PROJECT REPORT

FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

COMPANY REPORT: TOO BIG TO FAIL?
The Failure of KINGFISHER AIRLINES

ROLL NO: 295, 383

NAME: KUNAL AGARWAL
NISERG PANDYA
COMPANY: KINGFISHER AIRLINES.

Acknowledgement
This is to acknowledge that every member of the group has contributed
to his full potential towards the making of this project and that the final
outlay is the result of the dedicated efforts of all the group members as a
whole.
We would like to thank all the faculty members in the Management
Department for their constant support and advice, without which the
completion of this project would not have been possible. We would also
like to thank them for providing us the opportunity of working together
as a team and discovering how much we could achieve together.

Table of contents:
1) Introduction
2) Early Days of Kingfisher
3) SWOT And PESTEL Analysis
4) Acquisition of Air Deccan
5) Financial Unrest & Debt Recast
6) Loan Defaults, Loan Diversion and Forensics Audit
7) Post-Effects of Kingfisher Airlines
8) Conclusion
9) Annexures and Tables

Abstract
Indian Aviation Industry is one of the fastest growing markets in the
world. But nowadays it is in the news due to a different reason. And that
is the failure of one of the leading aviation players - Kingfisher Airlines.
The airline has been facing financial issues for many years. Till
December 2011; Kingfisher Airlines had the second largest share in
India's domestic air travel market. However due to the severe
financial crisis faced by the airline, it has been grounded. The company
has no funds to pay the salaries to the employees and is facing several
other issues like fuel dues; aircraft lease rental dues, service tax dues and
bank arrears. The main issue at hand is the bank loans and interest
burden which lead the airlines into an accumulated debt and loss
pile of Rs.12000 crore. The biggest mistake of Kingfisher was the
acquisition of another airline with a different business model.
Kingfisher owed an SBI led bank consortium loans to the tune of
Rs.7000 crore. And the effects that this led to the Airlines as well as to
the other UB Group companies is shocking. In a way both Kingfisher
and UB Group are insolvent.
Word Count: 198 words.

Introduction:
We have broken the shackles of conservative socialism. The growing
middle classes want the kind of standard of living you enjoy in the West.
So what I'm selling is a lifestyle.
Dr.Vijay Mallya
Kingfisher Airlines is an airline group based in India it is a subsidiary of
United Breweries Group. The group headed by Dr. Vijay Mallya is a
flamboyant businessman having interests in beverage alcohol, aviation
infrastructure, real estate and fertilizer among others.
The airline started commercial operations in 9 May 2005 with a fleet of
four new Airbus A320-200s operating a flight from Mumbai to Delhi.
The airlines at the time of its start-up, it became the first (and only)
Indian airline to order the Airbus A380. It placed orders for five
A380s, five Airbus A350-800 aircraft and five Airbus A330-200 aircraft
in a deal valued at over $3 billion. Delivery of the A330s was due to
start in late 2007, followed by the A380s in 2010 and the A350s in 2012.
Ever since its launch in May 2005, Kingfisher Airlines had blazed a trail
of innovations and introduced a range of market-firsts that had
completely redefined the whole experience of flying. By elevating its
customers to a level of being guests and not just passengers, Kingfisher
Airlines had endeared itself to consumers. Kingfisher Airlines was the
first Indian airline to introduce in-flight entertainment (IFE) system
on domestic flights. Passengers on-board are provided
complimentary welcome kit that contains a pen, facial tissue and
headphone to use with the IFE system. Kingfisher Airlines had made
alliance with Dish TV to provide live TV entertainment to passengers.
As of July 2007, Kingfisher operated only on domestic routes; however
it started its international operations on 3rd September, 2008 with a
flight between Bangalore and London, and later on added new
international destinations, namely Hong Kong, Dhaka, Colombo,
Singapore, Dubai and Bangkok. However, on 15th September 2009,
Kingfisher Airlines withdrew the London service.

The airline also entered into a breakthrough agreement with Indian

Airlines, making it the first public-private- partnership in the sector.
Under this partnership, IA would provide all ground handling services at
its terminals in Mumbai and Delhi.
On December 19th, 2007 Air Deccan and Kingfisher Airlines
decided to merge. Kingfisher Airlines parent company United
Breweries (UB Group) have acquired 46% of Air Deccans parent
Deccan Aviation, which possesses 52% of the total stakes.
Kingfisher initially acquired 26% equity stake in Air Deccan for Rs. 550
crores. This valued Air Deccan at approximately Rs. 2,115 crore. No
doubt, Air Deccan had the second largest market share after Jet Airways.
Just to compare, Jet paid Rs. 1,450 crore for the whole of Sahara.
It then bought another 20% stake for Rs. 418 crores through an open
offer to Air Deccans other investors (public, institutional investors).
Kingfisher Airlines was merged into Deccan Airlines and then got
rebranded as Kingfisher Airlines.
In May 2009, Kingfisher Airlines carrier over a million passengers that
provided it the highest market share among the airlines in India.
Word Count: 501 word

Early Days of Kingfisher

The early days of Kingfisher Airlines as in the time before they acquired
the Air Deccan were a great time for Dr. Mallya. Not in monetary terms
but in terms of awards and recognitions.
Since most airlines posted net losses due to surging fuel costs, investors
track a metric called EBITDAR which means earnings before interest,
taxation, depreciation, and amortization and rental costs. Most airlines
lease aircrafts and do not own them. Kingfisher Airlines reported a
revenue of Rs.14.41 Billion in the year ending on 31st March, 2008,
but a net loss of Rs.1.88 Billion.
But by that time Kingfisher had been awarded the following awards:
King Club had won the Freddie Awards 2008 in the following
categories:
Best Bonus Promotion
Best Customer Service
Best Member Communications (First Runner-up)
Best Award Redemption (First Runner-up)
Best Elite Level (Second Runner-up)
Best Website (Second Runner-up)
Program of the Year (Second Runner-up)
Named Best Airline in India / Central Asia; Best Cabin Crew
Central Asia.
NDTV Profit Business Leadership Award for Aviation.
Rated India's Second Buzziest Brand 2008 by The Brand Reporter.
Ranked amongst India's Top Service Brands of 2008 by Pitch
Magazine.
Voted as India's Favourite Airline.
Rated as Asia Pacific's Top Airline Brand.
Brand Leadership Award.

 Economic Times Avaya Award 2006 for Excellence in Customer

Responsiveness.
India's No. 1 Airline in customer satisfaction by Business World.
Rated amongst India's most respected companies by Business World.
Rated amongst India's 25 Innovative Companies by Planman Media
in 2006.
The Best Airline" and "India's Favourite Carrier' in a Survey
conducted by IMB for The Times of India.
Best New Domestic Airline for Excellent Services and Cuisine by
Pacific Area Travel Writers Association (PATWA).
Service Excellence 2005-2006 for a New Airline by Skytrax.
Ranked Third in the survey on India's Most Successful Brand launch
of 2005 under the Brand Derby Survey conducted by Business
Standard.
Buzziest Brands of 2005 by agencyfaqs and The Brand Reporter.
Rated amongst the Top Ten Internet Advertisers by Yahoo.
Rated amongst the top ten in the Best Television Commercial Jingles
by NDTV.
Best New Airline of the Year Award for 2005 by Centre for Asia
Pacific Aviation (CAPA) Award in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East
region.
Listed in the top 100 most trusted brand in The Brand Trust Report.
In-spite of all such awards, recognition high revenues Kingfisher never
posted a profit.

SWOT and PEST Analysis

STRENGTHS

Strong brand value and reputation in the minds of customers.

Quality of the service.

Route rationalization.

First airline to have a new fleet of airbuses.

Quality and continuous innovation.

WEAKNESSES

Still a not in profit organization.

High ticket pricing.

Facing a tough competition from competitors.

OPPORTUNITIES

The expanding tourism industry.

The non-penetrated domestic market.

International market.

Untapped air cargo market.

THREATS

Competitors

Infrastructure issues.

Fuel price hike.

Tourism saturation

Economic slowdown.

Promotions and sponsorship declining.

POLITICAL FACTORS
Open sky policy
FDI limits: 100% for Greenfield airports
o 74% for the existing airports
o 100% through special permission
o 49% for airlines.
ECONOMICAL FACTORS

Contribution to the Indian economy.

Rising cost of fuel.
Investment in the sector of aviation.
The growth of the middle income group family affects the aviation
sector.

SOCIAL FACTORS

Development of cities leads to better services and airports.

Employment opportunities.
Safety regulations.
The status symbol attached to a plane travel.

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

The growth of e-commerce and e-ticketing.

Satellite based navigation system.
Modernisation and privatisation of the airports.
Developing green field airports with private sector for example in
Bangalore the airport corporation limited.

Acquisition of Air Deccan

Dr. Mallya had a dream of owning an International Airlines. And to
fulfill this dream he started the Kingfisher Airlines. Indian aviation
regulations prohibited domestic airlines from flying on international
routes until they had operated in the domestic market for five years.
Dr. Mallya was not going to wait for 5 years so in 2006 he eyed a
stake in the low cost airlines Air Deccan.
In January 2006, when Deccan went public planning to offload 25% of
its stake through an IPO, it could barely manage to offload the 25% even
after extending the issue closing date and reducing the price band.
Air Deccan had reported a net loss of Rs. 340 crore for the 15-month
period between April 1, 2005 and June 30, 2006.
Surprisingly, Deccans owner did not want stake in Air Deccan to be
picked up. When news reports came in that Mallya was interested in
buying a stake in Deccan, its owner said Mallya is from Venus, I am
from Mars. We are here for a long haul. We are not for sale. We are
three times bigger (than Kingfisher) in routes and operations.
The two airlines had different business models and cater to totally
different passenger segments. Dr. Mallya, however, was confident that
he will be able to tap synergies and make the merger successful.
Before Air Deccan arrived on the scene in 2003, a flight from Bangalore
to Delhi cost Rs.12000.
The arrival of Deccan led to this falling to Rs.2500. As LCCs like
SpiceJet, Indigo and others sprouted and followed Air Deccans lead,
even full service airlines were forced to cut fares to stay in the business.

Result: domestic air travel really took off; the number of passengers
flying within the country jumped from 29.2 million in 2003 to 90.44
million in 2006.
The flip side: the airline industry was awash in red ink, and
collectively incurred losses of Rs 2,000 crore last year; Deccan, in
particular, bled Rs 426 crore during the six months ended
September, 2007.
Kingfisher was not far behind, with losses of Rs 350 crore during this
period.
UB Group executives squarely blame Deccan for this state of affairs.
They pointed out that while Deccans cut rate and unviable fares even
during peak hours ensured that it flew near-full, the premium Kingfisher
(and some other airlines, too) took off near-empty in the afternoons.
The industry was fast losing its pricing power, and to that extent, it
would have destroyed every airline,
(Balasubramanium, 2008)
The first, and obvious, benefit from the merger will accrue to the entire
domestic aviation industry. Dr. Mallyas initiatives, analysts say, will
not only help Kingfisher and Deccan stem their losses, but also improve
the fortunes of other airlines.
The other compelling reason behind the merger is the potential for huge
savings from cost synergies, route rationalization and bulk purchase
deals.
A closer look at the two airlines reveals that except for the conflicting
nature of their business models, the two carriers dont seem to have any
other legacy issue.
Dr. Mallya says that following the merger, both brands will retain their
independent identitiesKingfisher targeting the premium and normal
fare segment and Deccan serving budget travelers.

I see no reason for Mallya to want to dilute that brand equity.

(Gopinath)
The new airline, with 600-plus flights a day and a large network of
70 destinations is valued at an estimated Rs.5000 crore.
The UB Group hopes to save around Rs 250 crore annually as a
result of combined operations and higher revenues, and turn
profitable by the end 2008-09.
The savings, according to KPMG Senior Advisor Mark Martin, will
primarily come from maintenance as Kingfisher and Deccan operate
similar types of aircraft.
Their pilots are type-rated on the same type of aircraft and both airlines
can share their crew. Besides, the marketing network created by Deccan
will be available to Kingfisher and vice versa. (Mark)
Then, route rationalization will allow it to pare down the plan to acquire
over 100 new planes, thus, resulting in massive savings.
The combined airline will integrate critical departments like
maintenance, flight operations, cabin crew, airport terminal services and
marketing support and also gain from each others slot allocations and
access to airports.
The international market (both outbound and inbound), though growing
at a healthy 17 per cent per annum, is already crowded and foreign
airlines fly two-thirds of Indian passengers.
Investors, though, werent very happy. The Deccan scrip slid from
Rs 330 to a low of Rs.277.90 on NSE on December 20, when the
merger was announced.

Post-deal the share market and passenger load of Kingfisher Airline

grew massively (see table 1 & 2)
But in-spite such huge market share Kingfisher was still bleeding
money.
Post-merger with Air Deccan, things kept going south. In the second
quarter of 2009, Kingfisher reported a net loss of Rs.418.77 crore.
Its income from operations declined by 13.6%

Financial unrest & Debt recast

Post Deccan merger Kingfisher Airlines got heavily leveraged. The
operating costs of the company were high and so were the loan and
interest amounts.
Kingfisher Airlines had accumulated losses of Rs. 4,321 crore at the
end of FY 2010-2011; which amounted to more than 50% of its net
worth!
Dr. Mallya says high cost of aviation turbine fuel (ATF) and weakening
rupee were the reasons.
But the cost of fuel and power as a percentage of Net Sales were steadily
decreasing, but the percentage of Loan and Interest burden kept on
increasing
Fin. Year

Net
Sales

2007-2008

Power
& Fuel
Cost

Power &
Fuel cost
as % of
Sales

PBDIT

Interest

PBDT

1,456.28 889.30

61%

-211.56

434.44

-646

2008-2009

5,269.17 2,602.62

49%

+45.70

2,029.33

-1,983.63

2009-2010

5,067.92 1,802.99

36%

-12.89

2,425.59

-2,258.48

2010-2011

6,233.38 2,274.03

36%

1,025.62

2,340.32

-1,314.70

The table effectively proves that the main burden on Kingfisher was
of its interest and loan amount.

The debt-equity ratio were at a nightmare proportions:

Fin. Year

Equity (Rs. In
crores)

Debt (Rs. In
crores)

Debt-Equity
Ratio

2005-2006

98.18

451.66

4.6 : 1

2006-2007

135.47

916.71

6.76 : 1

2007-2008

135.80

934.38

6.8 : 1

2008-2009

362.91

5,665,56

15.6 : 1

2009-2010

362.91

7,922.60

21.88 : 1

2010-2011

1,050.88

7,057.08

6.72 : 1

Kingfishers book equity had been wiped out although audited

financials pretended otherwise. The airline was burning cash at a rapid
rate, an estimated Rs.301 crore in 2012, is in a business that requires
capital perpetually, has no pricing power given six carriers fighting over
the major hubs in India, is dependent on the vagaries of the price of oil
and the largesse of state-run financial institutions in India, and its parent
UB has run out of financial room to accommodate the needs of this
capital-starved child.
In the year 2010 a debt recast package was done. It is believed that
non-performing loans had been repackaged into subordinated debt, and
that Kingfisher had defaulted on its obligations is unquestionable. We do
not believe that Kingfishers antics would have found any takers in a
responsible credit market and that the airline would have been liquidated
by then. During 2010, Kingfisher defaulted in principal repayment of
Rs.203.1 crore and overdue interest of Rs.81.6 crore, for a total default

of, 284.7 crore. Between July 2010 and March 2011, Kingfisher
defaulted on interest payments of Rs.349.8 crore. Foregone principal
repayments are undisclosed. Therefore, from the beginning of financial
year 2010 to the end of Financial Year 2011, the airline defaulted on
dues of at least Rs.634.5 crore to the financial institutions. (Data for the
period April-June 2010 is unavailable.) Clearly, the loans given by the
banks to Kingfisher were impaired and therefore under the pretext
of a debt recast, the banks had converted some of these unpaid
principal and interest amounts into cumulative convertible
preferred shares {Rs.755 crore of term loans converted into CCPS
of 7.5%} and cumulatively redeemable preferred shares {Rs.553
crore of term loans converted into CRPS of 8% with a maturity of
12 years}. Table 3 shows the top three banks in the consortium,
which accounted for 62% of the CCPS. The convoluted logic of debt
restructuring, via acquisition of CCPS, of an organization that
doesnt have the cash to meet its obligations, - which were
subsequently converted into ordinary shares of Kingfisher at a
premium of 61.6% to the closing price of the underlying common
share - speaks eloquently to the financial shenanigans underway at
the banks and Kingfisher. Moreover, subscribing to common equity
at a premium implies that the banking consortium is now sitting on
a significant mark-to-market loss on its equity holding in the airline.
At the end of this a consortium of 17 banks owned nearly 25%
equity in Kingfisher and were exposed to debt of around Rs.7000
crore.

Loan Defaults, Loan Diversion and Forensics Audit

Even after the Debt restructuring, the debt of Kingfisher on 15th
September, 2011 stood at Rs.6500 crore. As a result of this, the company
was not paying its dues to various institutions and certain moves were
initiated by various institutions like the Mumbai International Airport
sent notice for Rs.90 crore outstanding dues, Service Tax
Department froze 11 Kingfisher accounts for non-payment of Rs.70
crore despite collecting it from travelers, Kingfisher canceled
several flights after Income-Tax Department frozen some of its
accounts. Kingfisher was in danger of losing a number of primeflying slots. International Air Transport Association asked travel
agents to stop booking tickets on Kingfishers behalf for failure to
settle dues since February, Employees protested due to delay salary
payments.
Kingfisher curtailed its international operations initially and then
suspends them. It also suspends its domestic operations from a few
cities.
Then Pilots started reporting sick to protest non-payment of salaries.
Flights were cancelled, 34 of its aircrafts are repossessed due to nonpayment of lease rentals.
On October 6, 2012, DGCA issued show-cause notice to Kingfisher
asking why its flying permit should not be suspended or cancelled.
And on October 20, 2012, the airlines permit got suspended and
experts said Vijay Mallyas United Breweries group needs to pump in
over Rs. 3,000 crore to get Kingfisher airborne again as no foreign
operator would come forward to invest in the airline in its present state.
On December 31, 2012: The carrier lost its flying licence as the
DGCA refused to renew its Air Operator Permit (AOP).
In Dr. Mallyas defense, he did try to pump in loans of Rs.450 crore on
February 18 from UBHLs.

After this the banks started to recall its loans. By February end an SBI
led consortium of 17 banks had granted loans of Rs.7500 crore.
In the following months, many employees went on strike, senior
executives quit and Kingfisher again posted a Net Loss of Rs.822.4 crore
on 31st December, 2013 for the quarter.
In the March 2014, the consortium of lenders led by State Bank of
India considered declaring Kingfisher Airlines a wilful defaulter.
Sources cited that the consortium had appointed Ernst & Young to
conduct a forensic audit on Kingfisher, to determine if funds were
diverted from the airline to other group companies.
The forensic audit by consultancy firm Ernst & Young had found
diversion of funds by Kingfisher Airlines to Formula One and other
ventures of promoter Dr. Vijay Mallya, lenders said. Officials from
IDBI Bank and SBI said, "Prima facie, there seems to be diversion of
funds. We now need to study the report and authenticate the mapping
transaction trail undertaken by the consultancy firm."
SBI chairman Arundhati Bhattacharya made a statement saying, "We are
studying the report and it would not be right to discuss the details."
However, the bank has sent show-cause notices to Mallya and three
other directors following the audit report.
On August 21, 2014, Punjab National Bank issued notice to
Kingfisher alleging the carrier had wilfully defaulted in payment of
outstanding dues of over Rs 770 crore.
And on September 1, 2014, United Bank of India declares Vijay
Mallya and three directors of Kingfisher Airlines as wilful
defaulters.

Post-Effects of Kingfisher Airlines

After Dr. Mallya was declared a wilful defaulter by IDBI, a series of
events in the related companies started taking place.
During the crisis UBHL group had to sell its majority stake in USL
to UK Based distiller Diageo Plc.
Diageo Plc, the worlds largest distiller, is tightening corporate
governance practices at United Spirits Ltd (USL) and the UK-based
company has hired a consulting firm to vet USLs contracts with
other UB Group companies to ensure these agreements are arms
length transactions. Deloitte, which has been working with USL on
various projects, has been asked to ensure that the terms of USLs
contracts with United Breweries Holdings Ltd (UBHL), the UB Groups
holding company, and other group firms, do not give an unfair
advantage to these companies, according to two people familiar with the
matter. According to USLs annual report, the company had
financial dealings with UBHL worth over Rs.1000 crore in the
previous financial year. These transactions included buying and selling
of goods, loans, deposits and advertisement and sales promotion
expenses. USL was owed Rs.1188.7 crore by UBHL as on 31 March
2013, according to the annual report. USL, Indias largest liquor
maker, also gave loans and deposits to a group company worth
Rs.1318.6 crore, the report showed. Both USL and Deloitte declined
to comment. Diageo, which completed its purchase of a 25.02% stake in
USL in July 2013 and made compliance to both laws and company
policy and installing its global business practices at USL one of its
biggest priorities at the Bangalore-based company. On 21 August
Diageo removed as many as 100 UB Group executives off USL
payrolls as many of these executives were employed by other UB
Group firms, including the grounded Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. The
executives were later transferred to UBHL. The removal of UB
Group executives off the payrolls and the vetting of contracts with UB

companies are seen as moves by Diageo to distance USL from the larger
UB Group. Dr. Mallya and his firms control less than 10% of USL now,
while Diageo is by far the largest shareholder at USL after building up a
stake of nearly 30%, partly by buying shares on the stock market over
the past few months.
The effect of Kingfishers mismanagement can be seen on UBHL If
Kingfisher is insolvent, then the UB group which owns
approximately 55.57% of Kingfisher in addition to other
investments used as collateral for its airline business will be heavily
exposed to debts.
The following table outlines the valuation of UB groups key
investments that are readily marketable:

As outlined in the table, the market value of UB groups holdings is

only Rs.4713.4 crore, compared to debt on its books of Rs.2331.6
crore, in addition to debt guarantees and collateral provided on
behalf of Kingfisher of Rs.16852.9 crore as per its Financial year
2011 Annual Report. That could mean only one thing: Both UB group
and Kingfisher are at the mercy of Indian financial institutions and
shareholders should not stick around for worse to come.
Both, UB group and Kingfisher are effectively insolvent.

Word count: 3119 words

Conclusion
Kingfisher Airlines is deep in the debts and losses. So should the
government organize its rescue? Critics say that it has already been
rescued in the past thanks to Dr. Vijay Mallyas political clout, yet it
has never made a profit since inception. When millions of small
businesses are allowed to go bust when banks cut off credit to thousands
of smaller defaulters, rescuing Kingfisher will smack of crony
capitalism.
The airline has defenders too. Kingfisher has justly earned a
reputation for excellent service standards. Quality is always worth
preserving. We need to save Kingfisher without saving Dr. Mallya.
Indias airlines suffer from high taxes on fuel, rising world prices and an
obligation to service some uneconomic routes to destinations like the
Northeast. Yet this did not prevent them from making profits in the past.
Even today, Indigo is profitable.
So are many global airlines. Top US carriers like United Airlines,
Delta and US Air reported good profits in the last two quarters.
Indeed, in the quarter ending June, United Airlines turned
profitable after losing money for six years, Delta reported the
highest quarterly profit in history and Lufthansa doubled its profits.
The quarter ending September has been only somewhat less
profitable for them. So, Kingfisher and other Indian carriers cannot
claim that global conditions are terrible.
Kingfisher has already been rescued. Banks converted unpaid loans
to Kingfisher into equity at a very favorable premium of 62% to the
ruling market price, a tribute to Dr. Mallyas political clout rather
than companys future prospects. Even after that the company has
sunk deeper into the debt. Even after being restructured and slashed, its
debts exceed Rs 7,000 crore. Government concessions to the industry
may save other airlines, but not Kingfisher.

One way forward is for banks to convert a big chunk of their

outstanding loans to Kingfisher into equity at the current market
price, giving them a 51% stake in the company
If Dr. Mallya really wants yet another chance, he must be told to bring in
at least Rs 3,000 crore of fresh equity. If he cannot entice the investing
publicwhich is probablehe must sell his other assets. Apart from
liquor company UB Holdings, he owns stakes in the cricket team Royal
Challengers, Bangalore; the Kolkata football teams Mohun Bagan and
East Bengal; and the Formula 1 team Force India. Indeed, UB Holdings
itself is reported to have provided bank guarantees of over Rs 16,000
crore to the banks.
If Dr. Mallya will not sacrifice his other assets for Kingfisher, then
he cannot ask others to sacrifice their financial interests for him.

Word count: 434 words

Total main text word count: 4063 words

List of annexures and tables

Table 1
Kingfisher passenger numbers and passenger load factor:
1QFY2010 to 3QFY2012

Table 2:
India domestic market share: 3QFY2012

Source: Jet Airways

Table 3:

Table 4: The Debt Recast Package

Bibliography
Company start-up info. Retrieved from www.makemytrip.com:
http://www.makemytrip.com/flights/kingfisher-airlineshistory.html
Awards and recognition: Retrieved from profit.ndtv.com:
http://profit.ndtv.com/stock/kingfisher-airlines-ltd_kfa/reports

Bibliography
Data Regarding Debt Recast: Veritas Investment. (2012). Pie in the Sky.
Toronto.

Bibliography
Forensics Reports: Manju, A. B. (2014, September 10). Retrieved from
www.dnaindia.com: http://www.dnaindia.com/money/reportkingfisher-diverted-funds-to-formula-one-audit-2017440
SBI' Forensics Audit: Ashwin Mohan, Simran Gill. (2014, March 26).
Retrieved from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201403-26/news/48595106_1_kfa-kingfisher-airlines-audit-report
Bibliography
UBHL's Insolvency: Veritas Investments. (2012). Pie in the Sky.
Toronto.

Bibliography
Debt Recast Package: Veritas Investments. (2012). Pie in the Sky.
Toronto.

Bibliography
Graphs of Passenger Load: CAPA Centre for Aviation & airline
reports.