Spinozas Ethics: Books II & III

Independent Study | Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

In this paper I begin by introducing Spinozas conception of adequate ideas and locating
it more broadly in his theory of knowledge. I then provide a brief overview of Book III
before turning to close consideration of the doctrine of conatus, and of the three primary
emotions, the passive emotions, and the active emotions.

Adequate Ideas, Knowledge, and Doubt1

Spinoza devoted the lions share of Book II to an elaboration of perception and the
inadequate knowledge derived thereby. His conclusion is that as long as the human
Mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate,
but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own Body, and of external
bodies (EIIP29c). But the situation is not hopeless: through the use of reason, we may
obtain adequate ideas.

An adequate idea is an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself without relation to

its object, has all the propertiesthat is, the intrinsic characteristicsof a true idea
(EIIdef4). Spinoza says intrinsic in order to exclude extrinsic characteristics, namely
the agreement of the idea with that of which it is the idea (EIIdef4 explication).

I greatly benefited from Margaret Wilsons chapter in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza,
specifically her section discussing adequate ideas.
1

There is something peculiar here worth noting, because it will allow us to trace a
connection between true and adequate ideas, illuminating both. In considering adequate
ideas Spinoza seems to bracket the matter of its concurrence with that of which it is the
idea. But in Book I he writes, A true idea must agree with that of which it is an idea.
This raises the questions: Are all true ideas adequate? and Are all adequate ideas true?
Equally important is the question of what X there is to consider about an idea, beyond
its concurrence with the object of which it is an idea, for it seems to be that this X is
what will determine whether or not the idea is adequate.

The first two questions find an answer in the proof of Proposition 41 in Book II: we
asserted that to knowledge of the second and third kind [that is, Reason and Intuition]
there belong those ideas which are adequate. Therefore this knowledge is necessarily
true. This conclusion is itself a citation of EIIP34: every idea which in us is absolute
that is, adequate and perfectis true. This comes after Proposition 32, which states that
all ideas insofar as they relate to God are true; that is, ideas in God agree completely with
their objects. This is the case because, as per the doctrine of parallelism, an idea in
Thought just is an object in Extension, and the order and connection of ideas is the same
as the order and connection of things (EIIP7).

It becomes clear that the Xthat feature which makes an idea adequate, as apart from
considerations of its alignment with its objectis that ideas position in the infinite
intellect. As Spinoza writes in the Corollary to Proposition 7, whatever follows formally
from the infinite nature of God, all this follows from the idea of God with the same

[necessary] order and connection as an object of thought in God. Thus adequate ideas in
us are those that are congruent with those same adequate ideas in God. As has been
shown, ideas in God are necessarily true. Therefore, those same ideas in us are true as
well. In considering adequate ideas it is this congruence in Thought that makes them
adequate, and not their agreement with objectsalthough, as seen, these ideas will be
true, in agreement with their objects.

This is perfectly consistent with the explanatory barrier Spinoza sets up between
attributes from the very start: Things which have nothing in common with each other
cannot be understood through each other (EIAx5). We see that the adequacy of ideas,
which are modes under the attribute of Thought, could not have been explained by
reference to objects, which are modes under the attribute of Extension. It now becomes
clear why Spinoza identifies the second kind of knowledgewhich is necessarily
truewith Reason, which is an affair of the mind, of Thought. Spinozas rationalist
definition of knowledge in Book Ithe knowledge of an effect depends on the
knowledge of the cause (EIAx5)makes predictable 1) the elaboration of adequate
ideas in us in terms of congruence (perhaps overlapping is here a better word) with
those ideas in God, and 2) the reference to their position in the necessary causal chain
unfolding deterministically across infinite attributes and flowing from Gods essence.

My citation of Axiom 5 above, however, should not imply that knowledge of infinite
causal chains is necessary for our possession of an adequate idea. Such knowledge is
impossible for finite beings, and exists solely in the infinite intellect of God. A given

adequate idea in us is adequate in virtue of its identity, or overlapping, with that perfect
idea in God. This requires not the humanly impossible knowledge of each of the infinite
causes of an idea or object, but, instead, a grasp of the essence of things. This
interpretation is strongly supported by a passage in Spinozas Treatise on the Emendation
of the Intellect: The essences of singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from
their series, or order of existing, since it offers us nothing but extrinsic denominations,
relations, or at most, circumstances, all of which are far from the inmost essence of
things. That essence is to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the
same time from the laws inscribed in these things, as in their true codes, according to
which all singular things come to be, and are ordered (TIE101).2 Possessing an adequate
idea of a thing consists, then, in understanding why it is; not by reference to, or situation
in, an infinite causal series of other objects, but rather in virtue of grasping the reasons
which reveal the thing as existing necessarily and determinedly. It is the nature of
Reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent (EIIP44).

Nothing is genuinely contingent on Spinozas metaphysical view. However, insofar as we

do not have adequate knowledgerelying instead on opinion, the first kind of
knowledge, arising from our being affected (that is, determined) by external things and
our conflation of those muddled affections with realitywe mistakenly regard things
from the common order of nature, taking them to be contingent. As long as the human
Mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it does not have an adequate,
but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own Body, and of external
2

This passage and the TIE were brought to my attention through a reference in Michael Della
Roccas Spinoza. Although this Treatise is the earliest of Spinozas writings, it provides useful
guidance for understanding some of the themes in the Ethics.

bodies (EIIP29c). To illustrate, take the example of a trains arriving on time. On some
occasions I have experienced the train running on schedule; on other occasions I have
known it to be late. When I head to the station, then, I regard it as a real possibility that
the train might be either late or on time. Of course, the train will be either late or on time,
but whichever is the case is the case necessarily, not contingently. My opinion that things
can go this way or that, depending perhaps on other contingent factors, such as whether
or not the conductor spontaneously decided to stop for a cigarette break at the previous
station, is mistaken. The source of my mistaken judgment is my reliance on my past
haphazard experiences, or affections, which have appeared to me, in the absence of
adequate knowledge, as fortuitous encounters that may have equally happened or not
happened. In fact, the trains arrival time was necessary and determined, as was the
conductors decision (or lack of) to have a cigarette, and as were all my previous
affections. I relied on opinionwhich provides at best a fragmentary, partial, and
shallow knowledgeand it proved to be a source of falsity and error. More strongly,
opinion, the first kind of knowledgebeing intrinsically inadequate, as it is arises from
encounters that are limited by perspective, seeing things from one point, from one angle,
at only one time, and so onis the source of falsity and error. Spinoza makes this explicit
when he distinguishes, in the second Scholium to Proposition 40, three kinds of
knowledge, and identifies the second and third kind to be always adequate and
necessarily free of falsity. Thus, as already shown, opinion is the sole source of falsity
and inadequate ideas.

But how is it possible for us, finite human minds, to obtain adequate ideas?

When we are externally determined, we have inadequate ideas; when we are internally
determined, we have adequate ideas. In the realm of Extension this could mean that the
body is affected from within itselfthat is, the affection is not caused by interaction with
any external object. The parallel in the realm of Thought must be some sort of closed
system of ideas which is not determined, or affected, from without. In the realm of
Extension, we can imagine that some spatially dispersed set of fundamental particles
collide (by predetermined necessity), and begin to interact with one another in a selfperpetuating pattern thereby creating an object in duration, e.g. an existing bowl or an
existing human body. If all ideas in us correspond to some part of our body then, just as
material particles enter into clusters of mutually interacting, self-perpetuating objects, so
ideas enter into mutual causal relations in a self-perpetuating pattern according to the
order of the intellect (EIIP18s).3

This concerns Spinozas theory of knowledge. If the human mind is a closed system of
ideas, what could ground Reason? All ideas in a closed system ultimately point to one
another. As Spinoza implies in the final pages of the TIE, and as his choice of the
geometric method suggests: we must discover (or simply assume?) axioms and basic
3

This is precisely Spinozas picture of the physics of bodies: an existing body is a

conglomeration of stuff coexisting, across a duration of time and space, in some stable,
and self-perpetuating ratio. If certain bodies composing an individual thing are made to
change the existing direction of their motion, but in such a way that they can continue
their motion and keep the same mutual relation as before, the individual thing will
likewise preserve its own nature without any change of form (EII.Lemma6). And,
Furthermore, the individual thing so composed retains its own nature, whether as a
whole it is moving or at rest, and in whatever direction it moves, provided that each
constituent part retains its own motion and continues to communicate this motion to the
other parts (EII.Lemma7).

definitions. Descartes had made an appeal to God as the guarantor of truth and Reason, as
the underwriter of our most clear and distinct perceptions. But, as Spinoza observes in
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, the arguments for the existence of such a God are
themselves based on the Reason which they are meant to ultimately guarantee. In other
words, the arguments are circular. Spinoza attributes to us innate adequate ideas, which
we are capable of clearly and distinctly perceiving by the use of Reason, which
functions within a closed system of self-referencing ideas, which are actually identical to
parts of our body. This identity of ideas (modes of Thought) and bodies (modes of
Extension) shuts down skeptical objections by making any disjunction between ideas and
objects metaphysically impossible, for they are not ultimately two different things.
Descartes had been vulnerable to the skeptics objection only because he had erroneously
entertained the possibility that his thoughts could be mistaken about how the world really
is. In Cartesian terms, he was vulnerable to doubt because of the yawning abyss between
Thinking substance and Extended substance. Spinozas metaphysics, on the other hand,
fuses together Thought and Extension. The skeptic is unable to pry open any space he can
leverage into wholesale doubt because such a prying open is rationally inconceivable
given the unity of the two attributes, Thought and Extension which were, for
Descartes, two distinct substances in God. In other words, Spinoza rejects skepticism
from within his own metaphysical system, which he has rationally deduced from
definitions and axioms as if a geometric proof. Whereas Descartes grounds Reason (and
clear and distinct perception) in God, Spinoza, the arch-rationalist, grounds Reason in
Reason.

In EIIP43 Spinoza writes, He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a
true idea, and cannot doubt its truth. It is now needless to say that the proof of this
proposition is made by deduction from previous propositions. And the circularity
becomes clear: the validity of this deductive method is proven only in Proposition 40 of
Book II, Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also
adequate. It follows that if Spinozas propositions express adequate, true ideas, then the
original axioms and definitions, from which all the propositions ultimately follow, must
themselves express adequate, true ideas. To him who has these ideas, they are known at
the same time to be true, and cannot be doubted. They are perceived clearly and
distinctly as certain knowledge without doubt. Spinoza writes in the Scholium to
Proposition 43, that a true idea involves absolute certainty. Indeed, just as light
makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and
falsity.

The above discussion of knowledge began with a question: How is it possible for us to
obtain adequate ideas? I considered the possibility that adequate ideas are those that are
internally determined by the causal interactions of sub-ideas of the complex idea that is
the human mind. But this may be mistaken, for Spinoza writes, The idea of the idea of
any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human
mind (EIIP29). A resolution is not here necessary for two reasons. First, the preceding
discussion of knowledge, doubt, and adequacy does not depend on it. Second, Spinoza
offers us another means by which to gain adequate knowledge.

This comes in Proposition 38: Those things that are common to all things and are
equally in the part as in the whole can be conceived only adequately (EIIP38). This
proposition requires unpacking. Supposing that there is something, A, common to all
bodies. It follows that 1) the idea of A will be in God and 2) that, just as A is common to
all bodiesthat is, to all modes in Extensionso, in virtue of parallelism, the idea of A
will be common to (or will be equally in) all ideasthat is, to all modes of Thought,
including all those modes of Thought that are human minds (or, what is the same, ideas
of the human body). Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to
all men. For all bodies agree in certain respects, which must be conceived by all
adequately, or clearly and distinctly (EIIP38c). For example, the modes of Substance
considered under the attribute of Extension all have in common that they have
determinate sizes. Spinoza himself does not go into any detail elaborating on these
commonalities but to say that these things in common are, when considered under the
attribute of Thought, adequate ideas. These ideas are not mutilated or inadequate because
they are not ideas of externally determined affections of the body. Instead, they seem to
pervade the entire realm of Thought. When they are known, they are known directly and
with certainty to be true.

We have now seen how adequate ideas are possible. Before proceeding to Book III, I will
highlight two more critical conclusions of Book II: first, that knowledge of God is not
only possible but exists adequately in all minds; second, that there is no free will.

In Proposition 45 Spinoza claims that every idea necessarily involves the eternal and
infinite essence of God since no mode can be conceived but through an attribute and
attributes express the essence of God. Furthermore, the knowledge of the eternal and
infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect (EIIP46). This
follows from Proposition 38: Those things that are common to all things can be
conceived only adequately. The knowledge of the essence of God, being common to all
things, is an adequate idea in the human mind.

The human minda definite and determinate mode of thinkingis, like all else,
completely determined by necessity, possessing no absolute, or free, will. The mind is
determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is likewise determined by another
cause, and this again by another, and so ad infinitum (EIIP48). Moreover, There is in
the mind no volitionthat is, affirmation and negationexcept that which an idea,
insofar as it is an idea, involves (EIIP49). Affirmation and negation are, in other words,
intrinsic to ideas, and do not depend on the assent or dissent of some faculty, such as
Descartes faculty of the will, that exists somehow apart from ideas.

A Brief Overview of Book III

Book III represents Spinozas derivation of a psychology from his metaphysics. He

introduces his psychology as against those of authors who believe man disturbs rather
than follows Nature's order, and has absolute power over his actions, and is determined
by no other source than himself (EIIIPref). As Della Rocca notes, this project stems

from Spinozas guiding belief in naturalism about human beingsa belief he famously
expresses as the view that man is not a kingdom within a kingdom. For Spinoza, the
principles at work throughout nature in general also govern human psychology. 4
Spinoza states this same point unequivocally in the Preface to Book III: Nature is always
the same, and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the same; that is, the
laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form
to another are everywhere and always the same. So our approach to the understanding of
the nature of things of every kind should likewise be one and the same; namely, through
the universal laws and rules of Nature. Therefore the emotions of hatred, anger, envy,
etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as all
other particular things.

Spinoza holds that there are three primary emotions: desire, joy, and sadness. Desire is
related to our conatus, or striving, to persist in existence. All other desires derive from the
desire to persevere in being. Striving is common to all finite modes. Joy is an increase in
our power. Sadness is a decrease in our power. All other emotions are various
constellations of the primary emotions in conjunction with our ideasfor example, love
is a constellation of joy and an idea, namely the idea of the cause of our joy. Spinoza
derives numerous psychological principles from this foundation. In a lengthy section of
EIII Spinoza explicates dozens of emotions on this basis.

Della Rocca, M. (1996). Spinoza's metaphysical psychology. In The Cambridge Companion

to Spinoza (9th ed., p. 192). New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Spinoza will identify some emotions as passive and some as active. Active emotions are
connected with adequate ideas. Therefore we can expect that active emotions will be
compounds of primary emotions with adequate ideas. We can also expect that passive
emotions will be compounds of the primary emotions with inadequateor, what is the
same, externally determinedideas.

Striving and the Emotions

I begin this section with a careful consideration of Spinozas doctrine of conatus, or

striving, as it appears in Propositions 4 through 11 of Book III. This consideration will
require an explication of Spinozas notion of essence. I will present and defend what I
believe is the correct and consistent definition of essence.5 I then proceed to fill out the
notion of striving through an elaboration of it in terms of Extension, relying on the
Physics Interlude in Book II (where Spinoza presents his physics). Finally I provide an
introductory explication of his emotional psychology, focusing mainly on the three
primary emotionsdesire, joy, and sadness.

Striving

I owe a debt to the discussion of striving presented by Della Rocca in his chapter in The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, although I go my own way in seeking to define essence and
connecting that notion with Spinozas doctrine of striving.

Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being (EIIIP6). This
is Spinozas explicit statement of the doctrine of striving. First I will present and support
Spinozas proof of this proposition. Then I will further unpack its meaning.

As we know from Book I, all singular things are modes through which the attributes of
God are expressed in definite and determinate ways (EIP24c) and that Gods power is
his very essence (EIP34). The proof of Proposition 34 states that Gods power,
whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence. Thus Spinoza writes that
particular things are things which express in a definite and determinate way the power of
God whereby he is and acts (EIIIP6d). That alone does not obviously suggest that
particular things strive to persist in being. The deduction of conatus depends on the two
preceding propositions.

Proposition 4 states that no thing can be destroyed except by an external cause. Spinoza
takes this to be self-evident. The definition of a thing, after all, affirms and does not
negate, the things essence. Therefore, insofar as we are considering something in
itself, bracketing all external causes that may come to affect it, we can find nothing in it
which can destroy it (EIIIP4d). Although the notion of essence is far from clear, the gist
of the argument makes intuitive sense. If, for example, we consider a teacup apart from
all the external things that might shatter it to piecessuch as other dishes, clumsy dinner
guests, and the floorit seems that the cup should persist in existence. This is especially
obvious given Spinozas rationalism. For there would be no reason that the cup, once
existing, should suddenly cease to exist; this would be an unacceptable brute fact.

So, the argument shapes up: 1) If the cup goes out of existence, then there must be some
cause, 2) The cause can either be external or internal, 3) If the cause (or reason) of the
cups destruction is external, then we are no longer considering the cup in itself, and
are thus no longer considering conatus, 4) The cause (or reason) cannot be internal, 5)
Therefore, in the absence of destruction from without, the cup will continue in existence.

This argument is valid, but not obviously sound. (1) is true given rationalism. (2) is true,
exhausting the possibilities. That (3) is a nonissue follows from the meaning of striving,
which makes external causes irrelevant. But what about (4)? What reasons does Spinoza
have for denying that an object can have within itself the cause of its destruction? To the
extent that the notion of essence is unclear, we cannot rely on Proposition 4 for an
answer.

Proposition 5 states that, Things are of a contrary nature, that is, unable to subsist in the
same subject, to the extent that one can destroy the other. Unfortunately, this proposition
also fails to provide an answer, for its proof depends on Proposition 4: If [two or more
things of contrary natures] were able to be in agreement with one other, or to coexist in
the same subject, there could be something in the said subject [that is, the larger thing of
which the former are parts] which could destroy it, which is absurd (Prop. 4). Although
it fails as an argument for Premise (4) above, this proposition reminds us of two
important, related ideas. First, a particular thing can have other things within itselffor
example, the human body has within itself the stomach, heart, and so on. Second, for a

thing to persist is just for its parts to maintain certain stable ratios of rest and motion
amongst themselves. Therefore, for a thing to be destroyed is just for its part to cease
maintaining those ratios among themselves.

On the one hand, if two things are anathema to each other, they are incapable of entering
into stable and persisting interactions with one another. To illustrate, we wouldnt ask fire
and gunpowder to subsist in the same subjectthey cant. It makes sense, then, that
existing subjects dont and cant feature things of contrary nature, for the very moment
those things interact either one, the other, or both are destroyed. On the other hand, we
can imagine possible counterexamples. Della Rocca brings up a time-bomb. I would
suggest a more familiar example: a human being afflicted by a genetic degenerative
disease.

Both examples have shortcomings. Spinoza could respond that the time-bomb is not
really an object at all. Yes, the parts of the bomb stand in stable positions in space and
time with regard to each other, but this is not enough. After all, the White House and the
Eiffel Tower stand in stable relation as well, and they are certainly not a singular object.
Neither are two adjacent books on the library bookshelf. The parts of a singular object
must enter into causal relations together. The bomb is one thing, the fuse another, and the
timer a third.

My own example is not open to this rebuttal since Spinoza agrees that the human body is
a particular object. However, Spinoza could offer at least three other responses. First, the

degenerative mutation does not pertain to the objects essence. Second, the cause of the
mutation was an external object. Third, conatus does not involve finite time, but
indefinite time (EIIIP8). I cannot definitively resolve these challenges here, so instead I
will proceed with the presentation of the doctrine.

Proposition 8, partially quoted above, states that, The conatus with which each single
thing endeavors to persist in its own being does not involve finite time, but indefinite
time. The proof is as follows: If it involved a limited period of time which would
determine the duration of the thing, then solely from the power by which the thing exists
it would follow that it could not exist after that limited period of time, but is bound to be
destroyed. But (EIIIP4), this is absurd. It should be clear that Proposition 4 is a
cornerstone of Spinozas conative doctrine, and so we must grapple with the notion of
essence it presents.

Id like to consider Spinozas text with regard to essence. He writes: The conatus with
which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of
the thing itself (EIIIP7). This seems to be the claim that a things conatus is (identical
to) its essence. If we replace conatus with powerwhich is justified by the proof of
Prop. 7, Therefore, the power of any thing, or the conatus with which it acts or
endeavors to actand retrofit this identity to the proof of Proposition 4 we get the
following: This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of anything affirms, and
does not negate, the thing's power: that is, it posits, and does not annul, the thing's

power. So, the actual essence of a particular, determinate affection of God is its power,
with which it acts.

This is not a surprising conclusion, for as we saw above in Book I Spinoza writes, God's
power is his very essence (EIP34). The proof, again, is as follows: From the sole
necessity of God's essence it follows that God is self-caused and the cause of all things.
Therefore, God's power, whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence. In
other words, God is the only necessary being and thus he is his own cause and the cause
of all modes. And Gods power, and hence his essence, just is his necessary existence and
law-governed causationflowing from his nature, and manifest in infinite modes across
attributesof all things. We can run a modified definition regarding particular objects,
power, and essence: A particular things power, and hence its essence, is just its 1)
determined (by God) existence and 2) law-governed causation3) flowing from its
natureof other things.

I believe this is the correct definition of the power and essence of particular objects for
several reasons.

First, it is in line with the traditional notion of essence in that it says what it is that makes
a particular object the particular object that it is. This is related to criteria (1) of the
definition, determined existence. The determined object is not merely determined to exist.
Rather, it is determined to exist within a necessary causal chain flowing from Gods
power. That is, the object has a definite, necessary, and unique place within that chain,

and it is this unique position within the infinite intellect that makes it the object that it is.
This is perfectly consistent with Spinozas claim, at the very beginning of the Ethics, that
knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of causes and with his discussions of the
order and connection of things. The matter of what makes an object the object that it is
has therefore been settled, but there is something more to say. Recall, from my section on
adequate ideas, that Spinoza wrote, in the TIE, that the essences of singular, changeable
things are not to be drawn from their series, or order of existing. Recall also that no
finite mind can grasp an infinite causal chain. This may appear to contradict all Ive said
above. In fact, however, it is perfectly consistent. My definition features a metaphysical
claim about essence and identity conditions. The two details Ive recalled are
epistemological claims. The passage in the TIE continues, essence is to be sought only
from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these
things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, and are
ordered. In deducing my definition of the essence of particular objects from
metaphysical certainties about God, I have done precisely what Spinoza prescribesI
have sought essence from the fixed and eternal, i.e. God, and from the laws inscribed
therein, i.e. Gods necessary existence and essence according to which all singular
things come to be, and are ordered. Now, it is true that we, finite minds, cannot situate
an object, or idea, in an infinite chain, but Spinoza does not ask us to. In Book V it will
become clear that our adequate knowledge of particular objects is intuitive, knowledge
of the third kind. We intuit, or clearly and distinctly perceive, all particular objects as
causally situated modes unfolding like clockwork from the necessary nature of God.

Second, this definition is in line with our common notion of power; that is, the ability to
act on and affect external objects. This is related to criteria (2), law-governed causation
of other things. The object is not only the effect of previous causes; it is also, insofar as it
is an individual expression of Gods power to act, a cause of effects. This is consistent
with what Spinoza writes in Book III: From the given essence of a thing certain things
necessarily follow, nor do things effect anything other than that which necessarily
follows from their determinate nature (EIIIP7d). In other words, the individual mode
stands only in those relations of cause and effect which it is uniquely determined to stand
in by the necessary nature of God. This is also perfectly consistent with Book I: Nothing
exists from whose nature an effect does not follow (EIP36) and all things are from the
necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way (EIP29).

Third, this definition makes Spinozas talk of increases and decreases of power, and
hence essence, perfectly intelligible, while making the connection of this to the
possession of adequate ideas absolutely apparent. This is related to criteria (3), flowing
from its nature. Spinoza writes: By emotion I understand the affections of the body by
which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished (EIIIDef.3) and The
human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or
diminished (EIIIPt.1). A bodys power, as we have seen, is identical to its essence. So
we ask: with reference to which of the three elements of the above definition can we
understand the possibility of degrees of essence and power? (1) and (2) are immediately
ruled out, for necessity and determination are not matters of degree. We conclude: a
particular body is powerful to the extent that its actions flow from its own nature. In other

words, (3) is the variable that determines a particular objects degree of power and
essence. So, an objects increase in power is identical (but not limited) to a decrease in its
external determination. And now the connection to adequate ideas emerges. A decrease in
external determination, which is the source of inadequate ideas, is a decrease in
inadequate ideasand, therefore, it is at the same time an increase in the proportion of
adequate to inadequate ideas. By the same token, a particular objects increase in
adequate ideas is identical to an increase in that objects power, since adequate ideas are
internally determined. And this is precisely Spinozas view: Hence it follows that the
more the mind has inadequate ideas, the more it is subject to passive states; and, on the
other hand, it is the more active in proportion as it has a greater number of adequate
ideas (EIIIP1c).

I qualified the definition above with the phrase and of its own perseverance in being.
This should not be taken to mean that particular objects are self-causing in the way that
God is self-causing, or that existence is involved in the essence of particular objects.
When a particular object perseveres in being, its self-perpetuating activity does not
determine its position in the order of things. The objects self-perpetuation, conatus, is an
entirely internal, local affair, so to speak. Furthermore, in considering the essence, which
does not involve existence, of a particular thing that is, considering it in itself we
see that it does not involve finite time, but indefinite time. The objects actual duration
is not determined by its essence, from within, but by the order of things flowing from
Gods necessary nature, i.e. it will be brought into existence by its external causes, will
instantiate and manifest its essence and strive to persist in being, until it is destroyed by

external causes, which are, of course, determined by the necessary order of things in
infinite intellect and not by the objects own essence.

With a clear definition of essence I set out the argument for P6.

The proof of P4 begins as follows: This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of
anything affirms, and does not negate, the thing's essence: that is, it posits, and does not
annul, the thing's essence.

To paraphrase,

The definition of a thing, T, affirms (or posits) Ts essence.

Plugging in the definition of essence we get:

The definition of a thing, T, affirms (or posits) Ts determined existence and

law-governed causationflowing from its natureof other things.

The proof continues: So as long as we are attending only to the thing itself, and not to
external causes, we can find nothing in it which can destroy it.

Insofar as we are considering only the essence of T, we should be unable to find anything
which can destroy it. That is, insofar as we are considering T as a law-governed finite

mode of God, uniquely situated within the necessary order of things, and without external
determination by other finite modes, we should be unable to find anything which can
destroy it.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as uniquely positioned in the infinite

order and connection of things. What could it mean for T to be destroyed? T would have
to no longer occupy its unique and necessary place in the order of things. This is absurd,
since it is the essence of T to uniquely occupy this place, and it is metaphysically
impossible that any other objectwhich essentially occupies a different position in the
order of thingscould occupy Ts place. If it did, that object just would be Tto occupy
a determinate position in the infinite is what it is to be a particular object.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as internally determined. For T to cease

to be internally determined it would have to be externally determined. This is absurd,
since considered in its essence T is by definition internally determined. Moreover, if T
were determined by external objects, Ts destruction would be externally caused, which
is completely consistent with P4.

Nothing can destroy T insofar as T is considered as a law-governed cause. T would have

to cease to be law-governed, but that is impossible. Can T cease to be a cause? No, since
T is essentially the cause that it is just as it essentially occupies the position it does in
infinite intellect.

We can conclude, therefore, that Proposition 4 is true: No thing can be destroyed, except
by an external cause. P5 follows trivially from P4: If no thing can be destroyed except by
an external cause, then no thing can be destroyed by an internal cause. Therefore a thing,
considered in itself, will persist in its being, unless destroyed by an external cause. P6 is
true.

I now discuss Spinozas physics to flesh out the idea of striving.

Bodies strive to persist in being. In physical termsconsidering things as modes under

the attribute of Extensionto be a body is to be composed of smaller bodies that stand in
stable relations of motion and rest. Therefore bodies persevere in being when these
relations are preserved. According to Spinoza, a body in motion will continue to move
until it is determined to rest by another body, and a body at rest continues to be at rest
until it is determined to move by another body (EIILemma3c).6 The Lemma states that
A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another
body, which likewise has been determined to motion or rest by another body, and that
body by another, and so ad infinitum. It follows that complex individuals come to exist
when simpler bodies, each following its determined path, intersect and become tangled
up, so as to preserve an unvarying relation of movement among themselves. In order
for component bodies to stably compose these complex, self-preserving conglomerations,
such as the human body, they must fall into mutually causal relations with each other.

This conclusion is an upshot of Spinozas typical rationalism and commitment to the Principle of
Sufficient Reason: If we suppose a moving body simpliciter, without consideration of any other
body, we must continue to regard solely as a moving body. For if it stopped, or slowly, or sped up
without reason, this change would be an unacceptable brute fact.
6

Once they have fallen into such unvarying relations of movement the pattern sustains
itself.

Importantly, Spinoza believes that parts of a complex body can be swapped out, as long
as they are at the same time replaced by parts of the same nature. If the union of bodies
is maintained the individual thing will retain its nature as before, without any change in
its form. Similarly, the bodys parts, and thus the body, may become proportionately
bigger or smaller so long as the same mutual relation of motion-and-rest are preserved.

The human body is composed of many individual parts of different natures, each of
which is extremely complex. Each of those sub-parts can undergo numerous changes
while retaining its nature. The same goes for the sub-parts sub-parts. These parts of all
different natures are each affected in numerous different ways, communicating their
motions to other parts. As a result of its complexity, the human body can be affected in
myriad ways and can move external bodies and dispose them in a great many ways.

To summarize: a body is defined by the relations in space and time of its part, whether
these parts are themselves complex or simple. The body will, in itself, seek to preserve
these ratios. This preservation is consistent with certain external affections, such as when
substance is replaced by substance of the same kind. An example of this is when the
human body consumes food and water in order to sustain itself. It is also consistent with
increases and decreases in the size of the body, depending on which makes the body more
adaptable to the vast set of other external objects with which it must contend.

Importantly, as Charles Jarrett puts it, each of an objects states has, or rather is, a force
for continuing. It is a change of state, not the continuation of one, that is in need of
explanation.7

We are now prepared to consider Spinozas primary emotions: joy, sadness, and desire.

Primary Emotions

Proposition 9 states that The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and
insofar as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its own being over an indefinite
period of time, and is conscious of this conatus.8 The mind is necessarily conscious of
its conatus because, as EIIP23 established, it is necessarily conscious of itself through
the ideas of the affections of the body. This awareness, when it is related to the mind
alone, is the Will. When it is related to both mind and body it is called appetite. As may
already be clear, this appetite in a man is therefore nothing else but man's essence,
since striving is essence, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things
7

Jarrett, C. (2007). Ethics III: Emotions. In Spinoza a guide for the perplexed (p. 105). London:
Continuum.
8
This Proposition attributes both adequate and inadequate idea to the essence of the mind. This
may seem strange but, in my opinion, such an attribution is unmysterious. An objects given
essencethat is, the objects essence when it is considered as existingis necessarily situated in
the infinite intellect, i.e. it is not free-floating but in-the-world and hence affected in certain
necessary ways. Admittedly, Im puzzled as to how inadequate ideas are included in striving for
one reasondont they diminish an objects power of acting, and hence striving? I conclude that
my summary in the final paragraph of my section of striving is correct, that is, some external
affections prove beneficial to an objects persistence in being insofar as they make the object
better suited to survive in its unique situated position. As an analogy, alcohol might be good in
some cases, such as when a wound must be cleanedin that case alcohol actually serves to
restore the bodys health, i.e. its power to act, its striving. This example foreshadows one of
Spinozas most famous claims, that nothing is good or bad in itself, but is rather good or bad
relative to us, insofar as we are affected by it in a way that promotes or decreases or power and
desire to continue in being.

that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform (EIIIP9s).
Spinoza identifies appetite with Desire, with one qualification which brings his
conception of Desire in line with our common notion of the same: desire is appetite
accompanied by the consciousness thereof" (EIIIP9s)and it is certainly true that we
tend to ascribe desire to others only when they themselves are conscious, aware of their
wants.9 From this explication, however, Spinoza does draw at least one counterintuitive
conclusion: we do not desire a thing because we judge it to be good; rather, we judge a
thing good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.

In EIIIP11s Spinoza defines three primary emotions: desire, joy, and sadness. Joy is
nothing but the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection. Pain is
nothing but the passive transition of the mind to a state of lesser perfection.10 Joy, when
related to both mind and body is expressed as pleasure and cheerfulness. Sadness is
similarly expressed as pain and melancholy. (In Shirley: Anguish and Melancholy,
respectively.) The pair of pleasure and pain are related to man when one part of him is
affected more than others; cheerfulness and melancholy when all parts are equally
affected. An example will be useful here. A shoulder rub or a flesh wound are examples

If it was not clear before, its certainly obvious now: not everything mental is an object of
awareness. Apparently we can have an appetite we ourselves are unaware of, though such an
appetite will not be called desire. Unconscious motivations? Do we have here a precursor to
Freud?!
10
Im using Curleys terms from the 1985 translation of the Ethics. Shirley, in his 2002
translation, uses pleasure in place of joy and pain in place of sadness. In Shirley pleasure
is termed titillation and pain is termed anguish. The original Latin parallels to Curleys
terms: joy/ laetitia; pleasure/ titillatio; cheerfulness/ hilaritas; sadness/ tristitia; pain/ dolor;
melancholy/ melancholio; gladness/ gaudium.
9

of localized pleasure and pain, respectively; being with a loved one or learning of a loved
ones death are examples of general cheerfulness and melancholy, respectively.

In the remainder of the above cited Scholium Spinoza returns to a clarification of

Proposition 10, which states that An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot
be in our mind, but is contrary to it. How can one idea be contrary to another idea? As
we have seen, the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence
of the body for as long as it exists. As soon as the mind ceases to affirm the existence of
the body its capacity to perceive through the senses [is] annulled. The mind itself
cannot cease to affirm the body, as follows from P6. This cessation must result from
another, external idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and thereby of
the mind as well. It is in this sense that an idea can be contrary to the idea that constitutes
our mind. As Spinoza writes in Proposition 12, The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to
think of those things that increase or assist the bodys power of activity. When the body
is affected by external things, those things will remain present to the mind and hence the
mind (and body) will remain affected in a specific way involving the nature of that
external thing. When the body is affected by those things that increase its powers of
activity, the mind thinks of those things and endeavors to continue thinking of those
things. On the contrary, when the mind thinks of those things that diminish the bodys
power, it endeavors to call to mind those things that exclude the existence of the former.
For example, if we find ourselves out in the harsh cold and rain the mind will call to mind
shelter, i.e. it will desire it and, if possible, act so as to procure it, since it is in the actual
procurement of shelter, and not in its imagining, that the idea of shelter excludes the idea

of cold and rain. Hence, Spinoza writes, it [is apparent] that the mind is averse to
thinking of things that diminish its power and [what is the same] the bodys power
(EIIIP13c).

A question remains regarding how desire can be both an essence and an emotion. It
seems that concrete, specific desires are modifications or affections of the desire to
persevere in our being. The desire to live, for example, gives rise to a desire for shelter
from the snow. [T]he upshot of this is that we have one most basic desire, the desire to
persevere in existence, and all other desires arise from it. 11

We now have a picture of Spinozas psychological basics. Increases in power are

experienced as joy; decreases of power are experienced as sadness. Desire, which is just
the conscious awareness of our conatus, leads us to an aversion toward those things that
decrease our power and an affirmation of those things that increase it. All the other
emotions will be permutations, or permutations of permutations, of these basic three
desire, joy, sadnesscoupled with other ideas. I will conclude this paper with a cursory
overview of the remainder of Book III, to which I now turn.

The other emotions and psychological principles

The other emotions are permutations of the primary three coupled with ideas of external
causes. Thusly Spinoza defines love and hate in EIIIP13s. Love is joy accompanied by
11

Jarrett, C. (2007). Ethics III: Emotions. In Spinoza a guide for the perplexed (p. 108). London:
Continuum.

the idea of an external cause. Similarly, hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an
external cause. One seeks to preserve and have present that which one loves. The
converse is true for that which one hates.

Spinoza introduces several psychological principles. [1)] If the mind has once been
affected by two emotions at the same time, when it is later affected by the one it will also
be affected by the other. [2)] Anything can indirectly [per accidens] be the cause of
joy, sadness, or desire (EIIIP14&15). 3) Sometimes we may come to love or hate an
object on the basis that we imagine it to have something in common with another object,
one we love or hate, respectively (P16). We may also come to love and hate one and the
same object when that object, which we imagine as likely to affect us with sadness, is
imagined to bear something in common with another object, one that we imagine as
likely to affect us with joy (P17). An exceedingly clear example of this last may be a
drug. We may know that the drug ultimately lead to sadness; nonetheless, the drug has
become associated, from the past concurrence of drug use with pleasure, with joy. This
brings us to the principle expressed by Proposition 18: From the image of things past or
future man is affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain as from the image of a
thing present. Spinoza relies on this principle in his explication of hope, fear,
confidence, despair, gladness (gaudium, not laetitia), and disappointment. Hope, for
example, is an inconstant joy, arising from the image of a thing future or past, of whose
outcome we are in doubt. Fear is similarly an inconstant pain, arising from the image of
a thing in doubt (EIIIP18s2). Confidence and despair arise to the extent that doubt is
removed. For example, I come to despair when I learn that my friends diagnosis is

nearly certain and dire. This brings us to the principles of Propositions 19 through 22.
He who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will feel pain. If, however, he
imagines that it is being preserved, he will feel pleasure. He who imagines that a thing
that he hates is being destroyed will feel pleasure (EIIIP19&20). When I suppose that
the thing I love is joyful or sad, I too will experience joy or sadness, respectively (P21). If
we suppose that someone is causing the object of our love joy or sadness we will be
affected with love or hate toward him, respectively (P22). The underlying rationale
should be obvious. Insofar as the object of our love brings us joy, we desire to preserve it.
Thus whatever causes that object joy serves to preserve the object in being and thereby
indirectly preserves our own joy derived from our object of love. Spinozas reasoning is
always rooted in the psychological basics presented above in this way. He continues
deriving a breadth of principles from those fundamentals and showing how they give rise
to dozens of emotions.

In Proposition 58 Spinoza returns to the distinction between passivity and activity

previously discussed in the Definitions of Book IIIwith regard to emotions. He writes:
Besides the joy and desire that are passive emotions, there are other emotions of joy and
desire that are related to us insofar as we are active and Among all the emotions that
are related to the mind insofar as it is active, there are none that are not related to joy or
desire (EIIIP59)that is, only those emotions involving desire and joy, but not all such
emotions, are active emotions. Active joy and active desire are central to the ethical
arguments Spinoza will present in Books IV and V, so we must understand these clearly.

The definitions of passivity and activity refer to external and internal determination,
respectively. These definitions are worth quoting.

Definition 1: I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly
perceived through the said cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect
cannot be understood through the said cause alone.
Definition 2: I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to
us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is, when from our nature there follows in us
or externally to us something which can be clearly and distinctly understood through our
nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when something takes place in
us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause.

Thus, when we are the adequate cause of an emotiondefined as an affection of the

body by which [its] power of activity is increased or diminished (EIIIDef3)that
emotion, or action, is active. (Spinoza refers to all other emotions as passions, of which
we are, at most, only partial causes.)

Active joy and active desire are intimately related to adequate ideas. An increase in
adequate ideas, or knowledge, is concomitant with active joy. In fact, they can be seen as
identical since both are transitions to states of greater power or, what is the same, greater
degrees of internal determination. If we recall, external affection represents, in a sense, a
mutilation of clear and distinct perception. Thus the passionsbeing joy, sadness, or
desire coupled with external causesare necessarily muddled and confused. Those

activities which flow from adequate understanding Spinoza calls Strength, which he
subdivides into two: Courage and Nobility. Courage is the desire whereby every
individual endeavors to preserve his own being according to the dictates of reason
alone while Nobility is the desire whereby every individual, according to the dictates
of reasons alone, endeavors to assist others and make friends of them (EIIIP59s).
Activities which are directed solely toward the agents advantage are filed under courage;
those directed to the advantage of others (and thereby indirectly benefit one) are filed
under nobility. To the extent that our ideas are adequate we will correctly perceive what
will increase our powers of acting and perseverance and, at the same time, our desire will
be properly calibratedfor it can be muddled by associations and other externally
determined factorsso as to orient us toward those things and away from things that will
diminish our powerthat is, we will be guided by reason toward what is genuinely good
for us, i.e. conducive toward our perseverance in being.