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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176479

October 6, 2010

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,


vs.
PEDRO P. BUENAVENTURA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) assails the Decision1 dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution2 dated January 30, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82079.
Respondent Pedro P. Buenaventura and his first wife (now deceased) owned a townhouse unit in Casa Nueva Manila
Townhouse, Quezon City. On December 27, 1994, they obtained a loan from petitioner. As security for the loan, they mortgaged
the townhouse to petitioner.3 Under the loan agreement, respondent was to pay RCBC a fixed monthly payment with adjustable
interest for five years. For this purpose, respondent opened an account with RCBCs Binondo branch from which the bank was
to deduct the monthly amortizations.4
On April 19, 1999, respondent received a Notice of Public Auction of the mortgaged townhouse unit. He wrote Atty. Saturnino
Basconcillo, the notary public conducting the auction sale, demanding the cancellation of the auction sale. However, the notary
public proceeded with the public sale on May 25, 1999, where RCBC emerged as the highest bidder. The Notary Publics
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on September 28, 2000.
On September 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint for Annulment of Sale
and Damages against RCBC, notary public Saturnino Basconcillo, and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City. Respondent
prayed that the RTC (1) annul the extra-judicial foreclosure and sale of the property; (2) cancel the Certificate of Sale; and (3)
direct the payment of P170,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P70,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus P2,500.00 for every court appearance of his counsel, and the costs of the suit.
RCBC failed to timely file an Answer and was declared in default. Based on respondents evidence, the RTC rendered a
decision,5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the foreclosure sale of the plaintiffs (respondents) property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39234 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City conducted on May 25, 1999 by notary public ATTY. SATURNINO M. BASCONCILLO, and the
resulting certificate of sale issued by said notary public on May 27, 1999 null and void and of no effect; and
2. Ordering RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION to pay to the plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P70,000.00 as actual damages; and the costs of suit; and
3. Dismissing the complaint as against ATTY. SATURNINO M. BASCONCILLO and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that respondent made regular payments of the monthly amortizations as they fell due, as evidenced by his
passbooks and the various deposit slips acknowledged by RCBC.7 The RTC also found that RCBCs own computer-generated
amortization schedule showed that no balance was due respondent after his last payment on March 27, 2000.8
RCBC filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied in a resolution9 dated February 11, 2004.
RCBC then appealed to the CA. In the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision,10 the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with
modification, deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages.
The CA ruled that the foreclosure sale was premature. It held that respondent made valid and sufficient payments on his loan
obligation. It found respondents evidence as sufficient proof to negate default on his part in paying the monthly amortizations. It
noted that sometime in September 1996, RCBC sent respondent a letter informing the latter of past due accounts since January
27, 1996, which would warrant the application of the acceleration clause. The CA, however, deemed the same to have been
"cured" by a subsequent Amortization Schedule given by the bank to respondent stating that, as of March 27, 2000, he no
longer had an unpaid balance on his loan. The CA said this clearly suggests the uninterrupted receipt by RCBC of the
installments, thus, negating the claim that respondent was in default. It also noted respondents evidence (his passbooks) which
indicated that he had sufficient funds to cover the remaining balance of his loan at the time of the foreclosure sale. Moreover, the
CA said that based on the term of the loan (April 27, 1995 to March 27, 2000), the loan was not yet due and demandable at the
time of the foreclosure.
On the other hand, the CA found the award of moral and exemplary damages unwarranted. It held that since respondent
irregularly paid his monthly amortizations, RCBC did not act maliciously and in bad faith when it initiated the foreclosure
proceedings.
RCBC moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but it was denied in a Resolution dated January 30, 2007.

In this petition, RCBC argues that the CA Decision is not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence. In particular, it assails
the CAs finding that respondent was not in default at that time of the foreclosure of the mortgage. It says that the foreclosure
sale was done in the lawful exercise of its right as mortgagee of the property as, at the time of the foreclosure sale, respondent
had unpaid amortizations. The bank points out that respondent made payments until March 2000, but these payments were not
withdrawn by the bank and credited to respondents loan payments but remained in his account.
In his Comment, respondent avers that he never received a copy of petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to file the Petition
for Review in violation of Rule 45, Section 2. Thus, he argues that the motion is without legal effect, and therefore, the petition
has been filed out of time. He also alleges that the petition lacks the requisite affidavit of material dates. Respondent likewise
posits that the petition does not raise questions of law. He argues that the issue raised by petitioner, while purportedly a
question of law, in reality questions the sufficiency of evidence relied upon by both the trial court and the CA, which this Court
has held in the past to be a question of fact.
In its Reply, petitioner counters respondents arguments by saying that the issue it raised whether respondents subsequent
payment of unpaid amortizations done after the foreclosure and public sale of the property invalidates the extra-judicial
foreclosure and public sale proceedings is a purely legal question.
The petition lacks merit and must be denied.
Clearly, the petition disputes the factual findings of the CA,11 which, in turn, merely affirmed the factual findings of the RTC.
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this
Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. Inquiry into the veracity of the CAs factual findings and conclusions is not
the function of the Supreme Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it our function to reexamine and weigh
anew the respective evidence of the parties.121avvphi1
While it is true that there are well-established exceptions to this principle, petitioner in this case has failed to show that this case
falls under one of such exceptions.
The RTC and the CA both found that respondent was not in default on the monthly payments of his loan obligation.
These findings are supported by the evidence on record.
At the time of foreclosure April 1999 respondents savings account deposits showed a balance of P852,913.26.13 This was
more than enough to cover whatever amortizations were due from him at that time. Moreover, the Amortization Schedule shows
that, as of April 27, 1999, respondents loan account with the bank totaled only P269,023.38.14 The same schedule shows that,
by March 27, 2000, he had "0.00" balance left to pay,15 meaning he had paid his loan in full.
Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation.16 It is a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at the time it
is due.17
In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the
mortgage, to have the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation.18
RCBCs own Amortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of Article 1176 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the
presumption that the said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that
such installments have been paid.19
Respondents passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it made demands for him to pay his
past due accounts, and even after the auction sale.
RCBC cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits were "not withdrawn."20 It is not respondents
fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited. His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his
payment in the savings account he had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly
liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement.
This bolsters the conclusion of the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the
application of the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the property.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution dated January 30, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82079 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134685. November 19, 1999]
MARIA ANTONIA SIGUAN, petitioner, vs. ROSA LIM, LINDE LIM, INGRID LIM and NEIL LIM, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
May the Deed of Donation executed by respondent Rosa Lim (hereafter LIM) in favor of her children be rescinded for
being in fraud of her alleged creditor, petitioner Maria Antonia Siguan? This is the pivotal issue to be resolved in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The relevant facts, as borne out of the records, are as follows:
On 25 and 26 August 1990, LIM issued two Metrobank checks in the sums of P300,000 and P241,668, respectively,
payable to cash. Upon presentment by petitioner with the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for the reason
account closed. Demands to make good the checks proved futile. As a consequence, a criminal case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 22127-28, were filed by petitioner against LIM with Branch 23
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. In its decision dated 29 December 1992, the court a quo convicted LIM
as charged. The case is pending before this Court for review and docketed as G.R. No. 134685.
It also appears that on 31 July 1990 LIM was convicted of estafa by the RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q[2]
89-2216 filed by a certain Victoria Suarez. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, however,
[3]
this Court, in a decision promulgated on 7 April 1997, acquitted LIM but held her civilly liable in the amount of P169,000,
as actual damages, plus legal interest.
[4]

Meanwhile, on 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying the following parcels of land and purportedly executed
by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil, was registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City:
(1) a parcel of land situated at Barrio Lahug, Cebu City, containing an area of 563 sq. m. and covered by TCT
No. 93433;
(2) a parcel of land situated at Barrio Lahug, Cebu City, containing an area of 600 sq. m. and covered by TCT
No. 93434;
(3) a parcel of land situated at Cebu City containing an area of 368 sq. m. and covered by TCT No. 87019; and
(4) a parcel of land situated at Cebu City, Cebu containing an area of 511 sq. m. and covered by TCT No.
87020.
New transfer certificates of title were thereafter issued in the names of the donees.

[5]

On 23 June 1993, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children before Branch 18 of the RTC of
Cebu City to rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title
issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB14181. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred
all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and
confederated with her children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioners and other creditors
prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations.
On the other hand, LIM denied any liability to petitioner. She claimed that her convictions in Criminal Cases Nos.
22127-28 were erroneous, which was the reason why she appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. As regards the
questioned Deed of Donation, she maintained that it was not antedated but was made in good faith at a time when she
had sufficient property. Finally, she alleged that the Deed of Donation was registered only on 2 July 1991 because she
was seriously ill.
[6]

In its decision of 31 December 1994, the trial court ordered the rescission of the questioned deed of donation; (2)
declared null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the names of private respondents Linde, Ingrid and Neil
Lim; (3) ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel said titles and to reinstate the previous titles in the name of
Rosa Lim; and (4) directed the LIMs to pay the petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000 as moral
damages; P10,000 as attorneys fees; and P5,000 as expenses of litigation.
[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on 20 February 1998, reversed the decision of the trial
court and dismissed petitioners accion pauliana. It held that two of the requisites for filing an accion pauliana were
absent, namely, (1) there must be a credit existing prior to the celebration of the contract; and (2) there must be a fraud, or
at least the intent to commit fraud, to the prejudice of the creditor seeking the rescission.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Deed of Donation, which was executed and acknowledged before a notary
public, appears on its face to have been executed on 10 August 1989. Under Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the questioned Deed, being a public document, is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the
date thereof. No antedating of the Deed of Donation was made, there being no convincing evidence on record to indicate
that the notary public and the parties did antedate it. Since LIMs indebtedness to petitioner was incurred in August 1990,
or a year after the execution of the Deed of Donation, the first requirement for accion pauliana was not met.
Anent petitioners contention that assuming that the Deed of Donation was not antedated it was nevertheless in fraud
of creditors because Victoria Suarez became LIMs creditor on 8 October 1987, the Court of Appeals found the same
untenable, for the rule is basic that the fraud must prejudice the creditor seeking the rescission.

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to this Court and submits the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF DONATION, EXH. 1, WAS ENTERED INTO IN FRAUD OF [THE] CREDITORS
OF RESPONDENT ROSA [LIM].
Petitioner argues that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Deed of Donation was not in fraud of creditors is
[8]
contrary to well-settled jurisprudence laid down by this Court as early as 1912 in the case of Oria v. McMicking, which
enumerated the various circumstances indicating the existence of fraud in a transaction. She reiterates her arguments
below, and adds that another fact found by the trial court and admitted by the parties but untouched by the Court of
Appeals is the existence of a prior final judgment against LIM in Criminal Case No. Q-89-2216 declaring Victoria Suarez
as LIMs judgment creditor before the execution of the Deed of Donation.
[9]

Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied or interpreted Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, in holding that being a public document, the said deed of donation is evidence of the fact which gave rise
[10]
to its execution and of the date of the latter. Said provision should be read with Section 30 of the same Rule which
provides that notarial documents are prima facieevidence of their execution, not of the facts which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.
Finally, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals overlooked Article 759 of the New Civil Code, which provides: The
donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when at the time of the execution thereof the donor did not reserve
sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation. In this case, LIM made no reservation of sufficient property to
pay her creditors prior to the execution of the Deed of Donation.
On the other hand, respondents argue that (a) having agreed on the law and requisites of accion pauliana, petitioner
cannot take shelter under a different law; (b) petitioner cannot invoke the credit of Victoria Suarez, who is not a party to
this case, to support her accion pauliana; (c) the Court of Appeals correctly applied or interpreted Section 23 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court; (d) petitioner failed to present convincing evidence that the Deed of Donation was antedated and
executed in fraud of petitioner; and (e) the Court of Appeals correctly struck down the awards of damages, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation because there is no factual basis therefor in the body of the trial courts decision.
The primordial issue for resolution is whether the questioned Deed of Donation was made in fraud of petitioner and,
therefore, rescissible. A corollary issue is whether the awards of damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are
proper.
We resolve these issues in the negative.
The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter court are conclusive, except in a
[11]
number of instances. In the case at bar, one of the recognized exceptions warranting a review by this Court of the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals exists, to wit, the factual findings and conclusions of the lower court and Court of
Appeals are conflicting, especially on the issue of whether the Deed of Donation in question was in fraud of creditors.
Article 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts which are rescissible, and among them are those contracts
undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them.
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to prosper, the
[12]
following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although
demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3)
[13]
[14]
the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim;
(4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third
[15]
person who received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud.
The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation,
[16]
and this must be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without any prior
existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion
pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the
judgment be subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was
[17]
constituted.
In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of
donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989.
We are not convinced with the allegation of the petitioner that the questioned deed was antedated to make it appear
that it was made prior to petitioners credit. Notably, that deed is a public document, it having been acknowledged before
[18]
a notary public. As such, it is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of its date, pursuant to Section
23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners contention that the public documents referred to in said Section 23 are only those entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer does not hold water. Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of
a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (Emphasis
supplied).
The phrase all other public documents in the second sentence of Section 23 means those public documents other
than the entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer. And these include notarial
documents, like the subject deed of donation. Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of documents. -- For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) . . .
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments. . . .
It bears repeating that notarial documents, except last wills and testaments, are public documents and are evidence
of the facts that gave rise to their execution and of their date.
In the present case, the fact that the questioned Deed was registered only on 2 July 1991 is not enough to overcome
the presumption as to the truthfulness of the statement of the date in the questioned deed, which is 10 August
1989. Petitioners claim against LIM was constituted only in August 1990, or a year after the questioned alienation. Thus,
the first two requisites for the rescission of contracts are absent.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the contract of donation,
still her action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil
Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect
the claims due them. Also, Article 1383 of the same Code provides that the action for rescission is but a subsidiary
remedy which cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation
for the same. The term subsidiary remedy has been defined as the exhaustion of all remedies by the prejudiced
[19]
creditor to collect claims due him before rescission is resorted to. It is, therefore, essential that the party asking for
[20]
rescission prove that he has exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. Petitioner neither
alleged nor proved that she did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not maintainable
[21]
even if the fraud charged actually did exist.
The fourth requisite for an accion pauliana to prosper is not present either.
Article 1387, first paragraph, of the Civil Code provides: All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates
property by gratuitous title are presumed to have been entered into in fraud of creditors when the donor did not reserve
sufficient property to pay all debts contracted before the donation. Likewise, Article 759 of the same Code, second
paragraph, states that the donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors when at the time thereof the donor did
not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation.
For this presumption of fraud to apply, it must be established that the donor did not leave adequate properties which
creditors might have recourse for the collection of their credits existing before the execution of the donation.
As earlier discussed, petitioners alleged credit existed only a year after the deed of donation was executed. She
cannot, therefore, be said to have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. Besides, the evidence disclose that
as of 10 August 1989, when the deed of donation was executed, LIM had the following properties:
(1)

(2)

A parcel of land containing an area of 220 square meters, together with the house constructed
thereon, situated in Sto. Nio Village, Mandaue City, Cebu, registered in the name of Rosa Lim and covered
[22]
by TCT No. 19706;
A parcel of land located in Benros Subdivision, Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu;

[23]

(3)

A parcel of land containing an area of 2.152 hectares, with coconut trees thereon, situated at Hindag[24]
an, St. Bernard, Southern Leyte, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13572.

(4)

A parcel of land containing an area of 3.6 hectares, with coconut trees thereon, situated at Hindag-an,
[25]
St. Bernard, Southern Leyte, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13571.

During her cross-examination, LIM declared that the house and lot mentioned in no. 1 was bought by her in the
[26]
amount of about P800,000 to P900,000. Thus:
ATTY. FLORIDO:
Q

These properties at the Sto. Nio Village, how much did you acquire this property?

Including the residential house P800,000.00 to P900,000.00.

How about the lot which includes the house. How much was the price in the Deed of Sale of the house and lot at
Sto. Nio Violage [sic]?

I forgot.

How much did you pay for it?

That is P800,000.00 to P900,000.00.

Petitioner did not adduce any evidence that the price of said property was lower. Anent the property in no. 2, LIM
[27]
testified that she sold it in 1990. As to the properties in nos. 3 and 4, the total market value stated in the tax
declarations dated 23 November 1993 was P56,871.60. Aside from these tax declarations, petitioner did not present
evidence that would indicate the actual market value of said properties. It was not, therefore, sufficiently established that
the properties left behind by LIM were not sufficient to cover her debts existing before the donation was made. Hence, the
presumption of fraud will not come into play.

Nevertheless, a creditor need not depend solely upon the presumption laid down in Articles 759 and 1387 of the Civil
Code. Under the third paragraph of Article 1387, the design to defraud may be proved in any other manner recognized by
the law of evidence. Thus in the consideration of whether certain transfers are fraudulent, the Court has laid down
specific rules by which the character of the transaction may be determined. The following have been denominated by the
Court as badges of fraud:
(1) The fact that the consideration of the conveyance is fictitious or is inadequate;
(2) A transfer made by a debtor after suit has begun and while it is pending against him;
(3) A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor;
(4) Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency;
(5) The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by a debtor, especially when he is insolvent or greatly
embarrassed financially;
(6) The fact that the transfer is made between father and son, when there are present other of the above
circumstances; and
(7)

The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property.

[28]

The above enumeration, however, is not an exclusive list. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the
men who perpetrate the fraud in each case. This Court has therefore declined to define it, reserving the liberty to deal
[29]
with it under whatever form it may present itself.
Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving any of the circumstances enumerated above or any other
circumstance from which fraud can be inferred. Accordingly, since the four requirements for the rescission of a gratuitous
contract are not present in this case, petitioners action must fail.
In her further attempt to support her action for rescission, petitioner brings to our attention the 31 July 1990
[30]
Decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 92, in Criminal Case No. Q-89-2216. LIM was therein held guilty of estafa
and was ordered to pay complainant Victoria Suarez the sum of P169,000 for the obligation LIM incurred on 8 October
1987. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Upon appeal, however, this Court acquitted LIM of estafa but
held her civilly liable for P169,000 as actual damages.
It should be noted that the complainant in that case, Victoria Suarez, albeit a creditor prior to the questioned
alienation, is not a party to this accion pauliana. Article 1384 of the Civil Code provides that rescission shall only be to the
extent necessary to cover the damages caused. Under this Article, only the creditor who brought the action for rescission
[31]
can benefit from the rescission; those who are strangers to the action cannot benefit from its effects. And the revocation
[32]
is only to the extent of the plaintiff creditors unsatisfied credit; as to the excess, the alienation is maintained. Thus,
petitioner cannot invoke the credit of Suarez to justify rescission of the subject deed of donation.
Now on the propriety of the trial courts awards of moral damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in favor
of the petitioner. We have pored over the records and found no factual or legal basis therefor. The trial court made these
awards in the dispositive portion of its decision without stating, however, any justification for the same in the ratio
decidendi. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted these awards for want of basis in fact, law or equity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 50091 is AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

UNITED PLANTERS SUGAR MILLING CO., INC. (UPSUMCO),


Petitioner,

G.R. No. 126890


Present:

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE


NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST
(APT), AS TRUSTEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES
Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 9, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:

For consideration is the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO)
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2009 which granted both Second Motions for
Reconsideration filed by respondents Privatization and Management Office (PMO), formerly Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and
Philippine National Bank (PNB), and reinstated the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 1996 which, in turn, reversed
and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bais, Negros Oriental. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and judgment is herein rendered declaring that
the subject Deed of Assignment has not condoned all of UPSUMCOs obligations to APT as assignee of PNB.
To determine how much APT is entitled to recover on its counterclaim, it is required to render an accounting
before the Regional Trial Court on the total payments made by UPSUMCO on its obligations including the following
amounts:
(1) The sum seized from it by APT whether in cash or in kind (from UPSUMCOs bank deposits as well as
sugar and molasses proceeds):
(2)

The total obligations covered by the following documents:

(a) Credit agreement dated November 05, 1974 (Exh. 1, Record p. 528); and
(b)
(c) The Restructuring Agreements dated (i) June 24, 1982, (ii) December 10, 1982, and
(3) May 9, 1984 and
(3) The P450,000,000.00 proceeds of the foreclosure
Should there be any deficiency due APT after deducting the foregoing amounts from UPSUMCOs
total obligation in the amount of (P2,137,076,433.15), the latter is hereby ordered to pay the
same. However, if after such deduction there should be any excess payment, the same should be turned
over to UPSUMCO.
The Regional Trial Court is hereby directed to receive APTs accounting and thereafter, to render the proper
disposal of this case in accordance with the foregoing findings and disposition.
Costs against appellees.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner prefaces its arguments that it is the aggrieved party, not the government as represented by respondent APT (now
the PMO), as its deposits with respondent PNB were taken without its prior knowledge and that it was reluctant to give assent to the
desire of the government to forego redemption of its assets by reason of uncontested foreclosure.
Facts showed that in 1974, petitioner, engaged in the business of milling sugar, obtained takeoff loans from respondent PNB
to finance the construction of a sugar milling plant which were covered by a Credit Agreement dated November 5, 1974. The said loans
were thrice restructured through Restructuring Agreements dated June 24, 1982, December 10, 1982, and May 9, 1984. The takeoff
loans were secured by a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land where the milling plant stood and chattel mortgages over certain
machineries and equipment. Also included in the condition for the takeoff loans, petitioner agreed to open and/or maintain a deposit
account with [respondent PNB] and the bank is authorized at its option to apply to the payment of any unpaid obligations of the client
any/and all monies, securities which may be in its hands on deposit.
From 1984 to 1987, petitioner contracted another set of loans from respondent PNB, denominated as operational loans, for
the purpose of financing its operations, which also contained setoff clauses relative to the application of payments from petitioners
bank accounts. They were likewise secured by pledge contracts whereby petitioner assigned to respondent PNB all its sugar produce
for the latter to sell and apply the proceeds to satisfy the indebtedness arising from the operational loans.
Later, respondent APT and petitioner agreed to an uncontested or friendly foreclosure of the mortgaged assets, in
exchange for petitioners waiver of its right of redemption. On July 28, 1987, respondent PNB (as mortgagee) and respondent APT (as
assignee and transferee of PNBs rights, titles and interests) filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale with the Ex-Officio
Regional Sheriff of Dumaguete City, seeking to foreclose on the real estate and chattel mortgages which were executed to secure the
takeoff loans. The foreclosure sale was conducted on August 27, 1987 whereby respondent APT purchased the auctioned properties
for P450,000,000.00.
Seven (7) days after the foreclosure sale, or on September 3, 1987, petitioner executed a Deed of Assignment assigned to
respondent APT its right to redeem the foreclosed properties, in exchange for or in consideration of respondent APT condoning any
deficiency amount it may be entitled to recover from the Petitioner under the Credit Agreement dated November 5, 1974, and the
Restructuring Agreements[s] dated June 24 and December 10, 1982, and May 9, 1984, respectively, executed between [UPSUMCO]
and PNB On the same day, the Board of Directors of petitioner approved the Board Resolution authorizing Joaquin Montenegro, its
President, to enter into said Deed of Assignment.
Despite the Deed of Assignment, petitioner filed a complaint on March 10, 1989 for sum of money and damages against
respondents PNB and APT before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bais City alleging therein that respondents had illegally
appropriated funds belonging to petitioner, through the following means: (1) withdrawals made from the bank accounts opened by
petitioner beginning August 27, 1987 until February 12, 1990; (2) the application of the proceeds from the sale of the sugar of petitioner
beginning August 27, 1987 until December 4, 1987; (3) the payment from the funds of petitioner with respondent PNB for the operating
expenses of the sugar mill after September 3, 1987, allegedly upon the instruction of respondent APT and with the consent of
respondent PNB.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and ruled
that only the takeoff loans and not the operational loans were condoned by the Deed of Assignment. In a Decision dated November
28, 2006 and Resolution dated July 11, 2007, the Court (Third Division) reversed and set aside the CA Decision. The case was
thereafter referred to the Court en banc which reversed the ruling of the Third Division.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner raises the following grounds:
1. The order of the Honorable Court En Banc reinstating the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals
would be inconsistent with the facts of the case and the findings of this Honorable Court.
2. There is no valid ground to conclude that APT has still the right to the deposit of UPSUMCO after the
August 27, 1987 friendly foreclosure, and the withdrawal of P80,200,806.41 as payment could be applied either as
repayment on the Take-off Loans or for the Operational Loans.

3. The findings that the condonation took effect only after the execution of the Deed of Assignment hence
upholds the validity of APTs taking of the deposit of P80,200,806.41 in UPSUMCOs PNB account as payment of the
deficiency is without basis.

4. The admission of the case by Honorable Court En Banc after the denial of the Second Division of the
Second Motion for Reconsideration and the referral of the case to the Honorable Court En Banc appear not to be in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

5. The basis for admission of the case to the Honorable Court En Banc are belated issues which have no
other purpose but to give apparent reasons for the elevation of the case.

6. There is no legal basis for the withdrawals of UPSUMCOs deposit on the ground of conventional
compensation.

7. Since the amount of P17,773,185.24 could not be the subject of conventional compensation, it should be
returned to petitioner immediately by respondents.
After a careful review of the arguments in the petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Court finds the same to be mere
rehash of the main points already set forth in the Courts En Banc Resolution of April 2, 2009 and, hence, denies the same for lack of
merit. The pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:

The rulings of the lower courts, as well as the petition itself, are not clear as to the amount extended by way
of takeoff loans by PNB to UPSUMCO. However, the Court of Appeals did enumerate the following transactions
consisting of the operational loans, to wit:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Trust Receipts dated August 26, 1987; February 5, 1987; and July 10, 1987;
Deed of Assignment By Way of Payment dated November 16, 1984 (Exh. 3 [PNB]; Exh. 12 [APT]; Record,
p. 545);
Two (2) documents of Pledge both dated February 19, 1987;
Sugar Quedans (Exh. 13 to 16; Record, pp 548 to 551);
Credit Agreements dated February 19, 1987 (Exhs. 2 [PNB] & 4 [APT]; Record, pp. 541-544) and April
29, 1987 (Exh. 11 [APT]; Record, pp. 314-317).
Promissory Notes dated February 20, 1987 (Exh. 17; Record, p. 573); March 2, 1987 (Exh. 18; Record,
p. 574); March 3, 1987 (Exh. 19; Record, p. 575); March 27, 1987; (Exh. 20; Record, p. 576); March 30,
1987(Exh. 21; Record, p. 577); April 7, 1987 (Exh. 22; Record, p. 578); May 22, 1987 (Exh. 23; Record,
p. 579); and July 30, 1987 (Exh. 24; record p. 580).

On 27 February 1987, through a Deed of Transfer, PNB assigned to the Government its rights titles and
interests over UPSUMCO, among several other assets. The Deed of Transfer acknowledged that said assignment
was being undertaken in compliance with Presidential Proclamation No. 50. The Government subsequently
transferred these rights titles and interests over UPSUMCO to respondent Asset and Privatization Trust (APT),
[now PMO].
xxxx
This much is clear. The Deed of Assignment condoned only the take-off loans, and not the operational
loans. The Deed of Assignment in its operative part provides, thus:
That United Planter[s] Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (the Corporation) pursuant to a resolution passed by its
board of Directors on September 3, 1087, and confirmed by the Corporations stockholders in a stockholders
Meeting held on the same (date), for and in consideration of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) condoning
any deficiency amount it may be entitled to recover from the Corporation under the Credit Agreement
dated November 5, 1974 and the Restructuring Agreement[s] dated June 24, and December 10, 1982, and
May 9, 1984, respectively, executed between the Corporation and the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), which financial claims have been assigned to APT, through the National Government, by PNB, hereby
irrevocably sells, assigns and transfer to APT its right to redeem the foreclosed real properties covered
by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. T-16700 and T-16701.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this instrument to be executed on its behalf by Mr.
rd
Joaquin S. Montenegro, thereunto duly authorized, this 3 day of September, 1997.
xxxx
This notwithstanding, the RTC Decision was based on the premise that all of UPSUMCOs loans were
condoned in the Deed of Assignment. In contrast, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that only the take-off loans
were condoned, and thus ruled that APT was entitled to have the funds from UPSUMCOSs accounts transferred to
its own account to the extent of UPSUMCOs remaining obligation, less the amount condoned in the Deed of
Assignment and the 450,000,000.00 proceeds of the foreclosure.
The challenged acts of respondents all occurred on or after 27 August 1987, the day of the execution
sale. UPSUMCO argues that after that date, respondents no longer had the right to collect monies from the
PNB bank accounts which UPSUMCO had opened and maintained as collateral for its operational take-off
loans. UPSUMCO is wrong. After 27 August 1987, there were at least two causes for the application of
payments from UPSUMCOs PNB accounts. The first was for the repayment of the operational loans, which
were never condoned. The second was for the repayment of the take-off loans which APT could obtain
until 3 September 1987, the day the condonation took effect.
The error of the Courts earlier rulings, particularly the Resolution dated 11 July 2007, was in assuming that the
non-condonation of the operational loans was immaterial to the application of payments made in favor of APT from
UPSUMCOSs PNB accounts that occurred after 27 August 1987. For as long as there remained outstanding
obligations due to APT (as PNBs successor-in-interest), APT would be entitled to apply payments from the bank
accounts of PNB. That right had been granted in favor of PNB, whether on account of the take-off loans or the
operational loans.
Petitioner filed with the RTC the complaint which alleged that among the conditions of the friendly
foreclosure are: (A) That all the accounts of [United Planters] are condoned, including the JSS notes at the time of
the public bidding. It was incumbent on petitioner, not respondents, to prove that particular allegation in its
complaint. Was petitioner able to establish that among the conditions of the friendly foreclosure was that all its
accounts are condoned? It did not, as it is now agreed by all that only the take-off loans were condoned.
This point is material, since the 2007 Resolution negated the findings that only the take-off loans were
condoned by faulting respondents for failing to establish that there remained outstanding operational loans on which
APT could apply payments from UPSUMCOs bank accounts. By the very language of the Deed of Assignment, it
was evident that UPSUMCOs allegation in its complaint that all of its accounts were condoned was not proven. Even
if neither PNB nor APT had filed an answer, there would have been no basis in fact for the trial court to conclude that
all of UPSUMCOs loans were condoned (as the RTC in this case did), or issue reliefs as if all the loans were
condoned (as the 2007 Resolution did).
As noted earlier, APT had the right to apply payments from UPSUMCOs bank accounts, by virtue of the
terms of the operational loan agreements. Considering that UPSUMCO was spectacularly unable to repay the takeoff loans it had earlier transacted, it simply beggars belief to assume that it had fully paid its operational
loans. Moreover, APT had the right to obtain payment of the operational loans by simply applying payments from
UPSUMCOs bank accounts, without need of filing an action for collection with the courts. The bank accounts were
established precisely to afford PNB (and later APT) extrajudicial and legal means to obtain repayment of
UPSUMCOs outstanding loans without hassle.

B.
There is no question that the Deed of Assignment condoned the outstanding take-off loans of UPSUMCO
due then to APT. The Deed of Assignment was executed on 3 September 1987as was the UPSUMCO Board
Resolution authorizing its President to sign the Deed of Assignment. However, despite the absence of any terms to
that effect in the Deed of Assignment, it is UPSUMCOs position that the condonation actually had retroacted to 27
August 1987. The previous rulings of the Court unfortunately upheld that position.
It is easy to see why UPSUMCO would pose such an argument. It appears that between 27 August
1987 and 3 September 1987. APT applied payments from UPSOMCOs bank accounts in the amount of around 80
Million Pesos. UPSUMCO obviously desires the return of the said amount. But again, under the terms of the loan
arguments, APT as successor-in-interest of PNB, had the right to seize any amounts deposited in UPSUMCOS
bank accounts as long as UPSUMCO remained indebted under the loan agreements. Since UPSUMCO was
released from its take-off loans only on 3 September 1987, as indicated in the Deed of Assignment, then APTs
application of payments is perfectly legal.
The earlier rulings of the Court were predicated on a finding that there was a friendly foreclosure agreement
between APT and UPSUMCO, whereby APT agreed to condone all of UPSUMCOs outstanding obligations in
exchange for UPSUMCOs waiver of its right to redeem the foreclosed property. However, no such agreement to the
effect was ever committed to writing or presented in evidence. The written agreement actually set forth was not as
contended by UPSUMCO. For one, not all of the outstanding loans were condoned by APT since the take-off loans
were left extant. For another, the agreement itself did not indicate any date of effectivity other than the date of the
execution of the agreement, namely 3 September 1987.
It is argued that the use of the word any in any deficiency amount sufficiently establishes the retroactive
nature of the condonation. The argument hardly convinces. The phrase any deficiency amount could refer not only
to the remaining deficiency amount after the 27 August foreclosure sale, but also the remaining deficiency amount as
of 3 September 1987, when the Deed of Assignment was executed and after APT had exercised its right as creditor
to apply payments from petitioners PNB accounts. The Deed of Assignment was not cast in intractably precise
terms, and both interpretations can certainly be accommodated.
It is in that context that the question of parol evidence comes into play. The parol evidence rule states that
generally, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. Assuming that the Deed of Assignment failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to retroact the
effect of condonation to the date of the foreclosure sale, none of the parties, particularly UPSUMCO, availed of its
right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed. As there is
nothing in the text of Deed of Assignment that clearly gives retroactive effect to the condonation, the parol evidence
rule generally bars any other evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement, such as
evidence that the said Deed had retroactive effect.
It is argued that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, [t]he failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto.
Petitioner did not exactly state in its Amended Complaint that the condonation effected in the Deed of
Assignment had retroacted to the date of the foreclosure sale. What petitioner contented in its amended complaint
was that the Deed of Assignment released and discharged plaintiff from any and all obligations due the defendant
PNB and defendant APT, that after the foreclosure by PNB/APT plaintiff is entitled to all the funds it deposited or
being held by PNB in all its branches, and that among the conditions of the friendly foreclosure are that all the
accounts of the plaintiff are condoned. It remains unclear whether petitioner had indeed alleged in its Amended
Complaint that the Deed of Assignment executed on 3 September1987 had retroacted effect as of the foreclosure
sale, or on 27 August 1987. If petitioner were truly mindful to invoke the exception to the parol evidence rule and
intent on claiming that the condonation had such retroactive effect, it should have employed more precise language
to the effect in their original and amended complaints.
xxxx
The right of respondent PNB to set-off payments from UPSUMCO arose from conventional compensation
rather than legal compensation, even if all the requisites for legal compensation were present between those two
parties. The determinative factor is the mutual agreement between PNB and UPSUMCO to set-off payments. Even
without an express agreement stipulating compensation, PNB and UPSUMCO would have been entitled to set-off of
payments, as the legal requisites for compensation under Article 1279 were present.
As soon as PNB assigned its credit to APT, the mutual creditor-debtor relation between PNB and
UPSUMCO ceased to exist. However, PNB and UPSUMCO had agreed to a conventional compensation, a
relationship which does not require the presence of all the requisites under Article 1279. And PNB too had assigned
all its rights as creditor to APT, including its rights under conventional compensation. The absence of the mutual
creditor-debtor relation between the new creditor APT and UPSUMCO cannot negate the conventional
compensation. Accordingly, APT, as the assignee of credit of PNB, had the right to set-off the outstanding obligations
of UPSUMCO on the basis of conventional compensation before the condonation took effect on 3 September 1987.
V.
The conclusions are clear. First. Between 27 August to 3 September 1987, APT had the right to apply
payments from UPSUMCOs bank accounts maintained with PNB as repayment for the take-off loans and/or the
operational loans. Considering that as of 30 June 1987, the total indebtedness of UPSUMCO as to the take-off loans
amounted to P2,137,076,433.15, and because the foreclosed properties were sold during the execution sale for only
450 Million Pesos, it is safe to conclude that the total amount of P80,200,806.41 debited from UPSUMCOs bank
accounts from 27 August to 3 September 1987 was very well less than the then outstanding indebtedness for the
take-off loans. It was only on 3 September 1987 that the take-off loans were condoned by APT, which lost only on
that date too the right to apply payments from UPSUMCOS bank accounts to pay the take-off loans.

Second. After 3 September 1987, APT retained the right to apply payments from the bank accounts of
UPSUMCO with PNB to answer for the outstanding indebtedness under the operational loan agreements. It appears
that the amount of P17,773,185.24 was debited from UPSUMCOs bank accounts after 3 September. At the same
time, it remains unclear what were the amounts of outstanding indebtedness under the operational loans at the
various points after 3 September 1987 when the bank accounts of UPSUMCO were debited.
The Court of Appeals ordered the remand of the case to the trial court, on the premise that it was unclear
how much APT was entitled to recover by way of counterclaim. It is clear that the amount claimed by APT by way of
counterclaim over 1.6 Billion Pesos is over and beyond what it can possibly be entitled to, since it is clear that the
take-off loans were actually condoned as of 3 September 1987. At the same time, APT was still entitled to repayment
of UPSUMCOs operational loans. It is not clear to what extent, if at all, the amounts debited from UPSUMCOs bank
accounts after 3 September 1987 covered UPSUMCOs outstanding indebtedness under the operational loans. Said
amounts could be insufficient, just enough, or over and beyond what UPSUMCO actually owed, in which case the
petitioner should be entitled to that excess amount debited after 3 September 1987. Because it is not evident from
the voluminous records what was the outstanding balance of the operational loans at the various times postSeptember 3 UPSUMCOs bank accounts were debited, the remand ordered by the Court of Appeal is ultimately the
[1]
wisest and fairest recourse.
Petitioner insists that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the respondents second motions for reconsideration with
the prayer that the case be referred to the Court en banc as the same appear not to be in accordance with the rules.
Generally, under Section 3 of the Courts Circular No. 2-89, effective March 1, 1989, the referral to the Court en banc of cases
assigned to a Division is to be denied on the ground that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions
of a Division may be appealed. Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution shall not be entertained
for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, except for
[2]
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have first been obtained. Accordingly, the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, determines the issues which are of transcendental importance, as in the present case, which
necessitates it to accept the referral of a Division case before it and the grant of a second motion for reconsideration.
In sum, the Resolution of the Court En Banc reinstating the Decision of the CA categorically ruled that only its takeoff loans,
not the operational loans, were condoned by the Deed of Assignment dated September 3, 1987. The Deed of Assignment expressly
stipulated the particular loan agreements which were covered therein. As such, respondent APT was entitled to have the funds from
petitioners savings accounts with respondent PNB transferred to its own account, to the extent of petitioners remaining obligations
under the operational loans, less the amount condoned in the Deed of Assignment and the P450,000,000.00 proceeds of the
foreclosure. As the En Banc Resolution explained, respondent APT had a right to go after the bank deposits of petitioner, in its capacity
as the creditor of the latter. Likewise, respondent PNB had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of petitioners sugar and
molasses, in satisfaction of petitioners obligations. Respondent PNB never waived these rights and the same were transferred to
respondent APT (now PMO) by virtue of the Deed of Transfer executed between them. Moreover, there was no conventional
subrogation since such requires the consent of the original parties and of the third persons and there was no evidence that the consent
of petitioner (as debtor) was secured when respondent PNB assigned its rights to respondent APT, and that the assignment by
respondent PNB to respondent APT arose by mandate of law and not by the volition of the parties. Accordingly, the remand of the case
to the RTC for computation of the parties remaining outstanding balances was proper.

[3]

The doctrine of stare decisis et no quieta movere or principle of adherence to precedents does not apply to the present case
so as to bar the Court en banc from taking cognizance over the case which rectified the disposition of the case and reversed and set
aside the Decision rendered by a Division thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO)
is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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