G.R. No.

182835
April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, ARNOLD

GOMEZ YFABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y DELANTAR, AND ROGER
JALANDONI Y ARI, Appellants.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But
the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards
that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need
such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during
the pre-trial conference.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove
that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those
messages.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station
where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to
hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was
that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish
and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to
the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously
parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the
police station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent
inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained messages which led to the
entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away
from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to Kua Justin as the one who was hit in such shootout
and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, and
his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group
of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call
numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that
accused Enojas left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a)
aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to
murder. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in
the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they
are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,
aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming
that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an
entrapment using this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current
jurisprudence.18crallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the
lesser crime of HOMICIDEwith the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court
also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to P30,000.00, with an
additional P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005]

MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged[1] respondent Judge Lily
Lydia A. Laquindanum[2] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabacan-Carmen, North Cotabato
with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent brought her vehicle to the Toyota
Service Center in Davao City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and replacement of parts that were
damaged due to a vehicular mishap.
Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up, respondent went to ToyotaDavao on June 23, 2001 at around 11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson M. Garao, a service
advisor, who told her that the vehicle would be released upon payment of deductible
franchise. Respondent allegedly refused to pay insisting that the same will be paid by the
insurance company. She then asked to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but the
latter was in a meeting.
At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza, Toyota-Davaos
Administration and Marketing Head. Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain to respondent
that the payment of the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company but
the latter got angry and raised her voice while demanding to see the manager.
She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,[3] Service Department Manager, who
alleged that respondent heatedly disagreed with him and shouted that she was a judge and
insisted on seeing the manager. Upon being told that complainant was in a meeting,
respondent furiously replied that she should be given preferential treatment over said
meeting.[4]
At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she
paid the amount stated therein under protest.
Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogation
but she again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew better
than to sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill in the blanks but respondent curtly informed him
that she will not sign just the same.
Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car. On July 4, 2001, she filed a
case for Replevin, Damages and Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Replevin.[5]
In her Comment,[6] respondent denied that she threw her weight around and abused her
judicial authority. She claimed that upon being informed by Garao about the deductible
franchise, she instructed the latter to communicate with her insurer. After the lapse of two (2)
hours, Garao told her that he could not contact the insurers office because it was closed on
Saturdays. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was reached, she
suggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before she would
pay.
[7]

She eventually paid the deductible franchise under protest. She averred that she
requested for the execution of a demand letter[8] to serve as proof of her claim for

refund. Thereafter, Garao brought out the vehicle and gave the key to her driver, who
inspected the car to make sure that everything is in order. She then directed Salvador Caducoy
to transfer her belongings from another vehicle.[9]
When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao ran after them and told her
that she needed to sign a release form.[10] She was given a blank Release of Claim with
Subrogation[11] form which she refused to sign. When Saragoza advised her that the vehicle will
not be released, she retorted that she will only sign if the form has been properly filled up. The
parties were at an impasse when Yez angrily said di fill up-an!, then took back the form and
went to his office but did not return.[12]
It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the Toyota-Davao premises. She
wrote a letter[13] to complainant detailing her ordeal. The letter was received by a lady
employee who gave her another demand letter[14] stating that in addition to the payment of
deductible franchise, she is also required to sign a release form which she refused because
some portions were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her car.
On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza (Linaza) from
FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize.[15]
In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended[16] the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He
observed that respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate
the law. No fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had
respondent grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have gone to
her office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.
The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with modification that
complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this baseless harassment
suit. The OCA opined that complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated charges
despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but
also of the Investigating Justice and this Court.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.
In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in their complaints.[17] Administrative proceedings against judges are by
nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal
cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be
more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18]
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
and corruption.[19] On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the
right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[20]
Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the
demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form,
did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She
was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be
deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund.
We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this
unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to
litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.[21]

During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event
transpired on June 23, 2001,[22] which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge of
the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations
therein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief.[23] Significantly, she also went to
respondents office and apologized.
Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrieved
with zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident that
complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an alleged erring member of the
bench. Verily, the delay militates against the veracity of their allegations.
Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after Toyota-Davao lost
possession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suit
she filed against them. More specifically, the instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002
or about eight (8) months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July
4, 2001. As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, the timing couldnt be worse.[24]
The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In
complainants letter dated January 21, 2002,[25] she informed this Court about a similar
complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council for the purpose of objecting to
(respondents) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabato
or elsewhere. Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice
to the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading
respondents reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be countenanced.
In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[26] this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a groundless suit
against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her by suspending him from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,[27] we affirmed the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses imposed against
petitioner for filing an unfounded suit in bad faith.
The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is commensurate under the
circumstances.
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members
of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member
of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.[28]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondent
Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Midsayap,
Cotabato City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco is
FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and unfounded suit.
SO ORDERED.

Arnado vs Suarin
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof.[19] Atty. Dela Victoria failed to substantiate this burden. In stark contrast, Atty.
Maloloy-on proved truthful her defense when she submitted a copy of the entire court records
involving the criminal case against the Veranos,[20] including the certification[21] of Branch Clerk
of Court Atty. Villariza that Atty. Dela Victoria did not file any motion to set bail and the
certification[22] of the MTCC Executive Judge Omelio that she did not arrogate unto herself, at
any time in her capacity as clerk of court, the authority of determining the amount of bail to be
posted.
Culled from his very own complaint, it was the failure of Atty. Maloloy-on to apologize
to Atty. Dela Victoria that drove him to institute this administrative case, especially after being
lectured on why she could not accept his tendered cash bond. Obviously, he considered this
an affront, given that he is a former judge and has been engaged in the practice of law for
three (3) decades. Thus, he filed his complaint for alleged gross ignorance of the law, even
without competent evidence to support it.
We cannot overemphasize that a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient,
impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. He should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical
or improper practices that impede, obstruct, or prevent their realization, charged as he is with
the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice by Canon
12[23] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[24] Although no person should be penalized for
the exercise of the right to litigate, this right must be exercised in good faith. A lawyer who files
an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because as an officer of the court, he does not
discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary.[25] Such filing of baseless complaints is indeed contemptuous of the courts.[26]
Ordinarily, lawyers who file unfounded complaints are disciplined by imposing upon them
a fine in an amount commensurate to the gravity of the offense to be determined by this Court
as the disciplining authority.[27] On various occasions, this Court has imposed a fine ranging
from P2,000.00 toP5,000.00 for cases similar to the one at bench. In this case, the OCA
recommends a fine of P2,000.00. We agree.
As to Atty. Dela Victoria's request for further investigation, the same must be denied,
it having become moot under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for filing his unfounded complaint against Atty. Maria Fe O. Maloloyon, Atty. Alfonso L. Dela Victoria is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is meted
a FINE of P2,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. For having become moot because of the
dismissal of his administrative complaint, the request of Atty. Dela Victoria for an investigation
isDENIED.
SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by

the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given
the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and
admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal
evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. 4

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.
Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that
the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we
here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken
from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and
must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said
firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to
him.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they
allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the
requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they
had invalidly seized.

**Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is
the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search
was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Umil v Ramos
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
***3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the
persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession
at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.10 A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the
same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital.
The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)
"sparrows" including Dural;second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie
Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as
the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the
effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and,
therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed
to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not
appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,
an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was
filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a
former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and
that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila
was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said
house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August
1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the
house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted
he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,
radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an
NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other
members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the
arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the
whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military
agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she
admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested

without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of
Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents
frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she
arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito
Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose
house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time
of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of
Ocaya.20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and
Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their
arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in
the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.

arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers,
in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest
without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November
1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke
at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis
supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney
and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988.28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for
subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to
insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the
peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously
becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but
only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the
bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 8868385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section
5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to

know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest
had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the
lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No.
731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,
even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel
Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court
on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued
the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the
case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution
denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information
filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for
bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of
the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On
the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records,
strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based
their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested
were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant
is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality
of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,
with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions,
not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records
show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.