as
• cruelty toward oneself. Cruelty in the JI1Oo'V:m worIel; for NIetzsche, is and ought 10
be c:oncemed exclusive1y with "the individual's altitude 10ward himself" (Ibid..
342
• 246), involving ·man's conquest of bis impulses, the triumph of reason, and - in
one word - self-overcoming...• (Ibid.) For Kanfmann, in SUIn, the only cruelty
countenanced by Nietzsche is the hardness of the highest sort towards bjmself.
Similarly, Schacht insists that Nietzsche's comments in BGE 229 on the
·spirimaHsation· [Vergeistigung) of cruelty in societies with high cultures
demonst1'ale Nietzsche's abhorIence of anything like the cruelty found in ancicnt,
martial societies. Nietzsche, he claims, regards the whole process of
343
• of nostalgia and bis belief that many aspects of bis ideal typical "blond beast" of
antiquity would be unacceplable - indeed UDlhinkab\e - today. Il is my view.
however. that Nietzsche does admire. and wishes ta reclaim, the ancient noble's
"healthy animality." Part of this reclamation project, by my lights, involves
throwing off the faIse consciousness (including "nnmanly" guilt and bad
conscience) that Nietzsche associates with the whole priestly sublimation and
interiorisation endeavour.
Nietzsche. we should recal1, deems the "sweetening and spÏIimalisaÜon"
inseparable" from bis "extreme poverty ofblood and muscle" (EH "WISe" 1). His
association ofspiritualisation and sublimation with a degenerative, feminising
"softening" ofinitially bard, masculine dispositions is particularly pronounced in
On the GeneaIogy ofMorals. In GM ll.6, Nietzsche argues that although the
debased and hypocritical foon. PIeviously, one took pleasure in seeing c:ruelty
inflieted upon others openly and honestly ("without c:ruelty thete is no festival: thus
the 10Dgest and most ancient part ofhuman history tearlles" GM ll.6); today, by
contrast, our pleasme in c:ruelty perversely zequiIes "a certain sublimation and
subtilization [Sublimienmg und Subtilisienmg], that is ta say it bas ta appear
tnmsJated into the imaginative and psychical lins Imo.ginative und Seeüsdre
ilbersetzt] and adomcd with m innocent Dames .." (GM ll.7) This nnhealthy
psychological self-decepqon, associated elsewbere with the "entire antisellSllll'istic
• 13 Cf. the rdeaeuce ta the "dc1icacy and __ tartufl'ely oftame domestic anima'Js
[der ~ noch mehr der Tarti1Jferie ZJ1hmer Haustiere]" in GM ll.6 and
their "tender... and most hypocritical conscience [dem z.artesten hypolaitischen
344
• bc responsible for the guilt and bad conscience that rcigns over the psyche of
modem ascetic type like a tyrant, and for the perverse delight the ascetic takes in
exerting bis will to power on bimse1f (in order to suppress bis instincts) rather!han
on others (GM liI7-18»)4
Schacht and others have rightfully noted Nietzsche's association of the
sublimation and interiorisation ofcruelty with the lise of European high cultuIe,
where "culture" in ~ context refers to the development and increasing
sophistication of the arts and letters, science and teehnology. Nietzsche, however,
never considered modem European high culture to bc "high" in the sense of noble
or lofty; on the contl'aly, he refers to this culture depreciatingly as Zivilisanon,
comparing it unfavourably to an idealjsed realm of culture associated with true
nobility.lS Nietzsche sees himself as clearing the path for a truc cultural
renaissance in this second sense of culture: "only after me aIe there again hopes,
tasks, prescribable paths of culture [vorzuschreibende Wege der Kultur]•••" (EH
boldest and most spiritual natures [Undu1dsam1œitftlr die geistigsten und ki1hnsten
Naturen]." (WP 121)
He concludcs that our modem civilisation - the civilisation ofinternalisation,
sublimation, and "spiritualisation" ofcruelty - "bas aims different from those of
•
natures." Schacht acknowledges this point: "Being thorougly 'civilized,' for
Nietzsche, does Dot as such endow hnman beings with high stafns ; for by itselfit
means ooly tbat tbey have been well tamed and socia1ly integtatcd, and thus tumed
into good 'herd animals.'•.." (Schacht 1983: 389)
34S
• culture..." (Ibid.) While these psychological processes, responsible for the
aforementioned "taming" ofEuropean man, bave indeed he1ped create a highly
sophisticated civilisation, it bas stifled the creative self-asseltÏon of the higher
beings that, for Nietzsche, form the core of any worthwhile, noble culture. 16
Hence the need to imagine the liberation ofhigher hnman beings from tbis
oppressive psychological yoke as a plecondition ta a new cultural flourishing.
Nietzsche believes that the human species as a whole will advance only when its
most perfect exemplars conduet themselves in accordance with wbat Nietzsche calIs
"Dionysian pessimism" (GS 370), ie. when they unconditionally embrace an
etemal., temDle truth of all existence: the inescapably violent, auel nature of life.
He speaks admiringly of the ancient Greek tragedians for their recognition of
"eveI)'thing temDle, evil, ayptie, destructive and deadiy underlying existence ....
(BT "Attempt" 4) Whereas a contempoœy scholar like Nussbamn can insist that
the most important morallesson imparted by ancient Greek tragedy involves the
acknowledgement ofour essential neediness in the face ofchanging fortune,
Nietzsche insists on the contIaIy that tragedy's true importance lies in its ability ta
impart a sense of the "fearfulness of reality" [die Furchtbarkeiten der Realitlir] (EH
Nietzscbe takes fi) 1lISk Jater Greek society - in particular the philosophers ofthe
. .
Hellenistic era - for having tumed away from tbis Iesson: "might the 'Greek:
16 Blondel cames close ta the IDlI!k in bis desaiption of the difference between
Kultur and ZiviIisation in Nietzscbe's writings: "Kultur and ZiviIisation are
• OJ>J!OSÏ:te8 from the point of view of values: the former implies the 'noble' values of
. an intellectual or spiritual end, wbile the latœr is linIœd ta the pejorative appreciation
ofJP.a1i'll!tions considered 'simply' material " (1991: 42)
346
• cheerfulness' of the later Greeks be nothing but the glow ofsunset? The epicurean
".Vill againstpessjmism merely a precaution of the afflieted?" (BT "Attempt" 1) A
society that toms its back from this fearful reality, that "sublimates" and
"spirimalises" the cruelty implicit in this view through the embrace ofan
"optimistic, superficial [obeTjllichlicher], '0' logical inteIpIetation of the world" (BT
"Attempt" 4), is already in decline and doomed to go under at the bands of rival
culttues still hocest and courageous enough to embrace the ttuth of "Dionysian
pessimism" (see BGE 257)0
The highest men, once in tooch with their deepest inclinations and instincts,
rediscover the ttuth of this primordial evil and violence within themselveso
Nietzsche often Iefers to the highest man's exploration of bis own "depths" in tenns
of an encounter with an inner COle ofàIeadfulness and eviL "[E]vil [das Bose],"
claims zarathustIa, "is a man's best stIength.•• The most evil is necessary for the
Superman's best." (Z IV OHM S) The same point is made in Z me 2, where
zarathustra declares that "the wickl'dest in man is neeessary for the best in him [dtYJ
dem Menschm sein Bôsestes 71Ôtig ist VI seinem Bestm],/ ••. [A]1I that is most
wickl'd in him is bis best strength and the hardest stone for the highest eteator..... 17
Part of what it means to attain the heïghts of moral-spiritual deve10pment is to
discover that growing "better" also means growing "wickeder" [buser und bOser
wenlm] (IbitL), that "man is beast and supedleast; the higher man is inhuman
who made this discovelY, who took the initial, courageous step ofexploring and
IeVe1ling in bis noble, beastly-side, but whose indoctrination in slave morality
obliged him in the end to IeCOil and take flight from it. In a hDerating, ail-tao-
347
• flc:eting moment of mac! blood-lust, the pale aiminal committed an ad ofviolence;
bis soul 'wanted blood, not booty: he thirsted for the joy of the knife!" [eT dib:stete
nach tkm GlJJdc des Messers] (Ibid.) In the im!DC"1lialt: wake of the hDerating ad of
madness. however, the aiminal's "simple mind" (arme VeT1lUl!fi], sIavishly caught
op in the dietates ofplebeian ethics and "conscience", drew him back from bis
joyous revelling, not wanting "ta be asbamed of bis madness". "'Wbat is the good
ofbloodT" he asks himself, suddenly adopting a small-minded, utilitarian view of
bis action. "'Will you not at least commit a theft tao? Take a revengeT" (Ibid.)
Unable ta imagine how the joyously-performed ad ofviolence could stand on its
own. as a monument ta passionate, innocent self-expression. the criminal then
performs a base action (theft) in a pathetic, plebeian attempt ta "justify" bis
violence. Nietzsehe's point seems ta be that only one of refined sensibility, fully in
toueh with bis dark sicle, couId see that :he initial murderous attack: is self-
justifying. In the eyes of the vast majorlty, by contrast, Ibis deed could only make
sense by being mmied ta a wlgar ad that wou1d ensme some sort ofmateriaJ
"payoff." The pale aiminal is thus a "beap ofdiseases" not becanse ofbis tenlole,
violent crime, but because of a "simple-mindedness" unequaI ta bis deed.
Nietzsche longs for a society in which creative men no longer leave their actions
in the lUIcl1like the pale criminal His highest man joyfully overtlu:ows all false
18 '''l'I1eœ is always a c:ertain madness in loVe. But also there is always a c:ertain
method in madness [etwas VeT1lUl!fi im Wahnsinn]" (Z 1ORW)
348
• [alles Bose. Furchtbare. Tyrannische. Raubtier- und Schlongenhafte am
Menschen] serves ta enhance the species 'man' [ZUT ErhOhung der Spezies
<<Mensch» dient]...• (BGE 44) ·In the general ecooomy of the whole [In der
groften Okonomie des Ganzen],· he argues, the unIeashing of such potential
destructiveness would be a far better thing than the maintenance of limp-wristed
humanitarianism:
action ~ upon rule-bound moral absolutes like those found in the Ten
Commandments. As Nietzsche explains. the highest man understands that there are
no such absolutes:
•
life may he more respectful oflife ~ a whole than a 1mmanitarian, egalitarian
concem for the security of aIl. In particular circnmstAAceS. zarathustra ICadily
349
• suggests. life-affirming Jasagen may rcquire killiDg and stealing: "Is there not in
alI life itself- stealing and killing [lst in alIem Leben selber nicht - Rauben und
Totschlagen]?" (Z ID ONL 10) To cJaim the contrary. wams Zarathustta, to place
any universa\istie legal or moral constraints on the actions of the highest sort, is to
preach "a sermon of death" that contradicts and opposes alI life (lbid.). "Certain
(Cbapter V). wc will xecalI that Nietzsche's critique of modem sublimation and bis
the inteleStS ofmaintaining the uneasy peace that cb..-scœrises the rarified. Bite
noble. ie. "the innooent conscience of the beast ofprey [die Unschu1d des
RDubtier-Gewissens]". needs to "erupt". most especialIy when the noble
temporacily talœs leave of the "constIaints and conventions" of the society of equaIs
and finds himse1famongst plebeian inferiOIS (GMLll). Nietzsche likens tbis fIee-
spirited jaunt amongst inferiolS to a joumey baclc into the "wildemess" [wieder in
•
die W'Udnis zun7ck]. during which high-spirited noble types tum mto "triumphant
350
• murder, arson, rape, and torture..." (Ibid.) He makes it clear that superior men
who release tension in tlüs way do not attribute great weight to their actions; they
emerge from these violent spurts of sctivity "exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as
if it wcre no more than a students' prank..." (Ibid.)
Nietzsche elsewhere evokes the likelihood of a self-absorbed lofty type
unIeashing damage and destruction during pcriods of respite from creative sctivity.
Not (as we shall sec in oore detail further on) out of maliciousness. but rather out
of an innocent, yet urgent need to discharge creative tension or energies in the
absence of an immedilUe project. Nietzsche makes thi:; suggestion in the course of
his idiosyncratic interpretation ofevi! in the Bible, where he insists that the serpent
in Eden is none other than God "recuperat[ing] from being God." (EH "BGE" 2)
The Almightly, he c\aims, "had made everything too beautiful.•. The Devi! is
merely the id1eness ofGod on that seventh clay." (Ibid.) Having created a perfect
world that seemed to require no further improvement, the :Iivine creative will,
unable to discharge its strength in further creation, turned its instincts tewards
destruction and mischief-making.20
The noble type may innocently cause "collateral damage" not only during
periods of respite, but aIse in the course of the creative, seIf-asserting process
itseIf. We saw in Chapter VIn that one ofNietzsebe's favourite met2phorical
descriptions ofhis master-type is that of the creative sculpter who hammers away
upon the "foIm1ess" materiaI that is modem hnmankjnd (EH "Z" 8). Absorbed in
his work, the sculpter cares not if, in the process ofcreation, stone fragments are
sent flying in aIl directions: "what is that te me']" asks Zarathustra, as fragments fly
from the blows ofhis"raging bammer" (Z n OBI; sec aIse EH"Z" 8).21 And what
351
• if the fragments s<rike unfortunate innocents who happen to be in their path?
Nietzschc's answer is suggested in the following fragment: "one must leam to
sacrifice mony [Vzek zum Opfer bringen] and to take onc's cause seriously enough
not to spare men rum die Menschen nicht zu schonen]•.." (WP 982) Whatever
suffcring cansed as an innocent by-produet ofcreative aetivity is of little
consequence compared to thc grandeur of the artist's oeuvre.22
Nietzsche raises this possibility of a healthy, "accidentaI" release of violent
c:eative energy in bis middle period, in bis description of the "evil of the strong"
[das Bost! der Stiirke] as a type of involuntaxy venting or "discharge" (D 371).23
lIlItllre of the bighest sort and of the need forsudden releases of the flow. V1rtUe,
Zarathustta informs us, bas nits origin and beginning" in the "surging" of a heart
"broad and fulllike a river" tiIat is "a blessing and a danger !ein Segen uru:l eine
~ahr] to those who live ncaIby." (ZI OBV 1) Furtheron, the metaphorofthe
surging river is excbanged for ttat of the storm. Zarathustta's "happiness and
freedom," we are informed, "come[s]like a storm" that may be mistaken by bis
important use assigned by N'lelZSCbe to the hammer," he claims, ois that of the
destruction of mass. Nietzsche more readily evokes the bammer uscd by the
sculptor or the blacJrsrnith, the stoneeutter's bush bammer. the pick b;;mmeror the
mallet used on thecoldchiselbythe tJbermmsch." (Blondel 1991: 106) Blondel
1IS!>1IIIICS that N'1ClZSChe's image ofthe sculptor with bammer is somehow denuded
of all violence; as I suggested above, this is problematic. .
22 Cf. Z IV L for anotber example ofunintentiooal baml. inflieted by the innocent
creative type upon.an innocent bystander: "as happens with those who think on
diffieu1t things, on bis way [Zarathustra] unintentionaJly [unversehens] trod on a
man."
23 "The evil ofthe strong [Dos IsOse der Starke] harms others without giving
thought to it - it Iuzs 10 discbarge itself [es nu4J sich auslassen]._" D 371.
• 24 "[A]ll praise 10 this spirit of all fIee spirits. the laughing storm that blows dust
in the cyes of all the dim-sighted and ulœrated [Schwarz.richtigen,
Schwiirsücittigen]." (Z IV OHM 20)
352
• incoosequential plebeian element is shrugged offas the inevitable, ancillary product
of the inner workings of creativity.
It would be quite wrong-headed, in NielZsChe's view, to criticise noble creative
types for such accidentaI cruelty. From the standpoint of NielZsChe's master
morality, after ail, they are acting in an exemplary fashion in serving as vehicles for
their own creative instincts. In SUIn, they simply cannot help themselves. To
suggest otherwise, 10 berate them for failing to aet prudently before di<cbarging
their energy or to show remorse for the consequences of their actions, would be to
fall in10 the trap ofa slave morality that tries to engender remorse and sbame (Le.
bad conscience) in nascent nobles for their essentially healthy insti!1cts and
inclinations. NielZsChe's tendency to associate remorse [die Relie] with slave
morality is illustrated most clearly in GS 41, where he insists that feeling annoyed
or remorsefu! [Reue empjinden] when "something goes wrong" as a result of one's
actions ought 10 he reserved for those servile types who "have received orders and
••• have to reckon with a beating when bis lordship is not satisfied with the result"
As for sbame, Z3ra1hustra decries the fact that slave morality bas given it pride of
place in "the history of man"; he would rather see men "still sbameless
[Schamlosen]" than "with the distorted eyes [die vermzkten Augen] of their sbame"
(ZnOp).2S
• anything especially ignoble; benœ the sbame experienced by the lofty sort who
cornes in close proximity 10 those unable 10 lise above the self-eontempt engendered
by slave morality.
353
• Nietzsche's dismiso.a) of the very idea ofa supcrior man feeling remorse or
shame for damages resulting from bis actions seems 10 follow logicaIly from bis
deeming the instincts of the lofty man "holy" and unCIring, urges him 10 follow
them "to the end" (Z 1OBV 2; Z II OBI), 10 believe unwaveringly in bimself and in
bis own "entrails" [Eingeweiden] (Z II OIP). It is sufficient for such a man 10 fcel
joy in the performance of a particular action, for this feeling constitutes "the praofit
is a righz action" (AC Il; emphasis in original). As Zarathustra puts il, all of bis
passions are 10 he considered virtues, and all of bis devils, angels (Z 1OJP). In
sum, the lofty man who bas succeeded in overthrowing the striCimeS of slave
morality is encouraged to tbink ofbim self as bis own measuring rod or "principle
of selection" [auswlJhlendes PrinVp]. (EH "WISC" 2) The conclusion seems 10 he
that the lofty man who is fully in toueh with bis fine instincts shou1d have absolute
disaetion in ward and deed.
Nietzsehe's Obermensch is 10 he unconstrained not only by "conscience". but
also by conventional ruIes or legal injundions that the advoeatcs of slave morality
clairn have universailegitimacy. N'letzsche, as we have xepeatedly seen, evinces
nothing but contempt for the idea oflaws that apply indiscriminantly 10 aIl, an idea
that he traces baclc 10 Christianity.26 Only a "mole and dwarf." scoffs Zarathustra,
claims "'Good for aIl, evil for all.'" (Z mOSG 2) From the standpoint ofhis
raritied vezsion of morality, Nietzsche deems the blanket interdictions oflegal
systems - religious or SC"OillIT - 10 he morally wOIthless. The man of viItue is
"beyond the law" [Jenseits des Rechts] (GM ILlO) and his sense ofjustice
[Gerichtsbarkeit] is"beyond appeal" (WP 962) becan5e only he possesses the tru1y
354
• flexible wisdom tbat is capable of making moral decisions "on the fly". 50 10 speak,
in response 10 particu1ar. contingent circumstanees and without the safety net of a
rigid, universal set of roles and regulations.27
Niet:zse:be is not against law as sucb; on the contraty. as wc saw in the previous
cbapter. he identifies it as an indispensable 1001 for the control of the many. Wbat
he opposes is the use oflaw 10 place constraintson the "radicallife-will" of the
finest. "A legal order thougbt of as 50vereign and universa1," claims Nietzsche,
355
• cIaims lhat the perceptions. intuitions, and judgements of the man of virtue are in
50me sense the standard.31 Aristotle appears unwilling. however. to bestow upon
the virtuous man the ab50lute discretionary power lhat Nietzsche sees as bis rigbL
Even the best of us. argues Aristotle. cm have our judgement distorted by persona!
int=t and passion; !:ence the need for law. wbich, as a mecbanism denuded of
passion and particular attacbments, serves as a co=tÏve in this regard and ensures
the constancy and stability requiIed for the maintenance of public order.32 ·[T]he
in writing; for enaetments must he universal. but actions are conœmed with
'euIars."
~Mirtue and the excellentperson would seem to he the standaId in each case."
(Nico1ntu:1Jom Ethics, 1166812-13) "[I]t seems !bat what is really 50 is what
appears 50 to the excellcut person. If this is conect, as it seems to he, and virtue,
i.e. the good person in 50 far as he is good, is the mcasure of each thing. then what
appearpIeaswes to bim will aJso he pleasllres. and what is pleasantwill he what he
enjoys." (Ibid., 1176a17-19) Cf. the discussion in Nussbaum, 1980: 423 and
1986: 311.
32"& who bids the law rule may he decmed to bid God and Resson alone rule,
but he who bids man rule adds an elc:ment of the beast; for desü:e is a wild beast,
and passion pervCl1S the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The
!aw is reason unatfected by desile." Politics. 1287829-33. Annas notes !bat
• Atistotle fiDds a place for rules in moral deJibenli.on, although in ber opinion he
does DOt develop as satisf'actœy an account of rules as the Stoics (Annas 1993: 94-
102).
356
• equality, and no one is 50 immeasurably superior 10 others" as 10 warrant blanket
exemption from the laws (Ibid., l3l3a6-8). Nietzsche, by contrast, remains under
the influence of a "fatalistic" view of persoDS, often (but by no means always)
using the language of "instinct" 10 describe them as simply in possession (or not) of
the means 10 moral peri'ectability. This fataHsm powetS bis blindly optimistic view
of the judgement of the higbest man, and bis concomitant portrait of an élitist ideal
society characterised by pezpetual improvisation and instability at evety level. On
the level ofindividual practical ddiberation, Nietzsehe's noble individuals are
while on the politicallevel, bis noble friendslenemies are expected 10 restrain each
other and enforce mutual obligations through stIength of will and physical force
alone, without the assistance ofa neutral framework of laws.
1 would argue that in bis dismissive treatment of the place of rules and laws.
Nietzsche's avowedly normative vision ofa new socio-political arder actually veetS
off the path of ail recognisable morality, even the morality of virtue-ethïcs. For
although, as we bave seen, Nietzsche borrows R'pelltedly from the language of
virtue-ethics, and is influenced by a developmental notion of ethics, bis fatalistic
view of Rangordnung and of "higher" and "lower" types of personality, which
involves virtually denying the status ofhumanity 10 the so-called lower orders,33
push him outside of the consensus view of moral philosophy that (a) rules are (10
seme degree) an inevitable and important part of evetYday moral practice,34 and (b)
33 One could respond that Nietzsche on the c:onIraly acknowledgcs the "all-too-
lunnan" status of the ~ority. This is lmdeni ab\y 50, but we should recall our
eadier exploration of another, normative conception ofhlJman~ developed by
Njetzsche, a conception that he associatcs only with a minority of the specie&
34 As Annas bas IeCCl1tly explained, ancient schools of moral philosophy respccted
the place ofrules without seeing virtuous action in tmns ofsome sort ofmrchanical
application ofIUles 10 particular situalions. According 10 Stoic theorY, for examp\e,
"part ofleaming is grasping general rules 10 follow, and the expert takes care.10
• ïnculc:aœ the right IUles. Further, the expert need not he seen as abandoning the
rules; IlIlher, she h3s intemalizt;d them, and follows them, though not in the
conscious, deliberative way of the beginner. ft (1993: 96) Although Ariston, pupil
357
• such IUles may rightfully circumscrilJe our actions in order to safeguard the well-
being ofothers. In sum, 1believe that bis fatalism is responsible for the perceptible
slide in bis writings from ostensibly moral intentions and goals (a politico-aùtural
• of Zeno, apparently R;jected the notion that rules have any place in moral
judgemcnt, Annas notes that this pIaced him in a position ofheterodoxy vis-à-vis
Stoic doctrine (Ibid., 101).
358
• vulnerable strikes him as a demonstration of the WOISt possible taste (and,
ultimarely, of a base character). As early as Daybreak, Nietzsche writes that it is
only the "evil of the weak" [das Bose der Schwiiche] that "wants to harm others
and to see the signs of the suffering it bas C3nsed." (D 371) Similarly, zarathustra
reaches that in order to leam how to enjoy owselves, we must first "unleam he ,y to
do harm to others and to contrive harm [verlemen wir am besten. andem wehe VI
tun und Wehes auszudenken]." (Z il OC) Nietzsche associates this wlgar effort to
infliet pain and suffering - which he identifies as the basis of ressentiment - with
"despotism" [Gewalt-Herrischen] and sees it as the antithesis of nobility (Z m
ONL 11).35 Only wlgar pretenders to virtue take advantage of theit positions of
power to "scratch out the eyes of theit enemies with theit virtue"; in zarathustra's
words, they "raise themselves only in order to lower others." (Z il OV)
Nietzsche believes, moreover, that ftom the standpoint of the tru1y superior
human type, the idea of gratuituous, petty cruelty towards inferiors would he
abhorrent: "[a]n easy prey is something contemptible for proud natures." (GS
13)36 zarathustra reiterates this sentiment when he declares that being "prlcldy
toward small things" [gegen das Kleine stlJChlicht VI sein] seems to him like "the
3S See a1so Z il OT, where Zarathustra warns us to "[m]istrust all in whom the
urge to punish is strong!"
36 "Eine leichte Beure ist stolzen Naturen etwas Verlichtliches..."
37 "1 am polire [hiiflich] towards them. as towards every small veXation.•." (Z m
VMS 2); "My nature directs that 1am mild and benevolent [müd und wohlwollendJ
towards everyone..o" (EH "CW" 4); "1 treat everyone with the same geniality
[Leuueligkeitl,1 am even full ofconsideration for the basest people_o" (EH
"CIever" 10) As we shall see be1ow. however, Niettsche's commitment to
politeness and geniality towards supposed inferiors is much more tenuous that is
• often supposed. When these inferiors are seen as obstacles to the nobleman's
aeative endeavours. he is more !han prepared to countenanœ a more cutting
treatmen~ ofthem.
359
• [vorübergeht]," suggests Zarathustra, "in order ta spare oneseIf for a worthier
This sense of noblesse oblige does Dot lead him to concede to the many a
lAsterhaften UlId ZUgelosen] ," (WP 871) one may give them carte blanche. Of
360
• course, "they may on occasion do things !bat would convict a lesser man rein
geringerer Mensch] of vice and immoderation." but whal of it? There can be no
comparison between violence caused by a noble who is simply "discharging" bis
energies and !bat inflicted by a malicious, vulgar SOIt who enjoys lording it over
those weaker !han himselt: While the latter is morally objectionable. the former is
• Oberzeugung, dojJ man 1lUT gegen Seines-Gleichen Pjlichten hot. gegen die Andem
sich 1IllCh Gutdiinken verirlllt]: !batjustice can he hoped for (unfortn nate1y not
counted on) only inter pares (among equals]." WP 943.
361
• Chapter Ill, Nietzsche attributes a less-than-human status to this majority,
espccially in ligbt of bis association of the eategory "human" with the transcende!1ce
of mere nature in the context ofcreative making and doing. Tbose whom
proponents of slave morality bave hitbeno honoureà as pre-eminent do not count,
in NielZSCbe's eyes, "as belonging to mankjnd at all- to me tbey are the refuse of
mankind [AusscJu4l der Menschheit], abortive offspring of sickness and vengeful
instincts..." (EH "Clever" 10)
Nietzsche's aforementioned sense of 71Qblesse oblige is directly re1ated to tbis
contempt for the "mob". Tbere i· no "honest" [rechtsclu!ffenen] duel between
uncquaJs. declares the cbivalrous Nietzsche; "where one despises [verachtet] one
connor wage war..." (EH "W"lSe" 7) Virtue, he insists, wbile requiring aJ,stention
from deh"betate war-making against inferiotS, in no way obliges us to treat tbem
with the respect due to the bealtbiest members of the hnman species. They are as
insects, and merit the saIne disgust and contempt we reserve for insects.41 In and
of tbemselves, "[t]be great majority of men bave no rigbt to existence [Die
allermeisten Menschen sind ohne Recht zum Dasein]...." (WP 872) Tbeir rigbt to
exist is "a tbousand times" smaller tban tbat of tbeir noble betters. who embody the
hope for the future perfectl.1Jility ofbtunankjnd (GM m.14).42
Nietzsche, bowever, does concede to the ill-constituted one redeeming quality,
one raison d'erre tbat serves to justify tbeir continued existence: tbeir raie as
stepping stones upon which higher exemplars ofbllmankjnd may tread on the way
41 "Tbese œachers ofsubmission! Whetever tbere is anytbing smaI1 and sick and
scabby, tbere tbey crawllike lice; and only my disgust [mein Ekel] Stops me from
cracking tbem." (Z m VMS 3) Cf. the contemptuous reference to "beetles and
dragonflies" in Z n OLe.
42 Nietzsche held tbis view as carly as UM m.6: "the question is tbis: how cau
your life, the individua1life, receive the higbest value, the deepest significance?
How cau it be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the
362
• 10 ever-more sublime levels of moral and spiritual development. As Zarathustra
opines to the flawed. so-called "higher men" in Z IV G. "You are only bridges: may
higher men than you step across upon you [magen Hohere au! euch
hinüberschreiten]! You are steps [Stlifen]: sa do not he angry with him who climbs
overyou into his height [der übereuch hinweg in seine Hohe steigt]!" In this
instrumental sense, and only this sense, does Nietzsche deem the majority of
humankind "necessary". Their importance in this respect becomes clear in the
course of NielZSChe's exposition of the Eternal Retum thought experiment. As
difficult as it may be 10 embtace the idea that ugliness bas 10 he confronted and
waIked on on the way to self-overcoming, the highest man must overcome bis
nausea at this prospect ("it is haId for me to understand that small people are
necessary!" Z mVMS 2; cf. zn OR) and say "yes" to il As Zarathustra puts il,
"only a buffoon thinks: 'Man can also bejumped over.'" (Z m ONL 4)
The fact that the many are necessary in this sense - the fact, that is to say, that
Nietzsche deigns 10 "embrace" theirvery existence - does not mean that he
envisions a peaceful. harmonious coexistence betweeu the various social omers in
bis iciealised community. As he stIesses in the NadùJJss, although the very
363
• The Society of Cold Indifference and Fear
inappropriate bebaviour.
1 would argue that thete is yet another teasOn why NiClZSChe vetos the idea of
pitying one's abject inferiors, and it relates ta bis insistence that the "higher" and
• crossly)). "To many men," adv!scs zarathustra, "you ougbt Dot to give your band,
but only your paw: ~d 1 should like it ifyo\,;r i'3w had claws, tao." (Z 1 OWC)
364
• "lower" castes remain as separate as possible. As we leam from ancient Greek
tragedy and from the moral philosophers inspired by this literary tradition, pity
potentially serves as an emotional bond that reconfirms and reinforces the
commonality tying the pitier and the pitied 1Ogether. In pitying another human
i>eing for a misfortune befalling mm or her through no fault of bis or h:r own (e.g.
the loss offamily orfriends, illness or disability, etc.), we accept the fact of our
own vulnerability; the fact that we could just as easily fall prey to a simi!ar
misfortune. Pity, as Nussbaum indicates, "contains a thought experiment in which
one puts oneself in the other person's place, and indeed reasons that this place
might in fact be, or become, one's own." (Nussbaum 1994: 157)
The person who does not recognize mm- or berself as sharing a common
humanity with the suffeIer, by contradistinctioD, "will Ieaet to the suffering with an
arrogant hardness, rather than with compassion." (Nussbanm 1992: 237) Nothing
will prevent such a self-aggrandiser from acting haIsbly and tyrannically toward
thase who are weaker, as Rousseau rightly observes in Émik IV:
Pomquoi les rois sont-ils sans pitié pour leurs sujets?
C'est qu'ils comptent de n'être jamais hommes.
Pomquoi les riches sont-ils si durs pour les pauvres?
Cest qu'ils n'ont pas peur de le devenir. Pourquoi
la no~lesse a-t-elle un si grand mépris pour le
peuple? C'est qu'un noble ne sera jamais roturier.
(Rousseau 1966: 290; cïted in Nussbaum 1994:
144)44
Nietzsche, in my view, conducts himselflike the privileged ODes criticised by
Rousseau, with one. crucial difference: unlike Rousseau's arrogant king and
wealthy noble, he evinces a moral philosopher's acute awareness of the cognitive
and affective linkage between pity and social equality, and self-consciousiy lies bis
rejection of the latter 10 bis critique of the former: "My reproach against thase who
•
44 "Why are kings without pity for their subjects? h is bccause they count on
never being hnman beings. Why are the rich so harsh 10 the poor? h is becanse
they bave no fear ofbecoming poor. Why does a noble bave such contempt for the
common people? it is because he never will be a peasanL"
365
.. practise pily." he declares, His that shame, rev=. a delieate feeling for distance
[die Scham. die Ehrfurcht, dos zartgefiihl vor Distanzenl easily eludes them, that
pit)' instantly smelIs of mob..•" (EH "W"lSC" 4) Nietzsche wants to prevent the
formation ofan affective bond between "superior" pitier and "inferior" sufferer;
this. 1would suggest. is an important reason behind bis rejection of pily. and one
that bas been all but ignored in the secondary litetature.
the sufferings of the majority: "My mind and longing go out ta the few." explains
the discriminating Zarathustra. "[T]he protracted, the remote things: what aIe your
many. little, brief miseries ta me [was ginge mich euer kIeines, vieIes, lauzes Elend
an]!" (Z IV OHM 6) For those designated as canaille in N"lCtZSChe's imagined new
•
inclined ta erect a false image ofone's be10ved than ofone's adversmy. that the
motive ta deve10p a tIUe, Iea1istic account ofone's adVersaIY - in oIder ta tfetermine
whether one should fear him - is stronger than the motive ta see one's be10ved as
sIhe tIUly is.
366
• that slave morality's attempt to replace fear with the maxim "love thy neighbour" is
ultimately dishonest and futile (Ibid.), Nietzsche does acknowledge that the official
denigration of fear bas had a pemicious effect on European .:ulture.
The active persecution and near extinction of the predator-type man in our time
bas resulted in bath a widespread decrease offear and a "diminution and leveling of
European man" tÏ1at Nietzsche claims "constitutes our greatest danger." (GM L12)
"[T]ogether with the fear of man," he insists, "we have also lost our love of him,
our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him." (Ibid.)46 Noble
sublimity and plebeian fear have always gone together, for, as Zarathustra
observes, the souls of the inferior (the so-cal1ed "good and just") "are so u:ûamiliar
with what is great [$0 frond seid ihr don GrojJen mit evrer SuIe]" that it is
inevitable - and indeed desirable - that the 0be17lU!1lSch he "femjuf' [IiudItbar] to
them "in bis goodness." (Z n OMP) Were he not fearful- were the majority ta feel
46 This theme is also developed in the middle periocL Sec D 551: "And bas the
world oot lost some ofits charm [Rek] for us becanse we have grown Jess fearful?
• With this diminution ofour fearfulness [unserer Furchtsamkeit] bas our own
dignity and solemnity, our ownfetlTSomeness [<<unsere eigene Fun:htbar1ceit»],
not also diminisbed?"
367
• BOsens], the growing emancipation of man from the narrow and anxiety-ridden
service." (Ibid.)
In opposition 10 what he sees as mainstream cowardliness and servility,
N"Jetzsche apls for the master morality package deal: "who would not a hundred
limes sooner fcar whele one cao also admire !han not fear but he permanently
•
'18 "._wes: m&:hte nicht hundertmallieber sich flIrchten, wenn cr zugleich
bewundern darf, aIs sich nicht filIchten, aber dabei den ekeIhaften Anblick des
Mi8raIenen, Verldeinerten, VerklhIII i1ClteD, Vergifteœnnichtmehrloswerden
klSnnen."
368
• After outlining the nature of Nietzsebc's imagined political order of the future in
Cbapter IX. wc began tbis chapter with an examination of the various attemplS
vision that are most difficult to reconcile with h1leral-democralic SCIIS1oilities. One
famj1jar strategy is to readily concede N"1Ctzsebc's embrace of hierarchical master-
slave relations, while insisting that tbis UDfortunate "retrograde" clement is
separable in principle from (and even contradicted by) the emancipatoIy, critical
"postmodem" side that celebrates, for example, the possloility of democratic Cree
agency, a politics of difference, cultural pluralism, the "multiple self", ete. This
taetic ofidentifying two Nicr:zscheans and jettisoning one in the name of the other
least, with IesigDatioo) upon the graduai ptoccss of psychological change that
redirects inward the initiaI1y violent, outwaIdly~ impulses of the primitive
wamor. As wc have seen, however, a1though Nietzsche repndiates nostalgia and
•
refuses to negatc the D10Ie "inlelesting" potentialities of the modem personaIity, he
treats the sublimation and interiorisation ofimpulses as neither desiIable nar
369
• neressary. Indeed. he sees tbese phenomena as largely r:esponsible for what he
believes ta he the widcspn:ad dishonesty and hyp<Y.:risy of modern (servile)
European culture. He identifies sublimation ofinitially hea1thy impulses Dot with
his sort of se1f-discipline (see Chapter V). but rather with the oppressive, servile
population and its priestly 1eadeIs. He ~ this minority ta reject this legacy of
false consciousness and embzaee the sort of open, hODest, and hea1thy outwaId
the piospect that se1f-exptessive action, innocently and joyfully perfoIIned, may
•
majority fœ:es Nietzsebe (whose entire project is initially driven by a moral
CO\1CC[n for human flourishing) offthe traeks of moral discourse altogether.
370
• Nevertheless, Nietzsche imagines that the absolute discretionary power
accordcd ta bis supcrior sort would not lead to a malicious. bloodthirsty persecution
of the plebeian clement. His highest human being. we should recall. is interested in
direct confrontations ooly with wcrthy opponents. and would consider the prospect
that the lot of the majority be left in the bands of thase who can ooly look upon
them with derision and contempt. Because of bis insistence upon the maintenance
ofa c1ear separation ofhigher and lower human beings. and bis desireta prevent
the development ofaffective bonds of obligation between the two. Nietzsche's
imagined political order would indeed be characterised by an absense ofpity. But
this, 1 would argue, would not be to its credit; it would resemble a pitiless,
terrifying nightmare.
• 371
• Reviewand Conclusion
Nietzsehe's writiDg and (b) NielZSChe's disturbing tendency to depart from the
boundaries ofethical discourse in the very pursuit of bis ethical vision. this
dissertation bas frequently criticised the central pillaIS of what bas been referred to
throughout as the "new orthodoxy" in Nietzsche intelpretation and commentaIy.
As 1sec il, these pillaIS cao he identified as: an originality thesis, according to
•
deceptions oftranscendentalists and metaphysiciaos that masquerade as ttuth.
372
• Nietzsche is interestcd in making ttuth- and knowledge-cIaims about various
aspects of xeality without appealing to an absolutist, metaphysical dualist standard
ofTroth with a capital "T". He strives, moIeOver. for an epistemie objectivity that
in no way entails "neutrality" between competing epistemie (or moral) perspectives;
on the contrary. we have seen that Nietzsehe's claim to objective ttuth is at the same
time an unapologetie claim for the superiority ofone particular perspective: the
perspective of a superior type ofhuman being who bas been freed of ail vestige of
false consciousness, whose fine character and unerrÏng instincts ensure that he (and
conflict with the beliefs and practices ofan essentially servile-minded majority. We
argued that Nietzsehe's fIequent Iduetance to invoke moral terms (virtuc, justice,
ete), and bis oft-professed hostility towards such language - or ironie usage of the
373
• Nietzsche insists upon both the cognitive and moral natuIe of our passions,
inclinations, "instincts", or "drives", arguing !bat an accurate discrimination of the
virtuous from the vicious cao ooly he accomplished through a keen assessment of
the instincts (hea1thy or unhea1thy; life-affirming or morbid; lofty or base) of the
persans in question. Thase with fine instincts, insofar as they joyously mnbrace
ratber!han shun them, are able to raise themselves te a moral-spiritual plane al
which virtue is within reach, whereas thase with a servile disposition are said te
remain forever base, notwithstanding their vain, all-too-transparent attempts al
374
• whenever he claims to "ground" bis particular table of values - including bis view
of the ubiquity and inevitability of human self-aggrandisemelJt - in ::. "scientific"
understanding of the cosmos.
In the second place, we examjned Nietzsche's evocation of an alternative, rival
conception of nature tbat owes more to ancient moral philosophy tban to modem
naturalism. In tbis second conception, natuIe, ratbo-.r tban being seen as an extemal.
neutral arbiter of all manner of valuation, plays a less epistem:llogically-ambitious
(but still important) normative IOle within bis moral view. speaking in particular to
human nature. In tbis context Nietzsche describes bis bigber sort of man as both
"artificial" and "natural". Artificial, in tbat ~ superiorman ofvirtue strives to
transcend the natural animaI world (altbougb not bis own animal instincts) tbrougb
the creation and embe!ljsbment of a moral and cultural artifice of meaning. And
Nietzsche, the natural uZos of human activity. the .:nmmit of human excellence.
Like the moral philosopbeIs of Greek and Roman antiquity. Nietzsche uses tbis
second, normative notion of nature to deride tbose whom he considels to he unable
or unwilling to live a creative life as both "ImnabJraJ." (m the sense tbat tbeY cannot
attain the specificaUy human uZos) and all-too-"natural". in the sense tbat tbeir
daily. mundane existence is no loftiertban tbat of the rest of the natural anima!
world.
'Ibis normative conception ofhuman nature also plays a key IOle in Nietzsche's
construction of an optimistic, developmental conception of hnman agency tbat sits
uneaS'ly with the rigid, deterministic bebaviouralism suggested in passages wbere
modem natuIalism bolds sway. According to Nk;ê=be's developmental etbic,
even superior hnman beings will find the road to virtue very rocky indeed. Far
from coming to virtue "effortlessly". bigber men may start otfwitb distorted views
• oftbemselves and otbeIs becanse ofbad influences and upbringing. They can,
375
• bowever, move from inadequate ta more satisfactory be1iefs about the truc nature of
human flourishing, and Nietzsche hopes ta help this process along.
Herein lies the pertinence ofNietzsche's thought for polilicaI, as weIl as moral
philosophy. We identified Nietzsche's political project in general as an attempt ta
revitalise and l'CCOllStrUet a master morality for the modern world, a morality that he
hopes will supplant the now-hegemonic slave morality and usher in a new era of
human excellence and creativity. Thus Nietzsche's visic:1 is one that celebrates not
same open-ended, pexpetual contestation, as same proponents of the new
orthodoxy would have us be1ieve, but l'atœr points toward an endogame resulting in
the victory of human excellence and greatness over the forces of morallspiritual
c1egeneration and decadence. He feels a deep sense of responsibility not simply for
bis own moral-spiritual perfectability, but more importantly for the perfectability of
the human species as a whole, the aspiration to which he sees as fast disappearing
in the wake ofslave morality's ever-increasing hegCmony. Slave morality, believes
Nietzsche. is leading humankind inta a species-wicle degeneration through its
elevation of the pathetically complacent and sterile "last man" and its efetennined
attempt ta exterminate aIl that represents huma n greatness The tide, he insists,
must he tumed al aIl costs, and it must he accomplisbed through a revitalisation of
master morality.
envying and resenting the rare examples ofhuman CltCe1lenee in their midst, bas
attemptrd through its moral and intellectualleadmship (the priest1y caste) ta snuff
out aIl fomIs of life.affiJ:ming creativity and individua1ity in its midst. While still
• very young, naseent noble types are encouraged ta mistrust and even loath their
376
• own coxporeal instincts and inclinations. Nietzsche's "consciousness-raising"
rescue operation involves. in SUIn, an attempt to wean these nascent noble types
away from this ingrained se1f-contempt and "bad conscience" (i.e. plebeian false
consciousness) by urging them to ...mbark upon ajourney ofse1f-discovery!bat
would lead bath to ajoyous embrace of their own noble fibre and to a visceral
contempt of the plebeian values and practices !bat bad oppressed them heretofore.
While countenancing the possibility of the reemetgence ofa dominant caste of
"masterS" in the modem era, Nietzsche does not imagine bis modem master caste as
exorcising an plebeian influence and rediscovering bis truc, lofty instincts and
disposition. Paradoxical1y. Nietzsche calls upon those who would he bis disciples
• to follow bis example and break with an teaeheJs - including, after a fashion,
377
• himself - in order to find their own, idiosyncratic path to virtue. We noled that
Nietzsehe's notion of "breaking free" is in no way analogous to a libertine cali to
blind indulgence of any and every passion, to a postmodemist celebration of the
perpetuai play of chaotic forces within. On the contrary, bis conception of the
noble rediscovery of one's true self involves a herculean effort of self-maslery and
discipline, as the higher instincts work to subdue al! vestiges of servility that had
been encouraged du.-ing the period ofsubservience to slave rnorality.
along with the loneliness and suffering that accompany sucb a self-imposed
marginalisation. Not everyone, stresses Nietzsche, makes it through this phase
successfully. Sorne, who have broken with mainstream society and its value
scheme but who prove incapable of ascending to a new fortO of optimism. succumb
to the temptations of nihilism. Having thrown off their youthful. naïve beliefs,
nihilists react Iike disillusioned and embittered adolescents, jumping to the false
conclusion 1lat aIl moral and spiritual values aIe wanting simply because the values
of slave rnorality have been found ta be empty and false. Unable to transcend their
bitterness and resentment, nihilists pride themselves in spuming of al! manner of
belief. For Nietzsche, however, virtue is epitomised not by perpetuai scepticism
and the refusa! ta commit to any set of values, but rather by the attainment of a new
plateau of hope and belief; a belief in the creative powers and futuIe potential of the
highest sort of man.
For those who resist the siren song of nihilism, Nietzsche foresees an end to
suffering, bitterness, and perpetuai negation through the attainment of a truly llfe-
affiIming, Jasagen-ing perspective. In passing through the difficult thought
experiment known as Etemal Retum of the Same, bis superior human being attains
an unconditional sense ofself-love and radically embraces al! of existence, even as
378
• character. 'Through an unmitigated embrace of the Eternal Rewm thought
experiment, the self-loving noble. convinced of the interconnectivity of all things,
persuades himself that everything that has cver happened has been ultimately
necessary for bis own development, and hence desirable. He therefore aceedes
with enthusiasm to a hypothetical, infinite repelÏtion of all past events. Successfully
performed, this conceptual conjuring act is presented as an imaginative victory of
the omnipotent, noble will over Fortuna. In effect, all !bat bac! previously becn
considered "fate", "chance", or "predestination" is now imagined to he the product
of the noble type's omnipotent, all-determining will. Far from a celebration of
meaningless continency and chaos, Nietzsehe's Eternal Rewm doctrine emphasises
the nobility ofimposing meaning upon chaos. even if the act of will that imposes
this order involves a wholly fanciful "Doble lie".
theory of moral and spiritual àevelopment, he does Dot sec the cu!tivatiOD of
authentic Dobility to he limited to this sort ofpersona! struggle. Without miDimising
the importance of the personal démarche in the quest for nobility, Nietzsche insists
•
composed oflike-minded and similarly lofty-spirited companions•
379
• In this context we explored the importance Nietzsche attributes to fri;:iidship
amongst equals. in which each friend serves as a foil to the other. sharpelÙng the
self-understanding and improving the capacities of self-criticism ofhis counterpatt.
Nietzsche puts forth a particularly austere, hard-nosed conception of friendship !bat
(he readily concedes) would put off the vast majority of people who. in his view.
want company simply to reinforœ their slovenly habits. NielZSChean friends are
portrayed as high-minded individuals interested solely in helping each other attain
their highest moral and spiritual potential.
While craving meaningfu1 human contact with equals, these friends insist,
paradoxically, upon their own autonomy and self-sufficiency. Here we came face-
ta-face with another of NielZSChe's contradictions. On the one band, he provides
the aforementioned portrait offriendship !bat in some respects recalls Arlstotle's
on-going contact with friends. 1argued !bat this repulsion stems from the influence
of a Stoic call for self-sufficiency, which makes N"1CtZSche balk at the idea !bat bis
higbest men are obliged ta accept "gifts" from each other.
This Staic dimensÏt>n looms particularly large in Nietzsehe's tR"atment ofpity.
The Nietzschean superior man refuses ta pity other, similarly lofty types and abhors
the idea ofbeing pitied bimself, for in bis view pity bas no place among equals; it is
seen rather as an uncpnscionably vulgar fonD. ofcondescension. To commiserate
with a friend, argues Nietzsche, implies a beliefOn the part of the pitier!bat (a) the
pitied friend, having failed ta overcome suffering, remains vulnerable ta
misfortune, and !bat (b) this failw:e, although perhaps regrettable, is perfectly
acceptable. The aet ofpity. in other words, is said ta encourage one's companion
to remain satisfied with bis inferior state rather!han strive for further moral
380
• rnorally destructive commiseration. encouraging instead a harsh, adversa.'Ïal
relationship !bat seems to make the friend indistinguishable from the enemy.
We noted. moreover. that Nietzsehe's critique ofpity exteDds even deeper. to a
rejection of this sentiment when it is directed 10wards the superior man's inferiors.
Two reasons were identified for Nietzsche's refusaI to countenance the idea of a
"noble" pity of the "herd": (a) pity is always beneath the dignity of the highest man
b-:cause it represents a base. hypocritical form of will to power, i.e. it is dismissed
as an ostensibly benevolent sentiment !bat hides the pitier's secret rejoicing in the
inability of others to overcome their misfortunes. Furthermore, (b) pity seems to
fester a certain emotional bonding between pitier and pitied. This latter insight,
common to bath ancient Greek tragedy and moral philosophers like Aristotle and
Rousseau, is decisive, for Nietzsche ""ishes to cuItivate and maintain at alI costs a
"pathos of distance" between higher and lower "orders" ofhumanity. The
formation, through the pitying impulse, ofa community ofsentiment !bat
transcends hierarcby would undermine this effort.
1be very idea !bat Nietzsche countenances the formation or reconstitution of ony
sort ofcommunity through political action - not 10 mention a bierarchicaI, caste
381
• Nietzsche does fancy himself a creative artist of sorts, but the raw material with
which he imagines himself working is neither clay. nor stone, nor canvas and paint;
it is nothing less !bat humankind itself. Thus Nietzsche's talk of the need for
political action is driven by bis inlereSt - both aesthetic and ethical- in the
"sculpting" of higher human beings.
Notwithstanding Nietzsche's flirtation with a modern natura1istic vie\\' of
heredity. which. as we noted above, pushes him precipitously close to a form of
behavioural determinism, 1argue !bat bis more optimistic. developmental ethical
stance leads him to definitively reject the pessimistic notion !bat an unfavourable
upbringing destroys ail hope of moral and spiritual self-improvement Nietzsche
maintains the hope !bat something can be done to pull superior types out of their
false consciousness. Indeed, he insists !bat if something is not done, the chances
for the successful épanouissement ofhigher human beings in contemponuy
Europe - and hence ofthe future development of the human species - are ncxt to nil.
As noted earlier. Nietzsche believes these chances to be shrinking fast; he finds
highest. finest cxemp1ars, and fears for their utter extinction (and for the possibility
offinding appropriate, me8n ingful human contact for himse1f) if action is not taken.
The political action envisioned by Nietzsche entails a conceptual out1ine of and
advocacy for an élite commnnity !bat aims first and foremost al the reproduction and
382
• "froitfuIness" of the artistie type to the literaI and frank treatment ofbiological
reproduction and breeding of the next generation through ploper upbringing and
education.
Many self-proclaimed Nietzseheans in the contemporary Academy - the
purveyors of the new orthodoxy who see in Nietzsche's thought nothing but
benign, emancipatory potential - seem to believe that the ooly full-proof way of
dcfending Nietzsche against the charge of racism and proto-Nazism is to dcny the
literaI end of the continuum altogether. What these commentators seem unable to
grasp. however. is that acknowledging Nietzsche's emphasis on "blood" and his
interest in eugenics need not entail associating him with any racist doctrine, ifby
racism we mean any belief in the natura!. biological superiority ofan existent,
"pure" race, nation, or ethnie group. Nietzsche, as hllS often been noteei, was
contemptuous of all Iacist, anti-semitie views, including the concem for
genealogical"purity" found in the (in his view) dcgenerate aristocracies ofhis day.
While suggesting at times that the superior human beings of the futuIe should have
the right sort of "blood," he assumes that that blood would he a most heterogeneous
mix, imagining that the parents of the next generation ofhigher human beings will
Niet2SChe's two-front war against Fortuna. Wc will reeal1 that on the individual
383
• imaginatively subdues FoTtuna by transforming the individual, nascent noble's past
misfortune into the product cf the higher man's will. On the collective front, the
political steps taken te wrest mastI:r types as a group from herd society represents
an even more ambitions attempt te end ail future vulnerability to the ravages of
chance. Yet again, the Stoic imperative of self-sufficiency, whieh suggests that the
truly virtuous man bas absolute control over the means of bis own moral-spiritual
development, emerges as highJy influential.
In the COUISC ofthis study, we have contrasted Nietzsehe's disparaging
treatment ofpolities in modem, herd society with bis own vision of a political
community aimed al nurturing human greatness. We noted that the "grand polities"
conducted by and among Nietzsehe's higher, noble human beings involves the
performance of great deeds ofIong-tetm scope and ambition; the architectonie
aetivity of institution-building is invokes as an arcbitypical exampie. In speaking of
"great polities" Nietzsche aIludes notjust to aetivities related to the breeding of the
next generation and te the foundation ofinstitutions, but also to other, ill-defined
types ofaetivity invoiving competitive posturing and contestation between rival
politicai actOIS of relative1y equal stature. From Nietzsehe's sparse account of this
clash ofcompeting wills we can galber little more than the fact that it is driven by an
open, honest Iust for power and regulated Dot by rule-driven Iegal codes (which
Nietzsche considels fit ooly for those of servile character), but by informai custom
and mutuai, guarded consideration and respect.
We also Ieamed that Nietzsche accords women membetship in this idealised
higher community, but bis treatment ofwomen hardly reflects the avowed feminism
of some of bis most ardent CODtemporaIy followers on the acadenüc scene.
Neither, 1suggest, is he a misogynist; on the contrary, he honoured those
"healthy", "natural" womeo who perform those roles he considels appropriate for
• the female sex and essential for the flourlshing of the commnDÏty as a whole.
384
• NielZSChe's treatment of women, 1argue, resists bath feminist and misogynist
readings; while not a misogynist, bis unabasbed picture of the bigber sort of
woman in bis idealised commnnity of the future, with its stress on the raies of
motberhood and consort to the Obermensch, place bim definite1y outside the camp
of modem feminism. Indeed, some of bis most scathing rhetoric is invoked to
denounce the so-caIled degenerare type of female, a "sterile" creature secretly
resentfui ofbealthy women who foolisbly asserts her "rigbt" to compete with men
in the public sphere. Like Aristotle, who acknowledged tbat friendsbip between the
sexes was indeed poss.ible, but of a Iower order tban the exquisite philia between
virtuous males, Nietzsche argues tbat althougb certain remarlcable women cao serve
as. admirably "dangerous" consorts to bigber men, tbeir activity ougbt ta be
circumscribed to the domestic spbere. Nietzsche appears ta draw upon civic
hUlIJanism in identifying lIncbecked female activity in the public spbere with
widespread social and political decay.
The contestation between (male) élites in Nietzsebe's rarified conception of a
public spbe!'e sbould result, in bis view, in the em.ergence of a bieraICby witbin the
élite itself, a political division of labour between those who retain the privilege of
remaining strictly witbin the realm of tbis rarified, competitive bigber colIJlIJunity,
and tbose resembling PIato's "guardians" whose task it is ta sully their bands by
ruling over the hoi polloi. N'letzsebe stresses tbat the rule over inferiOIS, unlike tbat
between equals, ougbt ta invoive law, for tl10se ofplebeian SCIIs.ibilities are said ta
require the clarity and strict discipline imposed by infleX1"bie laws and rules. Strict
laws are also required to keep the majority's bitter, seetbing ressentiment tawards
tbeir betters in cbeclc, wbich bas. its origin in the herd's unconscious, painful
385
• is, of course, closely related to an ostensibly ethical one, for (as we have seen)
Nietzsche believes the protection of higher human beings to be essential for the
further ethical and spiritual development of the human species as a whole.
Furthermore, we examined Nietzsche's related claim that relations of
domination are wholly in line with the principles ofjustice. Against thase arguing
that Nietzsche's notion of will to power is wholly self-referential, aiming at self-
mastery alone, we took note of Nietzsehe's view that healthy,lofty expressions of
will ta power are often cther-directed, involving higher-order clashes with those of
simi1arly strong cbaracters as well as less significant (although eminently desirahle)
aets of will aimed at bringing natural inferiors to hecl. Here again, 1 argue that
Nietzsche belies bis own ideal of noble self-sufficiency by insisting that the
freedom of the strong to exert their will can be actualjsed only in and through (a)
clashes with equals, and (b) the domination of the weak. As in ancient Greek and
Roman accounts ofpolitical freedom, Nietzsehe's higher, more perfect human
specimens have need of lower types who function as steps to he tread upon in the
• conscience and "unmanly" guilt - that he wishes ta sec overthrown and rep1aced by
386
• a revitalised, modem version ofmaster morality. Nietzsche criticises s~ve morality
for having banisheci our undeniable "joy in cruelty" to the shadows of our
existence. Under the potent psychological and moraï influence of a servile table of
values, he daims, we alIow ourselves to revel in cruelty only furtively and
dishonestJy, behind veils ofcivilised respectability. He wishes to replace the
guilty, secretive pleasures of the "tamed" animal with the open and honest self-
assertion of the master type. Nietzsche calls upon those of noble sensibility to
nnashamedly unleash the "beast of prey" that rernains trapped within, to alIow
themseIves those innocent explosions of Dionysian energy that faithfully reflect
what Nietzsche sees as the "fearfulness ofreality" and the violent, cruel nature of all
existence.
Some may wish to counter any suggestion that this explosiveness might harm
others by painting to Nietzsche's insistence that the .bighest soIt of man possesses
an attitude of noblesse oblige vis-à-vis bis infeàors. It is ofcourse true that
Nietzsche repudiates overt, malicious cruelty; the lofty man, in bis view, would
consider it beneath bis dignity (not to mention the height ofbad taste) to lord it over
bis infeàors. From the point ofview of the majority, however, Nietzschean
noblesse oblige tums out be a highly uncertain safeguard against Dionysian excess,
refeaing as it does to the noble's obligation 10 himself, rather than to othCIS. We
noted that Nietzsche recognises no duty to (mfc:rlor) others based upon any
inalienable right to persona! security. The studied indifferenœ that passes for
mcrciful forbearance in N1elZSChe's moral philosophy may prevent the noble type
from conducting search-and-destroy missions against the majority, but it is doubtful
that it would have the moral force to prevent the noble from cansing tminten!ed
harm through bis innocent acts ofself-assertion.
• but innocent and unintended. Like a sculptor who is 50 absorbed in bis hammering
387
• !bat he cares not where the flying fragments of stone or plaster land, Nietzsehe's
highest man, obsessed with bis own need to impose his will upon things, events,
and people, remains oblivious to any "collateral damage" !bat may result from bis
self-assertion. Admittedly, he is no sadist, who would precipitate this damage.
Neither, however, would he he an ardent defender of the rights of the majority for
protection from harm. In Nietzsche's view, it is self-evident!bat the benefits
accrued from a creative type's self-assertion far outweigh any accidentaI destruction
reaped as a by-product of the creative process.
Some writers working in the framework of the new orthodoxy readily
acknowledge Nietzsehe's approval of political domination, but quickly dismiss its
relevance by atlempting to isolate it from the supposed emancipatoty potential of
Nietzsehe's "real" philosophy. Those professing postmodemist views speak in this
context of bis unfortunate Iapses into the language of "metaphysics",
"essentialism", or "modernism", which routinely are held to he responsible for all
hieraIchy and violence. But is it possible to separate out and marginalise in this
manner the dimension ofdomination from the totality ofNietzsehe's thought? This
study suggests the contrary, that Nietzsehe's politics and bis philosophy form an
position may have an internai coherence and may possess some redH:IIIing political
and moral features; whetherthisis so is beyond the scopeofthis study (althoughI
have SOlDe doubts on thisscore). To claim that such a position is in any way
"N1etzsehean," however, is highly dubious•
• ***
388
• Many have found themselves drawn ta Nietzsehe's philosophy because of the
undeniable psyehological and moral insights found in many of bis observations of
the human condition. 1count myself in this group, and in the course of this study
have argued that the most insightful and worthwhile clements of bis wode cao he
traced back ta the influence of a deve10pmental ethie that stresses, among other
academie world vis-à-vis Platonie and Kantian rationalism, aIe now making a
strong comeback in moral philosophy (e.g. Annas 1993; Baier 1995; McDowell
1994; Nussbaum 1990. 1986; Taylor 1993). and Nietzsche caojustifiab1y be seen
as an important SOUlCe of this renaiSS'mce. Nietzsche also deserves our œspectful
attention for bis uncanny ear for moral hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness. i.e. for
the t}'PC of rommiserating pity that cao mask a "benefactor's" self-aggrandisement
• 389
• of the notion of "canons", nor with their dismissa1 of distinctions between high and
low culture as mere devices for the silencing of oppressed groupS.1
What is much less compelIing (to say the least) is Nietzsche's disturbiog resort
moral or political visions - attempt to explain away this tendency on the part of their
"founding father" rather!han confront it directly. Nietzsche believes oot simply that
a minority is often more talented !han the majority in the pursuit ofcertain
endeavours (a se1f-evident observation that would attraet little opposition), but that
human beings are so unequal as to warrant varying levels of respect and
consideration from the political authority of ajust society. For Nietzsche, showing
respect for the dignity of the species, and indeed for life itself, entails showing
di.srespect for the needs and wishes of the vast majority of the species, a disrespect
manifested in the view that this majority can ooly he ofinstrumental interest to the
bis claim that the whole Judaeo-Ouistian heritage of the Western wodd bas been
misanthropie. and that he alone bas escaped the contamination and is solely
respoIIS1ole for the m:JamariQn of philanthropy (10 the original sense of that word).
Nietzsche's attempt 10 ground bis views ofa human Rangordmmg via modern
naturalism seems at variance with bis own developmental ethie. which stresses not
the rigid, ontological barriers between higher and lower human types ofNietzsche's
390
• imagination. but rather the capacity for human leaming in the moral-spiritual
sphere. His efforts at denying this capacity 10 the vast majority of humanity. when
stripped of its pseudo-scientific figieaf, seem 10 me to he quite aIbitrary and
negates and subverts bis (in my mind healthy) se3l:Ch for suitable companioDS, and
ultimately renders any and every type ofcompanionship unaceeptable. It is surely
not coincidental that in bis last yeaIS ofsanity Nietzsche found it increasingiy
difficult 10 cultivate satisfying and successful reIationships. Neither, as Berlcowitz
bas recently argued, is it surprising that even bis creation Zarathustra finds him?Jf
at the end of bis saga of moral-spiritual development in a far from enviable position.
• 391
• Primary Sources: Nietzsche
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